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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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JET 4/7/2005

File Folder MATLOCK CHRON JUNE 1985 (3/4)

FOIA

F06-114/2

Box Number 9

YARHI-MILO

912

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
7446	LETTER	MATLOCK TO BENSON RE ANDREI R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2	1	6/21/1985	B1
7447	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE ARMAND HAMMER MEETING WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN JUNE 24, 1985 R 10/1/2012 F2006-114/2	1	6/21/1985	B1
7448	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE ROWNY ARTICLE ON GORBACHEV'S FIRST HUNDRED DAYS R 10/1/2012 F2006-114/2	1	6/24/1985	B1
7449	MEMO	MARTIN TO PLATT RE DRAFT ROWNY ARTICLE ON GORBACHEV'S FIRST ONE HUNDRED DAYS IN POWER R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2	1	ND	B1
7450	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE MESSAGE TO GORBACHEV PAR 10/1/2012 F2006-114/2	3	6/25/1985	B1
7451	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #7450 PAR 10/1/2012 F2006-114/2	3	6/25/1985	B1
7452	MEMO	SHULTZ TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE MEETING WITH DOBRYNIN JUNE 24: GORBACHEV'S RESPONSE ON INTERIM RESTRAINT R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2	2	6/25/1985	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 21, 1985

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Mr. Raymond Benson
Counselor for Press and Cultural Affairs
American Embassy
Moscow

Dear Ray:

Could you discreetly get these pictures to Andrei? (Tell him I was unable to get them signed and delivered to him in New York before he left.)

The meeting went well, and Andrei seemed appropriately impressed. Though, at his request, we did not publicize the meeting, I suspect that the Moscow intellectual community already knows of it, since Andrei was telling his American friends of it as soon as he got out of the Oval Office.

I assume the Soviet authorities are aware of the call. When Andrei left the West Wing (in Bud McFarlane's car) he asked if he should mention his meeting to the Soviet Embassy and I strongly advised him to do so. I suggested he just say that he came by to see me and I suggested it -- and how could he say no? (Actually, he had asked me if I could arrange it.)

Earlier, Andrei spent about an hour with Bud, who was charmed by him. I don't know whether the Soviet authorities are aware of that meeting or not.

I'd appreciate any feed back from private comments by intellectuals or officials in Moscow when the news gets around. I'm sure Bud and the President will be interested if it evokes any favorable vibes on the gossip circuit. (It would be best to report any reaction by letter to me.)

I assume you'll share this letter with Art and Curt.

Sincerely,



Jack F. Matlock
Special Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

cc: Mr. Thomas Simons, EUR/SOV

DECLASSIFIED
NLS F06-114/2 # 7446
BY NOT NARA. DATE 11/21/07

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

June 21, 1985

Matlock

ACTION

DECLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

NLRR F06-114/2 # 7447

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

BY KML NARA DATE 10/1/12

SUBJECT: Armand Hammer's Meeting with President,
June 24, 1985, 4 p.m.

We have been informed that a ten-minute meeting has been scheduled for Armand Hammer with the President on Monday, June 24. According to Svahn's office, the meeting was scheduled on Don Regan's instructions as the result of a letter from Hammer to the President regarding his work as Chairman of the President's Cancer Commission, and thus you were not consulted in advance.

It is unfortunate that the meeting has been scheduled at this particular time, since Hammer just saw Gorbachev this week, and coming immediately to see the President gives him the opportunity to pose as an intermediary between the two -- a role we should not encourage.

However, assuming that it is too late to call the meeting off, I believe that we can limit the damage by making sure that the President's calendar shows -- and Speakes indicates if questioned -- that the meeting was granted to Hammer in his capacity as Chairman of the Cancer Commission.

We can be sure, however, that Hammer will use most of his time to report on his meeting with Gorbachev and to press his own suggestions.

I would therefore recommend that you brief the President on what to expect from Hammer during your 9:30 meeting Monday. Suggested talking points are attached at TAB I. In particular, I believe it important that the President not go beyond what he has already said publicly in regard to a summit meeting.

Recommendation:

That you brief the President Monday morning on Hammer's call along the lines of the attached talking points.

Approve M Disapprove —

Attachment: Done 6/29

Tab I - Talking Points re Hammer Call on President

~~SECRET~~

Declassify: on OADR

MEMORANDUM

4975

JH-c4

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

June 24, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR SALLY KELLEY

FROM:

WILLIAM F. MARTIN

Martin

Maltby

Just

SUBJECT:

Letter to the President from Myron Wasylyk concerning Secretary Baldrige's Trip to the Soviet Union

We have reviewed and concur in the proposed draft letter (TAB A), drafted by the Department of State to Mr. Myron Wasylyk, Acting Executive Director, National Captive Nations Committee, concerning Secretary Baldrige's participation in the U.S.-USSR Joint Commercial Commission meeting in Moscow on May 20, 1985.

Attachment:

Tab A Proposed Draft Letter to Mr. Myron Wasylyk with Incoming Correspondence

4975 6
UNCLASSIFIED

(Classification)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
TRANSMITTAL FORM

S/S 8516159

Date June 19, 1985

For: Mr. Robert C. McFarlane
National Security Council
The White House

Reference:

To: President Reagan From: Myron Wasyluk

Date: May 1, 1985 Subject: Secretary Baldrige's

Trip to the Soviet Union

WH Referral Dated: May 29, 1985 NSC ID# 302358
(if any)

 The attached item was sent directly to the
Department of State.

Action Taken:

- XX A draft reply is attached.
 A draft reply will be forwarded.
 A translation is attached.
 An information copy of a direct reply is attached.
 We believe no response is necessary for the reason
cited below.
 The Department of State has no objection to the
proposed travel.
 Other.

Remarks:


Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary

UNCLASSIFIED

(Classification)

Dear Mr. Wasylyk:

The National Captive Nations Committee recently wrote to express its concern over the President's decision to authorize a meeting of the U.S.-USSR Joint Commercial Commission and the participation of Secretary Baldrige in this meeting.

This Administration's key objective has been to strengthen the United States' position in the world. With the support of the American people and the Congress, we have done so. Our defenses are being rebuilt. Our alliances are solid, and our commitment to defend our values has never been more clear. Based on this position of strength, we are now in our strongest position in years to establish a constructive and realistic working relationship with the Soviet Union.

This Administration will not ignore Soviet actions which trouble us. On the contrary, we need to respond forcefully. But in doing so, we are more likely to be successful by direct measures that counter the specific challenge. We should not

Mr. Myron Wasylyk ,
Acting Executive Director,
National Captive Nations Committee,
P.O. Box 1171,
Washington, DC.

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steps to improve our trade relationship can be taken now, a fundamental change in our trade relations cannot take place without parallel improvements in other aspects of the bilateral relationship. In his recent meetings, Secretary Baldrige emphasized this point. We will continue to emphasize this relationship in our future contacts.

In concrete terms, the granting of Most Favored Nation (MFN) status to the Soviet Union can only take place in the context of a significant overall improvement in our relationship. Under the terms of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the Trade Act of 1974, MFN treatment may not be extended to those non-market economy countries who deny their citizens the opportunity to emigrate. Unless there is a major change in current Soviet policy on the question of emigration in particular, we can see little prospect that the USSR will be granted MFN status. In addition, although the export of equipment for oil and gas production and exploration is generally permitted under current export control regulations, we generally deny licenses for the export of oil and gas technology to the Soviet Union. Secretary Baldrige made these points to Soviet officials during the May meeting of the JCC.

8516159

T H E W H I T E H O U S E O F F I C E

REFERRAL

MAY 29, 1985

TO: DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ACTION REQUESTED:

DRAFT REPLY FOR SIGNATURE OF WHITE HOUSE STAFF MEMBER

DESCRIPTION OF INCOMING:

ID: 302358

MEDIA: LETTER, DATED MAY 1, 1985

TO: PRESIDENT REAGAN

FROM: MR. MYRON WASYLYK
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
(ACTING)
NATIONAL CAPTIVE NATIONS COMMITTEE,
INC.
POST OFFICE BOX 1171
WASHINGTON DC 20013

SUBJECT: URGES THE PRESIDENT TO POSTPONE IF NOT CANCEL
THE TRADE TALKS SCHEDULED FOR MAY 20 85
IN MOSCOW

PROMPT ACTION IS ESSENTIAL -- IF REQUIRED ACTION HAS NOT BEEN
TAKEN WITHIN 9 WORKING DAYS OF RECEIPT, PLEASE TELEPHONE THE
UNDERSIGNED AT 456-7486.

