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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 4/4/2005

File Folder MATLOCK CHRON MARCH 1985 (1/4)

FOIA

F06-114/2

Box Number 8

YARHI-MILO

806

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
6930	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE SHCHERBITSKIY VISIT	3	3/1/1985	B1
6931	MEMO	MCFARLANE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE SHCHERBITSKIY VISIT <i>R 6/22/2011 M266/1</i>	3	ND	B1
6932	MEMO	WHAT TO EXPECT FROM SHCHERBITSKIY <i>D 5/26/2011 F2006-114/2</i>	3	2/20/1985	B1 B3 B6
6935	REPORT	REPORT <i>PAR 5/26/2011 F2006-114/2</i>	2	2/12/1985	B1 B3 B6
6936	REPORT	REPORT <i>D 5/26/2011 F2006-114/2</i>	3	2/26/1985	B1 B3 B6
6937	REPORT	REPORT <i>D 5/26/2011 F2006-114/2</i>	1	2/26/1985	B1 B3 B6
6938	REPORT	REPORT <i>D 5/26/2011 F2006-114/2</i>	1	2/26/1985	B1 B3 B6
6939	REPORT	REPORT <i>R 5/26/2011 F2006-114/2</i>	1	2/26/1985	B1
6940	REPORT	REPORT <i>R 5/26/2011 F2006-114/2</i>	1	2/26/1985	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
6941	REPORT	REPORT <i>R</i> 5/26/2011 F2006-114/2	1	2/26/1985	B1
6942	REPORT	REPORT <i>D</i> 5/26/2011 F2006-114/2	1	2/26/1985	B1 B3 B6
6943	REPORT	REPORT <i>D</i> 5/26/2011 F2006-114/2	1	2/26/1985	B1 B3 B6
6944	REPORT	REPORT <i>D</i> 5/26/2011 F2006-114/2	1	ND	B1 B3 B6
6945	REPORT	REPORT <i>D</i> 5/26/2011 F2006-114/2	1	2/26/1985	B1 B3 B6
6946	REPORT	REPORT <i>D</i> 5/26/2011 F2006-114/2	1	2/26/1985	B1 B3 B6
6947	REPORT	REPORT <i>D</i> 5/26/2011 F2006-114/2	1	2/26/1985	B1 B3 B6
6948	REPORT	REPORT <i>D</i> 5/26/2011 F2006-114/2	1	2/26/1985	B1 B3 B6
6949	REPORT	REPORT <i>D</i> 5/26/2011 F2006-114/2	1	2/26/1985	B1 B3 B6
6933	MEMCON	FIRST SHULTZ-GROMYKO MEETING <i>R</i> 11/21/2007 F06-114/2	16	1/7/1985	B1

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
6934	MEMCON	SECOND SHULTZ-GROMYKO MEETING <i>R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2</i>	14	1/7/1985	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SECRET/SENSITIVE

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

SUBJECT: Politburo Member Shcherbitsky's Visit to the U.S.

You will be meeting Thursday with Soviet Politburo Member Vladimir Shcherbitsky, who is in the U.S. this week as head of a Soviet "parliamentary" delegation. I will be forwarding suggested talking points shortly, but thought that you might want to have some information in advance regarding how this visit fits into the current state of U.S.-Soviet relations.

Background

The Soviets responded a few weeks ago to an invitation issued in Tip O'Neill's name by Tom Foley and Dick Cheney when they visited Moscow the summer of 1983. (You will recall that they briefed you on their trip following their return to Washington.) Therefore, the Soviets picked the time for the visit, and also decided that it would be, in Soviet terms, a high-level one by selecting a full Politburo member to head it.

The Soviet decision to send the delegation to the U.S. at this time was an important one. Several factors probably entered into this decision:

(1) A desire to symbolize the intensification of contacts with the U.S., following the "freeze" of much of last year;

(2) A desire to influence American public opinion, and especially Congress, as negotiations at Geneva are about to begin and as Congress debates our defense modernization program;

(3) The felt need for a political "reconnaissance mission" at a high level and outside formal Foreign Ministry channels; and

(4) Perhaps -- on the part of some Soviet officials -- a desire to expose one of their more provincial and reputedly hard-line Politburo members to realities in the United States.

The fact that this decision was made despite ongoing leadership uncertainty in Moscow is interesting in itself. Given

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BY RW NARA DATE 6/22/11

Chernenko's parlous health, full Politburo members, aside from Gromyko who must continue to function as Foreign Minister, might be expected to limit their foreign travel unless the question of succession has been decided in principle. I would consider the decision to send Shcherbitsky here for ten days as tending to corroborate reports that a decision has been made on the succession -- or that medical advice is that Chernenko is likely to hang on for at least a month or so.

Discussion

Although one of the Soviet objectives is doubtless to influence Congress and our public opinion, I do not believe that this group will be notably effective on that score. Shcherbitsky has none of the charm and PR skill that Gorbachev used to such good advantage in the UK last December.

I believe that we can make best use of this visit by seeing to it that Shcherbitsky receives an accurate impression of our strength and resolve, and at the same time, of our desire to move decisively to reduce offensive nuclear weapons and to forge a better working relationship with the Soviets. The visits the Congressional hosts have planned for the delegation to California and Texas should do a lot to impress the provincial Shcherbitsky with our basic economic, social and political health. No Soviet official comes back from such exposure to the U.S. without being shaken by the palpable evidence of U.S. strength and well being.

This being the case, I believe that you should devote the thirty minutes you have available for your meeting with Shcherbitsky to driving home some of the points you made to Gromyko last September. Specifically, I believe you should concentrate on the following themes:

-- Your desire to move toward a radical reduction in offensive nuclear weapons;

-- Your determination to keep U.S. defenses adequate and specifically to continue present programs until there is a fair agreement to limit them;

-- The fallacy of the Soviet attack on SDI research, making plain that the current Soviet ploy will fail;

-- The reasons we are concerned with the Soviet military build-up and in particular with the problem posed by their prompt hard-target kill capability, which suggests a first-strike strategy; and

-- The necessity for improvements in the human rights situation if relations in general are to improve.

I will soon be sending you suggested talking points along these lines, but in the meantime you may wish to scan the CIA study "What to Expect from Shcherbitsky" at Tab A, and the biography of Shcherbitsky at Tab B.

Attachments:

- Tab A - "What to Expect from Shcherbitsky"
- Tab B - Biography of Shcherbitsky

Prepared by:
Jack F. Matlock

cc: Vice President





18-1
FOIA(b)(1)(3)(6)

Vladimir Vasil'yevich SHCHERBITSKIY
(Phonetic: shchairBEETSkee)

USSR

*First Secretary, Central Committee,
Communist Party of the Ukraine;
Member, Politburo, Central Committee,
Communist Party of the Soviet Union*

*Addressed as:
Mr. Shcherbitskiy*




© (1977)


Vladimir Shcherbitskiy has been a full member of the CPSU Politburo since April 1971 and first secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party since May 1972. He is currently one of only two full Politburo members based outside of Moscow, sharing that distinction with the first secretary of the USSR's largest non-Russian republic, Kazakhstan. Shcherbitskiy's presence on the Politburo reflects the Ukraine's status as one of the most populous and economically important of the 14 non-Russian republics. Popularly known as the breadbasket of the Soviet Union, it produces one-fifth of the nation's grain and one-fourth of its meat and milk; it is also second in total exports after the Russian Republic.



Shcherbitskiy's rise to his current position in the party and government is primarily due to his close ties to the late CPSU General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev—the two had earlier career connections in the Dnepropetrovsk region of the Ukraine.




in the mid-1970s, he was often mentioned as a possible successor to Brezhnev as General Secretary. Such speculation almost entirely disappeared during Brezhnev's waning years, however, and, in our view, the continued failure of Shcherbitskiy to be moved to a national-level position in Moscow has kept him from the innermost circles of Kremlin power.



A Conservative Hardliner

Shcherbitskiy, who will be 67 on 17 February, can be viewed as an important swing man between the generally recognized "old guard" and the younger generation in the current Politburo lineup. Six of the other full members are in their seventies, and the remaining four are 62 or younger. We believe that on most issues Shcherbitskiy identifies most closely with his elder colleagues. He has a reputation among observers as a conservative hardliner in both his domestic and foreign policy positions. Two of the principal themes in his speeches and articles are national defense and party discipline. During his tenure in the Ukraine, he has consistently called for greater party discipline and control, especially among young people. He has favored the repression of both dissent and Ukrainian nationalism. In the economic sphere, he is firmly against structural economic reforms such as those recently instituted by the Chinese. Shcherbitskiy agrees that greater emphasis on party discipline will overcome any and all socioeconomic problems. His view that the party must strictly manage and control the introduction of new technology into society was published in his 1983 book *Scientific-Technical Progress—a Party Concern*.



