

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections

This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.

Collection: Matlock, Jack F.: Files
Folder Title: Matlock Chron July 1985 (6)
Box: 10

To see more digitized collections visit:

<https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library>

To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:

<https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection>

Contact a reference archivist at: reagan.library@nara.gov

Citation Guidelines: <https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing>

National Archives Catalogue: <https://catalog.archives.gov/>

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 4/7/2005

File Folder MATLOCK CHRON JULY 1985 (6/8)

FOIA

F06-114/2

Box Number 10

YARHI-MILO

1007

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
7548	MEMO	PLATT TO MCFARLANE RE SPECIAL AIR MISSIONS AIRCRAFT FOR HELSINKI R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2	1	7/18/1985	B1
7549	MEMO	PLATT TO MCFARLANE RE REQUEST FOR SPECIAL AIR MISSIONS AIRCRAFT R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2	1	7/2/1985	B1
7533	E-MAIL	E-MAIL PROFS PEARSON AND MCFARLANE RE PLANE REQUESTS R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2	1	7/17/1985	B1
7534	MEMO	SOVIET RUSSIAN PSYCHOLOGY: SOME COMMON TRAITS BY MATLOCK R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2	8	ND	B1
7535	LETTER	DRAFT LETTER PRESIDENT REAGAN TO GORBACHEV R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2	5	7/23/1985	B1
7536	MEMO	MADEL TO MARTIN RE SPECIAL HIGH LEVEL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2	2	7/23/1985	B1
7552	CABLE	051501Z JUL 85 R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2	2	7/5/1985	B1
7553	CABLE	222153Z JUL 85 R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2	1	7/22/1985	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 4/7/2005

File Folder MATLOCK CHRON JULY 1985 (6/8)

FOIA

F06-114/2

Box Number 10

YARHI-MILO

1007

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
7537	MEMO	MCFARLANE TO REGAN RE AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP FOR SOLZHENITSYN <i>R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2</i>	2	ND	B1
7538	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #7537 <i>R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2</i>	2	ND	B1
7539	E-MAIL	E-MAIL PROFS FROM MARTIN; MCFARLANE; D'AMICO RE SOLZHENITSYN <i>R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2</i>	1	7/21/1985	B1
7541	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE WHITE HOUSE CEREMONY FOR SOLZHENITSYN <i>R 10/1/2012 F2006-114/2</i>	2	7/12/1985	B1
7542	MEMO	MCFARLANE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE A CEREMONY FOR SOLZHENITSYN? <i>R 10/1/2012 F2006-114/2</i>	2	ND	B1
7544	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #7542 <i>R 10/1/2012 F2006-114/2</i>	2	ND	B1
7545	MEMO	MCFARLANE TO REGAN AND BUCHANAN RE AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP FOR SOLZHENITSYN <i>R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2</i>	1	ND	B1
7547	E-MAIL	SAME TEXT AS DOC #7539 <i>R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2</i>	1	7/21/1985	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Attlock
2192
→ *SB-File*
Helsinki
File
DM-C

July 22, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR DONALD T. REGAN

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE *RCM*
SUBJECT: Special Air Missions Aircraft Request for Secretary Shultz

Secretary Shultz will head the U.S. Delegation to the US/Mexico Binational Commission Meeting in Mexico City and will then proceed to Helsinki for the CSCE 10th Anniversary Commemoration.

The State Department has requested Special Air Missions Aircraft for Secretary Shultz's travel between July 25 and August 2. State requests a C-9 to take the Secretary to Mexico City on July 25. On July 26 the C-9 will return to Washington with the Secretary's staff (Shultz himself will travel privately to California). On July 29 the Secretary requests two C-135s (since a larger C-137 is unavailable and a single C-135 cannot accommodate the entire delegation) to go to Helsinki, with both returning to Andrews Air Force Base on August 2.

We recommend that the request for aircraft be approved and that the Department of Defense be notified.

cc: Christopher Hicks
Edward V. Hickey, Jr.

OK
DM

Ironically the
2-135s are cheaper
than 1
137!!

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

July 18, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM:

JACK F. MATLOCK *Mike for*

SIGNED

SUBJECT: Special Air Missions Aircraft Request for Secretary Shultz

We have followed up on your PROFS note re your disapproval of the original request for Special Air Missions Aircraft by State and have clarified the facts concerning the request.

With regard to the Mexico City leg of Shultz's trip, State is requesting from the White House a C-9 to carry the delegation to and from Mexico City. State is not requesting from us a C-20 to take Shultz to California as mentioned in the earlier memo. They will contract directly with Defense for the C-20 since it is for Shultz's personal use.

Regarding the Helsinki leg of the trip, State has sent over a new memo to you (Tab II) with updated information. State originally sought a single C-137, but was advised by the Military Aide's Office that none were available for the trip to Helsinki. Since one C-135 could not accommodate the entire delegation, the WHMO offered State two C-135s as the only feasible substitute. Additionally, the two C-135's would also cost less (on an hourly basis) than one C-137.

In light of this, we believe that State's request is reasonable and fully consistent with White House regulations.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to Don Regan at Tab I.

Approve *DCM*

Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memo for Don Regan
 Tab II State's new request (7/18)
 Tab III State's original request (7/2)
 Tab IV Background papers



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

July 18, 1985

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. McFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Special Air Missions Aircraft for Helsinki

Secretary Shultz will lead the US delegation to the CSCE Tenth Anniversary Commemoration in Helsinki, July 29-August 1. During the trip he will meet for the first time with new Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze. The Department July 2 requested the Special Air Missions aircraft necessary to transport the Secretary's party to and from Helsinki.

Due to the importance of the meeting with Shevardnadze (which will include discussion of the upcoming Reagan-Gorbachev summit) and the emphasis the US places on the CSCE process, a large delegation is accompanying the Secretary. He has already urged you to join him, and also invited Jack Matlock to attend from your staff. Ambassadors Nitze and Kampelman will travel with the Secretary to provide guidance on arms control issues, in addition to his own staff and the Department's officers responsible for Soviet and CSCE affairs. Senator D'Amato, chairman of the CSCE commission, has also been invited and may bring other members of congress, and four members of the CSCE Commission staff will definitely attend.

The Department originally sought a single SAM C-137, which would have accommodated the principal members of the delegation and their staffs. No C-137 is available, however, and the Department has determined that one C-135 will not accommodate all of the principals involved when crew members, security personnel and a small press contingent are taken into account. Therefore, the Department requests the use of two C-135s, to allow the entire delegation to travel together. (Based on figures supplied by the Air Force, two C-135s are actually less costly than one C-137.)

The Department urges your cooperation in providing the transportation necessary to permit the delegation to travel as a group on this important foreign policy mission.

Nicholas Platt
Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F06-114/2#7548

BY LAT NARA, DATE 11/21/07

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DECL:OADR



July 2, 1985

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Request for Special Air Missions Aircraft

In the furtherance of the President's foreign policy, Secretary Shultz will head the U. S. Delegation to the U.S./ Mexico Binational Commission Meeting in Mexico City, after which he will proceed to Helsinki for the CSCE Tenth Anniversary Commemoration. He plans to leave Washington on July 25 and proceed to Helsinki on July 29 following a stop in California. He will return to Washington on August 1.

Since it will not be possible for Secretary Shultz to maintain his schedule before and after the proposed travel, the use of Special Air Missions aircraft is requested to transport the Secretary on the above itinerary as well as a second Special Air Missions aircraft to transport necessary staff directly from Washington on July 28 to Helsinki, returning also on August 1.

Thank you for your continued cooperation and assistance.

Nicholas Platt

Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: 8/10/85

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F06-114/2#7549

BY LOT NARA, DATE 11/21/07

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Matter

July 5, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: NICK ^{*Nick*} KLISSAS / PAULA ^{*PD*} DOBRIANSKY

SUBJECT: Special Air Missions Aircraft Request for Secretary Shultz

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum for Don Regan requesting that a Special Air Missions aircraft be provided for Secretary Shultz for his travel to the US/Mexico Binational Commission meeting in Mexico City and to the CSCE 10th Anniversary Commemoration in Helsinki (July 25 - August 2). A Second Special Air Missions aircraft has also been requested to transport necessary staff directly from Washington on July 28 to Helsinki, returning also on August 2.

Jack Matlock *Jack* and Peter Sommer *Peter* concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum for Don Regan at Tab I.

Approve _____

Disapprove *7/5/85*

Attachments

- Tab I Memo for Don Regan
- Tab II State Department request

u

MSG FROM: NSWRP --CPUA TO: NSSSB --CPUA
To: NSJFM --CPUA

07/17/85 10:58:32

NOTE FROM: BOB PEARSON
Subject: Plane requests

Please prepare asap a memo from Bud to Regan for the Shultz one aircraft as indicated in Bud's note. I will request that Bill Martin sign for Bud to get it to Chris Hicks asap for Regan. I will inform State that they will have to pay for all planes in addition to the one for the Secretary. Many thanks.

*** Forwarding note from NSRCM --CPUA 07/17/85 10:30 ***
To: NSWFM --CPUA

*** Reply to note of 07/17/85 09:53

~~SECRET~~

NOTE FROM: ROBERT MCFARLANE
Subject: Plane requests

The following rules--which have been long established--ought to govern State's requests.

1. The Secretary's travel is almost always designated "Presidential" and I have no problem with that. They should request it and we will endorse it to Regan. In the Helsinki case, he should be authorized one aircraft to go first to Mexico City and then to California and ultimately to Helsinki. He has also requested a second aircraft to pick up delegation members in Mexico City and bring them to D.C. and another one to carry delegation members from D.C. to Helsinki. It seems to me that the one aircraft he is authorized for both legs can also handle the delegations to both places. Specifically, the delegation can accompany him to California. I am sure that the aircraft would return to Andrews at that point and so the delegation which had been in Mexico could return with it to D.C. Then when he is ready to depart for Helsinki, the aircraft could load the delegatin here and go to California where it would pick him up and go on to Helsinki. If, for some reason, they still want a second aircraft, they should pay for it on whatever legs they want to use it on.