RETURN CORRESPONDENCE, WORKSHEET AND COPY OF RESPONSE
(OR DRAFT) TO:
AGENCY LIAISON, ROOM 91, THE WHITE HOUSE

SALLY KELLEY
DIRECTOR OF AGENCY LIAISON
PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE

THE WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

INCOMING

DATE RECEIVED: MAY 02, 1985

NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: MR. MYRON WASYLYK

SUBJECT: URGES THE PRESIDENT TO POSTPONE IF NOT CANCEL
THE TRADE TALKS SCHEDULED FOR MAY 20 85
IN MOSCOW

ROUTE TO: OFFICE/AGENCY (STAFF NAME)	ACTION		DISPOSITION	
	ACT CODE	DATE YY/MM/DD	TYPE RESP	C COMPLETED D YY/MM/DD
LINAS KOJELIS	ORG	85/05/02		1/1
REFERRAL NOTE: <u>99 DOS</u>	D	85/05/29		1/1
REFERRAL NOTE:		1/1		1/1
REFERRAL NOTE:		1/1		1/1
REFERRAL NOTE:		1/1		1/1
REFERRAL NOTE:		1/1		1/1

COMMENTS: _____

ADDITIONAL CORRESPONDENTS: MEDIA:L INDIVIDUAL CODES: _____

PL MAIL USER CODES: (A) _____ (B) _____ (C) _____

- *****
- | | | | |
|--------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|---|
| *ACTION CODES: | *DISPOSITION CODES: | *OUTGOING | * |
| * | * | * CORRESPONDENCE: | * |
| *A-APPROPRIATE ACTION | *A-ANSWERED | *TYPE RESP=INITIALS | * |
| *C-COMMENT/RECOM | *B-NON-SPEC-REFERRAL | * OF SIGNER | * |
| *D-DRAFT RESPONSE | *C-COMPLETED | * CODE = A | * |
| *F-FURNISH FACT SHEET | *S-SUSPENDED | *COMPLETED = DATE OF | * |
| *I-INFO COPY/NO ACT NEC* | | * OUTGOING | * |
| *R-DIRECT REPLY W/COPY * | | | * |
| *S-FOR-SIGNATURE * | | | * |
| *X-INTERIM REPLY * | | | * |
- *****

REFER QUESTIONS AND ROUTING UPDATES TO CENTRAL REFERENCE
(ROOM 75, OEOB) EXT. 2590
KEEP THIS WORKSHEET ATTACHED TO THE ORIGINAL INCOMING
LETTER AT ALL TIMES AND SEND COMPLETED RECORD TO RECORDS
MANAGEMENT.

I have sworn upon the altar of God, eternal hostility
against every form of tyranny over the mind of man
— Thomas Jefferson

#302358 10



NATIONAL CAPTIVE NATIONS COMMITTEE, INC. 5516159

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- Walter Trohan (County Clare, Ire.)

May 1, 1985

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

We wish to express our support for Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger in his attempt to postpone Commerce Secretary Malcolm Baldrige's trip to the Soviet Union. At present, Secretary Baldrige is scheduled to attend a trade summit in Moscow on May 20 with Soviet Foreign Trade Minister Nikolai Patolichev. However, in light of reasons given by Secretary Weinberger as well as others we strongly urge you to postpone if not cancel the trade talks.

We agree with Secretary Weinberger in asserting that the trade talks are untimely and imprudent. Given that the Soviets are likely to obtain advanced oil-drilling technology as a result of the talks a postponement is well warranted. Furthermore, the shooting of U.S. Army Major Arthur D. Nicholson Jr. serves as further evidence that a trade summit is inappropriate at the present time.

Moreover, in conjunction with Secretary Weinberger's reasons for postponement of the trade talks we would add several of our own. The Soviets are seeking MFN (Most Favored Nations) status as well as greater access to U.S. credit markets. Granting the Soviets such concessions as MFN status or credit availability would be in our opinion a mistake. For not only would it be a victory for the Soviet economy but it would also indicate that the U.S. was unwilling to transcend its economic interests in order to promote its foreign policy.


In addition, the Soviets remain in Afghanistan, and continue to be instrumental in anti-American operations in Central America. We feel that it is an inversion of standards to closely scrutinize the behavior of the Contras and the Duarte government, as a prerequisite to funding, and yet to ignore recent Soviet Behavior.

Furthermore, there is no evidence from recent history to suggest that the relaxing of trade restrictions will favorably influence Soviet behavior. Therefore, because the U.S. has little to gain from the trade summit we see no evidence to warrant a liberalizing of U.S./Soviet trade relations.

Trade
May 1, 1985
Page 2

We urge you to strongly consider the arguments given by Secretary Weinberger as well as our own. At a time when the U.S. needs to respond in a significant manner to recent Soviet atrocities, among them the shooting of Major Nicholson, the postponement of the trade talks would be a wise decision.


Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Myron Wasyluk".

Myron Wasyluk
Executive Director
(Acting)

NATIONAL CAPTIVE NATIONS
COMMITTEE INC.

P.O. Box 1171
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20013



The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

June 21, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. MARTIN

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SIGNED

SUBJECT: Letter to the President from Myron Wasylyk re Secretary Baldrige's Trip to the Soviet Union

I have reviewed and concur in the proposed draft letter (TAB A), prepared by the State Department to Mr. Myron Wasylyk, Acting Executive Director, National Captive Nations Committee, concerning Secretary Baldrige's participation in the U.S.-USSR Joint Commercial Commission meeting in Moscow on May 20, 1985.

AS Sestanovich, *WJ* Wegg and *RA* Robinson concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to Sally Kelly at Tab I.

Approve *Wm*

Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I Memorandum to Sally Kelley

Tab A Draft Letter to Mr. Myron Wasylyk with Incoming Correspondence

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 24, 1985

ACTION

DECLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

NLRR F06-114/2 #7448

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*BY KML NARA DATE 10/1/12

SUBJECT: Rowny Article on Gorbachev's First Hundred Days

Ed Rowny has written an article commenting on Gorbachev's start as Party leader, for possible placement as an op/ed article.

Many parts of Rowny's analysis are highly speculative regarding Gorbachev's position in the Soviet hierarchy and the reasons for some of his actions. The article would be unexceptionable if it were written by an academic. However, I do not believe it desirable for an Administration official to speculate in print in this manner regarding Soviet internal politics. Furthermore, I do not consider some of the speculation well founded. In particular, I believe it undesirable for an official to make the sort of the comments Rowny makes on page 13. The include remarks about Soviet exploitation of the President's trip to Europe, with the implication that it made him vulnerable, and about Gorbachev's attitude toward a summit meeting, a subject on which Rowny is not fully informed, and should not pretend to be.

I short, I recommend strongly that Ed be asked not to publish an article on this subject, and in particular that clearance be withheld from the remarks on page 13.

W.R. Fortier, *SK* Sestanovich, Kraemer and *KD* Small concur.

Recommendation:

That you authorize Bill Martin to send the memorandum to Platt at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

TAB I - Martin-Platt Memorandum

TAB A - Platt-Martin Memorandum with Rowny Article

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify: OADR

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F06-114/2-4 7449

BY LRT, NARA, DATE 11/21/07

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
WITH UNCLASSIFIED ATTACHMENT

MEMORANDUM FOR NICHOLAS PLATT
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Draft Rowny Article on Gorbachev's First One
Hundred Days in Power (U)

We have reviewed the draft article by Ambassador Rowny on
"Gorbachev's First Hundred Days," which was forwarded in your
memorandum of June 21, 1985. (U)

While the article is an interesting exercise in political
speculation which would be appropriate for a scholar who is not a
U.S. Government official, we question the desirability of an
American official speculating in public regarding the internal
political status of a foreign leader. Furthermore, some of the
assertions on page 13 of the draft seem particularly
inappropriate. The reference to the President's recent trip to
Europe could be read as an implicit suggestion that the trip was
a failure and made the President vulnerable to Soviet propaganda.
In addition, the characterization of Gorbachev's attitude toward
a summit meeting is not consistent with the President's own
comments on the subject, and we believe it important that no U.S.
Government official go beyond the President's public comments on
this subject. (C)

For these reasons, we would prefer that the article not be
published. (C)

William F. Martin
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

TAB A Platt-Martin Memorandum with Draft of Rowny
Article

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify: OADR



8518509 thru 8518511

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

4628

14

June 21, 1985

MEMORANDUM

TO: NSC - Mr. William Martin
OSD - COL David Brown
ACDA - Mr. William Staples

SUBJECT: Draft Rowny Article

Attached is the long version of the article by Ambassador Rowny on Gorbachev's first one hundred days in power.

Please provide any comments to S/ART - Fred Shaheen on (632-4153) by COB, Tuesday, June 25, 1985.

Nicholas Platt
for Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary

Attachment:
As stated.