Shcherbitskiy's foreign policy stance toward both Eastern Europe and the West is no less doctrinaire. His public statements indicate that he supported the crushing of Czech



IV

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[REDACTED]

reform in 1968 and took a rigid line on Polish reform (he was the first Soviet leader to endorse martial law). He has frequently called for more ideological vigilance, Bloc cohesion, and adherence to the Soviet model. [REDACTED]

In his recent speeches commemorating the 40th anniversary of Ukrainian liberation from Nazi Germany, Shcherbitskiy has spoken out strongly against the United States, labeling it as the "source of the growth of international tension" and accusing Washington of seeking to dominate the world and of pursuing a policy of "state terrorism." He has also accused the US leadership of starting preparations for nuclear war. Shcherbitskiy has gone out of his way several times to criticize the United States and stress the priority of defense for both the USSR and the Warsaw Pact. [REDACTED]

Rare Contact With Westerners

While he has traveled frequently to Soviet Bloc countries and often been host to visiting Bloc officials in Kiev, Shcherbitskiy has had little personal exposure to Western officials. In 1967 he accompanied then Premier Aleksey Kosygin to the United States for the UN Special Session following the Arab-Israeli war and for Kosygin's Glassboro, New Jersey, summit meeting with President Lyndon Johnson. (The Soviets also visited Niagara Falls during that trip.) Since becoming Ukrainian party chief, however, Shcherbitskiy is not known to have had any substantive meetings with US diplomats or government officials. [REDACTED]

Early Life and Career

Shcherbitskiy was born into a blue collar family in the Dnepropetrovsk area. He graduated from the Dnepropetrovsk Chemical Engineering Institute in 1941 and promptly joined the Communist Party. Within months, he joined the Red Army, with which he served for five years as an officer on the Caucasian front. After the war, he returned to the Dnepropetrovsk region and advanced through the ranks of the party apparatus. He became Chairman of the Ukrainian Council of Ministers (the top government post) in 1961 and a candidate member of the CPSU Politburo (then called the Presidium) shortly thereafter. Shcherbitskiy's fortunes declined in 1963 when then CPSU First Secretary Nikita Khrushchev appointed a protege to head the Ukrainian Communist Party. Not long afterward, Shcherbitskiy was removed from the Politburo and the chairmanship of the Ukrainian Council of Ministers and sent back to a former job as first secretary of the Dnepropetrovsk Oblast Party Committee. After Brezhnev replaced Khrushchev, however, he restored Shcherbitskiy to his pre-1963 positions on the CPSU Politburo (1964) and in the Ukraine (1965). Brezhnev's elevation of Shcherbitskiy to the post of Ukrainian party chief in 1972 was part of a [REDACTED] policy struggle on both the republic and national levels. Shcherbitskiy has been a deputy to the USSR Supreme Soviet (legislature) since 1958. [REDACTED]

Personal Data

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] An avid soccer fan, he sometimes juggles his schedule to see a game. He is not known to speak any languages other than Russian and Ukrainian. Shcherbitskiy is married and has a grown son. [REDACTED]

12 February 1985

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Aleksandr Antonovich ZAKHARENKO
(Phonetic: zaHARenkuh)

USSR

*Principal, Sakhnov Secondary
School, Korsun-Shevchenkovskiy
District, Ukrainian SSR
(since at least 1976)*

*Addressed as:
Mr. Zakharenko*

Aleksandr Zakharenko was elected a deputy to the USSR Supreme Soviet in 1984. He serves on the Council of the Union in the Supreme Soviet and is a member of the Council's Planning and Budget Committee. Zakharenko was a delegate to the 25th (1976) and 26th (1981) Congresses of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. He participated in a session of the Commission for the Reform of the General Educational and Vocational School, held in early February 1985. The commission was chaired by Politburo member Mikhail Gorbachev. Zakharenko is 48 years old.

CR M 85-11064
26 February 1985

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BY RW NARA DATE 5/26/11


22

Vladimir Vasil'yevich KARPOV
(Phonetic: KARpuf)

USSR

Editor in Chief,
Novyy Mir
(since 1981)

Addressed as:
Mr. Karpov



©

Vladimir Karpov is a decorated former military officer turned journalist. The publication he edits, *Novyy Mir (New World)*, is a monthly literary and sociopolitical journal published in Moscow by the USSR Writers' Union. Karpov has been a secretary on the board of the Writers' Union since 1981. He was elected a deputy to the USSR Supreme Soviet in 1984.

As a teenager Karpov attended a military infantry school in Tashkent, in the Uzbek Republic. After World War II he studied at the elite Frunze Military Academy in Moscow and then spent six years with the General Staff of the Defense Ministry. During that period he attended evening classes at the Gor'kiy Institute of Literature in Moscow and began writing war novels, short stories, and essays. After he switched to a full-time writing career, he spent some time in the army reserves, where he attained the rank of colonel. Karpov worked for the Uzbek State Committee for Publishing from 1966 until 1972. During 1974-77 he served as editor in chief of the journal *Oktyabr*. He joined *Novyy Mir* as a first deputy editor in 1979.

Karpov, 62, holds the title Hero of the Soviet Union—the country's highest military honor—presumably for his service during World War II. He won a national literary prize for his partly autobiographical novel *Capture Them Alive*. He visited the United States in 1977 as a tourist with a group of writers. He has also been a member of official journalistic delegations to Israel and Afghanistan, both in 1980.

CR M 85-11073
26 February 1985

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NLRR F06-114/2#694D
BY RW NARA DATE 5/26/11

23

Sergey Vladimirovich KORENKO
(Phonetic: kahRENko)

USSR

Deputy, USSR Supreme Soviet
(since March 1984)

Addressed as:
Mr. Korenko

Within the USSR Supreme Soviet, Sergey Korenko serves on the Council of the Union. He is secretary of the Council's Industrial Commission. In addition to holding his elected position, Korenko works full-time as a miner in Soligorsk, Belorussia. He is a brigade leader at the Belorussian Mining Enterprise, where one of the world's largest known potash deposits is located. In 1974 he was a member of a group nominated for a Belorussian State Prize for developing and introducing advanced mining technology for potassium extraction.

Korenko is 41 years old.

CR M 85-11065
26 February 1985

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NLRR F06-114/2#6941
BY RW NARA DATE 5/26/11



TENTATIVE PROGRAM FOR
VLADIMIR SHCHERBITSKIY

Sunday, March 3:

- 3:20 p.m. Special Aeroflot flight arrives at Andrews AFB; delegation met by Congressmen Foley and Cheney Counselor Derwinski and Protocol
- 3:30 p.m. Proceed to Madison Hotel (Shcherbitskiy to Embassy)
- 7:00 p.m. Informal Welcome Buffet Supper at Madison to be Hosted by Congressmen Foley and Cheney

Monday, March 4:

- 10 - 12 a.m. Meeting with House Foreign Affairs Committee Room 2168 Rayburn House Office Building
- 12:30 p.m. Luncheon hosted by House Foreign Affairs Committee Room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building
- p.m. Free
- 5-7:00 p.m. Reception in Capitol (Statuary Hall) Hosted by Congressman Foley and Host Committee
- 7:30 p.m. Philadelphia Symphony at Kennedy Center (Matlock to Host for White House Box)
- 9:00 p.m. Post concert dinner at Kennedy Center

Tuesday, March 5:

- 10-12:00 p.m. Meeting with Host Committee
Location to be Determined
Agenda to follow 1983 visit to Soviet Union:
Defense/Arms Control, Human Rights, Regional
Issues, Economics/Trade
- 1::00 Luncheon Hosted by Senate Leadership
Senator Dole and nine official members in S-128
Secretary of the Senate for rest of delegation in
S-205
- 2:30 p.m. Tour of Capitol
- 3:00 p.m. Coffee with SFRC?
- 5:00 - 6:30 Reception hosted by Senate leadership.
- 6:30 p.m. Depart for Hockey Game at Capitol Center
(Washington Caps-New Jersey Devils)
Buffet Supper at Capitol Center

Wednesday, March 6:

- 10-12:00 a.m. Substantive Discussion with Host Committee
Location to be Determined
- 1:00 p.m. Luncheon hosted by the Speaker of the House
And Host Delegation
Cannon Caucus Room
- p.m. Press Conference?
- p.m. Free
- 7:30 Reception and Dinner at Smithsonian Castle Hosted
by Kennan Institute

Thursday, March 7:

- 12:30 p.m. Luncheon hosted by Secretary of State in Madison
Room
- Meeting with the President?
- 5-7:00 p.m. Reception Hosted by Soviet Embassy
- 7:30 p.m. Home Dinners for Delegation Members Hosted by
3 or 4 different Members of Congress; Foley to
host Shcherbitskiy

Friday, March 8:

- 9:30 a.m. Depart for Texas via Air Force planes
- 11:45 a.m. Arrive in Mueller Airport, Austin;
- 12:30 p.m. Luncheon, Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, campus
of the University of Texas at Austin
- 2:30 p.m. Meeting with Governor MARK White for Principals
and Member of Congress, tour of Capitol for
remainder of party
- 3:30 p.m. Depart Mueller Airport
- 4:10 p.m. Arrive Dallas Love Field

- 5:00 p.m. Tour modern Frito-Lay fast food processing plant
- 6:30 p.m. Arrive at Hotel Mandalay-Four Seasons
- 7:00 p.m. Reception at Hotel
- 8:00 p.m. Dinner at Hotel with Dallas business, financial and social leaders

Saturday, March 9:

- 8:00 a.m. Breakfast with business and political leaders at home of Richard Fisher of Brown Brothers Harriman, Vice President of the Greater Dallas Chamber of Commerce
- 10:30 a.m. Visit to Nieman Marcus hosted by Stanley Marcus
- 11:30 a.m. Visit to Western Wear Fashion Center
- 1:00 p.m. Barbeque, Las Colinas Equestrian Center - 125 business leaders in Dallas-Ft. Worth Area
- 3:30 p.m. Tour of R.E.I. Inc., producer of optical scanners
- 4:00 p.m. Return to Hotel, free time
- 5:00 p.m. Depart Hotel for Ft. Worth
- 5:45 p.m. Tour of Amon Carter Museum of Western Art in Ft. Worth arranged by Majority Leader Wright
- 6:30 p.m. Tour Omni Theater, view film - arranged by Majority Leader Wright
- 7:30 p.m. Dinner
- 9:30 p.m. Visit to Billy Bob's Texas

Sunday, March 10:

- 9:00 a.m. Depart Hotel for Dallas Love Field
- 10:00 a.m. Depart Dallas for San Francisco
- 11:00 a.m. Arrive San Francisco International Airport
- 11:30 a.m. Sightseeing Tour of City, including Berkeley University

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- 4:30 p.m. Delegation to Fairmont Hotel, Shcherbitskiy to stay with Consulate
- 7:00 p.m. Dinner with local business and political figures at Bank of America

Monday, March 11:

- 8:00 a.m. Light Breakfast at Hotel
- 9:15 a.m. Meeting with Mayor Diane Feinstein
- 10:30 a.m. Tour of Varian Associates
(Manufactures medical equipment used in treating cancer)
- 1:30 p.m. Tour of FMC Inc. (Manufactures farm equipment)
- 4:00 p.m. Depart Moffit Air Force Base for New York
To be Arranged by Rep. Burton: Visit to GM-Toyota Assembly plant and to University of California at Berkeley under consideration
- 4:00 p.m. Depart San Francisco for New York
- 11:50 p.m. Arrive New York, La Guardia Airport, Proceed to Hotel Inter-Continental (Shcherbitskiy to stay with SMUN)

Tuesday, March 12:

- Free for shopping, call on U.N. Secretary General, to be arranged by Soviets (Note: Congressman Thomas Downey may arrange for a visit to his district)

Wednesday, March 13

- a.m. Free, to be arranged by Soviets
- 7:00 p.m. Depart JFK for Moscow via Special Aeroflot flight (Currently there are no plans for a Congressional host to see plane off at departure, although Downey or other New York Congressman may do so.)

