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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

**Withdrawer**

JET 4/6/2005

**File Folder** MATLOCK CHRON APRIL 1985 (4/6)

**FOIA**

F06-114/2

**Box Number** 9

YARHI-MILO

902

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
7299	MEMO	MCFARLANE TO MATLOCK RE USSR PROPOSAL FOR REGIONAL CONSULTATIONS <i>R 10/1/2012 F2006-114/2</i>	2	4/17/1985	B1
7308	MEMO	SHULTZ TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE MY MEETING TODAY WITH DOBRYNIN <i>R 6/23/2010 M125/2</i>	2	4/10/1985	B1
7300	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE MEETING WITH HARTMAN APRIL 18, 1985 <i>R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2</i>	1	4/18/1985	B1
7301	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE REPORT OF USSR INTENT TO RESOLVE SAKHAROV <i>R 1/11/2012 M125/2</i>	2	4/19/1985	B1
7302	TALKING POINTS	POSSIBLE MEETING WITH VELIKHOV <i>R 1/11/2012 M125/2</i>	2	ND	B1
7309	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC# 7301 <i>R 1/11/2012 M125/2</i>	2	4/19/1985	B1
7310	TALKING POINTS	SAME TEXT AS DOC# 7302 <i>R 1/11/2012 M125/2</i>	2	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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**Collection Name** MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

**Withdrawer**

JET 4/6/2005

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YARHI-MILO

902

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
7303	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE SDI AND ALLIANCE (SAME TEXT AS 7040) <b>R 1/11/2012 M125/2</b>	3	4/5/1985	B1
7304	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE DRAFT STRASBOURG SPEECH <b>R 10/1/2012 F2006-114/2</b>	2	4/25/1985	B1
7305	MEMO	KIMMITT TO ELLIOTT RE STRASBOURG SPEECH <b>R 10/1/2012 F2006-114/2</b>	1	ND	B1
7306	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE REDRAFT OF PRESIDENT'S LETTER TO GORBACHEV <b>R 10/1/2012 F2006-114/2</b>	15	4/25/1985	B1
7307	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE PRESIDENT'S REPLY TO GORBACHEV LETTER OF MARCH 24 <b>R 10/1/2012 F2006-114/2</b>	1	4/16/1985	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

April 17. 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCHARLANE

FROM:

JACK MATLOCK *JGM*

SUBJECT:

Soviet Proposal for Regional Consultations

You will recall that the Soviets have proposed a series of consultations on regional issues, including Southern Africa, the Far East and Southeast Asia, Central America, the Middle East, and Afghanistan.

This is clearly in response to our proposal for regular consultations on regional issues, which the President made in his speech to the UNGA last September. That background makes it important for us to respond positively, or else the President's effort to expand the dialogue and put it on a regular basis will seem to be a sham.

I understand, however, that there is opposition in some parts of State to agreeing to consultations on Central America. I can understand the reluctance of those who are not accustomed to dealing with Soviets to discuss these matters with them, but I believe their apprehensions are misplaced. Consultations do not mean that we tell the Soviets any secrets or give them openings they can exploit. They can be used to put down firm markers in a way which is useful, even if (as will be the case) the interlocutors disagree on virtually every point of each other's presentation. Furthermore, the very existence of such consultations is bound to create some healthy concern in places like Managua and Havana, and we should put ourselves in a position to take implicit advantage of this. (No matter what the Soviets tell the Cubans and Sandinistas, the latter will be nervous that their Soviet backers might be tempted by a deal with us which sells them down the river.) Finally, I think it is clear that if we refuse to discuss Central America, the Soviets will refuse to discuss Afghanistan, and I believe we can use consultations on Afghanistan to probe Soviet intentions and to make clear the dangers of increased pressure on Pakistan.

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Declassify on: OADR

NLRRF06-114/2 #7299

BY KML NARA DATE 10/1/12

✓

For these reasons, I believe it important for us to accept the Soviet proposal in principle, but make a few changes in the dates and the order of the consultations. For example, I believe the meeting on the Middle East should come last (since we have already had one), and should be not less than six months after the Vienna meeting. Also, instead of consultations on "Central America," they should be defined more broadly as "Latin America and the Caribbean" or perhaps "Western Hemisphere" (with the understanding that Canada is not included). At a minimum, we should make sure that Cuba is within the area discussed, and it would be useful to be able to place some markers in regard to places like Guyana and Surinam.

Since Secretary Shultz is still considering what his position should be on this matter, you may wish to discuss it with him.

Recommendation:

That you encourage Secretary Shultz to accept the Soviet proposal for regional consultations, with some adjustments as noted above.

Approve RM Disapprove     

Attachment:

TAB I Secretary Shultz memo to the President w/attachment

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

7308  
Mastlock

April 10, 1985

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: George P. Shultz <sup>GPS</sup>  
SUBJECT: My Meeting Today with Dobrynin

Dobrynin came in at his request today and presented a proposal to hold meetings on regional problems. The proposal is attached and is presumably related to your proposal for regular discussions on regional topics made in your UN General Assembly speech last fall. As you can see from the text, the Soviets are very specific about topics, dates and venues.

Dobrynin also gave me the original signed version of Gorbachev's letter to you of March 24. He asked if the letter being carried by Speaker O'Neill constituted a response, and I replied that there would be a full response in good time.

Dobrynin also asked about Bud's press briefing today, in particular about the distinction made between "meetings" and "summits." He asked if this had some special significance in relation to your invitation to Gorbachev. I said that Bud was making the distinction between the kind of meeting two heads of state could have if they were both attending some other meeting and had a discussion together, on the one hand, or, on the other, an especially arranged and carefully prepared meeting. I also pointed to Bud's emphasis on viewing relationships between countries as a process in which meetings between heads of state serve as markers in the flow of that process. Dobrynin is leaving on Friday, April 19, for consultations in Moscow and asked to come in to see me just before his departure. I told him that we could get together next Wednesday or Thursday.

I will have further comments in the next few days on their ideas of how to implement your proposal for regional dialogue.

Attachment

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~  
DECL: OADR

NLRR M08-125/2 #7308  
BY KWL NARA DATE 6/25/10

To continue and to develop the practice of holding bilateral exchanges of opinions on the level of experts on regional problems, in which, as we understand, the American side is interested too, we propose to arrange meetings of our representatives to discuss the following issues.

1. To resume exchanges of opinions on Southern Africa in order to consider the state of affairs pertaining to the implementation of corresponding UN resolutions on the granting of independence to Namibia, and ensuring the security of Angola. Such a meeting could be held in Washington or in any third country in late April.

2. To discuss the situation in the Far East and in the South-East Asia. These two themes could rather be discussed separately. Such an exchange of views is meant to take place in Moscow in the second half of May.

3. To exchange views on the situation in Central America. This might be done in Moscow or in a third country in the beginning of June.

4. To continue exchanging the views on the Middle East settlement, the situation in the region, including Lebanon, and on the Iran-Iraq conflict. This meeting could be held in Washington in the second half of June.

5. To resume the discussion of issues related to the situation around Afghanistan. We suggest to do this next July in Moscow between the U.S.Embassy and the U.S.S.R. Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

It would be advisable, in our view, to conduct the exchange of opinions on the level on which, for instance, recent consultations on the Middle East were held, or through the Soviet Embassy in Washington and the American Embassy in Moscow correspondingly.

If our suggestions are acceptable to the American side, appropriate practical details related to the meetings of experts could be worked out in the very near future.

*Matlock*

*Chivers*  
5

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

*JMC*

~~SECRET~~

April 18, 1985

INFORMATION

**RCM HAS SEEN**

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Ambassador Hartman  
April 18, 1985, 4:30 P.M.

Art considers his meeting with you as preparatory to his meeting with the President tomorrow. He has indicated to me that, in addition, he wants to discuss the following topics:

- The telephone call you made to him a couple of weeks ago;
- His recommendations regarding replacement of some Soviet local employees at the Embassy with Americans;
- The situation facing us in arms control negotiations.