Gorbachev's First Hundred Days

The Soviet Union is truly the god that limps. While its military capabilities elevate it to superpower status, it is a colossus that cannot feed its own people. Economically ailing, its rate of real economic growth has actually declined at a steady rate over the past two decades. It is ruled by a lumbering and ossified bureaucracy. The cronyism institutionalized during the Brezhnev years made upward mobility nonexistent and stifled creativity. Unrest among internal Soviet nationalities makes the Soviet Union a simmering cauldron. Black marketeering is rampant. Alcoholism is openly acknowledged to be a national epidemic.

Soviet recognition that a new and young leadership was needed manifested itself when 73-year-old leader Konstantin Chernenko finally passed from the scene on March 10, 1985. Announcement of his death was so anticlimactic that it was carried on page 2 of Pravda. The front page news was that the mantle of leadership had officially passed to the Politburo's youngest member, 54-year-old Mikhail Gorbachev.

From one death watch to another, the Soviet Union poured more and more money into weapons causing the Soviet system to slump into further decay. Indeed, there was a time in the early '70s when Sakharov and Amalrik were questioning whether the Soviet Union could survive until 1984. Thus, there was perhaps a deep psychological need in both the Soviet Union and the West to look upon Gorbachev's arrival on the scene as as a breath of fresh air. Both hope to find in Gorbachev a new vitality, and to provide

for the Soviet Union a new direction. Many in the West hope that he can restrain his country's foreign policy appetites and restore sanity to the growth of their nuclear force structures. At home, many Soviets undoubtedly hope he can raise their standard of living and bring their country economically into the twentieth century.

Can these hopes be realized? Do the first hundred days match the picture of the forceful and vigorous reformer who, under the American system, could be expected to turn things around? The answer lies not so much in the man himself -- though he is quite remarkable -- as in the nature of the collective leadership he serves. A new leader in the Soviet system, in contrast to a newly elected US president, does not bring several hundreds of new people along with him. Instead a Soviet leader works with a bureaucracy he inherits, and only gradually makes changes which make it responsive to him.

Accordingly, what we see going on in the Soviet Union is a struggle to change the faces of the Politburo. But it will change its superficial nature slowly, and may never change its fundamental nature. The fact that Gorbachev -- at least to outside observers -- presided over the smoothest succession in Soviet history does not alter the basic objective of the Politburo -- its continuity. Gorbachev was elected because the Politburo recognized that it needed to be rejuvenated; but those who elected him would like to remain members of the team, and, in the end, to survive.

To be sure, the means of succession have changed. Anyone familiar with the political graveyards of the 30s, 40s and early 50s can remember that Trotsky was exiled and ultimately murdered,

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that Kirov was assassinated, Zhdanov died under mysterious circumstances, and Kamenev, Zinoviev, Kuznetsov, Vosnesensky and Beria were all shot. The list is endless. Emphasis on the use of terror has been replaced by a reliance on natural attrition. Yet the succession process continues to foster and preserve the same objective -- a small entrenched collective leadership dedicated to continuity. The difference is that in recent years the collective has kept itself alive. It is from this one central fact that all Soviet policies derive.

This notion of ruling through collective leadership has its roots deep in Russian history. In fact, it predates the tsars and was the way early Russian society was ruled at the time of the arrival of the Varangians. From the middle of the eleventh century, decision-making of the principalities was influenced by the veche, a group of leaders roughly paralleling the modern Politburo, which on occasion expelled princes just as the Politburo expelled Khrushchev. The General Secretary, Khrushchev, like his successors, who in many ways has the power in modern-day Soviet leadership comparable to the princes of the Kievian era. Similarly, the power of the early princes rested upon, in an even broader sense, the support of the druzhina, an early analogue of the modern-day nomenclatura, which allocates power and influence throughout the Soviet Union. Be this as it may, the veche, by its actions, preserved the oligarchy just as its modern counterparts.

The modern-day collective leadership, just as the tsars did before it, has had to conjure up external threats to help justify its own legitimacy. The collective leadership of the Soviet Union since

Stalin has made repeated attempts to improve its productive efficiency. But for Gorbachev to attempt a major economic reform would be to break the bubble of Marxist-Leninism, which also serves to legitimize the gerontocracy. As a result, the stagnate and overarmed country cannot leap forward, it can only keep sputtering along.

Following Brezhnev's death in November 1982, Yuriy Andropov was "elected" first among equals by this leadership. Even though Brezhnev's health was precarious for many months and his death anticipated, when he did finally expire, Soviet troops were placed on alert until well after Andropov assumed control. This pattern was repeated on February 9, 1984, when Andropov died. However, when General Secretary Chernenko died on March 10, 1985, the mood within the Soviet Union was not only one of indifference, but almost one of relief. It is now clear that Chernenko's death had been expected for some time and that steps were taken while he was still alive in anticipation of the change. Indeed, in his speech nominating Gorbachev as the new leader, Gromyko stressed repeatedly that Gorbachev had played a key role in running the country before Chernenko died. Gromyko even revealed that Gorbachev had chaired Politburo meetings in Chernenko's absence, adding that he had performed "brilliantly."

In hindsight, we can see that Gorbachev skillfully maneuvered within the power structure so that the passing of the baton to him at Chernenko's death was swift and certain. But Gorbachev was probably also aided by a powerful patron, Yuriy Andropov, who made a deathbed deal with the collective leadership which assured that

Gorbachev would ultimately become the nation's leader. Key Gorbachev supporters were moved into place even before Chernenko's death. Nine key personnel shifts occurred in the last three months of Chernenko's tenure -- all Andropov proteges and all affiliated with Gorbachev. We can only surmise that Gorbachev must have had a guardian angel someplace. Gorbachev had presided over a series of agricultural failures, as one wag put it, unprecedented since the days of Joseph and the Pharaoh. For Gorbachev still to come out on top suggests that there is something remarkable about him, considering the fact that his predecessor in the agriculture job, Kulakov, reputedly committed suicide for more modest crop failures.

Chernenko's long sickness probably meant that Gorbachev was firmly entrenched in the role of interim leader by the time of his visit to the United Kingdom from December 15th to the 21st of 1984. One can posit that Gorbachev's first hundred days can actually be counted as coinciding with Chernenko's last one hundred days. To be sure, Gorbachev was the highest ranking Soviet leader to visit the United Kingdom since Prime Minister Alexei Kosygin went there in 1967. Some watchful Kremlinologist saw this as a sign that Gorbachev would take over. Orwell was right; the year 1984 did foreshadow a change.

In many respects, Chernenko's death finally broke the hold Brezhnev's proteges had on the Politburo. Gorbachev had actually been groomed by Andropov for a number of years. Indeed, their relationship goes back to the time the elder Soviet took his vacations

in Stavropol where Gorbachev was Party boss. Gorbachev's ascension may have also been aided behind the scenes by supreme ideologist Mikhail Suslov.

My guess is that additional members of the Brezhnev clique will continue to be quietly retired with full honors between now and the 27th Party Congress in February 1986. In the meantime, Gorbachev is still in the process of becoming more than first among equals. Gorbachev's quick elevation of Viktor Chebrikov, 61, Yegor Ligachev, 64, and Nikolai Ryzhkov, 54, raises the number of Andropov proteges on the Politburo to seven out of thirteen, the remainder being the Brezhnev hold-overs. It is now being widely speculated that Ligachev may in fact be the number-two in power. Like Gorbachev he seems to have been watched over by both Andropov and Suslov. Chebrikov, as head of the KGB, also had a long affiliation with Andropov. By the time the Party Congress opens, Gorbachev should have consolidated his internal position to such an extent that he will, after the 27th Party Congress, in fact become the unquestioned titular head of State as well as Party leader. Once this takes place, he will have somewhat more latitude in playing an influential role in arms control and foreign policy. This will be construed by many in the West as a personal power play by Gorbachev. However, closer students of the Kremlin will understand that it is merely an evolution in the character of the collective leadership.

Even though the Brezhnevites continue to follow Chernenko into oblivion, United States leaders should not, for the short term, expect much new in arms control until the collective

leadership has put Gorbachev's men in key places. In the meantime, because of the Soviets' strong penchant for continuity and because some mileage can still be extracted therefrom, Gorbachev is continuing the public line that was adopted by the Soviets following the NATO dual-track decision of 1979. This decision was that US missiles should be deployed in Europe in response to the Soviet SS-20 threat and to seek arms control negotiations to negate that threat. The Soviets' approach was based on the hypothesis that NATO could be split from the United States over the issue of deployment of missiles in Europe. However, while it was obvious to the West that this policy was no longer working, the Soviets were incapable of shifting gears and did not have another issue to use to try to split NATO. Under the circumstances, a decision was made, probably, by Gorbachev to seek steps leading to the resumption of arms control negotiations in 1985.