Drafted:EUR/SOV/SOBI:SLysyshyn
Wang No. 0681n

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SYSTEM II
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~~AA Attack~~
Chron

March 4, 1985

UNCLASSIFIED WITH
SECRET/SENSITIVE ATTACHMENTS

MEMORANDUM FOR NICHOLAS PLATT
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Records of Shultz-Gromyko Meetings in Geneva,
January 7-8, 1985

Attached are corrected memoranda of conversation covering Secretary Shultz's meetings with Foreign Minister Gromyko in Geneva January 7-8. Earlier drafts should be withdrawn.

Robert M. Kimmitt
Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary

Attachments:

- Tab A - First Shultz-Gromyko Meeting
- Tab B - Second Shultz -Gromyko Meeting
- Tab C - Third Shultz-Gromyko Meeting
- Tab D - Fourth Shultz-Gromyko Meeting

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SECRET/SENSITIVE ATTACHMENTS

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

2/1/85

FIRST SHULTZ-GROMYKO MEETING
Geneva, January, 1985

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

- U.S. Secretary of State George P. Shultz
Robert C. McFarlane, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Ambassador Paul Nitze
Ambassador Arthur Hartman
Jack F. Matlock, Special Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs
Dimitri Arensburger, Interpreter
- USSR Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko
Georgy M. Korniyenko, First Deputy Foreign
Minister
Ambassador Viktor Karpov
Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin
Alexei Obukhov, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Viktor Sukhodrev, Interpreter

DATE, TIME January 7, 1985; 9:40 A.M. to 1:00 P.M.
AND PLACE: Soviet Mission, Geneva, Switzerland

Gromyko opened the meeting with the observation that he and the Secretary were well aware of the problems which require discussion, and that it was not clear whether time would remain toward the end of the discussions to touch on other questions. Accordingly, he proposed that they proceed to the business at hand with a presentation by each side of the way, in principle, the problem should be addressed. These presentations, which need not be long statements, could be followed by a give-and-take discussion to get at the heart of the matter. Would such a working approach be acceptable to the Secretary?

Secretary Shultz observed that the evolution of the meetings between the two of them had been good in the sense that they had taken on an increasingly conversational cast as time had gone by. He cited in particular the meetings in New York and Washington last September as embodying more back-and-forth interchange, and added that he believed that this method provided the best

opportunity for developing individual subjects and therefore agreed with the proposal.

Secretary Shultz then said that since he had material which had been discussed with and considered by the President in detail, he felt it was important to lay it out for Gromyko carefully and thoroughly. This would take some time, but he thought it would not be excessive under the circumstances, since it is easy to understand the importance of these questions.

With respect to Gromyko's introductory comment about the questions to be discussed, the Secretary agreed that they had come to Geneva to concentrate on arms control questions. But, as the President had said in September, in a sense all questions between us are interrelated. If, toward the end of the discussions, time remained to discuss other questions, they could take a look at them. We continue to have major concerns in the human rights area and he would draw Gromyko's attention to them here. Perhaps there would be a chance to develop these matters in greater detail, but he wanted to point out their importance to us at this time. Just as other major issues between us throughout the world, they have an impact on the overall relationship. In this connection, the Secretary continued, we had received word that the Soviets accepted the idea of discussions on the Middle East and this made us hopeful, since discussion of other matters would doubtless follow.

The Secretary then proposed that they get down to business with a discussion of arms control questions.

Gromyko responded that, except for the Secretary's mention of a possible discussion of what he called human rights issues, they shared the same view. He had no intention of distracting the attention of participants in the talks with a discussion of human rights, and assumed that this would not surprise the Secretary. Other than that, their views coincided, and if the Secretary had no objection, he would present the introductory Soviet statement.

The Secretary agreed.

Gromyko then proceeded to make his opening presentation, which contained the following points:

-- The world's public has been anticipating these meetings with a lively interest. This is the case because people and nations throughout the world fully understand the importance of searching for ways to end the arms race, achieve disarmament and avert a nuclear war. The press does not indulge in exaggeration when it says that the eyes of the entire world are focussed on Geneva. People are hungry for news of a constructive nature.

-- It is a truism that relations between the USSR and the U.S. are bad. The Secretary is familiar with the Soviet view of what had caused this situation and also with Soviet policy. He (Gromyko) had set these forth on behalf of the Soviet Government in earlier

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meetings with the Secretary and also in his recent meeting with the President. He saw no need to repeat what he had said previously on this subject.

-- He wished to stress most emphatically that if we do not find ways to halt the arms race and end the threat of nuclear war, it will be impossible to correct our relationship. If this is not done, our relationship will heat up and this will affect the situation in the entire world.

-- The Soviet Union is in favor of a relationship free of vacillations and one based on equality, mutual regard for each other's interests, and respect for and non-interference in each other's internal affairs. These thoughts were dominant in the messages from General Secretary Chernenko to the President and Gromyko had made every effort to emphasize them in his meeting with the President.

-- It is important to take a principled approach -- a correct approach in principle -- in resolving problems in our relationship. He wished to outline in total candor how the Soviet side viewed such an approach.

-- The upcoming negotiations, if they take place -- and the Soviet side believes they must take place -- must have as their ultimate objective the elimination of nuclear arms. In the final analysis this goal must be achieved if we are to have real security in the world as a whole and between our two countries in particular. The world today is not what it was 40-50 years ago. It has changed with the appearance of nuclear arms. Not everyone seems to understand this, because if it were understood, the question before us would be resolved. Those countries which possess nuclear arms are in the best position to understand. Therefore, we must make every effort to move toward this ultimate objective. Otherwise we will find ourselves in a situation whereby nuclear arms come to dominate people and people will find themselves caught in an irresistible current which drags them along. Where this would lead is clear. Science, and indeed, not just science, but all reasonable people in positions of authority recognize what might occur if nuclear arms remain in existence and if the nuclear arms race continues. No matter how strong the words are which are chosen to emphasize the importance of this problem, none are adequate to express the dangers of continuing the nuclear arms build-up. Only ignorant people -- and there are fewer and fewer of these -- and dishonest individuals could treat such statements as propaganda and not a true reflection of reality. Both the Soviet and U.S. Governments must know that this is the case. It is the first point of principle he wished to make.

-- The second point regards how we should proceed, both here in Geneva and beyond -- indeed how to conduct our relations in general. The principle of equality and equal security is of exceptional importance. It is absolutely essential at every phase in our consideration of the problem and at every stage in

our discussion of it. Absolute equality and equal security merit repetition a thousand times. All agreements connected with the resolution of the problem before us, a problem of vital importance to both our countries and to mankind in general, must be based on this principle. If we follow this principle, neither your security nor ours will be damaged; the security of both our countries and of the whole world will rather be stronger. We believe that if both sides act in an honest way, it will be possible to comply with this principle and find solutions to the nuclear arms problem and to other problems. It is within the realm of the possible to find mutually satisfactory solutions. There is no place here for fatalism. All problems in the world are created by human beings, and it is up to human beings to resolve them. All problems existing today can be solved if our two countries proceed along the same path. And if we do, others will follow. He emphasizes this point because one frequently hears statements almost to the effect that there is no opportunity for people, or even governments, to affect the process. All too often, when the modernization and development of arms are considered (and this is especially true of space arms), it is suggested that there is no possibility of intervening to block such developments, as if it is written in the stars that it must happen. It is suggested that there might be some discussion of limitations -- as if militarization has to continue. But this is inconsistent with human logic and with human capacities and must be rejected. We must believe in the possibility of human beings resolving this problem.

-- The third principle pertains to outer space. We must set the goal of preventing the militarization of space. Questions of strategic nuclear arms and medium-range nuclear arms must be considered in conjunction with the problem of preventing the militarization of space. In other words, questions of space arms, nuclear strategic arms and nuclear medium-range arms must be resolved in one single complex, that is, comprehensively, in their interrelationship. He wished to stress comprehensively, since this is dictated by objective circumstances, and especially the requirements of strategic stability.

-- He noted statements by U.S. officials at various levels, including the highest, which emphasized the importance of strategic stability, and pointed out that the Soviets believe that strategic stability requires such an approach. If the forthcoming negotiations are to be put on a practical track from the outset, there must be a specific, joint understanding regarding their ultimate objectives.

-- In the Soviet view, the first such goal must be the prevention of the militarization of space. That is, there must be a ban on the development, testing and deployment of space attack arms [space strike weapons], along with the destruction of those already in existence. Given such a radical approach, opportunities would emerge for far-reaching decisions in the other areas as well.

-- By "space attack arms" the Soviet Union meant space arms based on any physical principle [literally: "principle of action"], regardless of basing mode, which are designed to strike space objects, objects in space and targets on land, sea or in the air from space, that is, targets on earth. This includes anti-satellite systems and relevant [or "corresponding"-- sootvetstvuyushie] anti-missile systems.

-- The second goal relates to strategic arms. Given a complete ban on space attack arms, the Soviet Union would be prepared to agree to a radical reduction of strategic arms accompanied by a simultaneous and a complete ban, or severe limitation, of programs to develop and deploy new strategic systems, i.e., long-range cruise missiles, new types of ICBMs, new types of SLBMs and new types of heavy bombers. However, all these measures with regard to strategic arms would be possible only if they were coupled with a complete ban on space attack arms.

-- Additionally, the problem of strategic arms cannot be resolved separately from the problem of medium-range nuclear systems, that is missiles and aircraft, because the U.S. systems deployed in Europe are strategic systems with respect to the Soviet Union. This was emphasized in the past, particularly during the negotiations where Ambassador Nitze headed the U.S. delegation. To the Soviet Union these are strategic arms, even though in the past, for convenience, they had been called medium-range systems, taking into account only their range.

