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File Folder MATLOCK CHRON MAY 1985 (4/5)

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| ID | Doc Type | Document Description | No of Pages | Doc Date | Restrictions |
|------|----------|--|-------------|-----------|--------------|
| 7359 | MEMO | MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE SHULTZ-GROMYKO MEETING: TALKING POINTS R 10/1/2012 F2006-114/2 | 3 | 5/11/1985 | B1 |
| 7360 | MEMO | CONSULTATIONS ON REGIONAL ISSUES WITH USSR R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2 | 3 | ND | B1 |
| 7363 | MEM | SHULTZ MAY 14 MEETING WITH GROMYKO R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2 | 31 | 4/29/1985 | B1 |
| 7361 | MEMO | SAME TEXT AS DOC #7359 R 10/1/2012 F2006-114/2 | 3 | 5/11/1985 | B1 |
| 7362 | MEMO | DEGRAFFENREID TO KIMMITT RE STATE DRAFT REPORT ON H.R. 75 DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS COMMUNIST REGIMES R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2 | 1 | 5/9/1985 | B1 |

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MATLOCK JMC
7359

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

May 11, 1985

ACTION

DECLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

NLRR F06-114/2 # 7359

FROM:

JACK MATLOCK *JM*BY KML NARA DATE 10/1/12

SUBJECT:

Shultz-Gromyko Meeting: Talking Points

Bob Linhard has forwarded to you suggested revisions in the Secretary's presentation of arms control issues. We have now reviewed the talking points prepared on subjects other than arms control and have a number of suggestions to make.

Most importantly, I believe the approach to consultations on regional issues should be revised to be consistent with the proposal the President made in his UNGA address for regular consultation on these issues. You will recall that the Soviets have proposed consultations on Afghanistan, the Near East and Persian Gulf, East and Southeast Asia, Central America and Southern Africa. We accepted talks on Afghanistan and Southern Africa and said that Shultz would take up the rest in Vienna. The Soviets have agreed, somewhat to our surprise, since we had assumed that they would not discuss Afghanistan unless we were willing to discuss Central America.

I am attaching a separate paper on this issue, but I would urge that, at Vienna, Secretary Shultz indicate that we accept the Soviet proposal for consultations in all these areas and will be in touch with them through normal diplomatic channels to set times and places. He might also add that consultations on European questions might also be useful (under which rubric we would include Eastern Europe), and that we would like to see them develop into a pattern of regular consultation and not just one-shot meetings.

The attached talking points show our markups. The more significant changes are the following:

-- On the introductory points, I believe it is not wise to make comments about Gorbachev (the line about his being "a very impressive leader"). This sounds patronizing and is unnecessary; furthermore, positive-sounding comments on Gorbachev could be taken as a dig at Gromyko.

-- Summitry: I would omit the comments on summitry on pages three and four of the introductory remarks. The ball is in the Soviet court, and we should let Gromyko bring this issue up if he wants. If Shultz broaches the issue it will convey to them that

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

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we are motivated primarily by a desire to set a meeting, rather than to deal with the issues. Tactically this is unwise.

-- Afghanistan: The proposed presentation seems weak to us. It treats the standard Soviet position -- that the only problem is outside interference -- as a "contingency" theme rather than as the all-but-certain starting point of the Soviet discussion. Given this (and the total lack of progress in the UN talks), it does no good simply to restate that we are committed to a negotiated settlement. The question for the Soviets is not whether we are committed but whether they can do better militarily than through a negotiated settlement.

Because we have some evidence of Soviet anxiety (and possibly divisions) on this score, it may be a good time to have a somewhat blunter talk, in which Shultz speaks more directly about the trends of the war (i.e., the growing strength of the mujahidin) and about how we see the alternatives (i.e., we have no interest in a Soviet defeat, but we and many other nations also have a strong interest in no Soviet victory. Because this is so, no good will come of this war for the Soviet Union.) At the same time the Secretary could add some conciliatory notes. He can, for example, reaffirm that we have no desire to be involved in Afghanistan's affairs over the long term. We were content for decades -- through many different Afghan regimes and despite preponderant Soviet influence -- to have no such role and we seek none now. A parallel between an Afghan settlement and the Austrian State Treaty should not be constructed, lest it be misunderstood as a U.S. attempt to establish de jure U.S. rights in regard to Afghanistan.

Southern Africa and Central America: There should be more direct references to the specific problem of Cuban troops. As regards Central America, we should not just call for "Cuban restraint," but demand that there be no Cuban military presence in Nicaragua.

Middle East: The Secretary should not repeat the suggestion that better treatment of Soviet Jews would help show that the Soviets can play a constructive role in the region. This issue should be considered entirely outside the context of Middle East issues.

Don Don Fortier and Steve Sestanovich concur. Burghardt, Laux, Teicher and Steiner have concurred in regard to the subjects in their areas.

Recommendation:

That you suggest to Secretary Shultz that his talking points be amended as indicated in the attached package.

Approve RCM Disapprove
Approved

Attachments:

- Tab I - Talking points, with revisions noted
- Tab II - Discussion of regional consultations

BY LDT, NARA, DATE 11/21/07SECRET/SENSITIVE

CONSULTATIONS ON REGIONAL ISSUES WITH THE SOVIETS

The Soviet proposal was clearly a response to the President's suggestion in his UNGA speech that we establish a pattern of regular consultations on regional issues. Since this is the case, it could be very damaging to the credibility of our diplomacy in general if we, in effect, renege on implementing one of our own proposals.

While the President's proposal did not commit us to any specific form of consultation, the Soviet proposal was not a one-sided one, since they included issues of great sensitivity to them (Afghanistan) as well as those of great sensitivity to us (Central America and the Middle East). Therefore, the question is not one of consulting selectively on those issues which the Soviets can somehow use to an advantage.

We should, however, proceed with regional consultations not just because we have proposed them in general, but also because they can be used to our diplomatic and political advantage if conducted properly. The following considerations are relevant:

-- Being seen in close communication with the Soviets (even if most of this comprises talking past each other) is useful to us. Our public gets nervous when we seem only to be shouting at each other in public; a pattern of consultations would have a soothing effect, even if nothing concrete materialized.

-- Regional consultations, particularly if they are a regular occurrence, can be a useful vehicle for laying down markers and avoiding surprises. Things can be said which would seem more challenging if said at higher levels. And regular consultations would also provide the possibility for informal but important messages on the fringes.

-- Regional consultations do not legitimize any particular Soviet role, and should be conducted with care to avoid seeming to do so. They do recognize the obvious fact that the Soviet Union is a superpower and, whether legitimately or not, is involved in many of the trouble spots.

-- In many instances, the mere existence of talks can have a useful effect on Soviet allies. Ours also sometimes become a bit nervous, of course, but this is manageable so long as we brief them thoroughly and explain our aims. Their "friends" know very well that the Soviets may not level with them, and are likely to be concerned that the Soviets may make some deal behind their backs. Consultations on Central America and the Caribbean, for example, are bound to cause worry in Havana and Nicaragua, since they will never be sure just what is going on, and will fear that some deal may be made behind their backs. This can be used subtly to increase their incentives to look for ways to deal directly with us. Such talks also would discourage attempts by self-appointed "mediators" to try to inject themselves into the process.

Structuring the Talks

None of this means, of course that we have to accept the Soviet proposal just as it was made. We can propose a different order and timing, and should make sure that they cover the area as we would define it.

For example, since we have already had one round on the Middle East, the next should wait until we have gone through a cycle of consultations on other areas. Also, we should make clear that consultations on "Central America" should be defined more broadly, to encompass all of Latin America, or at a minimum, Central America and the Caribbean (to make sure Cuba is in there). We should also attempt to get Eastern Europe on the agenda by proposing talks on European issues, and perhaps hold scheduling the talks on Latin America implicitly hostage to Soviet agreement to this.

Since the hierarchical structure of the two bureaucracies does not provide an exact fit, we have some flexibility in determining the level of the interlocutors on our side. The Soviets will normally hold the talks at the Division Chief level. We have the option to use an Assistant Secretary to head our group, or if we prefer not to go that high, a DAS. In some instances, we might even want to have a couple of office directors do it. Such technicalities can be determined in each specific instance.

Using the Talks

Each set of talks obviously must be prepared carefully with clear-cut goals in mind, and a strategy for using the talks to further them.

We must take great care to avoid the appearance or substance of a "condominium" approach; the goal is not to settle regional issues but to bring pressure on the Soviets to limit their direct or indirect military involvement in the regional issues.