In 1984, the Soviets added a new issue to their campaign designed to drive a wedge between the US and the NATO Allies, namely, the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). Still the Soviets' first attempt to move toward this new policy proved abortive. We will recall that the Soviets made the US an offer in June 1984 to meet in Vienna on September 15 to discuss "space arms." However, our almost immediate reply caught the Soviets off guard and the Soviets fumbled. Apparently, they had not expected a reply so quickly, and every time we repeated our "yes" they attached another precondition. As Britain's Foreign Minister remarked at the time, it seems that the Soviets just couldn't take "yes" for an answer.

It may be that this event gave Gorbachev the opportunity he was looking for. Perhaps he began exerting a dominant influence within the Politburo after he saw how clumsily the Soviets' offer in June was handled. Indeed, we can speculate that he was the one who approved -- if not the one who masterminded -the Soviets' follow-up offer in mid-November. This second offer resulted in the US reply on November 22 which said that Secretary Shultz would be prepared to meet Foreign Minister Gromyko in Geneva in early January.

In the fall of 1984, Chernenko's health began to fail rapidly. For seven weeks, Chernenko had dropped out of sight, supposedly, accordingly to the Soviet press, on vacation. In perhaps no other way can the stark difference between the closed society of the Soviet Union and the open society of the United States be more apparent. In the United States it is inconceivable that President Reagan could drop out of sight for even seven hours. To do so for seven days would be unthinkable for seven weeks impossible. In January and February of this year, the Soviets twice went through the charade of parading Chernenko in public although on both occasions he appeared to be in frail health. It was clear that his illness was terminal.

During this same time, Gorbachev was seen more prominently in public. In December, of course, he took his highly successful trip to London where he and his attractive wife Raisa captivated their British audience. Following his London trip, there were stories in the press that Gorbachev might visit the United States.

But Chernenko's worsening health undoubtedly prevented Gorbachev from traveling abroad.

We can't, of course, know for certain that Gorbachev was making the key decisions in the Politburo on Soviet foreign policy and arms control matters in January of 1985. My personal guess, as I have suggested, is that he was.

Whatever the competition for the mantle of leadership, the Soviets' desire to put on a solid face by the collective leadership was evident. In his speech nominating Gorbachev, Gromyko alluded to the need to show unity in the face of prying foreign eyes. The fact that Gromyko displayed a confident attitude at this time helped achieve this objective.

As for Gromyko, we can surmise that he had a relatively free hand tactically. It might be that Gromyko was in fact making his own decisions within the limits decided upon by the Politburo, since anything other would amount to a real break with Soviet tradition. The collective approach to Soviet policy is highly ingrained, and even a seasoned diplomat like Gromyko will not act outside the bound of his instructions.

Nevertheless, it is becoming increasingly clear that Gorbachev was, during the last weeks before Chernenko died, playing an increasingly influential role in the Soviet Union's arms control decision-making apparatus. Our best piece of evidence comes from Soviet arms negotiator Viktor Karpov who said, on the day after Chernenko died, that the Soviet team's instructions had been given them by Gorbachev the week before the negotiations began.

Although this is the first time Karpov had mentioned names

26

(he never indulged in such speculation when he and I negotiated throughout 1982 and 1983), it is not the first time Karpov had gone out of his way to impress on Westerners the importance of continuity and collectivity in the Soviet leadership. In November 1982, during SALT II, I had invited the Soviet negotiating team to a cocktail party which had been scheduled to take place the day after Brezhnev died. The day Brezhnev died I called Karpov to express my condolences and told him I was cancelling the scheduled party. Karpov thanked me, but asked that I not cancel the party. "We do a lot of business at these parties," Karpov said, "and we would like to go ahead with it. As a matter of respect for General Secretary Brezhnev," he added, "we will not bring our wives." Our party did, in fact, go ahead on schedule as a stag affair. As one Soviet negotiator put it, their wives were left home to mourn Brezhnev's passing.

Although Gorbachev was no doubt playing the dominant role in the Politburo prior to his formal assumption of power, I do not mean to imply that he decided that serious negotiations would be in the offing. It is painfully obvious in the Geneva negotiations that there apparently were no Soviet policy changes for the "new" negotiations. In fact, in all three areas: START, INF, and Defense and Space, the Soviet approach has been to revert to earlier, harder positions.

At the same time that the "new" negotiations were going on in Geneva, General Secretary Gorbachev attempted on several occasions to influence public opinion on arms control. First, he issued his

Easter Day moratorium, a statement that was nothing more than a warmed-over version of offers the Soviets had made in 1982 and 1983. In fact, the same moratorium proposal had been made several weeks earlier in the Geneva negotiations but not disclosed publicly because of the confidentiality agreement entered into between the two Chief Negotiators. That Gorbachev chose to make this public on Easter Day, with all the implications of a "new beginning, a new dawning" in order to assist the various "peace demonstrations," make it clear that Gorbachev was eager to try his hands at influencing Western public opinion. His Easter moratorium proposal laid an egg.

Gorbachev again took to the bully pulpit on April 23, the very day that the first round of the new arms control negotiations came to a close. Gorbachev publicly blamed the US for the lack of progress in the talks. Here, Gorbachev was doing nothing more than turning up the pressure, taking the offensive publicly in order to divert attention from Soviet actions to the contrary. This is a standard Soviet negotiating technique.

What speculation can we indulge in concerning Gorbachev's approach to arms control during his "official first 100 days?"

First, Gorbachev was too preoccupied with consolidating his power base to pay much attention to arms control. It is true that Gorbachev has quickly placed two of his allies, Ligachev and Ryzhkov, the two most junior members of the Secretariat, into the Politburo as full members. Additional clues as to Gorbachev's priorities and which way he will mold the Soviet leadership will come from the pattern of his future appointments. But the way the

appointments are running right now, it appears that he will focus on domestic issues before he embarks on any major foreign initiatives. Further, the luxury of having the experienced Foreign Minister, Gromyko, managing arms control may be allowing Gorbachev to focus on issues at home. He can take his time about taking charge in foreign affairs, in general, and arms control in particular. Gromyko, despite rumors to the contrary, apparently was never a serious competitor for Gorbachev's job and did not threaten the latter's position. If anything, Gorbachev may find it difficult to tell Gromyko, who is at the pinnacle of his career and enjoys enormous prestige, precisely what to do. Accordingly, Gorbachev may well be taking his time about moving into the thorny briar patch of arms control. In the meantime, Gorbachev may be doing what comes most naturally to Soviet leaders: simply continuing past policies and thereby exercising continuity.

Second, it may be that the Soviets have made an assessment of the "correlation of forces" and decided that they are ahead in all areas of strategic power: long-range and intermediate offensive weapons and defenses against them as well. As a consequence, the Soviet leaders may have decided that they do not need to press ahead on arms control. Instead, they may have decided that they have nothing to lose by engaging in the arms control process, so long as they are careful not to enter into agreements that are unfavorable to the Soviet Union.

Finally, Gorbachev may have decided that now is the time to test the will and patience of the United States. Soviet leaders are certainly aware that President Reagan has had a difficult

time getting his defense proposals through the Congress. Further, the Soviets may try to further exploit what they see as a loss in Reagan's popularity as a result of his last trip to Europe. Gorbachev may be convinced that he needs to do nothing at this stage, that things are going his way without any effort on the Soviets' part.

As is usually the case with Soviet leaders, Gorbachev's approach is probably a combination of all three of the above. Or, he may be playing a fourth hidden wild card that we know nothing about. Gorbachev's "go-slow" attitude concerning a meeting with President Reagan may mean that he is playing the role of the reluctant partner, hoping thereby to get more for having finally given in. My guess is that he wants a meeting this fall to take place. It would enhance his image at home and abroad as well as help him consolidate his internal position. On the other hand, he may have decided that he has more to gain by watching Reagan's conduct and the flow of public sentiment during the next several months than by meeting with Mr. Reagan at an early date. Nevertheless, we can be certain Gorbachev is making calculations on how he can gain most from his not inconsiderable skills at influencing public opinion in the West.

What should we conclude from all of the above?

First, Gorbachev, more vigorous and public than his predecessors, has been able to achieve the smoothest transition to power to date in the Soviet Union.

Second, the Soviets place great faith in consistency and patience. They have learned from past experience to anticipate that sooner or later that the West, if the Soviets do nothing, will move toward the Soviet view.

Third, for the short run, the Soviets may believe they have nothing to gain from allowing progress to be made in arms control.

Fourth, while the Soviets firmly believe in collective leadership, Gorbachev's rapid emergence as first amongst equals could set him apart. He appears to have started, and might be able to achieve much desired domestic reforms in Soviet economy. But as for major changes in the Soviets' approach to arms control, he will have to wait until after the Party Congress next year.