-- The third negotiation would deal with medium-range nuclear arms. Its main aim would be an agreement to end the further deployment of U.S. missiles in Western Europe coupled with a simultaneous cessation of Soviet countermeasures. This would be followed by a reduction of medium-range nuclear systems in Europe to levels to be agreed. Naturally, British and French medium-range missiles must be taken into account in these levels. He then repeated "they must be taken into account," and observed that talk to the effect that the UK and France are separate states, that they should be disregarded and that their arms should not be counted in solving the question of medium-range systems in Europe, did not impress anyone. Such talk did not make the least impression on the Soviet Union. The UK and France and their nuclear systems were on one and the same side with the U.S. This is true in fact as well as in formal, legal terms, no matter how the problem is addressed. Thus, at least in discussions with the Soviet Union, the U.S. should steer clear of the thesis that UK and French systems ought not be taken into account. Any talk along these lines is a waste of time.

-- In summarizing the last portion of his statement, Gromyko reiterated the following. The problem of strategic arms and the problem of medium-range nuclear arms cannot be considered separately or in isolation from the problem of space arms, or more precisely, that of the non-militarization of space. The problem of strategic nuclear arms cannot be considered independently of the question of medium-range nuclear arms. All

of this must be considered comprehensively [in one complex] if there is, in fact, a serious desire to reach agreement. The Soviet Union hoped that it could count on the U.S. Government's understanding of the Soviet position.

-- Perhaps he was repeating it for the thousandth time, but the Soviet leadership would like to see serious progress toward agreement in order to reach the objectives which he had described at the beginning of his statement. Agreements must be based on respect for the security interests of both the USSR and the U.S. The entire world would give a sigh of relief if this could indeed be achieved. Moreover, the Soviet Union has no negative aims with respect to the U.S.. It wants a fair and objective agreement that meets the interests of both countries.

-- The Soviet Union wants to live in peace with the U.S.. The USSR is aware that from time to time responsible officials in the U.S. make statements to the effect that the USSR poses a threat to the U.S. The Soviet Union tends to think that individuals who make such statements do not understand the situation. However, these statements are made so frequently that we cannot rule out the possibility that those who make them may come to believe in them. After all, some people still believe in the devil. But we believe that common sense and objective reasoning, if it is followed by U.S. policy makers, can make agreement possible.

-- Could a country with hostile aims present proposals on eliminating nuclear arms, on no-first-use of nuclear arms, and insist that other nuclear powers follow the Soviet example? Could such a country present a proposal on the non-use of force in international relations? Could such a country make proposal after proposal aimed at curbing the arms race, disarmament and improving Soviet-U.S. relations? The Soviet Union has presented many such proposals. A country with hostile designs would not present these kinds of proposals. Could such a country harbor evil designs toward the United States? Surely it could not. He wished to stress that the Soviet leadership and the entire ruling party of the USSR, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, had no hostile designs against the legitimate interests or security of the United States. The USSR does not pursue such a goal. Judge our policies on the basis of our statements and our specific proposals.

-- The Soviet Union intends to pursue this course at the forthcoming negotiations. However, if common sense does not triumph at these negotiations -- and he was not speaking of the Soviet side -- then, of course, the USSR would be forced -- he emphasized would be forced -- to take appropriate steps to protect its security interests. However, it is in our mutual interest not to follow such a path. It is in our interest to follow the path of striving for an objective agreement which, he was convinced, is possible provided both sides advance objective and justified positions. If this were not the Soviet desire, it would have been pointless to hold these meetings here. In that case, we would be simply rolling down to the abyss. But the

Soviets believe that an objective possibility of agreement exists. He could not speak for the Secretary on these points, and invited him to speak for himself.

The Secretary thanked Gromyko for his comprehensive introductory comments, and promised to be equally brief in presenting his views.

First, he remarked that during Gromyko's visit to the United States, especially during his conversation with the President, Gromyko had used the phrase "question of questions." This had caught people's attention. He had defined it as whether we would move toward peace or toward confrontation, and, especially, whether we would be able to resolve the overriding question of nuclear arms. Gromyko had said, and the President had agreed -- in fact, the President had said several times -- that our goal must be the elimination of nuclear arms. This was repeated in the letters exchanged between the two heads of state.

The Secretary noted that Gromyko, in his arrival statement, had spoken about advancing along a path of radical reduction of nuclear arms and the goal of eliminating them. We share that goal. If, as a result of these meetings, we can agree on a negotiating format, we should instruct our negotiators to work toward that aim.

The Secretary pointed out that the President views this meeting as a major opportunity to launch a new effort aimed at reaching arms control agreements that enhance the security of both our nations. Our principal task is to look to the future, to establish a more efficient process and more effective negotiating approaches for addressing critical arms control questions. He hoped the meetings today and tomorrow can lay the basis for progress toward that end.

The President had directed that careful and thorough preparations be made for the meeting, and he had personally taken an intensive role in them. Accordingly, the Secretary thought it important to set forth the President's thinking carefully and in detail. He would go through the President's views of the strategic situation as it had developed in the past and as he saw it developing in the future. He would then deal with the question of subjects and fora for the future negotiations, if we can agree on them.

The Secretary said that he would begin by setting forth our views on the future strategic environment, including the relationship between defensive and offensive forces. He then made the following points:

-- Gromyko would agree that, as the President had said, the U.S. has no territorial ambitions. It is inconceivable that the U.S. would initiate military action against the USSR or the Warsaw Pact unless we or our allies were attacked. We hope that the

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USSR has no intention of initiating an attack on the U.S. or its Allies, and the Secretary had heard this in Gromyko's statement.

-- At the same time the U.S. is determined to maintain sufficient forces to deter attack against ourselves and our allies. This means forces of such size, effectiveness and survivability as to deny an opponent any possibility of gain from an attack. We expect that you wish to maintain similar capabilities.

-- We will maintain a sufficient deterrent with or without arms control agreements. However, we believe, as Gromyko said this morning with regard to the USSR, that the strategic relationship can be made more stable and secure, and that stability and security can be maintained at significantly lower levels of armaments, if this relationship is regulated through effective arms control. We prefer that path.

-- It is disturbing to us that the USSR has placed so much emphasis upon massive expansion and modernization of its nuclear forces, both offensive and defensive. In light of this, we are obliged to take some steps necessary to maintain our offensive and defensive capabilities.

-- This interplay between us does create a dangerous situation. So it is one we must address. The political and military measures necessary to do so will be difficult for both sides. But we must tackle this problem; the danger must be defused.

-- In preparing for this meeting and for renewed negotiations, the U.S. has conducted a review of our past arms control efforts. While some worthwhile agreements have been reached, our efforts in the area of strategic arms have not fulfilled their original promise in terms of constraining the arms competition and enhancing stability. We believe you would agree.

-- At any rate, in the late 1960's and early 1970's we negotiated measures that we hoped would be helpful to the security of each of us. Those constraints, as we reviewed the record, were based on three assumptions:

(1) with defensive systems severely limited, it would be possible to place comparable limits on strategic offensive forces, and to establish a reliable deterrent balance at reduced levels;

(2) the constraints on ballistic missile defenses would prevent break-out or circumvention; and

(3) both sides would adhere to the letter and spirit of the agreements.

-- These premises, as we examined the record, have come increasingly into question over the past decade.

-- Both sides today have substantially greater offensive

capabilities than in 1972. Not only have the numbers of offensive weapons reached exceedingly high levels; of even greater concern, systems have been deployed on the Soviet side, in significant numbers, which have the capability for a devastating attack on missile silos and command and control facilities.

-- On the defensive side, the Soviet Union has taken full advantage of the ABM Treaty -- this was not criticism, just an observation -- it has exploited technical ambiguities, and has also taken steps which we believe are almost certainly not consistent with the ABM Treaty.

-- The viability of the ABM Treaty was based on several key assumptions:

First, that large phased-array radars would be constrained so as to limit potential breakout or circumvention to provide the base for a territorial ABM defense. Allowance was made for early warning radars, but they were to be on the periphery and outward facing.

Second, that ABM interceptors, launchers and radars would be neither mobile nor transportable.

Third, that the line between anti-aircraft and antiballistic missile defenses would be unambiguous.

Fourth, that the ABM Treaty would soon be accompanied by a comprehensive treaty, of indefinite duration, on offensive nuclear forces.

-- Unfortunately, today those assumptions no longer appear valid.

-- The Krasnoyarsk radar appears to be identical to radars for detecting and tracking ballistic missiles, and could serve as part of a base for a nationwide ABM defense.

-- The inconsistency of the location and orientation of this radar with the letter and spirit of the ABM Treaty is a serious concern, for it causes us to question the Soviet Union's long-term intentions in the ABM area.

-- We are also concerned about other Soviet ABM activities that, taken together, give rise to legitimate questions on our part as to whether the Soviet Union intends to deploy a wide-spread ABM system. The SA-X-12 anti-air missile is one element of our concern; it seems to have some capabilities against strategic ballistic missiles, and thereby blurs the distinction between anti-aircraft missile systems and anti-ballistic missile systems.

-- The Soviet Union is pursuing active research programs on more advanced technologies, which have a direct application to future ballistic missile defense capabilities.

-- Most importantly, as to offensive nuclear forces, it has not proven possible to work out mutually acceptable agreements that would bring about meaningful reductions in such arms, particularly in the most destabilizing categories of such forces.

-- So, in our view, as we look back at that period when the strategic environment that we were hoping for was designed, we must say that the strategic environment has since deteriorated. But it is important to look today at the future. He therefore would offer some comments which would help Gromyko understand the conceptual and political framework in which we approach renewed negotiations.

-- For the immediate future we wish to work with you to restore and make more effective the regime for reliable mutual deterrence which, in 1972, was thought by both sides to be our common objective.

-- We must negotiate "effective measures toward reductions in strategic arms, nuclear disarmament, and general and complete disarmament" called for when we signed the ABM Agreement in 1972. We are prepared to negotiate constructively toward this end.

-- We must reverse the erosion which has taken place of the premises assumed when we entered into the ABM Treaty.

-- The research, development and deployment programs of both sides must be consistent with the ABM Treaty.

-- You may argue that it is the U.S., and not the Soviet Union, that has decided to embark on the creation of a nationwide ABM system, including the deployment of defensive systems in space. Certainly, your comments imply this. Therefore, I wish to explain the U.S. position.

