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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 8/20/1985

File Folder 1985 CORRESPONDENCE -RELATED MATERIAL (4/5)

FOIA

F06-114/1

Box Number 7

YARHI-MILO

711

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
6573	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE REPLY TO GORBACHEV LETTER ON NUCLEAR TESTING [4] <i>R 3/3/2011 F2006-114/1</i>	1	8/20/1985	B1
6574	MEMO	MCFARLANE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE REPLY TO GORBACHEV'S LETTER OF JULY 28, 1985 [5-7] <i>R 3/3/2011 F2006-114/1</i>	3	7/28/1985	B1
6586	MEMO	PLATT TO MCFARLANE RE PRESIDENTIAL RESPONSE TO GORBACHEV [9-12] <i>R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1</i>	4	8/14/1985	B1
6576	LETTER	PRESIDENT REAGAN TO FORMER PRESIDENT NIXON RE GENEVA [39-42] <i>R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1</i>	4	10/29/1985	B1
6577	LETTER	PRESIDENT REAGAN TO FORMER PRESIDENT FORD RE GENEVA [43-46] <i>R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1</i>	4	10/29/1985	B1
6580	LETTER	PRESIDENT REAGAN TO FORMER PRESIDENT CARTER RE GENEVA [47-50] <i>R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1</i>	4	10/29/1985	B1
6583	MEMO	MCFARLANE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE LETTERS TO FORMER PRESIDENTS CONCERNING GENEVA [51] <i>R 2/17/2010 GUIDELINES</i>	1	10/29/1985	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

NO —
It has ^{not} been sent. If
in DBE —

JG —

August 1985-2
Proposed letter —
never sent

July
Secretariat is asking if
this letter has been
sent. ADM Poudexter³
seems to think that it
was handled but he's
not sure how. We have
not received a signed
copy back. Do you know
if the matter was handled
in a different way?
SB.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

SYSTEM II
90852

JTnot
S 4
FILE Presidential
LRR

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

August 20, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK

SUBJECT: Reply to Gorbachev Letter on Nuclear Testing

Secretary Shultz has concurred in the text of the letter which was discussed with you earlier.

I am sending the text in final in order to preposition it, in case the soundings you have undertaken indicate that it should be sent.

Bob ^{fh} Linhard concurs.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you send the attached Memorandum to the President, provided your soundings indicate that it would be desirable for him to offer private consultations with the Soviets on the nuclear testing issue.

Approve ___ Disapprove ___

Attachments:

Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Letter to Gorbachev

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR F06-114/1 #6573
BY RW NARA DATE 3/3/11

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

SUBJECT: Reply to Gorbachev's Letter of July 28, 1985

Issue

Whether to sign a letter replying to Gorbachev's letter of July 28, 1985.

Facts

Gorbachev wrote you on July 28 to propose a moratorium on nuclear testing. We have rejected the Soviet proposal publicly, but you have not responded formally to the letter.

Discussion

Gorbachev's letter, while containing an unacceptable proposal, gives you an opening to see whether the Soviets are willing to conduct some informal consultations with the aim of identifying ways in which the interrelated issues of nuclear testing, verification, and offensive weapons reduction might be addressed. If the Soviets are genuinely interested in finding a way to make progress on the testing issue (which they may not be), the proposal for private talks could provide a way out of the current stalemate in resolving the critical verification problem. If Gorbachev refuses even to discuss the issue, then our public posture will subsequently be strengthened, since you will have made every effort to find a solution to the verification problems on a reasonable basis.

Recommendation

OK

No

That you sign the letter at Tab A.

— —
Attachment:

Tab A Letter to Gorbachev

Prepared by:
Jack F. Matlock

cc: Vice President

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR FOIA #6574
RV RW NARA DATE 3/3/11

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. General Secretary:

Your letter of July 28 addressed an issue of genuine importance and concern to both our countries -- nuclear testing. In previous exchanges with you and your predecessors I have sought to find ways to create the necessary conditions for progress on this issue. My latest proposals, conveyed in my letter of July 27, crossed with your letter of July 28, and I hope you have them under consideration.

I must confess that I learned of the immediate public announcement of your proposal for a moratorium on nuclear testing with regret and some surprise. The announcement was made at a juncture and in a fashion which seemed more appropriate to propaganda use than as a basis for serious negotiation. Coming in the wake of an apparent acceleration and completion of the Soviet Union's own essential testing for 1985, such handling understandably raised doubts in my mind as to the seriousness of your proposal, and compelled us to respond as we did.

Our negative reaction to your moratorium announcement, however, does not imply that we question the significance of nuclear testing as an issue. I fully recognize the desirability of progress in this area, both for its own sake and for the stimulus it might provide to other arms control negotiations -- especially our negotiations in Geneva.

As is the case in the Geneva negotiations, I am convinced that meaningful progress on nuclear testing will ultimately depend on our ability to resolve two principal sets of issues: verification and nuclear weapons reduction. Any meaningful nuclear testing regime will require a degree of confidence in our monitoring abilities beyond

that now available to either of our countries. It also seems self-evident that the testing issue can be resolved most easily in an environment of diminishing stocks of nuclear weapons.

Mr. General Secretary, if Soviet goals are as they have been described by Soviet spokesmen, it seems to me that they are not inconsistent with United States goals. Therefore, if we adopt a business-like approach toward working out the practical aspects of achieving these goals, we should be able to bridge our differences.