Fifth, Gorbachev may well be planning to test his public relations skills to see if he can achieve, by influencing Western publics, have to accomplish through negotiations.

Based on the track record of Gorbachev's first 100 days, what can we be led to expect from him in the future?

The honest answer is that we shall simply have to wait and see. We certainly have no evidence yet to support the view that Gorbachev is a foreign policy reformer anxious for change. We should not expect a new, enlightened and conciliatory approach to arms control.

As to what we should do in the meantime, we in the West must learn to be realistic, objective and patient. We should not undertake further US initiatives unless they would clearly serve our interests by making them now. We should continue to explain that adopting our existing proposals would serve the mutual current

interests of both the United States and the Soviet Union. We should, above all, act prudently.

Meanwhile, we can hope that the Soviet leaders will sooner or later see that it is in their own interest to enter into arms control agreements which significantly reduce the risk of nuclear war. One would hope that the Soviet Union would come to this realization sooner rather than later. They would benefit, we would benefit, and the entire world would benefit.

In the final analysis, the Soviet Union remains the Soviet Union. And, in a sense, Stalin and all of his heirs were reformers who ended up nearly destroying the system or being destroyed by it themselves. Whether Mikhail Gorbachev succeeds where all the others have failed remains a great unanswered question.

E WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SENSITIVE

Eye Only

~~SECRET~~

*JFAD's
Message*

32

Eye Only

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CAS 6/17/02

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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Julia

~~Denial P.~~

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CAS 6/17/02

JFHOC
34

NOT FOR SYSTEM

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

June 25, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

THROUGH: JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: JACK MATLOCK

SUBJECT: "Backchannel" Message to Gorbachev

13526
E.O. 12958
As Amended
Sec. 3.3(b)(1)

Attached are suggested points for a message to Gorbachev. I believe that the best channel would be to ask [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] to see whether he could go to Moscow urgently [REDACTED] as a follow-up to the meeting [REDACTED]

If the Soviets do not respond promptly to a request for a meeting [REDACTED] (i.e., within about a week), we should consider other means of passing the message.

[REDACTED]

Recommendation:

That you approve the attached talking points for transmittal ASAP.

Approve ___ Disapprove ___

Attachment:

Tab I - Text of Message

DECLASSIFIED IN PART 7450
NLRR E06-114/2 # 1800
BY KML NARA DATE 10/1/12

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

35

TEXT OF MESSAGE

-- Your comments regarding the possibility of the General Secretary making a trip to the United States were passed on to the White House and have been carefully considered.

-- I have been asked to let you know that our highest authorities are confused regarding the General Secretary's desires in this regard. Communications received through official channels have often been at variance with those received unofficially. Our people have also noted your statement that not all senior Soviet officials may be completely informed about the General Secretary's desires as regards a meeting with the President, and realize that this may be the root of the problem.

-- The President wants to make sure that the General Secretary clearly understands his reasons for feeling that meetings between them are likely to be most productive if they are held in each other's countries.

-- Our historical experience is that meetings in our respective countries have been much more productive than those held in third countries.

-- The reasons for this are clear: when our leaders meet in each other's countries, there is more time for discussion, the atmosphere can be less formal and more candid, and the visitor has the possibility of seeing something of the other country -- an important element in increasing understanding.

-- The President invited the General Secretary to come to the United States first because the last two summit meetings held in either of our countries were in the Soviet Union. Therefore, the President feels that courtesy requires him to receive his Soviet counterpart before he can accept an invitation to visit the Soviet Union.

-- At the same time, the President is very interested in visiting the Soviet Union, and if the General Secretary wishes, would be prepared to announce that he will visit the Soviet Union next year, simultaneously with an announcement that the General Secretary has accepted the President's invitation to come to the United States this year.

-- The President wishes to assure the General Secretary that if he visits the United States, he will be received with the respect and honor due the leader of the other superpower. If the General Secretary desires, he would have the opportunity to address the people of the United States on television and of course to visit whatever parts of the country he wishes. He can expect a warm reception from the American people.

-- The President noted the General Secretary's comment about the current state of relations being a barrier to his visit. The President recognizes the unsatisfactory state of relations between our countries, but feels that, precisely because relations need to be improved, it is important to establish an atmosphere for a meeting which will be conducive to real progress. This can be done more effectively in our respective countries than in a third country where both leaders would be, in a sense, the guest of another government.

-- For these reasons, and despite some discussion which has taken place in official channels, the President continues to feel that a meeting is likely to be more productive if a pattern of visiting each other's countries can be established. He hopes that the General Secretary will give the matter further thought and will convey his considered view on the question so that our officials can be instructed to make arrangements to the full satisfaction of both parties.

-- Aside from the confusion over the General Secretary's personal desires regarding a meeting, our senior authorities have also noted that the General Secretary has at times seemed to be misinformed about the U.S. position on some important questions. For example, he has quoted purported statements by U.S. officials which in fact were not made. Our authorities have no doubt of the General Secretary's sincerity in doing so, but are concerned by the evidence that he must have received incorrect information, and therefore may have formed a distorted view of what actual U.S. policy and intentions are.

-- Obviously, misunderstandings regarding attitudes on the other side make it much more difficult to take practical steps to narrow the differences between our two countries. For this reason, it may be useful to establish a more effective means for the leaders of our two countries to communicate privately, unofficially and directly. If the General Secretary shares the view that such an arrangement would be helpful, the President would welcome any concrete suggestions he may have for putting it into effect.

-- I would appreciate your discussing these thoughts with the General Secretary, and am at your disposal if he wishes me to convey any comment or suggestions privately and unofficially to the White House.

JFHOC
34

NOT FOR SYSTEM

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

June 25, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

THROUGH: JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: JACK MATLOCK

SUBJECT: "Backchannel" Message to Gorbachev

13526
E. O. ~~12958~~
As Amended
Sec. 3.3(b)(1)

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[REDACTED] to see whether he could go to Moscow urgently [REDACTED] as a follow-up to the meeting [REDACTED]

If the Soviets do not respond promptly to a request for a meeting [REDACTED] (i.e., within about a week), we should consider other means of passing the message.

Recommendation:

That you approve the attached talking points for transmittal ASAP.

Approve ___ Disapprove ___

Attachment:

Tab I - Text of Message

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLRR E06-114/2 # 7451
BY KML NARA DATE 10/4/12

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

35

TEXT OF MESSAGE

-- Your comments regarding the possibility of the General Secretary making a trip to the United States were passed on to the White House and have been carefully considered.

-- I have been asked to let you know that our highest authorities are confused regarding the General Secretary's desires in this regard. Communications received through official channels have often been at variance with those received unofficially. Our people have also noted your statement that not all senior Soviet officials may be completely informed about the General Secretary's desires as regards a meeting with the President, and realize that this may be the root of the problem.

-- The President wants to make sure that the General Secretary clearly understands his reasons for feeling that meetings between them are likely to be most productive if they are held in each other's countries.

-- Our historical experience is that meetings in our respective countries have been much more productive than those held in third countries.

-- The reasons for this are clear: when our leaders meet in each other's countries, there is more time for discussion, the atmosphere can be less formal and more candid, and the visitor has the possibility of seeing something of the other country -- an important element in increasing understanding.

-- The President invited the General Secretary to come to the United States first because the last two summit meetings held in either of our countries were in the Soviet Union. Therefore, the President feels that courtesy requires him to receive his Soviet counterpart before he can accept an invitation to visit the Soviet Union.

-- At the same time, the President is very interested in visiting the Soviet Union, and if the General Secretary wishes, would be prepared to announce that he will visit the Soviet Union next year, simultaneously with an announcement that the General Secretary has accepted the President's invitation to come to the United States this year.

-- The President wishes to assure the General Secretary that if he visits the United States, he will be received with the respect and honor due the leader of the other superpower. If the General Secretary desires, he would have the opportunity to address the people of the United States on television and of course to visit whatever parts of the country he wishes. He can expect a warm reception from the American people.

-- The President noted the General Secretary's comment about the current state of relations being a barrier to his visit. The President recognizes the unsatisfactory state of relations between our countries, but feels that, precisely because relations need to be improved, it is important to establish an atmosphere for a meeting which will be conducive to real progress. This can be done more effectively in our respective countries than in a third country where both leaders would be, in a sense, the guest of another government.

-- For these reasons, and despite some discussion which has taken place in official channels, the President continues to feel that a meeting is likely to be more productive if a pattern of visiting each other's countries can be established. He hopes that the General Secretary will give the matter further thought and will convey his considered view on the question so that our officials can be instructed to make arrangements to the full satisfaction of both parties.