The basic proposition which should infuse our presentation in all of them is that great power military involvement is dangerous since if one gets involved, the other is likely to, in one way or another. Therefore, it is in the long-term Soviet interest to avoid the risk of military confrontation and to conduct our inevitable competition by less dangerous means.

We of course should not expect to make headway simply by intellectual persuasion, but by using the talks to reinforce and facilitate other actions designed to convince the Soviets that their attempts to use force in these situations is likely both to fail and to increase other dangers to their policy.

For example, as regards Latin America and Southern Africa, we should start a steady effort to apply the Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement to the use of Cuban troops abroad. This must be done

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without bluff or threat, but by consistent and repeated observations that the use of Cuban military power outside its borders is inconsistent with the undertaking that offensive weapons be excluded from Cuba. (Khrushchev used the term, "those weapons you consider offensive." We should let them know that we consider Cuban troops in Angola and Nicaragua as "offensive weapons.") They can then ponder what this means, but it would be a clear signal -- without committing us to anything -- that, ultimately Cuban military involvements abroad call into question any commitment which they may have thought they had regarding U.S. intervention in Cuba itself.

Another aim should be to cultivate the impression that there is in fact a line which we will simply not allow Soviet penetration of the Western Hemisphere to cross. We will not do them the favor of defining that line, but rather should make it clear that even if they score some temporary successes, they would only be setting themselves up for a bigger, more damaging defeat later. There are many subtle ways that this thought can be cultivated, without making any specific threats.

A reinforcing theme would be to point out repeatedly the dangers of allowing a surrogate to lead them into unwanted confrontations. Since this is doubtless a Soviet worry, we should play on it.

This is only a suggestive presentation of the sort of aims and arguments which we should employ in these regional talks. Similar ones are available for the other areas, although they will of course be different, in accord with local circumstances. For example, regarding Afghanistan, the message should be that we will do all we can to keep the mujahedin effective unless and until the Soviets are willing to discuss withdrawal. At that point, however, we would do all we legitimately can to guarantee that an Afghanistan free of Soviet troops would not be used by outside powers to their disadvantage. The message, of course, should not be purely a verbal one, but must be given credence by seeing to it that the mujahedin are in fact supplied with more effective arms.

In sum, the regional talks are in no way a substitute for doing what we should concretely to foil Soviet intervention on the ground. Rather, they should be seen as a diplomatic reinforcement of these efforts.

National Security Council
The White House

~~Don Fortner~~
JM-C

System # _____

Package # _____ 1

| | SEQUENCE TO | HAS SEEN | DISPOSITION |
|-----------------|-------------|--------------------|--|
| Paul Thompson | _____ | _____ | _____ |
| Bob Kimmitt | _____ | _____ | _____ |
| John Poindexter | <u>1</u> | <u>[Signature]</u> | _____ |
| Tom Shull | _____ | _____ | _____ |
| Wilma Hall | _____ | _____ | _____ |
| Bud McFarlane | _____ | _____ | _____ |
| Bob Kimmitt | _____ | _____ | _____ |
| NSC Secretariat | _____ | _____ | _____ |
| Situation Room | <u>2</u> | _____ | <u>DACOM TO</u> <u>BUD & PAUL</u> |

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

RECEIVED 09 MAY 85 19

TO MCFARLANE FROM PLATT, N

DOCDATE 09 MAY 85 8

URGENT 

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By CAS NARA, Date 6/17/02

KEYWORDS: USSR AFGHANISTAN SHULTZ, G
SOUTH AFRICA BERLIN DOBRYNIN, ANATOLIY I
EAST ASIA CENTRAL AMERICA
SUBJECT: SHULTZ GROMYKO MTG BRIEFING PAPERS

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR MCFARLANE DUE: 10 MAY 85 STATUS S FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MATLOCK

FORTIER

POINDEXTER

KIMMITT

PEARSON

COMMENTS URGENT ACTION REQUIRED ** REGIONAL OFFICERS: PLS PASS YOUR COMMENTS
DIRECTLY TO J. MATLOCK

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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520



~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

May 9, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Briefing Papers for Shultz-Gromyko Meeting

Attached are the non-arms control briefing papers prepared for the Secretary's use in his May 14 meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko.

Nicholas M. Platt
for Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
By CAS NARA, Date 6/17/02

The Secretary's May 14 Meeting with Gromyko

1. Introductory Points

-- This is a moment in our relations that is both interesting and perplexing.

-- We've had a good deal of discussion about basic principles and approaches in recent years. You have met with President, and his correspondence with Mr. Gorbachev and his predecessors is now pretty extensive. Counting your three meetings in the US last fall, this is sixth time you and I have met over past year.

-- So I think both sides now have a pretty good idea of where we are coming from, and what the main issues are. We know what the agenda is.

-- This year's political events should encourage us to look forward and move forward, it seems to me:

o The President not only has a well-thought out approach to our relations, but a solid new mandate to pursue that approach with you.

~~o Mr. Gorbachev has been a very impressive leader in his first two months in office.~~

o ~~and~~ We have a record of accomplishment that is not long, but is also not negligible. It is a base to build on, at Geneva and in our relations in general.

-- It is also a year of anniversaries. For us anniversaries are above all an occasion to take stock and look to the future:

o The lesson of the World War II anniversaries is that we have it in our power to set goals -- in our case reconciliation, more stable peace and greater freedom in a ravaged world -- and achieve those goals over decades and not just years.

o The lesson of the Austrian State Treaty anniversary that brings us together today is that we and the peoples most directly involved can resolve geopolitical problems to general benefit if we have the will to do so.

o And the lesson of the UN 40th anniversary coming up is that diverse nations can work together in useful ways despite all the differences of interest and purpose that divide them.

SECRET/SENSITIVE
DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
NSA FD6-114/2# 7363
BY LSJ NARA, DATE 11/21/87

The President has set forth some of his ideas in detail in his letter of April 30. ~~and also~~
I also hope you took careful note of the suggestions ~~in his letter to the Soviet Parliament Nov 8~~

-- Another lesson, I think, is that hard work and patience is required to make any serious endeavor fruitful. You probably know that more than any other man in the world of international affairs, but I also know it very well.

-- We would like to use this meeting, too, to push things along.

-- Yet, we continually seem to run up against obstacles to forward movement. I would be less than candid if I did not tell you that we think you are responsible for most of them.

-- The shooting of Major Nicholson is a case in point. His killing, in itself, was outrageous and totally unjustified act. But your government's handling of the tragedy simply made matters worse, and thereby jeopardized prospects for more constructive relations.

-- Another example is the continued refusal by your government to cooperate in bringing an end to the intolerable situation in the Berlin air corridors.

-- I don't want to dwell on the Nicholson tragedy today; I will return to the Berlin air corridors question later on.

-- At this point I only want to underscore the fact that both our countries' interests would be served by seeking to resolve such problems, rather than by deliberately exacerbating them.

-- An even more serious obstacle, as I see it, is what looks to us like an unwillingness on your part to begin tackling the major issues.

-- We have discussed the issues enough to know what they are. The "questions of questions" you cited last fall include most of them:

o We need to get down to business in reducing the enormous nuclear arsenals we have built up in recent years;

o we need to take concrete steps to eliminate the threat and use of force in international affairs; and

o we need to build trust and confidence in the way we deal with each other, by working to resolve issues of substance to mutual benefit.

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-- We've been able to use our previous meetings to move various issues forward: talks on nuclear non-proliferation at our first meeting in 1982, and of course agreement to new Geneva negotiations when we met in January.

-- There have even been some issues where progress has come about only long after we've talked:

o I remember I first raised dual-national cases with you in September 1982, and was pleased to see positive actions on two of them -- Lamport and Stolar -- in recent months.

o In Washington last September we had our first exchange on the President's proposal for consultations on regional issues at the policy level, and now we may be making some progress there too. I will want to come back to that.

-- So I would ask you to join me in seeing how we can get things moving on real issues.

-- Both sides have been calling for deeds rather than words for a couple of years now.

-- We have an American expression for what is needed: we need to put our money where our mouth is.

-- For our part, we are ready for such an effort.

-- That is the way we are approaching the possibility of a meeting between the President and the General Secretary.

-- In his March 24 letter, Mr. Gorbachev referred to the President's invitation to visit Washington, and expressed his positive attitude toward a meeting at the highest level.

-- He then wrote that while we would not need to sign major agreements at such a meeting, if we were in a position to conclude agreements on issues we had been working on, that would be a useful place to do it.

-- As I told Ambassador Dobrynin April 18, we agree with that approach.

-- The President's invitation to visit Washington is still on the table. I would be glad to report to him any views you may have for me on venue and timing. We read a lot from Soviet sources in the papers, but I would like to hear such views from you.

use only if Gromyko raises.