At the same time, it seems clear that the public debate in which our governments are currently engaged can hardly be expected to lead us to a mutually acceptable solution. In fact, public jockeying for propaganda advantage can only exacerbate mistrust regarding the intentions of the other side.

In order to explore the feasibility of making progress on this crucial issue, I would suggest that we each name a representative to meet privately and confidentially to discuss ways in which our differences might be bridged. If they are able to develop some promising ideas, these could be pursued formally by our Foreign Ministers when they meet next month.

I will appreciate your reaction to this suggestion. If it is agreeable to you, I believe it might help us find a way to narrow our differences on this important issue.

Sincerely,

His Excellency
Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev
General Secretary of the Central Committee
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
The Kremlin
Moscow

8

SYSTEM II PROFILE

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

ID 8590852

RECEIVED 14 AUG 85 17

TO MCFARLANE

FROM PLATT, N

DOCDATE 14 AUG 85

GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL S

28 JUL 85

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 20, 1997
By GAJ NARA, Date 6/12/02

KEYWORDS: USSR

NUCLEAR TESTING

HS

SUBJECT. PRES REPLY TO GORBACHEV LTR OF 28 JUL RE NUCLEAR TESTING MORATORIUM

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR PRES

DUE: 20 AUG 85 STATUS S FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MATLOCK

POINDEXTER

COMMENTS ** STAFFED PER WFM. AMBASSADOR MATLOCK, PLEASE SEND ME COPY

OF 28 JULY GORBACHEV LTR -- BRIAN

RLF# 8523870

8523963

LOG

NSCIFID

(B /)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO



August 14, 1985

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Presidential Response to Gorbachev

We have not replied formally to Gorbachev's July 28 letter to the President, which presaged Moscow's public announcement of a nuclear testing moratorium. Our public remarks have made our views quite clear, but we might use a reply to move the discussion of the testing issue in a more positive direction.

We have worked up the attached draft with Jack Matlock. In essence, it suggests private discussions between designated representatives to move the testing issue forward. It would explore Soviet willingness to meet our concerns on verification of testing limitations, especially in light of Gorbachev's August 13 TASS interview which notes the relationship among testing limits, verification, and reductions of nuclear arms.

Secretary Shultz has seen and approved this draft.

Brockmeyer
for Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/1 #6586

BY CW NARA DATE 11/27/07

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
DECL: OADR

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

DRAFT PRESIDENTIAL LETTER TO GORBACHEV

Dear Mr. General Secretary,

Your letter of July 28 addressed an issue of genuine importance and concern to both our countries -- nuclear testing. In previous exchanges with you and your predecessors I have sought to find ways to create the necessary conditions for progress on this issue. My latest proposals conveyed in my letter of July 27, crossed with your letter of July 28, and I hope you have them under consideration.

I must confess that I learned of the immediate public announcement of your proposal for a moratorium on nuclear testing with regret and some surprise. The announcement was made at a juncture and in a fashion which seemed more appropriate to propaganāa use than as a basis for serious negotiation. Coming in the wake of an apparent acceleration and completion of the Soviet Union's own essential testing for 1985, such handling understandably raised doubts in my mind as to the seriousness of your proposal, and compelled us to respond as we did.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

DECL: OADR

11

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

- 2 -

Our negative reaction to your moratorium announcement, however, does not imply that we question the significance of nuclear testing as an issue. I fully recognize the desirability of progress in this area, both for its own sake and for the stimulus it might provide to other arms control negotiations -- especially our negotiations in Geneva.

As is the case in the Geneva negotiations, I am convinced that meaningful progress on nuclear testing will ultimately depend on our ability to resolve two principal sets of issues: verification and nuclear weapons reduction. Any meaningful nuclear testing regime will require a degree of confidence in our monitoring abilities beyond that now available to either of our countries. It also seems self-evident that the testing issue can be resolved most easily in an environment of diminishing stocks of nuclear weapons.

Mr. General Secretary, if Soviet goals are as they have been described by Soviet spokesmen, it seems to me that they are not inconsistent with United States goals. Therefore, if we adopt a businesslike approach toward working out the practical aspects of achieving these goals, we should be able to bridge our differences.

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SECRET/SENSITIVE

- 3 -

At the same time, it seems clear that the public debate in which our governments are currently engaged can hardly be expected to lead us to a mutually acceptable solution. In fact, public jockeying for propaganda advantage can only exacerbate mistrust regarding the intentions of the other side.

In order to explore the feasibility of making progress on this crucial issue, I would suggest that we each name a representative to meet privately and confidentially to discuss ways in which our differences might be bridged. If they are able to develop some promising ideas, these could be pursued formally by our Foreign Ministers when they meet next month.

I will appreciate your reaction to this suggestion. If it is agreeable to you, I believe it might help us find a way to narrow our differences on this important issue.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

SECRET/SENSITIVE

Sept. 12, 1985 B

backup

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14

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

October 2, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT: Gorbachev's Letter to the President

The official translation of the Gorbachev letter to the President which Shevardnadze presented to him is at Tab A. Since Shevardnadze paraphrased it for the President in almost every particular, you may not wish to burden him with it at this time, but send it later when we have drafted a proposed response. However, I have included a Memorandum to the President at Tab I if you wish to send it forward at this time.

You will note that the letter concludes with a suggestion that we work out "an appropriate joint document" for the meeting. We might consider whether it would be advantageous for us to try to do so. If we do, we should propose a draft, discussion of which could be a vehicle for smoking out Soviet intentions on some of the issues. I have asked State to think about the question and get us their recommendations.