Regarding the second topic, you should be aware that Hartman has opposed the proposals by PFIAB and others to replace Soviet employees at the Embassy with Americans. I have not yet had the opportunity to discuss the matter in detail with him, but I believe that he exaggerates the difficulties of arranging for the replacement, over time, of a large number of the Soviets. I would recommend, therefore, that you make clear to him the desirability, if practical means can be found, to move toward the greater utilization of Americans in these positions at the Embassy.

You may also wish to have Art fill you in on his impressions of Gorbachev as a person, and get his views on the best tactical approach for us to follow for the next year or so.

*e.g. Bill Odom proposed some time ago that he would be happy to provide linguists.*

~~SECRET~~  
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F06-114/2#7300

BY NRT NARA, DATE 11/21/07



~~ADMIRAL JOHN M. POINDEXTER~~

AMB. JACK MATLOCK.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

CAS 6/14/02

PRESERVATION COPY

National Security Council  
The White House

1

System # \_\_\_\_\_

Package # \_\_\_\_\_

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Paul Thompson	_____	_____	_____
Bob Kimmitt	_____	_____	_____
John Poindexter	1	<i>[Signature]</i>	_____
Tom Shull	_____	_____	_____
Wilma Hall	_____	_____	_____
Bud McFarlane	2	<i>m</i>	A
Bob Kimmitt	_____	_____	_____
NSC Secretariat	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
<i>JP</i>	3	<i>[Signature]</i>	_____

I = Information    A = Action    R = Retain    D = Dispatch    N = No further Action

cc: VP    Meese    Baker    Deaver    Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)

7301 8

MEMORANDUM

OUTSIDE THE SYSTEM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

April 19, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT: Report of Soviet Intent to Resolve Sakharov Problem

Edward Fredkin has informed me that, during Academician Velikhov's recent visit to the United States, he informed Fredkin that he had discussed the Sakharov situation with Gorbachev several times, and that Gorbachev had recently informed him that the matter will be "resolved positively" as soon as there has been "some time to consolidate" [presumably Gorbachev's political position]. Velikhov added that there is some concern about the reaction in the United States, and particularly fear that Sakharov's release would be criticized as "too little, too late." Velikhov apparently asked Fredkin whether he could obtain any assurances on this score.

This matter did not come up during Velikhov's call on me Monday, at which time Fedkin accompanied him (see separate memorandum on this), but Fredkin telephoned me later to report it and to suggest that I agree to a quiet meeting with Velikhov when I am in Moscow with the Baldrige mission.

Comment:

I am not sure that Fredkin has the story straight -- there may be some wishful thinking on his part -- but this is the first real straw in the wind I have noticed that the Soviets might be considering a move to release Sakharov. (You will recall that Fredkin is the person you asked me to contact last fall, in response to an appeal by Tanya Yankelevich to the Vice President. Subsequently, he made several efforts to encourage resolution of the Sakharov situation during his business trips to Moscow.)

There is some plausibility in Velikhov as a channel. He is a Vice President of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, which has been the only Soviet institution with a vested interest in trying to resolve the problem, and members of which are known to have intervened on Sakharov's behalf. Furthermore, he is known to be in direct contact with Gorbachev, particularly in regard to plans for greater use of computers in Soviet society, an effort which comes largely under Velikhov's jurisdiction. Given Velikhov's responsibility for maintaining contacts with Western scientists, one can also presume that he has a professional interest in

SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

Declassify on; OADR

DECLASSIFIED

BY RW NARA DATE 11/11/12  
NRR 1108-125/a # 7301

9

removing this impediment to greater cooperation and more effective contact.

In sum, I believe it would be premature to jump to the conclusion that this is for real, but also that it would be irresponsible not to make some effort to follow up to make sure we have the story straight. I therefore recommend that I see whether I can arrange some sort of meeting with Velikhov while I am in Moscow to attempt to clarify the Soviet intent and to learn whether there is anything reasonable they want us to do (or not do) to facilitate the matter. (I have briefed Art Hartman on this and he concurs.)

Suggested talking points are at Tab I.

Recommendation:

That you authorize a discreet contact with Velikhov while I am in Moscow, and my use of talking points along the lines of those at TAB I.

Approve



Disapprove

Attachment:

Tab I - Suggested talking points

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

Possible Meeting with Velikhov  
Suggested Talking Points

-- Ed Fredkin mentioned to me your conversation with him about possible plans to resolve the Sakharov situation in a positive manner. He also mentioned that your authorities had some concern about the reaction in the United States.

-- Did he understand you correctly, and is there anything you would like me to convey to the President?

[If he confirms the report and asks for assurances about the content of -- or absence of -- official statements here:]

-- We would of course view a positive and humanitarian resolution of this problem in a highly favorable light. Of course I mean a decision to allow both Mrs. Bonner and Academician Sakharov to leave the Soviet Union if they wish. Is this what Mr. Gorbachev has in mind?

[If he confirms:]

-- In that case I can assure you of our full cooperation in handling the matter publicly as you prefer.

-- Any official U.S. comment will be positive. If you wish a positive statement by the President that can certainly be arranged. He will in any case be required to respond to questions by the press, but I am sure he would agree to issue a formal statement expressing his pleasure at the development, if that is your desire.

-- I can also assure you that there will be no attempt to "take credit" for the Sakharovs' release, or to claim that it was in any way the result of U.S. pressure.

-- So far as press comment is concerned, I'm sure you understand that we have no control over that. But I am confident that it will be very positive

[If Velikhov indicates that the decision will be to allow Mrs. Bonner to travel, but not Sakharov:]

-- That will be a positive development, though we had hoped that you would decide to resolve the problem for both of them.

-- Nevertheless we welcome this as a step in the right direction, and it should open the way to resumption of cooperation under the Health Agreement.

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M08-125/2 #7302

BY RW NARA DATE 1/11/12

-- I can assure you that any statements we make will be positive, and we will not claim or imply that you have acted in response to pressure from us.

-- Of course, if Academician Sakharov's situation changes for the worse subsequently, I cannot guarantee that we will not be forced to say something about it. But we certainly won't criticize the permission for Bonner to travel.

-- On a purely personal basis, I can tell you that the Sakharov relatives in the United States have told me that they are confident that Mrs. Bonner will not engage in political activity if she comes for medical treatment, and will wish to return to the Soviet Union to be with her husband. Obviously, if an attempt is made to prevent her return, that could create a stir. For this reason, I really think it would be in your interest to solve the whole problem once and for all.

[If Velikhov cites security reasons for not letting Sakharov leave:]

-- This is really a silly reason. You know, I've lived here long enough to know about your penchant for secrecy, but this is going to absurd lengths. The fact is -- and you can believe this or not, but it is true -- we have absolutely no interest in Academician Sakharov from an intelligence point of view. We already know all we need to about the sensitive work he engaged in many years ago, and frankly, from what we know of Sakharov he would refuse to talk about it anyway. We couldn't run the risk of questioning him, even if we wanted to, which we don't. So your folks will be making a big mistake if they get hung up on security considerations.

[If Velikhov asks for some quid pro quo -- which I consider unlikely:]

-- I'll have to take that up in Washington, but [depending upon the nature of the request] I am hopeful that something along these lines can be worked out.

OR (if request presents obvious problems)

-- I'll check out the idea in Washington, but I doubt that we could go that far.

-- I can assure you that all this will be handled with the utmost discretion. How do you want me to communicate our decision?

*Classified*

*File Chron 12*

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

J. MARLOCK

PRESERVATION COPY

7309 13

MEMORANDUM

OUTSIDE THE SYSTEM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

April 19, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

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SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

Declassify on; OADR

BY RW NARA DATE 11/11/12  
NLR/M08-12517#7309

DECLASSIFIED



removing this impediment to greater cooperation and more effective contact.

