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**Collection Name** MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

**Withdrawer**

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**File Folder** MATLOCK CHRON MARCH 1985 (2/4)

**FOIA**

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807

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
6950	MEMCON	THIRD SHULTZ-GROMYKO MEETING <b>R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2</b>	11	1/8/1985	B1
6951	MEMCON	FOURTH SHULTZ-GROMYKO MEETING <b>R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2</b>	16	1/8/1985	B1
6952	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE GENEVA MEMCONS <b>R 6/22/2011 M266/1</b>	2	2/11/1985	B1
6953	MEMO	MCFARLANE RE MEETING WITH SHCHERBITSKIY <b>R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2</b>	1	3/6/1985	B1
6954	MEMO	MCFARLANE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE SHCHERBITSKIY <b>R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2</b>	3	3/5/1985	B1
6955	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE MEETING MEMO FOR SHCHERBITSKIY <b>R 3/27/2012 M266/1</b>	1	3/6/1985	B1
6956	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #6953 <b>R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2</b>	1	3/7/1985	B1
6957	TALKING POINTS	MEETING WITH SHCHERBITSKIY <b>R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2</b>	6	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
6958	TALKING POINTS	SAME TEXT AS DOC #6957 <b>R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2</b>	3	ND	B1
6959	REPORT	REPORT	1	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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THIRD SHULTZ-GROMYKO MEETING  
Geneva, January, 1985

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

U.S. Secretary of State George P. Shultz  
Robert C. McFarlane, Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs  
Ambassador Paul Nitze  
Ambassador Arthur Hartman  
Jack F. Matlock, Special Assistant to the  
President for National Security Affairs  
Dimitri Arensburger, Interpreter

USSR Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko  
Georgy M. Korniyenko, First Deputy Foreign  
Minister  
Ambassador Viktor Karpov  
Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin  
Alexei Obukhov, Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
Viktor Sukhodrev, Interpreter

DATE, TIME January 8, 1985; 9:30 A.M. to 12:00 Noon  
AND PLACE: Soviet Mission, Geneva, Switzerland

Before proceeding with the formal meeting, the Secretary took Minister Gromyko aside and told him about U.S. concerns in the area of human rights. He named several individuals whose fate was of particular concern and mentioned repression of Hebrew teachers. Gromyko listened, but made no comments.

Gromyko opened the formal meeting by suggesting that since they had no chairman, the discussions be conducted in a spontaneous manner which he found to be very good.

The Secretary said that the proposal submitted by Gromyko toward the end of the afternoon meeting yesterday was reasonable. In this connection, the first point he wanted to make was that having studied the Soviet proposal he could see that they were suggesting genuinely new negotiations. We accepted that it is new negotiations we are talking about.



Secondly, Gromyko had suggested that we proceed in terms of three different negotiating fora or baskets, or whatever they were to be called. The Secretary accepted that and viewed it as a kind of division of labor on the different subjects.

The Secretary's third point related to Gromyko's observation that the subjects to be dealt with in these three bodies were interrelated and that the three fora constituted one complex. He agreed with Gromyko's statement that the issues are interrelated and, therefore, consideration of these three elements in one complex is acceptable to us. However, Gromyko had made the point that an agreement reached in any one of the three fora would not be consummated until there was final agreement -- in effect, until there was agreement in all three. At the same time, Gromyko had provided some exceptions to that rule and the Secretary understood Gromyko's point; Gromyko had stated his view on the relationship between the different fora. The Secretary pointed out that the U.S. approach is different in that we are seeking agreement in each of the fora, and if an agreement which is considered to be mutually advantageous is reached in a given setting, we will be willing to raise it as something that should be considered for consummation. But, perhaps this falls within the category of the exceptions that Gromyko had identified.

The Secretary then pointed out that we do not feel that we should be bound by a self-denying ordinance and refuse to conclude agreements which are in our mutual interest. He understood the Soviet position, but was explaining ours.

Regarding the subjects and objectives of the third forum, the Secretary observed that there is common ground in our approaches. As he had said yesterday, our views differed with regard to the third forum, but perhaps that difference is not so great in terms of what is to be discussed in it.

Gromyko interjected that what the Secretary was calling the third forum was really the first forum, and the Secretary indicated that he considered the number used not important and agreed to call it the first if Gromyko wished.

The Secretary went on to cite the second forum which would take up strategic nuclear offensive arms, and said that the subjects and objectives for that forum appear reasonable to us, and we agree. He noted that in this forum the U.S. is prepared to discuss trade-offs in whatever areas either the U.S. or the USSR has an advantage. This is in recognition of the fact that if we are to reach a reasonable agreement it will be most unlikely for it to be a mere mirror image of the force structures of the two parties. After all, we want to come out with a situation which reflects genuine equality.

Turning to the third forum, the Secretary noted that it concerns intermediate-range, or what the Soviets call medium-range, nuclear forces; either term is acceptable to us. The subject and objectives involved a problem that can be talked about. It



seemed to him that in both cases Gromyko was looking to reductions, perhaps radical reductions. We agree with this. He added that Gromyko was familiar with our principles and ideas. We are prepared to discuss different approaches toward working out an agreement within equal global ceilings.

Turning to the first forum, Secretary Shultz said that in some respects this is where the most difficult issues lie. At the same time, it seemed to him, as he had already said, that it might not be all that difficult to determine the subject matter of that forum. He had offered Gromyko an explanation in response to his perceptive question, and he had some further remarks.

Gromyko had suggested, Secretary Shultz continued, that the subject be non-militarization or demilitarization of space. (Gromyko interjected that he had not referred to demilitarization, but rather non-militarization.) The Secretary thought that such statements involved an overly narrow definition. There is no lack of willingness on our part to talk about and negotiate matters regarding space arms. But the Soviet definition is too narrow. What happens in space is a kind of abstraction, the result of something done with respect to offensive or defensive arms. He cited these two categories while recognizing that offensive and defensive arms are interrelated. If Gromyko would look at the subjects listed yesterday by the Secretary, he would recognize that they are related to this forum. For example, there are categories of anti-satellite systems which, though land-based, operate in space. Thus, to repeat, the Soviet concept is too narrow. Accordingly, we believe that this forum should deal with the full range of defensive systems, regardless of their basing mode. We are also prepared to deal with space arms questions as proposed by the Soviet Union.

The Secretary added that we had taken into account the concerns voiced by Gromyko several times last September concerning nuclear arms and nuclear explosions in space. Thus we believe it would be appropriate if the discussions in this forum were to focus particularly on nuclear defensive systems, including existing systems. While he agreed with Gromyko that the ultimate goal should be the elimination of nuclear arms, he thought that this forum should include all such arms, whether offensive or defensive. We certainly agree that the elimination of the entire category of nuclear arms is desirable.

The Secretary continued by pointing out that the Soviet Union has the world's only operational ASAT system, and -- as he understood it -- had conducted some twenty tests of that system. Moreover, while this system is land-based, the original launchers intended for it could launch other systems. Since the ASAT system operates in space, this could be considered to be militarization of space. The U.S., in contrast, has not deployed ASATs and has yet to test the system it has under development against satellites. Thus, we are far behind the Soviet Union in this area. On the Soviet side, in contrast, we see something



that exists. Beyond that he could mention a number of systems that are in space and have military uses, such as satellites for verifying compliance with agreements, for communications purposes and various other uses. To a very considerable extent we would not want to dispense with these systems because they are useful. Thus, the Secretary pointed out, "demilitarization" in one final sweep is not practical or verifiable. In looking through the record he had found, back at the ASAT talks in 1978 and 1979, a statement on this point made by the head of the Soviet delegation, Ambassador Khlestov, which ran as follows:

As for the concept of a 'comprehensive agreement,' the more we analyze it, the more doubts it causes us... From a purely technical point of view, it is practically impossible to single out, with sufficient precision, from the whole complex of systems and services which we call space technology, only those systems which would be designed exclusively for countering satellites ... we propose that in the future we continue to concentrate our efforts on the tasks which both sides recognize as realistic and feasible.

The Secretary then turned to the matter of a space-based missile defense system, to which the Soviet Union had directed great attention, reviewing some thoughts he had tried to advance yesterday.

-- First, U.S. scientists say that these systems are years off. He did not know what Soviet scientists have to say on the basis of their own research. One can never say what a "hot research group" might come up with. The Secretary had personal experience with many such research groups at the University of Chicago, at Stanford and at MIT. And though none of those research groups focussed on the subject under discussion here, he knew that it was impossible to tell in what direction such research efforts might lead. This effort, therefore, is long-term by its very nature.

-- Second, deployment of these systems is covered by a number of existing treaties. The Limited Test Ban Treaty prohibits nuclear detonations in space, the Outer of Space Treaty bans the deployment of nuclear weapons in space, while the ABM Treaty prohibits systems that are space-based, sea-based, air-based or mobile land-based. Thus, there is a whole body of treaty language that has been agreed upon in this area.

-- Third, regarding research as such, the Secretary had two points. One, that an agreement on research, as we see it, is virtually impossible to verify for a variety of reasons. Much relevant research stems from objectives unrelated to the question at hand. As an example he could point to advances in computational ability. We are both engaged in such research and this is impossible to stop. Beyond that -- and this was his second point -- we think that, in the end, if there is the



possibility of defense, it would offer a more comfortable and secure form of strategic stability than the one now existing.

The Secretary recognized that Gromyko disagreed, but expressed the hope that the Soviets would study our thinking. There is much time to talk about this matter and to digest it. It seems to us that if it is possible ultimately to determine a basis where a major element of deterrence would be defensive, in contrast to preponderantly offensive elements of deterrence we have now, this might offer a more comfortable and more secure form of strategic stability. If this can be accomplished it is potentially desirable. Perhaps we will not be able to find a way to do so. Therefore, for both these reasons the U.S. believes that research should continue and in fact will continue. Even if we were to agree on some limitation, it would be impossible to verify it. If it should turn out that a particular technology seems feasible, the U.S. would undertake more direct discussions, as provided by the ABM Treaty. At any rate, this is a matter for the future.

The Secretary said that this brought him back to a point in connection with the first forum. The U.S. is fully prepared to discuss and negotiate matters involving space arms and to take up whatever proposals the USSR may make in this area. As he had said yesterday, we are prepared to take up space arms questions in either of the other two fora, if they are related to the context of discussions there. As Gromyko had said yesterday, the world is changing. Perhaps as the negotiations continue, even on familiar subjects, we may want to approach them in different ways. Regarding further details and potential content of discussions in the first forum, the Secretary referred Gromyko to his comments on this subject the day before.