2. On State visits, the visiting delegation is authorized one aircraft. They can use it for whomever they wish as far as I am concerned. In the case of Li Peng's separate schedule, if it cannot be worked out to use one aircraft then the second one will have to paid for by someone--probably by State. But, because Li Peng is being accompanied by Herrington, he may send a memo to us seeking to have his travel to Chicago declared a Presidential mission--as a Cabinet officer--and we will see whether it is approved. If it isn't however, then DOE would have to pay for it.

cc: NSWRP --CPUA
NSPBT --CPUA
NSKWZ --CPUA

NSJMP --CPUA
NSFEG --CPUA
NSWGH --CPUA

cc: NSSSB --CPUA

DECLASSIFIED

NLS FOI-114/247533

BY LOT NARA, DATE 11/21/07

JM-c
1

5712

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

July 22, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK

SUBJECT: Meeting with Senator Robert Byrd of West Virginia

Senator Robert Byrd is requesting an appointment to see you sometime this week. The Senator will be heading a Senate delegation which will visit the Soviet Union, as well as Hungary and Czechoslovakia, in late August. He specifically would like to discuss with you some way in which he might represent the President during his trip. Senator Byrd also plans to see Secretary Shultz.

This appears to be a very impressive delegation: Senators Thurmond, Nunn, Stevens, and Warner will be going as well.

Ron Sable concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you agree to see Senator Byrd sometime this week, if possible.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab I Incoming memo from Pam Turner

CC Nick Klissas

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 17, 1985

TO: ROBERT MCFARLANE

THROUGH: MAX L. FRIEDERSDORE *mf*
M. B. OGLESBY, JR. *Bo*

FROM: PAM TURNER *pt*

Subject: Meeting with Senator Robert C. Byrd
(D-West Virginia)

Senator Byrd has requested an opportunity to meet with you next week. Senator Byrd will be heading a Senate delegation which plans to visit the Soviet Union in late August, and would like to discuss with you some way in which he might represent the President (a message, etc.) during his trip.

The trip leaves August 23rd, and returns September 4th. They will visit Hungary, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union, where they have scheduled a meeting with Mr. Gorbachev on September 2nd or 3rd. Other members of the delegation include Senators Thurmond, Nunn, Stevens, Warner, DeConcini, Boren and Mitchell.

Senator Byrd also plans to meet with Secretary Shultz.

Guidance please.

JM-c
a

5784

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

July 22, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Papers on Soviet Union for the President

Attached at Tab A is the second in the series of papers I am preparing for the President. It deals with common traits of Soviet Russian psychology.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I Memorandum to the President

Tab A Paper on Soviet Union for the President

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By *CS* NARA, Date *6/18/02*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

SUBJECT: Paper on the Soviet Union

Attached at Tab A is the second in the series of studies we are doing on the Soviet Union. It deals with Soviet Russian psychology, and I believe you will find it of interest.

Attachment:

Tab A Paper on the Soviet Union

Prepared by:
Jack F. Matlock

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By CWS NARA, Date 6/14/02

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F06-114/2 #7534

BY LOJ NARA, DATE 11/21/07

11

SOVIET RUSSIAN PSYCHOLOGY:
SOME COMMON TRAITS

Yes, they lie and cheat. And they can stonewall a negotiation when it seems in their interest to strike a deal. They have a sense of pride and "face" that makes the proverbial oriental variety pale in comparison. Yet, in private, with people he trusts, the Russian can be candid to a fault -- grovelling in his nation's inadequacies -- and so scrupulously honest that it can be irritating, as when he makes a big deal over having forgotten to return a borrowed pencil.

Do these contradictions stem from ideology and politics? To a degree, certainly. The lying, cheating and stonewalling, even the exaggerated sense of pride, often serve an obvious political or ideological purpose. But that is not the whole story, for these traits have deep roots in Russian culture and society.

Now when we talk about the "psychology" of a nation or ethnic group, we need to bear in mind that we are not talking about the psychology of every individual in that group. By no means every Russian, or every Soviet official, fits a stereotype. They exhibit as much individual variety as any other people. Yet there are certain psychological characteristics which are more common, and more characteristic, in one society than in another. What we are concerned with here are some which differ from those most common to Americans and explain in part frequently observed behavioral differences.

The "Truth": Reality or a Convenient Fiction?

Lying is endemic in every society. But societies differ in how the phenomenon is regarded. All societies I know of excuse it under certain circumstances. Who would reproach a wife who comforted her husband after he had delivered a dull after-dinner speech by telling him, "It was a very thoughtful talk, dear, and I'm sure those idiots who dozed off just had too much to drink before dinner?" We would call it a white lie; not the truth, but meant well.

The Russians have many more categories of the "excusable" lie than we typically do. There is, for example, the lie which is not so much meant to deceive as to salvage the pride of the liar. Most Russians would feel that it is a social faux pas to confront another person with an embarrassing fact, and that it is understandable if the other person denies the fact and concocts an alternate, fictional explanation, since he is only trying to save face, not to deceive. They even have a separate word for this sort of lie, to distinguish it from one made with deliberate intent to deceive.

In 1976, President Ford made a direct appeal to Brezhnev to turn off the microwave signals being directed at the American Embassy in Moscow. We then supplied the Soviets with the technical data we had that proved conclusively the existence of the microwave

radiation and even pinpointed the sources. Subsequently, Gromyko had the gall to state to our Ambassador in a face-to-face meeting that he could assure us, officially and on behalf of the Soviet Government, that no microwaves were being directed at our Embassy.

Gromyko, of course, knew that we knew he was lying, and that there was no way this "assurance" was going to diminish our confidence in the hard facts we had gathered with our own instruments. So why did he do it? I suspect that his reasoning went something like this: "They know very well that we will not admit to this. They are just trying to put us on the spot, and gain an advantage. We'll show them we are not so weak that they can push us around." (In fact, somewhat later the microwave signals were turned off, but without any admission that they ever existed.)

In addition to condoning lying to save face, Russians expect it from governments and official authorities. Lying for reasons of state is not so much excused as simply accepted as a fact of life. They know their own authorities lie to them, and assume that every other government does the same. This is why Russians have never understood why Watergate brought an end to Nixon's presidency. To them, the charges against President Nixon seemed so trivial -- a very mild form of what they assume all government officials do as a matter of course -- that they simply could not accept that these charges could have been the real reason for his resignation. (Given to conspiracy theories, most Russians seem convinced that Nixon was removed by an anti-Soviet cabal because he tried to improve relations with the Soviet Union.)

These typically Russian attitudes toward telling the truth are mingled with a much more purposeful and cynical view of the "truth" which the communist regime introduced. As a calculated instrument for establishing and maintaining control of the population, the communist authorities introduced an elaborate and pervasive system not merely to control information, but to shape the perception of reality by distorting and misrepresenting facts which tended to undermine the political line of the moment. Communist Party professionals were trained on the proposition that the truth is what the Party says it is at a given moment, and many of those who adapted to this requirement seem over time to lose the ability to distinguish between the Party line and reality. Psychologically, the Party line becomes reality for them. Professor Leszek Kolakowski, a former Polish Communist who broke with the regime some 20 years ago and now lives in England, has described this phenomenon as follows:

[The truth of Stalinist totalitarianism] consisted not simply in that virtually everything in the Soviet Union was either falsified or suppressed -- statistics, historical events, current events, names, maps, books (occasionally even Lenin's texts) -- but that the inhabitants of the country were trained to know what was politically "correct." In the functionaries' minds, the borderline between what is

"correct" and what is "true," as we normally understand this, seems really to have become blurred; by repeating the same absurdities time and again they themselves began to believe or half-believe them. The massive corruption of the language eventually produced people who are incapable of perceiving their own mendacity.

To a great extent this form of perception seems to survive, in spite of the fact that the omnipresence of ideology has been somewhat restricted recently. When Soviet leaders maintain that they have "liberated" Afghanistan, or that there are no political prisoners in the Soviet Union, it is quite possible that they mean what they say. To such an extent have they confounded linguistic ability that they are incapable of using any other word for a Soviet invasion than "liberation," and have no sense at all of the grotesque distance between language and reality. It takes a lot of courage, after all, to be entirely cynical; those who lie to themselves appear among us much more frequently than perfect cynics."

Whether it is a case of lying to themselves or of conditioned cynicism, the ability of many Russians (and not only communist officials) to change their version of the truth when so instructed by authority can be breathtaking to an outsider. When the "line" is changed abruptly, many seem to wipe the previous position from their consciousness and blithely assume it never existed. One encounters such habits even in the trivia of everyday life.

Once, while visiting Moscow some years ago, I had dinner in a restaurant with several other Russian speakers. The waitress apparently did not spot us as foreigners, and when we ordered extra bottles of mineral water (it was a sultry summer day) she simply said abruptly. "We're out." This was a little hard to believe, because while most foods are scarce, mineral water rarely is in Soviet restaurants. So we protested and pressed her for an explanation, and she repeated her denial several times and finally terminated the conversation with a curt, "We're out of it, and that's that."

As the waitress walked away from our table, she was intercepted by the maitre d' (who knew we were foreigners), and a few words were exchanged. A couple of minutes later, she appeared with two chilled bottles, which she placed on our table, offering no explanation. I observed naively, "Thanks, I thought you were out."

Her reply was instant and accusatory, "Of course we have mineral water. Why do you think we live worse than you?" It was as if her statement less than five minutes earlier had never been made, and my gentle reference to it was taken as an affront to her national pride. What right did I, a foreigner, have to think that such a simple commodity would be unavailable! And if I had

chosen to remind her of her previous statement, she doubtless would simply have denied ever having said it.

