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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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JET 4/1/2005

File Folder MATLOCK CHRON FEBRUARY 1985 (3/3)

FOIA

F06-114/2

Box Number 8

YARHI-MILO

805

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
6871	FAX RECEIPT	FAX RECEIPT FROM KIMMITT [7] R 2/17/2010 GUIDELINES	1	3/2/1985	B1
6872	DISTRIBUTION RECORD	DISTRIBUTION RECORD [8] R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2	1	3/4/1985	B1
6866	MEMO	MEETING WITH THATCHER [20-23] R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2	4	2/20/1985	B1
6867	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENT WITH SUSHKOV [24] R 10/1/2012 F2006-114/2	1	2/25/1985	B1
6868	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC # 6866 [33-36] R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2	4	2/20/1985	B1
6869	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC # 6867 [37] R 10/1/2012 F2006-114/2	1	2/25/1985	B1
6870	MEMO	MEMO OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN PARASTAEV AND ROSTOW [51-54] R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2	4	2/11/1985	B1
6873	MEMO	HUTTON TO KIMMITT [57]	1	2/27/1985	B6

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

UNCLASSIFIED

February 21, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JMM*SUBJECT: Request for Presidential Address on East-West
Relations at CSIS, May 15-17

Amos Jordan of the Center for Strategic and International Studies at Georgetown University at Georgetown University has written requesting that the President deliver an address on East-West relations at the CSIS Leadership Forum, which will be held in Washington May 15-17.

Although CSIS would offer an appropriate platform for the President on this subject, I believe that the timing is not good. The President will have just returned from a trip to Europe, where he will deliver two or three major addresses, one of which may well deal with the same topic. Therefore, I believe that it would be too soon to contemplate another major address on this theme.

Bill Martin *Wm* and Steve *Not available* Sestanovich concur.

Recommendation:

That you authorize the memorandum at Tab I recommending against a Presidential address to the CSIS Leadership Forum May 15-17.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I Memorandum to Frederick J. Ryan, Jr.
Tab A Incoming Letters from Amos Jordan

MEMORANDUM FOR FREDERICK J. RYAN, JR.

FROM: ROBERT M. KIMMITT

SUBJECT: Request for Presidential Address on East-West
Relations at CSIS, on May 15-17

Although CSIS would provide an appropriate forum for a Presidential address, we believe that the timing proposed (May 15-17) is not good. The President will have just returned from his European trip where he will have made two or three major addresses, some of which will probably deal with the same subject. Another major address at the time proposed, therefore, does not seem advisable.

Attachment:

Tab A Incoming Letters from Amos Jordan

1170
3

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM

February 12, 1985

TO: ROBERT KIMMITT

FROM: FREDERICK J. RYAN, JR., DIRECTOR
PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS AND SCHEDULING

SUBJ: REQUEST FOR SCHEDULING RECOMMENDATION

PLEASE PROVIDE YOUR RECOMMENDATION ON THE FOLLOWING
SCHEDULING REQUEST UNDER CONSIDERATION:

EVENT: Address - Center for Strategic & International Studies' National
Leadership Forum on the future of East-West relations

DATE: ~~April~~ ^{MAY} 15-17, 1985

LOCATION: Georgetown University - Washington, D.C.

BACKGROUND: See attached

YOUR RECOMMENDATION:

Accept _____ Regret _____ Surrogate _____ Message _____ Other _____
Priority _____
Routine _____

IF RECOMMENDATION IS TO ACCEPT, PLEASE CITE REASONS:

RESPONSE DUE 2/15/85 TO JEAN APPLEBY JACKSON



Staff to NSC 4

Center for Strategic & International Studies
Georgetown University • Washington DC

Amos A. Jordan
President
Chief Executive Officer

February 7, 1985

OFFICE SCHEDULING

1985

RECEIVED

Frederick J. Ryan, Jr.
Director of Appointments
and Scheduling
Old Executive Office Bldg.
Room 188
Washington, D.C. 20506

Dear Mr. Ryan:

Enclosed please find a letter of invitation to the President inviting him to deliver a major address on the future of East-West relations here at CSIS. The occasion will be the second annual National Leadership Forum, the premier event of the Center involving our most important friends and supporters.

We keenly appreciated your assistance in gaining the President's participation in last year's Forum, and very much hope that it will be possible for him to deliver our final address. We are, of course, willing to be flexible in terms of time and date. We are virtually locked into the dates of May-15-17, but will work within those constraints to accomodate the President's schedule.

Thank you for your assistance again this year. I look forward to answering any questions you may have about the event and to finalizing arrangements.

Sincerely,


Amos A. Jordan

cc:Kimmitt



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Center for Strategic & International Studies

Georgetown University / 1800 K Street Northwest / Washington DC 20006 / Telephone 202/887-0200
TWX: 7108229583 Cable Address: CENSTRAT

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February 6, 1985

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I. Hugh Roff, Jr.

Sen. William V. Roth
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Sen. Paul Trible
Jean-Louis van den Branden
R. James Woolsey

Ronald Reagan
President of the United States
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

We would be delighted if you would accept our invitation to deliver a major address on the subject of East-West relations at 10:00 a.m. on May 17 here at the Center for Strategic and International Studies of Georgetown University.

The occasion will be a major three-day conference on The Future of East-West Relations under the auspices of the Center's National Leadership Forum, cochaired by Ambassador Anne Armstrong and Senator Sam Nunn. The Forum is an annual event of the Center, involving approximately 250 of the nation's leaders from the public and private sectors as well as academia. We were honored by your participation in last year's Forum on the subject of bipartisanship in U.S. foreign policy. As with last year, we would hope that you will be the final speaker and that we may publish your remarks, along with those of our other keynote speakers, for national distribution.

The enclosed tentative agenda indicates our approach to the subject and the caliber of individuals we plan to involve. I look forward to answering any questions you or your staff may have about this invitation.

Sincerely,

Amos A. Jordan
President



Center for Strategic & International Studies
Georgetown University • Washington DC

DRAFT AGENDA

NATIONAL LEADERSHIP FORUM

THE FUTURE OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS

WEDNESDAY, MAY 15

- 3:00 p.m. registration
- 4:00 keynote address by Zbigniew Brzezinski
- 7:00 dinner, address by Rep. Dante Fascell on "Helsinki and Madrid: Negotiating with the Russians" (invited)

THURSDAY, MAY 16

- 8:30 a.m. plenary address by James Schlesinger
- 10:00 morning panels (see attached)
- 12:30 lunch, remarks by Henry Kissinger
- 2:30 afternoon panels

FRIDAY, MAY 17

- 10:00 a.m. closing address by the President of the United States, Ronald Reagan (invited)

COCHAIRS

Ambassador Anne Armstrong
Senator Sam Nunn

February 4, 1985

CSIS/NLF PANELS

Thursday, May 16

(1) Military Strategy, Force Structure, and Arms Control Issues

morning panel - Strategic Offensive and Defensive Forces

Paul Nitze (chair), Albert Gore, Eugene Rostow,
R. James Woolsey

afternoon - Conventional Forces

John Glenn (chair), William Kaufman, Lawrence Korb,
Harlan Ullman

(2) East-West Economic Relations

am panel - U.S. Trade Policy

Robert Malott (chair), John Deutch, Don Bonker,
Bruce Parrot

pm panel - East Bloc Trade Issues

Don Kendall (chair), Marshall Goldman, Thane Gustafson

(3) Regional Affairs

am panel - Eastern European Political and Social Issues

Lawrence Eagleburger (chair), Madeleine Albright,
Charles Gati

pm panel - U.S.-Soviet Competition in the Third World

Sam Huntington (chair), Ray Cline, Ronald Palmer,
Stephen Solarz

(4) Other Issues

am panel - The Helsinki Process

James Billington (chair), Phil Geylin, John Hughes,
Leonard Sussman

pm panel - The Successor Generations -- East and West

Richard Cheney (chair), Carl Gershman, Walter Laqueur,
Mark Palmer

** this is a draft agenda and not all of those mentioned have yet agreed to participate

C
WHSR
021305L
MAR 85

WASHFAX RECEIPT

THE WHITE HOUSE

C

DECLASSIFIED
Sec.3.4(b), E.O. 12958, as amended
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2006
BY NARA CA, DATE 2/12/10

MESSAGE NO. 578 CLASSIFICATION SECRET PAGES 2

FROM ROBERT KIMMITT 456-2224 Gf1/WW
(NAME) (EXTENSION) (ROOM NUMBER)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION WEINBERGER MEMO RE THATCHER MTG & CARBON-CARBON TECHNOLOGY
NSC LOG # 90191

D/

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO:	DEPT/ROOM NO.	EXTENSION
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REMARKS ORIG WILL FOLLOW

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL DISTRIBUTION RECORD

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BY LDT NARA, DATE 11/21/07 Date 4 MAR 1955

Subject: Carbon-Carbon Technology

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE The Pentagon	ORIG	4 mar	1550	Walter Robinson
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RECEIVED 23 FEB 85 14

TO BERMAN, ANTHONY FROM MATLOCK

DOCDATE 21 FEB 85

Chow

KEYWORDS: CANADA

ARMS CONTROL

BERMAN, ANTHONY

SUBJECT: MATLOCK LTR TO CANADIAN STUDENT RE ARMS CONTROL

ACTION: FOR FURTHER ACTION

DUE: 27 FEB 85 STATUS S FILES WH

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

PEARSON

MATLOCK

COBB

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COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSCIFID (DR)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

DISPATCH _____ W/ATTCH FILE _____ (C)

90

National Security Council
The White House

System # I
Package # 1378
1600 wmt

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bob Pearson	<u>1</u>	<u>P</u>	<u>P</u>
Bob Kimmitt	<u>P 2</u>	<u>V</u>	
John Poindexter			
Paul Thompson			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat	<u>P</u>		<u>P</u>
Situation Room			
<u>Pearson</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>23 FEB 1985</u>	<u>A</u>

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meees Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

Bob,

*I was about to send this out, but wonder if a Presidential letter might not help create the right atmosphere for the March trip. A comprehensive reply, ~~might~~ - made public - might be useful. Good point, but I think I would let Jack respond. ^{However, do discuss with him.} *Bob**

1378
10

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 21, 1985

Dear Mr. Berman:

This is in further reply to your letter of January 25, 1985. On behalf of President Reagan, I would like to thank you for sending your views on arms control.