Finally, the Secretary returned to the question of structuring the negotiations. He recalled that Gromyko had said that they would appoint leaders for the three negotiating groups, and that, most likely, one would be named chairman of the overall delegation. Gromyko had also invited us to do as we wished in this regard. The Secretary observed that Gromyko's suggestion concerning the structure was novel. We had not heard such a suggestion previously and therefore we were still thinking about it. He did not know at this point where we would come out in terms of personnel appointments. To some extent he thought this would be a reflection of who would be "Mr. One," "Mr. Two" and "Mr. Three." Thus, this matter remained open so far as the U.S. is concerned.

The Secretary then said that his delegation had prepared a statement describing its proposals regarding the subjects and objectives of the whole complex of negotiations. This text could serve as a basis for discussion. He could give it to Gromyko now, or perhaps Gromyko preferred to make some comments before looking at the U.S. text.



Gromyko responded that indeed he had some comments. He was gratified to hear that certain aspects of the Soviet proposal regarding the structure of possible negotiations are acceptable to the U.S. On some other aspects of the Soviet proposal, the Secretary had voiced some doubts or reservations. He hoped that the Secretary would give added thought to these matters. It is good that the Secretary recognized the interconnection among the questions to be negotiated in the three groups. Nevertheless, there is a difference in the Soviet and American understanding of this interrelationship. The U.S. should be aware of this.

In dealing with this concept, Gromyko observed, the Soviet side proceeds from the premise that the subject ("material") of the negotiations compels us to consider the subject matter of the three groups as interrelated. That is why he had said yesterday that the problems must be solved in comprehensive fashion. In particular, he had explained why it would be impossible to make progress on some issues without agreement on space, more precisely on the non-militarization of space. He had also referred to a different interrelationship, namely that between strategic arms and medium-range nuclear arms.

When the Secretary referred to interrelationship, Gromyko continued, he was talking about a different kind of interrelationship -- that of offensive and defensive weapons. The Soviet Union cannot accept this if for no other reason than because the USSR did not recognize the category which the U.S. called defensive systems. He had said clearly that these systems, these concepts and this U.S. program were offensive systems, offensive concepts and an offensive program. They are a component part of a whole. One had to look at things from the standpoint of their ultimate logic. He did not wish to repeat what it would mean if the U.S. proceeded to implement its plan.

The Secretary observed that Gromyko had made himself very clear yesterday.

Gromyko continued that accordingly, we are speaking different languages when we refer to an interrelationship. Nevertheless, the very idea of an interrelationship does exist and that in itself is a positive element. Still, the two sides attached different meanings to it and this must be kept in mind.

The Secretary responded that, in practical terms, the question would present itself in terms of what would happen if, for example, we reached some kind of understanding in forum three or forum two. Would it be converted into a formal agreement or not? Under one interpretation of the interrelationship, the answer would be "no." Under a different interpretation the answer would be "yes."

Gromyko replied that this would not necessarily be the case. The point is that there are different interpretations of the concept of interrelationship. When we go beyond concrete specifics and relate these matters to high policy, we have to recognize that



the foundations of your plan and our plan are different. Naturally, this is of major importance. Everything said and written in the U.S. attributes defensive aims to your program -- as if everything in it is good and nothing bad. Even here in Geneva, though perhaps in a more restrained fashion, this has been the U.S. position. He, however, had told the Secretary that this is not the case, that the objective of the U.S. program is just the opposite. He had said this yesterday.

Gromyko then turned to the question of what agreements could be concluded in the absence of an overall agreement. As he had explained the day before, there are two groups of questions on which agreement is possible in the absence of an overall agreement. He did not preclude the possibility that it might be possible to reach agreement on individual questions in one of these groups which did not bear critically on the interrelationship. The number of such questions would be small. In this instance, there would be no need to await resolution of the other questions with which the groups would be dealing. The other category involved those questions which could be resolved and agreed upon entirely independent of progress on any other issue or group of issues. He had cited examples such as a comprehensive nuclear test ban. This type of question could be singled out, agreed upon, and an accord signed and brought into force. There were also two agreements that had been negotiated in the past, but had not entered into force. They were part of the same category that Gromyko was talking about.

The Secretary said he understood.

Gromyko noted that he had listed them yesterday. He wanted to provide additional clarification on one point because he felt that the Secretary had not clearly understood the matter. Let us assume that significant progress had been made in one or more of the groups. As they saw it, it would not be necessary to wait for the other groups to finish their work before discussing the overall picture. The whole delegation should meet from time to time to review their progress. It would be good if everything could be completed at the same time, but this can hardly be expected. There should be a periodic overall analysis, and this would provide an organic connection of the work by all three groups.

For example, Gromyko continued, let us assume that group "x" had conducted ten meetings. At that point the delegation as a whole could meet to see how things were going. This should be standard practice. There would be one delegation that is split into three groups. Thus, there would inevitably have to be consideration of the interrelationship the ministers had talked about -- provided, of course, both sides understood the meaning of the interrelationship in the same way. One should not rely exclusively on the literal meaning of the word, and one should not impose a kind of law on the groups under which they had to finish their work and wash their hands before a decision is made how to proceed further.



Gromyko said he hoped this explanation would be useful. He offered it because he suspected that the Secretary had not fully understood the Soviet concept.

The Secretary replied that this was an important clarification which he found very interesting.

Gromyko then noted the U.S. concern over the concept of non-militarization of space. Of course, one could invent some kind of symbol to replace this word, but Gromyko did not believe that it would be helpful to resort to algebraic techniques. If anything, that could be harmful. He added that the Secretary knows what the Soviet side means in this regard, and the Soviet side knows what the U.S. has in mind. Gromyko reiterated that he was convinced that the U.S. and USSR can prevent the militarization of space. If such militarization were to occur, the USSR, the U.S. and mankind as a whole will be pushed further toward the abyss toward which we have been moving. This is what will happen unless we find a way to halt such movement. Thus, even though the U.S. might not like the term militarization and may on occasion scorn it, he would urge honesty and precision in dealing with this subject.

Secretary Shultz's statements, Gromyko continued, had been reminiscent of those appearing in the U.S. press to the effect that it is wrong to raise the question of the militarization of space because space is already militarized. There are no scales which would measure the falsity of this thesis. We all understand that this is not the case. If we look at steps taken by both countries, there are things we can learn. For example, look at the U.S. space shuttle. If viewed in terms of its potential, one could conclude that under certain circumstances it could be used in ways in which no Soviet system can be used, and therefore that space is already militarized. But this would be an oversimplification. He did not want us to take this path since it would only make it harder to reach the goals before us.

Gromyko then reiterated what he had said the day before regarding space arms, or more precisely the non-militarization of space. The latter implies that there should be a ban on the development, testing and deployment of attack (or strike) space arms, accompanied by the destruction of existing systems of this kind. If such an approach is followed, far-reaching solutions to other issues would become possible as well. In order not to dilute the question of space arms by tangential issues, the Soviet side has proposed to talk about attack (strike) space arms. By attack space arms the Soviet Union means space arms based on any physical principle, regardless of basing mode, which can strike objects in space and which can strike objects on land, sea or in the air, that is on the planet earth, from space. Of course, this would include relevant anti-missile and ASAT systems.

Gromyko then said that, in referring to what he termed the U.S. defensive system, Secretary Shultz had spoken at length about research and about the difficulty in verifying a ban on research.



To a considerable degree what the Secretary said about verifying a research ban is true. But let us assume that all this preparatory research should demonstrate that such systems can indeed be developed. The U.S. position is "if it's possible, then let's do it." The Soviet position is to exclude this possibility since it would be a boon to mankind if this system is never developed.

Gromyko continued that this situation reminded him of the story of two men visiting Monaco. One of them suggests going to the casino in the hope of winning something; the other one refuses since he does not want to risk losing what he has. This illustrates the difference between the U.S. and Soviet positions. The Soviets feel the wiser course is not to risk losing everything. This is not just the unanimous view of the Soviet leadership but is also shared by people everywhere. People instinctively feel that this path should not be pursued because it would generate a very great threat to peace and would intensify the arms race. Nothing would do more to enhance U.S. prestige than a decision to rule out that option. That was the way to reduce nuclear arms, a goal mentioned by the Secretary, the President, as well as the leadership of the Soviet Union. Specifically, General Secretary Chernenko had said this on numerous occasions and it had been repeated by Gromyko at this very table. Nuclear arms should be reduced down to their complete elimination from the arsenals of nations.

In the U.S., Gromyko continued, there is presently a popular thesis to the effect that one should switch the character and nature of deterrence and that instead of relying on strategic and medium-range nuclear systems for deterrence, one should rely on systems which the U.S. has baptized defensive systems. The Soviet Union believed that this would not serve the cause of peace, that this would increase the threat, that the threat would become awesome if the large-scale missile defense system was developed. Under such circumstances, the nuclear arms race would not be curbed by such systems but just the opposite would occur; it would acquire new momentum. The USSR can not understand how the U.S. fails to see this. It must be some kind of self-hypnosis. This plan will intensify the nuclear arms race.

Gromyko said that if the Secretary had no further comments on the substance, perhaps they should give some thought on how to conclude their meetings. Earlier, the Secretary had mentioned a draft which Gromyko assumed was a draft of a joint statement. The Soviet delegation would certainly take a look at this draft and consider it. The Soviet delegation, for its part, would present its own draft. Gromyko thought that at this point it would be advisable to have either a working break or to recess for lunch, after which they could see how to proceed with regard to the joint statement and consider where to go from there.

The Secretary replied that he liked Gromyko's procedural suggestion, but wanted to make sure he understood clearly Gromyko's



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description of how the set of negotiating groups in the delegation would work. Gromyko had mentioned a situation in which one of the three groups, Group X, had held ten meetings and had come up with something. It would then be appropriate -- and in any event this would occur periodically -- for the whole group to consider the results, and for Group X to report what it had agreed upon.

Gromyko confirmed that this was right.

The Secretary continued that he understood Gromyko had suggested that the whole group engage in a kind of summary review to judge whether this one thing that had been agreed upon could stand on its own or whether it should wait. This would be the function of such periodic meetings.

Gromyko again confirmed that this was correct; the overall delegation would make a judgment on how the agreement reached fits into the framework of the other questions being negotiated.

The Secretary noted that the structure proposed by Gromyko was unusual and imaginative and the Secretary would have to testify in Congress and explain how it worked. Thus, he added jokingly, he might ask Gromyko to write his testimony.

The Secretary then presented the U.S. draft text of a joint statement. (Attachment 1)

Gromyko simultaneously gave the Secretary the text of the Soviet draft (Attachment 2).