Ends and Means

Some of the attitudes described above are connected with another difference in the typical Russian and the typical American ethical system. By and large, Americans believe that good ends do not justify bad means. Most Russians feel that proper ends justify whatever means necessary.

An emigre Russian professor recently conducted a survey comparing Russian and American attitudes on this subject, placing it in a completely non-political context. He asked the same question to a sample group of persons born in the U.S. and to a group of recent emigres from the Soviet Union. The question was, "If you have a good friend who is having trouble passing a course at school, is it right for you to give him answers during an exam?" The great majority of Americans said it was not right; the Russians, by a comparable majority, said it was.

It is easy to see how this attitude can be exploited by the political authorities. If they can present the objective of a given action as a laudable one, their people are likely to accept whatever means are claimed necessary to achieve it.

The Soviet handling of the KAL shoot-down illustrates many of these factors. A deeply embarrassing incident, first denied, then -- when denial was no longer possible -- a concocted story meant to be exculpatory, particularly in the eyes of the Russian people. The authorities could rely on the Russian propensity to justify means to a "necessary" end if they could be convinced that KAL 007 was a "spy plane" which threatened their security. And the larger tragedy of it all is that most Russians probably believed the concoction, because to disbelieve it would mean that they, as a nation, are aggressive brutes with no respect for human life -- an image the direct opposite of the one the Russians have of themselves and the one the regime, with all its instruments of disinformation, cultivates.

Compromise and Principle

Americans tend to see the willingness to compromise as a value in and of itself. Russians, on the other hand, tend to view it as a fault and a sign of moral weakness. The morally "correct" behavior is to stand firm on your principles and either prevail or go down fighting.

This does not mean that Russians do not understand bargaining. Anyone who has haggled with the peasants in an open-air market or dealt with their grain purchasers can testify to their innate ability to negotiate a price. But if a principle is involved, that is another matter.

15

Of course, none of us likes to think that we ever compromise on our principles. The real difference between Russians and Americans is that the former impute a "principle" to a much broader category of issues than we would. The communist line is always described as a "principled" line. Counting British and French nuclear systems in any INF agreement is a matter of "principle." For a long time, paying more than 6% on borrowed funds was also one, with the result that the Soviets would knowingly pay a higher price than market on a contract so that the supplier could provide a lower nominal interest rate. In real terms, the lower rate was an illusion, and they knew it, but the "principle" itself was important enough to them to insist upon it.

The underlying Soviet attitude toward compromise explains in part some of their foreign policy blunders. They probably genuinely expected the rest of the world to see their withdrawal from the INF and START negotiations in 1983 as a noble defense of principle, even if it was a principle the outsiders did not agree with. They must have realized very quickly that it was an error but once they had taken the step, they had to readjust their "principles" before they could correct it. Thus the maneuvering in advance of the Geneva meeting last January, and the insistence at that time that the renewed negotiations be characterized as entirely new.

In actual practice, the Soviet attitude toward compromise is related more to its public presentation than to the act itself. Like the peasant woman in the market who wants to move her onions before she takes the train back to her village, Soviet leaders can be quite realistic in judging when it is in their interest to strike a deal and when they may be better off without one. If they are interested in a deal, however, they will wish to position themselves so that they can present it to their own people as a triumph of some principle. This partially explains their habit of seeking general agreements in principle before negotiating details. The agreement in principle, as it were, legitimizes the detailed bargaining which must follow and the result can be portrayed as a successful embodiment of the principle, rather than a craven compromise.

If, however, the Soviet leaders are unable to adjust their "principled" position to accommodate a deal, they may refuse to conclude the deal at all, even if it is in their interest. Immediately after the Trade Act of 1974 was passed with the Jackson-Vanik and Stevenson Amendments, the Soviets very privately showed a willingness to reach a deal. They offered an emigration figure of at least 50,000 a year, but on condition that there would be no public acknowledgement that there was a deal. Everything fell apart when there were leaked stories in Washington about this; the Soviets drew back, refused further negotiation and have never since been persuaded to resume bargaining on the issue.

Pride, Face and Status

The Russians have only themselves to blame for the widespread criticism their actions evoke, and the fear and derision they inspire in outsiders. It is doubtless too much to expect them to understand this -- though some of their intellectuals do. Some criticism they can take -- but only in private. They usually do not mind the fear, because it is testimony to their importance and, furthermore, has important political uses. It is really the derision that sends them up the wall. And their skins are so thin on this subject, that they often see insult where none is intended.

Gorbachev's opening monologue to Baldrige in May provided several examples of this. "We recognize that you are a great country and have great achievements," he claimed, "but you ignore what we have achieved. You won't treat us as equals." Subsequently, he complained that even when they pay good hard cash for our grain, which we are anxious to sell, we make statements that they cannot feed their own people, while we never make such statements about Western Europe, which imports more food per capita than the Soviet Union.

Distorted and self-serving as Gorbachev's statements were, they probably represented genuine feelings. Underlying them is a deep inferiority complex bred of many factors: an awareness of their technological backwardness and lower living standards; a basic (though probably subconscious) sense of their political illegitimacy; a recognition that their system has failed to fulfill its promises to provide a better life for their people; and a feeling that they have been systematically denied their rightful recognition and "place in the sun."

Never mind that they have usually stimulated by their own actions and behavior the treatment which they resent. The fact is probably that their skins are thin precisely because they know in their hearts that the criticism, and much of the derision, is well founded. A Russian-speaking American diplomat who served in Moscow in the 1930's tells the following story. Despite the Stalinist atmosphere of the time, he managed to acquire a number of Russian friends, and at their meetings they would speak freely of many of their country's problems. Once, however, the diplomat was called on in a gathering which included foreigners to discuss the current situation, and he alluded gently to some of these problems. Afterwards, some of his Soviet acquaintances came up and told him with indignation, "We thought you were our friend!" He protested that he was, indeed, a friend and pointed out that he had said nothing which was not true. "Of course it's true." the Soviets replied. "But if you were our friend, you wouldn't tell the truth about us."

It is hard to imagine a Chinese or a Frenchman making a statement like that. But then, they have a rock-steady foundation of national and cultural self-confidence to rely on. The Russian psyche, in contrast, teeters on the sand of self-doubt.

The Other Side of the Coin

Having said so much about contrasts in Russian and American attitudes, a word may be in order about some similarities. We are not poles apart in everything.

In private, and away from a politically-charged environment, a Russian is typically gracious and remarkably open -- if he likes you and considers you sincere. Five or ten minutes after a chance meeting -- say in a train compartment or on a park bench -- he is likely to tell you the story of his life and elicit yours, and respond with spontaneity and candor. In this respect Russians are much less reserved than most West Europeans, and are quick to notice that Americans have the same trait.

Nor do they allow the xenophobic strain in much of their thinking -- and much of the propaganda -- to affect personal ties with individuals. West Germans often are amazed by the warmth and hospitality shown them by Russians when they visit the Soviet Union, given Russian memories of World War II. Many Germans have told me that they are treated better in Leningrad than in Paris by the man on the street.

For all their sensitivity to criticism in public, Russians expect it in private, so long as it does not seem gratuitous or damaging to their sense of national dignity. In fact, the foreigner who tries to curry favor by praising everything Soviet earns only their contempt; such praise is considered insincere, and often patronizing and condescending to boot. (Of course, they like praise of those things they are genuinely proud of, such as their heroism in World War II, Shostakovich's music or Voznesensky's poetry, but not of the things they know very well do not merit praise.)

Their deepest contempt, however, is reserved for those foreigners who try to ingratiate themselves by running down their own country. This the Russians simply do not understand -- in their eyes the foreigner should stand up for his country just as a Russian would for his own -- and if he does not do so, he is considered morally defective. This attitude, of course, does not prevent them from using such persons for propaganda purposes, but Russians, official or otherwise, really have no respect for them.

This attitude applies in particular to members of communist parties in Western Europe and the U.S. In 1976 we sponsored a major exhibition on American life in Moscow to mark the Bicentennial of American Independence. It was an election year, and one section of the exhibit had a real voting machine and the Soviet visitors were encouraged to go in and cast a mock ballot. The slate used was taken from New York and the American Communist Party was on the ballot.

Almost nobody voted the CP slate (if memory serves, there were perhaps three of four votes for the communists out of thousands cast). Almost all Soviet visitors voted for either Ford or Carter. Our American guides conducted a bit of exit polling at the exhibit, asking visitors how they had voted. Once in a while they would ask why the visitor had not voted for the communists. Sometimes that question only elicited a discreet shrug, but several Soviet visitors were brutally frank, making statements like, "If I were an American, do you think I'd vote for those clowns?" or "Do you think I want America to have a mess like we have here?" So much for Marxist "proletarian solidarity"!

Unfortunately, these appealing Russian traits of personal openness and candor are all too often submerged under the repressive lid of the police state. But when the regime tries to suppress these traits, it is moving against, rather than with, the Russian cultural tradition. Whenever the lid is slightly raised, the traditional behavior spurts forth, all the more vehemently for having been constrained.

* * * * *

The contradictory pull of the various urges, hang-ups and ideological imperatives at work in Soviet Russian minds and emotions tends to make Soviet behavior not only unpredictable to the outsider, but unpredictable for Russians themselves.

Michael Vozlensky, a former member of the Soviet elite who defected in the early 1970's and has written a classic work on the Soviet ruling class, commented recently that those who think the Soviet leaders operate in accord with a careful plan of action have it all wrong. "Everything is decided ad hoc," he maintained. "They don't know themselves what they are going to do next. But they will always claim that they had it in mind all along."

He may be right.

Prepared by:
Jack F. Matlock

Mumukshu

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

July 85

19

Jack Matthews

outside
system

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PRESERVATION COPY

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

CAS 6/18/02

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

7/23/85

Revised Draft Letter to Gorbachev

Dear Mr. General Secretary:

I appreciated your kind message following my recent operation, and am pleased to assure you that my recovery is proceeding rapidly. I look forward to the opportunity to talk with you privately in Geneva November 19 and 20 about the serious issues that divide our two countries.