In sum, I believe it would be premature to jump to the conclusion that this is for real, but also that it would be irresponsible not to make some effort to follow up to make sure we have the story straight. I therefore recommend that I see whether I can arrange some sort of meeting with Velikhov while I am in Moscow to attempt to clarify the Soviet intent and to learn whether there is anything reasonable they want us to do (or not do) to facilitate the matter. (I have briefed Art Hartman on this and he concurs.)

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Recommendation:

That you authorize a discreet contact with Velikhov while I am in Moscow, and my use of talking points along the lines of those at TAB I.

Approve \_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_

Attachment:

Tab I - Suggested talking points

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

7310 15

Possible Meeting with Velikhov  
Suggested Talking Points

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-- We would of course view a positive and humanitarian resolution of this problem in a highly favorable light. Of course I mean a decision to allow both Mrs. Bonner and Academician Sakharov to leave the Soviet Union if they wish. Is this what Mr. Gorbachev has in mind?

[If he confirms:]

-- In that case I can assure you of our full cooperation in handling the matter publicly as you prefer.

-- Any official U.S. comment will be positive. If you wish a positive statement by the President that can certainly be arranged. He will in any case be required to respond to questions by the press, but I am sure he would agree to issue a formal statement expressing his pleasure at the development, if that is your desire.

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-- Nevertheless we welcome this as a step in the right direction, and it should open the way to resumption of cooperation under the Health Agreement.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

DECLASSIFIED

MLRR m08-125/a #7310

BY RW NARA DATE 1/11/12

-- I can assure you that any statements we make will be positive, and we will not claim or imply that you have acted in response to pressure from us.

-- Of course, if Academician Sakharov's situation changes for the worse subsequently, I cannot guarantee that we will not be forced to say something about it. But we certainly won't criticize the permission for Bonner to travel.

-- On a purely personal basis, I can tell you that the Sakharov relatives in the United States have told me that they are confident that Mrs. Bonner will not engage in political activity if she comes for medical treatment, and will wish to return to the Soviet Union to be with her husband. Obviously, if an attempt is made to prevent her return, that could create a stir. For this reason, I really think it would be in your interest to solve the whole problem once and for all.

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[If Velikhov asks for some quid pro quo -- which I consider unlikely:]

-- I'll have to take that up in Washington, but [depending upon the nature of the request] I am hopeful that something along these lines can be worked out.

OR (if request presents obvious problems)

-- I'll check out the idea in Washington, but I doubt that we could go that far.

-- I can assure you that all this will be handled with the utmost discretion. How do you want me to communicate our decision?

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SYSTEM II  
90425

SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

April 5, 1985

ACTION

**RCM HAS SEEN**

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

THROUGH: JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT: SDI and the Alliance

Yesterday's message from Mulroney regarding the problems caused by the public announcement of the invitation to participate in SDI research without advance consultation and coordination is but the tip of one of the icebergs floating in Alliance waters on this issue. If we cannot find the means to deal with the problem, all of our careful efforts to preserve Alliance unity are likely to go the way of the Titanic.

So far, the Canadians have been by far the most outspoken to us (fortunately in private), but they may have done us a service by stating directly and vigorously -- indeed, hyperbolically -- feelings which are to a significant degree shared by the other Allies.

Last weekend, I attended a German-American conference in Dallas where Woerner, Teltschik, and assorted senior political figures from the CDU, SPD and FDP were present. CDU and FDP officials went to considerable lengths to maintain solidarity on SDI in their public pronouncements (though Telschik's speech was slightly reminiscent of Howe's, with too much hectoring on the dangers ahead), while Ehmke made clear the SPD opposition to the whole concept, and to the SPD intent to make the question of joint research a major political issue. (In a private moment of either candor or bluff, Ehmke boasted to me, "This idea we will kill, make no mistake about it.")

In the corridors, the CDU types were less reticent than in public. Their usual refrain was, "Don't you guys realize that we have a mammoth political problem on our hands? We want to be helpful. We want to be part of the research. But when you suddenly go public with proposals before we have our ducks in a row, you make this impossible. And every week some senior U.S. official makes a public statement which seems at variance with what the President, Shultz and McFarlane are saying, and this really keeps the pot boiling."

It is ironic that the latest flap is over joint research, since this potentially is (or was) one of our strongest cards, had we

SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

BY RWJ NARA DATE 11/1/12  
NLRP M08-1251-#7303  
DECLASSIFIED

played it right. It is also deeply discouraging that, having gained the high ground in January and February with careful statements by the President, yourself, Shultz and Paul Nitze, we now see alarm spreading in the Alliance in more acute (though less public) forms than we had earlier.

Joint research, of course, is not really the fundamental issue. Fundamental for the Allies are such questions as (1) Is SDI a research program to determine options for the future (as the President has said repeatedly), or is the U.S. in fact hell-bent to develop and deploy strategic defense systems regardless of other considerations? (2) Will the U.S. consult and keep Allied governments informed as the program evolves? and (3) Won't the talk of the immorality of nuclear weapons weaken support for the nuclear deterrence which will still be required for decades at least?

Our answer to the first of these questions is clear, unequivocal and persuasive. Unfortunately, however, when senior officials say (or even imply) that our minds are already made up on the deployment issue, doubts are created. Frankly, Ikle and Keyworth can hardly open their mouths without at least implying this. And though Richard Perle is usually more careful with his wording, his remarks often suggest the same. But ~~it~~ seems to me that, even if our minds are already made up, we must make every effort not to convey that impression, because if we do we are simply adding fuel to the flames of opposition, particularly in Europe.

The second question is, for governments like the Canadian and German, perhaps the most important of all. That is why we get such a negative reaction even when we do something they want, if we do it without consultation and advance preparation. I see no reason whatever for the premature public announcement of the Weinberger letter (naming countries which had not even received it), unless the intent was to force allied governments to reject the offer and thus save us some difficult technology-transfer decisions. I do not believe that such a Machiavellian ploy was the President's intent. *but probably DOD's.*

The third question is inherently a more difficult one, since we must recognize that, however clearly we explain the continued need for an adequate offensive deterrence for a long time to come, emphasizing the moral superiority of defense over offense does to a degree strengthen the hand of the "no-nuke" clique. Still, I believe this one is fully manageable with valid, straightforward answers provided a general atmosphere of distrust is not created by mishandling other issues, preeminently the sensitive one of consultation.

The damage done by ill-considered statements or hasty public gestures, therefore, far surpasses the importance of the individual issues themselves. Such incidents feed a climate of public questioning and distrust which makes it much more difficult for friendly governments to cooperate with us. It is easy to blame Howe for setting the current negative trends in

motion (and he is in fact partly culpable), but we must recognize that some of our own people have contributed to the mood. It is simply not in our interest to debate senior officials of friendly governments in public or to make it harder for our friends to stay in step with us by confronting them with surprises.

I know that you are aware of much -- perhaps all -- of this. I hope you will have the opportunity to discuss the problem frankly and in detail with the President. It would be a tragedy if, through the indiscipline and thoughtlessness of some of his subordinates, we undermine the best hope we have for the security of our country in coming decades.

SB 20

3116

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

April 19, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

THROUGH: ROBERT M. KIMMITT

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Travel Request to Travel to Vienna on May 14-15, 1985 to Participate in the Vienna Talks, and to Moscow on May 18-22 to Participate in the JCC Talks

1. I have been invited to participate in the forthcoming talks between Secretary Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko to be held in Vienna on May 14-15, 1985.

2. I have also been invited by Secretary Baldrige to participate in the JCC meetings with the Soviets to be held in Moscow on May 18-22.

I plan to proceed to Moscow from Vienna to join Secretary Baldrige's group. I will be using commercial air for the Washington/Vienna/Moscow portion and will be returning on Secretary Baldrige's aircraft. Since I will be travelling with officials from State and working on preparatory material en route, it will be necessary to travel in the same class of accommodation used by the State officials.