I understand that State is working on a draft reply to the letter, though I have not seen the proposed text yet. Given the relatively short time remaining before the Geneva meeting, it may be a good idea to answer it fairly soon -- that is, next week. After consultation with State, I will convey to you my thoughts on the substance of a reply.

RECOMMENDATION

1. That you sign the Memorandum at Tab I to the President.

Approve ___ Disapprove ___

OR, ALTERNATIVELY

2. That you hold the letter and send it to the President when we have prepared a draft reply.

Approve ___ Disapprove ___

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLS 97-001 #96
BY CAS, NARA, Date 4/12/02

15

Attachments:

Tab I Memorandum to the President

Tab A Official Translation of Letter dated September 12, 1985, from Gorbachev to the President

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF LANGUAGE SERVICES

(TRANSLATION)

LS NO. 117677

Dear Mr. President:

I would like to communicate some thoughts and considerations in continuation of the correspondence between us and specifically with a view to our forthcoming personal meeting.

I assume that both of us take this meeting very seriously and are thoroughly preparing for it. The range of problems which we are to discuss has already been fairly clearly delineated. They are all very important.

Of course, the differences between our two countries are not minor and our approaches to many fundamental issues are different. All this is true. But at the same time the reality is such that our nations have to coexist whether we like each other or not. If things ever come to a military confrontation, it would be catastrophic for our countries, and for the world as a whole. Judging by what you have said, Mr. President, you also regard a military conflict between the USSR and the USA as inadmissible.

Since that is so, in other words, if preventing nuclear war and removing the threat of war is our mutual and, for that matter, primary interest, it is imperative, we believe, to use

His Excellency
Ronald Reagan,
President of the
United States of America.

Authority NLS 97-001 #97
BY OAS, NARA, Date 6/12/12
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it as the main lever which can help to bring cardinal changes in the nature of the relationship between our nations, to make it constructive and stable and thus contribute to the improvement of the international climate in general. It is this central component of our relations that should be put to work in the period left before the November meeting, during the summit itself and afterwards.

We are convinced that there are considerable opportunities in this regard. My meeting with you may serve as a good catalyst for their realization. It seems that we could indeed reach a clear mutual understanding on the inadmissibility of nuclear war, on the fact that there could be no winners in such a war, and we could resolutely speak out against seeking military superiority and against attempts to infringe upon the legitimate security interests of the other side.

At the same time we are convinced that a mutual understanding of this kind should be organically complemented by a clearly expressed intention of the sides to take actions of a material nature in terms of the limitation and reduction of weapons, of terminating the arms race on Earth and preventing it in space.

It is such an understanding that would be an expression of the determination of the sides to move in the direction of removing the threat of war. Given an agreement on this central issue it would be easier for us, I think, to find mutual understanding and solutions of other problems.

What specific measures should receive priority? Naturally, those relating to the solution of the complex of questions concerning nuclear and space arms. An agreement on non-militarization of space is the only road to the most radical reductions of nuclear arms. We favor following this road unswervingly and are determined to search for mutually acceptable solutions. I think that in this field both sides should act energetically and not postpone decisions. It would be good to be able to count on having obtained some positive results by the time of my meeting with you.

In connection with certain thoughts contained in your letter of July 27 of this year, I would note that on several occasions we have explicitly expressed our views on the American program of developing space attack weapons and a large-scale anti-ballistic missile system. It is based not on emotions or subjective views, but on facts and realistic assessments. I stress once again--the implementation of this program will not solve the problem of nuclear arms, it will only aggravate it and have the most negative consequences for the whole process of the limitation and reduction of nuclear arms.

On the other hand, quite a lot could be done through parallel or joint efforts of our countries to slow the arms race and bring it to a halt, above all in its main arena--the nuclear one. It is indeed for this and no other purpose that we have taken a number of unilateral, practical steps.

Mr. President, both you and I understand perfectly well the importance of conducting nuclear explosions from the standpoint of the effectiveness of existing nuclear weapons and the development of new types of nuclear weapons. Consequently, the termination of nuclear tests would be a step in the opposite direction. This is what guided our decision to stop all nuclear explosions and appeal to the U.S. to join us in this. Please look at this issue without preconceived notions. It is quite clear that at the present level of nuclear arms our countries possess, a mutual termination of nuclear tests would not hurt the security of either of them.

Therefore, if there is a true desire to halt the nuclear arms race, then there can be no objections to a mutual moratorium, and the benefit it brings would be great. But the continuation of nuclear tests--albeit in the presence of somebody's observers--would be nothing else but the same arms race. The U.S. still has time to make the right decision. Imagine how much it would mean. And not only for Soviet-American relations.

But a moratorium on nuclear tests, of course, is still not a radical solution to the problem of preventing nuclear war.

In order to accomplish that, it is necessary to solve the whole complex of interrelated matters which are the subject of the talks between our delegations in Geneva.

It is quite obvious that in the final analysis the outcome of these talks will be decisive in determining whether we shall

succeed in stopping the arms race and eliminating nuclear weapons in general. Regrettably, the state of affairs at the Geneva talks gives rise to serious concern.

We have very thoroughly and from every angle once again examined what could be done there. And I want to propose to you the following formula--the two sides agree to a complete ban on space attack weapons and a truly radical reduction, say by 50 percent, of their corresponding nuclear arms.