As you mention in your letter, a nuclear war would be a disastrous event for all mankind. The United States Government is committed to reducing the possibility of such an event from ever happening.

We will soon resume negotiations with the Soviet Union on nuclear arms control. Our goal in these negotiations is for a verifiable and meaningful agreement that significantly reduces the numbers of weapons on both sides and contributes to real security in the world.

The President is appreciative of your warm comments on his reelection. We value highly the close relationship between Canada and the United States, and the President looks forward to his visit with Prime Minister Mulroney and the Canadian people in March.

Sincerely,



Jack F. Matlock
Special Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Mr. Anthony Berman
Apartment 405
33 Cote-Saint Catherine Road
Montreal, Quebec H2V 2A1

EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Ottawa

January 28, 1985


Dr. Tyrus W. Cobb
Deputy Director for Western Europe
National Security Council
Old Executive Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20506

Dear Dr. Cobb,

Ambassador Robinson has requested that I send you the enclosed letter, addressed to President Reagan, from Mr. Anthony Berman, a 19-year-old Montreal College Student.

The obvious sincerity of this young man's concern and his high regard for the President attracted the Ambassador's attention and he has already sent the attached interim reply. The White House may wish to send an additional response to Berman's letter.

Sincerely,



Mario Ruggia
Staff Aide

Enclosure

MR:bb

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EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES
OTTAWA, CANADA

January 28, 1985

Mr. Anthony Berman
Apartment 405
33 Cote-St. Catherine Road
Montreal, Quebec H2V 2A1

Dear Mr. Berman:

Your letter, addressed to President Ronald Reagan, arrived this morning, and I will be forwarding it to the White House for a reply. You will be hearing from them in due course.

The concern you express over the risk of nuclear war is shared by Canadians and Americans alike. It is one of the most important issues of our time, and the President has pledged every possible effort toward the goal of eradicating nuclear weapons from the face of the earth.

Accomplishing this will not be easy, and visible results should not be expected overnight, but the government of the United States is fully committed to negotiations with the Soviet Union, and will stay with the process as long as it takes to achieve meaningful arms reduction and control.

I appreciate your comments on the occasion of the President's inauguration. Like most Americans, I share your enthusiasm as he enters his second presidential term, and am confident that the "New Beginning" we saw four years ago will become a period of unparalleled movement toward peace, human freedom, and economic prosperity... "A New American Emancipation" which will be shared by all North Americans.

Sincerely,



Paul H. Robinson, Jr.
Ambassador

Jan 25, 1985.

Dear: Mr. President

My name is Anthony Berman, I am a 19 year old student attending an English college in Montreal, Quebec, Canada.

During the beginning of this year, the most widely news report was "Nuclear War" and the meeting between your Secretary of State, Mr. Schultz and Soviet Cancellor, Mr. Gromeyko about the issues of finding a "peaceful solution" and avoiding any possible Nuclear War. Although there was some progress accomplished. Like many millions of people, whether they are Americans, Asians, Europeans, etc..., I feel petrified I feel petrified of what will become

of the Future. The devastation and destruction that I feel no living thing or object will survive if there was such a war! I've also read Mr. President that my country Canada would be the hardest hit since we are in the middle of the United States and Russia in the event of war!

I've visited Vermont twice and I have enjoyed my visit to the U.S. very much! I would not want to see any beautiful country like Canada or United States being destroyed. If any people survived a nuclear war, all that they would have to look at is books of pictures to see its one time beauty of their country in the past

15

I know Mr. President you are well aware of the Facts and I would hope that you continue your progress, whether the Russians are strict or not, I hope an agreement will be reached in the near future!

By the way, I was pleased that you were elected for a second term in office and I congratulate you! When I heard your statement on T.V., "YOU AIN'T SEEN NOTHIN YET"!

I had a feeling of pride, not only for the American people, the U.S. economy, but for Canadians and for World Wide Relations which eventually will lead to somekind of an agreement with the Soviet Union!

After studying US and World History, I would honestly like to say to you Mr. Reagan that I feel you are one of the best Presidents in the United States history! I would rank you among Presidents Abe Lincoln, Theodore Roosevelt and John F. Kennedy, Lincoln for his attitude of peace he preached, Roosevelt for his unity of the great world powers for an end to end all wars (World War II) and Kennedy for his equality to all mankind!

A real thrill for me Mr. President, is to meet you in person. To meet you because you are a great America and Great Man in history!

17

In conclusion, I thank-you Mr. President very much for taking your time in reading my letter of importance for the worlds concern. I find you the most important man in this world to creating a future and I feel confident that you can succeed!

Thank-you again

Sincerely

Anthony Berman

In order that this letter had reached you, please reply if you can.

Anthony Berman
33 Cote-St. Catherine Road. Apt. 40.
Montreal, Quebec
Canada, H2V-2A1

Tel: 1-514-277-9758

JM-C

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

February 25, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation on the Private Meeting with Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher of Great Britain, February 20, 1985

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Conversation covering the President's private meeting with Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher of Great Britain.

Attached at Tab I is a Kimmitt-Platt memorandum to transmit the Memorandum of Conversation to State.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you authorize transmission of the Kimmitt-Platt memorandum at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

- Tab I Kimmitt-Platt Memorandum
- Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

- cc: Jack Covey
 Constantine Menges
 Roger Robinson
 Donald Fortier
 Robert Linhard
 Tyrus Cobb
 Peter Sommer

19

1435

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

UNCLASSIFIED WITH
SECRET/SENSITIVE ATTACHMENTS

MEMORANDUM FOR NICHOLAS PLATT
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation on the President's
Private Meeting with Margaret Thatcher of
Great Britain, February 20, 1985 (U)

Attached is the memorandum of conversation covering the
President's private meeting with Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher
of Great Britain on February 20, 1985. (U)

Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary

Attachment

Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

UNCLASSIFIED WITH
SECRET/SENSITIVE ATTACHMENTS

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

Handwritten:
2/11/85

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Private Meeting with Prime Minister
Margaret Thatcher of Great Britain (U)

PARTICIPANTS: United States
The President
Jack F. Matlock, NSC

United Kingdom
Prime Minister Thatcher
Robin Butler, Principal Private Secretary

DATE, TIME February 20, 1985; 12:10 - 12:30
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

When the photographers had left the Oval Office, the President once again welcomed Prime Minister Thatcher to Washington and expressed regret that the time for their private meeting will be short. (U)

Prime Minister Thatcher said that during the larger meetings she wished to discuss how the U.S. plans to handle the upcoming negotiations with the Soviets in Geneva, to say a few words about the Middle East and to discuss economic questions. But there were a few "small matters" which she wished to mention in private. (S)

The first of these, she continued, related to winding up the Laker affair. The British are trying to settle out of court, since they feel it is best to get the whole matter out of the way so that they can achieve more liberalization in civil air relations. One problem which has developed is with the U.S. Export-Import Bank. The British are trying to persuade the bank to settle for a reasonable sum, and the airlines have agreed to the proposed settlement. She hoped the President could be helpful. She stressed that her government wishes to move toward liberalization and the denationalization of British Airways, and this matter stood in the way. (S)

The President observed that the Exim Bank has autonomy of operation, but we are in communication with the Director. Ambassador Price, in particular, has been trying to work something out, and he (the President) would weigh in if it seemed necessary. (S)

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F06-114/2-6866BY NOJ, NARA, DATE 11/21/07~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Thatcher said that the second matter concerned the British desire to sell a tactical communication system to the U.S. Army. It is a good system, and unlike the competing French system, is compatible with NATO standards. The sale is important because they need to find the money for Trident. (S)

The President assured her that the decision would be based entirely on the technical superiority of the system chosen. (S)

Thatcher said that, in that case, "We will get it." She then turned to a third matter, that involving the Cocom regulations regarding the export of carbon/carbon technology. She referred to the British action in halting the shipment of manufacturing equipment -- literally at the last minute, since the equipment was at the Hull docks prepared for shipment. The shipment was stopped, and this was essential since the equipment could be used to manufacture warheads, but it had been discovered that it was in fact a shipment permitted under Cocom rules. This had caused a certain embarrassment and had complicated the legal status of the action to prevent the export. She added that a U.S. company was involved, and in fact may have arranged for the shipment to be from the U.K. in order to avoid U.S. export controls. In any event, it is clear that the Cocom rules in respect to this type of equipment must be revised to exclude it. (S)

The President agreed. (S)

Thatcher then referred to the Argentine effort to buy Skyhawks from Israel. She said that she was aware that the Argentines had been able to acquire much military equipment from Israel but that a sale of Skyhawks would be a "devastating blow for us." She was aware that the U.S. had been firm on this question and emphasized the importance of continuing to block the sale. (S)

The President said he was aware of the situation. (S)

Thatcher then turned to New Zealand. She said she knew the President felt strongly about Lange's position on nuclear armed and powered ships, and assured him that she did also. She recalled that she had had no problems with Muldoon, but that Lange had fought the election on an anti-nuclear platform. He had taken the same position with the U.K. as he had with the U.S. She had advised him strongly not to ask whether nuclear weapons were aboard ships. She had pointed out to him that it was impossible to give this information, given the ships' missions. (S)

