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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

**Withdrawer**

JET 10/31/1985

**File Folder** 1985 CORRESPONDENCE RELATED MATERIALS (5/5)

**FOIA**

F06-114/1

**Box Number** 7

YARHI-MILO

712

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
6593	MEMO	MCFARLANE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE LETTER TO GORBACHEV [11] <b>R 2/17/2010 GUIDELINES</b>	1	10/31/1985	B1
6594	MEMO	MATLOCK AND LINHARD TO MCFARLANE RE LETTER FOR PRESIDENT REAGAN TO GORBACHEV [12] <b>R 2/17/2010 GUIDELINES</b>	1	10/31/1985	B1
6621	CABLE	010828Z NOV 85 [17-18] <b>R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1</b>	2	11/1/1985	B1
6595	MEMO	MCFARLANE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE REPLY TO GORBACHEV'S LETTER [20] <b>R 3/3/2011 F2006-114/1</b>	1	11/1/1985	B1
6597	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #6595 [24] <b>R 3/3/2011 F2006-114/1</b>	1	11/1/1985	B1
6599	MEMO	PLATT TO MCFARLANE RE LETTER TO GORBACHEV [26] <b>R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1</b>	1	10/31/1985	B1
6601	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE PRESIDENTIAL LETTER TO GORBACHEV ON REGIONAL ISSUES [39] <b>R 2/17/2010 GUIDELINES</b>	1	12/18/1985	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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712

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
6605	MEMO	MCFARLANE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE LETTER TO GORBACHEV [40] <b>R 3/3/2011 F2006-114/1</b>	1	12/23/1985	B1
6623	LETTER	PLATT TO MCFARLANE RE DRAFT LETTER PRESIDENT REAGAN TO GORBACHEV [49-51] <b>R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1</b>	3	12/13/1985	B1
6606	MEMO	MEMO TO BILL RE PRESIDENT REAGAN LETTER TO GORBACHEV [52] <b>R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1</b>	1	ND	B1
6609	LETTER	PRESIDENT REAGAN TO GORBACHEV [54-56] <b>R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1</b>	3	ND	B1
6610	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #6606 [59] <b>R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1</b>	1	ND	B1
6611	LETTER	SAME TEXT AS DOC #6609 [61-63] <b>R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1</b>	3	ND	B1
6613	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #6605 [66] <b>R 3/3/2011 F2006-114/1</b>	1	12/23/1985	B1
6616	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #6601 [67] <b>R 2/17/2010 GUIDELINES</b>	1	12/18/1985	B1

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
6625	LETTER	SAME TEXT AS DOC #6623 [72-74] <b>R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1</b>	3	12/13/1985	B1
6617	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #6606 [75] <b>R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1</b>	1	ND	B1
6626	LETTER	PRESIDENT REAGAN TO GORBACHEV [77-79] <b>R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1</b>	3	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

— Oct 29 1

Ryphoo

NSC/S PROFILE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ID 8508881

RECEIVED 04 NOV 85 10

TO PRESIDENT

FROM RYZHKOV, NIKOLAY

DOCDATE 29 OCT 85

PLATT, N

02 NOV 85

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997  
By GS NARA, Date 6/12/02

*File  
Pres Memo*

KEYWORDS: USSR

DOBRYNIN, ANATOLIY F

SUBJECT: RYZHKOV RESPONSE TO PRES CONGRATULATORY LTR / NEW POSITION AS CHAIRMAN

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ACTION: FOR RECORD PURPOSES DUE: STATUS C FILES WH  
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FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MATLOCK

SESTANOVICH

MANDEL

LENCZOWSKI

COMMENTS

REF# 8532539 LOG NSCIFID ( HW HW )

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ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO  
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DISPATCH \_\_\_\_\_ W/ATTCH FILE \_\_\_\_\_ (C)



S/S 8532539

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

November 2, 1982

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE  
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Ryzhkov Response to President's Congratulatory Letter

In a letter to the President, Nikolay Ryzhkov, Chairman of the Soviet Council of Ministers, expressed his appreciation for the earlier letter from the President congratulating him on his new position. Ambassador Dobrynin handed the text of the letter to the Secretary on October 31. The text with translation is attached.

*for Kenneth M. Lewis*  
Nicholas Platt  
Executive Secretary

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997

By *CS* NARA, Date *6/12/02*

4

DECLASSIFIED (RELEASED)  
Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997  
By CJS NARA, Date 6/12/82

Unofficial translation

His Excellency  
Ronald W. REAGAN  
The President of the  
United States of America  
The White House, Washington, D.C.

October 29, 1985

Dear Mr. President,

Thank you for your congratulations on my appointment to the post of the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers.

I am confident that a constructive development of the relations between the USSR and USA on an equal basis would be in the interests of the peoples of our countries and in the interests of peace.

N. RYZHKOV

The Kremlin, Moscow



5

Его Превосходительству  
Рональду У.Рейгану  
Президенту Соединенных  
Штатов Америки  
Белый дом, Вашингтон

Уважаемый господин Президент,

Благодарю Вас за Ваши поздравления в связи с моим назначением на пост председателя Совета Министров СССР.

Уверен, что конструктивное развитие отношений между СССР и США на равноправной основе отвечало бы интересам народов наших стран, интересам мира.

Н.РЫЖКОВ

Москва, Кремль  
29 октября 1985 г.

Oct 31

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FILE

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

October 31, 1985

Dear Mr. General Secretary:

As I told Foreign Minister Shevardnadze in New York October 24, I have been giving careful consideration to your letter dated September 12. The issues you raise are important ones, the ideas you have put forward are in many ways interesting, and I have wanted to study them thoroughly before replying.

Many of the specific points you addressed in your letter have been or will be dealt with by our delegations in the Geneva arms control negotiations or by our Foreign Ministers. In this letter I will therefore focus on what I consider the most significant issues you have raised.

You suggested in your letter that we might reach an understanding on the inadmissibility of nuclear war and other general principles which should guide us. Foreign Minister Shevardnadze has since proposed specific language for our consideration. As I have repeatedly made clear, it is indeed my view that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. I therefore have instructed Secretary Shultz to discuss this matter with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze in their meetings next week.

As we address this and other elements which may figure in any document we may issue in Geneva, I believe it is important to give the most careful consideration to our words. The experience of the past has been that overly vague or rhetorical language has led to expectations which, given the competitive aspect of our relationship to which you referred in your letter, cannot be sustained.

Authority NLSF99-051 (R) (CASE 7) #358 SMF 10/16/88  
BY C/S, NARA, Date 6/12/02

If we are to avoid subsequent misunderstandings and disillusionment, our own statements should be clear and based on concrete achievements. I am convinced that there is substantial common ground on the range of areas we have been discussing in connection with our forthcoming meeting, and I would hope that this common ground can be expanded during our meeting in Geneva.

You raised several specific areas in the security field where this might be possible. Secretary Shultz will be prepared to discuss all your ideas in concrete terms while he is in Moscow. I believe you will find that we are indeed prepared to go our fair share of the way to ensure our meeting is a productive one.

I do, however, want to address your response to the proposals we had previously made in the Geneva arms control talks, which was foreshadowed in your letter and which your delegation subsequently tabled in Geneva.

We have been carefully assessing your counterproposal over the last month. As I stated in my address to the United Nations on October 24, I believe that within it there are seeds which we should nurture and that in the coming weeks we should seek to establish a genuine process of give-and-take.

In order to foster such a process, I have approved a new and comprehensive proposal designed to build upon the positive elements of your counterproposal and bridge the positions of our two sides. I have asked our negotiators to extend the current round to permit your experts to achieve a full understanding of our approach. This new proposal deals with all three areas under discussion in the Geneva negotiations. Its essence is a proposal for radical and stabilizing reductions in strategic offensive arms and a separate agreement on intermediate-range nuclear missile systems, both of which bridge US and Soviet ideas. We also propose that both sides provide assurances that their strategic defense programs are and will remain in full accord with the ABM Treaty.

Such assurances assume a resolution of our current differences over compliance with the Treaty.

In the area of strategic arms, the United States agrees with the objective of a fifty percent reduction in strategic offensive forces. Our proposal builds on this, applying the fifty percent principle in a manner that is both equitable and can enhance stability. In the area of intermediate-range nuclear forces, we have also looked for elements we find in common. While I continue to firmly believe that the best outcome would be the complete elimination of intermediate-range nuclear missiles on both sides, in our new proposal, we have also moved in your direction. In defense and space we must begin now to establish a framework for a cooperative transition to more reliance on defenses and we would like to see a more developed dialogue on how such a transition could be jointly undertaken.

We have designed our approach to provide for a mutually acceptable resolution of the range of nuclear and space arms issues; to take account of the interrelationship between the offense and the defense; and to address those concerns that you and your negotiators have described as being of great importance to you. I am convinced that this new proposal can provide the basis for immediate and genuine progress on the numerous and complex issues facing us in the nuclear and space area, and I look forward to discussing it with you in Geneva later this month.

We will also have the opportunity in Geneva to discuss the other areas which make up our relationship. Much work remains to be done if we are to be able to announce specific progress on regional and bilateral issues. I hope that Secretary Shultz's Moscow visit will be a stimulus to rapid progress in the weeks ahead.

In conclusion, may I say once more that I am looking forward to our meeting and that I sincerely hope we will be able to set our countries on a less confrontational and more cooperative course in the years ahead. I will personally spare no effort to help bring this about.

Sincerely,

*Ronald Reagan*

His Excellency  
Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev  
General Secretary of the Central Committee  
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union  
Moscow

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

October 31, 1985

ACTION

SIGNED

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE *RCM*

SUBJECT: Letter to Gorbachev

Issue

Whether to sign a letter to Gorbachev.

Facts

Shevardnadze delivered to you a letter from Gorbachev when you met September 27. This letter has not yet been answered.

Discussion

Gorbachev's letter notified you that the Soviets would be making new proposals at the Geneva negotiations. Now that we are prepared to reply to that offer, it would be appropriate for you to respond to Gorbachev's letter by notifying him of our new proposals. This letter also serves to give your personal endorsement to George Shultz's mission to Moscow next week.

Recommendation

That you sign the letter at Tab A.

OK                      No

*RCM*

That you sign the letter at Tab A.

Attachment:

Tab A              Letter to Gorbachev

Prepared by:  
Jack F. Matlock

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on : OADR

DECLASSIFIED

Sec. 3.4(b), E.O. 12958, as amended  
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2006  
BY NARA *CS*, DATE *2/17/10*

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET~~

October 31, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

SIGNED

FROM: JACK MATLOCK <sup>FW</sup> and BOB LINHARD <sup>ML</sup>

SUBJECT: Letter from President to Gorbachev

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum to the President recommending that he sign the letter to Gorbachev which notifies Gorbachev of our new proposals in the NST negotiations and supports Secretary Shultz's meetings next week.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the Memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Approve RR Disapprove     

Attachments:

Tab I Memorandum to the President

Tab A President's Letter to Gorbachev

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
Sec. 3.4(b), E.O. 12958, as amended  
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2006  
BY: CD DATE 2/17/10



T. R. MacFarlane

RR  
13

DRAFT GORBACHEV LETTER

Dear Mr. General Secretary,

As I told Foreign Minister Shevardnadze in New York October 24, I have been giving careful consideration to your letter dated September 12. The issues you raise are important ones, the ideas you have put forward are in many ways interesting, and I have wanted to study them thoroughly before replying.