In other words, we propose a practical solution of the tasks which were agreed upon as objectives of the Geneva negotiations--not only would the nuclear arms race be terminated, but the level of nuclear confrontation would be drastically reduced, and at the same time an arms race in space would be prevented. As a result, strategic stability would be strengthened greatly and mutual trust would grow significantly. Such a step by the USSR and U.S. would, I believe, be an incentive for other powers possessing nuclear arms to participate in nuclear^a disarmament, which you pointed out as important in one of your letters.

We view things realistically and realize that such a radical solution would require time and effort. Nonetheless, we are convinced that this problem can be solved. The first thing that is needed is to have our political approaches coincide in their essence. Secondly, given such coincidence, it is important to agree on practical measures which facilitate

the achievement of these goals, including a halt in the development of space attack weapons and a freeze of nuclear arsenals at their present quantitative levels, with a prohibition of the development of new kinds and types of nuclear weapons.

In addition, major practical measures could include the removal from alert status and dismantling of an agreed number of strategic weapons of the sides as well as mutually undertaking to refrain from the deployment of any nuclear weapons in countries which are now nuclear-free, and undertaking not to increase nuclear weapons stockpiles and not to replace nuclear weapons with new ones in the countries where such weapons are deployed.

Naturally, the issue of medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe also requires resolution. I would like to emphasize once again: the Soviet Union favors a radical solution whereby, as we proposed in Geneva, the USSR would retain in the European zone no more weapons of this type, using warheads as the unit of count, than Britain and France possess.

Our delegation at the Geneva negotiations has appropriate instructions, and it intends to present our specific proposals on this whole range of issues and to give comprehensive clarifications in the near future. We count on the positive reaction of the U.S. side and hope that it will be possible to achieve certain results at the present round of talks.

Meaningful practical steps could and should be taken in the area of confidence-building measures and military measures aimed at easing tensions. I have in mind, in particular, that our two countries, together with other participants of the Stockholm Conference, should make a maximum effort to work towards successful completion of the conference. Such an opportunity, it seems, has now emerged. I would like to repeat what has already been said by our Minister of Foreign Affairs to the U.S. Secretary of State--we are in favor of making the subject matter of the Stockholm conference a positive element of my meeting with you.

Whether or not an impetus is given to the Vienna talks largely depends on our two countries. During the meeting in Helsinki the Secretary of State promised that the U.S. side would once again closely look at the possibility of first reducing Soviet and American troops in Central Europe as we have proposed. I am sure that such an agreement would make a favorable impact on the development of the all-European process as well. I see no reason why it should not be in the interest of the U.S.

In proposing practical measures concerning arms limitation and disarmament we, of course, have in mind that they should be accompanied by relevant agreed verification measures. In some cases it would be national technical means, and in other cases, when it is really necessary, the latter could be used in conjunction with bilateral and international procedures.

I have not attempted to give an exhaustive list of measures to limit arms and relax military tensions. There could be other measures as well. We would listen with interest to the proposals of the U.S. side on this score. The main thing is for both sides to be ready to act in a constructive way in order to build up a useful foundation, which, if possible, might also be included in the summit meeting.

Mr. President, for obvious reasons I have paid particular attention to central issues facing our countries. But of course we do not belittle the importance of regional problems and bilateral matters. I assume that these questions will be thoroughly discussed by E.A. Shevardnadze and G. Shultz with a view to bringing our positions closer and, better still, finding practical solutions wherever possible.

We hope that in the course of the meetings which our Minister of Foreign Affairs will have with you and the Secretary of State, as well as through active work at the Geneva talks, in Stockholm and in Vienna, and by means of exchanges through diplomatic channels, it will be possible in the time left before my meeting with you to create a situation making for a truly productive meeting.

We believe that the outcome of this preparatory work as well as the results of my discussions with you at the meeting itself could be reflected in an appropriate joint document. If you agree, it would be worthwhile, I think, to ask our

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- 9 -

Ministers to determine how work on such a final document could be best organized.

Sincerely yours,

M. GORBACHEV

September 12, 1985

~~SECRET~~ CHRON FILE

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SYSTEM II
91009

~~Matlock~~ FILE
Received SS

1985 OCT -7 PM 9 42

October 7, 1985

*I'd like a copy of
this letter to have for
reference purposes.*

RR Done 12/3/85

SECRET/SENSITIVE

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE *RCM*

SUBJECT: Gorbachev's Letter of September 12, 1985

Attached at Tab A is the official translation of the letter from Gorbachev which Shevardnadze handed you during your meeting last Friday.

You will note that its content is virtually identical to Shevardnadze's initial presentation to you. The one matter which was not mentioned in your meeting is the suggestion at the close of the letter that we consider "an appropriate joint document" to be issued after your meeting with Gorbachev in Geneva. We are now giving thought to whether this is a good idea. If you can reach agreement on some items for a future agenda, a joint communique laying out the concepts might be useful. There are also potential risks, and we will want to weigh them carefully before proceeding.

I will be forwarding to you shortly my recommendation on this point, and also suggestions for a reply.

Recommendation

OK

No

RR

That you read the letter at Tab A.

Attachment:

Tab A Official Translation of Letter from Gorbachev, dated September 12, 1985

Prepared by:
Jack F. Matlock

cc: Vice President

SECRET/SENSITIVE

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
Authority *NY 5597-001 #015*
BY *CK*, NARA, Date *6/12/02*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF LANGUAGE SERVICES

(TRANSLATION)

LS NO. 117677

Dear Mr. President:

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I assume that both of us take this meeting very seriously and are thoroughly preparing for it. The range of problems which we are to discuss has already been fairly clearly delineated. They are all very important.