The commercial air portion of my trip will be charged to the NSC.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve my travel to:

(a) Vienna

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

(b) Moscow

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachment:  
Travel Authorization

cc: Administrative Office

NSC STAFF TRAVEL AUTHORIZATIONDATE: April 18, 1985 21

1. TRAVELER'S NAME: JACK F. MATLOCK
2. PURPOSE(S), EVENT(S), DATE(S): (a) To participate in the Vienna talks between Sec. Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko on May 14-15, 1985; and (b) participate in the JCC talks conducted with Soviet officials and Secretary Baldrige in Moscow on May 18-22, 1985.

3. ITINERARY (Please Attach Copy of Proposed Itinerary): \_\_\_\_\_

DEPARTURE DATE o/a 5/12/85 RETURN DATE o/a 5/22/85

TIME \_\_\_\_\_ TIME \_\_\_\_\_

4. MODE OF TRANSPORTATION:

GOV AIR X\* COMMERCIAL AIR X\* POV \_\_\_\_\_ RAIL \_\_\_\_\_ OTHER \_\_\_\_\_

5. ESTIMATED EXPENSES:

(See breakdown below)\*\*  
TRANSPORTATION 1600 PER DIEM 773 OTHER 264 TOTAL TRIP COST \$2637 APPROX.

6. WHO PAYS EXPENSES: NSC XX OTHER \_\_\_\_\_

7. IF NOT NSC, DESCRIBE SOURCE AND ARRANGEMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_

8. WILL FAMILY MEMBER ACCOMPANY YOU: YES X NO \_\_\_\_\_

9. IF SO, WHO PAYS FOR FAMILY MEMBER (If Travel Not Paid by Traveler, Describe Source and Arrangements): \_\_\_\_\_

10. TRAVEL ADVANCE REQUESTED: \$ \_\_\_\_\_

11. REMARKS (Use This Space to Indicate Any Additional Items You Would Like to Appear on Your Travel Orders):\* Wash/Vienna/Moscow portion to be on Commercial Air; Moscow/Washington portion to be on Government transportation (Sec. Baldrige's aircraft)

\*\* PER DIEM in VIENNA  $\$91+33 = \$124 \times 3 = \$372$  approx )

\*\* PER DIEM in MOSCOW  $\$100+33 = \$133 \times 5 = \$665$  approx )

12. TRAVELER'S SIGNATURE: J. F. Matlock, Jr.

13. APPROVALS:



7364 22  
JH-C

MEMORANDUM

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

April 24, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

DECLASSIFIED

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

NLRR FD6-114/2 # 7304

SUBJECT: Draft Strasbourg Speech

BY KML NARA DATE 10/1/12

The draft which has been circulated of the President's speech in Strasbourg will be an unmitigated disaster in Europe if it is delivered in this form. It deviates to a shocking degree from the guidelines we provided the speechwriters.

It is a speech which would be an effective pep talk to persons in the United States who share the conservative philosophy. The rhetoric, however, will have exactly the opposite effect on Europeans, even on most of those who are our supporters. In sum, it will be totally counterproductive in Europe. This perception is bound to play back here in the press reporting, adding to the problems we have already encountered.

Remember, we had only a few paragraphs on East-West relations in the President's luncheon address in Quebec --but the speech was characterized in the press here and in Canada as representing a confrontational approach to the Soviet Union. We should also keep in mind that recent public opinion polls in this country demonstrate that there is increasing concern over a "confrontational" foreign policy (Tab II).

The problem involves both style and substance, and I would define the major ones as follows:

-- The appeal for entrepreneurship and the implicit condemnation of European state-sponsored social welfare will be seen as an attempt to inject the President into internal political struggles in Europe. Furthermore this is condescending and offensive in tone. Frankly, Strasbourg is not the place for a primer on Friedman economics.

-- The attacks on the Soviet Union are too strident for European tastes. It is better to make a positive case for our policies than engaging in vivid confrontational rhetoric. The latter is not effective with the audience the President will address in Strasbourg.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

-- The "crusading" overtones in the discussion of East-West issues will evoke a negative reaction in Europe. The President's objective must be to persuade and rally support, not to polarize European publics more and create problems for our friends in power there. As written, the East-West portions of the speech will be receptive only to a small minority.

One basic point to bear in mind is that Europeans usually understate cases publicly, making major points implicitly and by indirection. To them, this is a more persuasive mode of argumentation. A tone which is appropriate to an American political rally in Houston will be counterproductive. The alternative is not to appear wimpish, but rather to make a positive case and go easy on the invective.

Finally, I must say that I am appalled at the necessity of having to negotiate substantive issues with a speechwriting staff, which seems bent on making policy rather than expressing it effectively. This problem is exacerbated by delays in receiving texts and then unreasonable deadlines for reaction. In this case, the State draft was provided to speechwriters on April 1, but received the speechwriters' version this morning and they want all of our comments by COB today! It is clear to me that this text must be extensively rewritten if it is to help us in Europe. With the other problems hanging over this trip, we don't need a major gaffe.

*W*  
Peter Sommer, Ty Cobb, Steve Steiner, Jim Rentschler and Walter Raymond concur.

Recommendation:

That you inform Don Regan and Mike Deaver that the current text must thoroughly be rewritten in order to bring in line with the substantive guidelines provided earlier and to make it effective for a European audience, and that you authorize Bob Kimmitt to send the attached memo to Ben Elliott.

Approve \_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_

Attachment:

Tab I - Memo from Kimmitt to Elliott

Tab II - Speechwriter's Draft of the President's Address at Strasbourg

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR BEN ELLIOTT

FROM: ROBERT M. KIMMITT

SUBJECT: Strasbourg Speech

We have several substantive and stylistic concerns. The draft Strasbourg speech is an excellent statement of American economic and political principles. However, we are greatly concerned that it sends the wrong message to a European audience. Our concerns involve both substance and style. Bud has asked that our staff, in cooperation with State, provide you with revised language by COB Thursday, April 25. The purpose of this memo is to let you know that we have major problems with the current text.

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR E06-114/2 #7305

BY KML NARA DATE 10/1/12~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

RECEIVED 23 APR 85 20

TO MCFARLANE FROM CHEW, D

DOCDATE 23 APR 85

**URGENT**

KEYWORDS: EUROPE WEST NATO  
BONN SUMMIT SDI  
ARMS CONTROL DEMOCRACY PROGRAM

SUBJECT: PRES ADDRESS TO EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT IN STRASBOURG 8 MAY

ACTION: MEMO KIMMITT TO ELLIOTT / CHEW DUE: 24 APR 85 STATUS S FILES WH

FOR ACTION		FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
SOMMER	<b>MATLOCK</b>	FORTIER	PEARSON
	STEINER	MCMINN	KIMMITT
	MARTIN	COBB	RENTSCHLER
	LINHARD	SMALL	

COMMENTS DUE BY 4:00PM 24 APRIL

REF# LOG NSCIFID ( JF )

ACTION OFFICLR (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO

26

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. General Secretary:

As I mentioned in my letter of April 4, delivered by Speaker O'Neill, I have given careful thought to your letter of March 24 and wish to take this opportunity to address the questions you raised and to mention others which I feel deserve your attention. Given the heavy responsibilities we both bear to preserve peace in the world and life on this planet, I am sure that you will agree that we must communicate with each other frankly and openly so that we can understand each other's point of view clearly. I write in that spirit.

I had thought that we agreed on the necessity of improving relations between our countries, and I welcomed your judgment that it is possible to do so. Our countries share an overriding interest in avoiding war between us, and -- as you pointed out -- the immediate task we face is to find a way to provide a political impetus to move these relations in a positive direction.

Unfortunately, certain recent events have begun to cast doubt on the desire of your government to improve relations. In particular, I have in mind the public retraction of the commitment made earlier by a responsible Soviet official to take steps to make certain that lethal force is not used against members of the United States Military Liaison Mission in Germany.