-- ~~In the meantime,~~ I think we should approach our work here on the basis of a common view of what we should be doing. We should be working to move issues forward -- the big issues as well as the small.

-- We have gone beyond the point where a meeting at the highest level is needed to get things started in our relations. There is also a strong possibility that we may not get issues to the point where such a meeting can bring us to agreement.

-- ~~But our leaders and our nations' interests will be best served if we try.~~ I propose that we begin by going through our familiar agenda, with a view to identifying the most important and promising areas for agreement in the months ahead.

-- Propose that we begin with arms control, then turn to regional questions. After that, I would like to discuss ~~human rights~~ ^{compliance} and after that a number of bilateral subjects.

with agreements regarding humanitarian issues,

1931M

Regional Issues (beginning)

8. General Points on Regional Dialogue

Background: We are continuing to wrestle with the question of how best to engage the Soviets in a geopolitical dialogue on critical regions. You will want to discuss East Asian, Central American, and Middle East issues with Gromyko, as you indicated you would to Dobrynin on April 18. But you will also want to raise those issues we have agreed to discuss in the experts format with the Soviets -- southern Africa and Afghanistan. As to the other issues, you may want to suggest that you and Gromyko continue to discuss these other issues at your level for the time being, while holding open the possibility of talks in another format later on. You will want to stress that we hope to be able to move beyond a sterile, formulaic exchange of views and be able to engage in some real give-and-take on these issues. In that regard you might want to try and build on Gorbachev's statement to you and the Vice President, repeated to Speaker O'Neill, that both the US and the Soviet Union have to look at the Third World in new ways. We have linked that theme concretely to your talking points on Afghanistan.

In the event there has been no perceptible response to your April 18 démarche to Dobrynin on Berlin Air Corridors, you will also want to reiterate our concerns in the regional-issues portion of the discussions.

Talking Points

-- As I told Ambassador Dobrynin, we welcome the Soviet Union's constructive response to the President's offer at the UNGA for discussions on regional issues.

-- We believe that such discussions, at a variety of levels, are important and can make a valuable contribution to avoiding miscalculation and misunderstanding, particularly in times of crisis.

-- You and I will want to think carefully about how we handle this. We believe that our goal should be to move beyond sterile exchanges of well-known points of view.

-- We have some experience with the experts format on southern Africa and Afghanistan, and are pleased that we have now agreed to move ahead with those discussions.

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-- On the other issues I believe we should continue the dialogue at the Ministerial and Ambassadorial levels. We can have discussions between me and Dobrynin and you and Hartman, reinforced by experts from time to time as we deem necessary.

-- We may find it useful to use other formats as well as our dialogue on these issues develops.

-- The Vice President and I were struck when we met with Mr. Gorbachev by his observation that both the US and the Soviet Union have "a lot to think about" when it comes to dealing with the Third World.

-- We think that is a wise observation and agree that we must find new ways to address many of these issues. It is our hope that, on that basis, we may be able to build a more fruitful dialogue on these issues than we have had in the past.

-- I would like now to turn to the specific regional issues raised by the Soviet Union in its response to the President's proposal, beginning with Afghanistan.

1938M

→ Your proposal to hold meetings of regional experts on other areas was a good one, and we will be in touch with you regarding setting times and places.

- In addition to the areas you have mentioned, we might also consider consultation on European issues: that is, issues affecting the entire continent.

- We would hope to see these consultations evolve into a regular pattern of dialogue on all issues which ~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~ can affect our relationship.

Regional Issues (continued)9. Afghanistan

Background: The time is ripe for substantive discussion of Afghanistan between us and the Soviets. The last extended exchange of views was in May of 1983 when Gromyko gave an oral response to the letter you had written him on the subject. In the interim, the Soviets have toughened their military posture inside the country, including more systematic bombardments of civilian targets and their most vigorous winter campaign yet against resistance strongholds near the Pakistani frontier. The pace of attacks against mujahidin targets and access routes in Pakistan has also intensified, leading to a US condemnation of Soviet actions in fall 1984. On the diplomatic front, Gorbachev lectured Zia on Afghanistan at Chernenko's funeral, although he also expressed support for the UN negotiations. Kabul authorities, meanwhile, have backed away from the what UN negotiator Cordovez says was an earlier acceptance of the inter-relationship among the four elements (Soviet troop withdrawal, cessation of "outside interference," international guarantees, and return of the refugees) of the draft agreement put forward by the UN. This has induced Cordovez to postpone until June the next round of indirect talks between Pakistan and the DRA regime previously scheduled to begin in May in Geneva.

There are one or two straws in the wind which could possibly mitigate this bleak picture. On the peace process, Cordovez claims that Soviet UN Ambassador Troyanovsky has reaffirmed Soviet support for the indirect talks. Also, Cordovez asserts, the Soviets and the Kabul authorities have insisted that it was not their intention to go back on earlier commitments made with respect to the draft peace agreement. Further, the Deputy Head of the Soviet MFA USA Department told Mark Palmer his government recognizes the possibility of an inter-relationship between Soviet troop withdrawals and the end of "outside interference." (Moscow's standard line has been that "interference" must first cease and that troop withdrawal will then be negotiated between the Soviets and the Kabul regime.) Finally, Soviet academics in recent meetings with their American counterparts have gone farther than before in speculating on the practical elements of a negotiated settlement, even going so far as to say that "some mujahidin groups" could participate in the future Afghan government.

Talking Points

-- Pakistan showed flexibility at the last round of the UN sponsored talks and we believe that now may be a moment of opportunity to get a negotiated settlement.

Substitute
attached

17

-- Afghanistan remains a major issue in US-Soviet relations and will continue to adversely affect the quality of our relationship.

-- From the US perspective the fundamental problem is the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan, the brutal tactics used against the indigenous resistance and the civilian population. Soviet involvement in Afghanistan's internal affairs is both direct and massive.

-- Soviet pressures on the neighboring state of Pakistan are inappropriate and counterproductive. You are aware of our long standing commitment o Pakistan's security and territorial integrity.

-- A political solution providing for the orderly withdrawal of Soviet troops and linked to other elements of an overall agreement is the best approach to the Afghanistan problem.

-- We hope you will take a new look at this approach, in the context of finding ways of dealing with our differences on regional issues.

-- We have no desire to determine the nature of the regime in Kabul or to see the Soviet Union "defeated." Nor do we have any desire to see Afghanistan used as a base from which anti-Soviet activities are conducted.

-- We support a neutral, non-aligned Afghan government supported by the Afghan people. We have long recognized Soviet interest in a non-aligned Afghanistan, not hostile to the Soviet Union.

-- We are pleased that you have taken us up on our invitation to resume the expert talks on Afghanistan and that you have agreed to our suggestion that these talks be held in Washington in the near future.

-- Thirty years ago we were able to agree to a formula for an independent, stable Austria free of foreign forces. We should be able to work out an equally satisfactory solution for Afghanistan, bearing in mind the different circumstances.

Contingency Points

next page

Substitute attached

AFGHANISTAN

-- Important for us to address the issue of Afghanistan. Everything else in our relationship is made more difficult while the Soviet Union is waging a war of conquest there. Unfortunately, not sure our past discussions have done enough to clarify each side's view.

-- Let me set out how we see the situation now. We see the mujahidin military activity and popular opposition to the Kabul regime rising. We see the cost in Soviet men, materiel, and other resources (including Soviet prestige) rising. We see futile efforts to bully Pakistan, to whom we have an unshakeable commitment. We see growing unity of the resistance groups, which will give them greater international prominence.

-- For the United States, involvement in Afghanistan affairs is ordinarily of almost no interest. You know very well that over many decades, and with Afghan regimes of all kinds, we have been content to have no role. This was so even though the Soviet Union did have a major role in Afghan affairs. The Soviet Union will always have great influence in Afghanistan; how can it be otherwise?

-- What is our policy now? We have no interest in a Soviet defeat, and perhaps your military men are telling you that Soviet forces cannot be defeated. Perhaps not. But many nations also have a large interest in seeing that there be no Soviet victory. Above all, the people of Afghanistan will see that this is so. No good can come of this war for the Soviet Union.

-- Given this, the path of negotiations serves your interest as well as ours. We have supported it, but we have as yet seen no sign of serious Soviet commitment. How else to interpret the fact that even though at third round of Geneva talks Pakistan essentially agreed that that provisions on outside aid would come into force before actual Soviet withdrawal, still the Soviet Union gave no timetable for withdrawal?