Many of the specific points you addressed in your letter have been or will be dealt with by our delegations in the Geneva arms control negotiations or by our Foreign Ministers. In this letter I will therefore focus on what I consider the most significant issues you have raised.

You suggested in your letter that I am opposed to the possibility of a military clash between our two countries, and that language to this effect be incorporated into a concluding document for our Geneva meeting. Foreign Minister Shevardnadze has since proposed specific language for our consideration. As I have repeatedly made clear, it is indeed my view that a nuclear war can not be won and must not be fought. I therefore see no reason in principle why it should not be possible to reach agreement on this point and have instructed Secretary Shultz to develop appropriate language while he is in Moscow.

I believe it is important, however, that as we address this and other elements which may figure in any documents we may issue in Geneva, we give the most careful consideration to our words. The experience of the past has been that overly vague or rhetorical language has led to expectations which, given the competitive aspect of our relationship to which you referred in your letter, can not be sustained.

If we are to avoid subsequent misunderstandings and disillusionment, our own statements should be clear and based on concrete achievements. I am convinced that there is substantial common ground on the range of areas we have been discussing in connection with our forthcoming meeting. I see no reason why we should not be in a position to announce agreements in a number of fields when we meet in November if the Soviet side is prepared to show the necessary flexibility.

You raised several specific areas in the security field where this might be possible. Secretary Shultz will be prepared to discuss all your ideas in concrete terms while he is in Moscow. I believe you will find that we are indeed prepared to go our fair share of the way to ensure our meeting is a productive one.

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASABLE  
Authority NLSM 2000-004 #11 SMC 10/4/00  
BY CTS, NARA, Date 6/12/02

14  
This is intended  
to state our  
proposal - now  
being tabled  
at Geneva

I do, however, want to address your response to the proposals we had previously made in the Geneva arms control talks, which was foreshadowed in your letter and which your delegation subsequently tabled in Geneva.

We have been carefully assessing your counterproposal over the last month. As I stated in my address to the United Nations on October 24, I believe that within it there are seeds which we should nurture and that in the coming weeks we should seek to establish a genuine process of give-and-take.

In order to foster such a process, I have approved a new and comprehensive proposal designed to build upon the positive elements of your counterproposal and bridge the positions of our two sides. This new proposal deals with all three areas under discussion in the Geneva negotiations. Its essence is a proposal for radical and stabilizing reductions in strategic offensive arms and a separate agreement on intermediate-range nuclear missile systems, both of which bridge US and Soviet ideas. (We also propose that both sides reaffirm that their strategic defense programs are and will remain in full accord with the ABM Treaty. Such reaffirmation must be contingent upon a prior resolution of our current differences over compliance with the treaty. )

?

We have designed our approach to provide for a mutually acceptable resolution of the range of nuclear and space arms issues; to take account of the interrelationship between the offense and the defense; and to address those concerns that you and your negotiators have described as being of great importance to you. I am convinced that this new proposal can provide the basis for immediate and genuine progress on the numerous and complex issues facing us in the nuclear and space area, and I look forward to discussing it with you in Geneva later this month.

We will also, of course, have the opportunity in Geneva to discuss the other areas which make up our relationship. Much work remains to be done if we are to be able to announce specific progress on regional and bilateral issues. I hope that Secretary Shultz's Moscow visit will be a stimulus to rapid progress in the weeks ahead.

Before closing, I would like to reiterate the importance I personally attach to some movement on the Soviet side in the human rights field by the time of our meeting. As you know, I stressed this point to Foreign Minister Shevardnadze during our New York conversation. I understand your sensitivities and principles in this area and I do not ask you to compromise

them. But there are many cases which it would be possible for you to resolve without your having to do so. I can not tell you what an impact this would have on popular perceptions of the Soviet Union in this country and, I believe, in the world.

I have asked Secretary Shultz to convey my best wishes, and my hopes for major progress in our preparations for the Geneva meeting during his visit and in the weeks remaining.

Sincerely,

Ronald W. Reagan

✓ Oct 31 16

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
SECRETARIAT

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PAGE 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 5660  
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DTG: 010828Z NOV 85 PSN: 068010  
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 6741

BY CA NARA DATE 11/27/07

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NODIS

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PREL, UR, US  
SUBJECT: DELIVERY OF PRESIDENTIAL LETTER TO GORBACHEV

REF: STATE 335446

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. AMBASSADOR DELIVERED TEXT OF PRESIDENTIAL LETTER TO FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE AT 9:00 A.M. MOSCOW TIME NOVEMBER 1. THE AMBASSADOR NOTED THAT THE LETTER SET FORTH THE PRESIDENT'S THOUGHTS ON THE OVERALL BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP AND THE UPCOMING GENEVA MEETING. IN PARTICULAR, THE LETTER EXPLAINED THE BASIS FOR OUR RESPONSE TO THE SOVIET COUNTER-PROPOSALS OUTLINED IN GORBACHEV'S SEPTEMBER 12 LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT. AND IT PROVIDED THE PRESIDENT'S REACTION TO SOME OF THE PROPOSALS SHEVARDNADZE RECENTLY HAD PUT FORWARD TO US IN NEW YORK. THE LETTER ALSO INDICATED THAT OUR NEGOTIATORS HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO EXPLAIN OUR PROPOSALS MORE FULLY IN GENEVA. OF COURSE, THE AMBASSADOR ADDED, SECRETARY SHULTZ WOULD BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS THESE MATTERS IN DETAIL DURING HIS UPCOMING MOSCOW VISIT.

3. AFTER THANKING THE AMBASSADOR FOR CONVEYING THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER, SHEVARDNADZE SAID THE LETTER WOULD BE STUDIED THOROUGHLY, THE SOVIET SIDE WOULD WELCOME EVERYTHING CONSTRUCTIVE IN IT, AND A REPORT WOULD BE SENT TO GORBACHEV BY THE END OF THE DAY. SHEVARDNADZE SAID THAT A MESSAGE HAD BEEN RECEIVED YESTERDAY (OCTOBER 31) FROM THE SOVIET NEGOTIATORS IN GENEVA REGARDING THE U.S. DESIRE TO EXTEND THE CURRENT ROUND, AND THAT THE SOVIET SIDE SUPPORTED THIS IDEA.

4. THE AMBASSADOR NOTED HE WOULD BE LEAVING FOR HELSINKI LATE NOVEMBER 1 TO JOIN THE SECRETARY THERE. SHEVARDNADZE SAID THAT AS DOBRYNIN HAD TOLD THE SECRETARY, THE SOVIET SIDE WOULD WELCOME THE SECRETARY'S COMING DIRECTLY TO MOSCOW ON SATURDAY OR SUNDAY, BUT OF COURSE THAT WAS ENTIRELY UP TO THE

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
SECRETARIAT

PAGE 02 OF 02 MOSCOW 5660

DTG: 010828Z NOV 85 PSN: 068010

SECRETARY. SHEVARDADZE ASKED THAT AMBASSADOR HARTMAN  
CONVEY SHEVARDADZE'S BEST REGARDS TO SECRETARY  
SHULTZ. HARTMAN  
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Nov. 1, 1985<sup>19</sup>

back up material

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

SECRET/SENSITIVE

November 1, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE *JRC*  
SUBJECT: Reply to Gorbachev's Letter on Private Channel

You will recall that you mentioned to Shevardnadze during your private conversation on September 27 that it might be useful to establish a direct and unofficial channel of communication between you and Gorbachev. Gorbachev responded in a letter dated October 12 (Tab B), in which he named Dobrynin as his interlocutor. Obviously, what the letter implies is that the Soviets would like to reactivate the arrangement which Kissinger used -- a special channel through Dobrynin.

Such an arrangement is not in our interest since it gives Dobrynin access to our decision makers while denying us access to theirs. It also would mean that we rely entirely on Dobrynin to interpret and explain our positions to his government, which of course is not a desirable thing to do.

I suggest, therefore, that you reply to Gorbachev -- in a letter George Shultz or I could deliver to him personally -- that we of course will use Dobrynin to the same degree that they use Hartman. In other words, if they want to do things through established channels, fine. But if we use their man, they have to use ours.

Recommendation

OK      No       
*JRC*          

That you sign the letter at Tab A.

Attachment:

- Tab A Letter to General Secretary Gorbachev
- Tab B Letter from General Secretary Gorbachev

Prepared by:  
Jack Matlock

SECRET/SENSITIVE  
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
NLRR F06-114/1 #6595  
BY RW NARA DATE 3/3/11



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. General Secretary:

This is in reply to your letter of October 12, 1985, concerning the possibility of a confidential exchange of opinions on a non-official basis. My reasons for mentioning this possibility to Foreign Minister Shevardnadze were twofold.

First, it seemed that there could be some intrinsic value in exchanging opinions informally and privately without the constraints imposed by official formality. But I also wished to resolve certain ambiguities in how we communicate. From time to time in recent months Soviet officials have approached American officials or private citizens who are in touch with senior officials in our government and have offered comments which, they suggest, represent your views. Naturally, I have paid close attention to these comments since I take your opinions very seriously and wish to do the utmost to understand them with full clarity. However, the comments received in this manner have not always been consistent and thus I have difficulty determining to what degree they in fact represent your views. It therefore seemed worthwhile to seek a clarification.

I judge from your reply that you consider established channels adequate for communication between us. That is agreeable to me. Consequently Secretary Shultz will continue to look forward to receiving Ambassador Dobrynin at the State Department. Similarly, we will expect that Ambassador Hartmann will enjoy corresponding access to you in Moscow.

DECLASSIFIED / (K) (E) (S) (C) (D)  
Authority NUS 97-001 #105 SMF 10/22/99  
BY CWC NARA, etc 6/12/07

I hope that the meetings Secretary Shultz has in Moscow will lay the groundwork for a productive meeting between us in Geneva. I am very much looking forward to meeting you there and continue to hope that we will succeed in setting relations between our two contries on a more constructive course.

