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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 4/4/2005

File Folder MATLOCK CHRON APRIL 1985 (2/6)

FOIA

F06-114/2

Box Number 8

YARHI-MILO

811

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
7028	MEMO	MATLOCK TO KIMMITT AND PEARSON RE SOVIET WHALING <i>R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2</i>	1	4/2/1985	B1
7030	MEMO	MATLOCK TO POINDEXTER RE SOVIET WHALING <i>R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2</i>	1	4/1/1985	B1
7033	E-MAIL	E-MAIL PROFS PEARSON TO MCFARLANE; POINDEXTER TO MATLOCK AND SIMS RE WHALES AND SOVIET UNION <i>R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2</i>	1	3/29/1985	B1
7035	E-MAIL	E-MAIL PROFS POINDEXTER TO MATLOCK AND SIMS <i>R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2</i>	1	3/29/1985	B1
7036	MEMO	KIMMITT TO PLATT RE U.S.-POLAND AIR TRANSPORT AGREEMENT <i>R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2</i>	1	4/4/1985	B1
7050	MEMO	PLATT TO MCFARLANE RE U.S.-POLAND AIR TRANSPORT AGREEMENT <i>R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2</i>	2	3/25/1985	B1
7038	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE U.S.-POLAND AIR TRANSPORT AGREEMENT <i>R 3/27/2012 M266/1</i>	1	3/26/1985	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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811

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
7040	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE SDI AND ALLIANCE <i>R 1/11/2012 M125/2</i>	3	4/5/1985	B1
7043	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE PRESIDENT'S REPLY TO GORBACHEV LETTER OF MARCH 24 <i>R 3/27/2012 M266/1</i>	1	4/16/1985	B1
7045	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #7040 <i>R 1/11/2012 M125/2</i>	3	4/5/1985	B1
7047	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE U.S.-USSR RELATIONS: PLANNING FOR 1985 <i>PAR 5/26/2011 F2006-114/2</i>	5	4/8/1985	B1 B3

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Matlock
JM-C

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

April 2, 1985

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT
ROBERT W. PEARSON

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JF*

SUBJECT: Soviet Whaling

I believe our action should be announced when it is formally taken and the Soviets notified officially.

As of this afternoon, State had not received the determination regarding Soviet whaling from Commerce. I have asked State to work with Commerce to develop appropriate talking points for the press.

The situation with the Soviet fishing quota is that the Soviets were earlier given a 22,000 ton "partial" quota for this year, with the intent to increase this to something in the 70,000 to 100,000 ton range if cooperation with U.S. fishing interests is productive.

The impact of the determination of whaling violations will require (in State's opinion) cutting any additional quota allocation to half of what it would have been otherwise. Therefore, the prospect is for a total annual quota in the range of 46-61 thousand tons instead of 70-100 thousand tons.

Thanks, Jack.
Bob

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLS *F06-114/2#7028*

BT *LAT*, NARA, DATE *11/21/07*

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

National Security Council
The White House

BP
2

System # I
Package # 2607
1680

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bob Pearson	<u>1</u>	<u>P</u>	
Bob Kimmitt	<u>2</u>		
John Poindexter			
Paul Thompson			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room			
<u>Matlock</u>	<u>2</u>		<u>redo</u>

= Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Regan Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

Since SDC apparently planned to act 4/1,
could we state that SDC has actually
invoked the statute against the Soviets?
Ax.

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

April 1, 1985

~~SECRET~~INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER
FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK
SUBJECT: Soviet Whaling

The Soviets have been notified that we have no choice but to invoke U.S. law if they exceed their whaling quota.

Obviously, if this has happened, Commerce should enforce the law.

Richard Levine and Douglas^{A.A.} McMinn concur.

Attachment:

Tab A Prof Note

cc: Robert Sims

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
NLS F06-114/2#7030
BY LRT, NARA, DATE 11/21/07

MSG FROM: NSWRP --CPUA TO: NSGVE --CPUA
To: NSGVE --CPUA GEORGE VAN ERON

03/30/85 09:10:49

4
URGENT

NOTE FROM: BOB PEARSON

Subject: Forwarding Note 03/29/85 19:06 Whales and the Soviet Union
staff to matlock, levine and mcminn to concur. sys I, due COB 4/1. tx.

*** F O R W A R D E D N O T E ***

To: NSRCM --CPUA BUD MCFARLANE

-- ~~SECRET~~ --

NOTE FROM: JOHN POINDEXTER

SUBJECT: Whales and the Soviet Union
Mac Baldrige called. We have a problem with the Soviets taking too many whales. The Packwood-Magnusson Act stipulates that quotas are established for the taking of Minke (sp?) whales down around Antarctica. The Japanese and Soviet quotas are each 1900. About 3 weeks ago we detected that both countries would exceed their quotas if they kept up at the same rate. Warning notices were sent out to each country. If a country exceeds the quota, Commerce in coordination with State must certify that fact. Then the punishment that Commerce must mete out is a reduction by 50% in the quota for fish that the country can take from US waters. If Commerce doesn't certify, then Mac says the environmentalists will sue. Japan stopped at their quota of 1900; however the Soviets have continued and are now up to about 2300 whales. I ask him how we counted them. I thought there might be some new verification method we could use in arms control. Mac didn't know but said he would find out. Anyway it is Mac's intention to certify them on Monday and cut their quota by 50%. I told him I didn't see a problem, but would pass it on to you. With the killing of Major Nicholson, I don't see how we can do anything else. In fact without that, I think we should enforce the law.

copy to: Jack Matlock, Bob Sims

cc: NSRMK --CPUA
NSGVE --CPUA

BOB KIMMITT
GEORGE VAN ERON

NSWRP --CPUA

BOB PEARSON

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F06-114/2# 7033

BY LOT NARA DATE 11/21/07

MSG FROM: NSJMP --CPUA TO: NSGVE --CPUA
To: NSRCM --CPUA BUD MCFARLANE

03/29/85 19:06:46

-- ~~SECRET~~ --

NOTE FROM: JOHN POINDEXTER

SUBJECT: Whales and the Soviet Union

Mac Baldridge called. We have a problem with the Soviets taking too many whales. The Packwood-Magnusson Act stipulates that quotas are established for the taking of Minke (sp?) whales down around Antarctica. The Japanese and Soviet quotas are each 1900. About 3 weeks ago we detected that both countries would exceed their quotas if they kept up at the same rate. Warning notices were sent out to each country. If a country exceeds the quota, Commerce in coordination with State must certify that fact. Then the punishment that Commerce must mete out is a reduction by 50% in the quota for fish that the country can take from US waters. If Commerce doesn't certify, then Mac says the environmentalists will sue. Japan stopped at their quota of 1900; however the Soviets have continued and are now up to about 2300 whales. I ask him how we counted them. I thought there might be some new verification method we could use in arms control. Mac didn't know but said he would find out. Anyway it is Mac's intention to certify them on Monday and cut their quota by 50%. I told him I didn't see a problem, but would pass it on to you. With the killing of Major Nicholson, I don't see how we can do anything else. In fact without that, I think we should enforce the law.

copy to: Jack Matlock Bob Sims

cc: NSRMK --CPUA BOB KIMMITT NSWRP --CPUA BOB PEARSON
NSGVE --CPUA GEORGE VAN ERON

DECLASSIFIED
NLS F06-114/2 #7035
BY LOT NARA DATE 11/21/07

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

→ ~~Matlock~~ ^b
Cham

ACTION

April 3, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT

FROM: KARNA SMALL ^{KS}

SUBJECT: Presidential Radio Talk: Easter

We have reviewed the Presidential Radio Talk and have made a number of substantive changes. Because of the urgency, Ben Elliott's office was advised by telephone.