Mr. General Secretary, this matter has importance beyond the tragic loss of life which has occurred. It involves fundamental principles which must be observed if we are to narrow our differences and resolve problems in our countries' relations. For

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASABLE  
Authority NLSF99-051 #337 SMC 10/16/01  
BY WS, NARA, Date 6/14/02

21

this reason, I will give you my views in detail. The principles are those of dealing with each other on the basis of equality and reciprocity. The current Soviet position recognizes neither of these principles.

Now, I can understand that accidents occur in life which do not reflect the intention of political authorities. But when they do, it is the responsibility of the relevant political authorities to take appropriate corrective action.

For decades, members of our respective military liaison missions in Germany operated pursuant to the Huebner-Malinin agreement without a fatal incident. That encouraging record was broken when an unarmed member of our mission was killed by a Soviet soldier. Our military personnel are instructed categorically and in writing (in orders provided to your commander) never to use lethal force against members of the Soviet Military Liaison Mission, regardless of circumstances. Our forces in the Federal Republic of Germany have never done so, even though Soviet military personnel have been apprehended repeatedly in restricted military areas. In fact, some Soviet officers were discovered in a prohibited area just three days before the fatal shooting of our officer and were escorted courteously and safely from the area.

The position which your Government most recently presented to us, therefore, is neither reciprocal in its effect nor does it reflect a willingness to deal as equals. Instead of accepting the responsibility to insure that members of the United States Military Liaison Mission receive the same protection as that we accord members of the Soviet Military Liaison Mission, what we see is the assertion of a "right" to use lethal force under certain circumstances, determined unilaterally by the Soviet side, and in practice by enlisted men in the Soviet armed forces.

Now I will offer no comment on the desirability of allowing subordinate officials -- and indeed even rank-and-file soldiers -- to make decisions which can affect relations between great nations. If

you choose to permit this, that is your prerogative. But in that case, your Government cannot escape responsibility for faulty acts of judgment by individuals acting in accord with standing orders.

I hope that you will reconsider the position your Government has taken on this matter, and take steps to see to it that your military personnel guarantee the safety of their American, British and French counterparts in Germany just as American, British and French military personnel guarantee the safety of their Soviet colleagues. If your Government is unwilling or unable to abide by even this elementary rule of reciprocity, the conclusion we will be forced to draw will inevitably affect the prospects for settling other issues. The American people see this tragedy through the eyes of the widow and an eight-year-old child. Consequently it will remain a penetrating and enduring problem until it is properly resolved.

Your letter mentioned a number of other important principles, but here too our agreement on the principle should not be allowed to obscure the fact that, in our opinion, the principle cited has not been observed on the Soviet side. For example I could not agree more with your statement that each social system should prove its advantages not by force, but by peaceful competition, and that all people have the right to go their chosen way without imposition from the outside. But if this is true, what are we to think of Soviet military actions in Afghanistan or of your country's policy of supplying arms to minority elements in other countries which are attempting to impose their will on a nation by force? Can this be considered consistent with that important principle?

Mr. General Secretary, my purpose in pointing this out is not to engage in a debate over questions on which we disagree, but simply to illustrate the fact that agreement on a principle is one thing, and practical efforts to apply it another. Since we seem to agree on many principles, we must

devote our main effort to closing the gap between principle and practice.

In this regard, I am pleased to note that we both seem to be in agreement on the desirability of more direct consultation on various regional issues. That is a healthy sign, and I would hope that these consultations can be used to avoid the development of situations which might bring us to dangerous confrontations. I believe we should not be discouraged if, at present, our positions seem far apart. This is to be expected, given our differing interests and the impact of past events. The important thing is to make sure we each have a clear understanding of the other's point of view and act in a manner which does not provoke unintended reaction by the other.

One situation which has had a profoundly negative impact on our relations is the conflict in Afghanistan. Isn't it long overdue to reach a political resolution of this tragic affair? I cannot believe that it is impossible to find a solution which protects the legitimate interests of all parties, that of the Afghan people to live in peace under a government of their own choosing, and that of the Soviet Union to ensure that its southern border is secure. We support the United Nations Secretary General's effort to achieve a negotiated settlement, and would like to see a political solution that will deal equitably with the related issues of withdrawal of your troops to their homeland and guarantees of non-interference. I fear that your present course will only lead to more bloodshed, but I want you to know that I am prepared to work with you to move the region toward peace, if you desire.

Above all, we must see to it that the conflict in Afghanistan does not expand. Pakistan is a trusted ally of the United States and I am sure you recognize the grave danger which would ensue from any political or military threats against that country.

Turning to another of your comments, I must confess that I am perplexed by what you meant by your observation that trust "will not be enhanced



if, for example, one were to talk as if in two languages...." Of course, this is true. And, if I am to be candid, I would be compelled to admit that Soviet words and actions do not always seem to us to be speaking the same language. But I know that this is not what you intended to suggest. I also am sure that you did not intend to suggest that expressing our respective philosophies or our views of actions taken by the other is inconsistent with practical efforts to improve the relationship. For, after all, it has been the Party which you head which has always insisted not only on the right but indeed the duty to conduct what it calls an ideological struggle.

However this may be, your remarks highlight the need for us to act so as to bolster confidence rather than to undermine it. In this regard, I must tell you that I found the proposal you made publicly on April 7 -- and particularly the manner in which it was made -- unhelpful. As for the substance of the proposal, I find no significant element in it which we have not made clear in the past is unacceptable to us. I will not burden this letter with a reiteration of the reasons, since I am certain your experts are well aware of them. I cannot help but wonder what the purpose could have been in presenting a proposal which is, in its essence, not only an old one, but one which was known to provide no basis for serious negotiation. Certainly, it does not foster a climate conducive to finding realistic solutions to difficult questions. Past experience suggests that the best way to solve such issues is to work them out privately.

This brings me to the negotiations which have begun in Geneva. They have not made the progress we had hoped. It may now be appropriate to give them the political impetus about which we both have spoken. Let me tell you frankly and directly how I view them.

First, the January agreement by our Foreign Ministers to begin new negotiations was a good one. The problem has not been the terms of reference on the basis of which our negotiators met, even though each side may in some instances

interpret the wording of the joint statement somewhat differently in its application to specifics. The problem is, rather, that your negotiators have not yet begun to discuss concretely how we can translate our commitment to a radical reduction of nuclear arsenals into concrete, practical agreements.

A particular obstacle to progress has been the demand by Soviet negotiators that, in effect, the United States agree to ban research on advanced defensive systems before other topics are dealt with seriously. I hope that I have misunderstood the Soviet position on this point, because, if that is the Soviet position, no progress will be possible. For reasons we have explained repeatedly and in detail, we see no way that a ban on research efforts can be verified. Indeed in Geneva, Foreign Minister Gromyko acknowledged the difficulty of verifying such a ban on research. Nor do we think such a ban would be in the interest of either of our countries. To hold the negotiations hostage to an impossible demand creates an insurmountable obstacle from the outset. I sincerely hope that this is not your intent, since it cannot be in the interest of either of our countries. In fact, it is inconsistent with your own actions -- with the strategic defense you already deploy around Moscow and with your own major research program in strategic defense.

In this regard, I was struck by the characterization of our Strategic Defense Initiative which you made during your meeting with Speaker O'Neill's delegation -- that this research program has an offensive purpose for an attack on the Soviet Union. I can assure you that you are profoundly mistaken on this point. The truth is precisely the opposite. We believe that it is important to explore the technical feasibility of defensive systems which might ultimately give all of us the means to protect our people more safely than do those we have at present, and to provide the means of moving to the total abolition of nuclear weapons, an objective on which we are agreed. I must ask you, how are we ever practically to achieve that noble aim if nations

have no defense against the uncertainty that all nuclear weapons might not have been removed from world arsenals? Life provides no guarantee against some future madman getting his hands on nuclear weapons, the technology of which is already, unfortunately, far too widely known and knowledge of which cannot be erased from human minds.