Sincerely yours,



His Excellency  
Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev  
General Secretary of the Central Committee  
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union  
The Kremlin  
Moscow

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997  
By CS NARA, Date 6/12/02

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFICATION

CIRCLE ONE BELOW

**IMMEDIATE**

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

MODE

SECURE FAX # \_\_\_\_\_

ADMIN FAX # \_\_\_\_\_

RECORD # \_\_\_\_\_

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RELEASER \_\_\_\_\_

FROM/LOCATION

1. DAVID CHEW/WHITE HOUSE

TO/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. JIM KUHN/CAMP DAVID (FOR THE PRESIDENT)

2. \_\_\_\_\_

3. \_\_\_\_\_

4. \_\_\_\_\_

5. \_\_\_\_\_

6. \_\_\_\_\_

7. \_\_\_\_\_

David Chew,  
We need to get this signal  
tonight so Bud can carry  
it tomorrow. Request you  
DACOM to Camp David.  
J

INFORMATION ADDRESSES/LOCAL

1. \_\_\_\_\_

2. \_\_\_\_\_

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS:

Jim: Please call me as soon as the President has had an opportunity to sign this. Thanks.

David

11/1/85

545 p.m. per Jim Kuhn  
President signed.

J. Emory

~~Secret~~

CLASSIFICATION

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

November 1, 1985

ACTION

SIGNED

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE *RCM*

SUBJECT: Reply to Gorbachev's Letter on Private Channel

You will recall that you mentioned to Shevardnadze during your private conversation on September 27 that it might be useful to establish a direct and unofficial channel of communication between you and Gorbachev. Gorbachev responded in a letter dated October 12 (Tab B), in which he named Dobrynin as his interlocutor. Obviously, what the letter implies is that the Soviets would like to reactivate the arrangement which Kissinger used -- a special channel through Dobrynin.

Such an arrangement is not in our interest since it gives Dobrynin access to our decision makers while denying us access to theirs. It also would mean that we rely entirely on Dobrynin to interpret and explain our positions to his government, which of course is not a desirable thing to do.

I suggest, therefore, that you reply to Gorbachev -- in a letter George Shultz or I could deliver to him personally -- that we of course will use Dobrynin to the same degree that they use Hartman. In other words, if they want to do things through established channels, fine. But if we use their man, they have to use ours.

Recommendation

OK

No

That you sign the letter at Tab A.

Attachment:

- Tab A Letter to General Secretary Gorbachev
- Tab B Letter from General Secretary Gorbachev

Prepared by:  
Jack Matlock

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~  
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
NLRR F06-1141 #6597  
BY RW NARA DATE 3/3/0





Washington, D.C. 20520

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

October 31, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE  
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Letter to General Secretary Gorbachev

The Soviets have responded to our suggestion of a special channel of communications between the President and General Secretary Gorbachev by nominating Ambassador Dobrynin. Gorbachev's letter of October 12 is attached at Tab 2.

The Department believes that we should respond symmetrically by nominating Ambassador Hartman as our Moscow point of contact. The draft Presidential response at Tab 1 makes the point that Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze should be part of the process.

*Bmckmley*  
for Nicholas Platt  
Executive Secretary

SECRET  
DECL:OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/1 #6599  
BY CV NARA DATE 11/27/07

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SUGGESTED REPLY

27

Dear Mr. General Secretary:

I enjoyed once again the opportunity to talk with Foreign Minister Mr. Shevardnadze during his visit to New York for the UN 40th Anniversary ceremonies. We had a good, if brief, chat, and he and George Shultz had the opportunity to continue their more extensive discussions.

I would like in this letter to respond to your letter of October 12 on the question of channels of communication between us. I fully agree that it is important that we be able to communicate confidentially and rapidly on matters of concern to us and to the entire world.

We will be happy to work with Ambassador Dobrynin here in Washington. He should deal directly with Secretary Shultz, who will inform me immediately of any messages the Ambassador may convey. I will also continue to use Ambassador Hartman in Moscow to convey my thoughts on these most delicate and weighty matters directly to Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, who, I am confident, will relay them directly to you.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

Authority NLSS97-001 107 SME 10/22/99  
BY CAJ, NARA, Date 6/12/02  
DECLASSIFIED / RELEASABLE

Strictly confidential

Unofficial translation

28

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NUS917-001 #104 SMF 10/22/89  
BY CAJ, NARA, Date 6/2/02

October 12, 1985

Dear Mr. President,

Our Minister Eduard A. Shevardnadze has informed me in detail about his conversation with you in Washington on September 27.

While there exist substantial differences in the positions of the two sides regarding concrete issues, which surfaced also in the course of that conversation and which I shall not touch upon in this letter, we deem it important that you, like us, proceed from the objective fact that we all live on the same planet and must learn to live together. It really is a fundamental judgement.

Here I would like to give you my answer only to one specific question you raised during the conversation with Eduard A. Shevardnadze, namely with regard to a confidential exchange of opinions between us bypassing, should it become necessary, the usual diplomatic channel. I am in favor of this. Indeed, there may arise the need to contact each other on matters on whose solution depend both the state of Soviet-American relations and the world situation as a whole.

On our side to maintain the confidential liason with a person who will be designated by you for this purpose is entrusted to Ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin.

Sincerely yours,

M. GORBACHEV

His Excellency Ronald W. REAGAN  
The President of the United States of America,  
The White House



Nov. 7 19  
back up

CONFIDENTIAL

30

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
SECRETARIAT

*File  
Per  
November*

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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E. O. 12356: N/A  
TAGS: PPDC, PDIP, UR, US  
SUBJECT: NATIONAL DAY MESSAGE

1. EMBASSY IS REQUESTED TO DELIVER AT AN APPROPRIATE TIME PRIOR TO NOVEMBER 7 THE FOLLOWING NATIONAL DAY MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN TO ANDREI GROMYKO, CHAIRMAN OF THE PRESIDUM OF THE SUPREME SOVIET:

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN:

ON BEHALF OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, I WISH TO CONGRATULATE THE PEOPLE OF THE SOVIET UNION ON THE OCCASION OF THE NATIONAL DAY OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS. I LOOK FORWARD TO MEETING WITH GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV IN GENEVA LATER THIS MONTH. THIS MEETING PROVIDES AN HISTORIC OPPORTUNITY TO WORK TOGETHER TO CREATE AN AGENDA FOR A MORE CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES, ONE WHICH COULD REDUCE THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR WAR, ASSIST IN RESOLVING REGIONAL CONFLICTS, AND IMPROVE COMMUNICATION BETWEEN OUR GOVERNMENTS AND PEOPLES. THE UNITED STATES IS READY TO DO EVERYTHING IN ITS POWER TO ATTAIN THESE GOALS, WHICH ARE OF CRITICAL IMPORTANCE TO THE PEOPLES OF BOTH OUR NATIONS AND OF THE ENTIRE WORLD.

HIS EXCELLENCY  
ANDREI ANDREYEVICH GROMYKO  
CHAIRMAN, PRESIDUM OF THE SUPREME SOVIET OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS  
MOSCOW. END TEXT.

2. WE DO NOT PLAN TO RELEASE THE MESSAGE BUT HAVE NO OBJECTION OT ITS RELEASE BY THE SOVIETS. THERE WILL BE NO SIGNED ORIGINAL. SHULTZ  
BT

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997  
By CAS NARA, Date 6/12/02

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

REFERRAL

DATE: 04 NOV 85

MEMORANDUM FOR: STATE SECRETARIAT

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION: TO: SHEVARDNADZE, EDUARD

SOURCE: PRESIDENT

DATE: 04 NOV 85

KEYWORDS: USSR

SHEVARDNADZE, EDUARD

SUBJ: PRES THANK YOU LTR TO SHEVARDNADZE

-----  
REQUIRED ACTION: FOR DISPATCH

DUE DATE:

COMMENTS:



for WILLIAM F. MARTIN

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

*Feb. 28, 1985 31  
] backup - Nov. 4  
Pres. Thank you  
note to Shev.*

*F. L. -  
pres cov.* 8538<sup>33</sup>  
~~*Mallock*~~

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

November 4, 1985

Dear Mr. Minister:

I truly appreciated the opportunity to meet with you at the White House and in New York to discuss a broad range of issues of mutual concern to our two countries. I look forward to meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev in November and establishing a bilateral dialogue to bring about a more stable future for both of our peoples.

Nancy and I want to thank you and Mrs. Shevardnadze for the handsome gifts you brought for us. We are pleased to have the samovar and matching tray and the lacquered box as remembrances of the exquisite artistry of your fellow countrymen.

With our best wishes to you, Mrs. Shevardnadze, and to your colleagues as we approach our meeting in Geneva,

Sincerely,

*Ronald Reagan*

His Excellency Eduard A. Shevardnadze  
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the  
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics  
Moscow

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 31, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. JOHN E. HILBOLDT

FROM: WILLIAM F. MARTIN *WFM*

SUBJECT: Letter from the President to Shevardnadze

The NSC has reviewed the draft text of a letter from the President to Shevardnadze thanking him for the gifts he presented during his September visit. We have made some minor suggestions, included in the draft at Tab A, primarily to reflect the President's recent meeting with Shevardnadze in New York.

Attachments

- Tab A NSC suggested text for Presidential letter
- Tab B Original draft

35

Dear Mr. Minister:

I truly appreciated the opportunity to meet with you at the White House and in New York to discuss a broad range of issues of mutual concern to our two countries. I look forward to meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev in November and establishing a bilateral dialogue to bring about a more stable future for both of our peoples.

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With our best wishes to you, Mrs. Shevardnadze, and to your colleagues as we approach our meeting in Geneva,

Sincerely,

His Excellency Eduard A. Shevardnadze  
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the  
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics  
Moscow

RR:AVH:CMF:JEH:pps

Dispatch thru State via NSC.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

NSC Draft Letter to Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze

Dear Mr. Minister:

I truly appreciated the opportunity to meet with you at the White House and in New York to discuss a broad range of issues of mutual concern to our two countries. I look forward to meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev in November and establishing a bilateral dialogue to bring about a more stable future for both of our peoples.

Nancy and I want to thank you and Mrs. Shevardnadze for the handsome gifts you brought for us. We are pleased to have the samovar and matching tray and the lacquered box as remembrances of the exquisite artistry of your fellow countrymen.

With our best wishes to you, Mrs. Shevardnadze, and to your colleagues as we approach our meeting in Geneva,

Sincerely,

RR

JH  
[Handwritten signature]

37

38

Nov. 25

THE WHITE HOUSE  
November 25, 1985

Dear Mrs. Gorbacheva:

I know my husband will be writing to your husband, but I do want to personally thank you for your kind hospitality at dinner and tea in Geneva. Also, I want to express my thanks to you for your lovely gifts of jewelry and the porcelain tea set. They shall be constant reminders of a most memorable visit.

I shall look forward to our meeting again next year.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

Mrs. Raisa Gorbacheva  
The Central Committee of  
The Communist Party  
Moscow, U.S.S.R.



S 31

SYSTEM II  
91241

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

December 18, 1985

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Presidential Letter to Gorbachev on Regional  
Issues

A letter from the President to Gorbachev on regional issues is at Tab A. It would follow up, in greater detail and on a more formal basis, some of the suggestions he made in his handwritten letter.