The President said he felt the same way. We cannot announce which ships have nuclear weapons. And Lange had also taken a position against nuclear-powered vessels. (S)

Thatcher said that she did not have a full report on the implications of denying intelligence cooperation with New Zealand. She knows that intelligence from that area is important, but suspected that we could collect what we need without the New

Zealanders. In any event, she would "have a go at Lange." She said she does not want New Zealand to get out of the English-speaking group of nations, and solicited the President's view. (S)

The President said that we would not agree to notification and that we had cancelled exercises. We have other options -- for example we have large dairy surpluses which could be sold to New Zealand's detriment -- but he has not made a decision to dump them. (S)

Thatcher said, no, that would not be a good idea. It is just bad luck that Lange made the nuclear issue so much of his campaign. (S)

The President observed that he was seeking votes. (S)

Thatcher agreed and said that they must make clear that New Zealand cannot opt out and still be secure. (S)

The President mentioned that Lange would be coming here on his way to the U.K. (S)

Thatcher said yes, he would be participating in a debate at the Oxford Union. It is unprecedented for a prime minister to participate in an Oxford Union debate, but he has agreed to. When he comes to the U.K., she will have a go at him. But she feels that there should be no retaliation. (S)

She then turned to India, saying that she would be calling in on Rajiv Gandhi during a tour of the area. She felt we must give closer attention to India. She knows Rajiv and believes he will wish to be more with us than his mother did. (S)

The President mentioned that he would be visiting the U.S. (S)

Thatcher reiterated that they need to give him some attention. His mother used to say that the U.K. and the West had been good to them personally, but she had to go to the Soviet Union for arms. (S)

The President observed that the U.S. and Britain are on the same track in this regard. (S)

Thatcher then mentioned Nicaragua and said she had given Ortega a stern lecture during his recent visit to London. (S)

The President said he had been overjoyed to learn of the approach she had taken. (S)

Thatcher observed that the Nicaraguans had been very clever with their "election." They did not claim 90% of the votes, but only 61%. This made it seem superficially that an opposition is tolerated. One must go into such matters as censorship and other practices to understand the situation. But the Nicaraguans are having an effect going around the world saying that they have a

democratic government. This is a dangerous tack, because some are taken in by Ortega's apparent reasonableness. She had asked him why he needed such a large army. (S)

The President observed that, in proportion to our respective populations, it was as if there were 300,000 Cuban military advisers in the U.S. and the U.S. army were 35 million strong. (S)

Thatcher said that she had reproached him specifically on this point and had tackled him head-on regarding their reception of the Pope. She told him it had been a disgrace; she had seen what happened on television. He was shamefaced and claimed that there could have been no insult intended to the Pope since the country is 90% Catholic. But she felt that Ortega had gone away concerned by the reception she had given him. (S)

The President reiterated that he was delighted with the way she had handled the visit and that he appreciated it. He recalled that once we had spotted a ship in the Panama Canal which was carrying arms. The Nicaraguans had denied this and claimed that it had only agricultural equipment and had offered to let the "international press" witness the unloading. But when the ship arrived, it turned out that the only "international press" allowed at the dock was a Cuban journalist! (S)

The President then suggested that they join the other guests for lunch and the meeting concluded at 12:30. (U)

6867

24

Matlock

1524

JM-C

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

February 25, 1985

Giffen informed
3/5/85

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT: Request for Appointment with Soviet Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade Sushkov

Jim Giffen, President of the U.S.-USSR Trade and Economic Council, has informed me that Deputy Minister Sushkov will be visiting Washington the week of March 18, and Giffen would like to arrange an appointment with you.

You received Sushkov when he was last in Washington. Given the pressures on your calendar, I do not believe it is necessary for you to do so again. I would recommend, therefore, that I offer to meet with him if he wants an appointment at the NSC.

RWR
Rogers Robinson concurs.

Recommendation:

That I notify Giffen that your calendar will not permit a meeting when Sushkov is in Washington, but that I can receive him if he desires an appointment here.

Approve *JCM* Disapprove

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/2 #6867

BY KML NARA DATE 10/1/12

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

RECEIVED 29 NOV 84 10

TO MCFARLANE

FROM SNYDER, PATRICIA B

DOC DATE 23 NOV 84

MATLOCK

27 NOV 84

MCFARLANE

03 DEC 84

KEYWORDS: USSR

MP

Matlock
SB-C
JH-C

SUBJECT LTR TO MCFARLANE FM ESIPA PROPOSING AMERICAN PLAY IN MOSCOW

ACTION: FOR SIGNATURE

DUE: 27 FEB 85 STATUS S FILES WH

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MCFARLANE

HALL

SHULL

Approved

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

(LB LB)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

	-	2/21	Rec'd Snyder ltr		
<i>Jm</i>	S	2/21	Req Action Necessary	2/27	
<i>Rm</i>	4	2/25	For Signature	2/1	
	C	3/5	Mcfarlane spl ltr		<i>JH, WH</i>

DISPATCH

W/Attch

W/ATTCH FILE

(C)

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 5, 1985

Dear Ms. Snyder:


Thank you for your letter of February 14 which reported the great progress you have made in arranging for a theater exchange with the Moscow Musical Theater for Children. It is an excellent idea and I certainly hope that it can be implemented.

There are still some basic differences in our and the Soviet positions on a new government-to-government cultural exchange agreement, and it is difficult to predict how long it will take to work them out. However, I see no reason why your project should be held hostage to the general agreement. It obviously can stand on its own as an important contribution to better understanding and the cultural enrichment of young people in both countries.

In future meetings with Soviet officials we will make clear our support for this worthy project, and hope that your plans will be approved by the Soviet authorities.

With best regards,

Sincerely,



Robert C. McFarlane

Ms. Patricia B. Snyder
The Empire State Institute for
the Performing Arts
Empire State Plaza
Albany, New York, 12223

RECEIVED 29 NOV 84 10

NSC/D PRO/111

8650

27

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

UNCLASSIFIED

February 25, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

SIGNED

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *[Signature]*

SUBJECT: Letter from Patricia Snyder on Theater Exchange with Moscow Musical Theater for Children

Patricia Snyder has written you again (TAB II) to report on her efforts to arrange for an exchange of theater performances with the Moscow Musical Theater for Children. She reports that most of the details of the exchange have now been settled, but that there has been some delay in obtaining final approval from the Soviet authorities because the cultural exchange agreement has not yet been concluded.

Although a cultural exchange agreement would probably facilitate approval of projects such as this, there is no reason it should not go forward even without an overall agreement. Since it seems to be a worthy project, it might be appropriate for us to mention our interest in seeing it successfully implemented on the margins of the Shcherbitsky visit here (for example, by mention to Bessmertnykh of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs).

I have prepared a reply from you to Ms. Snyder which endorses the project and promises to lend it informal support.

Recommendation:


That you sign the letter at Tab I.

Approve *m* Disapprove

Attachments

- Tab I Letter to Ms. Snyder
- Tab II Incoming Letter

c)



8650 28
FEB 14 1985

ESIPA

February 14, 1985

Mr. Robert C. McFarlane
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. McFarlane:

Thank you for your response to my letter of November 23, 1984 and your kind personal note. At this time, plans for the exchange are going well; however, I would like to accept your kind offer of assistance.

The dates of our exchanges have been agreed to. The Moscow Musical Theatre for Children has accepted to tour to Albany and give performances of THE BLUE BIRD, PETER AND THE WOLF, and present an opera for young people between September 12 and October 5 of 1985. The Empire State Institute for the Performing Arts will tour to Moscow in the last few days of November for performances from December 5 through December 23 of 1985. We will take a new musical of RAGGEDY ANN authored by William Gibson and Joe Raposo, a concert of Sesame Street music led by Joe Raposo who has written much of the music for Sesame Street (as you may know, Mr. Raposo wrote the music for Mrs. Reagan for her adopted grandparents program). In the case of the musical RAGGEDY ANN, it might interest you to know that after first being presented at ESIPA in 1984, it generated great interest, and we hope after the tour to Moscow that we will tour it in the United States and eventually open the production on Broadway in the late Spring of 1986.

When we presented RAGGEDY ANN this past December, we were visited by Natalia Sats, Producer and Artistic Director of the Moscow Musical Theatre for Children, and Irina Mikheeva of the Department of Foreign Relations with the USSR Ministry of Culture. They were both favorably impressed with the production and agreed to its selection for tour to Moscow as I agreed to the selections that will be touring to Albany. The financing for both of our trips is assured. The one remaining problem is indicated in the attached cable that we received today from Moscow; and that is the absence of a

cultural agreement between the USSR and the USA. I have spoken with Dr. John Zimmerman of the Office of Soviet Union Affairs in the U.S. Department of State with regard to the anticipated conclusion of the cultural agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union, and he has told me that it is anticipated that the agreement could be concluded in the coming months.


Many arrangements and details need to be accomplished in the next few months to facilitate the exchange, and at this time I am confident that we have a sufficient amount of time to accomplish our goals. The point of this letter is to ask if there is any way that you can help to facilitate the exchange either by communicating your enthusiasm regarding the exchange to the Minister of Culture for the Soviet Union, Petr N. Demichev, or is there any suggestion you may have to help to solidify this exchange within the next month in the absence of the cultural agreement?

As I mentioned in my earlier communication to you (November 23, 1984) Joe Raposo met with Mrs. Reagan in Los Angeles in November just before Thanksgiving. He told her about the proposed exchange between ESIPA and the Moscow Musical Theatre for Children and that RAGGEDY ANN would be the production that would tour to Moscow. Mr. Raposo said that Mrs. Reagan was most enthusiastic and asked that he contact her after the New Year with regard to the project. Presently we are putting together a short video for presentation to Mrs. Reagan and it is anticipated that both Mr. Raposo and I will meet with her in the not too distant future.