Matlock ^{DM} provided changes; Dobriansky ^{PD} and Steiner ^{SS} concur. Covey ^{DL} concurred in the original text. Burghardt and Ringdahl were not available.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo to Ben Elliott at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment

TAB I Memo to Ben Elliott with attached edited Presidential Radio Talk

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

2680

MEMORANDUM FOR BEN ELLIOTT

FROM: ROBERT M. KIMMITT

SUBJECT: Presidential Radio Talk: Easter

The NSC has reviewed the attached Presidential Radio Talk and has made a number of important changes. These edits reflect strongly-held NSC views.

Attachment

As stated

cc: David L. Chew

2680
8

Document No. _____

URGENT

WHITE HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUM

DATE: 4/3/85 ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY: 5:00 P.M. TODAY

SUBJECT: RADIO TALK: EASTER

	ACTION FYI			ACTION FYI	
VICE PRESIDENT	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	OGLESBY	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
REGAN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	ROLLINS	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
DEAVER	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	SPEAKES	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
STOCKMAN	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	SVAHN	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
BUCHANAN	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	TUTTLE	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
CHEW	<input type="checkbox"/> P	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> SS	VERSTANDIG	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
FIELDING	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	WHITTLESEY	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
FRIEDERSDORF	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<u>DANIELS</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
HICKEY	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<u>RYAN</u>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
HICKS	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<u>ELLIOTT</u>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
KINGON	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
McFARLANE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

REMARKS:

Please provide any edits directly to Ben Elliott by 5:00 p.m. today, April 3rd, with an information copy to my office. Thank you.

RESPONSE:

David L. Chew
Staff Secretary
Ext. 2702

(Elliott)
April 3, 1985
Noon

Received SS

APR -3 PM 12 20

PRESIDENTIAL RADIO TALK: EASTER
SATURDAY, APRIL 6, 1985

My fellow Americans, this weekend, Jews the world over begin celebrating the festival of Passover, which each Spring commemorates the miraculous delivery -- the Exodus -- of their people from slavery. The message of Passover speaks to Jew and non-Jew alike. It resounds with bitter cries of slaves suffering inhumanity. And it rings forth with joyful cheers of a people set free, courageously undertaking the long journey to freedom and independence.

Tomorrow is Easter, a deeply holy day when Christians celebrate the victory of faith in a triumph of hope over despair and life over death. Through one magnificent act of pure and perfect love, Jesus left the promise sought since the beginning of time -- that there will never be a dark night that does not end. As it is said in John 3:16, "For God so loved the world, that He gave His only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in Him shall not perish but have everlasting life."

America was born and grew from a faith that has bound us in a communion of spirit, ever since our ancestors crossed the Atlantic, not to find soil for their ploughs, but liberty for their souls. When Daniel Webster visited the site at Plymouth Rock in 1820, he said, "...let us not forget the religious character of our origin. Our fathers brought hither their high veneration for religion. They journeyed by its light and labored

by its hope. They sought to...diffuse its influence through all their institutions, civil, political, and literary."

When we speak of faith and its importance today, it is not to impose our beliefs on others, but to ensure freedom of worship for all, so that America may remain one Nation under God, and in our institutions and daily lives, we may be the vessels of His wisdom, truth, and love.

All we have been and hope to be, all our power for good to make this world better, begin in the miracles of freedom and faith that God has placed in the human mind and heart. But these great gifts are not ours to enjoy in splendid isolation; they are the birthright of all His children.

We can be heartened by the great outpouring of generosity across our land from citizens sharing the bread of life with others in great need at home and in faraway lands. Charitable giving has surpassed \$65 billion, an all-time high and a sum greater than the national budgets of two-thirds of the world's countries. There has also been a sharp upsurge in contributions and voluntary activities in the last 4 years.

The response of our people to the crisis in Ethiopia has been miraculous. Almost \$75 million has been sent in donations for food by private individuals, with thousands of church groups donating time and resources. But millions of people remain desperately hungry, and they need our continued support.

I have spoken about our responsibility to help others' material needs. But can we commemorate Passover and Easter, can we celebrate this message of freedom and hope, and not remember,

as well, the great spiritual needs of God's children who have no freedom and little hope?

We must not forget God's believers who try valiantly
[~~There are over 100 million Christians, Jews, and Muslims in~~
to preserve their faith under communist domination
~~the Soviet Empire. But they are forbidden to give religious~~
~~instruction to their children, forbidden to study the Bible, or~~
~~the Torah, or to worship Allah, or even to wear crosses on their~~
~~necks.~~] In Lenin's words, "Religion and communism are

incompatible in theory and in practice. We must fight religion." And fight it they do with persecution ranging from intolerance, to ostracism, to imprisonment and torture in their infamous labor and prison camps and so-called psychiatric hospitals.

Dr. Ernest Gordon, President of an organization named CREED, Christian Rescue Effort for the Emancipation of Dissidents, noted that on a recent trip to Eastern Europe he spoke with a priest who had spent 10 years in prison. The priest asked him to deliver a message to the West: there is a war going on; it is not nuclear, but spiritual. The fall-out of the atheistic explosion is everywhere. But Dr. Gordon added, "Although the fall-out may be everywhere, God, too, is everywhere and not even tyrannies can keep Him out."

My friends, the cause of freedom is the cause of God. The United States will do everything humanly possible to work with the Soviets for a safer world. But to betray our deepest values is to betray ourselves; to ignore the prophet Isaiah's words, "bind up the broken-hearted...proclaim liberty to the captives of the world," is to make our own freedom a sham.

12

It is time for believers of all faiths to unite [~~in a crusade~~]
to help our brothers and sisters who cry out for freedom -- from
the Mujhadin under fire in Afghanistan, to brave heroes like
Scharansky, Sakharov, and Father Yakunin inside the U.S.S.R., to
embattled churches [^{oppressed by totalitarian rulers,} from Poland to Nicaragua] Let us join hands,
lift up our voices, and ask for God's help, remembering always
that where the spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty.

Until next week, thanks for listening and God bless you.