-- Aside from the confusion over the General Secretary's personal desires regarding a meeting, our senior authorities have also noted that the General Secretary has at times seemed to be misinformed about the U.S. position on some important questions. For example, he has quoted purported statements by U.S. officials which in fact were not made. Our authorities have no doubt of the General Secretary's sincerity in doing so, but are concerned by the evidence that he must have received incorrect information, and therefore may have formed a distorted view of what actual U.S. policy and intentions are.

-- Obviously, misunderstandings regarding attitudes on the other side make it much more difficult to take practical steps to narrow the differences between our two countries. For this reason, it may be useful to establish a more effective means for the leaders of our two countries to communicate privately, unofficially and directly. If the General Secretary shares the view that such an arrangement would be helpful, the President would welcome any concrete suggestions he may have for putting it into effect.

-- I would appreciate your discussing these thoughts with the General Secretary, and am at your disposal if he wishes me to convey any comment or suggestions privately and unofficially to the White House.

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Russian Str.
Attached

SECRET/SENSITIVE

June 26, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT: Gorbachev's Response to President's Letter on Interim Restraint

In a meeting with Secretary Shultz Monday, Dobrynin delivered a letter from Gorbachev which replies to the President's letter of June 10 explaining his decision on interim restraint.

I concur with the Secretary's analysis of the letter, in particular that it seems to have been written in the Foreign Ministry, and is designed primarily for the record. Given the harshness of some of the language which was drafted to refute charges of Soviet non-compliance, Gorbachev did reassert that he is "full of resolve to strive to find a solution" [to the "central issue of security"] and endorsed once more the President's earlier appeal for a "joint search for ways to improve Soviet-American relations." This is a typically Soviet way of trying to keep the door open.

Attached is a brief memo to the President forwarding the reply and Secretary Shultz's comments on it.

Recommendation:

That you forward the memorandum at TAB I to the President.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

TAB I Memorandum to the President

TAB A Memorandum from Secretary Shultz and Gorbachev Reply

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: *NSA 11-007 #274 SMF*
BY: *CWS*, NARA, Date: *6/17/02* 10/22/99

SECRET/SENSITIVE

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

SUBJECT: Gorbachev's Reply to Your Letter Explaining Your
Interim Restraint Decision

In a meeting Monday, Dobrynin delivered to George Shultz a reply from Gorbachev to your letter of June 10 explaining your interim restraint decision.

As George points out, the letter seems to have been staff written in the Foreign Ministry for the record. While it rejects charges of Soviet non-compliance in harsh language, Gorbachev was careful to conclude by reiterating a desire to work out problems in the relationship.

We are now working with State on a draft reply to this and Gorbachev's earlier letter.

Attachment:

Tab A Memorandum from Secretary Shultz and translation of letter from Gorbachev dated June 22.

Prepared by:
Jack F. Matlock

cc: The Vice President

SECRET/SENSITIVE
Declassify: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLSS97-001 #91 S.M.F. 10/22/99
BY CJS, NARA, Date 6/17/02

National Security Council
The White House

43

System # II
Package # 90713

85 JUN 25 P 6: 03

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bob Pearson			
William Martin	1	WM	A
John Poindexter			
Paul Thompson			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
William Martin			staff EYES ONLY
NSC Secretariat	2		MATLOCK
Situation Room			

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Regan Buchanan Other _____

COMMENTS Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

copy attached

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

90713

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

June 25, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: George P. Shultz *GPS*

SUBJECT: My Meeting with Dobrynin June 24:
Gorbachev's Response on Interim Restraint

Dobrynin came in yesterday evening to deliver Gorbachev's response to your June 10 letter on interim restraint. His English translation and the original Russian text are attached. After looking through the letter, I commented that it seemed extremely contentious, but we would respond to it carefully in due course.

The letter is long and worth more analysis, but at first glance the main point seems to be that the Soviets will not recognize any right of ours to depart from the provisions of SALT II and other arms control agreements by unilateral decision. Most of the letter is a catalogue, written very much in Gromyko's style, of things we have done that make them suspicious that this is our real intention. The steps we have taken give them every right to break commitments, the letter says, but they have not done so in the hope that "sober reasoning" and US self-interest would bring more restraint from us, and this has happened "to a certain, though not to a full, extent." By implication, your interim restraint decision reflects such restraint, but they remain suspicious that they are being asked to agree we have a right to violate commitments in response to violations they deny having made. The letter denies in advance that we have any such right, and says they will wait and see how we act in the future: "It depends on the American side how things will shape up further, and we shall make the appropriate conclusions."

Dobrynin drew attention to the concluding paragraphs of the letter, where Gorbachev states that "arms limitation has been and will be the central issue both in our relations and as far as the further development of the entire international situation is concerned." Thus our two countries have a "special responsibility," he goes on to say, and they remain committed to working with us on a "solution to the central issues of security on the basis of equality and equal security." This is the strongest language on the importance of arms control and US-Soviet negotiations for the world generally that I have seen from the Soviets, and it suggests that we do in fact have a good deal of leverage in negotiations if we can maintain our strength and steadiness.

DECLASSIFIED

MLS F06-114/2-7452

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

~~DECL: OADR~~

BY h0j NARA, DATE 11/21/07

Dobrynin had no other instructions, either on a meeting with you or anything else, but we had a relaxed exchange in which I made a number of points.

I noted there had been several occasions where we seemed on the verge of having things get better, and then something happened to throw us off course -- most recently, their shooting of Major Nicholson and their subsequent handling of the incident. It was a disturbing pattern. Looking at bilateral issues, we were not specific on any one, but agreed that with the right atmosphere there were a number of things that could be resolved easily. On regional issues, we agreed that not much had been accomplished in our talks, but that those on southern Africa had perhaps been more constructive than before. I was interested that he thought Afghanistan issues might well be pursued further. Perhaps things Rajiv Gandhi said here have registered in the Soviet Union. In connection with the Middle East, I brought up the hostage problem and called attention to the importance of Syria's role in Lebanon. He had nothing to say on Syria, but remarked that hijacking and hostage taking were outside the bounds of civilized behavior. I suggested that his government might say so.

In conclusion, we also discussed the upcoming meetings in Helsinki and the possibility of meetings here with Gromyko in the fall, as opportunities to move things along. He will be going back to Moscow for his summer leave next week, and I may have another conversation with him before that.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

46
Translation from the Russian

His Excellency
Ronald W. Reagan
President of the United States of America
Washington, D.C.

June 22, 1985

Dear Mr. President:

In connection with your letter of June 10, in which you outline the U.S. Government's decision on the SALT II Treaty made public the same day, I deem it necessary to express the viewpoint of the Soviet leadership on this matter.

I shall start by stating that your version of the past and present state of affairs in the key areas of Soviet-American relations, that of the limitation and reduction of strategic arms, cannot withstand comparison with the actual facts. Evidently, it was not by chance that you chose 1982 as your point of reference, the year when the American side declared its readiness to comply with the main provisions of the SALT II Treaty, unratified by the United States. Unfortunately, however, it was not this that determined the general course of your administration's policy and its practical actions with regard to strategic armaments.

It is hard to avoid the thought that a choice of a different kind had been made earlier, when it was stated outright that you did not consider yourself bound by the obligations assumed by your predecessors under agreements with the Soviet Union. This was perceived by others, and in the United States too, as repudiation of the arms limitations process and the search for agreements.

This was confirmed in practice: an intensive nuclear arms race was initiated in the United States. Precisely through this race, it would seem, and began to see and continues to see to this day the main means for achieving "prevailing" positions in the world under the guise of assuring U.S. national security.

In this sense, the few steps of the American side that you mentioned that went in a different direction and took account of the realities of today's world, are they not just temporary, "interim?"

It is not for the sake of polemics, but in order to restore the full picture of what has occurred, that I would like to return briefly to what has been done by the United States with regard to the current regime for strategic stability.

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Authority: NLSS 97-001 SMF 10/22
BY: CIS #92
NARA, Date: 6/17/02

One cannot dispute the fact that the American side created an ambiguous situation whereby the SALT II Treaty, one of the pillars of our relationship in the security sphere, was turned into a semi-functioning document that the U.S., moreover, is now threatening to nullify step by step. How can one then talk about predictability of conduct and assess with sufficient confidence the other side's intentions?

It is difficult to evaluate the damage done to our relationship and to international stability as a whole by your administration's decision to break off a process of negotiations that the USSR and the U.S. assumed a legal obligation to conduct. Such an obligation is contained in the very text of the SALT II Treaty, as well as in the accompanying "Joint Statement of Principles and Basic Guidelines for Subsequent Negotiations on the Limitation of Strategic Arms."

The chain ensuring the viability of the process of curbing the arms race, put together through great effort, was consciously broken.

Today it is especially clear that this caused many promising opportunities to slip by, while some substantial elements of our relationship in this area were squandered.