*SFC* Sestanovich, *ML* Ringdahl, *S.F.R.* Tahir-Kheli and *JFC* Covey concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the Memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments:

- Tab I Memorandum to the President
- Tab A Presidential Letter to Gorbachev
- Tab B Platt-McFarlane Memo

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
Sec. 3.4(b), E.O. 12958, as amended  
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2006  
BY NARA *ON*, DATE *2/17/10*

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

SUBJECT: Letter to General Secretary Gorbachev

Issue

Whether to sign a letter to General Secretary Gorbachev.

Facts

In your handwritten letter of November 28, you promised Gorbachev a more formal letter with detailed suggestions regarding some of the issues before us.

Discussion

The letter at Tab A urges steps to move toward a peaceful settlement of conflicts in Afghanistan and Southern Africa and reiterates your concern regarding the Soviet action in supplying SA-5 air defense missiles to Libya.

Recommendation

OK                      No

\_\_\_\_\_                      \_\_\_\_\_                      That you sign the letter at Tab A.

Attachments:

Tab A                      Letter to General Secretary Gorbachev

Prepared by:  
Jack F. Matlock

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR FOI-114/1 #6205  
BY RW NARA DATE 3/3/11

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. General Secretary:

I have already written to you informally to express some of my thoughts on the issues facing us in the wake of our meeting in Geneva. I would like in this letter to deal with some of the particularly pressing regional issues which I believe we must address in the months ahead.

I mentioned Afghanistan in my earlier letter, but I would like to share with you some further thoughts. Afghanistan was, after all, the regional question on which we spent the most time in Geneva. You expressed Soviet readiness to see an agreement emerge from the United Nations negotiating process which would entail a ceasefire, withdrawal of troops, return of the refugees and international guarantees. The discussion recalled the suggestion in your June 10 letter that my government had "opportunities to confirm by its actions" our readiness to reach a political settlement in Afghanistan. As I explained in my October speech to the UNGA, we are prepared to cooperate with others on practical steps. Three elements could form the basis for a lasting solution: A process of negotiations among the warring parties including the Soviet Union; verified elimination of the foreign military presence and restraint on the flow of outside arms; and movement toward political self-determination and economic reconstruction.

As you know, we have been disappointed with the results of the proximity talks conducted by the U.N. Secretary General's Special Representative. Five rounds in Geneva have not addressed the real issue on which a resolution of this problem depends -- withdrawal of your forces. No other element of the problem presents real difficulty.

Authority NLSF 99-051 #364 SNE 10/10/00  
BY CS, NARA, Date 6/12/02  
DECLASSIFIED (RELEASED)

To underscore this, we have formally notified the Secretary General that we accept the agreed formulation on guarantees. For your part, I believe that the talks would gain a real impetus from Soviet action to permit discussion of a timetable for withdrawal at Geneva and a public announcement to that effect. Were such action taken by the time of our Ministers' next meeting, it would enable them to have a more focussed and productive discussion.

Another area where I believe movement is possible is Southern Africa. Because we have covered this ground often in the past, the point I need to make is a simple one.

As I am sure you are aware, I am reviewing our policy in Southern Africa, specifically with respect to the war in Angola. This review might not be necessary if there were real evidence that the outside forces in that country could be reduced, and then withdrawn, making possible the reconciliation of the indigenous parties to the war. Such an outcome, of course, would dramatically improve prospects for the establishment of an independent Namibia in accordance with UNSC Resolution 435 -- an objective we share with the U.S.S.R. Unfortunately, the evidence is clear that your own involvement in Angola is deepening.

As I said at the UN in October, our aim is to reduce, not increase, military involvement by the superpowers in local disputes like that in Angola.

I was pleased to learn from Secretary Shultz that the Soviet Union had expressed an interest in calming tensions between Libya and Egypt. At the same time, it appears that Libya is preparing at least two sites for the emplacement of SA-5 Air Defense Missiles to be supplied by the Soviet Union. It is hard to reconcile Soviet interest in restraint in this region with the provision of advanced weapons to a leader whose reckless behavior is a major danger to regional stability. Because we view this development with utmost

seriousness, I was disappointed to see that the Soviet response to our presentation failed to address the transfer of these weapons to Libya. Our Ministers and experts should address this vital matter, since it raises the prospect of dangerous incidents that I hope you want to avoid as much as we do.

If you agree, both Angola and Libya are additional subjects which Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze might take up in their next meeting.

In closing, let me underline my satisfaction with our agreement in Geneva to put our regional experts' talks on a regular basis. When we met in Geneva we agreed that it was important for both of us to avoid a U.S.- Soviet clash over regional conflicts and to work for solutions. I believe that we must move forward on some of these issues before we meet again. In that regard, I was pleased to note that in your remarks to Secretary Baldrige you referred to the importance of dealing with regional trouble spots.

Sincerely,

His Excellency  
Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev  
General Secretary of the Central Committee  
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union  
The Kremlin  
Moscow

~~CLASSIFICATION~~

44

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
CROSSMATCH ACTION SHEET

MESSAGE # 3158  
DATE TIME: \_\_\_\_\_

IT IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE COMMENT OFFICER TO CLEAR WITH THE  
DEP EXEC SEC PRIOR TO THE ASSIGNED DUE DATE.

ACTION OFFICER	COMMENT OFFICER	INFO
FLANSON	<u>Matlock</u>	_____
	<u>Sestanovich</u>	_____
	<u>Ringdahl</u> <i>concur</i>	_____
	<u>Covey</u>	_____
	_____	_____
	_____	_____
	_____	_____

ACTION: CONCUR TO DEP EXEC SEC VIA PHONE AND/OR COMMENT HERE AND HANDCAL  
TO DEP EXEC SEC DUE DATE: 12/17

ACTION OFFICER COMMENTS:

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CLEARED BY: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_ TIME: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

CLEARED TO: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_ TIME: \_\_\_\_\_

~~CLASSIFICATION~~

ORIGINAL 45

12/14

~~SECRET~~

EUR/SOV/MULTI:EEBELMAK  
12/16/85 432-9806 WANG 2134P  
THE ACTING SECRETARY

EUR/SOV:MPARRIS  
AF/S:JDAVIDOV  
P:KARRACOST  
S/S:

EUR:MPALMER  
NEA:RPECK  
NSC:JMATLOCK  
S/S-6

IMMEDIATE MOSCOW

NOBIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, US, UR

SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL LETTER TO GENERAL SECRETARY  
- GORBACHEV ON REGIONAL ISSUES

JU  
EE  
MP  
JE  
MA  
S/S

- 1. ~~IS~~ - ENTIRE TEXT
- 2. EMBASSY SHOULD DELIVER TEXT OF PRESIDENTIAL LETTER AT PARA 3 TO HIGHEST APPROPRIATE MFA OFFICIAL AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.
- 3. BEGIN TEXT OF PRESIDENTIAL LETTER

DEAR MR. GENERAL SECRETARY,

I HAVE ALREADY WRITTEN TO YOU INFORMALLY TO EXPRESS SOME OF MY THOUGHTS ON THE ISSUES FACING US IN THE WAKE OF OUR MEETING IN GENEVA. I WOULD LIKE IN THIS LETTER TO DEAL WITH SOME OF THE PARTICULARLY PRESSING REGIONAL ISSUES WHICH I BELIEVE WE MUST ADDRESS IN THE MONTHS AHEAD.

I MENTIONED AFGHANISTAN IN MY EARLIER LETTER, BUT I WOULD LIKE TO SHARE WITH YOU SOME FURTHER THOUGHTS. AFGHANISTAN WAS, AFTER ALL, THE REGIONAL QUESTION ON WHICH WE SPENT THE MOST TIME IN GENEVA. YOU EXPRESSED

Authority MLSF99-051 #364 SMF 10/16/00  
BY CYS, NARA, Date 6/12/02

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

1 2

46

SOVIET READINESS TO SEE AN AGREEMENT EMERGE FROM THE UNITED NATIONS NEGOTIATING PROCESS WHICH WOULD ENTAIL A CEASEFIRE, WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS, RETURN OF THE REFUGEES AND INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEES. THE DISCUSSION RECALLED THE SUGGESTION IN YOUR JUNE 20 LETTER THAT MY GOVERNMENT HAD "OPPORTUNITIES TO CONFIRM BY ITS ACTIONS" OUR READINESS TO REACH A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN. AS I EXPLAINED IN MY OCTOBER SPEECH TO THE UNGA, WE ARE PREPARED TO COOPERATE WITH OTHERS ON PRACTICAL STEPS. THREE ELEMENTS COULD FORM THE BASIS FOR A LASTING SOLUTION: A PROCESS OF NEGOTIATIONS AMONG THE WARRING PARTIES INCLUDING THE SOVIET UNION; VERIFIED ELIMINATION OF THE FOREIGN MILITARY PRESENCE AND RESTRAINT ON THE FLOW OF OUTSIDE ARMS; AND MOVEMENT TOWARD POLITICAL SELF-DETERMINATION AND ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION.

AS YOU KNOW, WE HAVE BEEN DISAPPOINTED WITH THE RESULTS OF THE PROXIMITY TALKS CONDUCTED BY THE U.N. SECRETARY GENERAL'S SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE. FIVE ROUNDS IN GENEVA HAVE NOT ADDRESSED THE REAL ISSUE ON WHICH A RESOLUTION OF THIS PROBLEM DEPENDS -- WITHDRAWAL OF YOUR FORCES. NO OTHER ELEMENT OF THE PROBLEM PRESENTS REAL DIFFICULTY. TO UNDERSCORE THIS, WE HAVE FORMALLY NOTIFIED THE SECRETARY GENERAL THAT WE ACCEPT THE AGREED FORMULATION ON GUARANTEES. FOR YOUR PART, I BELIEVE THAT THE TALKS WOULD GAIN A REAL IMPETUS FROM SOVIET ACTION TO PERMIT DISCUSSION OF A TIMETABLE FOR WITHDRAWAL AT GENEVA AND A PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT TO THAT EFFECT. WERE SUCH ACTION TAKEN BY THE TIME OF OUR MINISTERS' NEXT MEETING, IT WOULD ENABLE THEM TO HAVE A MORE FOCUSED AND PRODUCTIVE DISCUSSION.

ANOTHER AREA WHERE I BELIEVE MOVEMENT IS POSSIBLE IS SOUTHERN AFRICA. BECAUSE WE HAVE COVERED THIS GROUND OFTEN IN THE PAST, THE POINT I NEED TO MAKE IS A SIMPLE ONE.