I can assure you that we will attend to every detail in seeing to the Soviet company's comfort, security, housing, transportation, and meals, and we will present them in our theatre in a first-class way. I know we can expect the same treatment because there is a bond of respect between the two producers on both sides of the ocean.

Thank you very much for your consideration. Any advice you can offer me would be most appreciated, and I look forward to hearing from you.

Sincerely,


Patricia B. Snyder
Producing Director

cc: Dr. John Zimmerman
U.S. Department of State



30

February 14, 1985

(Received via telephone from Western Union.
Confirmation copy will follow.)

10:45 a.m.

TO: Patricia B. Snyder

107 words from USSR

Re: C-1160-13.

UNFORTUNATELY CANNOT SOLVE ALL PROBLEMS BEFORE 12TH OF FEBRUARY. ASKING YOUR AGREEMENT TO POSTPONE FINAL ANSWER 10 DAYS MORE. DATES OF YOUR VISITS TO MOSCOW SUITS AND WE WILL BE INTERESTED IN IT. DATES OF OUR VISITS COULD BE ALL RIGHT. OBSTACLE IS ABSENCE OF CULTURAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN USSR AND USA. DOING MY BEST TO OVERCOME THIS OBSTACLE. ASK YOU VERY MUCH TO FACILITATE ALSO WITH THIS QUESTION. HAVE WRITTEN WARM ARTICLE ABOUT YOUR PERFORMANCE WITH YOUR PHOTOGRAPH. PLEASE WAIT FOR MY CABLE THESE DAYS.

SINCERELY,
NATALIA SATS



Matlock
1435

JH-C

Thatcher
Thatcher I
JH03
JH03

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SECRET/SENSITIVE

February 25, 1985

SIGNED

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JF*

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation on the Private Meeting with Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher of Great Britain, February 20, 1985

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Conversation covering the President's private meeting with Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher of Great Britain.

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum from Kimmitt to transmit the Memorandum of Conversation.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you authorize transmission of the Kimmitt-Platt memorandum at Tab I.

Approve K Disapprove

Attachments

- Tab I Kimmitt Memorandum
- Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

- cc: Jock Covey
Constantine Menges
Roger Robinson
Donald Fortier
Robert Linhard
Tyus Cobb
Peter Sommer

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 26, 1997
By CWS NARA, Date 6/13/02

~~_____~~ Matlock 1435 32

1435

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

February 28, 1985

UNCLASSIFIED WITH
SECRET/SENSITIVE ATTACHMENTS

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S) 2/24/05

MEMORANDUM FOR NICHOLAS PLATT
Executive Secretary
Department of State

Colonel R. J. Affourtit
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation on the President's
Private Meeting with Margaret Thatcher of
Great Britain, February 20, 1985.

Attached is the memorandum of conversation covering the
President's private meeting with Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher
of Great Britain on February 20, 1985.

Robert M. Kimmitt
Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary

Attachment

Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Private Meeting with Prime Minister
Margaret Thatcher of Great Britain (U)

PARTICIPANTS: United States
The President
Jack F. Matlock, NSC

United Kingdom
Prime Minister Thatcher
Robin Butler, Principal Private Secretary

DATE, TIME February 20, 1985; 12:10 - 12:30
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

When the photographers had left the Oval Office, the President once again welcomed Prime Minister Thatcher to Washington and expressed regret that the time for their private meeting will be short. (U)

Prime Minister Thatcher said that during the larger meetings she wished to discuss how the U.S. plans to handle the upcoming negotiations with the Soviets in Geneva, to say a few words about the Middle East and to discuss economic questions. But there were a few "small matters" which she wished to mention in private. (S)

The first of these, she continued, related to winding up the Laker affair. The British are trying to settle out of court, since they feel it is best to get the whole matter out of the way so that they can achieve more liberalization in civil air relations. One problem which has developed is with the U.S. Export-Import Bank. The British are trying to persuade the bank to settle for a reasonable sum, and the airlines have agreed to the proposed settlement. She hoped the President could be helpful. She stressed that her government wishes to move toward liberalization and the denationalization of British Airways, and this matter stood in the way. (S)

The President observed that the Exim Bank has autonomy of operation, but we are in communication with the Director. Ambassador Price, in particular, has been trying to work something out, and he (the President) would weigh in if it seemed necessary. (S)

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F06-114/2#6868

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~BY LDI NARA, DATE 11/21/87

Thatcher said that the second matter concerned the British desire to sell a tactical communication system to the U.S. Army. It is a good system, and unlike the competing French system, is compatible with NATO standards. The sale is important because they need to find the money for Trident. (S)

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The President said he was aware of the situation. (U)

Thatcher then turned to New Zealand. She said she knew the President felt strongly about Lange's position on nuclear armed and powered ships, and assured him that she did also. She recalled that she had had no problems with Muldoon, but that Lange had fought the election on an anti-nuclear platform. He had taken the same position with the U.K. as he had with the U.S. She had advised him strongly not to ask whether nuclear weapons were aboard ships. She had pointed out to him that it was impossible to give this information, given the ships' missions. (S)

The President said he felt the same way. We cannot announce which ships have nuclear weapons. And Lange had also taken a position against nuclear-powered vessels. (S)

Thatcher said that she did not have a full report on the implications of denying intelligence cooperation with New Zealand. She knows that intelligence from that area is important, but suspected that we could collect what we need without the New

Zealanders. In any event, she would "have a go at Lange." She said she does not want New Zealand to get out of the English-speaking group of nations, and solicited the President's view. (S)

The President said that we would not agree to notification and that we had cancelled exercises. We have other options -- for example we have large dairy surpluses which could be sold to New Zealand's detriment -- but he has not made a decision to dump them. (S)

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The President observed that he was seeking votes. (S)

Thatcher agreed and said that they must make clear that New Zealand cannot opt out and still be secure. (S)

The President mentioned that Lange would be coming here on his way to the U.K. (S)

Thatcher said yes, he would be participating in a debate at the Oxford Union. It is unprecedented for a prime minister to participate in an Oxford Union debate, but he has agreed to. When he comes to the U.K., she will have a go at him. But she feels that there should be no retaliation. (S)

She then turned to India, saying that she would be calling in on Rajiv Gandhi during a tour of the area. She felt we must give closer attention to India. She knows Rajiv and believes he will wish to be more with us than his mother did. (S)

The President mentioned that he would be visiting the U.S. (U)

Thatcher reiterated that they need to give him some attention. His mother used to say that the U.K. and the West had been good to them personally, but she had to go to the Soviet Union for arms. (S)

The President observed that the U.S. and Britain are on the same track in this regard. (S)

Thatcher then mentioned Nicaragua and said she had given Ramirez a stern lecture during his recent visit to London. (S)

The President said he had been overjoyed to learn of the approach she had taken. (S)

Thatcher observed that the Nicaraguans had been very clever with their "election." They did not claim 90% of the votes, but only 61%. This made it seem superficially that an opposition is tolerated. One must go into such matters as censorship and other practices to understand the situation. But the Nicaraguans are having an effect going around the world saying that they have a

30

democratic government. This is a dangerous tack, because some are taken in by the Nicaraguans' apparent reasonableness. She had asked Ramirez why they needed such a large army. (S)

The President observed that, in proportion to our respective populations, it was as if there were 300,000 Cuban military advisers in the U.S. and the U.S. army were 35 million strong. (S)

Thatcher said that she had reproached him specifically on this point and had tackled him head-on regarding their reception of the Pope. She told him it had been a disgrace; she had seen what happened on television. He was shamefaced and claimed that there could have been no insult intended to the Pope since the country is 90% Catholic. But she felt that Ramirez had gone away concerned by the reception she had given him. (S)

The President reiterated that he was delighted with the way she had handled the visit and that he appreciated it. He recalled that once we had spotted a ship in the Panama Canal which was carrying arms. The Nicaraguans had denied this and claimed that it had only agricultural equipment and had offered to let the "international press" witness the unloading. But when the ship arrived, it turned out that the only "international press" allowed at the dock was a Cuban journalist! (S)

The President then suggested that they join the other guests for lunch and the meeting concluded at 12:30. (U)

6869 1524

11/10/85
JMC
SBA

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

February 25, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JMC*

SUBJECT: Request for Appointment with Soviet Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade Sushkov

Jim Giffen, President of the U.S.-USSR Trade and Economic Council, has informed me that Deputy Minister Sushkov will be visiting Washington the week of March 18, and Giffen would like to arrange an appointment with you.

You received Sushkov when he was last in Washington. Given the pressures on your calendar, I do not believe it is necessary for you to do so again. I would recommend, therefore, that I offer to meet with him if he wants an appointment at the NSC.

RJR
Roger Robinson concurs.

Recommendation:

That I notify Giffen that your calendar will not permit a meeting when Sushkov is in Washington, but that I can receive him if he desires an appointment here.

Approve *JMC* Disapprove

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR F06-114/2 #6869
BY KML NARA DATE 10/1/12

51

Memorandum of Conversation
between Andrei S. Parastaev of the
Soviet Embassy in Washington and
Eugene V. Rostow, former
Director of ACDA
Washington, DC
11 February 1985

Summary. During a luncheon in Washington with Eugene V. Rostow sought out by Andrei S. Parastaev of the Soviet Embassy, Parastaev asked Rostow whether he was optimistic about the prospects for the nuclear arms talks in Geneva. Rostow replied that he was not particularly optimistic because he saw no signs of a change in the basic Soviet position insisting on "equal security" and rejecting Soviet-American equality as the basis for possible nuclear arms agreements, although he had noted with interest that Ambassador Kvitsinskiy was returning to Geneva. After an extended conversation covering most of the issues in the negotiations, during which Parastaev (1) spoke nostalgically of the walk-in-the-woods approach, and attempted to blame the Soviet rejection of that approach on "American leaks" and (2) was notably mild about the S.D.I. dimension of the problem, Parastaev closed by saying that the Soviet Union was anxious to achieve a modus vivendi with the United States as a matter of high urgency. He pointed out that some Soviet diplomats were looking forward to lengthy negotiations in Geneva, but that the problem required prompt and decisive action. Rostow assured him that the United States would welcome agreement based on the principle of equality, and gladly save face for the Soviet Union if it were willing to abandon the notion of "equal security" and make an agreement based on reduction to equal levels, taking the number of warheads and their destructive capacity into account.