Of course, the differences between our two countries are not minor and our approaches to many fundamental issues are different. All this is true. But at the same time the reality is such that our nations have to coexist whether we like each other or not. If things ever come to a military confrontation, it would be catastrophic for our countries, and for the world as a whole. Judging by what you have said, Mr. President, you also regard a military conflict between the USSR and the USA as inadmissible.

Since that is so, in other words, if preventing nuclear war and removing the threat of war is our mutual and, for that matter, primary interest, it is imperative, we believe, to use

His Excellency
Ronald Reagan,
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United States of America.

27

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BY CS, NARA, Date 6/12/02

it as the main lever which can help to bring cardinal changes in the nature of the relationship between our nations, to make it constructive and stable and thus contribute to the improvement of the international climate in general. It is this central component of our relations that should be put to work in the period left before the November meeting, during the summit itself and afterwards.

We are convinced that there are considerable opportunities in this regard. My meeting with you may serve as a good catalyst for their realization. It seems that we could indeed reach a clear mutual understanding on the inadmissibility of nuclear war, on the fact that there could be no winners in such a war, and we could resolutely speak out against seeking military superiority and against attempts to infringe upon the legitimate security interests of the other side.

At the same time we are convinced that a mutual understanding of this kind should be organically complemented by a clearly expressed intention of the sides to take actions of a material nature in terms of the limitation and reduction of weapons, of terminating the arms race on Earth and preventing it in space.

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What specific measures should receive priority? Naturally, those relating to the solution of the complex of questions concerning nuclear and space arms. An agreement on non-militarization of space is the only road to the most radical reductions of nuclear arms. We favor following this road unswervingly and are determined to search for mutually acceptable solutions. I think that in this field both sides should act energetically and not postpone decisions. It would be good to be able to count on having obtained some positive results by the time of my meeting with you.

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Therefore, if there is a true desire to halt the nuclear arms race, then there can be no objections to a mutual moratorium, and the benefit it brings would be great. But the continuation of nuclear tests--albeit in the presence of somebody's observers--would be nothing else but the same arms race. The U.S. still has time to make the right decision. Imagine how much it would mean. And not only for Soviet-American relations.

But a moratorium on nuclear tests, of course, is still not a radical solution to the problem of preventing nuclear war.

In order to accomplish that, it is necessary to solve the whole complex of interrelated matters which are the subject of the talks between our delegations in Geneva.

It is quite obvious that in the final analysis the outcome of these talks will be decisive in determining whether we shall

succeed in stopping the arms race and eliminating nuclear weapons in general. Regrettably, the state of affairs at the Geneva talks gives rise to serious concern.

We have very thoroughly and from every angle once again examined what could be done there. And I want to propose to you the following formula--the two sides agree to a complete ban on space attack weapons and a truly radical reduction, say by 50 percent, of their corresponding nuclear arms.

In other words, we propose a practical solution of the tasks which were agreed upon as objectives of the Geneva negotiations--not only would the nuclear arms race be terminated, but the level of nuclear confrontation would be drastically reduced, and at the same time an arms race in space would be prevented. As a result, strategic stability would be strengthened greatly and mutual trust would grow significantly. Such a step by the USSR and U.S. would, I believe, be an incentive for other powers possessing nuclear arms to participate in nuclear^a disarmament, which you pointed out as important in one of your letters.

We view things realistically and realize that such a radical solution would require time and effort. Nonetheless, we are convinced that this problem can be solved. The first thing that is needed is to have our political approaches coincide in their essence. Secondly, given such coincidence, it is important to agree on practical measures which facilitate

the achievement of these goals, including a halt in the development of space attack weapons and a freeze of nuclear arsenals at their present quantitative levels, with a prohibition of the development of new kinds and types of nuclear weapons.

In addition, major practical measures could include the removal from alert status and dismantling of an agreed number of strategic weapons of the sides as well as mutually undertaking to refrain from the deployment of any nuclear weapons in countries which are now nuclear-free, and undertaking not to increase nuclear weapons stockpiles and not to replace nuclear weapons with new ones in the countries where such weapons are deployed.

Naturally, the issue of medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe also requires resolution. I would like to emphasize once again: the Soviet Union favors a radical solution whereby, as we proposed in Geneva, the USSR would retain in the European zone no more weapons of this type, using warheads as the unit of count, than Britain and France possess.

Our delegation at the Geneva negotiations has appropriate instructions, and it intends to present our specific proposals on this whole range of issues and to give comprehensive clarifications in the near future. We count on the positive reaction of the U.S. side and hope that it will be possible to achieve certain results at the present round of talks.

Meaningful practical steps could and should be taken in the area of confidence-building measures and military measures aimed at easing tensions. I have in mind, in particular, that our two countries, together with other participants of the Stockholm Conference, should make a maximum effort to work towards successful completion of the conference. Such an opportunity, it seems, has now emerged. I would like to repeat what has already been said by our Minister of Foreign Affairs to the U.S. Secretary of State--we are in favor of making the subject matter of the Stockholm conference a positive element of my meeting with you.

Whether or not an impetus is given to the Vienna talks largely depends on our two countries. During the meeting in Helsinki the Secretary of State promised that the U.S. side would once again closely look at the possibility of first reducing Soviet and American troops in Central Europe as we have proposed. I am sure that such an agreement would make a favorable impact on the development of the all-European process as well. I see no reason why it should not be in the interest of the U.S.