-- Of course, at the present stage the details of these talks are not of paramount importance. The next round should go forward, but frankly we wonder whether any progress can be made until two things happen. The Soviet Union will have to make a real decision that it aims to withdraw. And in turn it will have to ask how it can address the concerns of the mujahidin.

Contingency Points

[If Gromyko says that the problem in Afghanistan is the result of US support for the mujahidin and once outside intervention ends the problem will be solved and the Soviet troops will withdraw]

-- The problem in Afghanistan is that the Soviet Union invaded the country and is supporting the Kabul regime which does not have the support of the Afghan people, one quarter of which have been made refugees.

-- The national resistance struggle is not an American creation. There is not one American tank, one American helicopter, or one American plane in Afghanistan.

-- Nonetheless, it is clear that the American people and the USG support what we consider the just cause of the Afghan resistance and that we will continue to do so until Soviet troops are withdrawn.

-- We have a genuine interest in finding a settlement acceptable to all parties and are willing to work constructively to that end. We invite you to join us in trying to repeat what we were able to accomplish thirty years ago.

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Regional Issues (continued)

10. Southern Africa

Background: The Soviets have accepted our offer of southern Africa experts talks. They have proposed Paris as a venue during the same week as your meeting with Gromyko. You may thus want to present a brief assessment of southern Africa in Vienna as a preview of the experts' discussion in Paris.

USG Policy remains to move as rapidly as possible toward Namibian independence under UNSCR 435. Gromyko is aware that the USG view is that Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola (CTW) is a practical problem which must be dealt with in the package, and also that the Angolans tabled a proposal last fall which implicitly accepted that view.

Talking Points

-- We are pleased that you have agreed to another series of discussions between our experts on southern Africa.

-- Let me today briefly provide our current perspectives on the Namibia-Angola situation, in advance of more detailed discussions between our experts.

-- As mediator, USG has been probing for flexibility on both Angolan and South African sides, has tabled USG ideas to move the negotiations forward by focusing them on a single documentary "Basis for Negotiations." Expect responses in next few weeks.

-- Statesmanship and flexibility will be required on both sides in order to reach a settlement. We expect the parties to treat the proposals seriously; their responses will signal their seriousness in reaching a negotiated settlement.

-- That is clearly in Angola's interest. A settlement will open the way to Namibia's independence and an end to the confrontation with South Africa. It could even create conditions for achieving peace inside Angola, but that is a matter for Angolans to decide among themselves.

-- The alternative to a settlement is more of what Angola has had during the past ten years: civil war and economic disintegration.

-- In one sense, important to address southern Africa and Central America together. In both cases Cuban policy has become an important negative factor.
-- In the past decade, Cuba's policy has increasingly supported offending purposes beyond its own territory. Large military contingents in Nicaragua and southern Africa undermine regional stability.
-- More than regional issues alone are at stake. One of the most important agreements building stability in our own relations was that concerning Cuba in 1962. Cuban policy cannot serve long-run Soviet interests.

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~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

- 2 -

-- As a party to the Lusaka Accord, USG has been urging both sides to complete the disengagement in southern Angola, and is pleased to see it has now happened - this is one more positive step toward a regional settlement.

-- We are prepared for a more thorough review when our experts meet.

[If Gromyko raises South Africa's recent move to give the MPC greater standing inside Namibia:]

-- USG position is that UNSCR 435 remains the only acceptable framework for Namibian independence - any SAG moves outside that framework are without standing. The South Africans are well aware of our views.

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~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Regional Issues (continued)

11. Berlin Air Corridors

Background: On May 5, the three Allied Ambassadors in Moscow raised the corridor issue with Gromyko's deputy, Korniyenko. He claimed there was no ulterior motive in making air corridor adjustments and that problems should be worked out at the technical level. Under these circumstances, the Allies envision that the US, UK, and French Foreign Ministers will raise the corridors issue with Gromyko in Vienna, and then meet to decide on next steps, which the US believes should be a series of demonstration flights in the corridors if discussions with Gromyko yield no positive results.

Talking Points

-- The allied Ambassadors spoke to Deputy Foreign Minister Korniyenko two weeks ago in Moscow about the Berlin air corridors.

-- The situation the Soviet Union has created continues to be unacceptable. The US, and its allies are increasingly concerned.

-- We are fast approaching the limits of our tolerance.

-- We still have an opportunity to deal constructively with this issue, if the Soviet Union will return without delay to quadripartite management and will work cooperatively at the technical level.

-- If the issue is unresolved, the Allies will take the necessary steps to protect their interests.

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Regional Issues (continued)12. East Asia

Background: When you met with Gromyko last fall, he raised the "Far East" as a subject for discussion in the context of Soviet allegations of "Japanese militarism." You reiterated US support for Japan and its position on the Northern Territories. At the same time you acknowledged the dynamism of the region and allowed that East Asia could be discussed if we were able to establish a pattern of regional consultations as the President proposed in his UNGA speech. This was one of the areas which was included in the Soviet proposal of April 10 for an expanded schedule of regional discussions. We believe your discussion of Asian issues with Gromyko should focus on southeast Asia, where Soviet support for Vietnam continues to threaten regional stability. You will probably also want to discuss the situation on the Korean peninsula, China, and Japan.

Raising the Cambodian issue with the USSR is part of our ASEAN policy. We regularly assure the ASEAN countries that we accord the Cambodian problem importance in our world-wide policy. Raising it with the Soviets supports their own efforts at getting to the root causes of the problem.

The Soviets have just hosted a successful visit by North Korea's Foreign Minister Kim Yong-nam which may signal a further warming of their relationship with Pyongyang at the expense of DPRK relations with China. The joint communique issued at the conclusion of the meeting suggests the Soviets were successful in holding open the possibility of their participation in any multilateral negotiations on North-South relations. Moscow continues to be coy about attendance at the 1988 Seoul Olympics.

The Chinese and Soviets have just completed their sixth round of political consultations. This exchange took place in the wake of heightened public expectations about Sino-Soviet rapprochement generated by Gorbachev's stated interest in improved relations and the message from Hu Yaobang to the new Soviet leader upon his accession to office. The talks did not lead to any breakthroughs, but both sides expressed their interest in improving political as well as economic, cultural, and trade relations.

The Japanese continue to look forward to a visit by Gromyko, but Moscow's refusal to discuss the Northern Territories has prevented this so far. The Japanese MFA, however, continues to believe that a Gromyko visit by this fall is possible. Deputy

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Foreign Minister Kapitsa will be visiting Japan soon for annual bilateral consultations with the Japanese. The MFA expects that he will be bringing a positive response on the question of a Gromyko visit.

Talking Points

-- As I said last fall, East Asia is one of the most dynamic and fascinating areas of world.

-- We believe that it is already a crucial component of the global economy and its importance will continue to grow.

-- Exchanges of view on the economic and political developments in this part of the world could be useful.

-- You noted last fall that this was an area that had not often been discussed in our meetings. I agree and believe we should talk about these issues. We prefer, at present, that this dialogue be conducted at the ministerial level for now, reinforced by experts as appropriate.

-- We believe that the region's stability would be improved if some of the continuing conflict could be ameliorated or resolved. This is especially true of Southeast Asia.

-- Vietnam's military occupation is the central problem in Cambodia and the central obstacle to a settlement.

-- The principles worked out by ASEAN and endorsed by the International Conference on Kampuchea -- complete withdrawal of foreign forces and internationally-supervised elections -- offer the best formula for a political solution in Cambodia which protects the interests of all states concerned.

-- The US is strongly opposed to a settlement which would restore Khmer Rouge control. The Khmer people would not, however, choose the Khmer Rouge in the free elections called for in the ASEAN proposals.

-- Soviet involvement in Vietnam's adventure thus contributes to instability in Southeast Asia, and has aroused resentment among all of Vietnam's neighbors, notably the ASEAN countries.

-- The USSR should use its influence to persuade Vietnam that a political settlement which restores an independent, neutral Cambodia is in Vietnam's own interests, as well as those of its neighbors.

-- We also favor the continuing efforts to expand the dialogue between the two Koreas. In our view direct talks between the DPRK and ROK are the best way to reduce tensions on the peninsula.

-- We, like you, continue to work to improve our relations with China. Our military sales to China encompass a number of defensive items, not offensive items.

-- We regard our mutual security relationship with Japan as fundamental to peace and stability in Asia. It is entirely defensive in nature

--Japan's defense efforts involve neither acquisition of offensive weapons nor intent to project military power beyond its borders

Contingency Points

[If Gromyko argues that US policy is increasing tension in the area:]

-- The cause for increased tension in East Asia is the continuing Soviet military buildup and your support for Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia.

-- Efforts by our friends in Asia to improve their defense posture is a consequence of the increased tension.