Report of Conversation

[In September 1983, Parastaev and Rostow met for the first time at a session of the Edinburgh Conversations, a series of Soviet-British meetings in the Dartmouth-Pugwash mode. Since 1983, a few Americans have been invited. Parastaev has recently been transferred to the Soviet Embassy in Washington from London. His job is to work with non-governmental groups, and he went to some trouble to find Rostow. The conversation reported below took place at a private luncheon involving only the two men.

[The tone of the meeting was amiable, even cordial, with a good deal of humor. Parastaev accepted direct and unvarnished statements (about the Soviet first strike capability, for example) very equably. His presentation of standard Soviet lines of defense seemed almost pro forma, and when Rostow corrected an inaccurate statement, Parastaev went on to another topic without pressing his point or disputing Rostow's, almost with a shrug, in the familiar attitude of the Russian caught trying to get away with something: "You can't blame me for trying. Come, no hard feelings."

DECLASSIFIED

NLS FD-114/2 #6870

BY NOT NARA, DATE 11/21/07

52

[The early part of the conversation dealt with a bet Rostow had made with three of the Soviet delegates to the Edinburgh conference, as reported to Eagleburger at the time. The leader of the Soviet delegation had said that in order to have good arms control agreements we must "trust each other." Rostow said he agreed completely, but that there were obstacles in the way—obstacles that had to be cleared up before there could be trust. For example, there was Vietnam, a painful subject no American was likely to forget for a long time. The Soviet Union had made two agreements with us about peace in Vietnam, in January and March 1973. Those agreements would have been quite satisfactory if they had been carried out. But the Soviets had torn up the agreements and thrown them in our face. At that point the Soviet delegates became quite upset, and three of them spoke with some heat. There were no such agreements, they said; if there were any, they were made by the Vice-Consul in Hanoi; and anyway, the agreements were "typical Kissinger deceptions of American public opinion." Not wanting to compromise the conference, Rostow intervened to say that in his family on occasions like this, when people were disputing facts, he would offer a bet of \$100,000 on one side or the other. He would bet the Russians \$100,000 that the text of the agreements supported his position. Everyone relaxed. The Russians laughed, and said they were not rich bourgeois and couldn't afford \$100,000, but would a bottle of vodka do? It was agreed that there would be a bet for three bottles of vodka, and the conversation was resumed—but not about "trusting" each other. The American Consul General in Edinburgh got the documents over night. The Russians agreed Rostow had won the bet. The episode was treated as a joke. Parastaev said he had dined out on the story all over Moscow. He was chagrined to discover that the champagne, caviar, and vodka he claimed to have left for Rostow with Professor Erickson (of Edinburgh, the organizer of the conference) had never been delivered. "My honor is at stake," Parastaev said, "and perhaps even the chance of success in Geneva. I will see to it that the bet is paid."]

1. Parastaev said that he and the other Soviet delegates to Edinburgh had expected Rostow to come to Moscow after the Edinburgh meeting and were disappointed that the visit did not materialize. Rostow reiterated what he had said in Edinburgh—that he and his wife were most interested in going to Russia, which they had never seen, but that no invitation had come along since Edinburgh. Again, Parastaev blamed Professor Erickson for the confusion. He said Rostow was persona grata in the Soviet Union (Rostow remarked you'd never guess it from reading the Soviet newspapers) and pressed Rostow for suitable dates. He said he would arrange a visit for Rostow in May or June, preferably for Rostow to give a lecture and meet with a number of groups interested in foreign affairs and international law at the University or the Academy. Parastaev accurately recalled two points Rostow had emphasized in Edinburgh—that the real cause of tension between the Soviet Union and the United States was Soviet aggression, not arms control, and that the legal concepts of aggression and self defense were not nearly so ambiguous as some people claimed. Law students in the Soviet Union and the West would write similar answers to examination questions on these matters, and receive the same grades.

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This phase of the conversation led to a discussion of the 1982 walk-in-the-woods episode, about which Parastaev appeared positively nostalgic, although he acknowledged that the walk-in-the-woods formula and subsequent American INF positions called for equal American and Soviet quotas.

What was so difficult for them about the walk-in-the-woods approach, Parastaev said, was the American propensity to leak. Rostow replied that the United States had kept perfect security about the incident for a very long time. The discussions took place in July, he said, and the Soviet Union rejected the proposal vehemently in September. Parastaev interrupted to say that the United States had also rejected the Ambassadors' trial balloon, but he backed off when Rostow said the United States had never rejected it. There was no leak, Rostow continued, until Christmas time, when a story appeared in the Chicago Tribune, originating in a French governmental leak from Paris. It received no attention from the world press, a phenomenon Rostow said he found difficult to understand. Rostow also noted that Soviet public diplomacy about the Geneva talks was very active. General Staradubov, for example, had written an article in the Los Angeles Times misrepresenting the American negotiating position in START. Rostow had--gently--corrected Staradubov in September 1982.

5. Rostow said he had noted with interest Kvitsinskiy's return to Geneva. Kvitsinskiy had told us he was severely criticized for sponsoring the walk-in-the-woods approach. Parastaev made no comment on the possible significance of Kvitsinskiy's assignment.

6. Parastaev said the Soviet Union was interested in a modus vivendi with the United States and that the question was urgent. Some Soviet diplomats were looking forward to long periods of negotiation on the shores of Lake Geneva and other agreeable places, but the problem should be addressed "urgently." Rostow agreed. In his view, the situation could easily get out of hand. He was confident the Soviet negotiators would find the United States receptive both to a nuclear arms agreement based on the principle of equality and to a broader modus vivendi addressing the root problem of aggression. If the nuclear arms agreement rested firmly on equal Soviet and American quotas, taking into account the number of weapons and their destructive capability, Rostow said he was sure the United States would be sympathetic to helping the Soviet Union save face. Parastev said the problem was not one of saving face, but of moving quickly. Rostow said he himself was not afraid of using phrases like "equal security" and "peaceful coexistence," although Soviet experts always told him we should never use the phrase "peaceful coexistence" because of what Lenin had said on the subject. Parastaev replied, rather solemnly, that what Lenin had said was a correct response to the circumstances at the time but should not be treated as if the words were carved in stone.

54

2. Parastaev asked whether Rostow was optimistic about the prospects in Geneva. Rostow replied that he was not particularly optimistic because he saw no signs of a change in the basic Soviet position, which was to reject the principle of Soviet-American equality as the foundation for the agreements and to press instead for what they called "equal security." Rostow said it was his judgment as a private citizen that the administration would never accept the Soviet position, and that in any event no agreement based on it would be approved by the Senate or by Congress as a whole. To the United States, the Soviet insistence on "equal security" meant that the Soviet Union was not interested in deterrence, but was asking us to accept the "right" of the Soviet Union to have a first strike capacity—that is, a position of permanent nuclear superiority which would have extremely serious political effects in the West, and lead to dangerous tension and instability.

3. This exchange was the principal focus of the conversation, which covered most aspects of the problem. Only positions of some novelty taken by Parastaev will be noted here.

4. Parastaev said that despite what Rostow had said in Edinburgh, and written elsewhere, he could not understand why the British and French weapons should not be counted on the American side. Britain and France were American allies, were they not? Rostow rehearsed the reasons why British, French, Chinese, or Israeli weapons or nuclear potentials should not be considered in evaluating the deterrent effect of the Soviet and American arsenals. The Soviets knew very well, he said, that the British and French forces were not a threat to them, but existed for quite different purposes. Parastaev agreed that in themselves British and French forces could not threaten the Soviet Union.

Parastaev raised the question of the American Strategic Defense Initiative as a change in the negotiating problem, but agreed promptly when Rostow pointed out that dealing with defensive weapons made the present agenda for Geneva exactly the same as that for SALT I. When Rostow said that there were only three ways in which the present Soviet first strike potentiality could be overcome—(1) a crash American building program; (2) effective missile defenses which might require 80 or 90 percent rather than 25 or 30 percent of the Soviet force to destroy our ground based nuclear weapons, our planes on the ground, and our submarines in port; or (3) nuclear arms agreements based on the principle of equality—Parastaev strongly emphasized that nuclear arms agreements were the best way to proceed.

Rostow said that he had recently had an extended discussion with friends and colleagues working on a draft report of a private arms control committee about the fact that the Soviet Union favored equal reductions, not reductions to equal levels. In some circumstances, equal reductions could make existing instabilities worse. There was nothing unfair in the idea of reductions to equal levels. Under the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922, for example, we sank much more naval tonnage than any other power.

SM-C 38
1018
Matter

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 26, 1985

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

I would like to thank you, and through you the Diplomatic Corps in Washington, for your birthday greetings and wishes for good health and happiness.

Permit me to extend my own greetings to you and the members of the Corps, along with the hope that peace and prosperity will prevail in all lands.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

His Excellency Anatoly F. Dobrynin
Dean of the Diplomatic Corps
Washington, D.C.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

1018

February 25, 1985

ACTION

SIGNED

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE 

SUBJECT: Letter to Soviet Ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin

Issue:

Response to letter from Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin.

Facts:

Soviet Ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin, acting in his capacity as Dean of the Diplomatic Corps, sent you birthday greetings on February 5, 1985 (Tab B).