Not to be

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Chen
54C
JFH06
13
VIA LDX
2416

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

April 4, 1985

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. NICHOLAS PLATT
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: U.S.-Poland Air Transport Agreement (U)

Your memorandum to Mr. McFarlane of March 25, 1985, requested concurrence to signing a new U.S.-Poland Air Transport Agreement. (C)

Although we are concerned by recent negative developments in U.S.-Polish relations, we concur that signature of this particular agreement is appropriate at this time, particularly in view of the U.S. economic interest involved. (C)

Robert M. Kimmitt
Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

TAB A U.S.-Poland Air Transport Agreement

DECLASSIFIED
NLS F06-114/2#7036
BY LOJ NARA DATE 11/21/07

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

March 25, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSESUBJECT: Granting of Circular 175 Authority to Conclude a
New United States-Poland Air Transport Agreement

In December 1981, the United States suspended the Air Transport Agreement between the United States and Poland as part of our response to the imposition of martial law in Poland. Although the U.S. informed Poland that we regarded operation of the 1972 bilateral Agreement as suspended, the Agreement contained no provision for suspension, required notice of one year for early termination, and was not due to expire by its own terms until March 31, 1982. In May 1982, Poland requested arbitration under the Agreement. Thus far the Polish side has not pushed this process, but would probably do so if the new agreement falls through.

In response to the large-scale release of political prisoners in Poland, President Reagan stated publicly in July 1984 that he was prepared to renew full civil aviation relations with Poland, subject to Warsaw's agreement not to pursue any claims under the 1972 Agreement, and to withdraw its arbitration request subject to the negotiation of a new bilateral agreement. In late 1984, both sides were able to agree, ad referendum, to an Air Transport Agreement and a Memorandum of Understanding. This agreement provides more favorable terms for U.S. carriers than in previous air transport agreements. By a related exchange of notes, Poland declares that it will not pursue any issues and claims it might have under the 1972 Agreement, including those related to its arbitration request, and withdraws that request, effective on the date the new agreement enters into force.

We have delayed final action on this agreement by almost two months, in response to Polish refusal to accept a U.S. ambassador and Polish mistreatment of Col. and Mrs. Myer. We have taken a number of other actions in this regard, including expulsion of the Polish military attache, restrictions in the Polish Embassy's access to USG officials, and postponement of negotiations on a new bilateral science and technology agreement.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
NLS F06-114/2#7050
BY LSJ NARA DATE 11/21/07

15

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

The current political situation in Poland is not encouraging, and we will be sending you a separate memorandum on possible USG responses to Polish backsliding. But we do not think the time has come to reverse the Presidential decision of last July to lift our sanction on LOT flights, particularly since the proposed agreement is to our economic advantage and requires the Poles to forego their very strong claim against us.

The Secretary has approved Circular 175 authority, recommending signature of the United States-Poland Air Transport Agreement, but has requested NSC concurrence before proceeding. Prompt action is required, for we are now at the point where further delay risks unraveling the agreement, as Embassy Warsaw has recently pointed out. The Polish Government could then pursue its outstanding arbitration request against the United States Government. Moreover, delay will adversely affect U.S. business interests. LOT, the Polish carrier, expects to start flying March 31, and Pan Am April 28. Both Pan Am (desperately looking for a moneymaker) and the U.S. tour operator working with LOT (American Travel Abroad) are likely to raise their concerns at a political level.

Brockmeyer
for Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

7039

14

2416

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

March 26, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

SIGNED

FROM: JACK MATLOCK

SUBJECT: U.S.-Poland Air Transport Agreement

State recommends that we proceed to implement the President's decision of last July to renew civil aviation relations with Poland by concluding a new U.S.-Poland Air Transport Agreement (TAB A). The negotiated agreement provides for service by Pan Am and the Polish carrier LOT, and if the agreement is signed, service would begin March 31.

It is recognized that relations with Poland are not good at present, but State feels that we have taken sufficient steps to indicate our concern over the Polish failure to grant agreement for an American Ambassador and for the Polish mistreatment of Col. and Mrs. Meyer. The decision is a matter of some urgency since tickets have already been sold by American tour operators and by Pan Am for the anticipated resumption of service.

Under the circumstances, which include the public announcement by the President last year that we would renew civil air relations and the economic stake of American firms, I believe that the State recommendation is justified and recommend approval.

Paula ^{not available} Dobriansky and Richard ^{RL} Levine concur.

Recommendation:

That you approve transmittal of the Kimmitt-Platt Memorandum at Tab I.

Approve RCM Disapprove

Attachments:

TAB I

Kimmitt-Platt Memorandum

TAB A

U.S.-Poland Air Transport Agreement

Don't send your memo until Thurs for approval on Friday.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M266 # 7038

BY KML NARA DATE 3/27/12

041501 L
C

WASHFAX RECEIPT
 THE WHITE HOUSE
C

NSCS

MESSAGE NO. 779 CLASSIFICATION ~~Confidential~~ PAGES 3

FROM ROBERT KIMMITT 456-2224 Gf1/WW
 (NAME) (EXTENSION) (ROOM NUMBER)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION U.S. Poland Air Transport Agreement
 NSC LOG # 2416

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO:	DEPT/ROOM NO.	EXTENSION
<u>B</u>	<u>Nicholas Platt</u>		

REMARKS _____

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

April 5, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

THROUGH: JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: JACK MATLOCK

SUBJECT: SDI and the Alliance

Yesterday's message from Mulroney regarding the problems caused by the public announcement of the invitation to participate in SDI research without advance consultation and coordination is but the tip of one of the icebergs floating in Alliance waters on this issue. If we cannot find the means to deal with the problem, all of our careful efforts to preserve Alliance unity are likely to go the way of the Titanic.

So far, the Canadians have been by far the most outspoken to us (fortunately in private), but they may have done us a service by stating directly and vigorously -- indeed, hyperbolically -- feelings which are to a significant degree shared by the other Allies.

Last weekend, I attended a German-American conference in Dallas where Woerner, Teltschik, and assorted senior political figures from the CDU, SPD and FDP were present. CDU and FDP officials went to considerable lengths to maintain solidarity on SDI in their public pronouncements (though Telschik's speech was slightly reminiscent of Howe's, with too much hectoring on the dangers ahead), while Ehmke made clear the SPD opposition to the whole concept, and to the SPD intent to make the question of joint research a major political issue. (In a private moment of either candor or bluff, Ehmke boasted to me, "This idea we will kill, make no mistake about it.")

DECLASSIFIED

In the corridors, the CDU types were less reticent than in public. Their usual refrain was, "Don't you guys realize that we have a mammoth political problem on our hands? We want to be helpful. We want to be part of the research. But when you suddenly go public with proposals before we have our ducks in a row, you make this impossible. And every week some senior U.S. official makes a public statement which seems at variance with what the President, Shultz and McFarlane are saying, and this really keeps the pot boiling."

It is ironic that the latest flap is over joint research, since this potentially is (or was) one of our strongest cards, had we

SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLYBY RWJ
NLRB 1005-125/2#7040
NARA DATE 11/11/12

played it right. It is also deeply discouraging that, having gained the high ground in January and February with careful statements by the President, yourself, Shultz and Paul Nitze, we now see alarm spreading in the Alliance in more acute (though less public) forms than we had earlier.