-- The President has set as a major objective for the coming decade the determination of whether new defensive technologies could make it feasible for our two countries to move away from a situation in which the security of both our countries is based almost exclusively on the threat of devastating offensive nuclear retaliation.

-- We believe both sides have an interest in determining the answer to this question. Indeed, your country has historically shown a greater interest in strategic defenses than the United States, and deploys the world's only operational ABM system.

-- A situation in which both of our countries could shift their deterrent posture toward greater reliance on effective defenses could be more stable than the current situation.

-- It could provide a basis for achieving the radical solution both our leaders seek -- eliminating nuclear weapons entirely on a global basis.

-- Our effort to see whether this is possible is embodied in the Strategic Defense Initiative. This SDI is strictly a research effort and is being conducted in full conformity with the ABM Treaty.

-- No decisions on moving beyond the stage of research have been taken, nor could they be for several years. Such research is necessary to see if it would be possible to move toward a world in which the threat of nuclear war is eliminated.

-- Whenever research validates that a defensive technology would make a contribution to strengthening deterrence, the United States would expect to discuss with the Soviet Union the basis on which it would be integrated into force structures. If either side ever wishes to amend the ABM treaty, then there are provisions for discussing that. In the U.S. view, such discussions should precede action by sufficient time so that stability is guaranteed. The Secretary repeated: whenever research validates that a defensive technology would make a contribution to strengthening deterrence, the United States would expect to discuss with the Soviet Union the basis on which it would be integrated into force structures.

-- The Soviet Union has been actively engaged for years in the sort of research being pursued under SDI.

-- The Secretary doubts that either side is prepared to abandon its research efforts now, before we know whether there are defensive systems that could enhance rather than diminish the security of both sides. We doubt an effective and verifiable ban on research, as such, could be designed in any event.

-- In the longer run, it appears that new technologies may open possibilities of assuring the security of both sides through a substantial improvement in our respective defenses. To the U.S., high-confidence defenses would appear to be a sounder approach to peace and security than the current situation, and could produce a more stable environment.

-- The United States recognizes that arms control and other forms of cooperation would play an important role in creating and sustaining such a less threatening environment. We believe that the security interests of both sides could be served by such an evolution and obviously we would have to move in stages.

-- But we are prepared to initiate a continuing discussion with you now on the whole questions of strategic defense (both existing and possible future systems), a discussion of reductions in offensive arms, and a discussion of the nature of the offense-defense relationship that we should be seeking to establish and maintain in the future. This was by way of saying that we fully agree about the relationship between offense and defense.

-- In the context of negotiations on offensive and defensive arms, we are also prepared to address space arms issues.

-- So we believe our negotiating efforts today and tomorrow should focus on the most urgent question before us: namely, how to begin the process of reducing offensive nuclear arms and enhancing the stability of the strategic environment.

The Secretary then turned to the way in which these comments lead us to suggestions regarding the subject and objectives of the future negotiations. Accordingly, he wished to offer comments on fora, subjects and objectives of the negotiations, as well as on their location and timing.

-- With respect to offensive nuclear systems, he proposed that we begin where we broke off and capture the progress made in the START and INF negotiations. We believe that much good work was done in both sets of talks, even though many issues remained unresolved.

-- Moreover, while the issues involved are clearly related, we continue to believe it would be most practical to address strategic and intermediate-range nuclear forces in separate fora.

-- Thus, we propose that we begin new negotiations on strategic arms reductions, and a second set of new negotiations on reductions in intermediate-range nuclear forces.

-- The subject of the first, strategic offensive arms -- or, more precisely, intercontinental-range offensive nuclear forces -- is fairly well established.

-- We are prepared in step-by-step fashion to reduce radically, to use Gromyko's word, the numbers and destructive power of strategic offensive arms, with the immediate goal of enhancing the reliability and stability of deterrence, and with the ultimate goal of their eventual elimination.

-- Thus, the subject of these negotiations would be reductions, radical reductions, in strategic offensive nuclear arms.

-- I propose that the objective of renewed talks be an equitable agreement providing for effectively verifiable and radical reductions in the numbers and destructive power of strategic offensive arms.

-- The second negotiation we envisage is on intermediate-range nuclear forces.

-- Here, too, I think our previous efforts revealed a common emphasis on reducing longer-range INF missiles, with the ultimate goal of their total elimination.

-- Moreover, we seem to agree that while systems in or in the range of Europe should be of central concern, any

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agreement must take account of the global aspects of the INF problem.

-- Both sides have proposed that certain INF aircraft and shorter-range missile systems be dealt with in some fashion.

-- We propose that the subject of the new talks be reductions in intermediate-range offensive arms.

-- The objective of such talks should be an equitable agreement providing for effectively verifiable and radical reductions in intermediate-range offensive nuclear arms.

The Secretary then turned to our ideas for addressing the other aspects of "nuclear and space arms" on which we agreed in November to begin negotiations.

-- In the early days of SALT I both sides agreed that a treaty limiting defensive arms should be paralleled by a treaty limiting offensive arms and vice-versa. For reasons including those the Secretary advanced earlier, we continue to believe there is merit in such an approach.

-- We understand that the Soviet Union believes that controlling weapons in space should be a priority matter. Gromyko had emphasized this in his presentation. We believe, however, that a forum permitting negotiation of defensive nuclear arms would be a more appropriate complement to new negotiations on offensive nuclear systems.

-- In such a forum, we would be prepared to address the question of space-based defensive systems in a serious and constructive manner. Space arms questions could also be taken up in the offensive arms negotiations as well, as this might be appropriate.

-- But we believe that it is important to address questions relating to existing defensive systems based on earth, as well as potential future space-based systems, and to restore and revalidate the assumptions on which the ABM Treaty was based.

-- We therefore propose that we establish a third negotiating forum, in which each side could address aspects of the offense-defense relationship not dealt with in the two offensive nuclear arms fora.

-- In making this proposal, we have taken careful note of the concern you expressed in our September meetings about the possibility of nuclear arms in outer space. Gromyko had referred to this subject several times.

-- Given our shared objective of eliminating all nuclear weapons and the concerns you expressed, we believe that the negotiations should focus on defensive nuclear arms, including nuclear systems

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that would be based in space or detonated in space, as well as defensive nuclear systems based on the earth.

-- Thus we propose that the subject of this third negotiation be defensive nuclear arms. The objective would be agreement on measures to enhance the reliability and stability of deterrence, and on steps toward the eventual elimination of all nuclear-armed defensive systems.

-- As to the formalities, the Secretary suggested that the location of all three talks be Geneva and that, as a matter of urgency, the negotiations should preferably open in the first half of March.

-- The most pressing task is to reach agreement on formal negotiations to address offensive and defensive forces. But the Secretary believed that it would also be useful to establish a senior-level process to complement the formal negotiations and to provide a channel for talking about broader problems. In these talks we might perhaps be able to provide the integrating process that Gromyko had referred to.

-- What we have in mind is to have more unstructured, conceptual exchanges on the maintenance of strategic stability and the relationship between offensive and defensive forces.

-- Continuing exchanges on these subjects between the foreign ministers should be part of this process. As the President has suggested, this might give some stimulation and act as an energizer to the negotiations. As he has further suggested, it might also be useful to have special representatives meet to address both conceptual and concrete ideas.

-- Senior representatives could also play an important role in clarifying each side's conceptual approach to the negotiations, as well as in exploring the details of specific proposals.

-- Moreover, as formal negotiations proceed in individual areas, senior representatives could meet periodically to help break logjams and coordinate our joint efforts in the various fora.

-- We believe that the problem of getting control of the growing nuclear forces is of fundamental concern. Those countries with nuclear arms must take the leadership. Certainly, he would hope that we can make progress to prevent these systems from overwhelming our two countries. As Gromyko had suggested, if our two countries take the lead in this regard, others would follow. Gromyko had also said that the ultimate goal would be to eliminate nuclear arms. We had no reservations in this regard, though we recognized the difficulties involved.

-- In this connection, the Secretary highlighted the importance of the non-proliferation regime and noted that their discussion in September 1982 had led to consultations on non-proliferation questions. From our standpoint, these discussions have been

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fruitful. However, further efforts are needed if we are to control nuclear arms, as we must -- if we are to reduce them drastically and ultimately eliminate them.

The Secretary concluded by saying that he had described how we see future developments and had outlined our ideas for structuring the future negotiations. The Secretary remarked that earlier he promised to take as much time as Gromyko had. He had not quite fulfilled that promise, but considering the time devoted to interpretation, he thought that they had ended up about equal. The Secretary cited Gromyko's phrase about the need for respecting the security interests of both parties. He found this to be a very good phrase and intended to proceed on this basis. He also expressed appreciation for Gromyko's attempt to present his comments with as much precision as possible.

Gromyko, who had earlier waived translation from English to Russian, observed that the Secretary had just delivered a very important statement and asked for a translation so that it could be given careful consideration. The Secretary's statement was thereupon translated in its entirety.

When the translation was completed, Gromyko observed that the statement was an important one dealing with fundamental principles, and said that he had two questions which arose from the Secretary's comment that at some stage the parties could enter into a discussion of the research the U.S. is doing and of ways it could be integrated into a system of strategic stability. His questions were: first, at what stage would this be discussed, and second, what specifically should be dealt with in the third forum, that is, the forum dealing with space matters, a forum to which we have not yet attached a label, because it is too early to do so.

Gromyko added that the Secretary's remarks on this subject had not been clear. The lack of clarity did not seem to be a linguistic problem but one rather in the U.S. position itself. What should be discussed in this third forum? Is this forum to discuss programs for large-scale space defense systems or not? And if this topic is discussed, what will be the angle of view applied? If your position is that space research programs are to be continued and sometime later can be discussed, then this is not acceptable. U.S. intentions to pursue such efforts were unacceptable, even though mention had been made that the U.S. might share some of the results. The Soviet position is that the topic should be discussed with the view of preventing the militarization of outer space. If this approach is taken, what is the point of such a large-scale program to develop ballistic missile defenses? What would happen if these two concepts collided? What would be discussed in this forum in that case? Perhaps this forum might hold only one meeting. What sort of negotiation would that be? Where would that lead us? Since all three fora are interrelated, if the third forum bursts like a soap bubble, the other two would go down with it. It would be a different matter if the subject of the negotiations in that forum were to be the prevention of militarization of space. In that case, he could see the sense of that third forum.