In proposing practical measures concerning arms limitation and disarmament we, of course, have in mind that they should be accompanied by relevant agreed verification measures. In some cases it would be national technical means, and in other cases, when it is really necessary, the latter could be used in conjunction with bilateral and international procedures.

I have not attempted to give an exhaustive list of measures to limit arms and relax military tensions. There could be other measures as well. We would listen with interest to the proposals of the U.S. side on this score. The main thing is for both sides to be ready to act in a constructive way in order to build up a useful foundation, which, if possible, might also be included in the summit meeting.

Mr. President, for obvious reasons I have paid particular attention to central issues facing our countries. But of course we do not belittle the importance of regional problems and bilateral matters. I assume that these questions will be thoroughly discussed by E.A. Shevardnadze and G. Shultz with a view to bringing our positions closer and, better still, finding practical solutions wherever possible.

We hope that in the course of the meetings which our Minister of Foreign Affairs will have with you and the Secretary of State, as well as through active work at the Geneva talks, in Stockholm and in Vienna, and by means of exchanges through diplomatic channels, it will be possible in the time left before my meeting with you to create a situation making for a truly productive meeting.

We believe that the outcome of this preparatory work as well as the results of my discussions with you at the meeting itself could be reflected in an appropriate joint document. If you agree, it would be worthwhile, I think, to ask our

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- 9 -

Ministers to determine how work on such a final document could be best organized.

Sincerely yours,

M. GORBACHEV

September 12, 1985

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

SECRET/SENSITIVE

October 2, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: Gorbachev's Letter to the President

The official translation of the Gorbachev letter to the President which Shevardnadze presented to him is at Tab A. Since Shevardnadze paraphrased it for the President in almost every particular, you may not wish to burden him with it at this time, but send it later when we have drafted a proposed response. However, I have included a Memorandum to the President at Tab I if you wish to send it forward at this time.

You will note that the letter concludes with a suggestion that we work out "an appropriate joint document" for the meeting. We might consider whether it would be advantageous for us to try to do so. If we do, we should propose a draft, discussion of which could be a vehicle for smoking out Soviet intentions on some of the issues. I have asked State to think about the question and get us their recommendations.

I understand that State is working on a draft reply to the letter, though I have not seen the proposed text yet. Given the relatively short time remaining before the Geneva meeting, it may be a good idea to answer it fairly soon -- that is, next week. After consultation with State, I will convey to you my thoughts on the substance of a reply.

RECOMMENDATION

1. That you sign the Memorandum at Tab I to the President.

Approve Disapprove

OR, ALTERNATIVELY

2. That you hold the letter and send it to the President when we have prepared a draft reply.

Approve Disapprove

SECRET/SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NISS 97-001 #96
BY *CAJ*, NARA, Date 6/12/82

Attachments:

Tab I Memorandum to the President

Tab A Official Translation of Letter dated September 12,
1985, from Gorbachev to the President

1-28-85

letter to
R. Nixon

~~SECRET~~~~Mallock~~
FILE

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 106-1141, #10576

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

BY C14 NARA DATE 11/27/07

October 29, 1985

Dear Dick:

As my November meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev draws near, I would like to review with you what I believe is the Soviet game plan for Geneva and my own approach to this critical meeting.

I have read and reread your thoughtful overview of where we stand with the Russians going into this meeting and appreciate your providing me with one of the most informed and thoughtful analyses of contemporary Soviet behavior I have read (if that sounds like a little overkill, it's because I agree with you).

The Soviet aim clearly is to focus Western public opinion exclusively on arms control, ignore important regional and human rights issues, and try to place the responsibility for any lack of progress in our relations solely on the United States -- specifically, on our determination to move ahead with our Strategic Defense Initiative. Gorbachev's statements in Paris, his Time interview and a variety of statements to Congressional and Cabinet officials all point in this direction. Gorbachev's relaxed manner and forceful speaking style lend themselves well to the media exposure such a strategy requires.

The latest Soviet counterproposals--which by any measure are one-sided--are clearly designed to continue the Soviet effort to strike at NATO unity by driving wedges between the U.S. and Europe. They are also aimed at permitting the Soviets to pursue key elements of their strategic force build-up while curtailing our own modernization program.

The major provisions of the recent Soviet counterproposal tabled in Geneva include: a ban on development (including "scientific research"),

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

testing and deployment of space-strike arms; a 50 percent reduction in nuclear delivery vehicles capable of striking the US and USSR; a limit of 6,000 nuclear charges on the permitted delivery vehicles, no more than 60 percent of which can be on any one force component; a ban on long-range cruise missiles; a ban or severe limitation on new types of delivery systems; and deep reductions in medium-range systems, based on "equality and equal security."

Under the Soviet counterproposals, depending on how "new types" of systems are defined, the US might have to forego Midgetman, D-5 and the ATB bomber, while the USSR could deploy the mobile SS-X-24 and 25 ICBMs, the SS-NX-23 SLBM, and the Blackjack bomber. Their counterproposal gives them the flexibility to maintain a substantial number of SS-18 heavy ICBMs and, probably, to deploy a follow-on to the SS-18 and other ballistic missiles as "modernized" systems. Moreover, the inclusion of our FBS in strategic limits would constrain US ability to provide extended deterrence.

The Soviet delegation can be expected to exploit the "linkage" issue, although agreement on "space strike arms" is no longer a precondition for discussion of reductions in strategic offensive arms. In Paris, Gorbachev said that it was possible to reach a US-Soviet accord on "medium-range nuclear missiles" in Europe without the "direct link with the problem of space and strategic armaments." However, in the Geneva negotiating sessions, the Soviets strongly suggest that some sort of linkage between START and Defense & Space issues remains.