The Secretary suggested that they adjourn for lunch and reconvene at 2:30 P.M., which would give them the opportunity to study each other's drafts and to respond at the afternoon meeting.

~~10:00~~

The meeting adjourned at 12:00 Noon.

Drafted by: D. Arensburger; J.F. Matlock



Attachment 1

TEXT OF U.S. DRAFT OF JOINT STATEMENT

The United States and the Soviet Union have agreed to begin a new complex of negotiations to address the interrelated questions of nuclear and space arms. To this end, three negotiating groups will be convened in Geneva, beginning on March 5, 1985, to begin the process of negotiating agreements on strategic offensive nuclear arms, intermediate-range nuclear arms, and nuclear defensive and space arms. The objective of these negotiations shall be the reduction of nuclear arms and the enhancement of strategic stability, with the ultimate goal of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

Attachment 2

TEXT OF SOVIET DRAFT OF JOINT STATEMENT

As previously agreed, a meeting was held on January 7 and 8, 1985, in Geneva between Andrei A. Gromyko, Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU, First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, and George Shultz, the U.S. Secretary of State.

During the meeting they discussed the subject and objectives of the forthcoming Soviet-US negotiations on nuclear and space arms.

The sides agree that the subject of the negotiations will be a complex of questions concerning space arms, as well as both strategic and medium-range nuclear arms; moreover, all these questions will be considered and resolved in their interrelationship.

The objective of the negotiations will be to work out effective agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in space, limiting and reducing nuclear arms, and strengthening strategic stability.

The sides believe that ultimately the forthcoming negotiations, just as efforts in general to limit and reduce arms, should lead to the complete elimination of nuclear arms everywhere.

The date of the beginning of the negotiations and the site of these negotiations will be agreed through diplomatic channels within one month.

FOURTH SHULTZ-GROMYKO MEETING  
Geneva, January, 1985

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

U.S. Secretary of State George P. Shultz  
Robert C. McFarlane, Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs  
Ambassador Paul Nitze  
Ambassador Arthur Hartman  
Jack F. Matlock, Special Assistant to the  
President for National Security Affairs  
Carolyn Smith, Interpreter

USSR Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko  
Georgy M. Korniyenko, First Deputy Foreign  
Minister  
Ambassador Viktor Karpov  
Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin  
A. Bratchikov, Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
Viktor Sukhodrev, Interpreter

DATE, TIME January 8, 1985; 3:35 to 6:55 P.M.  
AND PLACE: United States Mission, Geneva, Switzerland

Secretary Shultz began the meeting by saying that the two sides had reviewed each other's proposed press communiques. He had some comments to make about the Soviet draft, but as Minister Gromyko was the guest, he should have the floor first.

Gromyko responded that, frankly speaking, it would be hard for the Soviet side to accept the U.S. text. For one thing the U.S. referred to a new complex of negotiations whereas the Soviet side felt the need to discuss the problems in a complex -- or comprehensive -- fashion. The two concepts are not identical. The U.S. draft then speaks of the three groups meeting in Geneva on March 5 to begin work, although the sides had not yet agreed to begin negotiations. The purpose of this meeting is to discuss the possibility of holding negotiations. He had always taken care to say that if the sides can agree on the subject and objectives of the negotiations, then they could talk about the date and site of the talks. He always began his remarks with the



words "if we agree on the subject and objectives of the negotiations."

The U.S. draft, Gromyko continued, then goes on to mention defensive arms. Perhaps this is good for the U.S., but it is unacceptable to the Soviet side, as he had already stated many times. The USSR has a wholly different evaluation of the arms the U.S. calls defensive. The only way to proceed here is to find mutually acceptable language, and this is a matter of principle. U.S. and Soviet assessments of the U.S. plans are diametrically opposed to each other, and this is why the sides must look in a different direction to find acceptable wording.

Gromyko then asked for the Secretary's reaction to the Soviet draft statement.

Secretary Shultz said that as far as a date and place for negotiations are concerned, he of course recognizes that this would come only after reaching an agreement on the substance of the negotiations. If agreement is reached on the substance, it would be worthwhile to set a time and place so as to be specific and leave nothing vague that could be clearly specified.

As for Gromyko's remarks about defense, the Secretary had carefully listened to everything Gromyko said yesterday and today, and he believed he completely understood what Gromyko meant. He hoped that with time he and Gromyko would have an opportunity to continue exchanges on this subject because it represents a very deep issue.

The U.S. had identified one of the three fora agreed upon as "nuclear defensive and space arms," the Secretary continued. He recognized that Soviet attention is very much focused on space arms, as signalled by statements made here and elsewhere by Gromyko and also by Chairman Chernenko. The U.S. understands this and is prepared to discuss space arms. But, as he had mentioned this morning, the U.S. sees this issue as essentially a broader one. There should be clarity about the defensive arrangements the Soviet Union now has underway (the U.S. at least would call them defensive). In the U.S. view this Soviet program is a massive one and should be discussed. The USSR has research programs in particle beams, directed energy and lasers, and has as well a deployed ABM system that is being upgraded. It also has a massive air defense infrastructure. The United States, for its part, has done very little in defense. So it is incorrect to discuss U.S. plans and research programs without looking at the large Soviet defense program. For this reason the U.S. believes that this negotiating forum should address the question of defense broadly speaking.

The structure of the Soviet draft statement, the Secretary continued, provides a basis with which to work, and so the U.S. side has made an effort to integrate its ideas into its two drafts. The U.S. draft adopts the first and second paragraphs of the Soviet draft without change. The third paragraph of the



Soviet draft was slightly changed, and the last two paragraphs dropped in favor of a U.S. text. Shultz handed over to Gromyko a copy of the following statement:

As previously agreed, a meeting between Andrei A. Gromyko, Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU, First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, and George P. Shultz, Secretary of State of the USA, took place on January 7 and 8, 1985 in Geneva.

The question regarding the subject and objectives of the forthcoming Soviet-US negotiations on nuclear and space arms was discussed during the meeting.

The sides agree that the subject of the talks will be those interrelated questions pertaining to nuclear and space arms with these questions to be discussed and resolved in a complex of negotiations.

To this end, the negotiating groups will be convened in Geneva, beginning on March 5, 1985, to begin the process of negotiating agreements on nuclear defensive and space arms, strategic offensive nuclear arms and intermediate-range nuclear arms.

The objective of these negotiations shall be the reduction of nuclear arms and the enhancement of strategic stability, with the ultimate goal of the complete elimination of nuclear arms.

Gromyko observed that the U.S. had added the phrase "defensive arms" and this was unacceptable. He did not want to get into polemics, but all the credit ascribed by the Secretary to Soviet activity in the field of defense is not true to fact. This is not acceptable wording, and any wording that is not acceptable to both sides must be dropped.

Secretary Shultz asked whether the main problem involved the word "defensive", or was it something else?

Gromyko replied that "outer space" is absent from the U.S. draft as an objective of the negotiations.

The Secretary pointed out that the U.S. draft reads "negotiations on nuclear and space arms."

Gromyko said that the concept of outer space must not get lost here. It must be put in first place.

The Secretary replied that the U.S. does not want to lose it, but wants to discuss outer space. He read out the following alternative to the last paragraph:



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The objective of the negotiations will be to work out effective agreements aimed at preventing an arms race, limiting and reducing nuclear arms, and strengthening strategic stability on earth and in space.

Gromyko objected that this means relegating space to the backyard. The U.S. could call its strategic defense plan a plan to strengthen strategic stability if it wished.

Secretary Shultz said that, just as in baseball the number four hitter is the "clean-up hitter," he was saving the best for last. The phrase "strengthening strategic stability on earth and in space" could be interpreted in the Soviet way or in the U.S. way.

Gromyko said there should be no room for ambiguity here. He suggested taking a 15-minute break so that both sides could look over the drafts.

Secretary Shultz agreed, and the U.S. delegation left the room at 3:05 p.m.

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At 3:25 p.m. the U.S. delegation returned and the meeting resumed.

Gromyko presented the following draft of a joint statement:

As previously agreed, a meeting was held on January 7 and 8, 1985, in Geneva between Andrei A. Gromyko, Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU, First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, and George P. Shultz, the U.S. Secretary of State.

In accordance with the arrangement previously reached in principle between the USSR and the USA to enter into new negotiations on nuclear and space arms, the two sides focused their attention, as had been agreed, on discussing the question of the subject and specific objectives of these negotiations. The discussions were useful.

Both sides agreed that the ultimate objective of these negotiations, in the course of which all questions will be considered and resolved in their interrelationship as generally the two sides' efforts in the field of arms limitation and reduction, should be the gradual exclusion of nuclear weapons from the military arsenals of states until they are completely eliminated.

The exchange of views will be continued and the sides will seek to elaborate as early as possible an agreed approach to resolving the questions under question at this meeting.



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Andrei A. Gromyko and George P. Shultz agreed to continue the exchange of views, for which purpose they will meet again in early March. The date and venue of the meeting will be agreed additionally.

Secretary Shultz remarked that there was one place in the third paragraph that was unclear linguistically, but he did not disagree with the meaning of the sentence.

Gromyko explained that the Soviet side was referring to the ultimate goal of the negotiations and all actions taken to achieve that goal.

The Secretary said he wished to discuss this, but first he had a few questions. At this morning's meeting the two of them had discussed at length the Soviet proposal for structuring the negotiations in three groups. He thought they had made quite a bit of headway in discussing it. Essentially they were struggling with the description of one of the three fora, but now it seemed that the Soviet side was withdrawing this idea. He did not object, and in fact looked forward to another meeting with Gromyko, but why did Gromyko not now want to go ahead with this idea? The Soviet side had proposed and the U.S. had accepted the basic notion of a related complex of three negotiations.

Gromyko complained that he now had to repeat himself once again. He did not understand why the Secretary was not paying attention to him. He had stated the Soviet views on how to structure the negotiations, provided agreement was reached to hold them. Every time he mentions this, he makes this reservation because the two sides have not yet agreed on this. If we agreed when to meet next time to discuss the subject and objectives of the talks, he said, then everything he said about the structure would still be valid. He was not taking back a single word of what he had said.

The Secretary observed that there is a difference of ~~view~~ <sup>view</sup> in how the sides interpret research on defensive measures. He doubted there would be any change in these views by early March, and he doubted it could be resolved by then. It was more likely to be resolved through the process of negotiations.

Gromyko said he did not wish to single out any one question. He would suggest just continuing these talks and see what the outcome would be. They had come to no final result here yet, and he would suggest continuing these conversations, if the Secretary found this acceptable.