Joint research, of course, is not really the fundamental issue. Fundamental for the Allies are such questions as (1) Is SDI a research program to determine options for the future (as the President has said repeatedly), or is the U.S. in fact hell-bent to develop and deploy strategic defense systems regardless of other considerations? (2) Will the U.S. consult and keep Allied governments informed as the program evolves? and (3) Won't the talk of the immorality of nuclear weapons weaken support for the nuclear deterrence which will still be required for decades at least?

Our answer to the first of these questions is clear, unequivocal and persuasive. Unfortunately, however, when senior officials say (or even imply) that our minds are already made up on the deployment issue, doubts are created. Frankly, Ikle and Keyworth can hardly open their mouths without at least implying this. And though Richard Perle is usually more careful with his wording, his remarks often suggest the same. But it seems to me that, even if our minds are already made up, we must make every effort not to convey that impression, because if we do we are simply adding fuel to the flames of opposition, particularly in Europe.

The second question is, for governments like the Canadian and German, perhaps the most important of all. That is why we get such a negative reaction even when we do something they want, if we do it without consultation and advance preparation. I see no reason whatever for the premature public announcement of the Weinberger letter (naming countries which had not even received it), unless the intent was to force allied governments to reject the offer and thus save us some difficult technology-transfer decisions. I do not believe that such a Machiavellian ploy was the President's intent.

The third question is inherently a more difficult one, since we must recognize that, however clearly we explain the continued need for an adequate offensive deterrence for a long time to come, emphasizing the moral superiority of defense over offense does to a degree strengthen the hand of the "no-nuke" clique. Still, I believe this one is fully manageable with valid, straightforward answers provided a general atmosphere of distrust is not created by mishandling other issues, preeminently the sensitive one of consultation.

The damage done by ill-considered statements or hasty public gestures, therefore, far surpasses the importance of the individual issues themselves. Such incidents feed a climate of public questioning and distrust which makes it much more difficult for friendly governments to cooperate with us. It is easy to blame Howe for setting the current negative trends in

20

motion (and he is in fact partly culpable), but we must recognize that some of our own people have contributed to the mood. It is simply not in our interest to debate senior officials of friendly governments in public or to make it harder for our friends to stay in step with us by confronting them with surprises.

I know that you are aware of much -- perhaps all -- of this. I hope you will have the opportunity to discuss the problem frankly and in detail with the President. It would be a tragedy if, through the indiscipline and thoughtlessness of some of his subordinates, we undermine the best hope we have for the security of our country in coming decades.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

90382a 2
System II

~~EYES ONLY~~

Amb. Jack Matlock

System II

~~EYES ONLY~~

PRESERVATION COPY

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OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

CAS 6/17/02

WASHFAX RECEIPT
 THE WHITE HOUSE
C

M. A. Block

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MESSAGE NO. _____ CLASSIFICATION _____ PAGES two
 FROM ROBERT KIMMITT 456-2224 Gf1/WW
 (NAME) (EXTENSION) (ROOM NUMBER)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION PRES LTR TO GORBACHEV
 NSC LOG # 90382

<u>TO (AGENCY)</u>	<u>DELIVER TO:</u>	<u>DEPT/ROOM NO.</u>	<u>EXTENSION</u>
<u>STATE</u>	<u>NICK PLATT</u>	<u>EXEC SECRETARY</u>	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
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REMARKS ORIGINAL GIVEN TO JAMES F. SCHUMAKER OF THE DEPT OF STATE FOR DELIVERY

DECLASSIFIED
 White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
 By CS NARA, Date 6/14/02

McAloek

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 4, 1985

Dear Mr. General Secretary:

The visit to Moscow of a congressional delegation headed by the distinguished Speaker of our House of Representatives provides an important, new opportunity for a high-level exchange of views between our two countries. I hope your meeting with the Speaker and his colleagues will result in a serious and useful discussion.

I believe meetings at the political level are vitally important if we are to build a more constructive relationship between our two countries. I believe my meetings in Washington with First Deputy Premier Gromyko and Mr. Shcherbitsky and your discussion in Moscow with Vice President Bush and Secretary Shultz both served this purpose. As you know, I look forward to meeting with you personally at a mutually convenient time. Together, I am confident that we can provide the important political impetus you mentioned in your last letter for moving toward a more constructive and stable relationship between our two countries.


I believe that new opportunities are now opening up in U.S.-Soviet relations. We must take advantage of them. You know my view that there are such opportunities in every area of our relations, including humanitarian, regional, bilateral and arms control issues. In improving stability there is no more important issue than the arms control talks we have jointly undertaken in Geneva. Our negotiators have very flexible instructions to work with your negotiators in drafting agreements which can lead to radical reductions, and toward our common goal, the elimination of nuclear weapons.

DECLASSIFIED/RELEASED
Authority NLSFC99-051 #325 SMF 10/16/00
BY C/S, NARA, Date 6/14/02

In seizing new opportunities, we must also take care to avoid situations which can seriously damage our relations. I and all Americans were appalled recently at the senseless killing of Major Nicholson in East Germany. In addition to the personal tragedy of this brave officer, this act seemed to many in our country to be only the latest example of a Soviet military action which threatens to undo our best efforts to fashion a sustainable, more constructive relationship for the long term. I want you to know it is also a matter of personal importance to me that we take steps to prevent the reoccurrence of this tragedy and I hope you will do all in your power to prevent such actions in the future.

Let me close by reaffirming the value I place in our correspondence. I will be replying in greater detail to your last letter. I hope we can continue to speak frankly in future letters, as we attempt to build stronger relations between ourselves and between our two countries.

Sincerely,



His Excellency
 Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev,
 General Secretary, Central Committee,
 Communist Party of the Soviet Union
 Moscow, U.S.S.R.

~~SECRET~~

SYSTEM II
90382

25

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Rec'd of 10

1985 APR 4 12 46

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

April 4, 1985

SIGNED

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE *rcm*

SUBJECT: Letter to General Secretary Gorbachev

Issue

Letter to Gorbachev.

Facts

You indicated to Speaker O'Neill and Bob Michel yesterday that you would give them a letter to Gorbachev for delivery on their upcoming visit.

Discussion

Your letter encourages Gorbachev to move the current negotiations ahead, refers to the shooting of Major Nicholson and promises a more detailed reply to his last letter.

Recommendation

<u>OK</u>	<u>No</u>
<i>BR</i>	_____

That you sign the letter at Tab A to Gorbachev.

Attachments:

Tab A Letter to General Secretary Gorbachev

Prepared by:
Jack F. Matlock

cc Vice President

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997

By *CR* NARA, Date *6/14/02*

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

24

MEMORANDUM

SYSTEM II
90382

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

April 4, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK

SIGNED

SUBJECT: Presidential Letter to Gorbachev

A letter from the President to Gorbachev, for the O'Neill delegation to carry with them, is at TAB A.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the Memorandum to the President at TAB I.