AS I AM SURE YOU ARE AWARE, I AM REVIEWING OUR POLICY IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, SPECIFICALLY WITH RESPECT TO THE WAR IN ANGOLA. THIS REVIEW MIGHT NOT BE NECESSARY IF THERE WERE REAL EVIDENCE THAT THE OUTSIDE FORCES IN THAT COUNTRY COULD BE REDUCED, AND THEN WITHDRAWN, MAKING POSSIBLE THE RECONCILIATION OF THE INDIGENOUS PARTIES TO THE WAR. SUCH AN OUTCOME, OF COURSE, WOULD DRAMATICALLY IMPROVE PROSPECTS FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INDEPENDENT NAMIBIA IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNSC RESOLUTION 435 -- AN OBJECTIVE WE SHARE WITH THE U.S.S.R. UNFORTUNATELY, THE EVIDENCE IS CLEAR THAT YOUR OWN INVOLVEMENT IN ANGOLA IS

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

DEEPENING.

AS I SAID AT THE UN IN OCTOBER, OUR AIM IS TO REDUCE, NOT INCREASE, MILITARY INVOLVEMENT BY THE SUPERPOWERS IN LOCAL DISPUTES LIKE THAT IN ANGOLA.

I WAS PLEASED TO LEARN FROM SECRETARY SHULTZ THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAD EXPRESSED AN INTEREST IN CALMING TENSIONS BETWEEN LIBYA AND EGYPT. AT THE SAME TIME, IT APPEARS THAT LIBYA IS PREPARING AT LEAST TWO SITES FOR THE EMPLACEMENT OF SA-5 AIR DEFENSE MISSILES TO BE SUPPLIED BY THE SOVIET UNION. IT IS HARD TO RECONCILE SOVIET INTEREST IN RESTRAINT IN THIS REGION WITH THE PROVISION OF ADVANCED WEAPONS TO A LEADER WHOSE RECKLESS BEHAVIOR IS A MAJOR DANGER TO REGIONAL STABILITY. BECAUSE WE VIEW THIS DEVELOPMENT WITH UTMOST SERIOUSNESS, I WAS DISAPPOINTED TO SEE THAT THE SOVIET RESPONSE TO OUR PRESENTATION FAILED TO ADDRESS THE TRANSFER OF THESE WEAPONS TO LIBYA. OUR MINISTERS AND EXPERTS SHOULD ADDRESS THIS VITAL MATTER, SINCE IT RAISES THE PROSPECT OF DANGEROUS INCIDENTS THAT I HOPE YOU WANT TO AVOID AS MUCH AS WE DO.

IF YOU AGREE, BOTH ANGOLA AND LIBYA ARE ADDITIONAL SUBJECTS WHICH SECRETARY SHULTZ AND FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE MIGHT TAKE UP IN THEIR NEXT MEETING.

IN CLOSING, LET ME UNDERLINE MY SATISFACTION WITH OUR AGREEMENT IN GENEVA TO PUT OUR REGIONAL EXPERTS' TALKS ON A REGULAR BASIS. WHEN WE MET IN GENEVA WE AGREED THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR BOTH OF US TO AVOID A U.S. - SOVIET CLASH OVER REGIONAL CONFLICTS AND TO WORK FOR SOLUTIONS. I BELIEVE THAT WE MUST MOVE FORWARD ON SOME OF THESE ISSUES BEFORE WE MEET AGAIN. IN THAT REGARD, I WAS PLEASED TO NOTE THAT IN YOUR REMARKS TO SECRETARY BALDRIGE YOU REFERRED TO THE IMPORTANCE OF DEALING WITH REGIONAL TROUBLE SPOTS.

---SINCERELY, RONALD REAGAN

END TEXT OF PRESIDENTIAL LETTER

4. A SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL FOLLOW.

48

SYSTEM II PROFILE

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

ID 8591241

RECEIVED 05 DEC 85 14

TO PRESIDENT

FROM SHULTZ, G

DOCDATE 04 DEC 85

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997  
By CAS NARA, Date 6/12/02

KEYWORDS: USSR

AFGHANISTAN

GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL S

HS

SUBJECT: PRES FOLLOW UP LTR TO GORBACHEV RE DISCUSSIONS AT GENEVA SUMMIT

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR PRES

DUE: 06 DEC 85 STATUS S FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

~~SESTANOVICH~~

TAHIR-KHELI

COVEY

Matlock

~~MATLOCK~~ Rungdahl

SESTANOVICH

COMMENTS

**URGENT**

REF#

LOG 8591243

NSCIFID

( B / )

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
Sestonovich	S 12/13	rec'd state draft ltr		revision sent
MATLOCK	X 12/17	Prepare memo to Pres		PR, SE

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE (C)



ES SENSITIVE  
8536708

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

49  
SYSTEM II  
91241 dd-

December 13, 1985

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE  
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Draft Letter for General Secretary Gorbachev

We are providing a revised text of a draft Presidential letter to General Secretary Gorbachev on regional issues. This draft urges forward movement on Afghanistan and southern Africa and reiterates U.S. concern over Soviet supply of SA-5 air defense missiles to Libya.

*Nicholas Platt*  
Nicholas Platt  
Executive Secretary

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/1 #6623

BY CU NARA DATE 11/27/07

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~  
DECL: OADR

50

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Dear Mr. General Secretary,

I have already written to you informally to express some of my thoughts on the issues facing us in the wake of our meeting in Geneva. I would like in this letter to deal with some of the particularly pressing regional issues which I believe we must address in the months ahead.

I mentioned Afghanistan in my earlier letter, but I would like to share with you some further thoughts. Afghanistan was, after all, the regional question on which we spent the most time in Geneva. I was struck by your businesslike exposition of Soviet readiness to see an agreement emerge from the United Nations negotiating process which would entail a ceasefire, withdrawal of troops, return of the refugees and international guarantees. The discussion recalled the suggestion in your June 10 letter that my government had "opportunities to confirm by its actions" our readiness to reach a political settlement in Afghanistan. As I explained in my October speech to the UNGA, we are prepared to take practical steps. Three elements could form the basis for a lasting solution: a process of negotiations among the warring parties including the Soviet Union; verified elimination of the foreign military presence and restraint on the flow of outside arms; and movement toward political self-determination and economic reconstruction.

*Change*  
As an initial contribution to this process, in advance of the next round of the proximity talks in Geneva, we have formally notified the United Nations that we accept the agreed formulation on guarantees. I hope that this will give an impetus to the efforts of the UN Secretary General's Special Representative. For real progress to be made it is important that the sixth round of talks in Geneva get down to the central issue of troop withdrawals. In any event, I believe Afghanistan deserves more in-depth treatment at the next meeting between our ministers.

Another area where I believe movement is possible is southern Africa. Again, I do not intend to go over ground that we have covered often in the past. The point I want to make is a simple one.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~  
DECL: OADR

51

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

- 2 -

As I am sure you are aware, I currently face a difficult decision on our policy in southern Africa, specifically with respect to the civil war in Angola. I would not face this decision if there were some evidence that it would be possible to bring about a reduction in the outside forces in that country which would make possible the reconciliation of the parties involved. Such an outcome, of course, would dramatically improve prospects for the establishment of an independent Namibia in accordance with UNSC Resolution 435 -- an objective we share with the U.S.S.R.

As I said at the UN in October, our aim is to reduce, not increase, military involvement by the superpowers in local disputes like that in Angola.

I was pleased to learn from Secretary Shultz that the Soviet Union had expressed an interest in calming tensions between Libya and Egypt. At the same time, it appears that Libya is preparing at least two sites for the emplacement of SA-5 air defense missiles to be supplied by the Soviet Union. It is hard to reconcile Soviet interest in restraint in this region with the provision of advanced weapons to a leader whose reckless behavior is a major danger to regional stability. We view this development with utmost seriousness. I hope that our ministers and experts will address this subject and eliminate any prospect of an incident between us.

If you agree, both Angola and Libya are additional subjects which Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze might take up in their next meeting.

In closing, let me underline my satisfaction with our agreement in Geneva to put our regional experts' talks on a regular basis. When we met in Geneva we agreed that it was important for both of us to avoid a U.S. - Soviet clash over regional conflicts and to work for solutions. I believe that we must move forward on some of these issues before we meet again. In that regard, I was pleased to note that in your remarks to Mac Baldrige you referred to the importance of dealing with regional trouble spots.

Sincerely, Ronald Reagan

THE WHITE HOUSE

System 1  
Package 1

SEQUENCE TO HAS BEEN

Bill -

W I discussed this with Jim  
 JO night. First letter is a little off  
 PE President's hand written note) and  
 W The wrong thrust on Afghanistan. We  
 BU also need to start, however, on a  
 W longer letter that provide the follow-up  
 W points the President promised in  
 MS his. The second letter is more urgent  
 SI since I gather there is some desire  
 - to have Badger carry it out  
 [ on his trip.

Suggest we give to Steve S.  
 for action with coordination / union  
 to Ty Cobb. They should cable  
 draft to fact in Europe to get his  
 views need to process by mid-day  
 tomorrow.

Dan

DECLASSIFIED / RE / CASE 101

NLRR 106-114 / 1 # 6606

BY CV NARA DATE 11/27/07

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT  
FROM: George P. Shultz *GP*  
SUBJECT: Letters to Gorbachev

We need to take advantage of the momentum generated by your meeting with Gorbachev to move ahead in a number of fields of interest to us. The most significant:

-- In the Geneva talks, we want to prod the Soviets toward a more constructive dialogue on the offense/defense relationship;

-- On regional issues, we should pursue Gorbachev's suggestion of greater seriousness on an Afghanistan settlement and use our review of aid to UNITA to engage the Soviets in a more serious discussion of Southern Africa;

-- On human rights, you indicated you wanted to follow up on your exchange with Gorbachev in Geneva to emphasize the possibilities which would open up in areas of interest to the Soviets if we saw progress.

I have attached for your approval two draft letters to Gorbachev on these issues. The first deals with the Geneva talks and regional questions, and proposes that Shevardnadze and I take up these and other issues at a meeting here in January. The second addresses human rights, and could be delivered by Mac Baldrige during his visit to Moscow next week. Using Mac as a channel would reinforce our message on the inherent links between human rights and other areas of the relationship. As the first letter refers in passing to Mac's mission, it should be sent this week.

Attachments: As indicated

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~  
DECL: OADR

Authority NISF 99-051 #367 CAS 7/25/00  
BY GP, NARA, Date 10/12/02

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Dear Mr. General Secretary,

I have been heartened since returning from Geneva by the enthusiasm and hope with which reports of our recent meeting have been greeted around the world. This reaction by men and women everywhere confirms our joint assessment in Geneva of the utility of our meeting, and the responsibility we both share to ensure that that enthusiasm, and those hopes, are not in vain.

I do not intend in this letter to get into an exhaustive review of where our relationship stands after our meeting, or of where it may go. There are certain issues, however, which I do feel merit particular attention in the weeks ahead. I would like to share with you some thoughts on how we may approach them.

On substance, if our discussions in Geneva revealed anything, they revealed the extent of our differences on some of the core issues in the Geneva arms control talks and of the depth of our convictions on these issues. I took to heart the concerns you expressed so eloquently; I hope that you came to appreciate better my own concern that we not make the nuclear arms reductions we both consider overdue hostage to fears I am convinced are ungrounded.