Secretary Shultz suggested that the two delegations separate for a few minutes in order to caucus and look at the direction in which they were going.

The U.S. delegation left the room at 3:42 p.m.

\* \* \* \* \*



At 4:28 p.m. the U.S. delegation returned.

Gromyko joked that he hadn't expected to see the Secretary again until the second crow of the rooster.

Secretary Shultz replied that if today had been Sunday, the U.S. delegation would have been busy watching football in the other room. He said he was puzzled and could not figure out what was causing Gromyko to draw back from what had already been agreed upon. Certainly the two sides disagree on how to characterize what seem to the U.S. to be defensive systems, and which the Soviet Union feels are offensive. He expected that if we met six months or a year from now they might well still disagree, although there would be time for reflection. Although they disagree on what to call these arms, they do not disagree that it is important to discuss them. The U.S. is prepared to discuss them and Gromyko has indicated the same. The Secretary had developed in one of his presentations the sense in which technology is making certain distinctions in the ABM Treaty difficult to establish makes it difficult to establish, and therefore there is a need to examine a variety of technologies.

The Secretary noted that he had already pointed out that the deployed Soviet ABM system depends on nuclear explosions in the upper atmosphere or space. And so the U.S. had tried to define the subject matter of the first working group or forum so as to include what the Soviets want to talk about in space as well as things on the ground that seem relevant or important to the U.S. If we do not agree on the content, that is one problem. But if we do agree on the content -- and the U.S. has excluded nothing -- then we should be able to find the words to express this. If Gromyko's problem concerns the word "defensive," the Secretary could suggest some alternative wording. But perhaps this is not the problem. The Secretary thought that if they could capitalize on the extensive discussions that have taken place here, they certainly should. He had other language to suggest, but observed that perhaps Gromyko was not interested and had already decided to back away from the direction in which he had been going.

"Don't try to pretend that you don't understand us," Gromyko rejoined. He categorically rejected the reproach that he had retreated from his position. Each word he had spoken was valid. "Have we reached agreement on the subject and aims of the negotiations?" he asked rhetorically. Each time he had spoken of the structure of the possible negotiations, he had said, "when and if we agree on the subject and objectives of the negotiations, this is the structure we envision." He had spoken of one delegation divided into three groups. Of course, the negotiations would deal with the subjects for discussion in each group. These three groups would take stock of their progress and present reports on their work. This is how the Soviet side sees this issue. Let us talk seriously now. There would be one single negotiation made up of three groups working in three directions. Unfortunately, agreement has not yet been reached on



this. Tell us, Gromyko asked the Secretary, if this proposal is unacceptable.

Gromyko said that the Secretary had again raised the subject of Soviet ABM systems and certain other issues. If the Secretary insisted on this, Gromyko would have to repeat all that he had already said. Is it really necessary to do so? If we could reach agreement on these questions, we could name the date for the negotiations to begin, i.e., March 1 or April 1, although the latter was not a very good date. But we are not in a position to do that now.

Secretary Shultz inquired what precisely was the essence of their disagreement. He thought it boiled down to the subject or way of describing the first group. If this is the problem, he had a proposal, but perhaps this is not the problem.

Gromyko responded that this is indeed the main issue. "You don't want to accept our proposal to deal with the militarization of space," he added. Whenever he had raised this question, the Secretary began to speak of research, U.S. plans and so forth. The Soviet side does not share the U.S. view that it is essential to carry out this research. This is the first stage of implementing the U.S. plan. The Soviet side proposes to continue discussing this important question, but here there is absolutely no agreement on it. They had touched on other important questions as well, but this is the main one. If they had reached agreement on questions related to space, they could now set the time and place of the new negotiations, but they have no such agreement now. If you think we cannot exist without a new round of talks, then your idea is far from the truth. Such an exchange is in the interest of both sides. If this does not suit you, Gromyko said, tell us and we will not speak of it again. This was his short reply to the Secretary's remarks. He noted that time was running out and the sides should be brief.

The Secretary said he wanted to make sure he understood. Was Gromyko saying that they would establish these negotiating fora whenever the U.S. says that it will cease its research program on strategic defense?

Gromyko replied that he would not discuss that now. He proposed it for subsequent discussion. He wanted to discuss a whole series of questions by way of continuing the conversation here, but this would take several days. The Secretary certainly must understand, said Gromyko, that the Soviet side cannot accept the U.S. concept, point of view or policy on outer space. The U.S. must clearly understand the Soviet position on this. However, the Soviets are prepared to continue discussing all these issues. If a continued exchange does not suit you, Gromyko said, tell us. This is a proposal, not a request.

The Secretary replied that the U.S. would not stop its research program.



Gromyko commented that the Secretary had already said this. Secretary Shultz had said that if the essence is that the Soviet Union is waiting for the U.S. to stop its research program, this was useless because the U.S. would not stop. Gromyko repeated that the Secretary had already said this. He said that the Soviet assessment of the U.S. concept on space would not change, but the Soviet side is nonetheless prepared to continue the discussion.

The Secretary said he thought Gromyko had proposed that such a discussion take place in the first working group. This was implied by the draft joint statement Gromyko had presented at the morning meeting. This negotiating group would discuss the questions the two sides agree upon, but the U.S. wants it to discuss other questions too. This is what the sides should work toward, but this may not be acceptable to the Soviet side.

Gromyko replied that this problem would be discussed in one of the three groups.

Secretary Shultz said he agreed.

However, Gromyko continued, we have not yet cleared the way for the beginning of negotiations. If, for example, we agree now that this working group would meet on March 1, it would have the same problems at its first meeting that we are having here. What kind of negotiations would those be? At least one working group, or perhaps the whole delegation, would have to discuss this problem, and he thought it was better to discuss it at the ministerial level. It is not a question for a working group, but for a higher, more fundamental, level.

The Secretary remarked that he had given Gromyko a list of what he considered to be appropriate subject matter for this group, and it was a meaty set of material. Gromyko could see this in his notes. The Secretary thought this area is important to both sides and is negotiable.

Gromyko said it is not possible to begin discussing the work program of the working groups now. First they must agree on the objectives of the working group and when the negotiations would begin.

The Secretary asked whether Gromyko felt that further discussion of this question now would be fruitless.

Gromyko replied that he was not saying that; there was plenty of time left before tomorrow morning and of course they could sit here until then, but he thought it was hardly necessary to repeat what had already been said. There was no one but himself and the Secretary to discuss these questions. Their leaders had charged them with discussing them. Did he understand the Secretary to say that the idea of the two of them continuing their discussions was unsuitable? If so, one mode of action was indicated, but if not so, another mode of action was indicated.



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The Secretary replied, "No, it is not unsuitable." But it is also suitable to get the negotiations going as soon as possible. As he had said, he thought that the negotiations, once begun, should be closely followed and discussed at a high political level. The two sides have much to discuss. He was striving to understand the reason Gromyko did not wish to begin the negotiating process. Gromyko had handed him a proposed communique announcing the beginning of negotiations. Although no date was set, the objective of the talks was stated. And now, apparently Gromyko did not want this to happen.

[At this point, Korniyenko remarked to Gromyko in Russian, "Then they should take our text."]

Gromyko said that they want the negotiations to begin. But, he said, it is impossible to agree on the timing because there is as yet no agreed understanding on the subject and objectives of the negotiations. We are speaking of a common objective: both sides agree to the goal of completely eliminating nuclear arms. But this is the only thing we agree on, and therefore it is too early now to talk about a date for beginning the negotiations. He did not know whether at the next meeting they would be able to agree upon these questions and so he proposed to meet again in order to continue this discussion.

He said that the Secretary tried to interpret the fact that he would not agree to set a date for negotiations to mean that the Soviet side had changed its position and did not want to have negotiations. But Gromyko had said all along that they could not agree upon the date if they had not agreed on the subject and objectives of the negotiations. Don't try to pressure us, Gromyko warned, first of all, because we don't like it, and second, because it is hardly in either of our interests for our delegations to meet at the talks and immediately find themselves at an impasse so that the negotiations fall apart. This would be advantageous to neither side. Would it not be better to hold negotiations on a more reliable basis?

The Secretary noted that questions may arise over what is meant in the final sentence of the Soviet draft statement, which reads as follows: "The date of the beginning of the negotiations and the site of these negotiations will be agreed through diplomatic channels within one month."

Gromyko replied that he considered this normal. The sides could specify the month in which the talks would begin if the U.S. side feels this is important. They would not name a date, but would specify a month, or the 15th of a certain month. Gromyko had no desire to create any vagueness or uncertainty.

Korniyenko asked whether the U.S. accepts the subject and definition of the negotiations.

The Secretary replied that the U.S. could not accept the Soviet draft but could use it as a basis for discussion.



Gromyko suggested that instead of a date we could say that a meeting and exchange of views would take place in March. If it is so important we could specify the first half of March. February would not be convenient for him for several reasons and March would be better.

The Secretary replied that he was trying to find a sense of direction, not to pin down a date. The Soviet draft implies that we agree there will be negotiations and that perhaps Hartman and Korniyenko or Dobrynin and he would discuss the time and place.

Gromyko asked whether this would be later on.

The Secretary said yes. If the date were to be in March, this would be settled by discussion between them. This was his understanding.

Gromyko rejoined that it would not be hard to agree to meet in March. It would, in any case, be easier than climbing Mont Blanc.

The Secretary concurred that it would be no problem to find a time and place. The problem was to work together and come up with a joint text of a statement.

Gromyko replied that they had drafted their text taking account of the U.S. position and the views the Secretary had expressed here. If the two of them are to work out an agreed text, everything in it must be acceptable to both sides since it will be made public.

The Secretary said that if the statement is made public, it would imply that the date and place of the negotiations would be agreed upon through diplomatic channels. The two delegations would then meet and, having the benefit of our discussions, divide into three groups and get down to work. This is how Shultz understood the statement.

Gromyko said that if at the next meeting they reached a degree of mutual understanding that warranted beginning negotiations, they could agree on the date. They could name the month if this suits the Secretary more. If they agree to another meeting, it makes no sense to draw things out.

The Secretary said that Gromyko was in effect changing the Soviet text to read as follows' "The date of the beginning of the negotiations and the site of these negotiations will be agreed at the next meeting of foreign ministers in early March."

Gromyko replied that it is one thing to begin the negotiations and another thing to mention the date of another ministerial meeting. Either version would be all right with him. One version concerns the next meeting between himself and Secretary Shultz, and the other concerns the date on which negotiations would begin, although a month is not specified.