My approach to the Geneva meeting will be characterized by the same sense of realism and candor that has characterized my letters to you. I feel that the value of our upcoming meeting should not be measured necessarily by the presence or absence of agreements, but rather by the degree to which our meeting can contribute to narrowing our differences in critical areas and charting a course for constructive action in the future. And if, in the meantime, we can make headway on some of the issues that divide us and resolve some longstanding items under discussion, I would certainly welcome it.

I think we should use the time we have before November to look hard at our relationship. We should aim to draw up a joint agenda of practical steps we can take to resolve outstanding problems. I take it this is consistent with the approach Foreign Minister Shevardnadze outlined to Ambassador Hartman on July 22. I believe we should also seek to define mutually acceptable approaches to be followed by our negotiators on some of the important issues that divide us.

In this spirit, Secretary Shultz discussed a number of issues in his July 3 meeting with Ambassador Dobrynin, on which progress can be made if both sides are willing. Some of these issues are well known to you, but we think they deserve a fresh look. We would like to hear your views. I hope the meeting between Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze in Helsinki July 31, at the ceremonies commemorating the Tenth Anniversary of the Signing of the Helsinki Final Act, will be useful in carrying the exchange of views further. I also look forward to meeting at the White House this autumn with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, following his meeting with Secretary Shultz at the UN General Assembly.

I would like in this letter to review very briefly some of the key issues on which we should focus during the coming months. Clearly the central issues that we must address are the current negotiations in Geneva. We have tried to make every effort to promote progress in those talks -- to build up rather than tear down the current arms control regime. It was on this basis that I made my recent decision to continue our policy of not undercutting the SALT II agreement. From your comments on

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
DECL. OADR

21

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

- 2 -

my decision and the Geneva talks in your letters of June 10 and June 22, it is clear that our views are still far apart on the practical aspects of most of the key issues facing us.

Let me cite several examples. You alleged that the United States is developing "a new strategic weapon" to be deployed in space and that lasers could be used as disarming first-strike weapons. You charged that the US is developing space weapons "capable of performing purely offensive missions." Mr. General Secretary, our scientists have informed me repeatedly that no element of our Strategic Defense Initiative is capable of application to weapons of mass destruction or to weapons which would be effective against hardened point targets on earth such as missile silos. This is not a question of intentions, but of hard scientific and technical facts.

If our scientists really disagree on these points, I would appreciate your giving me concrete examples of what specific aspects of our program could be distorted to produce an offensive weapon capable of mass destruction or a first strike. Alternatively, we could arrange for specialists to meet for a thorough discussion of this very point. If there is such a possibility, it would certainly be incumbent on both of us to act to preclude its realization in practice.

Since we have agreed to be candid, I must also tell you that no impartial observer would be persuaded by the argument that Soviet research programs in the same scientific areas as those in our Strategic Defense Initiative are somehow fundamentally different. I can perceive no basis for a claim that such research is destabilizing only when it is conducted on the American side. Have we not agreed to deal on the basis of equality?

So let us finally get down to particulars and try to find a solution to the interrelated issues of offensive and defensive weapons. We will not find a solution by recourse to propaganda or by setting artificial preconditions to concrete bargaining. I think we should at least agree to allow our diplomats to get on with their work in the individual negotiating groups, when the talks resume in September.

As I expect you to address our concerns, I am, of course prepared to address yours as well. I have a suggestion which I believe can help lay to rest one of the issues which your government has raised with us. This is in the area of nuclear testing.

As you know, in my address to the United Nations General Assembly on September 24, 1984, I proposed several measures that

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

22

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

- 3 -

could help increase mutual understanding between our two countries. Among these proposals, I asked that we find a way for Soviet experts to come to the United States' test site, and for ours to go to yours, to measure directly the yields of nuclear weapons tests.

Since my address to the United Nations, I regret to say, U.S.-Soviet cooperation in the measurement of nuclear test yields has not yet been achieved. Most recently, the Soviet Union alleged that the U.S. nuclear test of April 2, 1985 exceeded the 150 kiloton threshold, and that the United States deliberately took steps to prevent Soviet national technical means of verification from establishing the true yield of the explosion. I wish to assure you, Mr. General Secretary, the yield of that test was less than 150 kilotons, and the United States took no steps to interfere with Soviet national technical means.

The United States has evidence provided by its national technical means of verification that the yield of a number of Soviet nuclear tests has exceeded 150 kilotons. Yet, the government of the Soviet Union says that these tests had yields under that limit.

It is evident from our exchanges on this question that there are large uncertainties in the procedures used by both sides to estimate the yields of underground nuclear tests conducted by the other side. These uncertainties create mistrust that undermines the arms control process.

I take the Soviet concerns over U.S. compliance with the 150 kiloton testing limit very seriously, and believe they should be resolved promptly and definitively. Accordingly, Mr. General Secretary, I invite you to send Soviet technical experts to meet with their U.S. counterparts to discuss and review U.S. data obtained from a direct yield measurement of the April 2 test. I am confident that expert Soviet examination of these data will confirm that the yield of this test was less than 150 kilotons. I am willing to have such a meeting take place at or near the Nevada test site to allow Soviet experts to inspect the site of the April 2 test.

I also invite you to send Soviet technical experts to the Nevada test site to measure the yield of a U.S. nuclear test. The Soviet experts are invited to bring with them any instrumentation devices you deem necessary to measure the yield of this test. Upon your acceptance of this invitation, our experts can meet without delay to set a date and make arrangements for this visit.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

SECRET/SENSITIVE

- 4 -

I am making this invitation without preconditions to ensure there are no obstacles from the U.S. side to its acceptance. I believe it would be a useful step, if in the months ahead we can initiate increased cooperation between our two countries in this area.

Let me turn to several other issues which do not deal with arms control. During the past two months our experts have held talks on southern Africa and Afghanistan. I think the tenor of these meetings has demonstrated the usefulness of this dialogue. On Afghanistan, in particular, I believe the talks underscored the recognition on both sides that the situation in that tragic country is an ongoing problem in our relations. As our experts indicated in their presentation, we continue to be ready to discuss concrete steps that can contribute to the UN Secretary General's efforts to develop a negotiated solution and lead to the withdrawal of Soviet troops. With regard to further regional experts' talks Secretary Shultz will be prepared in Helsinki to discuss scheduling an exchange on East Asian issues.

As we look to our meeting in November, there is no area in our relationship where the prospects for early progress are more promising than in the bilateral field. With the necessary political will we can take several important steps in the near future. [I am also hopeful that our negotiators at the third round of talks on Pacific air safety measures now being held in Japan will be able to finalize an agreement. There is no reason why existing differences cannot be resolved at this round.] Satisfactory conclusion of a Pacific air safety agreement should open up possibilities for progress in other areas, such as civil aviation, and the opening of new consulates in Kiev and New York.

I also believe that prompt decisions at the political level can resolve the remaining outstanding issues in our negotiations of a new exchanges agreement. We are both agreed that expanded contacts between our two peoples are in the long-term interest of both countries. There is no need for further delay in realizing our mutual goals in this area.

Let me conclude with a few words concerning the comments in your June 10 letter on humanitarian issues. This is a topic with a long history in our relations. We have different approaches, but in the past it has proven possible through quiet efforts to deal with such issues in ways that benefited both countries. I do not expect the differences in our approaches to be resolved quickly or easily. But perhaps the time has come again to focus on practical ways of dealing with each other's concerns. As Secretary Shultz told Ambassador Dobrynin July 3, it is not a question of negotiating, or of asking you to violate

SECRET/SENSITIVE

24

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

- 5 -

your laws, or of taking impossible steps on matters of great sensitivity. Rather, it is a question of taking feasible steps that can have a significant impact on the way we deal with each other across the agenda of issues before us.

You are familiar with the kinds of concerns we have identified in the past. I would ask you to give special attention to three of them. First, there is the question of Soviet spouses of American citizens who are repeatedly refused permission to unite their families in the United States. Second, there is the question of long-time applicants for exit permission to go to the United States who have a claim to US citizenship under our law. Third, there is the question of Soviet citizens of Jewish nationality who have been invited to join relatives abroad and have been refused permission to do so, at great hardship to them and their families, over the years. The first two categories are quite small, the last quite large. It might not be possible in a relatively short time to do more than resolve all the cases in the first two and make some headway in the third. But if that were indeed possible, I can assure you that the effect on our overall relationship would be substantial, and positive.

Mr. General Secretary, we have an important, historic opportunity to put our relationship on a sound footing, sustainable for the long term. Our agenda is full of proposals which, if realized, can form the substance of a more constructive relationship. I will continue to give serious thought to the concerns I have voiced and the various suggestions I have made. As we prepare for our meeting in November, I hope you will continue to call to my attention those matters which you feel I should address, just as I will be communicating my thoughts to you. This should assist us both in ensuring that our meeting is as constructive and productive as possible.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(outside the system)

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Jan 25
Matthias

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
INFORMATION

July 23, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. MARTIN

FROM: JUDYT MANDEL *JM*
SUBJECT: Special High Level Security Council Meeting

Per our conversation, State has informally requested our views on a French proposal at the UN that, in honor of the UN's 40th Anniversary there be a special high-level Security Council session possibly at the head of State and government level. (They will be sending a formal Platt-McFarlane as soon as possible.) We understand that this is separate from the current State proposal that the President participate in UN Anniversary events October 23-24.

The French proposal is vaguely worded and does not contain a specific objective, agenda, or date for the session, which is largely intended for public diplomacy purposes, e.g., to underline support, at the highest level, for the UN and Security Council. It has not even been agreed whether the session is to be open or closed.

The Soviets and their minions initially took the lead in vigorously opposing and lobbying against the proposal with other delegations, which generally support the notion. While the U.S. expressed some reservations (notably Shultz to de Cuellar in San Francisco), we have not actively lobbied against it.