This is not the place to go over once again the terrain we covered in Geneva. I wish only to say that our discussion convinced me that some of our positions, divergent at present to be sure, are not mutually exclusive. I am instructing my experts to explore how we can bridge the gap in the Geneva talks in the months ahead; I trust you are giving similar instructions. It is my hope that, with a joint effort in this regard, the sides will in fact be able to build common elements on which to realize concrete progress before we meet again next year.

Surely the Soviet Union cannot be opposed to strategic defense in principle. There must be a practical way to approach the relationship of offense and defense. Our negotiators in Geneva will of course be prepared to follow up on these possibilities when they return in January. I think Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-1141, #6609

BY CW NARA DATE 11/27/07



54

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

- 3 -

that it would be possible to bring about a reduction in the outside forces in that country which would make possible the reconciliation of the parties involved. Such an outcome, of course, would dramatically improve prospects for the establishment of an independent Namibia in accordance with UNSC Resolution 435 -- an objective we share with the USSR.

As I said at the UN in October, our aim is to reduce, not increase, military involvement by the superpowers in local disputes like that in Angola. If you agree, this is another issue which Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze might take up in their next meeting.

Finally, I wanted to reiterate how much I valued the candor and detail of our discussion on human rights issues. I hope you left that conversation with a better understanding of how I want to deal with what -- for us -- is a key determinant of our relationship. Secretary of Commerce Baldrige will be in Moscow December 9 - 11 for a meeting of the U.S. - Soviet Trade and Economic Council. He will be carrying a letter from me which builds on our discussion in Geneva, and which I hope you will carefully consider.

In closing, let me reiterate how much I appreciated the opportunity to establish a personal relationship with you in Geneva. I am confident that that tie will be invaluable in the months ahead as we seek to consolidate and expand the start we made there in putting our relations on a more satisfactory basis. You will have received separately an invitation to visit Washington in late June of next year. I hope that you will find the timing convenient, and look forward to what I am confident you will find a productive and informative visit.

From the standpoint of procedure, I think it is important that we do not allow the momentum which we established in Geneva to wane. We will be able in this channel and through our embassies to follow-up on the agreements reached in the past few weeks and to flesh out some of the new ideas which emerged from our meeting. I believe it would be useful, nonetheless, for Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze to meet periodically to review progress and identify areas where work is necessary in advance of our next meeting. We would be delighted if Mr. Shevardnadze could come to the United States for this purpose in late January of next year.

Sincerely, Ronald Reagan

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Dec '80

RECEIVED 05 DEC 85 14

TO PRESIDENT

FROM SHULTZ, G

DOCDATE 04 DEC 85

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 23, 1987  
By CS NARA, Date 6/12/02

*File Correspondence*  
*UC*  
*drafts*

KEYWORDS: USSR

AFGHANISTAN

GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL S

HS

SUBJECT: PRES FOLLOW UP LTR TO GORBACHEV RE DISCUSSIONS AT GENEVA SUMMIT

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR PRES

DUE: 06 DEC 85 STATUS S FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

SESTANOVICH

TAHIR-KHELI

COVEY

**MATLOCK**

COMMENTS

**URGENT**

REF#

LOG 8591243

NSCIFID

( B / )

ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

COPIES TO

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH

FILE

(C)

National Security Council  
The White House

59

System # II  
Package # 91241

SEQUENCE TO HAS SEEN DISPOSITION

Do ~~Pass~~ Bill -

W I discussed this with SMP last  
 Jo night. First letter is a little OPE (given  
 Pa President's hand written note) and has  
 W The wrong thrust on Afghanistan. We  
 Bu do need to start, however, on a  
 W longer letter that provide the follow-up  
 NS points the President promised in  
 SI his. The second letter is more urgent  
 - since I gather there is some desire  
 [ to have Baldridge carry it out  
 on his trip.

ci Suggest we give to Steve S.  
 for action with coordination / concern  
 to Ty Cobb. They should cable  
 draft to take in Europe to get his  
 views need to process by mid-day  
 tomorrow.

Dan

DECLASSIFIED / RE/CASO

NLRR F06-714 / #6610

BY AS NARA DATE 11/27/07

60

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT  
FROM: George P. Shultz *WPS*  
SUBJECT: Letters to Gorbachev

We need to take advantage of the momentum generated by your meeting with Gorbachev to move ahead in a number of fields of interest to us. The most significant:

-- In the Geneva talks, we want to prod the Soviets toward a more constructive dialogue on the offense/defense relationship;

-- On regional issues, we should pursue Gorbachev's suggestion of greater seriousness on an Afghanistan settlement and use our review of aid to UNITA to engage the Soviets in a more serious discussion of Southern Africa;

-- On human rights, you indicated you wanted to follow up on your exchange with Gorbachev in Geneva to emphasize the possibilities which would open up in areas of interest to the Soviets if we saw progress.

I have attached for your approval two draft letters to Gorbachev on these issues. The first deals with the Geneva talks and regional questions, and proposes that Shevardnadze and I take up these and other issues at a meeting here in January. The second addresses human rights, and could be delivered by Mac Baldrige during his visit to Moscow next week. Using Mac as a channel would reinforce our message on the inherent links between human rights and other areas of the relationship. As the first letter refers in passing to Mac's mission, it should be sent this week.

Attachments: As indicated

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~  
DECL: OADR

Authority NLSF 99-051 #3107 CAS 7/25/00  
BY CAS, NARA, Date 6/12/02

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Dear Mr. General Secretary,

I have been heartened since returning from Geneva by the enthusiasm and hope with which reports of our recent meeting have been greeted around the world. This reaction by men and women everywhere confirms our joint assessment in Geneva of the utility of our meeting, and the responsibility we both share to ensure that that enthusiasm, and those hopes, are not in vain.

I do not intend in this letter to get into an exhaustive review of where our relationship stands after our meeting, or of where it may go. There are certain issues, however, which I do feel merit particular attention in the weeks ahead. I would like to share with you some thoughts on how we may approach them.

On substance, if our discussions in Geneva revealed anything, they revealed the extent of our differences on some of the core issues in the Geneva arms control talks and of the depth of our convictions on these issues. I took to heart the concerns you expressed so eloquently; I hope that you came to appreciate better my own concern that we not make the nuclear arms reductions we both consider overdue hostage to fears I am convinced are ungrounded.

This is not the place to go over once again the terrain we covered in Geneva. I wish only to say that our discussion convinced me that some of our positions, divergent at present to be sure, are not mutually exclusive. I am instructing my experts to explore how we can bridge the gap in the Geneva talks in the months ahead; I trust you are giving similar instructions. It is my hope that, with a joint effort in this regard, the sides will in fact be able to build common elements on which to realize concrete progress before we meet again next year.

Surely the Soviet Union cannot be opposed to strategic defense in principle. There must be a practical way to approach the relationship of offense and defense. Our negotiators in Geneva will of course be prepared to follow up on these possibilities when they return in January. I think Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~  
DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR FOI-114/1 #6611

BY CU NARA DATE 11/27/07

62

SECRET/SENSITIVE

- 2 -

should also be prepared to address these issues further when they meet.

In addition to the Geneva talks, I would hope that we can register some forward motion on some of the regional issues we discussed in Geneva before we meet again.

The regional question on which we spent the most time in Geneva, of course, was Afghanistan. I was struck by your businesslike exposition of Soviet readiness to see an agreement emerge from the United Nations negotiating process which would entail a ceasefire, withdrawal of troops, return of the refugees and international guarantees. The discussion recalled the suggestion in your June 10 letter that my government had "opportunities to confirm by its actions" our readiness to reach a political settlement in Afghanistan. As I explained in my October speech to the UNGA, we are prepared to take practical steps, including the three elements I mentioned: a dialogue among the warring parties; cessation of outside military presence and supplies; and economic reconstruction.

I believe that our two countries might in the first instance seek agreement on the question of guarantees and a timetable for withdrawal. As an initial contribution to this process, in advance of the next round of the proximity talks in Geneva, we will formally notify the United Nations that we accept their formulation on guarantees. Perhaps the U.S. and the USSR also could work out together an explicit statement that we are prepared to guarantee an appropriate settlement, including a reasonable timetable for the withdrawal of your forces. This could give an impetus to the efforts of the UN Secretary General's Special Representative. If you agree, we might seek to develop such a statement by the time Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze next meet so as to enable them to have a more focussed and productive discussion on Afghanistan.

Another area where I believe movement is possible is southern Africa. Again, I do not intend to go over ground that we have covered often in the past. The point I want to make is a simple one.

As I am sure you are aware, I currently face a difficult decision on our policy in southern Africa, specifically with respect to the civil war in Angola. I would not face this decision if there were some evidence

SECRET/SENSITIVE

- 3 -

that it would be possible to bring about a reduction in the outside forces in that country which would make possible the reconciliation of the parties involved. Such an outcome, of course, would dramatically improve prospects for the establishment of an independent Namibia in accordance with UNSC Resolution 435 -- an objective we share with the USSR.

As I said at the UN in October, our aim is to reduce, not increase, military involvement by the superpowers in local disputes like that in Angola. If you agree, this is another issue which Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze might take up in their next meeting.

Finally, I wanted to reiterate how much I valued the candor and detail of our discussion on human rights issues. I hope you left that conversation with a better understanding of how I want to deal with what -- for us -- is a key determinant of our relationship. Secretary of Commerce Baldrige will be in Moscow December 9 - 11 for a meeting of the U.S. - Soviet Trade and Economic Council. He will be carrying a letter from me which builds on our discussion in Geneva, and which I hope you will carefully consider.

In closing, let me reiterate how much I appreciated the opportunity to establish a personal relationship with you in Geneva. I am confident that that tie will be invaluable in the months ahead as we seek to consolidate and expand the start we made there in putting our relations on a more satisfactory basis. You will have received separately an invitation to visit Washington in late June of next year. I hope that you will find the timing convenient, and look forward to what I am confident you will find a productive and informative visit.

From the standpoint of procedure, I think it is important that we do not allow the momentum which we established in Geneva to wane. We will be able in this channel and through our embassies to follow-up on the agreements reached in the past few weeks and to flesh out some of the new ideas which emerged from our meeting. I believe it would be useful, nonetheless, for Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze to meet periodically to review progress and identify areas where work is necessary in advance of our next meeting. We would be delighted if Mr. Shevardnadze could come to the United States for this purpose in late January of next year.