This point seems, at one time, to have been clearly understood by the Soviet Government. I note that Foreign Minister Gromyko told the United Nations General Assembly in 1962 that anti-missile defenses could be the key to a successful agreement reducing offensive missiles. They would, he said then, "guard against the eventuality ... of someone deciding to violate the treaty and conceal missiles or combat aircraft." Not only has your government said that missile defenses are good; you have acted on this belief as well. Not only have you deployed an operational ABM system, but you have upgraded it and you are pursuing an active research program.

Of course, I recognize that, in theory, the sudden deployment of effective defenses by one side in a strategic environment characterized by large numbers of "first-strike" weapons could be considered as potentially threatening by the other side. Nevertheless, such a theoretical supposition has no basis in reality, at least so far as the United States is concerned. Our scientists tell me that the United States will require some years of further research to determine whether potentially effective defensive systems can be identified which are worthy of consideration for deployment. If some options should at some time in the future be identified, development of them by the United States could occur only following negotiations with other countries, including your own, and following thorough and open policy debates in the United States itself. And if the decision to deploy should be positive, then further years would pass until the systems could actually be deployed. So there is no possibility of a sudden, secretive, destabilizing move by the United States. During the research period our governments will have ample time to phase out

systems which could pose a "first-strike" threat and to develop a common understanding regarding the place of possible new systems in a safer, more stable, arrangement. If such defensive systems are identified that would not be permitted by the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, the United States intends to follow the procedures agreed upon at the time the Treaty was negotiated in 1972. In particular, Agreed Statement D attached to that Treaty calls upon the party developing a system based upon other physical principles to consult with the other party pursuant to Article XIII, with a view to working out pertinent limitations which could be adopted by amendment to the Treaty pursuant to Article XIV. I presume that it continues to be the intention of the Soviet Union to abide by Agreed Statement D in the event the long-continuing Soviet program in research on directed energy weapons were to have favorable results.

I hope this discussion will assist you in joining me in a search for practical steps to invigorate the negotiations in Geneva. One approach which I believe holds promise would be for our negotiators on strategic and intermediate-range nuclear systems to intensify their efforts to agree on specific reductions in the numbers of existing and future forces, with particular attention to those each of us find most threatening, while the negotiators dealing with defensive and space weapons concentrate on measures which prevent the erosion of the ABM Treaty and strengthen the role that Treaty can play in preserving stability as we move toward a world without nuclear weapons. Proceeding in this fashion might avoid a fruitless debate on generalities and open the way to concrete, practical solutions which meet the concerns of both sides.

I believe we also should give new attention to other negotiations and discussions underway in the security and arms control field. We know that some progress has been made in the Stockholm Conference toward narrowing our differences. An

agreement should be possible this year on the basis of the framework which we have discussed with your predecessors. Specifically, we are willing to consider the Soviet proposal for a declaration reaffirming the principle not to use force, if the Soviet Union is prepared to negotiate agreements which will give concrete new meaning to that principle. Unfortunately, the response of your representatives to this offer has not been encouraging up to now. I hope that we may soon see a more favorable attitude toward this idea and toward the confidence-building measures that we and our allies have proposed.

One pressing issue of concern to us both is the use of chemical weaponry in the Iran-Iraq war. This situation illustrates the importance of curbing the spread of chemical weapons, and I suggest that it might be useful in the near future for our experts to meet and examine ways in which we might cooperate on this topic. A verifiable complete global ban on these terrible weapons would provide a lasting solution, and I would ask you therefore to give further study to the draft treaty we have advanced in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.

Steps to improve our bilateral relationship are also important, not only because of the benefits which agreements in themselves can bring, but also because of the contribution they can make to a more confident working relationship in general.

Several of these issues seem ripe for rapid settlement. For example, we should be able to conclude an agreement on improving safety measures in the North Pacific at an early meeting and move to discussions of civil aviation issues. We are ready to move forward promptly to open our respective consulates in New York and Kiev. Our efforts to negotiate a new exchanges agreement have, after six months, reached the point where only a handful of issues remain to be resolved. But if I had to characterize these remaining issues, I would say that they result from efforts on our side to raise our sights and look to more, not fewer, exchanges. Shouldn't we try to improve on past practices in this area? I am also hopeful

that the meeting of our Joint Commercial Commission in May will succeed in identifying areas in which trade can increase substantially, but it is clear that this is likely to happen only if we succeed in improving the political atmosphere.

Finally, let me turn to an issue of great importance to me and to all Americans. As the Vice President informed you in Moscow, we believe strongly that strict observance of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and of the Helsinki Final Act is an important element of our bilateral relationship. Last year we suggested that Ambassador Hartman meet periodically with Deputy Foreign Minister Korniyenko to discuss confidentially how we might achieve greater mutual understanding in this area. I am also prepared to appoint rapporteurs as you suggested to the Vice President, perhaps someone to join Ambassador Hartman in such meetings. Whatever procedures we ultimately establish, I hope we can agree to try, each in accord with his own legal structure, to resolve problems in this area. If we can find a way to eliminate the conditions which give rise to public recrimination, we will have taken a giant step forward in creating an atmosphere conducive to solving many other problems.

I was glad to receive your views on a meeting between the two of us, and agree that major formal agreements are not necessary to justify one. I assume that you will get back in touch with me when you are ready to discuss time and place. I am pleased that arrangements have been made for Secretary Shultz to meet Foreign Minister Gromyko in Vienna next month, and hope that they will be able to move us toward solutions of the problems I have mentioned as well as others on the broad agenda before us.

As I stated at the outset, I have written you in candor. I believe that our heavy responsibilities require us to communicate directly and without guile or circumlocution. I hope you will give me your frank view of these questions and call to my attention any others which you consider require our personal involvement. I sincerely hope that

we can use this correspondence to provide a new impetus to the whole range of efforts to build

confidence and to solve the critical problems which have increased tension between our countries.

Sincerely,

His Excellency  
Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev  
General Secretary of the Central Committee  
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union  
The Kremlin  
Moscow

JM-  
"JACK"  
7306 37

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

April 25, 1985

ACTION

DECLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

NLRR F06-114/2 #7306

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

BY kml NARA DATE 10/1/12

SUBJECT: Redraft of President's Letter to Gorbachev

I have redrafted the President's letter to Gorbachev to take account of the Soviet action Monday in disavowing an essential part of what we had understood to be the Otis-Zaitsev agreement.

So that you can quickly see what I have done, I have put a red line to the right of those paragraphs added, and a dotted line where there was some revision.

As you can see, I have tried to couch the comments on Nicholson in terms of principle that the Soviets can understand, and have toughened the tone of some other comments. I tried to focus on the nub of the issue, and to state it very plainly. I have also included a few implicit hints that Gorbachev may not be in a position to control his own military. I believe this is done in a way as not to seem provocative, but rather to challenge Gorbachev to demonstrate that he is in control. I believe these comments by the President will be a useful backdrop for other actions we might take on this matter.

Since the letter contains other points which I believe it is useful to get on the record at the highest level, I would hope that the President would be willing to sign it tomorrow so that we can get it to Hartman for delivery early next week. I have not yet attempted to clear the revised text with State, but will do so if you approve.

Recommendation:

That you approve or amend the attached text, following which I will clear with State (if you instruct) and send a memorandum to the President requesting his signature.

Approve \_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_

Attachment:

Tab I -- Redraft of President's Letter to Gorbachev

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Declassify on: OADR



Redraft of Letter to Gorbachev

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DECLASSIFIED

NLRR FOI-114/2 #7306A

BY KML NARA DATE 10/1/12

Dear Mr. General Secretary:

As I mentioned in my letter of April 4, delivered by Speaker O'Neill, I have given careful thought to your letter of March 24 and wish to take this opportunity to address the questions you raised and to mention others which I feel deserve your attention. Given the heavy responsibilities we both bear to preserve peace in the world and life on this planet, I am sure that you will agree that we must communicate with each other frankly and openly so that we can understand each other's point of view clearly. I write in that spirit.