Discussion:

The State Department has forwarded a proposed response for your signature (Tab A). Speechwriters have cleared the text.

RECOMMENDATION

OK No



That you sign the letter to Ambassador Dobrynin at Tab A.

Attachment:

- Tab A Letter to Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin
- Tab B Incoming letter

Prepared by:
Jack F. Matlock

cc Vice President

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

February 15, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

SIGNED

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Birthday Greetings to President Reagan from Heads of State

I have reviewed and concur in the proposed reply at Tab A prepared by the State Department to Soviet Ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin, acting in his capacity as Dean of the Diplomatic Corps. A memorandum to the President is at Tab I. Speechwriters have cleared the text of the response.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Approve *JFM*

Disapprove _____

Attachment:

- Tab I Memorandum to the President
- Tab A Letter to Soviet Ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin
- Tab B Incoming letter, State's memo

1018

4

DEAN OF THE DIPLOMATIC CORPS
WASHINGTON, D. C.


February 5, 1985

My dear Mr. President,

On behalf of my colleagues - ambassadors accredited in Washington and on my own behalf I would like to extend to you our best birthday greetings.

At the beginning of your next term in the highest office of the United States the Diplomatic Corp wishes you good health and happiness. All of us are looking forward to working with you, Mr. President, towards our main common goal - longlasting peace on Earth.

With best personal regards,



Anatoly F. DOBRYNIN

The Honorable
Ronald W. REAGAN
The President



10170
42

Washington, D.C. 20520

UNCLASSIFIED

February 12, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Presidential Reply to Dobrynin's Birthday Message

Soviet Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, acting in his capacity as Dean of the Diplomatic Corps, has sent the President greetings on the occasion of his birthday (Tab B). Attached (Tab A) is a draft reply for the President's signature.

B. McK...
for Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary

Attachments:

- Tab A: Draft Presidential Reply.
- Tab B: Ambassador Dobrynin's Birthday Message.

UNCLASSIFIED

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SUGGESTED REPLY

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

I would like to thank you, and through you the Diplomatic Corps in Washington, for your birthday greetings and wishes for good health and happiness.

Permit me to extend my own greetings to you and to the members of the Corps, along with the hope that peace and prosperity will prevail in your own lands.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

His Excellency Anatoly F. Dobrynin,
Dear of the Diplomatic Corps,
Washington, D.C.

all 44
2-20-85

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SUGGESTED REPLY

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

I would like to thank you, and through you the Diplomatic Corps in Washington, for your birthday greetings and wishes for good health and happiness.

Permit me to extend my own greetings to you and to the members of the Corps, along with the hope that peace and prosperity will prevail in ^{all} ~~your own~~ lands.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

His Excellency Anatoly F. Dobrynin,
Dean of the Diplomatic Corps,
Washington, D.C.

REFERRAL

DATE: 07 FEB 85

MEMORANDUM FOR: STATE SECRETARIAT

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION:

TO: PRESIDENT

SOURCE DOBRYNIN, ANATOLY

DATE: 05 FEB 85

KEYWORDS: USSR

HS

SUBJ: BIRTHDAY GREETINGS TO PRES FM HEADS OF STATE

REQUIRED ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS / DRAFT REPLY FOR PRES

SIG

DUE DATE: 11 FEB 85

COMMENTS


FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

~~Matlock~~ JMC

46

National Security Council
The White House

System # I.

Package # 1585

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bob Pearson	<u>1</u>	<u>P</u>	
Bob Kimmitt	<u>2</u>	<u>K</u>	
John Poindexter	<u>3</u>		
Paul Thompson	<u>4</u>	<u>T</u>	
Wilma Hall	<u>5</u>		
Bud McFarlane	<u>6</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>A</u>
Bob Kimmitt <i>LKP</i>	<u>7</u>	<u>P</u>	
NSC Secretariat	<u>8</u>		<u>D</u>
Situation Room			
<i>Floume</i>	<u>3</u>	<u>Done</u>	<u>Corrections</u>

I = Information **A = Action** R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 1, 1985


Dear Gene:

Thank you very much for your letter of February 22, and for keeping me informed of your contacts with Parastaev.

His comments are indeed of interest, since most Soviet official interlocutors are not as relaxed as he seemed to be on SDI, and some of his other comments were not the ones we usually hear from Soviet officials. Of course, as you point out, he could have been attempting to ingratiate himself with you and might have strayed from the prevailing Soviet view on some of these points. Still, it is of considerable interest to know that he expressed these views.

With warm regards,

Sincerely,



Mr. Eugene V. Rostow
Institute for National Strategic
Studies
National Defense University
Washington, D.C. 20319

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

UNCLASSIFIED

February 27, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM:

JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SIGNED

SUBJECT:

Letter from Eugene Rostow

Gene Rostow wrote you on February 22 to report on a meeting he had with Andrei Parastaev of the Soviet Embassy in Washington. Parastaev's comments on SDI were milder than most we are hearing from Soviet officials, and it is interesting to note that he spoke "nostalgically" of the "Walk-in-the-Woods" formula, attributing its rejection by the Soviets to U.S. leaks. As Rostow points out in his comment, the facts do not fit this explanation of the Soviet rejection, but it is nevertheless interesting that a well-informed Soviet official would suggest that the formula has attractions.

It is difficult to know how much of Parastaev's comments reflect views held on high in Moscow, and how much were an attempt to ingratiate himself with Rostow.

A letter from you thanking Rostow for keeping you informed is at TAB I.

Recommendation:

That you sign the letter at TAB I.

Approve Disapprove

Attachments:

Tab I Letter to Mr. Eugene Rostow
 Tab A Incoming Correspondence

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

To Jack Matlock
for short ack
back to
Gene pl.

Buel



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20319

15 February 1985

9
FEB 22 1985

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF:

Institute for National Strategic Studies

The Honorable Robert C. McFarlane
National Security Advisor to the President
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, DC 20006

Dear Bud,

I assume that the approach taken by Parastaev in my lunch with him yesterday is the standard line they are peddling these days, but I thought it might be of use to you anyway. I suppose the message of paragraph 6 was the point of the exercise.

As always,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Gene", is written above the typed name.

Eugene V. Rostow

55

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Chron

February 27, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: White House Tour for Soviet Citizens

Five Soviet Government officials, here to discuss civil aviation matters, are interested in getting tickets for the VIP tour of the White House. I have no objection to this. Nick has contacted Debbie Hutton, informing her that the East Wing visitors office has tickets available. Debbie will reserve the tickets for the visitors, contingent upon your final approval.

Kd & *Nick K. for G.R.*
Ken DeGraffenreid and Gilbert Rye concur.

RECOMMENDATION

Can we tour the Kremlin?

That you sign the memo to Debbie Hutton, which okays the tour for the Soviet officials.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab I

Memo to Hutton

Tab II

Incoming, with background papers

54

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

MEMORANDUM FOR DEBBIE HUTTON

FROM: ROBERT M. KIMMITT

SUBJECT: White House Tour for Soviet Citizens

We have reviewed and find no objection to providing tickets for the VIP White House tour to the five Soviet officials you mention in your memo of February 27, 1985. Additionally, Ms. Cindy Herrick of the East Wing Visitors Office (x2867) reports that tickets are available for the VIP tour on Friday, March 1, 1985. Please contact her directly to make the appropriate arrangements.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

58
Chiron
Matlock

ACTION

February 27, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK/TYRUS W. COBB

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Richard Allen

You are slated to have lunch with Dick Allen tomorrow and he will want to raise with you the IDU conference in July and the Strauss "Festschrift."

- Peter had written you earlier passing on State's views on the IDU meeting and the Strauss volume. State had recommended that we await clarification as to who is in fact coming before making a commitment for the President to meet with the IDU leaders attending the conference. Further, State opposed the concept of the President contributing to a chapter of a book honoring CSU party chairman Franz-Josef Strauss on his 70th birthday. In your response you disagreed with both recommendations.
- In your meeting with Dick you might probe further to see if he has any further indications of who will be attending the IDU "Political Party Leaders Conference" in late July (we have conflicting information on Thatcher's plans). We should indicate that the President would certainly meet with the foreign leaders attending the IDU conference, and that you will propose that the President host a dinner. (Dick Allen told Walt Raymond earlier this week that he expects a number of key conservative leaders to attend the conference.) You should be cautious about committing to private meetings, since as many as 20 leaders may attend, and it would be difficult to pick and choose.
- On the Strauss volume, you might ask Dick if he has received any commitment from other world leaders. His proposed volume includes contributions from Mitterrand, Thatcher, Kohl and other statesmen. You may wish to indicate to him that if he receives a commitment from Kohl and either Mitterrand or Thatcher we would be inclined to endorse a Presidential contribution. (If Kohl does not contribute -- or if other chiefs of state or government do not do so -- it would seem anomalous for the President to contribute.)

RECOMMENDATION

- 1. That you indicate that the President would probably be inclined to meet with world leaders attending the IDU conference and you plan to propose that he host a dinner.

Let's see who is more likely

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

- 2. That you inquire about the status of contributions to the Strauss volume from other world leaders and indicate our inclination to participate should Kohl and Thatcher or Mitterrand agree.

Approve RCM _____ Disapprove _____

Walt Raymond is sending a separate memo.

FEB 23 1985

RICHARD V. ALLEN

905 SIXTEENTH STREET, N. W.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20006

February 22, 1985

TELEPHONE (202) 737-2824

Dear Bud:

In connection with the proposed book ("Festschrift") to Minister-President Franz Josef Strauss on the occasion of his 70th birthday, I am sending herewith a copy of the outline of the volume.

The editors of the book will be former President Carl Carstens, Alfonz Goppel, Henry Kissinger and, hopefully, Leopold Senghor.