Gorbachev also proposed separate talks be held with the UK and France on medium-range systems and announced that the USSR would remove SS-20s opposite Europe from alert status and dismantle their "stationary installations" over the next two months.

The Soviet delegation in Geneva made a further informal proposal regarding "intermediate steps" which might be resolved in my meeting with Gorbachev. In the first, they offered to halt construction on the Krasnoyarsk radar if the US would halt construction of its radars at Thule, Greenland, and Fylingdales, England. In the second, they proposed

an INF agreement that would involve a freeze on deployments, followed by phased reductions. Elimination of all US LRINF missiles from Europe, however, remains the ultimate Soviet objective.

My own approach to Geneva will be quite different. I plan to engage the Soviets in a broad dialogue, including all major issues on our agenda: arms control, regional conflicts, bilateral problems, and human rights. In my public statements I will stress the need to work for a safer future and promote democratic ideals, and will point out that it is precisely the Soviets' willingness to use force in the international arena which is a major underlying cause of much of the world's tension. In my view, we must not lose sight of these broader questions when pursuing agreements in individual areas--no matter how important those areas may be.

Another key objective in Geneva, of course, will be to probe Soviet intentions and see if Gorbachev is prepared for a more cooperative relationship. If he is, he will find us responsive. I will present Gorbachev with a series of specific, innovative proposals in the area of bilateral exchanges which would dramatically improve communications between our two societies. As I outlined in my October 24 speech to the UNGA, I will also be bringing to Geneva new initiatives to address longstanding regional and bilateral problems that have prevented improved relations. I will also be raising questions of human rights directly with Gorbachev.

At the same time, I do not think that progress at Geneva should be measured only in terms of agreements signed. It is equally important that we and the Soviets try to set a realistic, mutually acceptable agenda for future discussions that will help us manage the relationship over the coming months in as constructive a manner as possible.

As you know, my key advisers and I are engaged in an intense series of pre-Geneva consultations with our Allies to ensure that Allied views are factored into our discussions with the Soviets. I also consider it of the utmost importance that I have the chance to talk directly with you and hope you can meet with me at the White House on November 8th to

~~SECRET~~

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discuss various aspects of my meeting with Gorbachev in Geneva. I have also invited Presidents Carter and Ford to join us.

In the meantime, I would welcome any comments you might have on our reading of Soviet intentions and my own approach to the meeting.

Sincerely,

Ron

The Honorable Richard Nixon
Federal Building
New York, New York 10278

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

43

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 29, 1985

Dear Jerry:

As my November meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev draws near, I would like to review with you what I believe is the Soviet game plan for Geneva and my own approach to this critical meeting. The Soviet aim clearly is to focus Western public opinion exclusively on arms control, ignore important regional and human rights issues, and try to place the responsibility for any lack of progress in our relations solely on the United States -- specifically, on our determination to move ahead with our Strategic Defense Initiative. Gorbachev's statements in Paris, his Time interview and a variety of statements to Congressional and Cabinet officials all point in this direction. Gorbachev's relaxed manner and forceful speaking style lend themselves well to the media exposure such a strategy requires.

The latest Soviet counterproposals--which by any measure are one-sided--are clearly designed to continue the Soviet effort to strike at NATO unity by driving wedges between the U.S. and Europe. They are also aimed at permitting the Soviets to pursue key elements of their strategic force build-up while curtailing our own modernization program.

The major provisions of the recent Soviet counterproposal tabled in Geneva include: a ban on development (including "scientific research"), testing and deployment of space-strike arms; a 50 percent reduction in nuclear delivery vehicles capable of striking the US and USSR; a limit of 6,000 nuclear charges on the permitted delivery vehicles, no more than 60 percent of which can be on any one force component; a ban on long-range cruise missiles; a ban or severe limitation on new types of delivery systems; and deep reductions in medium-range systems, based on "equality and equal security."

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Declassify on: OADR

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NLRR 806-714/1 #6577

BY CU NARA DATE 11/27/07

Under the Soviet counterproposals, depending on how "new types" of systems are defined, the US might have to forego Midgetman, D-5 and the ATB bomber, while the USSR could deploy the mobile SS-X-24 and 25 ICBMs, the SS-NX-23 SLBM, and the Blackjack bomber. Their counterproposal gives them the flexibility to maintain a substantial number of SS-18 heavy ICBMs and, probably, to deploy a follow-on to the SS-18 and other ballistic missiles as "modernized" systems. Moreover, the inclusion of our FBS in strategic limits would constrain US ability to provide extended deterrence.

The Soviet delegation can be expected to exploit the "linkage" issue, although agreement on "space strike arms" is no longer a precondition for discussion of reductions in strategic offensive arms. In Paris, Gorbachev said that it was possible to reach a US-Soviet accord on "medium-range nuclear missiles" in Europe without the "direct link with the problem of space and strategic armaments." However, in the Geneva negotiating sessions, the Soviets strongly suggest that some sort of linkage between START and Defense & Space issues remains.

Gorbachev also proposed separate talks be held with the UK and France on medium-range systems and announced that the USSR would remove SS-20s opposite Europe from alert status and dismantle their "stationary installations" over the next two months.