The United States crossed a dangerous threshold when it preferred to cast aside the Protocol to the SALT II Treaty instead of immediately taking up, as was envisaged, the resolution of these issues which were dealt with in the Protocol. Those issues are of cardinal importance - the limitation and prohibition of entire classes of arms. It is no secret as to what guided the American side in taking this step: it wanted to gain an advantage by deploying long-range cruise missiles. As a result, already today one has to deal with thousands of such missiles. The U.S. sought to sharply tilt in its favor the fine-tuned balance of interests underlying the agreement. Now you see, I believe, that it did not work out this way. We too are deploying cruise missiles, which we had proposed to ban. But even now we are prepared to come to an agreement on such a ban, should the U.S., taking a realistic position, agree to take such an important step.

The deployment in Western Europe of new nuclear systems designed to perform strategic missions was a clear circumvention, that is non-compliance, by the American side with regard to the SALT II Treaty. In this, Mr. President, we see an attempt by the United States, taking advantage of geographic factors, to gain a virtual monopoly on the use weapons in a situation for which our country has no analogue. I know that on your side the need for some regional balance is sometimes cited. But even in

that case it is incomprehensible why the U.S. refuses to resolve this issue in a manner which would establish in the zone of Europe a balance of medium-range missiles, whereby the USSR would not have more missiles and warheads on them than are currently in the possession of England and France. Such a formula would not infringe upon anyone's interests, whereas the distortion caused by the American missiles in Europe is not a balance at all.

In broader terms, all these violations by the United States of the regime for strategic stability have one common denominator: departure from the principle of equality and equal security. This and nothing else is the reason for the lack of progress in limiting and reducing nuclear arms over the past 4-5 years.

However, I would like you to have a clear understanding of the fact that, in practice, strategic parity between our countries will be maintained. We cannot envisage nor can we permit a different situation. The question, however, is at what level parity will be maintained -- at a decreasing or an increasing one. We are for the former, for the reduction in the level of strategic confrontation. Your government, by all indications, favors the latter, evidently hoping that at some stage the U.S. will ultimately succeed in getting ahead. This is the essence of the current situation.

Should one be surprised, then, that we are conducting negotiations, yet the process of practical arms limitation remains suspended? It would probably not be too great a misfortune if this process simply remained frozen. But even that is not the case. The "star wars" program -- I must tell you this, Mr. President -- already at this stage is seriously undermining stability. We strongly advise you to halt this sharply destabilizing and dangerous program while things have not gone too far. If the situation in this area is not corrected, we shall have no choice but to take steps required by our security and that of our allies.

We are in favor, as you say, of making the best use of the chance offered by the Geneva negotiations on nuclear and space arms. Our main objective at those negotiations should be to reestablish the suspended process of limiting the arms race and to prevent its spread into new spheres.

The SALT-II Treaty is an important element of the strategic equilibrium, and one should clearly understand its role as well as the fact that, according to the well-known expression, one cannot have one's pie and eat it too.

Your approach is determined by the fact that the strategic programs being carried out by the United States are about to collide with the limitations established by the SALT II Treaty, and the choice is being made not in favor of the Treaty, but in favor of these programs. And this cannot be disavowed or concealed, to put it bluntly, by unseemly attempts to accuse the Soviet Union of all mortal sins. It is, moreover, completely inappropriate in relations between our two countries for one to set forth conditions for the another as is done in your letter with regard to the Soviet Union.

I am saying all this frankly and unequivocally, as we have agreed.

One certainly cannot agree that the provisions of the SALT II Treaty remain in force allegedly as the result of restraint on the part of the United States. Entirely the contrary. The general attitude toward the Treaty shown by the American side and its practical actions to undermine it have given us every reason to draw appropriate conclusions and to take practical steps. We did have and continue to have moral, legal and political grounds for that.

We did not, however, give way to emotions; we showed patience, realizing the seriousness of the consequences of the path onto which we were being pushed. We hoped also that sober reasoning, as well as the self-interest of the U.S., would make the American side take a more restrained position. That was what in fact happened to a certain, though not to a full, extent. And we have treated this in businesslike fashion. Without ignoring what has been done by the American side contrary to the SALT II Treaty, we nevertheless at no time have been the initiators of politico-propagandistic campaigns of charges and accusations. We have striven to discuss seriously within the framework of the SCC the well-founded concerns we have had. We also have given exhaustive answers there to questions raised by the American side.

Unfortunately, the behavior of the other side was and continues to be utterly different. All those endless reports on imaginary Soviet violations and their publication did not and cannot serve any useful purpose, if one is guided by the task of preserving and continuing the process of arms limitation. Why mince words, the objective is quite different: to cast aspersions on the policy of the Soviet Union in general, to sow distrust toward it and to create an artificial pretext for an accelerated and uncontrolled arms race. All this became evident to us already long ago.

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One has to note that your present decision, if it were to be implemented, would be a logical continuation of that course. We would like you, Mr. President, to think all this over once again.

In any event, we shall regard the decision that you announced in the entirety of its mutually-exclusive elements which, along with the usual measures required by the Treaty, include also a claim to some "right" to violate provisions of the Treaty as the American side chooses. Neither side has such a right. I do not consider it necessary to go into specifics here, a lot has been said about it, and your military experts are well aware of the actual, rather than distorted, state of affairs.

One should not count on the fact that we will be able to come to terms with you with respect to destroying the SALT II Treaty through joint efforts. How things will develop further depends on the American side, and we shall draw the appropriate conclusions.

The question of the approach to arms limitation has been, is, and will be the central issue both in our relations and as far as the further development of the overall international situation is concerned. It is precisely here, above all, that the special responsibility borne by our two countries is manifested, as well as how each of them approaches that responsibility.

In more specific terms, it is a question of intentions with regard to one other. No matter what is being done in other spheres of our relationship, in the final analysis, whether or not it is going to be constructive and stable depends above all on whether we are going to find a solution to the central issues of security on the basis of equality and equal security.

I would like to reaffirm that, for our part, we are full of resolve to strive to find such a solution. This determines both our attitude toward those initial limitations which were arrived at earlier through painstaking joint labor, and our approach to the negotiations currently underway in Geneva and elsewhere.

I wish to say this in conclusion: one would certainly like to feel tangibly the same attitude on the part of the United States. At any rate, as I have already had a chance to note, we took seriously the thought reiterated by you in our correspondence with regard to a joint search for ways to improve Soviet-American relations and to strengthen the foundations of peace.

Sincerely,

M. Gorbachev

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Его Превосходительству
Рональду У. РЕЙГАНУ,
Президенту Соединенных Штатов Америки
г. Вашингтон

Уважаемый господин Президент,

В связи с Вашим письмом от 10 июня с.г., в котором Вы излагаете опубликованное в тот же день правительством США решение в отношении Договора ОСВ-2, считаю необходимым высказать точку зрения советского руководства на этот счет.

Начну с того, что изложенная Вами версия, как складывались и как обстоят дела сейчас в ключевой области советско-американских отношений — в вопросах ограничения и сокращения стратегических вооружений, — не выдерживает сопоставления с фактами. Видимо, не случайно Вы избрали точкой отсчета 1982 год, когда с американской стороны было заявлено о готовности соблюдать основные положения не ратифицированного Соединенными Штатами договора ОСВ-2. Но не это, к сожалению, определяло общий курс политики Вашей администрации и ее практические действия в том, что касается стратегических вооружений.

Трудно отделаться от мысли, что выбор иного плана был сделан раньше, когда прямо говорилось, что Вы не считаете себя связанными обязательствами, взятыми Вашими предшественниками по соглашениям с Советским Союзом. Это было воспринято другими, да и в самих США, как отречение от процесса ограничения вооружений, от поиска договоренностей.

Это подтверждала и практика: в США была начата интенсивная гонка ядерных вооружений. Именно в ней, похоже, стали видеть, и усматривают до сих пор, фактически главное средство достижений "превалирующих" позиций в мире под видом обеспечения национальной безопасности США.

В этом смысле не являются ли те упоминаемые Вами немногие шаги с американской стороны, которые шли в другом направлении, учитывали реальности сегодняшнего мира, всего лишь временными, "промежуточными"?

Не ради полемики, а в порядке восстановления полной картины происходящего, хотел бы кратко вернуться к тому, что было сделано Соединенными Штатами в отношении сложившегося режима стратегической стабильности.

Невозможно оспорить, что американской стороной было создано двусмысленное положение, при котором договор ОСВ-2 — одна из опор наших взаимоотношений в сфере безопасности — был превращен в полудействующий документ, который к тому же США сейчас грозятся поэтапно вообще свести на нет. Как тут можно говорить о предсказуемости поведения, с достаточной уверенностью судить о намерениях другой стороны?