-- We will continue to support our friends in these efforts.

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Regional Issues (continued)

13. Central America

Background: You should reaffirm our determination to stay the course in Central America, and note both the negative impact of Soviet arms shipments and our insistence that an overall settlement in the area include greater political pluralism and national reconciliation in Nicaragua. Gromyko will expect a response to their suggestion of experts' dialogue on Central America, following up on the President's UNGA proposal: you may wish to suggest that the dialogue take place within the context of future meetings with Gromyko.

Talking Points

-- US objectives in Central America clear and constant: support for stable, democratic societies; determination not to permit force to alter political balance; preference for peaceful, political solutions.

-- Major progress in El Salvador, Guatemala and elsewhere. Problem today is Nicaragua. Soviet support for aggressive, interventionist activities of Nicaragua and Cuba is a negative element in our relationship and destabilizing in the area.

-- Your increased military shipments, including Hind MI-24 attack helicopters deepen tensions, increase danger of conflict in region. Managua's arsenal is now far beyond its needs. Urge that you cease all such shipments.

-- We have made clear to the Nicaraguans our view that peace will only be possible if they engage in dialogue with the opposition and implement their democratic commitments.

~~-- Though our views on this area are widely divergent, I have nonetheless been glad to discuss these problems with you. I don't believe that discussions in the manner that you have proposed would enhance our understanding of the problems, but I believe that the most useful way for us to approach this subject would be through additional exchanges when we meet again.~~

Follow-on discussions of Central America will have to give major attention to Cuban activities.

Contingency Talking Points on Central America

[If the subject of aircraft for Nicaragua arises:]

-- As I have said before, emergence of jet fighter aircraft in Nicaragua would be unacceptable to the United States.

[If the subject of Cuban troops in Nicaragua arises:]

-- We will not tolerate presence of Cuban combat troops in Nicaragua, expect Cuban ~~restraint in activities there~~

a

military presence

unacceptable

Regional Issues (conclusion)14. Middle East/Persian Gulf

Background: Although the Soviets have not pushed vigorously for their Middle East conference proposal, it continues to be the centerpiece of their declared policy on the resolution of the Arab-Israeli dispute. Moscow has criticized both the Jordan-PLO Agreement and Mubarak's efforts. The Soviets continue to maintain their public support for PLO unity, and the Palestinian groups with which they are most closely associated have not joined the Syrian-sponsored Palestinian National Salvation Front; but Moscow's displeasure with Arafat's course is clear. They have reportedly refused to meet with a joint Jordanian-PLO delegation. In late February, Gromyko told Andreotti that US policy encouraged Israel's occupation of the West Bank and contrasted this with Soviet support for a comprehensive settlement which would involve recognition of Israel.

The Soviets profess a desire to see an end to the Iran-Iraq War, although they continue to be Iraq's main arms supplier, and East Bloc countries and North Korea provide the bulk of Iranian arms. We believe the Scud missiles used against Baghdad were transferred from Libya to Iran without Soviet permission, and that Moscow has on occasion stopped transactions between Eastern Europe and Iran for major systems, e.g. tanks.

The Iranian regime, pressed by its war needs and its diplomatic isolation, has recently moved to improve its ties with Moscow. The USSR's response has apparently been cautious.

Iran remains intransigently opposed to negotiations, refusing to discuss peace unless the Iraqi regime is replaced. With internal dissent rising and after the heavy losses from Iran's March offensive, the expected Iranian offensive on the southern front could become the make-or-break climax of Khomeini's "war till victory" policy.

Iran may for the first time use its small CW capacity in this offensive, and Iraq will probably continue to employ its substantial CW capability. We believe that the Soviets, like us, regret this. We have provided separately talking points for your use on Chemical Weapons non-proliferation.

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Talking Points: US-Soviet Middle East/Persian Gulf Talks

-- The discussions which were held in Vienna between Assistant Secretary Murphy and Ambassador Polyakov were useful, although nothing new or dramatic emerged from them.

-- We believe a continuing exchange of views on this vital area is an important way to prevent misunderstandings and miscalculations.

-- In our view, it is too soon to have another round of experts talks along the lines of the Vienna discussion, but events in the region are moving so fast that we might want to consider intensifying our own dialogue.

-- Discussions between me and Dobrynin and you and Hartman and their respective staffs could be useful.

-- In the mean time there is plenty for us to talk about today.

Talking Points: Gulf War

-- An early end to the Iran-Iraq War, with the sovereignty and territorial integrity of both sides intact, is the United States' goal and is in our mutual interest.

-- It is important that both our countries support Perez de Cuellar's and others' efforts to arrange a negotiated settlement.

-- Since Iran continues intransigently to refuse to negotiate a general ceasefire, the best means of bringing about a peace settlement is to cut off Iran's arms supplies.

-- The Soviet Union should exert its influence with its friends in the Warsaw Pact and with Libya, Syria, and North Korea to stop supplying arms to Iran.

Talking Points: Peace Process

-- The US is committed to working with the parties to achieve a just and lasting settlement. The only realistic path to peace is direct negotiations based on UNSC Resolution 242.

-- The positions we will support in negotiations are contained in the President's September 1, 1982 peace initiative. We support a two-stage process in which negotiation of transitional arrangements, and implementation of those agreements in the West Bank and Gaza, precede negotiations on the final status of those territories.

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-- Should Jordan and the Palestinians enter into direct negotiations with Israel, they should receive the support of all states seeking to further Arab-Israeli peace.

-- We would expect that neither Syria nor any other state would use or support violence to prevent a broadening of negotiations.

-- The Soviet Union has excluded itself from playing a positive role in the Middle East by not supporting those advocating reconciliation and a realistic approach to a negotiated settlement.

-- The Soviet Union has said that it wishes to play a constructive role in the Middle East, but Soviet actions make it difficult for us and for Israel to take such protestations seriously.

~~-- Lack of Soviet diplomatic relations with Israel raises questions regarding your ability to play a balanced role, as does Soviet anti-semitic and anti-zionist propaganda and Soviet treatment of Jews in the Soviet Union.~~

Contingency Points

[If Gromyko raises the Soviet July 29 Peace Proposal:]

-- The Soviet July 29 proposals do not refer to UNSC resolutions 242 and 338. Your effort to introduce new proposals does not facilitate negotiations between the parties but only widens the gap between them. Moreover, an international conference would not be productive.

[If Gromyko presses for another round of Middle East experts talks:]

-- Another round of experts talks is one possibility we might want to consider at an appropriate time.

-- We should view them in the context of regular consultations.

-- As I said, we believe it is too soon for another round of experts talks. On the other hand, we were not able to have a full exchange of views on Afghanistan in Vienna, and we believe it would be mutually useful to move ahead with discussions on that subject now.

on other regional issues.

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15. Human Rights

Background: Since you last met with Gromyko, little has changed on the plight of the Sakharovs, Orlov and Begun, on the persecution of Soviet Jewry, and on the array of administrative tactics designed to isolate Soviet citizens from foreign contact. Shcharanskiy's mother was informed April 23 that all family visits were cancelled for the remainder of 1985, which effectively negates the good will generated by an extended-family visit permitted in January. Persecution of Hebrew teachers has worsened with continuing arrests and convictions.

On the other hand, one longstanding Amcit case has been resolved (Lamport), and there is some progress in a second (Stolar). One longstanding separated spouse has been promised exit permission but has not yet received it (Weinglass). Since the beginning of the year, the number of Moscow Refuseniks receiving exit permission has risen substantially. Although overall Jewish emigration totals remain quite low, there was a noticeable increase in April, when 166 exit visas were issued (this figure is higher than any monthly totals for 1984 and higher than all but one monthly figure for 1983). You recently followed up on Gorbachev's suggestion to Vice President Bush of bilateral human rights rapporteurs, and Codel O'Neill's success in having two Members follow up Supreme Soviet human rights discussions with a First Deputy Interior Minister and the editor of "Kommunist" may be promising. The Soviets agreed to careful study of the Codel's list of cases.

Talking Points

-- In the current atmosphere of mutual determination to work energetically toward improvement in our relations, I want to emphasize once again the critical importance of movement in the area of human rights on substantial progress in our overall relationship.

-- Moreover, we are looking beyond isolated gestures, for significant and sustained response to our human rights concerns.

-- Human rights is an inextricable part of our common agenda. Your government signed on to certain undertakings on freedom of contacts in the Helsinki Final Act.

-- American human rights policy is bipartisan and institutionalized, as high in priority for this Administration as for the previous one. This continuity reflects the fundamental values and heritage of the American people.