Gromyko asked the Secretary to respond to his questions either then or after lunch, as he preferred. When the Secretary had done so, Gromyko would comment on other aspects of the U.S. position.

The Secretary promised to answer Gromyko's questions, but suggested that this be done after lunch since they were already running about an hour behind schedule. He also suggested, since time between meetings was useful to consider carefully and assess each other's comments, to move the afternoon meeting to 3:30 instead of 2:30, and put off the reception planned for the evening by one hour as well.

Gromyko agreed with this procedure.

Before departing, the Secretary said that he intended to say nothing to the press regarding the meeting and Gromyko stated that he, too, would follow a "no comment" policy.

The meeting adjourned at 1:00 P.M.

Drafted by: J.F.Matlock; D.Arensburger

SECOND SHULTZ-GROMYKO MEETING
Geneva, January, 1985

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

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 for National Security Affairs
 Ambassador Paul Nitze
 Ambassador Arthur Hartman
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 President for National Security Affairs
 Carolyn Smith, Interpreter

USSR Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko
 Georgy M. Korniyenko, First Deputy Foreign
 Minister
 Ambassador Viktor Karpov
 Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin
 A. Bratchikov, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
 Viktor Sukhodrev, Interpreter

DATE, TIME January 7, 1985; 3:35 to 6:55 P.M.
AND PLACE: United States Mission, Geneva, Switzerland

Secretary Shultz opened the meeting by saying that he would respond to the two questions Gromyko raised at the end of the morning session. The first question concerned when the U.S. expects to discuss how strategic defense-type systems could be integrated into force structures. In one sense, there is nothing concrete on this subject to speak of at this point because we do not yet have an outcome from our research. When we get to something concrete, or reach a development with potential operational characteristics, when and if the research of both sides demonstrates that there can be a system which could usefully contribute to moving away from reliance on offensive weapons, then we could discuss the strategic defensive forces. In other words, the discussion would be triggered by the emergence in U.S. or Soviet research programs of something with that potential. The U.S. also would be prepared -- even in advance of any such positive research development -- to discuss the ways such systems, if they proved feasible, could contribute to the goal of eventually eliminating all nuclear weapons, which

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is important in and of itself. This was the first question Gromyko had raised.

Gromyko's second question, the Secretary continued, concerned the subject matter of the third forum he had proposed, that of nuclear defensive systems. He expected this to be a forum in which both sides would feel free to raise whatever issues relating to defensive systems they wished to raise, including space-based or land-based systems, whether directed against weapons on the earth or in space. Nuclear offensive weapons in space are already banned by the Outer Space Treaty. Technical developments in recent years make it harder to draw certain distinctions between systems, for example, between ABM and air defense systems, between early warning, NTM, space track and ABM radars. Therefore, the U.S. believes there is much work to be done to reexamine, reevaluate and reinforce the fundamental ideas underlying the ABM treaty, as well as defensive systems in general. In addition, this would be an appropriate forum to discuss possible future arms, as he had mentioned earlier, and technical developments bearing on their future utility, to the ultimate objective of the total elimination of nuclear arms. The U.S. does not believe that research can be effectively or verifiably banned, nor does it believe that research which could, if successful, contribute positively to a reduction in the evils of war should be banned. This forum would be the appropriate one in which to raise questions relating to space arms, including the space systems Gromyko had discussed this morning. He thought there was a full house here to occupy both sides.

The Secretary then said he wished to explain the essence of the idea he was trying to put across, since it related to his answer to one of Gromyko's questions. Gromyko had said that the questions being discussed here are interrelated. Although for the purpose of the negotiations these questions cannot be discussed all at once, the sides must find "bundles" of questions to discuss. In the end, of course, all these issues are interrelated, and he recalled that in a recent letter Chernenko had referred to the "organic link" between offensive and defensive weapons.

Secretary Shultz then said that what we have in mind is a concept of deterrence in which the greatest degree of stability and equal security is inherent. He suggested looking at two steps. First, to try to attain the strategic environment envisaged in the early 1970s -- that is, reduction of offensive arms down to the levels contemplated at that time -- and then, in light of technical developments, to look at the defensive environment. In the meantime, research proceeds on strategic defensive weapons; both the U.S. and USSR have such research under way. On the basis of U.S. research, he did not know what the answer would be, but if the answers are positive, he would envisage that the two sides would together try to create a regime with relatively greater emphasis on defense. Of course, if we are able to eliminate nuclear weapons entirely (and he hoped we would be able to) there would be less to defend against. But if a side feels it has a secure defense, it has equal security and stability in a less

dangerous and less destabilizing mode. This is the concept on which the U.S. approach is based. It is not a concept that is being implemented now, but would emerge as time goes on. The reductions in offensive arms to which Gromyko had referred must be consistent with this.

Gromyko said he would respond, taking into account the answers Secretary Shultz had given to his questions. He thought this would be useful so that the Secretary could more fully understand the Soviet attitude toward the American concept of a large-scale missile defense system. The U.S. calls this whole idea a defensive concept, but the Soviet Union does not share this view. The Soviet side sees it as part of a general offensive plan.

Gromyko then invited the Secretary to climb to the top of an imaginary tower and look at the entire situation through Soviet eyes. The Soviet line of reasoning is simple. Assuming the U.S. succeeds in developing this large-scale anti-missile defense, it will have created a shield against hypothetical Soviet missiles. U.S. assumptions of this threat are pure fiction and fantasy, but Gromyko would leave this aside for the moment. If the U.S. did have such a defensive system in place, it would have the capability to inflict a first nuclear strike against the USSR with impunity. One needs no special gift of perspicacity to understand this; it is clear almost to the point of being primitive. If the Secretary were to view this situation from atop the tower, he would reach the same conclusion.

The United States, Gromyko continued, reasons that the Soviet Union can also develop its own strategic defense. Then there would be two such systems, a Soviet and a U.S. one, and then both sides could consider how to reconcile and adjust them to each other and integrate them into the relative defensive complexes of both sides. But Gromyko wished to ask: why have these systems at all? After all, one side has nuclear arms and the other side has them too, so although it is possible to paralyze or neutralize these weapons, why create a system to do so? Isn't it simpler to eliminate nuclear weapons themselves? Why should our two countries spend their material and intellectual resources developing such a system? Surely the reasonable solution would be to eliminate the weapons themselves. This is nothing more than the centuries-old question of the shield and the sword: Why have a shield to protect yourself from the sword if it is simpler to eliminate the sword? In speaking now of shields and swords, no one should be thinking of the weapons people used in olden times; the weapons now are terrible ones that threaten all humankind.

This, Gromyko stated, is the logic behind the Soviet reasoning. For this reason, the fact that the U.S. side calls its concept a defensive one makes no impression on the Soviet side. The U.S. must understand clearly that the USSR cannot be party, either directly or indirectly, to the development of such a system, either U.S. or Soviet. If the U.S. dismisses this reasoning and takes measures to develop such a system, the Soviet Union would

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decide on the counter-measures necessary to protect its own security. Gromyko wanted the U.S. administration to understand the Soviet position correctly. He was inclined to believe that Secretary Shultz understood this position.

Gromyko continued by stating that the U.S. seems to believe -- indeed he would go further and say it does believe -- that it would be able to create such a system and the Soviet Union would not, so the U.S. would be ahead. The U.S. thinks it would be in the dominant position and this tempts it. This is how the Soviet side sees the situation. The U.S. wants to gain advantage over the Soviet Union, and the defensive system if developed would be used to bring pressure on the Soviet Union. Let us not mince words, Gromyko said, even if they are harsh ones: the system would be used to blackmail the USSR.

To be blunt, Gromyko added, this is not the right approach to take in relations between our two countries. It is not the path dictated by the interests of our countries and the whole world. If the U.S. does not change its line, the Soviet Union will reveal the full truth to its own people and to the whole world. He thought the U.S. government had surely noticed the restraint shown by the Soviet side in its official pronouncements on this issue, particularly with regard to these meetings in Geneva. However, if the situation makes it necessary for the Soviet side to comment in full on the U.S. line, it will do so. This is not the path that will lead to a peaceful solution on the basis of an accord between our two countries. As sure as we know that after the Geneva meetings both sides will return home and as sure as we know that tomorrow will be a new day, the Soviet side is convinced that the two countries will protect what they consider to be just and fair. Gromyko urged that the U.S. reappraise this concept which it has christened "defensive". There is nothing defensive in this concept, he added.

Gromyko continued that this would not mean that the U.S. would have to give in to the Soviet position. It would simply mean a change of U.S. policy in favor of peace. It would be in the interests of the U.S. as much as the Soviet Union. The U.S. has mobilized formidable official and propaganda resources in support of its policy. Practically every day one hears pronouncements by U.S. officials at all levels, as well as by members of the press, in defense of this concept. But all the U.S. is doing is taking some half-dozen arguments and juggling them around. One day, argument number one becomes argument number six, the next day argument number two becomes argument number three, and so on. The U.S. changes the periods and commas, but the set of arguments is the same as it tries to prove that the concept is a defensive one. This is a non-viable concept and non-viable position.

Gromyko made bold to state that it gives rise to concern and alarm in Western Europe and in other countries, even those on remote continents. People today are not like they were 40 or 50 years ago, he said. Today they take to heart everything that bears on war and peace. Had the Secretary not noticed the mood

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of the world on matters relating to outer space? People want outer space to be a peaceful environment; they do not want the sword of war hanging over mankind's head and threatening space. Gromyko thought the U.S. should be aware of this and therefore he hoped the U.S. administration would take another look at the entire question of outer space.

Gromyko then stated that when he returned to Moscow after his last visit to Washington, he had reported in detail on his talks with the Secretary and with President Reagan in the White House. He informed his colleagues in the leadership, including Chernenko, what the President had said in their private conversation. He had, in fact, quoted verbatim from the President's words. Gromyko had told the President in response that he had spoken very good words but he wondered why the U.S. government made no changes at all in its practical plans for an arms race and in preparing for war. The President had not answered this question and Gromyko reported this also. All his colleagues liked the good words the President had spoken, but were disappointed that nothing positive was either done or promised to substantiate the words. This was the "political photograph" that he had brought back with him from his visit to Washington.