Yesterday the Soviets reportedly changed their position, and are no longer opposing the session. It is assumed in New York that Gromyko, as the new Soviet President, would participate.

State does not believe such a session is worthwhile, from the President's point of view, but is looking to us for guidance. If USUN receives no instructions by tomorrow, when the issue is to be discussed by the whole Security Council, USUN will not actively oppose the proposal, but make clear our reservations.

We must, therefore, decide whether to actively oppose the French proposal, which now apparently has the backing of many Security Council members, or to go along.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
NLS F06-114/2#7536

BY NOT NARA, DATE 11/21/07

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

24

On the con side, the session has no fixed agenda or specific goal and would achieve no tangible objective, while using up valuable high-level U.S. time. While the proposal speaks of attendance "at the highest possible political level," Gromyko's presence and that of other heads of State or government dictate Presidential or Vice Presidential involvement. Moreover, the Soviets may use this occasion to launch another propaganda initiative and put us on the defensive.

On the pro side, there may be some public diplomacy benefits. This will be an opportunity to show the President's personal involvement in resolving international problems, and taking the lead with other world leaders. It will underline our commitment to international peace and security, and provide a platform for our views. Finally, it will be an opportunity for yet another high-level U.S.-Soviet meeting, reinforcing the message that such contacts are not extraordinary. Jack Matlock will, of course, want to weigh this proposal carefully against other proposed meetings with the Soviets.

When the formal State recommendation comes in, we will staff it, but wanted you to have a heads up. We, of course, recognize that there is no question of the President's going to New York twice.

Peter Sommer has seen.

Attachments

Tab I USUN Cable, July 5, 85
Tab II USUN Cable, July 22, 85

cc: Jack Matlock

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RECALLED

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRETARIAT

PAGE 01 USMISSION USUN NEW 1543 DTG: 051501Z JUL 85 PSN: 031370
EOB901 RECALLED TOR: 106/1507Z CSN: EHA007

DISTRIBUTION: RCAL-01 7001 AD

WHIS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:
SIT:
EOB:

ROUTINE
DE RUEHT #1543/01 1861504
R 051501Z JUL 85
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8601
WHITEHOUSE

INFO UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 01543

E.O. 12356: OADR: DECL
TAGS: UNSC, UNGA, PREL
SUBJECT: CONSULTATIONS ON UN SECURITY COUNCIL SUMMIT

REF: USUN 1471

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY. DURING SECURITY CONSULTATIONS JUNE 28, THE SOVIET UNION AND UKRAINE FINALLY SUCCEDED TO STRONG FRENCH PRESSURE FOR A COUNCIL STATEMENT ON A SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING AT "THE HIGHEST POSSIBLE POLITICAL LEVEL" THIS FALL TO CELEBRATE THE UN'S FORTIETH ANNIVERSARY. THE SOVIETS AGREED AFTER THE FRENCH TEXT WAS MADE AMBIGUOUS ENOUGH TO SUGGEST THAT THE COUNCIL DID NOT NECESSARILY SUPPORT UNANIMOUSLY THE SUMMIT IDEA. THE CHANCES ARE NOW GREATLY IMPROVED OF SOME KIND OF SPECIAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING THIS FALL. HOWEVER, THE LEVEL OF REPRESENTATION AT ANY SUCH MEETING IS STILL VERY MUCH IN DOUBT AND THE "HIGHEST POSSIBLE POLITICAL LEVEL" IN UN PARLANCE COULD MEAN ALMOST ANYONE, INCLUDING UN PERM REPS. THE UKRAINE AND THE SOVIETS, AS COUNCIL PRESIDENTS FOR THE MONTHS OF JULY AND AUGUST, WILL PROBABLY MAKE SURE THERE IS NOT MUCH FURTHER DISCUSSION OF THE IDEA UNTIL SEPTEMBER. END SUMMARY.

3. AMB. ALLEYNE OF TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO, SECURITY COUNCIL PRESIDENT FOR JUNE, CONVENED INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS OF THE COUNCIL ON JUNE 28 FOR FURTHER DISCUSSIONS ON THE IDEA OF A SC SUMMIT TO CELEBRATE THE FORTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF THE UNITED NATIONS.

4. REPORTING ON THE RESULTS OF HIS BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS, ALLEYNE SAID THAT A "LARGE MAJORITY," AGREED IN PRINCIPLE WITH THE IDEA OF HOLDING A COUNCIL MEETING. ONE COUNTRY ASKED FOR MORE DETAILS BEFORE MAKING A COMMITMENT (COMMENT: THE US. END COMMENT), ONE COUNTRY FAVORED A MEETING BUT WARNED THAT A POORLY PLANNED SUMMIT COULD BE "DANGEROUS"; AND ANOTHER COUNTRY SAID THEY COULD NOT MAKE A COMMITMENT BECAUSE THEY NEEDED TO UNDERGO AN "ELECTORAL PROCESS." ALLEYNE SAID THAT MOST COUNCIL MEMBERS FAVORED A CLOSED MEETING ENDING WITH

A STATEMENT READ BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL. (ND+R RESERVED ON THE SUBJECT OF A CLOSED MEETING. THREE MEMBERS PREFERRED A MEETING IN SEPTEMBER, FOUR MEMBERS HAD NO PREFERENCE, AND THE MAJORITY PREFERRED A MEETING DURING THE PERIOD OCTOBER 20-24. ALLEYNE SAID THAT ALL MEMBERS PREFERRED AN OPEN, FLEXIBLE AND NON-CONTROVERSIAL AGENDA, EMPHASIZING THE THEME OF THE UN'S FORTIETH ANNIVERSARY. OTHER SUGGESTIONS FOR THE AGENDA INCLUDED NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, AND A REVIEW OF THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION.

5. AFTER ALLEYNE'S PRESENTATION, FRANCE IMMEDIATELY BEGAN WHAT BECAME A TWO-HOUR EFFORT TO GET THE COUNCIL TO AGREE TO A COUNCIL STATEMENT THAT "EXPRESSED THE HOPE" THAT THE COUNCIL WOULD MEET THIS FALL AT THE "HIGHEST POSSIBLE POLITICAL LEVEL." FRANCE'S CALL FOR A DECISION WAS SUPPORTED BY DENMARK, EGYPT, UK, INDIA, THAILAND, AND CHINA. BURKINA FASO, PERU, MADAGASCAR, AND AUSTRALIA ALSO CALLED FOR A DECISION IN PRINCIPLE, BUT DID NOT SPECIFICALLY ENDORSE THE FRENCH TEXT (REFTEL). MADAGASCAR SUGGESTED SEVERAL CHANGES IN THE TEXT. AMBASSADOR WALTERS SAID THAT THE U.S. RECOGNIZED THERE WERE MANY COMPLEX PROBLEMS SUCH AS THE LEVEL, AGENDA, AND TIMING THAT WOULD NEED TO BE RESOLVED BEFORE A FINAL DECISION ON A MEETING COULD BE TAKEN. HE SAID WE HAVE NO OBJECTIONS TO THE IDEAS PUT FORWARD BY FRANCE, BUT HE COULD NOT MAKE ANY COMMITMENT AS YET ON THE LEVEL OF U.S. REPRESENTATION AT ANY SUCH MEETING. (EARLIER THE US AND UK HAD AGREED PRIVATELY THAT THE PHRASE "HIGHEST POSSIBLE POLITICAL LEVEL" IN THE FRENCH DRAFT LEFT THE QUESTION OF THE LEVEL OF REPRESENTATION AT THE MEETING QUITE OPEN-ENDED AND UNRESOLVED.)

6. THE SOVIET UNION REPEATED THAT IN PRINCIPLE THEY DID NOT OPPOSE THE IDEA OF A COUNCIL MEETING, BUT BECAUSE OF THE COMPLEXITY OF SUCH A VENTURE THEY DID NOT BELIEVE THE COUNCIL WAS READY TO MAKE A DECISION, EVEN IF ONLY IN PRINCIPLE. HE SUGGESTED THAT FURTHER CONSULTATIONS WERE NECESSARY. HE ALSO OBSERVED THAT GATHERING FIFTEEN HEADS OF STATE FOR A SUMMIT MEETING WOULD BE A "WASTE OF TIME" UNLESS THEY HAD SOMETHING USEFUL TO DO. THIS WOULD DAMAGE, NOT HELP THE UN.

7. THE SOVIET UNION AND UKRAINE FIRST TRIED TO KILL THE IDEA OF A TEXT. WHEN THIS PROVED IMPOSSIBLE, THEY THEN TRIED TO DELAY A DECISION BY SAYING THAT THEY NEEDED TO REFER THE TEXT TO THEIR CAPITALS FOR APPROVAL BEFORE IT BT

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F06-114/2# 7552

BY LOJ NARA DATE 11/21/07

CONFIDENTIAL

28

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RECALLED

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRETARIAT

PAGE 01 USMISSION USUN NEW 1543 DTG:051501Z JUL 85 PSN:031370
EOB902 RECALLED TOR: 186/1511Z CSN:EHA000

END TEXT.

DISTRIBUTION: RCAL-01 /001 A0

WALTERC
BT

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:
SIT:
EOB:

ROUTINE
DE RUEHDT #1543/02 1861511
R 051501Z JUL 85
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8602
WHITEHOUSE

INFO UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 01543

E.O. 12356: OADR: DECL
TAGS: UNSC, UNGA, PREL
SUBJECT: CONSULTATIONS ON UN SECURITY COUNCIL SUMMIT

COULD BE RELEASED AS A STATEMENT BY THE COUNCIL PRESIDENT. FRANCE, HOWEVER, ARGUED THAT MAJOR REVISIONS TO THE TEXT HAD BEEN ACCEPTED TO AVOID THE NEED TO REFER TO CAPITALS, AND THAT AS THE TEXT STOOD, IT ONLY "EXPRESSED THE WISH" OF THE COUNCIL, AND THUS WAS NOT A COMMITMENT OF ANY KIND. THE SOVIETS TRIED TO INSIST THAT THE STATEMENT SAY "MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL EXPRESSED THE WISH ..." RATHER THAN "THE MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL ..." AS IN THE FRENCH DRAFT. (IN UN-SPEAK, THE LACK OF THE DEFINITE ARTICLE WOULD HAVE IMPLIED LACK OF UNANIMITY AMONG COUNCIL MEMBERS). FINALLY, THE SOVIETS AGREED TO THE FORMULATION, "ITS MEMBERS EXPRESSED..." THEY WERE SATISFIED THAT THIS TEXT WAS AMBIGUOUS CONCERNING THE UNANIMITY OF SUPPORT FOR THE SUMMIT IDEA.