It is highly desirable to have a response at some early date as to the prospective contribution of the President. As I mentioned, this could ideally be a short statement derived from an existing speech or other message. It need not be terribly complicated and long, and it would form a central part of the proposed book.

The subject would be some theme on the North Atlantic community, focusing on anything the President may wish to say.

Also attached is a copy of the original telex received in German from Dr. Wolfgang Piller, Chief Assistant to Franz Josef Strauss.

Would it be possible for you to give me a preliminary indication about this matter quite soon?

With best regards,

Sincerely,

Richard V. Allen

RVA:pso
Enclosures

The Honorable Robert C. McFarlane
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

*41 Rem being
sent to RVA
on Feb 28*

TRANSLATION

61

1. DRAFT

January 31, 1985

TRANSLATION:

Dear Mr. Allen:

Unfortunately, this telex could not be sent off any earlier because I had to accompany MP Strauss on an unexpected trip to Paris.

I am now in a position to give you a broad outline for the tribute in honour of the 70th birthday of Franz Josef Strauss. So far this is only an internal concept and I would appreciate if you would not pass it on to anyone at this stage.

We have a large number of acceptances already from Bundespraesident a.d. Prof. Carl Carstens, Bundespraesident von Weizsaecker, Bundeskanzler Kohl und Henry Kissinger and many others.

Not all politicians included in the concept below have been officially invited yet, because - as in the case of President Reagan - some inofficial contacts are necessary.

With respect to your own contribution, you will be contacted by Dr. Pfahls.

With best wishes

Dr. W. Piller

62

Tribute for MP Franz Josef Strauss on the occasion of his 70th birthday.

Editors : Henry Kissinger, Carl Carstens, Alfons Goppel, Leopold Senghor(?).

A) The Foundation

I. Career

1. Origin and Family (Maria Strauss)
2. Education and Military (V.Tucher, Vogel, Kohlmann, Bengtson)
3. Franz Josef Strauss and the CSU (Heubl)

I. -- The roots of the Christian and Social Policy--

1. Policy founded in Christian spirit (Ratzinger?)
2. The historic dimension: Moderate and Conservative policies in Weimar and Bonn (Golo Mann)

III.-- The age of science and technology--

1. The need and scope for political action in times of scientific and technological revolution (Luest)
2. The age of information-- new technology (Steinbuch)
3. The scope for art and policy in times of technology (Everding)

B)--The field of activity--

I.-- Bavaria--

1. Bavaria's long traditions (Albrecht von Bayern)
2. Bavaria's history until the foundation of the Federal Republik of Germany (Spindler)
3. Bavaria's role and impact within the federal system
4. The safeguarding of Bavaria's legal system (Hillermeier)
5. Bavaria's development into a modern industrial state and the safeguard of the environment (Petervon Siemens, Nixdorf)
6. Bavaria's contribution to the "Deutschlandpolitik" (Last German MP Conference 1947, Grundlagenvertragsurteil des BVFG July 1973, Franz Josef Strauss' policies towards the German Democratic Republic (Kraus).

II. --Germany--

1. Franz Josef Strauss: His personality and authority in the political arena (von Weizsaecker)
2. The chances and conditions for a German reunification in the 19th and 20th century - a comparison. (movement of 1848, Bismarck Reich, today) (Stuermer)
3. The notion/concept of democracy in the German constitution (Grundgesetz) and the present discussion on democracy in Germany (Carstens)
4. Franz Josef Strauss and the "Parliamentarian Democracy" (Strauch)

- 5. The Federal system
 - A) Constitution and Reality (Lerche)
 - B) The political stability of southern Germany (Lothar Spaeth)
- 6. The era of reconstruction
 - A) The system of state and constitution (Zimmermann)
 - B) Economic and financial reconstruction (HermannJosef Abs)
 - C) Political parties and their responsibilities (Ka.Schiller)
 - D) The social system (Katzner)
- 7. The Federal Republik today: its political and economic impact , its potential for the future. (Helmut Kohl)

III. --The "construction" of peace: Europe--Atlantic Alliance--

- 1. The North Atlantic Community (Reagan)
- 2. Perspectives of a modern industrial society- -example Great Britain (Thatcher)
- 3. Europe--A refuge for peace (Pertini)
- 4. The future of the European political cooperation (Francois Mitterrand)
- 5. The Iberic Peninsula and its impact on Europe (Felipe Gonzalez)
- 6. The challenge of Europe
- 7. NATO --a community of common values and defense--(Lord Carrington)
- 8. The separation of the world and solutions (Henry Kissinger)
- 9. CSU and EDU, EVP (Mock, Tindemans)

IV. --Focal point Middle East--

- 1. Israel (Perez)
- 2. Arab World (Mubarak)

V. --"The Third World"--

- Africa, Latin America, Asia:
- Leopold Senghor or
- Kaunda
- Duarte
- Deng Xiao Ping
- Nakasone

VI. --The chances for a system of international peace--
containment and detente (Glucksman, Kopel)

VII. --personal dedications to FJS--

(this is an opportunity for well-known personalities to write about encounters with FJS i.e. Kiesinger, Moeller, Kreisky, Scheel, Maier-Leibnitz, Schmueckle, Dollinger, Bergdorfer-Weichner and other cabinet members. Also, representatives of other orgnsisations i.e. the young generation, the farmers, the handicapped etc.

As a closing chapter, original comments by FJS on major political issues could be published.

64

HERRN
RICHARD ALLEN
WASHINGTON

JAN 3 | 1985

LIEBER MR. ALLEN (AUSRZ)

LEIDER KONNTE ICH NICHT SOFORT AM MONTAG VORMITTAG DIESE TELEKOPIE AN SIE ABSETZEN, DA ICH GANZ UEBERRASCHEND MIT DEM HERRN MINISTERPRAESIDENTEN NACH PARIS REISEN MUSSTE. IM NACHFOLGENDEN UEBERMITTLE ICH IHNEN DAS KONZEPT FUER DIE FESTSCHRIFT ZUM 70 GEBURTSTAG VON FRANZ JOSEF STRAUZ. ES HANDELT SICH BISHER NUR UM EINE INTERNE PLANUNG. DESWEGEN BITTE ICH SIE SEHR HERZLICH, DIE UNTERLAGEN NOCH NICHT WEITERZUGEBEN. ES LIEGEN ZAHLREICHE ZUSAGEN BISHER VOR (SEMI) SO Z.B. VON BUNDESPRAESIDENT A.D. PROF. CARSTENS, BUNDESPRAESIDENT VON WEIZSAECKER, BUNDESKANZLER KOHL UND HENRY KISSINGER UND VIELEN ANDEREN. DIE IN ABSCHNITT III (ROEM3) DES KONZEPTS VORGESEHENEN POLITIKER DER HOECHSTEN RANGORDNUNG SIND ABER NOCH NICHT ALLE AUF OFFIZIELLEM WEGE UM EINEN BEITRAG GEBETEN WORDEN, DA INFORMELLE FUEHLUNGNAHMEN - WIE IM VORLIEGENDEN FALL UEBER SIE MIT PRAESIDENT REAGAN - NOCH STATTFINDEN MUESSEN.

WEGEN IHRES EIGENEN BEITRAGS WIRD HERR DR. PFAHLS MIT IHNEN VERBINDUNG AUFNEHMEN.

MIT FREUNDLICHEN GRUESSEN
UND BESTEM DANK FUER IHRE BEMUEHUNGEN
IHR
DR. WOLFGANG PILLER

FESTSCHRIFT ZUM 70. GEBURTSTAG
DES BAYERISCHEN MINISTERPRAESIDENTEN FRANZ JOSEF STRAUZ

(3. KONZEPT)

HERAUSGEBER: --HENRY KISSINGER - KARL CARSTENS - ALFONS GOPPEL--
EVTL. LEOPOLD SENGHOR

A) --DIE GRUNDLAGEN--

I. WERDEGANG

1. HERKUNFT UND FAMILIE (MARIA STRAUZ)
2. SCHULE, STUDIUM UND MILITAERZEIT (V. TUCHER, VOGEL, KOHLMANN. BENGTON)
3. FRANZ JOSEF STRAUZ UND DIE CSU (HEUBL)

II. --WURZELN CHRISTLICHER-SOZIALER POLITIK--

1. POLITIK AUS CHRISTLICHEM GEIST (RATZINGER ?)
2. HISTORISCHE PERSPEKTIVEN: LIBERALE UND KONSERVATIVE POLITIK IN WEIMAR UND BONN (GOLO MANN)

III. --DAS NATURWISSENSCHAFTLICH-TECHNISCHE ZEITALTER--

1. POLITISCHER HANDLUNGSBEDARF UND -SPIELRAUM IM

65

NATURWISSENSCHAFTLICH-TECHNISCHEN ZEITALTER
(LUEST)

2. DAS INFORMATIONSZEITALTER - NEUE MEDIEN (STEINBUCH)
3. KUNST UND POLITIK IM TECHNISCHEN ZEITALTER
(EVERDING)

B) --DIE ARBEITSFELDER--

I. --BAYERN--

1. BAYERNS UNGEBROCHENE TRADITION (ALBRECHT VON BAYERN)
2. DER WEG BAYERNS BIS ZUR GRUENDUNG DES BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND (SPINDLER)
3. BAYERNS ROLLE UND AUFGABE IM FOEDERATIVEN SYSTEM (GOPPEL)
4. DIE WAHRUNG DER RECHTSORDNUNG IN BAYERN (HILLERMETER)
5. WANDLUNG BAYERNS ZUM MODERNEN INDUSTRIESTAAT BEI ERHALTUNG DER UMWELT (PETER VON SIEMENS, NIXDORF)
6. BAYERN BEITRAEGE ZUR DEUTSCHLANDPOLITIK (LETZTE

GESAMTDEUTSCHE MINISTERPRAESIDENTEN-KONFERENZ 1947,
GRUNDLAGENVERTRAGSURTEIL DES BVFG VOM JULI 1973,
WEICHENSTELLUNG IM VERHAELTNIS ZUR DDR 1983 DURCH
FRANZ JOSEF STRAUZ) (KRAUS)

II. --DEUTSCHLAND--

1. AMT, PERSON UND AUTORITAET IN DER POLITIK (VON WEIZSAECKER)
2. MOEGlichkeiten UND BEDINGUNGEN FUER DIE EINHEIT DEUTSCHLAND IM 19. UND 20. JAHRHUNDERT - EIN VERGLEICH (48ER BEWEGUNG, BISMARCK-REICH, HEUTIGE LAGE) (STUERMER)
3. DER DEMOKRATIEBEGRIFF DES GG UND DIE GEGENWAERTIGE DEMOKRATIE-DISKUSSION (CARSTENS)
4. FRANZ JOSEF STRAUZ UND DIE PARLAMENTARISCHE DEMOKRATIE (STUECKLEN)
5. DAS FOEDERATIVE SYSTEM
 - A) VERFASSUNG UND WIRKLICHKEIT (LERCHE)
 - B) DIE POLITISCHE STABILITAET DES DEUTSCHEN SUESENS (LOTHAR SPAETH)

6.5.