Perhaps after the next meeting they would be in a position to specify the date and place of the negotiations. Alternatively they could set the date through diplomatic channels. He saw no big problem here, especially with the next ministerial meeting. This should be a simple matter and he asked Shultz to believe him that he had no tricks up his sleeve. He assumed that the most recent Soviet draft is acceptable to the U.S. side. It mentions the negotiations and the date of the next ministerial meeting, though no date is set for the negotiations. To state things more simply, two versions are on the table. Which is more acceptable to the U.S. side?

The Secretary answered that both versions are acceptable in the sense that it is important to get the negotiations underway if we can structure them properly. It is also important for the two of them to continue to talk, not only directly as during these two days, but also in March or whenever. They could be in touch through diplomatic channels in the meantime. The question now was whether to announce the beginning of negotiations or to announce another ministerial meeting. In response to Gromyko's question of which he prefers, he would answer in typical Washington fashion that he prefers both. He wished to point out that for the U.S. the beginning of negotiations involves many complications. The U.S. must decide upon a leader of the delegation. Under the structure proposed by the Soviets, who would be the leader of the leaders? The U.S. choice would be affected by what is intended for the negotiations. On the question of intermediate-range forces, Ambassador Nitze, who led similar negotiations in the past, prefers not to continue in this duty, although he had promised to stay on as the Secretary's left or right-hand man [Ambassador Nitze was sitting to the Secretary's left]. So another person must be found to take his place. The U.S. must prepare itself for the negotiations because they are new and embody changes. This cannot be done instantly because a position must be developed in order to be ready for the talks. The Secretary thought that early March might be a little too early. All this must be taken into account if the talks are to begin, and it is best to say so now. This merely emphasizes the importance of further discussions at the ministerial level.

Gromyko said that a clear statement is needed to resolve these questions, yet the Secretary had not yet made such a statement. Does he accept that the date of negotiations will be settled through diplomatic channels? This afternoon the Secretary had remarked that he was puzzled by the Soviet draft. What in it was puzzling?

The Secretary replied that he was perplexed by the second Soviet draft, not the first. He was prepared to take the first draft as a framework and work through it. He was prepared to say that the time and place of negotiations will be agreed by diplomatic channels, although if we can set it ourselves, this would be preferable. He thought a few things in the draft could be changed or added to. At the same time, he thought the statement



could say that he and Gromyko had agreed to another meeting in March.

Gromyko said that Shultz had still not expressed himself clearly. The Soviet draft was drawn up taking account of the U.S. position, and if it is accepted, the question of a ministerial meeting is no longer urgent. The Soviet side had put a reference to another ministerial meeting in the second text because the U.S. had not agreed to their morning text. Reference to the ministerial meeting could be pigeon-holed. Gromyko understood that the Secretary was hesitating between the two texts. In one text the idea is clearly stated that negotiations will begin. If another meeting between them should be necessary, there would be no problem -- they can meet. World public opinion would be favorable to such a meeting. In fact, if such a meeting were announced, the U.S. delegation would probably be met with flags at the airport when it returned home.

The Secretary replied that first we must accomplish this between us and then the world could learn about it. He said he liked the implication in the first text that we have agreed to begin negotiations. While the structure of the Soviet text is acceptable to the U.S., there are a few aspects we wish to change. Although he could not accept the text in its present form, it deserves discussion. At the same time, with or without this text, a further meeting between the ministers would be useful because there is much to discuss, and not only questions related to arms.

Gromyko said he was alarmed by the Secretary's statement that he wished to make some changes.

The Secretary asked if Gromyko really expected him to accept the Soviet text without comment.

Gromyko replied that the text had been drafted after yesterday's meeting, taking into account the remarks Secretary Shultz had made.

The Secretary said that his delegation had also drafted its text taking into account what Gromyko had said both yesterday and during his trip to Washington. They had tried to reflect in its text the views Gromyko had expressed.

Gromyko stated that everything he had said is based on the text the Soviet side had drawn up. He did not know what the Secretary might suggest now; perhaps the Secretary would make him want to hang the whole thing up.

The Secretary asked whether Gromyko was interested in discussing this or not. He would assume that he was. He suggested going through the text to determine what could be done to make it acceptable to the U.S.



Gromyko suggested that the two delegations part for a few minutes to review the text.

The Secretary agreed and the U.S. delegation left the room at 5:50 p.m.

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At 6:25 p.m. the U.S. delegation returned.

The Secretary explained that the first and second paragraphs of the Soviet text are acceptable as they stand. In the third paragraph the U.S. wishes to drop the reference to strategic and medium-range arms. It proposes a paragraph reading as follows: "The sides agree that the subject of the negotiations will be a complex of questions concerning nuclear and space arms, with all these questions considered and resolved in their interrelationship."

Secretary Shultz proposed several additions to the fourth paragraph, which would read as follows: "The objective of the negotiations will be to work out effective agreements by a delegation divided into three negotiating groups, aimed at preventing an arms race on earth and in space, limiting and reducing nuclear arms, and strengthening strategic stability." He explained that here he had added a reference to the three groups, and clarified that the arms race meant on earth as well as in space.

Secretary Shultz said that the fifth paragraph of the Soviet draft would remain unchanged, although linguistically speaking, it did not read smoothly. He thought this was not worth arguing over. The final paragraph was acceptable as written. He thought if the sides could agree to fix the time and place of the negotiations, this would be desirable, but he would not insist on it.

Gromyko requested another break in order to examine the proposed U.S. changes.

The U.S. delegation left the room at 6:35 p.m.

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At 7:00 p.m. the U.S. delegation returned.

Gromyko remarked that some of the suggested changes were acceptable and some were not. The first paragraph was as solid as granite, and the second paragraph was also unchanged. He proposed that the third paragraph read as follows: "The sides agree that the subject of the negotiations will be a complex of questions concerning space and nuclear arms -- both strategic and medium-range -- with all these questions considered and resolved in their interrelationship."



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Gromyko also proposed an amended version of the fourth paragraph: "The objective of the negotiations will be to work out effective agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on earth, at limiting and reducing nuclear arms, and at strengthening strategic stability. The negotiations will be conducted by a delegation from each side divided into three groups."

By way of explanation, Gromyko said that we could not prevent an arms race on earth because there already is one, and therefore we must say that we will try to terminate it. Since there is as yet no arms race in space, we can say we will try to prevent one there. He said the Soviet side accepts the U.S. idea of referring to a delegation made up of three groups, but it prefers to say this in another sentence. The last two paragraphs of the statement stand unchanged.

The Secretary said this version of the text sounds reasonable, but he would like to caucus once again to look it over.

The U.S. delegation left the room at 7:10 p.m. On his way out, Mr. McFarlane had a brief exchange with Ambassador Karpov about the meaning of space arms (reported below).

\* \* \* \* \*

The U.S. delegation returned at 7:22 p.m.

The Secretary asked Mr. McFarlane to repeat the exchange he had had with Karpov so that he could make sure it represented the Soviet view.

Mr. McFarlane quoted paragraph three of the proposed Soviet text, which states that "the sides agree that the subject of the negotiations will be a complex of questions concerning space and nuclear arms." When referring to space arms, McFarlane inquired, does the Soviet side include land-based systems that attack targets in space, as well as space-based systems that attack targets on earth?

Gromyko said that he had stated this clearly yesterday. When referring to space strike arms, the Soviet side means space weapons of any mode of action or basing mode that are designed to attack space objects or attack from outer space objects in the air, land or sea. In the text at hand, this is what is meant, although it is expressed more economically. Gromyko added that this of course extends to ASAT systems and corresponding ABM systems.

McFarlane said that land-based systems that attack space objects include weapons which attack ballistic missile systems. Do the "corresponding ABM systems" to which Gromyko had referred include those ABM systems covered by the ABM Treaty?



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Gromyko replied that this applies not only to the systems permitted by the ABM Treaty.

McFarlane asked whether Gromyko calls space arms those weapons which are within this meaning.

Gromyko answered: "It is exactly as I said -- I cannot add or subtract anything else."

McFarlane said in that case the ABM system around Moscow is a space weapon.

The Secretary thanked Gromyko for this clarification. He then made a suggestion for the third paragraph that would stress this concept. He proposed to add to the phrase "space arms" a clarifying phrase, "wherever based or targeted." The rest of the paragraph would read as it stands.

Gromyko objected to this, saying that this would lead them into a jungle. Why mention targeting and why complicate the issue? What is unclear about this sentence? Why complicate an already clear sentence?

The Secretary wished to clarify another point. This paragraph also contains a reference to medium-range arms. As he understood it, the Soviet draft would say "medium-range arms" and the U.S. draft would say "intermediate-range arms."

Gromyko confirmed this, saying it was fine with him. Both the U.S. and Soviet sides are accustomed to certain specific parameters agreed on long ago. These parameters define those arms that are considered strategic, as well as where tactical arms end and medium-range arms begin. Everything here is mathematically precise.

The Secretary repeated that the U.S. would say "intermediate-range" and the Soviet side would say "medium-range." He had one more point to bring up. The U.S. side suggests that the fourth paragraph of the text be amended to read "agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on earth by limiting and reducing nuclear arms." The word "by" is the change suggested here.

Gromyko objected that this would worsen the paragraph and change its meaning. Neither side needed this change.

The Secretary replied that it was not a big point, but it did explain how the sides would end the arms race -- by limiting and reducing nuclear arms.

Gromyko again objected that this was a worse solution, and Secretary Shultz agreed to drop it. Although he believed his wording made the point more powerful, he would agree to leave the paragraph as it stands.



Gromyko wondered if the Secretary had found any other "heresy" in the Soviet draft.

The Secretary replied that he had found no heresy he was willing to disclose to Gromyko. He would now have a clean copy of the text typed up in English.

While the text was being typed, there was discussion of the time the joint statement would be released.

Gromyko asked that it be released at midnight Geneva time because of the time difference between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. The announcement would not get into Soviet media until tomorrow, but it would make the news in the U.S. today. Gromyko said that Shultz would have something to announce even if he did not read the statement -- he could announce that a statement had been agreed upon.

Secretary Shultz said that he would appear at a press conference this evening, and that he would be too sleepy to answer questions if he waited until midnight. He thought even 10:00 P.M. was late. It is possible to embargo the announcement, but on such a big story he doubted the embargo would be observed.

Gromyko pressed Shultz repeatedly not to make the announcement before midnight.

Secretary Shultz suggested a compromise of 11 p.m. Gromyko accepted, saying that the U.S. side wants the Soviet side to meet it more than half way. Shultz replied that Gromyko drives a very hard bargain.

When the clean copy of the joint statement arrived, the Secretary gave it to Gromyko.