Approve ✓ Disapprove

Attachments:

- TAB I Memorandum to the President
- Tab A Letter to Gorbachev
- Tab B Platt-McFarlane Memorandum

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 29, 1997
By CAS NARA, Date 6/14/02

WASHFAX RECEIPT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

PS

B

S/S #

WHSR 27
032041 MAR
CPS

MESSAGE NO 001230 CLASSIFICATION SECRET/SENSITIVE No. Pages 3

FROM B. McKinley S/S 632-3126 7224
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION Platt/McFarlane - SUBJECT: Draft Presidential
letter to Gorbachev

TO (Agency)	DELIVER TO	Extension	Room No.
NSC	EYES ONLY Robert Kimmitt	456-2224	
NSC	EYES ONLY Robert Pearson	395-3044	
NSC	REDACTED	395-5112	

FOR CLEARANCE INFORMATION PER REQUEST COMMENT

REMARKS ADVANCE COPY

S/S Officer: C. Coleman for (82)

DECLASSIFIED
Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
By CIS NARA, Date 6/14/02



Washington, D.C. 20520

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

April 3, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Draft Presidential Letter to Gorbachev

In a meeting with Speaker O'Neill April 3, the President agreed to provide the Speaker with a letter to present to Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev during the Speaker's upcoming trip to the Soviet Union.

The attached draft stresses the importance of high-level dialogue in building a more constructive relationship with the Soviet Union. It emphasizes the importance we attach to the arms control negotiations in Geneva and the President's outrage over the killing of Major Nicholson. The draft letter calls on Gorbachev to take steps to prevent such tragedies in the future, but does not request an apology. This would be inappropriate in Presidential correspondence, since the Soviets have already expressed regret on several occasions.

Nicholas Platt
for Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary

DECLASSIFIED
Author: NLS/09-051 #328 CAS 7/25/00
BY: CAS, NARA, Date 6/14/02
~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
DECL: OADR

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SECRET/SENSITIVE

Dear Mr. General Secretary:

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I believe meetings at the political level are vitally important if we are to build a more constructive relationship between our two countries. I believe my meetings in Washington with First Deputy Premier Gromyko and Mr. Shcherbitskiy and your discussion in Moscow with Vice President Bush and Secretary Shultz both served this purpose. As you know, I look forward to meeting with you personally at a mutually convenient time. Together, I am confident that we can provide the important political impetus you mentioned in your last letter for moving toward a more constructive and stable relationship between our two countries.

I believe that new opportunities are now opening up in US-Soviet relations. We must take advantage of them. You know my view that there are such opportunities in every area of our relations, including humanitarian, regional, bilateral and arms control issues. In improving stability there is no more important issue than the arms control talks we have jointly undertaken in Geneva. Our negotiators have very flexible instructions to work with your negotiators in drafting agreements which can lead to radical reductions, and toward our common goal, the elimination of nuclear weapons.

In seizing new opportunities, we must also take care to avoid situations which can seriously damage our relations. I and all Americans were appalled recently at the senseless killing of Major Nicholson in East Germany. In addition to the personal tragedy of this brave officer, this act seemed to many in our country to be only the latest example of a Soviet military action which threatens to undo our best efforts to fashion a sustainable, more constructive relationship for the long term. I want you to know it is also a matter of personal importance to me that we take steps to prevent the reoccurrence of this tragedy and I hope you will do all in your power to prevent such actions in the future.

SECRET/SENSITIVE
DECL: OADR

Authority NLSF99-051 #309 SMF 10/10/00
BY CIS, NARA, Date 6/14/00

30

SECRET/SENSITIVE

- 2 -

Let me close by reaffirming the value I place in our correspondence. I will be replying in greater detail to your last letter. I hope we can continue to speak frankly in future letters, as we attempt to build stronger relations between ourselves and between our two countries.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

SECRET/SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SYSTEM II
90419

*7043 Matlock 31
JH-C*

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

April 16, 1985

*SB
(see Gorbachev
File
letter)*

ACTION

DECLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

NLRR M266 #7043

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

BY KML NARA DATE 3/27/12

SUBJECT: President's Reply to Gorbachev Letter of March 24

I have reviewed State's draft reply to Gorbachev, and I believe that it is not an effective response to the Gorbachev letter. Not that I object to any of the substance per se, but rather to the pedestrian approach, which is devoid of personality and reeks of being staff-written. We can do better, and I believe we should try before asking the President to approve it.

Specifically, my objections are the following:

-- It does not really engage Gorbachev in a dialogue. Now that there is a Soviet leader who reads his mail and who seems to enjoy a spirited debate, I believe that the President should engage him on some key issues. His letter provides several openings, and we should exploit them.

-- Although it was written to include items from each element on our agenda, it really comes through as a grab-bag of disparate issues. It should be tightened, made more selective, and given a focus on some of the key issues.

Although I understand that Secretary Shultz would like to provide the letter to Dobrynin tomorrow, I believe we should take more time with it and make sure it is the best we can do. (Shultz has a number of other agenda items to take up with Dobrynin, so the letter is not really necessary for the meeting.) In principle, I think it would be better to have Hartman deliver it anyway. He will be going back to Moscow next week and it would be useful to give him the opportunity to schedule a discussion with Gromyko on the basis of his consultations here.

I am working on a redraft, and hope that we can avoid undue haste in making final decisions on the text.

Recommendation:

That you suggest to Secretary Shultz that we work on the text further, with the goal of having something ready for the President by the end of the week.

Approve *JM*

Disapprove _____

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

Done in [unclear]

32

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SYSTEM II
90419

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

April 15, 1985

SECRET/SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: George P. Shultz *GPS*
SUBJECT: Reply to Gorbachev

Attached for your consideration is a draft reply to Gorbachev's March 24 letter. The letter sets forth in considerable detail our views on the main issues on the US-Soviet agenda, and closes with an invitation to Washington for a meeting in September or October.

Ambassador Dobrynin will be meeting with me Wednesday afternoon, just prior to his return to Moscow for consultations. If you agree with the approach reflected in the attached draft, I would like to be able to give Dobrynin your reply to Gorbachev at that time.

Attachment: Draft Letter to Gorbachev

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLS 99-051 #334 CJS 7/25/00
BY CJS, NARA, Date 6/14/02

SECRET/SENSITIVE

SYSTEM II PROFILE

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

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ID 8590419

RECEIVED 15 APR 85 20

TO PRESIDENT

FROM SHULTZ, G

DOCDATE 15 APR 85

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1987
By CAS NARA, Date 6/14/02

KEYWORDS USSR
HS

ARMS CONTROL

GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL S

SUBJECT: DRAFT REPLY TO GORBACHEV 24 MAR LTR

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR PRES

DUE: 16 APR 85 STATUS S FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MATLOCK

LINHARD

URGENT

COMMENTS ** URGENT ACTION; DUE BACK IN WEST WING BY 1500 ON 16 APRIL

REF# 8511287

LOG 8590336

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(B /)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE (C)

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

SYSTEM II
90419

April 15, 1985

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

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Attachment: Draft Letter to Gorbachev

Authority NSA99-051 #334 CIS 7/25/02
BY CIS, NARA, Date 6/14/02

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

4/15/85

Draft Presidential Letter to Gorbachev

Dear Mr. General Secretary:

I appreciated receiving your letter of March 24 and believe the heightened pace of our high-level dialogue in recent weeks has been useful. Vice President Bush has reported to me on your good discussion on the occasion of Chairman Chernenko's funeral. I have reviewed the records of the most recent exchanges between Secretary Shultz and Ambassador Dobrynin in Washington and Foreign Minister Gromyko and Ambassador Hartman in Moscow. I have also had reports from Congressman O'Neill on his discussions with you and Mr. Gromyko during his visit to Moscow.