-- As you know, General Secretary Gorbachev raised with Vice President Bush the idea of bilateral rapporteurs to discuss mutual human rights concerns. Recently I followed up on this idea with Ambassador Dobrynin.

-- I noticed that Supreme Soviet officials and Codel O'Neill undertook an experts' follow-up meeting to their human rights discussions. I hope your government is pursuing the promised careful review of the Codel's case list expeditiously and creatively, and I hope we can agree to institutionalize regular high-level experts' dialogue on human rights issues.

-- Since we last talked, there have been a few hopeful signs. We are pleased that the long-standing request of American citizen Lamport and his family to leave has been granted.

-- We are also encouraged that a number of Moscow Jews long denied permission to emigrate have recently been granted exit permits, and we note the increase in Jewish emigration that occurred in April. We hope that this is the beginning of a sustained trend and that those Jews who wish to leave will be allowed to do so.

-- But a swallow or two does not make a spring. Overall Jewish emigration totals are still quite low. We still have 22 longstanding unresolved cases of separated spouses. The treatment of the Sakharovs, Orlov and Begun continues to be inhumane and unacceptable. Although Shcharanskiy was finally allowed a family visit in January, his family was told in April that no family visits would be permitted for the remainder of 1985. Persecution of teachers of Hebrew is unabated.

-- The situation of the Hebrew teachers is urgent, because of continuing arrests and convictions. This crackdown has created profound concern in the American Jewish community which we fully share. A halt to the campaign of intimidation and brutality against Hebrew teachers would be seen as an important signal.

-- We hope that the resolution of a number of longstanding Moscow Refusenik cases will be paralleled in other Soviet cities, and that the totals of exit permits will rise to approach the number of Soviet Jews wishing to emigrate.

-- As you know, there is a legislative relationship in US law between Most Favored Nation trade status and emigration. I want you to know that, under the right circumstances, we would be prepared to go ahead with MFN if emigration reached and were sustained at an appropriate level.

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-- We view the recent granting of exit permission to American citizen Abe Stolar and his wife and son as welcome progress. We hope that authorities will now be creative enough to find a way to include Stolar's daughter-in-law Julia with the rest of the family.

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-- There should be no easier area in which to improve the record than separated spouses. Resolution of the oldest of these cases -- McClellan, Kaplan, Kusmenko/Balovlenkov, Johnson/Petrov, Graham/Finkel, Tretyakova/Levin, Gubin/Lodishev, and Pergericht/Kuperman -- involves no political costs for the Soviet state, and should proceed promptly on humanitarian grounds.

-- The hunger strike of Yuriy Balovlenkov and Tamara Tretyakova is of special concern. The longer the hunger strike continues, the more difficult it will be to end, and the more publicity it is likely to create. A quiet resolution, without publicity would seem desirable.

-- Any easing of the Sakharovs' isolation would have a significant international effect. Restoration of telephone contact between the Sakharovs and their children, and permission for Elena Bonner to seek medical treatment in the West, would be important steps.

-- Shcharanskiy has now served over half of his 13 year sentence. Clemency would be appropriate for this still very ill man.

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- We view the recent granting of exit permission to American citizen Abe Stolar and his wife and son as welcome progress. We hope that authorities will now permit Stolar's daughter-in-law Julia to be included with the rest of the family.
- There should be no easier area in which to improve the record than separated spouses. Resolution of the oldest of these cases -- McClellan, Kaplan, Kusmenko/Balovlenkov, Johnson/Petrov, Graham/Finkel, Tretyakova/Levin, Gubin/Lodishev, and Pergericht/Kuperman -- involves no political costs for the Soviet state, and should proceed promptly on humanitarian grounds.
- The hunger strike of Yuriy Balovlenkov and Tamara Tretyakova is of special concern. The longer the hunger strike continues, the more difficult it will be to end, and the more the publicity it is likely to create. Quietly permitting the couple to live together where they choose would seem desirable.
- Easing the Sakharov's isolation would have a significant international effect. Restoration of telephone contact between the Sakharovs and their children, and permission for Elena Bonner to seek medical treatment in the West, would be important steps.
- Shcharanskiy has now served over half of his 13 year sentence. Clemency would be appropriate for this still very ill man.
- Positive moves in these areas would have a beneficial effect on our bilateral relations, and would be well received by the American Congress and public.

Bilateral Issues (beginning)16. Joint Commercial Commission

Background: Secretary Baldrige's visit to Moscow on May 20-21 will be the first meeting of the JCC since 1978. While we expect no major breakthroughs, the session will have considerable symbolic importance and should provide some momentum towards the resolution of certain outstanding bilateral issues. On a practical level we intend to inform the Soviets of our readiness to introduce legislation to end the ban on certain Soviet furskins, to find a mutually acceptable formula to terminate the embargo on Soviet nickel, and to renegotiate a maritime agreement. We also will be prepared to resume a modest USG trade promotion program.

The Soviets will raise MFN, official credits, and energy trade but probably do not anticipate movement on any of these questions. We will reply that we do not see the possibility for resolving these issues without major changes in Soviet policies in the area of emigration and human rights.

Talking Points

-- We believe that our dialogue on economic/commercial issues is helpful and hope that Secretary Baldrige's visit to Moscow on May 20-21 will enable us to make progress in resolving some outstanding issues in this area.

-- We are interested in expanding non-strategic trade with the USSR; however, it is not realistic to assume that our relationship in this area can be divorced from other aspects of our bilateral relations.

-- It is very difficult to envision a resolution of the more difficult questions in our economic relationship, such as MFN, without a significant change in Soviet policies in the area of emigration and human rights.

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Bilateral Issues (conclusion)17. Four Bilateral Political and Economic IssuesPacific Air Safety, Civil Aviation,
Consulates, Exchanges Agreement

Background: We have linked any discussion of resuming Aeroflot flights to the United States to two issues: (1) concluding an agreement on Pacific air safety measures, and (2) a better balance of economic benefits for American carriers if direct service is resumed. The Soviets have in turn tied the opening of new consulates in Kiev and New York consulates to Aeroflot resumption, and also made Aeroflot an issue in our negotiations for a new exchanges agreement. On Pacific air safety, the Soviets have promised a substantive response to the latest US-Japanese agreement draft, and we hope to have another round in late May. On economic balance, they have initiated discussions with and offered enough to interest PanAm in resumed Moscow/Leningrad service, perhaps next spring. Meanwhile, the exchange agreement negotiations have been businesslike, and are now focussing on the five or six core problems. These issues thus have evolved toward a package which we believe should be amenable to resolution in the next few months. But the starting point has to be concluding an agreement on Pacific air safety, along the lines we and the Japanese have proposed: a "clean" agreement listing the measures the three countries will take -- and to which the Soviets have already substantially agreed -- without language defining or implying responsibility for the safety of these routes. You will want to encourage Gromyko to take a forthcoming posture on this issue to move the entire bilateral package forward.

Talking Points

-- We see possibilities for genuine progress on a number of topics in bilateral relations, beyond the economic and other cooperative areas we are seeking to revitalize.

-- These topics are Pacific air safety, civil aviation, consulates and an exchanges agreement.

-- We have different ideas about what the sequence should be, and the effect has been to make these items a package.

-- I would like to propose that we make a start at unravelling this package by giving a political impulse to the topic where we are nearest agreement: Pacific air safety.

-- Here the first round of negotiations produced substantial agreement on a number of useful measures to improve safety along these already very safe routes.

-- The problem has been with language about responsibility.

-- What is important, it seems to me, are the measures, rather than philosophical arguments. We have therefore proposed a brief agreement restricted to the measures themselves, which have already been agreed.

-- If our three countries can reach early agreement on that, the door may be open to further steps in other areas.

-- I understand your people have had productive discussions with PanAm about the conditions for resumed direct air service between our two countries.

-- We are not discouraging that, and if you can reach a satisfactory outcome, we are ready to discuss getting our civil aviation agreement fully operative again.

-- We do not like the linkage you are applying between Aeroflot and consulates and an exchanges agreement, where we have already agreed in principle. But we understand it.

-- If we can get the civil aviation picture worked out, for our part we would expect to move forward rapidly on the consulates.

-- Hopefully, by then our negotiations on exchanges will have also proceeded to the point where they can be wrapped up.

-- So, as you see, Pacific air safety may be the place to start, but it opens the door to a pretty good prospect.