Before departing, Gromyko expressed his satisfaction with the frank and business-like atmosphere that had prevailed at these discussions.

Secretary Shultz, in his turn, thanked Gromyko for his kind words and said he appreciated the cordial discussions that had taken place. Gromyko had used the word "useful" in earlier remarks, and Shultz thought this word could be applied here too.

The meeting ended at 7:55 p.m.

Drafted by: Carolyn Smith; J.F. Matlock



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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

February 11, 1985

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: GENEVA MEMCONS

**RCM HAS SEEN**

**SIGNED**

Regarding page 14 of Tab D, the interpreter's record (attached) reads essentially as I had in the record.

I recorded the sentence myself -- I thought at the time -- verbatim. My notes read as follows:

"When you refer to space arms, do you intend to encompass systems on earth which attack targets in space, as well as systems in space which attack targets on earth?"

Paul Nitze was also taking notes and provided me with his mark-up of the interpreter's text. He did not note an alteration here. However, I can check with him directly if you wish.

I am sensitive to the point here, and don't believe I would have missed the qualifier -- though that is always possible when the conversation is flowing rapidly.

Attachment: Page 14 of *interpreter's record*

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**DECLASSIFIED**  
NLRR MD9-2166 #6952  
BY RW NARA DATE 6/22/11



Interpreter's record 29

By way of explanation, Gromyko said that we could not prevent an arms race on earth because there already is one, and therefore we must say that we will try to terminate it. Since there is as yet no arms race in space, we can say we will try to prevent one there. He said the Soviet side accepts the US idea of referring to a delegation made up of three groups, but it prefers to say this in another sentence. The last two paragraphs of the statement stand unchanged.

Shultz said this version of the text sounds reasonable, but he would like to caucus once again to look it over. The US delegation left the room at 7:10 p.m. On his way out, National Security Advisor McFarlane had a brief exchange with Ambassador Karpov about the meaning of space arms (reported below).

The US delegation returned at 7:22 p.m. Shultz asked McFarlane to repeat the exchange he had had with Karpov so that the US side could confirm this conversation.

McFarlane quoted paragraph three of the proposed Soviet text, which states that "the sides agree that the subject of the negotiations will be a complex of questions concerning space and nuclear arms...". When referring to space arms, McFarlane wondered, does the Soviet side include land-based systems that attack targets in space, as well as space-based systems that attack targets on earth?

Gromyko said that he had stated this clearly yesterday. When referring to space strike arms, the Soviet side means space weapons of any mode of action or basing mode that are designed to attack space objects or attack from outer space objects in the air, land or sea. In the text at hand, this is what is meant, although it is expressed more economically. Gromyko added that this of course extends to ASAT systems and corresponding ABM systems.

McFarlane said that land-based systems that attack space objects include weapons which attack ABM systems. Are the "corresponding ABM systems" Gromyko referred to ABM systems within the meaning of the ABM Treaty?

Gromyko replied that this applies not only to the systems permitted by the ABM Treaty. McFarlane asked whether Gromyko calls space arms those weapons which are within this meaning. Gromyko answered: "It is exactly as I said -- I cannot add or subtract anything else." McFarlane said that he assumed Gromyko's answer is yes and that the ABM system around Moscow is considered a space weapon.

Shultz thanked Gromyko for this clarification. He had a suggestion to make for the third paragraph that would stress this concept. He proposed to add to the phrase "space arms" a clarifying phrase, "wherever based or targeted." The rest of the paragraph would read as it stands.



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

January 24, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT: Records of Shultz-Gromyko Meetings in Geneva,  
January 7-8, 1985

Attached at Tabs A, B, C and D are the edited memoranda of conversation covering the Geneva meetings.

\* [ You may wish to review in particular pages 8 and 9 of the record of the second meeting (Tab B), and pages 14 and 15 of the record of the fourth meeting (Tab D).

Please let me know if you detect any inaccuracy in the memoranda so corrections can be entered before they are placed in the permanent record.

At Tab I is a Kimmitt-Platt memorandum to transmit the records to State when they are approved.

Recommendation:

That you authorize transmission of the Kimmitt-Platt Memorandum at Tab I.

Approve *JM* Disapprove     

Attachments:

- Tab I - Kimmitt-Platt Memorandum
- Tab A - First Shultz-Gromyko Meeting
- Tab B - Second Shultz-Gromyko Meeting
- Tab C - Third Shultz-Gromyko Meeting
- Tab D - Fourth Shultz-Gromyko Meeting



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NLS FOI-114/2 #6953

~~SECRET~~

The President has seen <sup>31</sup>  
SYSTEM II *Matlock*  
90240  
ADD-ON *JMC*

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

March 6, 1985

~~BY~~ NOI, NARA, DATE 11/21/07

~~SECRET~~

MEETING WITH POLITBURO MEMBER SHCHERBITSKY

DATE: March 7, 1985  
LOCATION: Oval Office  
TIME: 3:00 P.M.

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE *RCM*

*DR*

I. PURPOSE:

To explain your approach to U.S.-Soviet relations.

II. BACKGROUND:

Shcherbitsky is visiting the U.S. as head of a Soviet "parliamentary" delegation. His presence provides an opportunity to convey your position on key issues to the Soviet leadership.

III. PARTICIPANTS:

United States:

The President  
Secretary Shultz  
Mr. McFarlane

Jack F. Matlock, NSC  
Dimitri Zarechnak, Interpreter

Admiral *David S. MURPHY, Chief of Staff*  
USSR: *Richard Burt*

*Chief of Staff*  
*Regan*  
*Mr. Deaver*  
*Michael K.*  
*Richard Burt, Assistant Secretary of State*

Vladimir Shcherbitsky, Member of Soviet Politburo  
Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin  
Boris I. Stukalin, Department Head, Central Committee  
Aleksandr A. Bessmertnykh, Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
Oleg A. Krokhalev, Interpreter

IV. PRESS PLAN:

Photo opportunity.

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS:

3:00-3:10 - Photo opportunity - Oval Office  
3:10-3:40 - Discussion

Presentation of your views to Shcherbitsky, followed by his comment.

Attachments:

Tab A Talking Points & Bio

Prepared by:  
Jack F. Matlock

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

cc VP: Regan: Deaver: Sims



DECLASSIFIED

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WT

NARA DATE

11/21/07

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The President has seen \_\_\_\_\_ 32

SYSTEM II

90240

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 5, 1985

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE *RCM*

SUBJECT: Politburo Member Shcherbitsky's Visit to the U.S.

You will be meeting Thursday with Soviet Politburo Member Vladimir Shcherbitsky, who is in the U.S. this week as head of a Soviet "parliamentary" delegation. I will be forwarding suggested talking points shortly, but thought that you might want to have some information in advance regarding how this visit fits into the current state of U.S.-Soviet relations.

Background

The Soviets responded a few weeks ago to an invitation issued in Tip O'Neill's name by Tom Foley and Dick Cheney when they visited Moscow the summer of 1983. (You will recall that they briefed you on their trip following their return to Washington.) Therefore, the Soviets picked the time for the visit, and also decided that it would be, in Soviet terms, a high-level one by selecting a full Politburo member to head it.

The Soviet decision to send the delegation to the U.S. at this time was an important one. Several factors probably entered into this decision:

- (1) A desire to symbolize the intensification of contacts with the U.S., following the "freeze" of much of last year;
- (2) A desire to influence American public opinion, and especially Congress, as negotiations at Geneva are about to begin and as Congress debates our defense modernization program;
- (3) The felt need for a political "reconnaissance mission" at a high level and outside formal Foreign Ministry channels; and
- (4) Perhaps -- on the part of some Soviet officials -- a desire to expose one of their more provincial and reputedly hard-line Politburo members to realities in the United States.

The fact that this decision was made despite ongoing leadership uncertainty in Moscow is interesting in itself. Given

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Declassify: on OADR

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Chernenko's parlous health, full Politburo members, aside from Gromyko who must continue to function as Foreign Minister, might be expected to limit their foreign travel unless the question of succession has been decided in principle. I would consider the decision to send Shcherbitsky here for ten days as tending to corroborate reports that a decision has been made on the succession -- or that medical advice is that Chernenko is likely to hang on for at least a month or so.

### Discussion

Although one of the Soviet objectives is doubtless to influence Congress and our public opinion, I do not believe that this group will be notably effective on that score. Shcherbitsky has none of the charm and PR skill that Gorbachev used to such good advantage in the UK last December.

I believe that we can make best use of this visit by seeing to it that Shcherbitsky receives an accurate impression of our strength and resolve, and at the same time, of our desire to move decisively to reduce offensive nuclear weapons and to forge a better working relationship with the Soviets. The visits the Congressional hosts have planned for the delegation to California and Texas should do a lot to impress the provincial Shcherbitsky with our basic economic, social and political health. No Soviet official comes back from such exposure to the U.S. without being shaken by the palpable evidence of U.S. strength and well being.

This being the case, I believe that you should devote the thirty minutes you have available for your meeting with Shcherbitsky to driving home some of the points you made to Gromyko last September. Specifically, I believe you should concentrate on the following themes:

-- Your desire to move toward a radical reduction in offensive nuclear weapons;

-- Your determination to keep U.S. defenses adequate and specifically to continue present programs until there is a fair agreement to limit them;

-- The fallacy of the Soviet attack on SDI research, making plain that the current Soviet ploy will fail;



~~SECRET~~

34

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3

-- The reasons we are concerned with the Soviet military build-up and in particular with the problem posed by their prompt hard-target kill capability, which suggests a first-strike strategy; and

-- The necessity for improvements in the human rights situation if relations in general are to improve.

I will soon be sending you suggested talking points along these lines, but in the meantime you may wish to scan the CIA study "What to Expect from Shcherbitsky" at Tab A, and the biography of Shcherbitsky at Tab B.

Attachments:

- Tab A - "What to Expect from Shcherbitsky"
- Tab B - Biography of Shcherbitsky

Prepared by:  
Jack F. Matlock

cc: Vice President

SECRET/SENSITIVE

~~SECRET~~



MEMORANDUM

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90240  
ADD-ON

S 35  
JFM03

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

March 6, 1985

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *Jm*

SUBJECT: Meeting Memorandum for Shcherbitsky

Attached at Tab I and Tab A are the Meeting Memorandum and Talking Points for the President's meeting with Shcherbitsky.

Since there is no pre-brief, you might wish to discuss the meeting with the President at your 9:30 meeting tomorrow. Since it is important for Shcherbitsky to hear and carry back to Moscow the President's views on the key issues, I believe the President should present these views at the beginning of the meeting, as he did with Gromyko last September.