Sincerely, Ronald Reagan



REFERRAL

DATE: 26 DEC 85

MEMORANDUM FOR: STATE SECRETARIAT

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION:

TO: GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL S

SOURCE: PRESIDENT

DATE: 26 DEC 85

KEYWORDS: USSR

AFGHANISTAN

GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL S

HS

SUBJ: PRES LTR TO GORBACHEV

-----  
REQUIRED ACTION: FOR DISPATCH

DUE DATE:

COMMENTS:

39  
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e  
*Julie K. Madison*

FOR WILLIAM F. MARTIN  
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

----- FOR NSC USE ONLY -----

FOR INFO

F S I I O B C

*Dec. 26 .85*  
*background*

~~SECRET~~

The President has seen 12/24  
SYSTEM II  
91241  
64

Received 36

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

1985 DEC 23 PM 6:31

~~SECRET~~

December 23, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE *RM*

SUBJECT: Letter to General Secretary Gorbachev

Issue

Whether to sign a letter to General Secretary Gorbachev.

Facts

In your handwritten letter of November 28, you promised Gorbachev a more formal letter with detailed suggestions regarding some of the issues before us.

Discussion

The letter at Tab A urges steps to move toward a peaceful settlement of conflicts in Afghanistan and Southern Africa and reiterates your concern regarding the Soviet action in supplying SA-5 air defense missiles to Libya.

Recommendation

OK

No

*RM*           

That you sign the letter at Tab A.

Attachments:

Tab A Letter to General Secretary Gorbachev

Prepared by:  
Jack F. Matlock

~~SECRET~~

cc Vice President

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
NLRR F06-1141 #6613  
BY RW NARA DATE 3/3/11

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET~~

December 18, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Presidential Letter to Gorbachev on Regional  
Issues

A letter from the President to Gorbachev on regional issues is at Tab A. It would follow up, in greater detail and on a more formal basis, some of the suggestions he made in his handwritten letter.

*SRS* Sestanovich, *ML* Ringdahl, *S.P.Q.* Tahir-Kheli and *GC* Covey concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the Memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Approve *JFM* Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments:

- Tab I Memorandum to the President
- Tab A Presidential Letter to Gorbachev
- Tab B Platt-McFarlane Memo

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
Sec. 3.4(b), E.O. 12958, as amended  
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2008  
BY NARA *AL*, DATE *2/17/10*

68

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
CROSSMATCH ACTION SHEET

MESSAGE # 3687  
DATE TIME: \_\_\_\_\_

IT IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE COMMENT OFFICER TO CLEAR WITH THE  
DEP EXEC SEC PRIOR TO THE ASSIGNED DUE DATE.

ACTION OFFICER

COMMENT OFFICER

INFO

PEARSON

~~Matlock~~

Sestanovich

Lingdahl *concur*

Covey

ACTION: CONCUR TO DEP EXEC SEC VIA PHONE AND/OR COMMENT HERE AND HANDCAR  
TO DEP EXEC SEC DUE DATE: 12/17

ACTION OFFICER COMMENTS:

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CLEARED BY: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_ TIME: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

CLEARED TO: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_ TIME: \_\_\_\_\_

~~CLASSIFICATION~~

ORIGINAL

12/16 69

SECRET

EUR/SOV/MULTI:EEDELMAN  
12/16/85 632-9806 WANG 2139P  
THE ACTING SECRETARY

EUR/SOV:MPARRIS  
AF/S:JDAVIDOW  
P:MARMACOST  
S/S:

EUR:MPALMER  
NEA:RPECK  
NSC:JMATLOCK  
S/S-0

IMMEDIATE MOSCOW

NOBIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, US, UR

SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL LETTER TO GENERAL SECRETARY  
- GORBACHEV ON REGIONAL ISSUES

JW  
EE  
MP  
JR  
MA  
S/S

1. ~~(S - ENTIRE TEXT)~~
2. EMBASSY SHOULD DELIVER TEXT OF PRESIDENTIAL LETTER AT PARA 3 TO HIGHEST APPROPRIATE MFA OFFICIAL AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.
3. BEGIN TEXT OF PRESIDENTIAL LETTER

DEAR MR. GENERAL SECRETARY,

I HAVE ALREADY WRITTEN TO YOU INFORMALLY TO EXPRESS SOME OF MY THOUGHTS ON THE ISSUES FACING US IN THE WAKE OF OUR MEETING IN GENEVA. I WOULD LIKE IN THIS LETTER TO DEAL WITH SOME OF THE PARTICULARLY PRESSING REGIONAL ISSUES WHICH I BELIEVE WE MUST ADDRESS IN THE MONTHS AHEAD.

I MENTIONED AFGHANISTAN IN MY EARLIER LETTER, BUT I WOULD LIKE TO SHARE WITH YOU SOME FURTHER THOUGHTS. AFGHANISTAN WAS, AFTER ALL, THE REGIONAL QUESTION ON WHICH WE SPENT THE MOST TIME IN GENEVA. YOU EXPRESSED

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NLSF99-051 #3104 SMF 10/16/00  
BY CAS, NARA, Date 10/12/02

SOVIET READINESS TO SEE AN AGREEMENT EMERGE FROM THE UNITED NATIONS NEGOTIATING PROCESS WHICH WOULD ENTAIL A CEASEFIRE, WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS, RETURN OF THE REFUGEES AND INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEES. THE DISCUSSION RECALLED THE SUGGESTION IN YOUR JUNE 20 LETTER THAT MY GOVERNMENT HAD "OPPORTUNITIES TO CONFIRM BY ITS ACTIONS" OUR READINESS TO REACH A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN. AS I EXPLAINED IN MY OCTOBER SPEECH TO THE UNGA, WE ARE PREPARED TO COOPERATE WITH OTHERS ON PRACTICAL STEPS. THREE ELEMENTS COULD FORM THE BASIS FOR A LASTING SOLUTION: A PROCESS OF NEGOTIATIONS AMONG THE WARRING PARTIES INCLUDING THE SOVIET UNION; VERIFIED ELIMINATION OF THE FOREIGN MILITARY PRESENCE AND RESTRAINT ON THE FLOW OF OUTSIDE ARMS; AND MOVEMENT TOWARD POLITICAL SELF-DETERMINATION AND ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION.

AS YOU KNOW, WE HAVE BEEN DISAPPOINTED WITH THE RESULTS OF THE PROXIMITY TALKS CONDUCTED BY THE U.N. SECRETARY GENERAL'S SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE. FIVE ROUNDS IN GENEVA HAVE NOT ADDRESSED THE REAL ISSUE ON WHICH A RESOLUTION OF THIS PROBLEM DEPENDS -- WITHDRAWAL OF YOUR FORCES. NO OTHER ELEMENT OF THE PROBLEM PRESENTS REAL DIFFICULTY. TO UNDERSCORE THIS, WE HAVE FORMALLY NOTIFIED THE SECRETARY GENERAL THAT WE ACCEPT THE AGREED FORMULATION ON GUARANTEES. FOR YOUR PART, I BELIEVE THAT THE TALKS WOULD GAIN A REAL IMPETUS FROM SOVIET ACTION TO PERMIT DISCUSSION OF A TIMETABLE FOR WITHDRAWAL AT GENEVA AND A PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT TO THAT EFFECT. WERE SUCH ACTION TAKEN BY THE TIME OF OUR MINISTERS' NEXT MEETING, IT WOULD ENABLE THEM TO HAVE A MORE FOCUSED AND PRODUCTIVE DISCUSSION.

ANOTHER AREA WHERE I BELIEVE MOVEMENT IS POSSIBLE IS SOUTHERN AFRICA. BECAUSE WE HAVE COVERED THIS GROUND OFTEN IN THE PAST, THE POINT I NEED TO MAKE IS A SIMPLE ONE.

AS I AM SURE YOU ARE AWARE, I AM REVIEWING OUR POLICY IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, SPECIFICALLY WITH RESPECT TO THE WAR IN ANGOLA. THIS REVIEW MIGHT NOT BE NECESSARY IF THERE WERE REAL EVIDENCE THAT THE OUTSIDE FORCES IN THAT COUNTRY COULD BE REDUCED, AND THEN WITHDRAWN, MAKING POSSIBLE THE RECONCILIATION OF THE INDIGENOUS PARTIES TO THE WAR. SUCH AN OUTCOME, OF COURSE, WOULD DRAMATICALLY IMPROVE PROSPECTS FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INDEPENDENT NAMIBIA IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNSC RESOLUTION 435 -- AN OBJECTIVE WE SHARE WITH THE U.S.S.R. UNFORTUNATELY, THE EVIDENCE IS CLEAR THAT YOUR OWN INVOLVEMENT IN ANGOLA IS

~~SECRET~~

1 3

DEEPENING.

AS I SAID AT THE UN IN OCTOBER, OUR AIM IS TO REDUCE, NOT INCREASE, MILITARY INVOLVEMENT BY THE SUPERPOWERS IN LOCAL DISPUTES LIKE THAT IN ANGOLA.

I WAS PLEASED TO LEARN FROM SECRETARY SHULTZ THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAD EXPRESSED AN INTEREST IN CALMING TENSIONS BETWEEN LIBYA AND EGYPT. AT THE SAME TIME, IT APPEARS THAT LIBYA IS PREPARING AT LEAST TWO SITES FOR THE EMPLACEMENT OF SA-5 AIR DEFENSE MISSILES TO BE SUPPLIED BY THE SOVIET UNION. IT IS HARD TO RECONCILE SOVIET INTEREST IN RESTRAINT IN THIS REGION WITH THE PROVISION OF ADVANCED WEAPONS TO A LEADER WHOSE RECKLESS BEHAVIOR IS A MAJOR DANGER TO REGIONAL STABILITY. BECAUSE WE VIEW THIS DEVELOPMENT WITH UTMOST SERIOUSNESS, I WAS DISAPPOINTED TO SEE THAT THE SOVIET RESPONSE TO OUR PRESENTATION FAILED TO ADDRESS THE TRANSFER OF THESE WEAPONS TO LIBYA. OUR MINISTERS AND EXPERTS SHOULD ADDRESS THIS VITAL MATTER, SINCE IT RAISES THE PROSPECT OF DANGEROUS INCIDENTS THAT I HOPE YOU WANT TO AVOID AS MUCH AS WE DO.

IF YOU AGREE, BOTH ANGOLA AND LIBYA ARE ADDITIONAL SUBJECTS WHICH SECRETARY SHULTZ AND FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE MIGHT TAKE UP IN THEIR NEXT MEETING.

IN CLOSING, LET ME UNDERLINE MY SATISFACTION WITH OUR AGREEMENT IN GENEVA TO PUT OUR REGIONAL EXPERTS' TALKS ON A REGULAR BASIS. WHEN WE MET IN GENEVA WE AGREED THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR BOTH OF US TO AVOID A U.S. - SOVIET CLASH OVER REGIONAL CONFLICTS AND TO WORK FOR SOLUTIONS. I BELIEVE THAT WE MUST MOVE FORWARD ON SOME OF THESE ISSUES BEFORE WE MEET AGAIN. IN THAT REGARD, I WAS PLEASED TO NOTE THAT IN YOUR REMARKS TO SECRETARY BALDRIGE YOU REFERRED TO THE IMPORTANCE OF DEALING WITH REGIONAL TROUBLE SPOTS.