8. COMMENT. WITH THE LAST DAY OF TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO'S PRESIDENCY, AND FACED WITH THE SUCCESSIVE PRESIDENCIES OF THE UKRAINE AND SOVIET UNION, FRANCE WAS DETERMINED TO HAVE THE COUNCIL MAKE SOME DECISION ON THE SUMMIT IDEA. FRANCE'S SUCCESS MEANS THAT THERE IS NOW A BETTER CHANCE THAT SOME KIND OF "SUMMIT" WILL TAKE PLACE THIS FALL. NUMEROUS OBSTACLES REMAIN, HOWEVER, INCLUDING DECISIONS ON LEVEL, TIMING, AGENDA AND FORMAT.

9. FULL TEXT OF PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT FOLLOWS BELOW:

BEGIN TEXT:

THE SECURITY COUNCIL MET THIS MORNING IN INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS. ITS MEMBERS EXPRESSED THE WISH THAT THE COUNCIL DEVOTE A SOLEMN MEETING TO CELEBRATE THE FORTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF THE UNITED NATIONS. THEY EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT THE MEMBER STATES WOULD PARTICIPATE AT THE HIGHEST POSSIBLE POLITICAL LEVEL.

THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL IS MANDATED TO PURSUE ACTIVELY HIS CONSULTATIONS WITH THE MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL IN ORDER TO SET THE DATE AND THE AGENDA FOR THIS MEETING AND TO DECIDE THE CONDITIONS OF ITS IMPLEMENTATION, WITH THE HELP OF THE SECRETARIAT.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

29

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRETARIAT

PAGE 01 USMISSION USUN NEW 1640 DTG: 222153Z JUL 85 PSN: 061900
EOB211 AN002126 TOR: 203/2202Z CSN: HCE349 BT

DISTRIBUTION: STEI-01 RAY-01 LEVN-01 /003 AI

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:
SIT:
EOB:

OP IMMED
UTS8297
DE RUEHDT #1640 2032153
O 222153Z JUL 85
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0714

INFO UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ USUN NEW YORK 01640

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, UNSC
SUBJECT: CONSULTATIONS OF SECURITY COUNCIL JULY 24
REF: A) USUN 1605, B) USUN 1572, C) USUN 1543

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ENTIRE TEXT

2. UKRAINIAN PERMREP HAS SCHEDULED CONSULTATIONS OF THE WHOLE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL FOR JULY 24.

3. SUBJECTS ARE PRESUMED TO BE THOSE DEALT WITH IN WALTER'S-SOUDOVENKO BILATERAL ON JULY 25. (REF A.)

4. MOST PARTICULARLY, PRESIDENT WILL DISCUSS HIGH-LEVEL MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON THE OCCASION OF THE 40TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE UN.

5. AUSTRALIANS TOLD US JULY 22 THAT THEY PERCEIVED A "SEA CHANGE" IN USSR POINT OF VIEW ON THIS SUBJECT. AUSTRALIANS SAID, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT SOVIET UNDER SECRETARY FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS USTINOV CAME BACK FROM HOME LEAVE IN MOSCOW LAST WEEK AND WAS NOW REPORTED TO HAVE DROPPED HIS OPPOSITION TO THE MEETING. IT IS WIDELY ASSUMED HERE THAT GROMYKO WILL PARTICIPATE.

6. OTHER HIGH-LEVEL PARTICIPANTS ARE REPORTED TO BE PRESIDENT MITTERRAND, PM THATCHER, PM GANDHI, PRESUMABLY WITH SEVERAL OTHER COUNTRIES SENDING COMPARABLE LEVEL REPRESENTATION. AUSTRALIANS TOLD US THEY ARE SURE PM HAWKE WILL WISH TO PARTICIPATE IF MANY OTHER HEADS OF STATE COME.

7. UNLESS GUIDANCE TO THE CONTRARY IS RECEIVED, U.S. WILL CONTINUE TO EXPRESS OUR WILLINGNESS IN PRINCIPLE TO A MEETING, BUT OUR INABILITY TO ZERO-IN ON THE LEVEL OF OUR PARTICIPATION AT THIS EARLY DATE. SHORT OF A STRONG NEGATIVE REACTION FROM THE U.S., IT IS LIKELY THAT A SECURITY COUNCIL SUMMIT WILL TAKE PLACE.

WALTERS

DECLASSIFIED
NLS F06-114/2#7553
BY NOJ, NARA, DATE 11/21/07

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

*File Crossin
Re do*

5538
ADD-ON

30

*JM-C
JF405*

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR DONALD REGAN

FROM: ROBERT C. McFARLANE

SUBJECT: American Citizenship for Solzhenitsyn

Senator Wallop recently wrote the President recommending that he participate in a ceremony marking Alexander Solzhenitsyn's receipt of American citizenship. While the President was originally receptive to the idea, after some careful thought the President has decided not to go through with a ceremony.

In reviewing this matter, I outlined a number of reasons why such a ceremony would be a risky idea. They are, in rough order of importance, the following:

1. We do not really know Solzhenitsyn's personal attitude toward acquiring American citizenship. We suspect that they are deeply ambivalent, a suspicion reinforced by the fact that he and his wife were scheduled to take the oath a few weeks ago and only she showed up. The fact is that Solzhenitsyn has always considered himself a Russian, forced to live in exile by an oppressive regime which unjustifiably deprived him of Soviet citizenship. He has publicly criticized those Soviet citizens who left their country voluntarily. He may indeed accept American citizenship for a variety of practical reasons, but I suspect it is a reluctant choice and that, in his heart, he does not consider himself an American.
2. Solzhenitsyn is really an unguided missile in his public remarks. He is quite capable of using the occasion to attack publicly certain aspects of our current policy (such as, for example, the President's willingness to meet with Gorbachev).
3. A public gesture by the President would be very controversial and divisive among anti-communist Russian emigres. Solzhenitsyn and his friends have waged a persistent, and at times almost scurrilous battle against emigres of the "Sakharov" persuasion -- those who are in fact closest to us in ideology and Western values. (Solzhenitsyn believes in a restoration of traditional authoritarian rule in Russia and considers Western constitutionalism an alien concept, unworkable in Russia.)

~~SECRET~~
DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F06 714/2#7537

BY LoT NARA, DATE 11/21/07

4. Solzhenitsyn was invited to the White House in 1982 and refused, in a manner which was implicitly insulting to the President and his policies.

5. A publicized meeting at this time would be considered by Gorbachev as a public slap. It would do nothing to improve the atmosphere for the Geneva meeting, and could militate against possible moves on Gorbachev's part to make some concessions in the human rights area. I would not consider this an overriding consideration if a clear purpose were served by the ceremony, but given the other risky factors, the net effect is uncertain.

In sum, I believe the idea carries many serious risks and no certainty of positive results.

Matlock Chron
32

National Security Council
The White House

253 CB

RECEIVED

System # I
Package # 5538 A/O

85 JUL 23 P 3: 26

✓ 1893

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bob Pearson	<u>1</u>	<u>P</u>	
William Martin	<u>2</u>	<u>Wm</u>	
John Poindexter	<u>3</u>	<u>J</u>	
Paul Thompson			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane	<u>4</u>		
William Martin			
NSC Secretariat	<u>5</u>		
Situation Room			

Let's just check

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Regan Buchanan Other

COMMENTS

Should be seen by _____
(Date/Time)

memo made by me

*memo to Regan/
Buchanan has
been rebone
8/2/85*

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

July 23, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Response to Solzhenitsyn Item

In accordance with your PROFS note of July 20, attached at Tab I is a memo from you to Don Regan and Patrick Buchanan on why it would not be worthwhile for the President to meet Solzhenitsyn.

Ron Sable concurs *(Cleared with Friedersdorf, who will send Wallop an Acknowledgement of the Wallop correspondence.) RJ*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo to Regan and Buchanan at Tab I.

Approve *m*

Disapprove _____

Attachments

- Tab I Memo to Regan and Buchanan
- Tab II Background papers

cc: Nicholas Klissas

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F06-114/2-47538BY LOT NARA DATE 11/21/07~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR DONALD REGAN
PATRICK BUCHANAN

FROM: ROBERT C. McFARLANE

SUBJECT: American Citizenship for Solzhenitsyn

Senator Wallop recently wrote the President recommending that he participate in a ceremony marking Alexander Solzhenitsyn's receipt of American citizenship. While the President was originally receptive to the idea, after some careful thought the President has decided not to go through with a ceremony.

In my memorandum to the President on this subject, I outlined a number of reasons why such a ceremony would not be a good idea. They are, in rough order of importance, the following:

1. We do not really know Solzhenitsyn's personal attitude toward acquiring American citizenship. We suspect that they are deeply ambivalent, a suspicion reinforced by the fact that he and his wife were scheduled to take the oath a few weeks ago and only she showed up. The fact is that Solzhenitsyn has always considered himself a Russian, forced to live in exile by an oppressive regime which unjustifiably deprived him of Soviet citizenship. He has publicly criticized those Soviet citizens who left their country voluntarily. He may indeed accept American citizenship for a variety of practical reasons, but I suspect it is a reluctant choice and that, in his heart, he does not consider himself an American.
2. Solzhenitsyn is really an unguided missile in his public remarks. He is quite capable of using the occasion to attack publicly certain aspects of our current policy (such as, for example, your willingness to meet with Gorbachev).
3. A public gesture by you would be very controversial and divisive among anti-communist Russian emigres. Solzhenitsyn and his friends have waged a persistent, and at times almost scurrilous battle against emigres of the "Sakharov" persuasion -- those who are in fact closest to us in ideology and Western values. (Solzhenitsyn believes in a restoration of traditional authoritarian rule in Russia and considers Western constitutionalism an alien concept, unworkable in Russia.)