I have tried to keep the talking points as brief as possible, given the importance of the issues. Since these are all issues with which the President is thoroughly familiar, I hope this will present no problem. I have tried to cast them in a friendly and forthcoming tone, while keeping a firm attitude on substance and not shirking mention of problems.

The essential elements, I believe, are the following:

- Commitment to radical reductions of offensive weapons;
- Explanation of SDI position;
- Concern with Soviet military build-up;
- Mention of regional issues and human rights;
- Reference to wartime collaboration and Soviet sacrifices;
- Desire to solve problems on basis of equality.

*Wm*  
Bill Martin concurs.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you approve the Meeting Memorandum at Tab I and the Talking Points at Tab A.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments:

Tab I Meeting Memorandum  
Tab A Talking Points & Bio  
Tab II Clearance List

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Declassify: on OADR

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NLRR M266 #6955

BY KML NARA DATE 3/27/12



BY LOT, NARA, DATE 11/21/07

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SECRETMEETING WITH POLITBURO MEMBER SHCHERBITSKY

DATE: March 7, 1985

LOCATION: Oval Office

TIME: 3:00 P.M.

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

I. PURPOSE:

To explain your approach to U.S.-Soviet relations.

II. BACKGROUND:

Shcherbitsky is visiting the U.S. as head of a Soviet "parliamentary" delegation. His presence provides an opportunity to convey your position on key issues to the Soviet leadership.

III. PARTICIPANTS:

## United States:

The President  
Secretary Shultz  
Mr. McFarlane  
Jack F. Matlock, NSC  
Dimitri Zarechnak, Interpreter

## USSR:

Vladimir Shcherbitsky, Member of Soviet Politburo  
Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin  
Boris I. Stukalin, Department Head, Central Committee  
Aleksandr A. Bessmertnykh, Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
Oleg A. Krokhalev, InterpreterIV. PRESS PLAN:

Photo opportunity.

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS:3:00-3:10 - Photo opportunity - Oval Office  
3:10-3:40 - Discussion

Presentation of your views to Shcherbitsky, followed by his comment.

## Attachments:

Tab A Talking Points &amp; Bio

Prepared by:  
Jack F. MatlockSECRET

Declassify on OADR



DECLASSIFIED

NLS FD6-114/2 #6957

HQJ NARA DATE 11/21/67

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ADD-ON

31

TALKING POINTS

Introductory

-- Welcome you to Washington. Happy you will see California and Texas.

-- Convey my personal regards to Chairman Chernenko and to your other Politburo colleagues.

-- As I told Gromyko in September, we want to improve relations. It is particularly urgent to get the high levels of nuclear weapons down, and get on a course toward their complete elimination.

-- But this can only be done if we face the problems realistically and frankly.

-- Since our time is short, let me tell you how I view the situation. I hope you will let your colleagues on the Politburo know what I have in mind.

Geneva Negotiations

-- We both recognize that, even though our systems and political beliefs are different, we both have a vital interest in reducing the threat of nuclear war.



-- We are both committed to starting on a path of radical reduction of nuclear weapons. I take this commitment seriously, and hope you do too.

-- I am pleased that we will be starting new negotiations in Geneva next week.

-- Our negotiators will make every effort to reach an agreement for radical reductions in offensive weapons. If yours have comparable instructions, we should be able to make rapid progress.

SDI

-- Must say that I am concerned with the way Soviet media are casting suspicion on our approach to the Geneva talks.

-- In particular, we see an effort to distort our defensive research program and must wonder if you are trying to create a pretext to avoid implementing the goal of reducing offensive weapons.



-- Your country has devoted much more effort to defensive systems than we have. You have been conducting research for years in the same areas we are. Yours is the only country to deploy an ABM system.

-- It is natural, therefore, for us to conduct research in this area as well.

-- In fact, there are sound reasons for both of us to examine the future potential of defensive technologies. If we continue to rely on offensive weapons alone to provide strategic balance, we will find that new technologies will make that increasingly difficult.

-- There are also moral reasons for exploring the potential for defensive technologies. No leader should have to defend his country by threatening to destroy millions of innocent people.

-- As far as the U.S. is concerned, we have absolutely no aggressive intent toward the Soviet Union and do not aspire to superiority or to a first-strike capability.

-- There are, however, many aspects of Soviet strategic weaponry which suggest that you may wish to preserve that capability. If that is in fact the case, then agreement between us will of course be impossible.

-- Nevertheless, we are committed to adhere to the ABM Treaty. Our research effort is in full accord with it, and we are committed to consult with you if new forms of strategic defense become feasible.

-- We look forward to discussing these matters with you in Geneva. We are willing to take your concerns into account, but you must also be prepared to understand ours.

#### Other Issues

-- Arms control is not the only problem we face. We need to try to make progress across the board in improving the relationship.

-- Frankly, we believe that your policies in a number of critical regions are designed more to fuel conflict than to bring about the peaceful resolution of disputes.

-- For example, we are concerned that last year you doubled the amount of arms you shipped to Nicaragua over the 1983 level. And the war goes on in Afghanistan with great human suffering.

-- We must find ways to move toward a world where such disputes can be settled peacefully. That is why we have proposed holding regular consultations on world problems.



-- In our bilateral relations, much can be done to improve the relationship.

-- We would like to see expanding trade, increased contacts and a more healthy dialogue.

-- In this connection, I cannot stress too much how important humanitarian issues are to the American people.

-- We are a nation of immigrants, with people from all over the world, so naturally our people take an interest in what happens in the home countries of their ancestors.

-- We take our obligations under the Helsinki Final Act seriously and expect other signatories to do the same.

-- I am sure members of Congress have let you know how they feel on these issues. I feel the same.

-- I would hope that you would give careful consideration to these concerns. If we are to improve our relationship significantly, our citizens must be convinced that the Soviet government lives up to its commitments in this area, and in others as well.

Conclusion

-- Have explained some of our concerns with Soviet actions and policies since we must be frank with each other if we are to solve the problems.

-- At the same time, I want you to know that we are aware of the suffering wars have brought to your people in the past -- and of our successful cooperation in World War II in defeating a common enemy.

-- If our children and grandchildren are to live in peace, we must learn to stress our common interests and work toward solving these problems.

-- We are committed to solving as many problems as we can. Want to deal with your government realistically, as equals. Seek no advantage.

-- Please take this message back to your colleagues.

-- Hope your visit is a pleasant one, and that we will see more of your colleagues in the United States in the months to come.



MEETING WITH VLADIMIR SHCHERBITSKY

- WELCOME. PERSONAL REGARDS TO CHERNENKO.
- WANT TO IMPROVE RELATIONS AND GET THE HIGH LEVELS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS DOWN.
- NEED TO FACE PROBLEMS REALISTICALLY AND FRANKLY.
- WE BOTH HAVE VITAL INTEREST IN REDUCING THREAT OF NUCLEAR WAR.
- I TAKE THIS COMMITMENT TO REDUCE NUCLEAR WEAPONS SERIOUSLY, AND HOPE YOU DO TOO.

2

- PLEASED THAT WE WILL BE STARTING NEW NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA NEXT WEEK.
- OUR NEGOTIATORS WILL MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO REACH AGREEMENT. IF YOURS MAKE SAME EFFORT, WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO MAKE RAPID PROGRESS.
- CONCERNED WITH WAY SOVIET MEDIA ARE CASTING SUSPICION ON OUR APPROACH TO GENEVA.
- IN PARTICULAR, WE SEE EFFORT TO DISTORT OUR DEFENSIVE RESEARCH PROGRAM AND MUST WONDER IF YOU ARE TRYING TO CREATE A PRETEXT TO AVOID IMPLEMENTING THE GOAL OF REDUCING OFFENSIVE WEAPONS.

3

- YOU DEVOTE MORE EFFORT TO DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS THAN WE. YOU HAVE BEEN CONDUCTING RESEARCH FOR YEARS IN THE SAME AREAS. YOURS IS THE ONLY COUNTRY TO DEPLOY AN ABM SYSTEM.
- NATURAL FOR US TO CONDUCT RESEARCH IN THIS AREA AS WELL.
- SOUND REASONS FOR BOTH OF US TO EXAMINE FUTURE POTENTIAL OF DEFENSIVE TECHNOLOGIES. NEW OFFENSIVE TECHNOLOGIES WILL MAKE DETERRENCE INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT IN FUTURE.
- ALSO MORAL REASONS: NO LEADER SHOULD HAVE TO DEFEND HIS COUNTRY BY THREATENING TO DESTROY INNOCENT PEOPLE.

DECLASSIFIED  
 NLS F06-114/2-6958  
 10J NARA DATE 11/21/07



4

-- U.S. HAS ABSOLUTELY NO AGGRESSIVE INTENT TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION AND DOES NOT ASPIRE TO SUPERIORITY OR TO FIRST-STRIKE CAPABILITY. 44

-- MANY ASPECTS OF SOVIET STRATEGIC WEAPONRY SUGGEST THAT YOU MAY WISH TO PRESERVE THAT CAPABILITY. IF THAT IS IN FACT THE CASE, THEN AGREEMENT BETWEEN US WILL BE IMPOSSIBLE.

-- U.S. IS COMMITTED TO ADHERE TO THE ABM TREATY AND TO CONSULT WITH YOU IF NEW FORMS OF STRATEGIC DEFENSE BECOME FEASIBLE.

-- WILLING TO TAKE YOUR CONCERNS INTO ACCOUNT AT GENEVA, BUT YOU MUST ALSO BE PREPARED TO UNDERSTAND OURS.

5

-- ARMS CONTROL IS NOT OUR ONLY PROBLEM. NEED FOR PROGRESS ACROSS THE BOARD.

-- BELIEVE SOVIET POLICIES IN CRITICAL REGIONS ARE DESIGNED MORE TO FUEL CONFLICT THAN TO BRING PEACE.

-- CONCERNED THAT LAST YEAR SOVIET UNION DOUBLED THE AMOUNT OF ARMS SHIPPED TO NICARAGUA OVER THE 1983 LEVEL. WAR GOES ON IN AFGHANISTAN WITH GREAT HUMAN SUFFERING.

-- MUST FIND WAYS TO MOVE TOWARD PEACEFUL SETTLEMENTS. WE HAVE PROPOSED REGULAR CONSULTATIONS.

6

-- IN BILATERAL RELATIONS, MUCH CAN BE DONE TO IMPROVE RELATIONSHIP.

-- WOULD LIKE TO EXPAND TRADE, INCREASE CONTACTS AND ESTABLISH MORE HEALTHY DIALOGUE.

-- IMPORTANCE OF HUMANITARIAN ISSUES.