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High-Level Dialogue/Summit (beginning)

18. Further Ministerial Meetings

Background: After completing the substantive exchanges, we recommend that you turn to the question of further Ministerial meetings and the possibility of a summit. *if Gromyko makes a proposal* Regarding your next meeting, you may want to ask Gromyko whether he plans to be in Helsinki at the end of July, at the time of the commemoration of the tenth anniversary of the CSCE agreement, while noting that you have not yet decided whether you will attend. Gromyko may raise this in any case. If you do not want to commit yourself to a meeting at Helsinki, your next meeting will likely be at the time of the UNGA ~~perhaps at the same time as a Reagan-Gorbachev meeting.~~ In this event, exchanges through Ambassadors will be the primary means of working out a summit agenda.

Talking Points

-- As always, I think our discussions have been useful. We covered a lot of ground, and I think there are many areas on which we should follow up through our respective Ambassadors.

-- I look forward, in particular, to your response to the ideas which I presented on the Geneva talks.

-- As you know, the neutral and non-aligned have sought high-level attendance at July's meeting in Helsinki to commemorate the 10th anniversary of the CSCE accords.

-- I have not decided whether I will attend, and suggest that we keep in touch on this question.

-- We should also keep in touch on the next subject I would like to discuss, that of a meeting between our two leaders.

[If you decide to agree to a Helsinki meeting:]

-- It might be useful for the two of us to meet at Helsinki. It would provide an opportunity to take stock of where we stand in Geneva, in our regional dialogue, and on bilateral and humanitarian questions.

-- It would also be a good occasion to see where we stand on the next subject I would like to discuss, that of a meeting between our two leaders.

This should be contingent on Gromyko raising the question. 4/29/85 38

High-Level Dialogue/Summit (conclusion)

19. Summit

Background: The ball is in the Soviets' court on the question of a date and time for a possible Reagan-Gorbachev meeting, and we want to avoid conveying an impression of over-eagerness for a summit. Thus, you should adjust your presentation on the basis of what Gromyko has to say on the subject.

Talking Points

- President recognizes importance of dialogue between our two leaders.
- He values highly his correspondence with Mr. Gorbachev and his predecessors, and believes that his meetings with you and Mr. Shcherbitskiy were useful in clarifying views and issues and making it possible to move the relationship forward.
- That is why he invited General Secretary Gorbachev to visit him in Washington at the earliest convenient opportunity.
- We are pleased that Mr. Gorbachev answered that the Soviet leadership attaches great importance to contacts at the highest level, and that he personally has a positive attitude about a summit meeting.
- We are prepared to discuss the details for a meeting whenever you are ready.
- We agree with Mr. Gorbachev when he wrote that such a meeting should not necessarily be concluded by signing some major documents, though some agreements could well be formalized.
- We would like to have a meeting that both states can view as positive and that will serve as a building block for better relations in the future.
- We do not need to agree at this time on a specific agenda for the meeting or what topics would be discussed.
- I think we should agree, however, that our dialogue in the weeks ahead should be directed toward developing as substantive an agenda as possible.
- As discussions progress, we can then agree on an agenda through diplomatic channels and decide further down the road if we think it would be advisable to try to have our two leaders conclude any agreements.

[If Gromyko confirms that Gorbachev will come to the UNGA:]

-- President would be pleased to receive Mr. Gorbachev in Washington at the time of his visit to the UNGA. Suggest that he come to the US two days earlier than his UN commitments require.

-- Two days would give the President and Mr. Gorbachev enough time for several meetings, some relaxing events, and some hospitality in the evening.

[If the Soviets propose meeting in New York:]

-- We believe it should be in Washington. Since last such visit was former President Nixon's trip to Moscow, we believe not only that Mr. Gorbachev should come to Washington, but that he would enjoy seeing our capital.

[If Gromyko continues to insist on New York:]

-- I will pass your views on to the President.

[If Gromyko proposes a meeting outside the U.S.:]

- I will pass your views on to the President.

- His feeling has been that, since there have been two summit meetings in the Soviet Union

1949M since there has been one in the United States, it would be appropriate for the U.S. to host the next.

- This is why the President has invited the General Secretary to the United States.

- Are we to interpret your suggestion as meaning that the General Secretary is unwilling to accept the President's invitation?

Contingency Talking Points20. CSCE Tenth Anniversary Commemoration

Background: Some NNAs have been pushing for attendance at the "highest possible level" in Helsinki. They would like to see a summit; they would be satisfied if foreign ministers came. The Soviet line has been to support participation at least at the ministerial level, while indicating no decision has been taken. We have insisted that attendance will depend on the state of East-West relations at the time, as well as ministers' schedules. We scotched press rumors that we were planning a Reagan-Gorbachev summit for Helsinki. The Alliance agreed last December in Brussels that attendance should be at the "political level," which, we have stressed, could mean sub-Cabinet level. If you decide to go to Helsinki, it will be primarily for East-West reasons -- to meet again with Gromyko.

We view the Helsinki commemoration as another opportunity to stress our themes of peace and reconciliation, and to address both the promise and the shortcomings of the CSCE process. In particular, we will want to highlight the importance of the CSCE process as a means of holding the East accountable for its human rights and humanitarian commitments. Some NNAs have called for the commemoration to agree on a statement reaffirming the Helsinki and Madrid commitments. We have opposed this -- it would divert the focus of the meeting away from national statements evaluating the CSCE process; it could lead to embarrassing wrangling among delegation heads; and it would tempt maverick states (e.g., Malta) to try to hold the negotiations up for ransom. The Soviets are reported in general agreement with us on this.

Talking Points (if raised)

-- Focus at Helsinki should be on national statements, not on attempt to reach agreed statement reaffirming commitments to CSCE.

-- Important that atmosphere at Helsinki reflect importance we place on CSCE process.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

May 11, 1985

ACTION

DECLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

NLRRF06-114/2 # 7361

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*BY KML NARA DATE 10/1/12

SUBJECT: Shultz-Gromyko Meeting: Talking Points

Bob Linhard has forwarded to you suggested revisions in the Secretary's presentation of arms control issues. We have now reviewed the talking points prepared on subjects other than arms control and have a number of suggestions to make.

Most importantly, I believe the approach to consultations on regional issues should be revised to be consistent with the proposal the President made in his UNGA address for regular consultation on these issues. You will recall that the Soviets have proposed consultations on Afghanistan, the Near East and Persian Gulf, East and Southeast Asia, Central America and Southern Africa. We accepted talks on Afghanistan and Southern Africa and said that Shultz would take up the rest in Vienna. The Soviets have agreed, somewhat to our surprise, since we had assumed that they would not discuss Afghanistan unless we were willing to discuss Central America.

I am attaching a separate paper on this issue, but I would urge that, at Vienna, Secretary Shultz indicate that we accept the Soviet proposal for consultations in all these areas and will be in touch with them through normal diplomatic channels to set times and places. He might also add that consultations on European questions might also be useful (under which rubric we would include Eastern Europe), and that we would like to see them develop into a pattern of regular consultation and not just one-shot meetings.

The attached talking points show our markups. The more significant changes are the following:

-- On the introductory points, I believe it is not wise to make comments about Gorbachev (the line about his being "a very impressive leader"). This sounds patronizing and is unnecessary; furthermore, positive-sounding comments on Gorbachev could be taken as a dig at Gromyko.

-- Summitry: I would omit the comments on summitry on pages three and four of the introductory remarks. The ball is in the Soviet court, and we should let Gromyko bring this issue up if he wants. If Shultz broaches the issue it will convey to them that

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

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we are motivated primarily by a desire to set a meeting, rather than to deal with the issues. Tactically this is unwise.

-- Afghanistan: The proposed presentation seems weak to us. It treats the standard Soviet position -- that the only problem is outside interference -- as a "contingency" theme rather than as the all-but-certain starting point of the Soviet discussion. Given this (and the total lack of progress in the UN talks), it does no good simply to restate that we are committed to a negotiated settlement. The question for the Soviets is not whether we are committed but whether they can do better militarily than through a negotiated settlement.

Because we have some evidence of Soviet anxiety (and possibly divisions) on this score, it may be a good time to have a somewhat blunter talk, in which Shultz speaks more directly about the trends of the war (i.e., the growing strength of the mujahidin) and about how we see the alternatives (i.e., we have no interest in a Soviet defeat, but we and many other nations also have a strong interest in no Soviet victory. Because this is so, no good will come of this war for the Soviet Union.) At the same time the Secretary could add some conciliatory notes. He can, for example, reaffirm that we have no desire to be involved in Afghanistan's affairs over the long term. We were content for decades -- through many different Afghan regimes and despite preponderant Soviet influence -- to have no such role and we seek none now. A parallel between an Afghan settlement and the Austrian State Treaty should not be constructed, lest it be misunderstood as a U.S. attempt to establish de jure U.S. rights in regard to Afghanistan.