I welcome the agreement that Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Gromyko will meet in Vienna on May 14. I am hopeful that they will be able to work out specific steps to move our relationship forward. As promised in the letter Speaker O'Neill passed to you, I would now like to reply to your March 24 letter at some length.

I agree with you that the task before us is to provide impetus to our relations through concerted action at the political level, and that we should focus on issues where a practical, businesslike approach can lead us forward on substantive matters. It would be a mistake to underestimate our differences and to invite needless disappointment by ignoring the difficulties before us. I hope I have made it clear in my previous correspondence with the leaders of your country that I have a strong preference for serious, quiet diplomacy as the best approach to making progress on hard issues. I welcome the willingness to pursue the same approach which you expressed in your letter.

I hope that the response to the tragic killing of Major Nicholson will turn out to be an example of this approach in action. I hardly need to tell you that I and all Americans were appalled at that senseless act. It makes absolutely clear the necessity to end the pattern of Soviet military actions which threaten to undo our best efforts to put our relations on a stable and constructive basis for the long term. I understand from the exchanges between our military commanders that your troops in Germany are taking measures to prevent further tragic incidents of this kind; this is a constructive first step.

In any discussion of how to avoid threats to the prospects for constructive progress in our relations, I think it is fair to point out that in recent years such threats have arisen most frequently and most seriously from various regional tensions in the world. In general, as I have stated on a number of occasions, our concern is over the pattern of threatening or using force to impose outside solutions in regional situations. At this moment in particular, I would like to discuss an issue I find particularly troubling: Afghanistan.

I believe the time has more than come to move to a political resolution of this tragic affair, one that would enable the Afghan people to live in peace without the presence of foreign troops. We support the United Nations Secretary General's effort to achieve a peaceful, negotiated settlement among the parties. We remain committed to a political solution that will deal equitably with the related issues of withdrawal of your troops to their homeland and guarantees of non-interference. Your present course will only lead to more bloodshed. We are prepared to work with you in a different direction.

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~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

- 3 -

I am confident that the Government of Pakistan shares this approach. I want to make it very clear to you personally that Pakistan is a trusted ally of the United States. It must be completely understood that political or military threats against Pakistan are a matter of special concern to me.

As you know, I have stressed the importance of dialogue between our two governments on regional issues as a means of avoiding miscalculation, reducing the dangers of confrontation, and encouraging peaceful solutions. It was for this reason that I proposed in my UNGA speech last September that our two countries agree to periodic consultations at the policy level about regional problems. Secretary Shultz has informed me of your recent proposals for a possible series of regional discussions. We are prepared to move forward, and will be providing a detailed reply.

In addition to avoiding and managing negative developments that threaten the prospects for progress, I believe we should focus our energies also on issues where mutually beneficial forward movement could and should be possible. We have made progress in certain areas, thereby demonstrating that we can work together on specific issues despite our differences on other issues. As I mentioned in the letter Speaker O'Neill carried, I see opportunities in every area of our relationship, and I would like to suggest some of them for your consideration.

The interrelated issues under negotiation at Geneva provide us with our greatest challenge and our greatest opportunity. These negotiations have just begun. I would like to believe that the Soviet side, like the American side, is committed to serious, substantive exchanges, with full respect for the confidentiality so necessary for the talks to be successful.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Our negotiators have very flexible instructions to work with your negotiators in drafting agreements that can lead to radical reductions in nuclear weapons and, ultimately, toward their complete elimination. This is why, to be absolutely frank, we were disappointed in your public espousal April 8 of a proposal that we had earlier made clear was one-sided and unacceptable. I could not agree more with the point in your letter about conducting business in a manner not aimed at deepening differences and making policies to revitalize the situation.

With regard to defensive and space weapons and strategic stability, I want to point out some facts. The Soviet Union already has deployed ABM and anti-satellite systems. Judging by your research programs in the defensive field, you also appreciate the potential further contribution that defensive systems could make toward the establishment of a more stable balance. The research being done as part of my Strategic Defense Initiative holds great promise for enhancing the security not just of our two countries but of all mankind. It is my hope that we will be able to discuss these issues and their interrelationships in a frank and thoughtful manner in Geneva. Direct, personal involvement at our level will be needed if we are to be successful.

I suggest that we also give new attention to other negotiations and discussions underway between us in the security and arms control field. We know that some progress has been made in the Stockholm Conference toward narrowing our differences. Meaningful progress toward an agreement should be possible even this year on the basis of the framework which I have already suggested both privately in this channel and publicly in Dublin last June. Specifically, the United States will consider the

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- 5 -

Soviet proposal for a declaration on the non-use of force as long as the Soviet Union is prepared to consider the concrete measures needed to put that principle into action. Unfortunately, the response of your representatives to date to this offer has not been encouraging. I hope that we may soon see a more favorable attitude toward this idea and toward the confidence-building measures that we and our allies have introduced.

One area where our two countries have been able to work together for mutual advantage has been the area of nuclear non-proliferation. Our consultations in this area have been constructive and useful. I think that we ought to recognize their good work and seek to build upon it in order to strengthen the non-proliferation regime.

One pressing issue of concern to us both is the use of chemical weaponry in the Iran-Iraq War. This situation illustrates the importance of curbing the spread of chemical weapons, and I suggest that it might be useful in the near future for our experts to meet and examine ways in which we might cooperate on this topic. Of course, the lasting solution to this problem will be achievement of a complete global ban on these terrible weapons, and I ask you also to consider carefully the proposed treaty we have advanced in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.

We continue to feel that it would be in both our interests to arrive at an equitable and balanced agreement in the MBFR talks in Vienna which would reduce the level of conventional forces in central Europe.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

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SECRET/SENSITIVE

- 6 -

In addition to the implementation of our agreement on upgrading the Direct Communications Link, which is proceeding on schedule, we hope we can expand our ability to communicate rapidly during the time of crisis into other areas. We remain ready to discuss with you a number of concrete proposals in this field.

There are several important bilateral issues on which we can make progress relatively quickly if we seize the opportunities now before us. We should be able to conclude an agreement on improving safety measures in the North Pacific at an early meeting and move to discussions of civil aviation issues. Our efforts to negotiate a new cultural exchanges agreement have, after six months, reached the point where only a handful of issues remain to be resolved. And we are ready to move forward at the earliest possible date to open our respective consulates in New York and Kiev. I am also hopeful that the meeting of our Joint Commercial Commission in May will succeed in identifying areas of non-strategic trade that could be substantially increased.