I had thought that we agreed on the necessity of improving relations between our countries, and I welcomed your judgment that it is possible to do so. Our countries share an overriding interest in avoiding war between us, and -- as you pointed out -- the immediate task we face is to find a way to provide a political impetus to move these relations in a positive direction.

Unfortunately, certain recent events have begun to cast doubt on the desire of your government to improve relations. In particular, I have in mind the public retraction of what we understood to be the commitment made earlier by a responsible Soviet official to take steps to make certain that lethal force is not used against members of the United States Military Liaison Mission in Germany.

Mr. General Secretary, this matter has importance beyond the tragic loss of life which has occurred. It involves fundamental principles which must be observed if we are to narrow our differences and resolve problems in our countries' relations. For this reason, I will give you my views in detail. The principles are those of dealing with each other on the basis of equality and reciprocity. The current Soviet position recognizes neither of these principles.

Now, I can understand that accidents occur in life which do not reflect the intention of political authorities. But when they do, it is the responsibility of the relevant political authorities to take appropriate corrective action.

For decades, members of our respective military liaison missions in Germany operated pursuant to the Huebner-Malinin agreement without a fatal incident. That encouraging record was broken when an unarmed member of our mission was killed by a Soviet soldier. Our military personnel are instructed categorically and in writing (in orders provided to your commander) never to use lethal force against members of the Soviet Military Liaison Mission, regardless of circumstances. Our forces have never done so, even though Soviet military personnel have been apprehended repeatedly in restricted military areas. In fact, some Soviet officers were discovered in a prohibited area just three days before the fatal shooting of our officer and were escorted courteously and safely from the area.

The position which your Government most recently presented to us, therefore, is neither reciprocal in its effect nor does it reflect a willingness to deal as equals. Instead of accepting the responsibility to insure that members of the United States Military Liaison Mission receive the same protection as that we accord members of the Soviet Military Liaison Mission, what we see is the assertion of a "right" to use lethal force under certain circumstances, determined unilaterally by the Soviet side, and in practice by enlisted men in the Soviet armed forces.

Now I will offer no comment on the desirability of allowing subordinate officials -- and indeed even rank-and-file soldiers -- to make decisions which can affect relations between great nations. If you choose to permit this, that is your prerogative. But in that case, your Government cannot escape responsibility for faulty acts of judgment by individuals acting in accord with standing orders.

I hope that you will reconsider the position your Government has taken on this matter, and take steps to see to it that your military personnel guarantee the safety of their American counterparts in Germany just as American military personnel guarantee the safety of their Soviet colleagues. If your Government is unwilling or unable to abide by even this elementary rule of reciprocity, the conclusion we will be forced to draw will inevitably affect the prospects for settling other

issues. After all, this is not the first time American lives have been lost as the result of a policy on the Soviet part of using lethal force without determining whether the circumstances justified it. And no agreements will be possible between us if one of the sides insists on preserving unitateral advantages.

Your letter mentioned a number of other important principles, but here too our agreement on the principle should not be allowed to obscure the fact that, in our opinion, the principle cited has not been observed on the Soviet side. For example, I could not agree more with your statement that each social system should prove its advantages not by force, but by peaceful competition, and that all people have the right to go their chosen way without imposition from the outside. But if this is true, what are we to think of Soviet military actions in Afghanistan or of your country's policy of supplying arms to minority elements in other countries which are attempting to impose their will on a nation by force? Can this be considered consistent with that important principle?

Mr. General Secretary, my purpose in pointing this out is not to engage in a debate over questions on which we disagree, but simply to illustrate the fact that agreement on a principle is one thing, and practical efforts to apply it another. Since we seem to agree on many principles, we must devote our main effort to closing the gap between principle and practice.

In this regard, I am pleased to note that we both seem to be in agreement on the desirability of more direct consultation on various regional issues. That is a healthy sign, and I would hope that these consultations can be used to avoid the development of situations which might bring us to dangerous confrontations. I believe we should not be discouraged if, at present, our positions seem far apart. This is to be expected, given our differing interests and the impact of past events. The important thing is to make sure we each have a clear understanding of the other's point of view and act in a manner which does not provoke unintended reaction by the other.

One situation which has had a profoundly negative impact on our relations is the conflict in Afghanistan. Isn't it long overdue to reach a political resolution of this tragic affair? I cannot believe that it is impossible to find a solution which protects the legitimate interests of all parties, that of the Afghan people to live in peace under a government of their own choosing, and that of the Soviet Union to ensure that its southern border is secure. We support the United Nations Secretary General's effort to achieve a negotiated settlement, and would like to see a political solution that will deal equitably with the related issues of withdrawal of your troops to their homeland and guarantees of non-interference. I fear that your present course will only lead to more bloodshed, but I want you to know that I am prepared to work with you to move the region toward peace, if you desire.

Above all, we must see to it that the conflict in Afghanistan does not expand. Pakistan is a trusted ally of the United States and I am sure you recognize the grave danger which would ensue from any political or military threats against that country.

Turning to another of your comments, I must confess that I am perplexed by what you meant by your observation that trust "will not be enhanced if, for example, one were to talk as if in two languages...." Of course, this is true. And, if I am to be candid, I would be compelled to admit that Soviet words and actions do not always seem to us to be speaking the same language. But I know that this is not what you intended to suggest. I also am sure that you did not intend to suggest that expressing our respective philosophies or our views of actions taken by the other is inconsistent with practical efforts to improve the relationship. For, after all, it has been the Party which you head which has always insisted not only on the right but indeed the duty to conduct what it calls an ideological struggle.

However this may be, your remarks highlight the need for us to act so as to bolster confidence rather than to undermine it. In this regard, I must tell you that I found the proposal you made publicly on April 7 -- and particularly the manner in which it was made -- unhelpful. As for the substance of the proposal, I find no significant element in it which we have not made clear in

the past is unacceptable to us. I will not burden this letter with a reiteration of the reasons, since I am certain your experts are well aware of them. I cannot help but wonder what the purpose could have been in presenting a proposal which is, in its essence, not only an old one, but one which was known to provide no basis for serious negotiation. Certainly, it does not foster a climate conducive to finding realistic solutions to difficult questions. Past experience suggests that the best way to solve such issues is to work them out privately.

This brings me to the negotiations which have now been underway in Geneva for several weeks. They have not made the progress we had hoped. It may now be appropriate to give them the political impetus about which we both have spoken. Let me tell you frankly and directly how I view them.

First, the January agreement by our Foreign Ministers to begin new negotiations was a good one. The problem has not been the terms of reference on the basis of which our negotiators met, even though each side may in some instances interpret the wording of the joint statement somewhat differently in its application to specifics. The problem is, rather, that your negotiators have not yet begun to discuss concretely how we can translate our commitment to a radical reduction of nuclear arsenals into concrete, practical agreements.

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A particular obstacle to progress has been the demand by Soviet negotiators that, in effect, the United States agree to ban research on advanced defensive systems before other topics are dealt with seriously. I hope that I have misunderstood the Soviet position on this point, because, if that is the Soviet position, no progress will be possible. For reasons we have explained repeatedly and in detail, we see no way that a ban on research efforts can be verified, nor do we think such a ban would be in the interest of either of our countries. To hold the negotiations hostage to an impossible demand creates an insurmountable obstacle from the outset. I sincerely hope that this is not your intent, since it cannot be in the interest of either of our countries. In fact, it is inconsistent with your own actions -- with the strategic defense you already deploy around Moscow and with your own major research program in strategic defense.