The Soviet delegation in Geneva made a further informal proposal regarding "intermediate steps" which might be resolved in my meeting with Gorbachev. In the first, they offered to halt construction on the Krasnoyarsk radar if the US would halt construction of its radars at Thule, Greenland, and Fylingdales, England. In the second, they proposed an INF agreement that would involve a freeze on deployments, followed by phased reductions. Elimination of all US LRINF missiles from Europe, however, remains the ultimate Soviet objective.

My own approach to Geneva will be quite different. I plan to engage the Soviets in a broad dialogue, including all major issues on our agenda: arms control, regional conflicts, bilateral problems,

and human rights. In my public statements I will stress the need to work for a safer future and promote democratic ideals, and will point out that it is precisely the Soviets' willingness to use force in the international arena which is a major underlying cause of much of the world's tension. In my view, we must not lose sight of these broader questions when pursuing agreements in individual areas--no matter how important those areas may be.

Another key objective in Geneva, of course, will be to probe Soviet intentions and see if Gorbachev is prepared for a more cooperative relationship. If he is, he will find us responsive. I will present Gorbachev with a series of specific, innovative proposals in the area of bilateral exchanges which would dramatically improve communications between our two societies. As I outlined in my October 24 speech to the UNGA, I will also be bringing to Geneva new initiatives to address longstanding regional and bilateral problems that have prevented improved relations. I will also be raising questions of human rights directly with Gorbachev.

At the same time, I do not think that progress at Geneva should be measured only in terms of agreements signed. It is equally important that we and the Soviets try to set a realistic, mutually acceptable agenda for future discussions that will help us manage the relationship over the coming months in as constructive a manner as possible. Jerry, I believe this is not unlike the situation you faced with Brezhnev in Vladivostok. That is, while there is no little likelihood we will conclude a final agreement, there is a reasonable possibility of establishing a framework for the future resolution of these issues.

As you know, my key advisers and I are engaged in an intense series of pre-Geneva consultations with our Allies to ensure that Allied views are factored into our discussions with the Soviets. I also consider it of the utmost importance that I have the chance to talk directly with you and hope you can meet with me at the White House on November 8th to discuss various aspects of my meeting with Gorbachev in Geneva. I have also invited Presidents Nixon and Carter to join us.

~~SECRET~~

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In the meantime, I would welcome any comments you might have on our reading of Soviet intentions and my own approach to the meeting.

Sincerely,

Ron

The Honorable Gerald Ford
Post Office Box 927
Rancho Mirage, California 92270

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 29, 1985

Dear President Carter:

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Declassify on: OADR

NLRR f06-114/1 #6580

BY CN NARA DATE 11/27/07

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~~SECRET~~

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In the meantime, I would welcome any comments you might have on our reading of Soviet intentions and my own approach to the meeting.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

The Honorable Jimmy Carter
Post Office Box 350
Plains, Georgia 31780

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION

October 29, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. McFARLANE ✓

SUBJECT: Letters to Former Presidents concerning the Geneva Talks

Issue**SIGNED**

To sign the letters at Tabs A, B and C.

Facts

Your letters to Presidents Nixon, Ford and Carter are designed to inform them of our approach to the Geneva meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev and what we believe to be the Soviet strategy for the run-up to that meeting. Your letters also ask the former Presidents for their thoughts and invite them to meet with you in the White House prior to the Geneva meeting.

Discussion

The letters provide a detailed analysis of the Soviet arms control proposals and contrast them with your approach. You point out that you will attempt to engage the Soviets in a broad dialogue, including all the major issues on our agenda. The letters are similar in substance, but the letters to Presidents Nixon and Ford have been personalized.

Recommendation

OK NO

That you sign the letters to Presidents Nixon, Ford and Carter at Tabs A, B, and C, respectively.

Prepared by:
Tyrus W. Cobb

Attachments

Tab A Letter to President Nixon
Tab B Letter to President Ford
Tab C Letter to President Carter

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
Sec. 3.4(b), E.O. 12958, as amended
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2006
BY NARA CI DATE 2/17/10

MSG FROM: NSWFM --CPUA TO: NSCLM --CPUA
10/23/85 16:53:22 To: NSCLM --CPUA

52

-- SECRET --

NOTE FROM: WILLIAM F. MARTIN
Subject: Former President Luncheon, Nov. 8
Pls. watch for this. Tx.

*** Forwarding note from NSTC --CPUA 10/23/85 16:46 ***
To: NSWRP --CPUA

*** Reply to note of 10/23/85 16:41

NOTE FROM: Tyrus Cobb
Subject: Former President Luncheon, Nov. 8
Right. We sent the modified letters in. Bill should have them shortly. They were changed to reflect the Nov 8 date. Also, they put his reference to the UNGA in the past tense ("As I said at the UN on October 24...."), so we need to make sure they are not signed the same day, or worse, today).

cc: NSWFM --CPUA

Log # 8407

In other words,
these ~~dates~~ letters
should be dated
Oct 25 or later
when signed by
the President.

53

~~President's Sec. Serv.~~

8407

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

October 21, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

SIGNED

FROM: TYRUS COBB *TC*

SUBJECT: Letter to Former Presidents

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum from you to the President forwarding letters to former Presidents Nixon, Ford and Carter. The text of the letters is similar; however, the letters to Nixon and Ford have also been personalized in accordance with your instructions.

Recommendation

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Concurrence: Matlock, *Billon*, *Steve* Linhard, Steiner and *Phos* Somer

Attachments

- Tab I Memorandum for the President
- Tab A Letter to Nixon
- Tab B Letter to Ford
- Tab C Letter to Carter

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 29, 1997
By *CTD* NARA, Date *6/12/02*