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

~~SECRET~~

4. Solzhenitsyn was invited to the White House in 1982 and refused, in a manner which was implicitly insulting to you and your position.

5. A publicized meeting at this time would be considered by Gorbachev as a public slap. It would do nothing to improve the atmosphere for the Geneva meeting, and could militate against possible moves on Gorbachev's part to make some concessions in the human rights area. I would not consider this an overriding consideration if a clear purpose were served by the ceremony, but given the other risky factors, I am not sure what the net effect will be. Our public might well see it as an unwise and unnecessary offense to Gorbachev prior to your meeting.

In sum, I believe the idea carries many serious risks and no certainty of positive results.

From: NSWFM --CPUA
To: NSGVE --CPUA

Date and time 07/21/85 10:56:12

-- ~~SECRET~~ --

NOTE FROM: WILLIAM F. MARTIN

Subject: Response to Solzhenitsyn Item

Please make sure that Chris Lehman gets a copy of this. Thanks. Bill

*** Forwarding note from NSRCM --CPUA 07/20/85 10:34 ***

To: NSJMP --CPUA NSJFM --CPUA
NSWFM --CPUA NSWRP --CPUA

-- ~~SECRET~~ --

NOTE FROM: ROBERT MCFARLANE

Subject: Response to Solzhenitsyn Item

We ought to advise Max Friedersdorf of this. Rather than have Max go back to Wallop with all the rationale on why not have a Solzhenitsyn-Reagan Meeting, I would urge that he acknowledge the incoming letter with the comment that he is confident the Senator's views will be taken into account. At the same time, it would probably be worthwhile to have a memo from me to Regan and Buchanan

laying out the reasons why a meeting would not be the thing to do built along the lines of Jack's memo.

*** Forwarding note from NSJMD --CPUA 07/20/85 08:57 ***

To: NSRCM --CPUA

-- ~~SECRET~~ --

NOTE FROM: Jeanie D'Amico

SUBJECT: Response to Solzhenitsyn Item

The Sit Room informed me that the President's response to the item was "O.K."

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F06-114/2#7539

BY LOT NARA, DATE 11/21/07

~~SECRET~~

5538

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

July 12, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT: White House Ceremony for Solzhenitsyn

Senator Wallop wrote the President recommending that he take note of Solzhenitsyn's receipt of American citizenship by going to the Federal Court House in Vermont where the event is to take place or by arranging a White House ceremony. The President noted on his Senate mail log, "Why not? 1st choice is the W.H."

I believe that there are a number of reasons why this is not a good idea. They are, in rough order of importance, the following:

1. We do not really know Solzhenitsyn's personal attitude toward acquiring American citizenship. I suspect that they are deeply ambivalent, a suspicion reinforced by the fact that he and his wife were scheduled to take the oath and only she showed up. The fact is that Solzhenitsyn has always considered himself a Russian, forced to live in exile by an oppressive regime which unjustifiably deprived him of Soviet citizenship. He has publicly criticized those Soviet citizens who left their country voluntarily. He may indeed accept American citizenship for a variety of practical reasons, but I suspect it is a reluctant choice and that, in his heart, he does not consider himself an American.

2. Solzhenitsyn is really an unguided missile in his public remarks. He is quite capable of using the occasion to attack publicly certain aspects of our current policy (such as, for example, the President's willingness to meet with Gorbachev).

3. A public Presidential gesture would be very controversial and divisive among Russian emigres. Solzhenitsyn and his friends have waged a persistent, and at times almost scurrilous battle against emigres of the "Sakharov" persuasion -- those who are in fact closest to us in ideology and Western values. (Solzhenitsyn believes in a restoration of traditional authoritarian rule in Russia and considers Western constitutionalism an alien concept, unworkable in Russia.)

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

NLRRF06-114/2 #7541

~~SECRET~~BY KML NARA DATE 10/1/12

4. Solzhenitsyn was invited to the White House in 1982 and refused, in a manner which was implicitly insulting to the President.

5. A publicized meeting at this time would be considered by Gorbachev as a public slap. It would do nothing to improve the atmosphere at the Geneva meeting, and could militate against possible moves to make some concessions in the human rights area. I would not consider this an overriding consideration if a clear purpose were served by the ceremony, but given the other risky factors, I am not sure what clear purpose would be served.

In sum, I believe the idea carries many serious risks and no certainty of positive results.

RECOMMENDATION

That you advise the President not to implement this idea. It would probably be best to discuss it with him, but if you wish to send him a memorandum, one is attached at Tab I.

Approve ___ Disapprove ___

Attachments:

TAB I Memorandum to the President

Tab A Memo to the President from Oglesby

cc: Ron Sable

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

NLRR F06-114/2 # 7542

BY KML NARA DATE 10/1/12

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE *RCM*
SUBJECT: A Ceremony for Solzhenitsyn?

Senator Wallop wrote you recommending that you take note of Solzhenitsyn's receipt of American citizenship by going to the Federal Court House in Vermont where the event is to take place or by arranging a White House ceremony. You noted on your Senate mail log, "Why not? 1st choice is the W.H."

I believe that there are a number of reasons why this is not a good idea. They are, in rough order of importance, the following:

1. We do not really know Solzhenitsyn's personal attitude toward acquiring American citizenship. We suspect that they are deeply ambivalent, a suspicion reinforced by the fact that he and his wife were scheduled to take the oath a few weeks ago and only she showed up. The fact is that Solzhenitsyn has always considered himself a Russian, forced to live in exile by an oppressive regime which unjustifiably deprived him of Soviet citizenship. He has publicly criticized those Soviet citizens who left their country voluntarily. He may indeed accept American citizenship for a variety of practical reasons, but I suspect it is a reluctant choice and that, in his heart, he does not consider himself an American.
2. Solzhenitsyn is really an unguided missile in his public remarks. He is quite capable of using the occasion to attack publicly certain aspects of our current policy (such as, for example, your willingness to meet with Gorbachev).
3. A public gesture by you would be very controversial and divisive among anti-communist Russian emigres. Solzhenitsyn and his friends have waged a persistent, and at times almost scurrilous battle against emigres of the "Sakharov" persuasion -- those who are in fact closest to us in ideology and Western values. (Solzhenitsyn believes in a restoration of traditional authoritarian rule in Russia and considers Western constitutionalism an alien concept, unworkable in Russia.)

~~SECRET~~

4. Solzhenitsyn was invited to the White House in 1982 and refused, in a manner which was implicitly insulting to you and your position.

5. A publicized meeting at this time would be considered by Gorbachev as a public slap. It would do nothing to improve the atmosphere for the Geneva meeting, and could militate against possible moves on Gorbachev's part to make some concessions in the human rights area. I would not consider this an overriding consideration if a clear purpose were served by the ceremony, but given the other risky factors, I am not sure what the net effect will be. Our public might well see it as an unwise and unnecessary offense to Gorbachev prior to your meeting.

In sum, I believe the idea carries many serious risks and no certainty of positive results.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize a staff letter to Senator Wallop explaining that your schedule will not accommodate a visit to Vermont or a White House ceremony to mark Solzhenitsyn's acquisition of American citizenship.

<u>OK</u>	<u>No</u>
—	—

Attachment:

Tab A - Senate Mail Log

Prepared by:
Jack F. Matlock

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 9, 1985

RR

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: M. B. OGLESBY, JR. *Bo*

SUBJECT: Congressional Correspondence

Attached is the log of selected Congressional mail received July 2 - 8. This correspondence is being handled by the Office of Legislative Affairs.

JUL 02-08 1985

PRESIDENTIAL LOG OF SELECTED HOUSE MAIL

MEMBER

SUBJECT

COMMENTS

JOHN BRYANT

WRITES THAT APPARENTLY NABIH BERRI STILL RETAINS HIS U.S. "GREEN CARD" AND HAS SIGNIFICANT FINANCIAL HOLDINGS IN THIS COUNTRY. URGES YOU TO IDENTIFY AND FREEZE THESE U.S. ASSETS AND REVOKE BERRI'S "GREEN CARD". STATES THAT HE HAS REQUESTED HEARINGS TO EXPLORE MEASURES TO INSURE THAT THIS SITUATION DOES NOT OCCUR AGAIN.

✓

E "KIKI" DE LA GARZA

"SOUTH TEXANS JOIN IN ABUNDANT APPRECIATION FOR CORPUS CHRISTI HOME PORT SELECTION - A GREAT HELP FOR OUR AREA."

✓

TOM DELAY

RECOMMENDS MEASURES, INCLUDING A SWIFT RETALIATORY STRIKE, WHICH SHOULD BE TAKEN IN RESPONSE TO ANY FUTURE TERRORIST HOSTAGE-TAKING.

✓

JIM LIGHTFOOT

WRITES REGARDING IRREGULARITIES WITH THE FARM CREDIT SYSTEM AND STATES THAT THE MAJORITY OF PEOPLE IN HIS DISTRICT BELIEVE WE'RE ON THE BRINK OF AN ECONOMIC DISASTER. THERE IS TIME TO ACT AND THERE ARE A NUMBER OF VIABLE REMEDIES. URGES YOU TO GIVE THIS MATTER YOUR UTMOST CONSIDERATION.