Трудно подсчитать тот ущерб, который был причинен нашим отношениям, международной стабильности в целом, решением Вашей администрации прервать процесс переговоров, вести которые СССР и США юридически обязались. Такое обязательство содержится в самом тексте договора ОСВ-2 и в приложенном к нему "совместном заявлении о принципах и основных направлениях последующих переговоров об ограничении стратегических вооружений".

Была сознательно разомкнута собранная большими усилиями цепь, обеспечивающая жизнедеятельность процесса сдерживания гонки вооружений.

Сейчас особенно ясно видно, что из-за этого оказались упущены многообещающие возможности, а некоторые существенные элементы наших отношений в этой области и утрачены.

Опасный порог переступили США тогда, когда они предпочли отбросить протокол к договору ОСВ-2 вместо того, чтобы безотлагательно заняться, как это и было предусмотрено, решением тех вопросов, которые были в нем оговорены. Речь шла о вопросах кардинального порядка — об ограничениях и запрещениях целых классов вооружений. Не секрет, чем руководствовалась американская сторона, предпринимая этот шаг: хотела получить преимущество за счет развертывания крылатых ракет большой дальности. В результате уже сегодня приходится иметь дело с тысячами таких ракет. Тщательно выверенный баланс интересов, заложенный в основу договоренности, США вознамерились резко качнуть в свою сторону. Сейчас, я полагаю, Вы видите, что этого сделать не удалось. И у нас развертываются крылатые ракеты, которые мы предлагали запретить. Но мы готовы договориться о запрете и сейчас, если бы США, перейдя на почву реальности, согласились пойти на такой важный шаг.

Очевидным обходом, то есть несоблюдением, американской стороной договора ОСВ-2 стало развертывание в Западной Европе новых ядерных средств, предназначенных для решения стратегических задач. В этом,

господин Президент, мы видим попытку, используя географические факторы, получить для Соединенных Штатов по существу монополию на использование оружия в ситуации, аналога которой у нашей страны нет. Знаю, что с Вашей стороны делается подчас ссылка на необходимость некоего регионального баланса. Но и тогда непонятно, почему США отказываются решить этот вопрос таким образом, чтобы в зоне Европы было установлено равновесие по ракетам средней дальности, когда у СССР было бы не больше ракет и боезарядов на них, чем имеют сейчас Англия и Франция. Такая формула не ущемляла бы ничьих интересов. А перекося за счет американских ракет в Европе уже не является балансом.

Если говорить по-крупному, то у всех этих нарушений Соединенными Штатами режима стратегической стабильности один общий знаменатель — отход от принципа равенства и одинаковой безопасности. В этом, а не в чем другом причина отсутствия продвижения в деле ограничения и сокращения ядерных вооружений за последние 4-5 лет.

Хотелось бы, однако, чтобы у Вас было ясное понимание того, что на практике стратегический паритет между нашими странами будет сохраняться. Иной ситуации мы себе не представляем и не допустим. Вопрос, однако, в том, на каком уровне будет этот паритет — на снижающемся или на возрастающем. Мы — за первое, за снижение уровня стратегического противостояния. Ваше правительство, судя по всему, предпочитает второе, надеюсь, видимо, что на каком-то этапе США все же удастся вырваться вперед. Такова суть нынешней ситуации.

Стоит ли удивляться, что переговоры у нас с вами ведутся, а процесс практического ограничения вооружений остается прерванным. Было бы, наверное, полбеды, если бы этот процесс сохранялся просто замороженным. Но даже этого нет. Программа "звездных войн" — я должен сказать это Вам, господин Президент, — уже на нынешней стадии серьезным образом подрывает стабильность. Мы настоятельно советуем вам свернуть, пока дело не зашло слишком далеко, эту резко дестабилизирующую и опасную программу. Если положение в этой области не будет скорректировано, то у нас не останется другого выхода, как принять меры, требуемые нашей и наших союзников безопасностью.

Мы за то, чтобы, как Вы говорите, наилучшим образом использовать шанс, предоставляемый ведущимися в Женеве переговорами по ядерным и космическим вооружениям. Главная наша цель на них должна состоять в том, чтобы восстановить прерванный процесс ограничения гонки вооружений и предотвратить ее распространение в новые сферы.

Договор ОСВ-2 — важный элемент стратегического равновесия, и эту его функцию надо ясно понимать, равно как и то, что нельзя, по известному выражению, съесть пирог и одновременно иметь его нетронутым.

Ваш подход определяется тем, что стратегические программы, осуществляемые Соединенными Штатами, вот-вот натолкнутся на ограничения, установленные Договором ОСВ-2, и выбор делается не в пользу договора, а в пользу этих программ. И этого не отменить и не скрыть, скажу прямо, неблагоприятными попытками обвинять Советский Союз во всех смертных грехах. И уже совсем неуместно в отношениях между нашими странами ставить друг другу какие-то условия, как это делается в Вашем письме в отношении Советского Союза.

Обо всем этом я говорю откровенно и без околичностей, как мы с Вами условились.

Конечно же, нельзя согласиться с тем, будто положения договора ОСВ-2 остаются в силе в результате сдержанности Соединенных Штатов. Все обстоит наоборот. Общее отношение к договору, проявленное американской стороной, и ее практические действия по его подрыву давали нам все основания сделать соответствующие выводы и предпринять практические шаги. У нас для этого были и есть моральные, юридические и политические основания.

Но мы не поддались эмоциям, мы проявили терпение, понимая серьезность последствий того пути, на который нас толкали. Мы надеялись также, что трезвый расчет, да и собственные интересы США заставят американскую сторону занять более сдержанную позицию. В какой-то, хотя и не в полной степени, так и случилось. И мы по-деловому к этому отнеслись. Не игнорируя того, что делалось американской стороной вразрез с Договором ОСВ-2, мы тем не менее ни в какой момент не были инициаторами развертывания политико-пропагандистских кампаний по выдвиганию претензий и обвинений. Возникавшие у нас обоснованные озабоченности мы стремились

серьезно обсуждать в рамках ПКК. Там же мы давали исчерпывающие ответы на вопросы, возникавшие у американской стороны.

К сожалению, совсем иначе веда и ведет себя другая сторона. Все эти бесконечные доклады о мнимых советских нарушениях и их публикация никакой полезной цели не служили и служить не могут, если руководствоваться задачей сохранения и продолжения процесса ограничения вооружений. Что там скрывать, цель тут иная: бросить тень на политику Советского Союза вообще, посеять недоверие к нему и создать искусственный предлог для форсированной бесконтрольной гонки вооружений. Все это для нас стало давно уже очевидным.

Приходится констатировать, что ваше нынешнее решение, будь оно реализовано, станет логическим продолжением этой линии. Хотелось бы, чтобы Вы, господин Президент, еще раз все это взвесили.

Во всяком случае объявленное Вами решение мы будем воспринимать во всей совокупности его взаимоисключающих элементов, которые наряду с обычными требуемыми договором мерами включают и заявку на некое "право" нарушать положения договора по выбору американской стороны. Ни одна сторона такого права не имеет. Я не считаю необходимым вдаваться здесь в конкретику, о ней много наговорено, и ваши военные эксперты хорошо знают истинное, а не искажаемое положение вещей.

Не стоит рассчитывать, будто мы с вами сможем условиться насчет того, чтобы совместными усилиями разрушить Договор ОСВ-2. Как будет дальше складываться положение, зависит от американской стороны, а мы сделаем соответствующие выводы.

Вопрос об отношении к ограничению вооружений был, есть и будет центральным вопросом и в наших отношениях, и в том, что касается дальнейшего развития международной обстановки в целом. Именно здесь прежде всего проявляется та особая ответственность, которую несут наши страны, и то, как каждая из них подходит к этой ответственности.

А в более конкретном плане это вопрос о намерениях в отношении друг друга. Что бы ни делалось в других сферах наших отношений, в конечном итоге, быть им или не быть конструктивными и стабильными, зависит прежде всего от того, найдем ли мы с вами решение центральных вопросов безопасности на основе равенства и одинаковой безопасности.

Хочу подтвердить, что со своей стороны мы полны решимости добиваться, чтобы такое решение было найдено. Этим определяется и наше отношение к тем первоначальным ограничениям, которые были ранее достигнуты совместным кропотливым трудом. И наш подход к ныне ведущимся переговорам в Женеве, да и не только там.

В заключение скажу: конечно, хотелось бы осязаемо почувствовать такой же настрой и со стороны Соединенных Штатов. Во всяком случае, как я уже имел возможность отмечать, мы серьезно отнеслись к повторяемой Вами в нашей переписке мысли насчет совместного поиска путей к улучшению советско-американских отношений и укреплению устоев мира.

С уважением,

М. ГОРБАЧЕВ

22 июня 1985 года