In this regard, I was struck by the characterization of our Strategic Defense Initiative which you made during your meeting with Speaker O'Neill's delegation -- that this research program has an offensive purpose for an attack on the Soviet Union. I can assure you that you are profoundly mistaken on this point. The truth is precisely the opposite. We believe that it is important to explore the technical feasibility of defensive systems which might ultimately give all of us the means to protect our people more safely than do those we have at present, and to provide the means of moving to the total abolition of



nuclear weapons, an objective on which we are agreed. I must ask you, how are we ever practically to achieve that noble aim if nations have no defense against the uncertainty that all nuclear weapons might not have been removed from world arsenals? Life provides no guarantee against some future madman getting his hands on nuclear weapons, the technology of which is already, unfortunately, far too widely known and knowledge of which cannot be erased from human minds.

This point seems, at one time, to have been clearly understood by the Soviet Government. I note that Foreign Minister Gromyko told the United Nations General Assembly in 1962 that anti-missile defenses could be the key to a successful agreement reducing offensive missiles. They would, he said then, "guard against the eventuality ... of someone deciding to violate the treaty and conceal missiles or combat aircraft."

Of course, I recognize that, in theory, the sudden deployment of effective defenses by one side in a strategic environment characterized by large numbers of "first-strike" weapons could be considered as potentially threatening by the other side. Nevertheless, such a theoretical supposition has no basis in reality, at least so far as the United States is concerned. Our scientists tell me that the United States will require some years of further research to determine whether potentially effective defensive systems can be identified which are worthy of consideration for deployment. If some options should at some

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time in the future be identified, development of them by the United States could occur only following negotiations with other countries, including your own, and following thorough and open policy debates in the United States itself. And if the decision to deploy should be positive, then further years would pass until the systems could actually be deployed. So there is no possibility of a sudden, secretive, destabilizing move by the United States. During the research period our governments will have ample time to reduce systems which could pose a "first-strike" threat and to develop a common understanding regarding the place of possible new systems in a safer, more stable, arrangement.

If such defensive systems are identified that would not be permitted by the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, the United States intends to follow the procedures agreed upon at the time the Treaty was negotiated in 1972. In particular, Agreed Statement D attached to that Treaty calls upon the party developing a system based upon other physical principles to consult with the other party pursuant to Article XIII, with a view to working out pertinent limitations which could be adopted by amendment to the Treaty pursuant to Article XIV. I presume that it continues to be the intention of the Soviet Union to abide by Agreed Statement D in the event the long-continuing Soviet program in research on directed energy weapons were to have favorable results.

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I hope this discussion will assist you in joining me in a search for practical steps to invigorate the negotiations in Geneva. One approach which I believe holds promise would be for our negotiators on strategic and intermediate-range nuclear systems to intensify their efforts to agree on specific reductions in the numbers of existing and future forces, with particular attention to those each of us find most threatening, while the negotiators dealing with defensive and space weapons concentrate on measures which prevent the erosion of the ABM Treaty and strengthen the role that Treaty can play in preserving stability as we move toward a world without nuclear weapons. Proceeding in this fashion might avoid a fruitless debate on generalities and open the way to concrete, practical solutions which meet the concerns of both sides.

I believe we also should give new attention to other negotiations and discussions underway in the security and arms control field. We know that some progress has been made in the Stockholm Conference toward narrowing our differences. An agreement should be possible this year on the basis of the framework which we have discussed with your predecessors. Specifically, we are willing to consider the Soviet proposal for a declaration reaffirming the principle not to use force, if the Soviet Union is prepared to negotiate agreements which will give concrete new meaning to that principle. Unfortunately, the response of your representatives to this offer has not been encouraging up to now. I hope that we may soon see a more favorable attitude toward this idea and

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toward the confidence-building measures that we and our allies have proposed.

One pressing issue of concern to us both is the use of chemical weaponry in the Iran-Iraq war. This situation illustrates the importance of curbing the spread of chemical weapons, and I suggest that it might be useful in the near future for our experts to meet and examine ways in which we might cooperate on this topic. A verifiable complete global ban on these terrible weapons would provide a lasting solution, and I would ask you therefore to give further study to the draft treaty we have advanced in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.

Steps to improve our bilateral relationship are also important, not only because of the benefits which agreements in themselves can bring, but also because of the contribution they can make to a more confident working relationship in general.

Several of these issues seem ripe for rapid settlement. For example, we should be able to conclude an agreement on improving safety measures in the North Pacific at an early meeting and move to discussions of civil aviation issues. We are ready to move forward promptly to open our respective consulates in New York and Kiev. Our efforts to negotiate a new exchanges agreement have, after six months, reached the point where only a handful of issues remain to be resolved. But if I had to characterize these remaining issues, I would say that they result from efforts on

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our side to raise our sights and look to more, not fewer, exchanges. Shouldn't we try to improve on past practices in this area? I am also hopeful that the meeting of our Joint Commercial Commission in May will succeed in identifying areas in which trade can increase substantially, but it is clear that this is likely to happen only if we succeed in improving the political atmosphere.

Finally, let me turn to an issue of great importance to me and to all Americans. As the Vice President informed you in Moscow, we believe strongly that strict observance of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and of the Helsinki Final Act is an important element of our bilateral relationship. Last year we suggested that Ambassador Hartman meet periodically with Deputy Foreign Minister Korniyenko to discuss confidentially how we might achieve greater mutual understanding in this area. I am also prepared to appoint rapporteurs as you suggested to the Vice President, perhaps someone to join Ambassador Hartman in such meetings. Whatever procedures we ultimately establish, I hope we can agree to try, each in accord with his own legal structure, to resolve problems in this area. If we can find a way to eliminate the conditions which give rise to public recrimination, we will have taken a giant step forward in creating an atmosphere conducive to solving many other problems.

I was glad to receive your views on a meeting between the two of us, and agree that major formal agreements are not necessary to

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justify one. I assume that you will get back in touch with me when you are ready to discuss time and place. I am pleased that arrangements have been made for Secretary Shultz to meet Foreign Minister Gromyko in Vienna next month, and hope that they will be able to move us toward solutions of the problems I have mentioned as well as others on the broad agenda before us.

As I stated at the outset, I have written you in candor. I believe that our heavy responsibilities require us to communicate directly and without guile or circumlocution. I hope you will give me your frank view of these questions and call to my attention any others which you consider require our personal involvement. I sincerely hope that we can use this correspondence to provide a new impetus to the whole range of efforts to build confidence and to solve the critical problems which have increased tension between our countries.

Sincerely,

His Excellency  
Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev  
General Secretary of the Central Committee  
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union  
The Kremlin  
Moscow

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

April 16, 1985

ACTION

DECLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

NLRR F06-114/2 #7307

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *Jam*BY KML NARA DATE 10/1/12

SUBJECT: President's Reply to Gorbachev Letter of March 24

I have reviewed State's draft reply to Gorbachev, and I believe that it is not an effective response to the Gorbachev letter. Not that I object to any of the substance per se, but rather to the pedestrian approach, which is devoid of personality and reeks of being staff-written. We can do better, and I believe we should try before asking the President to approve it.

Specifically, my objections are the following:

-- It does not really engage Gorbachev in a dialogue. Now that there is a Soviet leader who reads his mail and who seems to enjoy a spirited debate, I believe that the President should engage him on some key issues. His letter provides several openings, and we should exploit them.

-- Although it was written to include items from each element on our agenda, it really comes through as a grab-bag of disparate issues. It should be tightened, made more selective, and given a focus on some of the key issues.

Although I understand that Secretary Shultz would like to provide the letter to Dobrynin tomorrow, I believe we should take more time with it and make sure it is the best we can do. (Shultz has a number of other agenda items to take up with Dobrynin, so the letter is not really necessary for the meeting.) In principle, I think it would be better to have Hartman deliver it anyway. He will be going back to Moscow next week and it would be useful to give him the opportunity to schedule a discussion with Gromyko on the basis of his consultations here.

I am working on a redraft, and hope that we can avoid undue haste in making final decisions on the text.

Recommendation:

That you suggest to Secretary Shultz that we work on the text further, with the goal of having something ready for the President by the end of the week.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Declassify on: OADR