✓

DAVID S. MONSON

"WHAT A THRILL IT WAS TO COME TO THE OVAL OFFICE AND INTRODUCE YOU TO THE UNIVERSITY OF UTAH WOMEN'S GYMNASTICS TEAM. THANK YOU FOR TAKING THE TIME AND FOR THE GENEROUS HOSPITALITY THAT WAS DISPLAYED. IT'S ALWAYS GREAT TO BE IN YOUR PRESENCE."

✓

TED WEISS

COMMENDS YOU FOR THE STATESMANLIKE MANNER IN WHICH YOU ARE HANDLING THE CURRENT HOSTAGE CRISIS. DESPITE SEVERE PROVOCATION BY THE HIJACKERS, YOUR RESPONSE HAS BEEN CALM AND EFFECTIVE.

✓

JUL 02-08 1985

PRESIDENTIAL LOG OF SELECTED SENATE MAIL

MEMBER

SUBJECT

COMMENTS

ALAN CRANSTON

CONGRATULATIONS ON THE RETURN OF THE HOSTAGES. WE MUST NOW SECURE THE RELEASE OF THE SEVEN REMAINING AMERICANS AND WE MUST HALT TERRORISM AGAINST U.S. CITIZENS AT THE WORLD'S AIRPORTS. URGES YOU TO SUPPORT S. 1369, LEGISLATION HE HAS INTRODUCED TO BAN U.S. AIRCRAFT FROM LANDING AT UNSAFE FOREIGN AIRPORTS AND DENY U.S. LANDING RIGHTS TO FOREIGN AIRCRAFT WHOSE GOVERNMENTS TOLERATE UNSAFE AIRPORTS.



BARRY GOLDWATER

DON HODEL MADE A RECENT APPEARANCE BEFORE THE PHOENIX TRUNK-N-TUSK CLUB AND RAISED ALOT OF MONEY AND MADE A SUPERB PRESENTATION. "I WANTED YOU TO KNOW THAT I THINK HE IS AN OUTSTANDING MAN. YOU SHOULD KEEP HIM ON THE ROAD AS MUCH AS HE CAN BE AWAY FROM HIS BUSINESS, HE SPEAKS OUR LANGUAGE."



MALCOLM WALLOP

ALEXANDER SOLZHENITZYN WILL SHORTLY BECOME A CITIZEN OF THE UNITED STATES. WE SHOULD NOT LET PASS BY THIS OPPORTUNITY FOR PUBLICLY REAFFIRMING WHO WE ARE, WHO OUR FRIENDS ARE, AND WHY. ASKS YOU TO MARK THIS UPCOMING EVENT WITH A CEREMONY AT THE WHITE HOUSE OR WITH A PRESIDENTIAL VISIT TO THE FEDERAL COURTHOUSE IN VERMONT WHERE THE EVENT IS TO TAKE PLACE.

???.
Why not - 1/25
Ceremony in Vt
W.H.

EDWARD ZORINSKY

"URGES YOU TO APPROVE S.822, LEGISLATION THAT WOULD AUTHORIZE THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE TO DEFER HOLDING A REFERENDUM WITH RESPECT TO THE NATIONAL WHEAT MARKETING QUOTA FOR THE MARKETING YEAR BEGINNING JUNE 1, 1986."



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

RR

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE *RCM*

SUBJECT: A Ceremony for Solzhenitsyn?

Senator Wallop wrote you recommending that you take note of Solzhenitsyn's receipt of American citizenship by going to the Federal Court House in Vermont where the event is to take place or by arranging a White House ceremony. You noted on your Senate mail log, "Why not? 1st choice is the W.H."

I believe that there are a number of reasons why this is not a good idea. They are, in rough order of importance, the following:

1. We do not really know Solzhenitsyn's personal attitude toward acquiring American citizenship. We suspect that they are deeply ambivalent, a suspicion reinforced by the fact that he and his wife were scheduled to take the oath a few weeks ago and only she showed up. The fact is that Solzhenitsyn has always considered himself a Russian, forced to live in exile by an oppressive regime which unjustifiably deprived him of Soviet citizenship. He has publicly criticized those Soviet citizens who left their country voluntarily. He may indeed accept American citizenship for a variety of practical reasons, but I suspect it is a reluctant choice and that, in his heart, he does not consider himself an American.

2. Solzhenitsyn is really an unguided missile in his public remarks. He is quite capable of using the occasion to attack publicly certain aspects of our current policy (such as, for example, your willingness to meet with Gorbachev).

3. A public gesture by you would be very controversial and divisive among anti-communist Russian emigres. Solzhenitsyn and his friends have waged a persistent, and at times almost scurrilous battle against emigres of the "Sakharov" persuasion - those who are in fact closest to us in ideology and Western values. (Solzhenitsyn believes in a restoration of traditional authoritarian rule in Russia and considers Western constitutionalism an alien concept, unworkable in Russia.)

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

NLRRF06-114/2 # 7544

BY KML NARA DATE 10/1/12

45

4. Solzhenitsyn was invited to the White House in 1982 and refused, in a manner which was implicitly insulting to you and your position.

5. A publicized meeting at this time would be considered by Gorbachev as a public slap. It would do nothing to improve the atmosphere for the Geneva meeting, and could militate against possible moves on Gorbachev's part to make some concessions in the human rights area. I would not consider this an overriding consideration if a clear purpose were served by the ceremony, but given the other risky factors, I am not sure what the net effect will be. Our public might well see it as an unwise and unnecessary offense to Gorbachev prior to your meeting.

In sum, I believe the idea carries many serious risks and no certainty of positive results.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize a staff letter to Senator Wallop explaining that your schedule will not accommodate a visit to Vermont or a White House ceremony to mark Solzhenitsyn's acquisition of American citizenship.

<u>OK</u>	<u>No</u>
<i>RR</i>	—

Attachment:

Tab A - Senate Mail Log

Prepared by:
Jack F. Matlock

54-C
46
5538
ADD-ON

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

July 23, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Response to Solzhenitsyn Item

In accordance with your PROFS note of July 20, attached at Tab I is a memo from you to Don Regan and Patrick Buchanan on why it would not be worthwhile for the President to meet Solzhenitsyn.

Ron Sable concurs *(Cleared with Friedersdorf, who will send Wallop an Acknowledgement of the Wallop correspondence.) RJ*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo to Regan and Buchanan at Tab I.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments

- Tab I Memo to Regan and Buchanan
- Tab II Background papers

cc: Nicholas Klissas

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED

NLS FOI-114/2# 7545BY LDT, NARA, DATE 11/21/07MEMORANDUM FOR DONALD REGAN
PATRICK BUCHANAN

FROM: ROBERT C. McFARLANE

SUBJECT: American Citizenship for Solzhenitsyn

Senator Wallop recently wrote the President recommending that he participate in a ceremony marking Alexander Solzhenitsyn's receipt of American citizenship. While the President was originally receptive to the idea, after some careful thought the President has decided not to go through with a ceremony.

In my memorandum to the President on this subject, I outlined a number of reasons why such a ceremony would not be a good idea. They are, in rough order of importance, the following:

1. We do not really know Solzhenitsyn's personal attitude toward acquiring American citizenship. Solzhenitsyn has always considered himself a Russian, forced to live in exile by an oppressive regime. He has publicly criticized those Soviet citizens who left their country voluntarily. He may accept citizenship, but I suspect it is a reluctant choice.
2. Solzhenitsyn is an unguided missile in his public remarks, and conceivably could use the occasion to attack some aspects of the President's foreign policy.
3. A public gesture would be very controversial and divisive among anti-communist Russian emigres. Those who espouse Western democratic ideals -- which Solzhenitsyn does not -- would be particularly offended.
4. Solzhenitsyn refused an invitation to the White House in 1982 -- and could do so again if not assured of a lengthy private session with the President.
5. A publicized meeting at this time would be considered by Gorbachev as a public slap, and could make concessions in the human rights area more difficult to extract. I would not consider this an overriding consideration if a clear purpose were served by the ceremony, but given the other risky factors, I cannot be confident that the benefits of the meeting would justify the risks.

From: NSWFM --CPUA
To: NSGVE --CPUA

Date and time 07/21/85 10:56:12

48

-- ~~SECRET~~ --

NOTE FROM: WILLIAM F. MARTIN

Subject: Response to Solzhenitsyn Item

Please make sure that Chris Lehman gets a copy of this. Thanks. Bill

*** Forwarding note from NSRCM --CPUA 07/20/85 10:34 ***

To: NSJMP --CPUA NSJFM --CPUA
NSWFM --CPUA NSWRP --CPUA

-- ~~SECRET~~ --

NOTE FROM: ROBERT MCFARLANE

Subject: Response to Solzhenitsyn Item

We ought to advise Max Friedersdorf of this. Rather than have Max go back to Wallop with all the rationale on why not have a Solzhenitsyn-Reagan Meeting, I would urge that he acknowledge the incoming letter with the comment that he is confident the Senator's views will be taken into account. At the same time, it would probably be worthwhile to have a memo from me to Regan and Buchanan

laying out the reasons why a meeting would not be the thing to do built along the lines of Jack's memo.

*** Forwarding note from NSJMD --CPUA 07/20/85 08:57 ***

To: NSRCM --CPUA

-- ~~SECRET~~ --

NOTE FROM: Jeanie D'Amico

SUBJECT: Response to Solzhenitsyn Item

The Sit Room informed me that the President's response to the item was "O.K."

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F06-114/2-#7547

BY LOT, NARA, DATE 11/21/07

July-C
SI

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

July 23, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Response to Solzhenitsyn Item

In accordance with your PROFS note of July 20, attached at Tab I is a memo from you to Don Regan and Patrick Buchanan on why it would not be worthwhile for the President to meet Solzhenitsyn.

Ron Sable concurs *(Cleared with Friedersdorf, who will send Wallop an Acknowledgement of the Wallop correspondence.) RJ*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo to Regan and Buchanan at Tab I.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments

- Tab I Memo to Regan and Buchanan
- Tab II Background papers

cc: Nicholas Klissas