Southern Africa and Central America: There should be more direct references to the specific problem of Cuban troops. As regards Central America, we should not just call for "Cuban restraint," but demand that there be no Cuban military presence in Nicaragua.

Middle East: The Secretary should not repeat the suggestion that better treatment of Soviet Jews would help show that the Soviets can play a constructive role in the region. This issue should be considered entirely outside the context of Middle East issues.

Don Don Fortier and Steve Sestanovich concur. Burghardt, Laux, Teicher and Steiner have concurred in regard to the subjects in their areas.

Recommendation:

That you suggest to Secretary Shultz that his talking points be amended as indicated in the attached package.

Approve RCM Disapprove _____
Approved

Attachments:

- Tab I - Talking points, with revisions noted
- Tab II - Discussion of regional consultations

~~Matlock~~

3683

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Cham

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

May 20, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR RONALD K. PETERSON

FROM: ROBERT M. KIMMITT *Boh*

SUBJECT: State Draft Report on H.R. 75 to Provide Mandatory Reciprocity in Granting of Privileges to Diplomatic Missions of Communist Regimes

We have reviewed and concur in the State draft report on H.R. 75, a bill to provide mandatory reciprocity in the granting of privileges and immunities to the diplomatic missions of communist countries.

Attachment:

Tab A State Draft Report



EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

May 2, 1985

LEGISLATIVE REFERRAL MEMORANDUM

TO: Legislative Liaison Officer-
Central Intelligence Agency
Department of Justice
National Security Council ✓

SUBJECT: State draft report on H.R. 75, a bill to provide mandatory reciprocity in the granting of privileges and immunities to the diplomatic missions of communist regimes.

The Office of Management and Budget requests the views of your agency on the above subject before advising on its relationship to the program of the President, in accordance with OMB Circular A-19.

A response to this request for your views is needed no later than FRIDAY, MAY 24, 1985.

Questions should be referred to TraceyLawler/SueThau (395-7300) the legislative analyst in this office.

Ronald K. Peterson
RONALD K. PETERSON FOR
Assistant Director for
Legislative Reference

Enclosures
cc: J. Barie



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Dear Mr. Chairman:

The Secretary has asked me to respond to your request for Executive Branch comments on H.R. 75, a bill to provide for mandatory reciprocity in the granting of privileges and immunities to the diplomatic missions of Communist regimes.

The Department of State fully agrees with the objective of H.R. 75 that there should be equality of treatment for US Government diplomatic personnel serving in foreign countries and for their diplomatic personnel assigned to the United States, and that there should be essential equivalence in numbers between the diplomatic and consular staffs of our diplomatic missions abroad and those of foreign countries here. However, H.R. 75 as drafted raises constitutional and legal issues, and contains a number of provisions with which we do not agree.

H.R. 75 would unduly restrict the constitutional authority of the President for the conduct of foreign affairs, for example in seeking to amend Section 254c of the Diplomatic Relations Act by inserting the language "In the case of the mission of a Communist regime to the United States, the President shall limit the number of members of the mission, and the privileges and immunities granted to them....". Indeed, the existing legislation in 254c grants the President domestic authority to specify treatment for foreign diplomatic missions in the U.S. reciprocal with treatment of U.S. diplomatic missions abroad.

The proposed legislation is additionally redundant, in that the Foreign Missions Act confers all the authority needed to enforce diplomatic reciprocity. Indeed, the Administration has been and is proceeding to enforce this reciprocity vigorously.

In adding a definition of the term "Communist regime" to Section 254a of the Diplomatic Relations Act, H.R. 75 lumps together a number of countries with varying political systems and relations with the United States for identically

The Honorable
Dante B. Fascell,
Chairman,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
House of Representatives.

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restrictive treatment. For example, Yugoslavia and China are communist but nonaligned countries with whom we have friendly relations and many significant mutual interests. Tibet is not an independent country. Angola, Benin, Ethiopia and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen have avowedly Marxist-Leninist regimes which are, however, in varying stages of establishing the kind of political cadre apparatus and centralized administrative control which is a distinguishing feature of a communist country. Nicaragua is a totalitarian state whose leaders are avowedly Marxist-Leninist. Libya is a radical, nonaligned state. Algeria, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Syria and Tanzania are socialist states which to varying degrees embrace nonalignment. Zambia is a one party state in which individual rights are generally observed but some political rights restricted. We have good relations with Zambia, which has been active in the search for peaceful resolutions to the problems of southern Africa. Guinea is nonaligned, and has since its April 1984 change of government made strides in economic liberalization and human rights, and developed closer relations with the U.S.

Additionally, since the Secretary of State is charged by the President with the day to day conduct of foreign affairs, he would appear to be a more appropriate person to designate countries as Communist than the Secretary of Defense.

With respect to implementing H.R. 75 for the Warsaw Pact countries of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the proposed legislation raises several significant policy and practical issues.

--The United States has a larger diplomatic mission in a number of the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact countries of Eastern Europe than do those countries here. Thus H.R. 75's requirement for strict numerical equality as well as reciprocity of treatment would result in a net loss to the United States.

--For the Soviet Union, if we cut back the size of their diplomatic mission here to a number equivalent to our's there, while retaining full diplomatic privileges and immunities, the likely Soviet response would be to make an equivalent reduction in our numbers. Alternatively, if we decided to deprive certain diplomats and other officials of their immunities, we would be violating a bilateral agreement in force since 1967 which gives all members of our Embassies and their families full diplomatic privileges and immunities on a reciprocal

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basis. The most logical Soviet response would be to strip an equal number of our personnel in the Soviet Union of their privileges and immunities. We could well be forced to withdraw our personnel, because they would be subject to Soviet judicial proceedings and harassment. In either case, in the conditions of inherent assymetry of information availability and access which characterize Soviet and American society, U.S. ability to understand and do business with the Soviet Union is likely to be the net loser in any cycle of visa refusal or other retaliatory measures.

--The disparity in numbers between the U.S. Embassy and Consulate in the USSR and the Soviet Embassy and Consulate in the U.S. arises from the fact that the Soviets employ only their own nationals abroad for clerical, housekeeping, driver and other service functions, whereas we have traditionally found it more efficient to employ local or third country nationals to perform these kinds of functions for our missions overseas. We are prepared to consider, consistent with the secure and effective operation of our mission in the USSR, replacing some local Soviet employees with Americans, but there are significant practical considerations affecting the feasible degree and pace of any such program.

If we can be of assistance to you in this or any other matter, please do not hesitate to contact us.

The Office of Management and Budget advises that from the standpoint of the Administration's program there is no objection to the submission of this report.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

William L. Ball, III
Assistant Secretary
Legislative and Intergovernmental Affairs

Enclosure:
Correspondence returned.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SYSTEM I
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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

May 9, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT
THROUGH: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*
FROM: KENNETH deGRAFFENREID *Kd*
SUBJECT: State Draft Report on H.R. 75 to Provide
Mandatory Reciprocity in Granting of Privileges
and Immunities to Diplomatic Missions of
Communist Regimes

I do not concur with part of the State letter, specifically the last paragraph on page 2 which contains language arguing against the merits of reducing the number of Soviet nationals in the US Embassy.* Since this is an issue before the President in the form of SIG(I) recommendations which will be discussed at a future NSPG meeting, we should not prejudge the President's decision. Indeed, the SIG(I) members, with the exception of State, support the opposite view of the likely result of reducing the Soviet presence.

I have no problem with the Constitutional arguments regarding Congressional mandating of what are basically Executive Branch authorities.

Matlock comment: I do not read the language as arguing against a reduction of local employees in Moscow. In fact, it concedes the point, and State is now refining a concrete plan to reduce the numbers drastically and to exclude them entirely from the new Embassy building. But this will take time to implement and a rigid legislative requirement could actually make it impossible to implement.

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Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F06-114/2#736Z

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BY hst NARA DATE 11/21/07

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

May 7, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT

SIGNED

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Draft Report on H.R. 75 to Provide Mandatory Reciprocity in Granting of Privileges to Diplomatic Missions of Communist Countries

I have reviewed and concur with the proposed State draft report on H.R.75, a bill to provide mandatory reciprocity in the granting of privileges and immunities to the diplomatic missions of communist regimes. A memorandum to Ronald K. Peterson to this effect is attached at Tab I for your signature.

SAS Steve Sestanovich, Paula Dobriansky, Chris *(Away)* Lehman and Ken *→ all attached memo* deGraffenreid concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I.

Approve *K* Disapprove _____

although I agree with Ken de Graffenreid.

Attachments:

Tab I Memorandum to Ronald K. Peterson

Tab A State Draft Report