- DER WIEDERAUFBAU
 - A) STAATS- UND VERFASSUNGSORDNUNG (ZIMMERMANN)
 - B) WIRTSCHAFTLICHER UND FINANZIELLER AUFBAU (HERMANN JOSEF ABS)
 - C) PARTEIEN IN DER VERANTWORTUNG UND PARTEI-GRENZEN (KA. SCHILLER)
 - D) SOZIALE ORDNUNG (KATZER)

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6. DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND HEUTE, IHRE POLITISCHE UND WIRTSCHAFTLICHE BEDEUTUNG, MOEGlichkeiten ZUKUENFTIGER ENTWICKLUNG (KOHL)

III. --EUROPAEISCH-ATLANTISCHE FRIEDENSARCHITEKTUR--

1. DIE NORDATLANTISCHE GEMEINSCHAFT (REAGAN)
2. PERSPEKTIVEN EINER MODERNEN INDUSTRIEGESELLSCHAFT - BEISPIEL GROSSBRITANNIEN (THATCHER)
3. EUROPA, HORT DER FREIHEIT (PERTINI)
4. ZUKUNFT UND CHANCEN DER EUROPAEISCHEN POLITISCHEN ZUSAMMENARBEIT (FRANCOIS MITTERRAND)
5. DIE IBERISCHE HALBINSEL UND IHRE BEDEUTUNG FUER EUROPA (FELIPE GONZALES)
6. EUROPA IN DER BEWAHRUNG
7. DIE NATO ALS WERT- UND VERTEIDIGUNGSGEMEINSCHAFT (LORD CARRINGTON)
8. DIE TEILUNG DER WELT, UND WIE SIE ZU UEBERWINDEN IST (KISSINGER)
9. CSU UND EDU, EVP (MOCK, TINDEMANS)

IV. --BRENNPUNKT NAHER OSTEN--

1. ISRAEL (PEREZ)
2. ARABISCHE WELT (MUBARAK)

V. --DIE ' 'DRITTE ' ' WELT

AFRIKA, LATEINAMERIKA, ASIEN:
- LEOPOLD SENGHOR ODER

- KAUNDA
- DUARTE
- DENG XIAO PING
- NAKASONE

VI. --MOEGlichkeiten EINER INTERNATIONALEN FRIEDENS-
ORDNUNG--

A~~B~~SCHRECKUNG UND ENTSPANNUNG (GLUCKSMANN, KOPELXXXXXXXXX)

A BSCHRECKUNG UND ENTSPANNUNG (GLUCKSMANN, KOPELEW)

VII. --WIDMUNGEN AN FRANZ JOSEF STRAUZ--

(HIER KOENNEN BEKANNTE PERSOENlichkeiten IHRE BEGEGNUNG MIT FRANZ JOSEF STRAUZ DARSTELLEN, U.A

.: KIESINGER,
MOELLER, KREISKY, SCHEEL, MAIER-LEIBNITZ, SCHMUECKLE,
DOLLINGER, BERGHOFER-WEICHNER UND ANDERE KABINETTS-

RICHARD V. ALLEN COMPANY

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MITGLIEDER, FERNER VERTRETER DER JUGEND, DER VER-
TRIEBENEN, DER BAUERN, DER BEHINDERTEN USW.

FERNER KOENNEN IM SCHLUSSTEIL ORIGINALSTELLUNGNAMEN
VON FRANZ JOSEF STRAUZ ZU BRENNENDEN POLITISCHEN
PROBLEMEN ABGEDRUCKT WERDEN.

ENDE+++

UEBERM. 0935 UZHR

RV ALLEN WSH

523809 BYMPR D

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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SB *lax*

COBB

February 27, 1985

- ~~Refer~~
- Jack
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hold d.l.e

Dear Joe:

Thanks so much for letting me know about the CSIS European Working Group that will be in Washington in March. As you note, you have assembled a highly talented and influential group of political, military and media leaders.

I would very much like to meet with your group, although my schedule will be very tight on March 14-15 as we finalize preparations for the President's trip to Canada. Let me suggest that I have the NSC's European group meet with the CSIS Working Group and I will sit in as much as I can. If this is satisfactory, you should contact Jack Matlock or Ty Cobb (395-5076) directly.

Sincerely,



Robert C. McFarlane

Mr. Amos A. Jordan
President
Chief Executive Officer
Center for Strategic & International Studies
Washington, D. C.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

February 22, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

SIGNED

FROM: JACK MAPLOCK/TY COBB

SUBJECT: Possible Meeting with European Working Group

Joe Jordan at CSIS has written you (Tab A), asking if you would meet briefly with members of the CSIS European Working Group sometime during the period March 14-15. Included in the group are some of Europe's most influential political, military and media leaders. The group was founded in order to improve the transatlantic dialogue and inter-alliance consensus.

Your schedule is always tight, but we would suggest that you do a drop-by for 10-15 minutes, as part of a longer meeting we would arrange with the NSC's Soviet/European and Defense groups in Room 208.

RECOMMENDATION

1. That you agree to do a 10-15 minute drop-by at a meeting in Room 208 on March 14 or 15 with the CSIS European Working Group, and sign the reply to General Jordan at Tab 1.

Approve Disapprove

2. Alternatively, that you regret that you will not be able to meet with the group and sign the reply to Jordan at Tab 2.

Approve Disapprove

Attachment

Tab 1	Letter to Jordan
Tab 2	Letter to Jordan
	Tab A - CSIS Incoming



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Center for Strategic & International Studies
Georgetown University • Washington DC

→ stopping
cc W. Hall
P. Shoup

Amos A. Jordan
President
Chief Executive Officer

February 7, 1985

The Honorable Robert C. McFarlane
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Bud:

I am writing in the hope that it will be possible for you to ~~briefly visit~~ ~~the~~ ~~group~~ ~~of~~ ~~theirs~~ ~~to~~ ~~Washington~~ ~~and~~ ~~it~~ ~~is~~ We would like to meet at a time of your convenience any time during those two days, in a conference room convenient to your office.

We founded this group a few years ago in order to improve the transatlantic dialogue and the prospects for consensus amongst senior individuals of diverse nationalities, professional background and political belief. As the attached list attests, the membership reflects these goals. Included in the group are some of Europe's most influential political, military, and media leaders. Their periodic meetings in Europe, their frequent discussion papers, and their annual visits to Washington have afforded this group considerable impact. On previous visits to Washington, they have met with a number of Cabinet-level officers. President Reagan has contributed to a book on the Western Alliance, edited by the chairman of the group, which we understand was distributed to members of the cabinet.

A number of the group will be in Washington in March in order to discuss a paper they have prepared on anti-Americanism in Europe. The heretofore successful format for their Washington meetings has consisted of a 10-15 minute summary of the paper by Brian Beedham, foreign editor of The Economist, followed by general and off-the-record discussion. If you would find another format to be preferable, we would be happy to comply.

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I very much hope you will be able to meet with the group. They would benefit from your insights, and I am confident that you would find their perspectives of value. Please have someone from your staff contact my Executive Assistant, Brad Roberts, at 775-3248 to set up a fixed time or to confirm your unavailability.

Thank you for your consideration.

Sincerely,



Amos A. Jordan

AAJ:lcw



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Center for Strategic & International Studies
Georgetown University • Washington DC

EUROPEAN WORKING GROUP

Brian Beedham, Foreign Editor, The Economist
Fritz Bolkenstein, Minister of Foreign Trade, The Netherlands
Marghareta Boniver, International Secretary, Italian Socialist Party
Emile Boursier, Vice President, Delegeue General de l'Union des
Industries Metallurgiques et Mineres
Irving Brown, Director of International Affairs, AFL-CIO
Peter Courterier, Member of the West German Parliament and President
of the Atlantic Treaty Association
Maurice Faure, Member, French Senate
Joseph Godson, CSIS Overseas Representative in London and group chair
Eric Hammond, President of the British Electricians Union
Evald von Kleist, Chairman, Wehrkunde
David Lomax, Chief Economic Adviser, National Westminster Bank
General Gerd Schmuckle, former Deputy Commander of SHAPE
Peter Shore, Shadow Leader of the House of Commons
Henri Simonet, former Belgian Foreign Minister
Lord Thomas, Chairman, Centre for Policy Studies
Edward Wauters, Managing Director, Belgian Kredietbank
Ray Whitney, Member of Parliament, House of Commons
Alan Lee Williams, Director General of the English Speaking Union