---SINCERELY, RONALD REAGAN

END TEXT OF PRESIDENTIAL LETTER

4. A SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL FOLLOW.

yy



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United States Department of State

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Washington, D.C. 20520 SYSTEM II  
91241 add-

December 13, 1985

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE  
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Draft Letter for General Secretary Gorbachev

We are providing a revised text of a draft Presidential letter to General Secretary Gorbachev on regional issues. This draft urges forward movement on Afghanistan and southern Africa and reiterates U.S. concern over Soviet supply of SA-5 air defense missiles to Libya.

*Nicholas Platt*  
Nicholas Platt  
Executive Secretary

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/1 #6675

BY CW NARA DATE 11/27/07

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DECL: OADR



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Dear Mr. General Secretary,

I have already written to you informally to express some of my thoughts on the issues facing us in the wake of our meeting in Geneva. I would like in this letter to deal with some of the particularly pressing regional issues which I believe we must address in the months ahead.

I mentioned Afghanistan in my earlier letter, but I would like to share with you some further thoughts. Afghanistan was, after all, the regional question on which we spent the most time in Geneva. I was struck by your businesslike exposition of Soviet readiness to see an agreement emerge from the United Nations negotiating process which would entail a ceasefire, withdrawal of troops, return of the refugees and international guarantees. The discussion recalled the suggestion in your June 10 letter that my government had "opportunities to confirm by its actions" our readiness to reach a political settlement in Afghanistan. As I explained in my October speech to the UNGA, we are prepared to take practical steps. Three elements could form the basis for a lasting solution: a process of negotiations among the warring parties including the Soviet Union; verified elimination of the foreign military presence and restraint on the flow of outside arms; and movement toward political self-determination and economic reconstruction.

*change*

As an initial contribution to this process, in advance of the next round of the proximity talks in Geneva, we have formally notified the United Nations that we accept the agreed formulation on guarantees. I hope that this will give an impetus to the efforts of the UN Secretary General's Special Representative. For real progress to be made it is important that the sixth round of talks in Geneva get down to the central issue of troop withdrawals. In any event, I believe Afghanistan deserves more in-depth treatment at the next meeting between our ministers.

Another area where I believe movement is possible is southern Africa. Again, I do not intend to go over ground that we have covered often in the past. The point I want to make is a simple one.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~  
DECL: OADR

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SECRET/SENSITIVE

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As I am sure you are aware, I currently face a difficult decision on our policy in southern Africa, specifically with respect to the civil war in Angola. I would not face this decision if there were some evidence that it would be possible to bring about a reduction in the outside forces in that country which would make possible the reconciliation of the parties involved. Such an outcome, of course, would dramatically improve prospects for the establishment of an independent Namibia in accordance with UNSC Resolution 435 -- an objective we share with the U.S.S.R.

As I said at the UN in October, our aim is to reduce, not increase, military involvement by the superpowers in local disputes like that in Angola.

I was pleased to learn from Secretary Shultz that the Soviet Union had expressed an interest in calming tensions between Libya and Egypt. At the same time, it appears that Libya is preparing at least two sites for the emplacement of SA-5 air defense missiles to be supplied by the Soviet Union. It is hard to reconcile Soviet interest in restraint in this region with the provision of advanced weapons to a leader whose reckless behavior is a major danger to regional stability. We view this development with utmost seriousness. I hope that our ministers and experts will address this subject and eliminate any prospect of an incident between us.

If you agree, both Angola and Libya are additional subjects which Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze might take up in their next meeting.

In closing, let me underline my satisfaction with our agreement in Geneva to put our regional experts' talks on a regular basis. When we met in Geneva we agreed that it was important for both of us to avoid a U.S. - Soviet clash over regional conflicts and to work for solutions. I believe that we must move forward on some of these issues before we meet again. In that regard, I was pleased to note that in your remarks to Mac Baldrige you referred to the importance of dealing with regional trouble spots.

Sincerely, Ronald Reagan

SEQUENCE TO HAS SEEN

Do: Barro Bill -

W I discussed this with Jim  
 J night. First letter is a little off  
 P President's hand written note) and  
 W The wrong thrust on Afghanistan. We  
 B do need to start, however, on a  
 W longer letter, that provide the following  
 W points in President announced in  
 M his. The second letter is more urgent  
 S since I gather there is some desire  
 - to have Baldridge carry it out  
 [ on his trip.

Suggest we give to Steve S.  
 for action with coordination / concern  
 to Ty Cobb. They should cable  
 draft to Jack in Europe to get his  
 views need to process by mid-day  
 tomorrow.

Dan

DECLASSIFIED (RELEASE)

NLRR FO6-114/1 #6617

BY CU NARA DATE 11/27/67

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT  
FROM: George P. Shultz *GP*  
SUBJECT: Letters to Gorbachev

We need to take advantage of the momentum generated by your meeting with Gorbachev to move ahead in a number of fields of interest to us. The most significant:

-- In the Geneva talks, we want to prod the Soviets toward a more constructive dialogue on the offense/defense relationship;

-- On regional issues, we should pursue Gorbachev's suggestion of greater seriousness on an Afghanistan settlement and use our review of aid to UNITA to engage the Soviets in a more serious discussion of Southern Africa;

-- On human rights, you indicated you wanted to follow up on your exchange with Gorbachev in Geneva to emphasize the possibilities which would open up in areas of interest to the Soviets if we saw progress.

I have attached for your approval two draft letters to Gorbachev on these issues. The first deals with the Geneva talks and regional questions, and proposes that Shevardnadze and I take up these and other issues at a meeting here in January. The second addresses human rights, and could be delivered by Mac Baldrige during his visit to Moscow next week. Using Mac as a channel would reinforce our message on the inherent links between human rights and other areas of the relationship. As the first letter refers in passing to Mac's mission, it should be sent this week.

Attachments: As indicated

Authority: *NLSF99-051 #3107*  
BY: *CS*, NARA, Date: *6/2/02*  
DECLASSIFIED *CS 7/25/00*  
~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~  
DECL: OADR

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Dear Mr. General Secretary,

I have been heartened since returning from Geneva by the enthusiasm and hope with which reports of our recent meeting have been greeted around the world. This reaction by men and women everywhere confirms our joint assessment in Geneva of the utility of our meeting, and the responsibility we both share to ensure that that enthusiasm, and those hopes, are not in vain.

I do not intend in this letter to get into an exhaustive review of where our relationship stands after our meeting, or of where it may go. There are certain issues, however, which I do feel merit particular attention in the weeks ahead. I would like to share with you some thoughts on how we may approach them.

On substance, if our discussions in Geneva revealed anything, they revealed the extent of our differences on some of the core issues in the Geneva arms control talks and of the depth of our convictions on these issues. I took to heart the concerns you expressed so eloquently; I hope that you came to appreciate better my own concern that we not make the nuclear arms reductions we both consider overdue hostage to fears I am convinced are ungrounded.

This is not the place to go over once again the terrain we covered in Geneva. I wish only to say that our discussion convinced me that some of our positions, divergent at present to be sure, are not mutually exclusive. I am instructing my experts to explore how we can bridge the gap in the Geneva talks in the months ahead; I trust you are giving similar instructions. It is my hope that, with a joint effort in this regard, the sides will in fact be able to build common elements on which to realize concrete progress before we meet again next year.

Surely the Soviet Union cannot be opposed to strategic defense in principle. There must be a practical way to approach the relationship of offense and defense. Our negotiators in Geneva will of course be prepared to follow up on these possibilities when they return in January. I think Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze

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NLRR F06-114/1 #16626

BY CW NARA DATE 11/27/87

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should also be prepared to address these issues further when they meet.

In addition to the Geneva talks, I would hope that we can register some forward motion on some of the regional issues we discussed in Geneva before we meet again.

The regional question on which we spent the most time in Geneva, of course, was Afghanistan. I was struck by your businesslike exposition of Soviet readiness to see an agreement emerge from the United Nations negotiating process which would entail a ceasefire, withdrawal of troops, return of the refugees and international guarantees. The discussion recalled the suggestion in your June 10 letter that my government had "opportunities to confirm by its actions" our readiness to reach a political settlement in Afghanistan. As I explained in my October speech to the UNGA, we are prepared to take practical steps, including the three elements I mentioned: a dialogue among the warring parties; cessation of outside military presence and supplies; and economic reconstruction.

I believe that our two countries might in the first instance seek agreement on the question of guarantees and a timetable for withdrawal. As an initial contribution to this process, in advance of the next round of the proximity talks in Geneva, we will formally notify the United Nations that we accept their formulation on guarantees. Perhaps the U.S. and the USSR also could work out together an explicit statement that we are prepared to guarantee an appropriate settlement, including a reasonable timetable for the withdrawal of your forces. This could give an impetus to the efforts of the UN Secretary General's Special Representative. If you agree, we might seek to develop such a statement by the time Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze next meet so as to enable them to have a more focussed and productive discussion on Afghanistan.

Another area where I believe movement is possible is southern Africa. Again, I do not intend to go over ground that we have covered often in the past. The point I want to make is a simple one.

As I am sure you are aware, I currently face a difficult decision on our policy in southern Africa, specifically with respect to the civil war in Angola. I would not face this decision if there were some evidence

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that it would be possible to bring about a reduction in the outside forces in that country which would make possible the reconciliation of the parties involved. Such an outcome, of course, would dramatically improve prospects for the establishment of an independent Namibia in accordance with UNSC Resolution 435 -- an objective we share with the USSR.

As I said at the UN in October, our aim is to reduce, not increase, military involvement by the superpowers in local disputes like that in Angola. If you agree, this is another issue which Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze might take up in their next meeting.

Finally, I wanted to reiterate how much I valued the candor and detail of our discussion on human rights issues. I hope you left that conversation with a better understanding of how I want to deal with what -- for us -- is a key determinant of our relationship. Secretary of Commerce Baldrige will be in Moscow December 9 - 11 for a meeting of the U.S. - Soviet Trade and Economic Council. He will be carrying a letter from me which builds on our discussion in Geneva, and which I hope you will carefully consider.

In closing, let me reiterate how much I appreciated the opportunity to establish a personal relationship with you in Geneva. I am confident that that tie will be invaluable in the months ahead as we seek to consolidate and expand the start we made there in putting our relations on a more satisfactory basis. You will have received separately an invitation to visit Washington in late June of next year. I hope that you will find the timing convenient, and look forward to what I am confident you will find a productive and informative visit.

From the standpoint of procedure, I think it is important that we do not allow the momentum which we established in Geneva to wane. We will be able in this channel and through our embassies to follow-up on the agreements reached in the past few weeks and to flesh out some of the new ideas which emerged from our meeting. I believe it would be useful, nonetheless, for Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze to meet periodically to review progress and identify areas where work is necessary in advance of our next meeting. We would be delighted if Mr. Shevardnadze could come to the United States for this purpose in late January of next year.

Sincerely, Ronald Reagan