Since then, that is since September 1984, Gromyko continued, the situation had not changed, or had changed for the worse. Take, for example, outer space, which is of immense importance. The situation is also worse as regards medium-range nuclear weapons and in the arms race in general. The situation now is worse than it was in September, and in September it was worse than the year before. As the situation worsens, we sit at the table in Geneva and talk. People everywhere, even if they are not involved with politics, are aware that the problems under discussion here concern the fate of peace in the world. Let there be no false modesty -- that is precisely what is at stake here. We are charged by our leaders to meet and exchange ideas on these questions. If there is a chance even to begin to turn this situation around, let us make use of this chance, because the situation today is worse than yesterday, yesterday was worse than the day before, and tomorrow will be worse than today. Perhaps the day would come when some political leaders will throw up their hands in despair, but we, the Soviets, will not be party to defeatism. We will continue to struggle to strengthen and preserve peace on earth.

Gromyko then asserted that it would be incorrect for the U.S. to construe his words as prompted by tactical or propaganda considerations. There is no room for propaganda here. We are talking here about high politics and questions of war and peace. Let us agree to discuss questions of outer space, the prevention of the militarization of outer space, strategic nuclear weapons and intermediate-range nuclear weapons (the Soviet side calls them medium-range weapons, but the name is not important). Let us agree upon the structure of negotiations and how to understand the interrelationship of the three elements, or triad. Let us decide how to breathe life into the negotiations.

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As for the structure of the negotiations, Gromyko wished to address that separately. He had something more to add to his comments on what the Secretary had mentioned in justification of the so-called defensive concept. The Secretary had said that the Soviet Union almost has such systems now and is certainly working toward them. Secretary Shultz had stated that Soviet air defense systems are almost the same as the systems the U.S. plans to develop. While he did not choose to call this a distortion, it certainly is a mistake. Perhaps the Secretary's information is not correct; in any case there is nothing of the sort in the Soviet Union. Air defense systems carry out air defense functions and no others.

Gromyko continued, saying that Secretary Shultz often speaks of verification. Whenever there is talk of an agreement, understanding, or accord between the two sides, the U.S. always speaks of verification and monitoring. Gromyko supposed the U.S. did this order to bring pressure to bear on the Soviet side, but there is no need to waste time in pressuring. The Soviet Union is in favor of verification, but it wants the degree and level of verification to correspond to the degree and level of the disarmament measure being considered. In the past, the U.S. has recognized this principle and on this basis the two sides have found a common language. Why is this principle unacceptable now? Gromyko called on all those present to consider this. He had the impression that the U.S. is afraid of verification since it always harps at length on verification, verification, verification.

The USSR has submitted a proposal that is now on the table in the U.S., West Germany, France, Britain and Italy, Gromyko added. This is the proposal for complete and general disarmament, coupled with a proposal for complete and general verification. The U.S. is prepared to discuss not verification of disarmament and the elimination of arms, but verification of arms. The U.S. seems to think it is all right to produce ten times more weapons so long as there is verification. The USSR advocates disarmament and the elimination of nuclear and other weapons with complete verification. Once and for all, Gromyko stated, let it be known that verification does not frighten us in the least. Since we are speaking of various agreements, verification should be discussed for each one of them in a businesslike manner, without ascribing blame where blame is not due and without accusing a party where there are no grounds for accusation.

Gromyko then stated that a document had been submitted to the U.S. Congress (and the document came from the State Department) which alleges that the Soviet Union has violated some of its agreements. The Soviet Union has not violated any agreements. He added that he had taken note of the language in which the document was couched, that is, that there were "apparent" violations or "doubts" about compliance. But this is not enough to accuse the Soviet Union of violations. The Soviet Union implements its agreements and does not violate them. If the sides conclude an agreement, the Soviet Union will adhere to it

strictly. The U.S. should not charge the Soviet Union with something of which it is not guilty. He was discussing questions of principle here. He wished to touch on how the Soviet side envisages the structure of negotiations, assuming the sides can agree on holding them, but first he wished to give the Secretary a chance to respond.

Secretary Shultz said that he appreciated Gromyko's comments on the importance of verification and for his expressed readiness to provide measures for verification and make them consistent with the means and goals to be achieved. The questions he raised in regard to what is seen as violations or misunderstandings highlight the complexity of these questions. This shows how important it is to discuss these developments, not only from the standpoint of violations but from the standpoint of what the sides can do to make the treaty regime clear and unequivocal. He raised this point now because this issue is so important. It is important because, if people have questions about compliance with obligations, they are likely to question the value of agreements in general. Therefore it is very important to answer these questions clearly so that the atmosphere of future relations is not poisoned.

The Secretary then returned to the beginning of Gromyko's comments about the central conceptual issues, since they are so important. Even if this meeting results in agreement on a set of negotiations, we must continue to work on the conceptual issues because they are of central importance. He would comment on the concepts and then would ask Mr. McFarlane to say a few words. After that, he would have a question to ask of Gromyko.

The Secretary continued by saying that perhaps his comment could be worded as follows: "Neither blackmailed nor a blackmailer be." He then invited Gromyko to climb to the top of the same tower Gromyko had imagined, and to look at the view before them. The two of them are men from Mars. When they look to the left, they see an impressive program of development of strategic and other nuclear programs. The drive, production capacity and destructive potential are most impressive. The two Martians cannot fail to notice that alongside this considerable effort in offensive arms, a comparable effort in defensive arms is underway -- some of it legitimate in accordance with the ABM treaty, and some of it questioned in that regard. Taking into account the invasions of the Soviet Union in the past, it is not surprising that the USSR is preoccupied with its ability to defend itself, but it still is an impressive display.

If the two Martians look to the right, the Secretary continued, they would also see an impressive offensive capability, as well as signs of renewed modernization of weapons. They could not fail to note that little attention is devoted to defense. And if they took a movie rather than a still photograph of this scene, they would remark that in the last three or four years someone had turned a light on this area, because now stirrings are visible. Although they are far behind what is seen on the left,

they now understand that defense is important. The two Martians up on the tower would also observe on the left a certain amount of concern over the defensive activities starting on the right. They would not find this concern surprising because those on the left have much more experience with defense than those on the right. Having heard Gromyko's statement that a strong defense has offensive significance, the two Martians would observe together that the lower the offensive systems of each side, the less force there is to this argument. If the systems are reduced to zero, the argument loses its force entirely. The two Martians are struck by the fact that both sides are talking about drastic reductions. In this sense, the concept of a gradual evolution from offensive deterrence to defensive deterrence seems to create a less threatening rather than more threatening situation.

The Secretary then asked Mr. McFarlane to comment further on the President's concept of the role defensive systems could play in preserving strategic stability.

Mr. McFarlane stated that President Reagan had a number of influences and motives for proposing a research effort to determine whether defensive systems might be developed which hold a promise of enabling us to move away from our historical reliance on offensive weapons to ensure deterrence. One of these came from his view of how the balance could become unstable by the turn of the century as a result of the nature of the offensive systems now being developed. Specifically, the emergence of offensive mobile and transportable systems, as well as cruise missiles, could lead us into a situation in which we are less certain of the characteristics and composition of systems on both sides. This would make a stable balance less stable.

Secondly, Mr. McFarlane continued, the President wished to find an alternative to offensive deterrence because of the Soviet Union's advantages in key areas, specifically ICBM warheads, which give the Soviet Union the capability to destroy the corresponding forces on the U.S. side which are essential for deterrence. The same asymmetry promises, through defensive systems on the Soviet side, to neutralize any retaliation the U.S. might undertake. The sum of Soviet programs in offensive and defensive arms undermines the traditional basis of deterrence that has existed for the past fifteen years.

Mr. McFarlane then pointed out that the psychological element was perhaps just as important in the President's mind as the military factor. Why should peace and deterrence depend on our ability to threaten someone else? Why not rely for peace and deterrence on weapons that do not threaten anyone? Since we are conducting research on essentially non-nuclear systems, this psychological factor is particularly relevant. Therefore the President decided to determine whether new technology could promise this. However, he made this decision with Soviet concerns about the appearance of a first-strike capability very much in mind. Surely, the development of defensive systems and their deployment while

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concurrently maintaining offensive systems could present the appearance of an intention to develop a first-strike capability. This is not the plan of the United States. This is why the Secretary made clear at the beginning of this meeting that if the day arrives when any or all these technologies show that they can contribute to deterrence, the integration of these concepts into the force structure would be a subject for discussion with the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union must agree that defensive systems play a role. Its own investment and success in developing defensive weapons are far advanced.

In sum, Mr. McFarlane pointed out, the President's view is that it is time for us to integrate defensive systems into the concept of deterrence in order to turn us to lesser reliance on offensive systems and greater reliance on defensive systems.

Secretary Shultz then remarked that there was plenty of room to explore this deep and difficult question further, but he wished to ask some questions concerning something Gromyko had stressed in his remarks. In his comments in Washington and in his airport arrival statement in Geneva, Gromyko eloquently stated again and again that the Soviet Union is in favor of the total elimination of nuclear weapons, and of radical steps toward that goal. The Secretary's questions concerned the program Gromyko had in mind to achieve this goal. If such a program is to be implemented, there must be a concrete expression of it. He therefore posed a series of questions:

- What kind of timing did Gromyko have in mind for the deep and radical reductions of which he had spoken?
- How far did he propose we go before the other must be engaged in order to move to zero?
- What if any changes must be made in the non-proliferation regime?
- How would we treat the variety of nuclear weapons that are not strategic?

The Secretary then observed that if the goal of this meeting is to move toward the total elimination of nuclear weapons, as Gromyko had stated upon his arrival in Geneva, they must put an explicit program behind that objective. They must define a clear and concise program to reach this goal and they must establish at the negotiations a means to achieve it. What does Gromyko have in mind that lies behind this general objective?