Finally, let me turn to an issue of great importance to me and to all Americans. As the Vice President informed you in Moscow, we believe strongly that human rights are an important element of our bilateral relationship. While we recognize your sensitivities on this question, human rights is an issue that must be addressed. Last year we suggested that Ambassador Hartman meet periodically with Deputy Foreign Minister Korniyenko to discuss confidentially our mutual concerns. I am also prepared to appoint rapporteurs as you suggested to the Vice President, perhaps someone to join Ambassador Hartman in such a meeting. Whatever procedures we ultimately establish, I hope we can agree that this channel will be used for trying seriously to

SECRET/SENSITIVE

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~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

- 7 -

resolve human rights problems and not for exchanging propaganda. Progress in this field will create a positive environment for progress in a number of other areas.

I have taken the liberty of speaking candidly in this letter. I take it that you agree with me that is the best approach, and I hope we can continue to speak frankly in our future correspondence. Let me close by reaffirming the value I place in these letters and my desire to use this correspondence to build stronger relations between the two of us and between our two countries.

Finally, I was glad to receive your views on a meeting between the two of us. In the spirit of your suggestion that we return to the question of time and place of such a meeting, let me suggest that we meet in Washington this fall, in either September or October. We also look forward to the meeting between Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Gromyko in Vienna in May, which we hope will provide an opportunity for us to move forward across the agenda I have discussed in this letter.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

1580M

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Matlock

~~368 EOB~~

~~Eyes Only - SDI~~

4/5/85

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OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE

CS 6/14/02

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

April 5, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

THROUGH: JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: JACK MATLOCK

SUBJECT: SDI and the Alliance

Yesterday's message from Mulroney regarding the problems caused by the public announcement of the invitation to participate in SDI research without advance consultation and coordination is but the tip of one of the icebergs floating in Alliance waters on this issue. If we cannot find the means to deal with the problem, all of our careful efforts to preserve Alliance unity are likely to go the way of the Titanic.

So far, the Canadians have been by far the most outspoken to us (fortunately in private), but they may have done us a service by stating directly and vigorously -- indeed, hyperbolically -- feelings which are to a significant degree shared by the other Allies.

Last weekend, I attended a German-American conference in Dallas where Woerner, Teltschik, and assorted senior political figures from the CDU, SPD and FDP were present. CDU and FDP officials went to considerable lengths to maintain solidarity on SDI in their public pronouncements (though Telschik's speech was slightly reminiscent of Howe's, with too much hectoring on the dangers ahead), while Ehmke made clear the SPD opposition to the whole concept, and to the SPD intent to make the question of joint research a major political issue. (In a private moment of either candor or bluff, Ehmke boasted to me, "This idea we will kill, make no mistake about it.")

In the corridors, the CDU types were less reticent than in public. Their usual refrain was, "Don't you guys realize that we have a mammoth political problem on our hands? We want to be helpful. We want to be part of the research. But when you suddenly go public with proposals before we have our ducks in a row, you make this impossible. And every week some senior U.S. official makes a public statement which seems at variance with what the President, Shultz and McFarlane are saying, and this really keeps the pot boiling."

It is ironic that the latest flap is over joint research, since this potentially is (or was) one of our strongest cards, had we

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DECLASSIFIED
BY RWS NARA DATE 11/11/12
NLR RM 08-125/a # 7045

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played it right. It is also deeply discouraging that, having gained the high ground in January and February with careful statements by the President, yourself, Shultz and Paul Nitze, we now see alarm spreading in the Alliance in more acute (though less public) forms than we had earlier.

Joint research, of course, is not really the fundamental issue. Fundamental for the Allies are such questions as (1) Is SDI a research program to determine options for the future (as the President has said repeatedly), or is the U.S. in fact hell-bent to develop and deploy strategic defense systems regardless of other considerations? (2) Will the U.S. consult and keep Allied governments informed as the program evolves? and (3) Won't the talk of the immorality of nuclear weapons weaken support for the nuclear deterrence which will still be required for decades at least?

Our answer to the first of these questions is clear, unequivocal and persuasive. Unfortunately, however, when senior officials say (or even imply) that our minds are already made up on the deployment issue, doubts are created. Frankly, Ikle and Keyworth can hardly open their mouths without at least implying this. And though Richard Perle is usually more careful with his wording, his remarks often suggest the same. But it seems to me that, even if our minds are already made up, we must make every effort not to convey that impression, because if we do we are simply adding fuel to the flames of opposition, particularly in Europe.

The second question is, for governments like the Canadian and German, perhaps the most important of all. That is why we get such a negative reaction even when we do something they want, if we do it without consultation and advance preparation. I see no reason whatever for the premature public announcement of the Weinberger letter (naming countries which had not even received it), unless the intent was to force allied governments to reject the offer and thus save us some difficult technology-transfer decisions. I do not believe that such a Machiavellian ploy was the President's intent.

The third question is inherently a more difficult one, since we must recognize that, however clearly we explain the continued need for an adequate offensive deterrence for a long time to come, emphasizing the moral superiority of defense over offense does to a degree strengthen the hand of the "no-nuke" clique. Still, I believe this one is fully manageable with valid, straightforward answers provided a general atmosphere of distrust is not created by mishandling other issues, preeminently the sensitive one of consultation.

The damage done by ill-considered statements or hasty public gestures, therefore, far surpasses the importance of the individual issues themselves. Such incidents feed a climate of public questioning and distrust which makes it much more difficult for friendly governments to cooperate with us. It is easy to blame Howe for setting the current negative trends in

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motion (and he is in fact partly culpable), but we must recognize that some of our own people have contributed to the mood. It is simply not in our interest to debate senior officials of friendly governments in public or to make it harder for our friends to stay in step with us by confronting them with surprises.

I know that you are aware of much -- perhaps all -- of this. I hope you will have the opportunity to discuss the problem frankly and in detail with the President. It would be a tragedy if, through the indiscipline and thoughtlessness of some of his subordinates, we undermine the best hope we have for the security of our country in coming decades.

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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April 8, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

THROUGH: JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: JACK MATLOCK

SUBJECT: U.S.-Soviet Relations: Planning for 1985

In a previous memorandum commenting on an informal paper passed to you by Rick Burt, I expressed the view that the paper is inadequate for the basis of discussion with the President since it failed to address the real substantive issues on which the President's attention should be focused. At this time, I would like to set forth these issues as I see them.

Fundamental Issue

The most basic tactical decision the President faces at this time is:

(a) whether to assume that Gorbachev is unable or unwilling to make significant changes in Soviet policy this year, and therefore to concentrate his attention almost exclusively on public diplomacy and alliance management; OR

(b) to decide that, even though the prospects for success may be slight, a careful and private attempt should be made to see whether Gorbachev is interested in arranging a real breakthrough in one or more of the key areas under contention.

There are powerful arguments for each of these alternatives.