-- WE ARE NATION OF IMMIGRANTS AND OUR PEOPLE TAKE AN INTEREST IN WHAT HAPPENS IN HOME COUNTRIES OF THEIR ANCESTORS.

-- WE TAKE OUR OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT SERIOUSLY. EXPECT OTHER SIGNATORIES TO DO SAME.



45

7

-- SURE MEMBERS OF CONGRESS HAVE LET YOU KNOW HOW THEY FEEL. I FEEL THE SAME.

-- HOPE THAT YOU WILL GIVE CAREFUL CONSIDERATION TO THESE CONCERNS. IF WE ARE TO IMPROVE OUR RELATIONSHIP, AMERICANS MUST BE CONVINCED THAT SOVIET GOVERNMENT LIVES UP TO ITS COMMITMENTS.

-- HAVE EXPLAINED SOME OF OUR CONCERNS SINCE WE MUST BE FRANK IF WE ARE TO SOLVE PROBLEMS.

-- AT SAME TIME, WE ARE AWARE OF SUFFERING WARS HAVE BROUGHT TO SOVIET PROPLE IN THE PAST -- AND ARE PROUD OF OUR SUCCESSFUL COOPERATION IN WORLD WAR II.

8

-- IF OUR CHILDREN AND GRANDCHILDREN ARE TO LIVE IN PEACE, WE MUST LEARN TO STRESS COMMON INTEREST AND WORK TOWARD SOLVING PROBLEMS.

-- U.S. IS COMMITTED TO SOLVING AS MANY PROBLEMS AS WE CAN. WANT TO DEAL WITH SOVIET GOVERNMENT REALISTICALLY, AS EQUALS. SEEK NO ADVANTAGE.

-- PLEASE TAKE THIS MESSAGE BACK TO YOUR COLLEAGUES.



REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENTS

47

To: Officer-in-charge  
Appointments Center  
Room 060, OEOB

Please admit the following appointments on March 7, 1985

for THE PRESIDENT of \_\_\_\_\_:  
(NAME OF PERSON TO BE VISITED) (AGENCY)

U.S.  
The President  
Secretary Shultz  
Robert C. McFarlane  
Jack F. Matlock  
Dimitri Zarechnak, Interpreter  
*Richard Burt*  
USSR

Vladimir Shcherbitsky, Member of Soviet Politburo  
Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin  
Boris I. Stukalin, Department Head, Central Committee  
Aleksandr A. Bessmertnykh, Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
Oleg A. Krokhalev, Interpreter

MEETING LOCATION

Building West Wing Requested by Jack F. Matlock/Stella Brackm  
Room No. Oval Office/Cab.Rm. Room No. 368 Telephone 395-5112  
Time of Meeting 3:00 Date of request March 6, 1985

Additions and/or changes made by telephone should be limited to three (3) names or less.

APPOINTMENTS CENTER: SIG/OEOB - 395-6046 or WHITE HOUSE - 456-6742



JM-C 48

1821

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

UNCLASSIFIED

March 6, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JF*

SUBJECT: Kettering Invitation

I would put it in the "nice to do," but not essential category.

It would, however, be useful to have at least one NSC staffer present.

Steve *SFS* Sestanovich, Constantine *not available* Menges and Oliver *OL* North concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you appoint a member from the NSC staff to attend.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments:

Tab A Letter from Kettering Foundation

444 North Capitol Street, N.W.  
Suite 408  
Washington, D. C. 20001  
202-393-4478

5335 Far Hills Avenue  
Suite 300  
Dayton, Ohio 45429  
513-434-7300

6 East 39th Street  
(9th Floor)  
New York, NY 10016  
212-686-7016

1821

49

*Kettering*  
Foundation

March 1, 1985

Mr. Robert M. Kimmitt  
General Counsel and Director of Legislative  
Affairs and Security Assistance  
17th & Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.  
OEOB, Room 372  
Washington, D.C. 20506

Dear Mr. Kimmitt:

The Dartmouth Conference Task Force on Regional Conflict Management has been invited to Moscow in April for discussions on Central America and the Caribbean. The American participants include William D. Rogers, Susan Purcell, Harold Saunders, Robert Leiken and Philip Stewart.

Prior to the trip, we are holding a discussion with a few interested and knowledgeable colleagues on topics related to this upcoming Soviet trip. We would be most pleased if you would join us.

We will meet on Wednesday, March 13, 1985 at 11:30 A.M. and will break promptly at 2:30 P.M. Discussion will continue through a working lunch which we will provide. The meeting will take place at the Washington Office of the Kettering Foundation, Suite 408, Hall of States Building, 444 No. Capitol Street, N.W. If you will be able to join us, please confirm with Shelly Weinstein, the Director of the Washington Office. She can be reached at 202/393-4478.

We would like to have prospectuses on such questions as: 1) the main trends in and around Nicaragua and El Salvador; 2) significant directions in Cuba's role in the region and relation to the Soviet Union; 3) the impact of events in Central America on the broader US-Soviet relationship; 4) aspects of the Central and Latin American debt crises that might be productively discussed with Soviet colleagues.

We plan a follow-up seminar after the Moscow meeting and hope that you will be able to join us for both of these discussions.

Sincerely yours,

*Phil Stewart*      *Hal Saunders*  
Phil Stewart <sup>mm</sup>      Hal Saunders <sup>mm</sup>



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50  
chew

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

March 6, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: STEVEN E. STEINER *Steve*

SUBJECT: Presidential Sendoff for Geneva Negotiators,  
March 8, 10:00 a.m., Oval Office and Rose  
Garden

At Tab I for your approval is the meeting memorandum for the President's sendoff for Ambassadors Kampelman, Tower and Glitman. We have set this up as a ten-minute private meeting in the Oval Office with the three Ambassadors, followed by remarks to the press in the Rose Garden (Roosevelt Room in case of rain).

The proposed Presidential remarks are at Tab II. We received Mark Palmer's contribution and worked with Speechwriters and NSC Staffers to develop this agreed text. Once you have approved, the final will be submitted to the President through the Speechwriters' channel.

*SES* { Bob Linhard, Sven Kraemer, Walt Raymond, Bob Sims and Karna Small concur.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1) That you sign the memorandum at Tab I to the President.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

2) That you approve the text at Tab II so that I can convey final NSC concurrence to Speechwriters.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments

- Tab I Memo to the President
- Tab II Proposed Presidential Remarks

## THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEETING WITH SENIOR GENEVA NEGOTIATORS

DATE: March 8, 1985

LOCATION: Oval Office and Rose Garden

TIME: 10:00 a.m. - 10:15 a.m.

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

I. PURPOSE

To give a sendoff to our negotiators and to reiterate your commitment to try to achieve progress in the new U.S.-Soviet negotiations.

II. BACKGROUND

Ambassadors Kampelman, Tower and Glitman leave for Europe later the same day, first to brief NATO on March 11 and then to begin the new talks with the Soviets in Geneva on March 12. Your private meeting will allow you to put a final touch on your instructions to them. Your remarks in the Rose Garden following the meeting will provide an excellent opportunity to put your own public spin on our negotiating objectives by giving them a high moral cast. (I will follow up by providing some more specifics at my press briefing Friday afternoon.)

III. PARTICIPANTS

Robert C. McFarlane, Ambassadors Kampelman, Tower and Glitman.

IV. PRESS PLAN

Oval Office meeting is private. Full press coverage of Rose Garden remarks.

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

Our three senior negotiators, along with Secretaries Shultz and Weinberger, will take part in your Congressional breakfast, following which you will escort them to the Oval Office for a 10-minute, private meeting. The three negotiators will then join you at the podium in the Rose Garden, where you will give brief remarks to the press. Our full delegation will be gathered in the Rose Garden. (In case of inclement weather, remarks will be given in the Roosevelt Room.) Proposed remarks will be provided separately.

Prepared by:  
Steven E. Steiner



(State/NSC)  
March 6, 1985  
7:00 p.m.

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PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT: SEND-OFF FOR U.S. NEGOTIATORS  
FRIDAY, MARCH 8, 1985

The challenge of statesmanship is to have the vision to dream of a better, safer world and the courage, persistence and patience to turn that dream into reality. Since the dawn of the nuclear era, each generation has lived with the reality of nuclear weapons and the fear of nuclear devastation. We face a moral imperative -- we cannot allow our children and their children to grow up with the fear of nuclear war.

Today we reaffirm a new vision -- of a world striving toward the elimination of nuclear weapons, of a world in which technology provides ever greater safety, rather than ever greater fear. Today we set out on a new path -- toward agreements which radically reduce the size and destructive power of existing nuclear arsenals.

Soviet leader Konstantin Chernenko said last month: "Our ultimate objective here is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons everywhere on this planet, the complete removal of the threat of nuclear war." I welcome that statement and assure Mr. Chernenko that the elimination of nuclear weapons is also the ultimate objective of the American Government and the American people.

It is now our task and responsibility to take practical steps to turn this vision into reality. We should have no illusions that this will be easy. Any venture of this magnitude will take time. Since the most vital security interests of both

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sides are at stake, this will clearly be long and difficult. And we are realistic, because we know that our differences with the Soviet Union are great. Patience, strength, and Western unity will therefore be required if we are to have a successful outcome.

Next week, the United States and the Soviet Union meet in Geneva to begin a new dialogue on these vital issues. For our part, the United States is ready -- with firmness, patience, and understanding -- to negotiate fair and equitable agreements reducing the dangers of nuclear war and enhancing strategic stability. And, above all, we seek agreement as soon as possible on real and verifiable reductions in American and Soviet offensive nuclear arms.

I have just concluded a very good meeting with our three negotiators -- Ambassadors Max M. Kampelman, John Tower, and Mike Glitman -- which culminates an intensive round of preparations. In the meeting, I gave my instructions for the first round of the talks. These instructions enable our negotiators to explore every promising avenue for progress. The negotiators have my strongest personal support. Like Americans everywhere, I want these negotiations to succeed. I will do everything I can to ensure that this happens, and I pray that the Soviet leadership is prepared to make the same commitment.

I want to thank our team for the fine work you have already done in getting ready for this endeavor. And, as you prepare to leave for Geneva, I cannot think of a more welcome message than



an unmistakable vote of confidence from the American people and the Congress.

Ambassadors Kampelman, Tower, and Glitman, and all the members of our negotiating team, I know that all of our fellow Americans wish you every success. And I know from my conversations with the bipartisan leadership of the Congress that the Congress of the United States joins in supporting you.

So, to all of you -- those who will be in Geneva, and those who will be supporting this crucial effort from Washington -- best wishes and God bless you.