Gromyko replied that the Soviet Union had submitted a proposal on complete and general disarmament to the United Nations. It had submitted a detailed proposal for a program of nuclear disarmament and it had also advanced a proposal on nuclear arms in the relevant forum in Geneva. However, the U.S. and its NATO allies had refused to consider these proposals. It cannot be said that the Soviet Union did not make these proposals; they are

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well known and they are known to all the governments concerned. This program requires no changes or alterations. What is needed is the desire to discuss this question.

Gromyko continued, saying that the Secretary had made a half-dozen references today to the complete elimination of nuclear arms. If the Secretary believes that the U.S., USSR, and other countries should strive to achieve this goal, this is good and the Soviet side welcomes such a statement. They are in sympathy with it and are impressed by it. Practical steps, however, must be taken to implement this goal.

Part of the problem is the question of non-proliferation, as the Secretary had mentioned. Secretary Shultz had asked what we could do jointly to reinforce the non-proliferation regime. This question must be considered within the context of the ultimate goal of eliminating nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union believes that the proliferation of nuclear weapons, whether horizontally or vertically, must be prevented. If we lead matters to the step-by-step elimination of nuclear weapons, this could lead to acceptance by all states of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. If the U.S. and USSR can do that, he is sure that all countries would support it, including those that did not sign the NPT.

Both sides agree, Gromyko continued, that the question of non-proliferation is an important one. Non-proliferation must be ensured with no exceptions. He was gratified to note that the U.S. and USSR have almost always held the same view on this. Our two countries had created the treaty, and Gromyko recalled how he and then Secretary of State Rusk hung a map on the wall and referred to it when discussing specific areas. The Non-Proliferation Treaty was developed step-by-step through joint efforts. And so the policy of the U.S. and the Soviet Union coincides on this issue. However fast or however slow we work toward eliminating nuclear arms, the task of ensuring non-proliferation will remain an important one.

Gromyko then asserted that the Secretary had tried to substantiate his position that the new U.S. system is defensive. As Gromyko had already said, the Soviets are convinced that it does not pursue defensive aims, but rather is part of a broad offensive plan. He would not repeat this again because he had already said it. Mr. McFarlane had said that he, Gromyko, had talked about the threat of a first strike from the United States, but that the U.S. had no such intent. It would be going too far to ask the USSR to rely on one person's word and conscience. In any case this thesis works both ways. This was his reply to Mr. McFarlane's remark. Mr. McFarlane had also said that nuclear technology is not connected with this concept. We know your side is talking more and more about non-nuclear technology. But the fact is that nuclear arms would be used whether or not some of the technology used is nuclear or non-nuclear. It makes no difference whether the technology is nuclear, or particle beams, or something else -- this does not change the character of the

system. It is important for you to understand our assessment of this.

Gromyko then turned to the structure of possible negotiations. He could not say more than possible negotiations because they are not yet in our pocket. He wished to speak of the objectives the sides should pursue in the negotiations. He had tried to explain this morning how all the issues are interrelated, that is, the issues of space weapons, strategic weapons and medium-range nuclear weapons. This would justify the establishment of three bilateral groups. Their work as a whole would embrace all three of these areas. Of course each group would have one area: one would deal with the non-militarization of outer space, one with strategic nuclear arms and one with medium-range nuclear arms.

Since the problems must be considered in their interrelationship, the three groups should meet jointly periodically to take stock of progress and to sum up the results of their work. Of course, it is difficult at this point to set up a precise calendar or schedule, but periodic joint meetings are necessary. The final result must also be a joint result.

There should therefore be a superstructure over all three groups, Gromyko continued. Each side would have a single delegation or big group composed of three issue groups. They would look at where they stand, come to a conclusion, and then give recommendations to both governments. Each group would begin deliberations when the main content of its work is defined. All three groups together could begin work when agreement is reached on the main content of all three and on the aim of all three: space arms, strategic arms, and medium-range arms.

Gromyko then said that there must be an understanding on this point. If we begin work with our eyes closed we will get nowhere. We can reach agreement only when everything is acceptable to both sides. If this looks more complicated than previous negotiations have been, then perhaps that is true, but your policies on the space issue make it necessary.

In passing, Gromyko noted that some people in the U.S. have been saying, "We told you the Russians would come back to the negotiations and they did." He said he would not hesitate to call this propaganda. He did not wish to put the U.S. in an awkward position, but if need be the Soviet Union would speak its mind on this issue. What is being discussed here is not a resumption of previous negotiations. The negotiating table is a different one and the problems are not the same. Space has now appeared as a problem, and U.S. nuclear missiles deployed in Western Europe have created a new situation. So what we are speaking of here is the possibility of new negotiations, not resumption of the old ones. It is a cheap ploy to say: "You see, the Russians came back," and he would advise the U.S. side not to resort to such cheap ploys.

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What he had said about the structure of possible negotiations, Gromyko continued, did not rule out agreements on separate elements of any of the three areas. For example, he had in mind such things as a moratorium on testing space arms or certain confidence-building measures for strategic arms. Whenever such agreements deal with issues which are not organically linked to unsolved problems, they could enter into force without waiting for the final outcome of the negotiations. Otherwise implementation of agreements on separate issues would be postponed until an aggregate solution is found and negotiated. A comprehensive solution will be indispensable in that case. This relates to the possibility of reaching agreement on separate questions within each forum.

For the sake of clarity, Gromyko repeated: The Soviet side does not rule out the possibility of reaching separate agreements on some issues which go beyond the limits of these three areas. An example would be a commitment by all nuclear powers not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. Another example would be a freeze of all nuclear arsenals. Here separate agreement is possible. A third example would be the entry into force of agreements previously signed, such as the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the Treaty on Peaceful Nuclear Explosions. A fourth example would be the cessation of all nuclear testing, that is, a comprehensive test ban. At present the ban on testing extends only to three environments. At one time we were near agreement on a comprehensive test ban. He recalled that when the SALT II Treaty was signed by Carter and Brezhnev in Vienna, Carter hosted a dinner during which he told Gromyko that he felt the CTB could be signed soon. These were trilateral negotiations involving the U.S., USSR and UK. Several points divided us, such as a question about monitoring tests in the UK, but Carter said we could reach agreement. Ask Carter, Gromyko said, he can confirm this. But afterwards the U.S. administration forgot about this conversation and no agreement was reached. Such an agreement if signed could be most promising.

Gromyko said he would now return to the issues at hand. Tomorrow they must take a look at where they stand, looking either from the tower or not, and reflect on what results would come from this meeting.

Secretary Shultz noted that time was running out and that people were waiting for them at a reception. But he had a question and a comment to make before ending. The question was whether he should consider what Gromyko had said about the structure of the negotiations to be a proposal.

Gromyko replied in the affirmative.

Secretary Shultz stated that his group would study this proposal carefully and would be prepared to discuss it tomorrow. He called Gromyko's attention to the fact that he had made a proposal this morning at the end of his presentation. He hoped Gromyko would study it carefully because it contains points

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similar to those in the Soviet proposal, although the Soviet proposal is more developed with regard to structure and relationship.

Gromyko replied that he had developed his proposal taking account of the Secretary's ideas. However, one point which they could not accept was the proposal to have meetings of special representatives or "wise men." In the past the U.S. called this an "umbrella" proposal. As Gromyko had already remarked to Hartman, umbrellas are very good against the rain.

Shultz interjected, "They also provide shade if the weather is hot."

Gromyko continued that if the Soviet proposal for three groups were adopted, each side could appoint anyone it wanted to guide their work. He could be a virtual dictator if a side wished. Each side could appoint its wisest men for its own internal workings. Gromyko thought it most probable that on the Soviet side the head of one of the groups would be head of the whole delegation. This was the most probable solution, although a final decision had not been made. The normal mechanism that operates within any government would work as usual and, of course, the sides could always use diplomatic channels. Shultz and Gromyko would each have their advisers and right-hand men, and each would be free to designate his own wise man. This is an internal affair. Gromyko's preliminary thinking was that the man who would head the big delegation would participate in the negotiations. If the two sides set up a situation in which two, four, or six wise men worked in parallel, they might create the impression on the outside that the situation in the negotiations was unsatisfactory. The two, four or six wise men would be meeting confidentially, but this could be misleading in terms of public opinion and might be seen as a screen concealing the true state of affairs. This is unnecessary and would add an undesirable element because it would look as if work were proceeding on two different planes -- the delegation on one hand and the wise men on the other. As for internal organization, this is a matter for each side to decide for itself. Gromyko was sure that both sides could find wise men, but from the point of view of principle, this was undesirable.

Secretary Shultz replied that his delegation would study these remarks and present its considered opinion tomorrow. By way of a preliminary comment he wished to say that he was not prepared to spin this question off into inner space where it would be conducted by itself and then return for review at some stage. Something so important and loosely defined must have constant interaction at high political levels in the two governments. He would want to keep close track of the negotiations and would want a direct way to compare notes with Gromyko as to how they both assess developments. The effort to consider the relationship between these different sets of talks is a high political matter, not a technical one.

The Secretary pointed out that the phrase "non-militarization of space" is a difficult one for the U.S.. First of all, outer space is already militarized. Secondly, neither side would want to dispense with some of the respects in which space is militarized, such as communications or NTM satellites. For this reason, this phrase causes a problem for the U.S. This does not mean that it would be difficult to include this subject in the forum. As he had stated this morning, it would be appropriate to discuss space arms, but there are other things to discuss too, in particular, land-based defensive weapons which have the potential of operating in space.

Secretary Shultz then said it would be necessary to give careful study to the way in which Gromyko put together these three sets of questions, which are in some ways separate and in some ways interconnected. He recognized that with or without a formal structure either side can pace the negotiations in one sector by what it wants in another. But he found it puzzling to establish in advance a ban on reaching agreement on something important that both sides might see as in their interest. He did not see why they would want to tie their hands in this manner. He would study this question carefully and respond to it and other questions tomorrow. He again drew Gromyko's attention to the proposal he had submitted today.

In conclusion, Secretary Shultz recalled that during World War II he had fought in the Pacific as a U.S. Marine. McFarlane was too young to have fought in that war but he fought as a Marine in another war. There was a saying that was common when they reached this stage and cocktails were waiting: "Stack arms and let's get the hell out of here."

Thereupon, the meeting adjourned at 6:55 P.M.

SECRET

Drafted by: C.Smith; J.F.Matlock