Regarding the first, it is clear that Gorbachev's first priority in 1985 is to consolidate his own power, and in this process he may not be able to introduce major changes in traditional Soviet policy. Therefore, we should not be sanguine that he has the authority to move in a decisive way to meet our concerns. We also should not assume that he has the desire to do so, even if his authority were well established. For these reasons, we should be cautious about raising public expectations or expending valuable negotiating capital prematurely. However, we also must recognize that, without public and allied perception of new initiatives on our part, a "stand-pat" position will come under increasing pressure and could militate against effective public diplomacy and Alliance management.

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Regarding the second approach, it seems to me that there is an outside chance that Gorbachev could be attracted by the right package of proposals. Among other things, this could give him ammunition to move toward consolidation of his authority, using the argument that an acceptable deal with the U.S. is possible and that this would relieve pressure on the system and give it time to work on getting its economy in better shape. (One can make a devastating critique of the Soviet policies of the 70's on Leninist grounds: it amounted to "infantile Marxism" -- in Lenin's words -- since it underestimated the strength of the "imperialists" and represented a premature move to challenge the West before "socialism" was consolidated.)

In particular, Gorbachev will have his own reasons for moving to get the Soviet military under more solid Party (meaning his own) control. There is some interesting evidence that this process may in fact have started, when we look at the series of events beginning with Ogarkov's ouster, the appointment of the political lightweight Sokolov as Defense Minister, and the exclusion of any military representatives from the Chernenko funeral commission. Furthermore, I doubt that anyone as smart as Gorbachev seems to be could have failed to understand the high price the Soviet Union has paid (in their image abroad, which is important to them) by the KAL affair and the Nicholson shooting. We can also assume that the failure to deal effectively with Afghanistan has not enhanced the prestige of the Soviet military establishment with the political leadership.

These are, of course, no more than straws in the wind, and one should not base policy on inferences drawn from them. But they provide some evidence that Gorbachev could conceivably judge it to be in his political interest to respond positively to a U.S. initiative which provides the prospect for eased relations -- at least for a few years -- and some assistance in gaining mastery over the Soviet military behemoth.

If the President decides to follow the second tactical approach, it will be most important to avoid making initiatives out of the blue either publicly or -- in the early stages -- in official channels. In either case, even an attractive proposal will be doomed to failure if it is presented in the wrong way. In order to attract Gorbachev, we must give him the chance to maneuver behind the scenes to set the stage for acceptance. Furthermore, for our own protection, we would need to float ideas which could not be attributed to us publicly, or misused to our disadvantage in formal negotiations.

Nature of Informal Proposal

A private, informal "channel" is of limited utility unless we have something to say which is not appropriate for our official discourse. This is why it is desirable to decide first whether we have anything to say, and only then (depending on the nature of what we want to convey) to decide how to convey it.

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I do not profess to have in my head a "magic formula" which just might lure Gorbachev to real negotiations. However, I believe that if the President decides he wants to test the water informally, it is best to present something comprehensive and not limited to one element or another. It is also best, in the early stages, not to be specific with numbers and other concrete details which could interfere with negotiations.

To illustrate the sort of things I have in mind as possible elements in a comprehensive package, I offer the following. They are not proposals on my part. (All would have to be thought through carefully.) I mean it only to illustrate the manner in which a package might be assembled. The package should include important elements of all the areas on our agenda, in keeping with our policy of not giving exclusive priority to any one.

(a) Regional issues: Propose a clear understanding (not to be formulated in a formal document) that neither side will act to exacerbate local conflicts by direct or indirect introduction of significant military force in places where neither side is currently involved. (This should be a precondition to the rest of the package; it would leave us free to help the mujahedin -- and would not solve the problem of Nicaragua -- but would serve as clear notice that all bets are off if the Soviets, for example, increase military pressure on Pakistan or try some form of armed intervention in Iran.)

Additionally, we might consider making a suggestion which goes further in regard to some specific situation, such as, for example, assistance in obtaining "no-intervention" commitments from interested parties as part of a negotiated withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan or, perhaps, some understanding in regard to parallel action to end the Iran-Iraq war.

(b) Arms Control: Here we will need to offer enough to be interesting -- and to provide a basis for arguing that we have taken Soviet SDI concerns into account -- without, of course either selling the store or crippling SDI. This may turn out to be a suggestion to square the circle, but it probably is worth a try.

Informal arms control proposals can take one of two forms, or can be a mixture of the two: (1) a mutual statement of general principles and goals; and (2) a concrete framework for future negotiation.

A proposal of the first type might contain a selection and rewording of some of the principles Chernenko proposed, along with some of our own, plus a commitment to reduce offensive nuclear weapons by a certain percentage not later than a certain year, plus a commitment by both sides to "strengthen" the ABM Treaty to the satisfaction of both.

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A proposal of the second type might contain:

(1) Re START: a proposal similar to (though not necessarily with the same content as) the one State was promoting last year;

(2) Re INF: "Walk-in-the-Woods" with some modifications.

(3) Re defensive arms: No limits on SDI research, but commitment on both sides to strengthen ABM Treaty and commit selves to no "surprise" testing and deployment -- i.e., without advance consultation and negotiation.

(c) Human Rights/Trade The Soviets remain intensely interested (though they often profess indifference for tactical reasons) in the trade relationship. It is, practically speaking, the only effective lever we have to induce more acceptable human rights practices. Nevertheless, their sensitivity toward being seen making deals in this area is so great that we can only use the lever effectively in private and informally. We need to decide concretely what we want and what we responsibly can offer for it, and then make this clear in some informal fashion. Such an informal "deal" could look roughly like this:

(1) If Jewish emigration reaches 10,000 and some political prisoners are released, the U.S. will give its blessing to the sale of licensable energy technology;

(2) If Jewish emigration reaches the rate of 25,000 per year and most political prisoners are released, we will review U.S. export controls with the goal of making them no more stringent than Cocom controls in general;

(3) If Jewish emigration reaches 50,000 and all prominent political prisoners are allowed to leave, we will take steps to grant MFN under the terms of existing U.S. legislation, but without referring to formal assurances on the Soviet part.


(4) The suggestions above are valid only if new negative elements are not introduced into the picture (e.g., a wave of arrests; imposition of an "education tax" or the like).

It is possible, of course, to think of other elements which might go into a package. I would reiterate that the above is intended only to illustrate the sort of proposal the President might wish to consider.

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Modalities

If the President decides that he wishes to have some sort of proposal floated unofficially, there are various ways of doing so.



FOIA(b)(1)

-- There are a number of other Americans who travel periodically to the Soviet Union and have appropriate contacts there. Several are reliable and could float "deniable" suggestions, presenting them as their "personal" ideas, based on contacts with senior Administration officials.

-- We could try to establish a more direct form of contact such as that discussed several times last year.

-- It is not desirable to use Dobrynin, unless and until we have reciprocity in Moscow.

Recommendation:

1. That you discuss with the President his desires regarding the tactical approach he prefers for 1985.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

2. That you let me know if I should give any further thought to any of the ideas expressed above.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____