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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 3/30/2005

File Folder 1985 CORRESPONDENCE-RELATED MATERIALS (2/5)

FOIA

F06-114/1

Box Number 7

YARHI-MILO

709

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
6555	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE PRESIDENT REAGAN REPLY TO GORBACHEV LETTER OF MARCH 24 [1] <i>R 3/3/2011 F2006-114/1</i>	1	4/16/1985	B1
6563	CABLE	GORBACHEV TO PRESIDENT REAGAN ON WW2 VICTORY ANNIVERSARY [25] <i>R 3/3/2011 F2006-114/1</i>	1	5/8/1985	B1
6558	CABLE	071310Z MAY 85 [27-28] <i>R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1</i>	2	5/7/1985	B1
6559	MEMO	PLATT TO MCFARLANE RE PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE ON V-E DAY [30] <i>R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1</i>	1	ND	B1
6560	MEMO	CHEW TO PRESIDENT REAGAN [32] <i>R 3/3/2011 F2006-114/1</i>	1	5/10/1985	B1
6561	MEMO	POINDEXTER TO CHEW [33] <i>R 3/3/2011 F2006-114/1</i>	1	5/10/1985	B1
6556	MEMO	MCFARLANE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE LETTER TO GORBACHEV FOR BALDRIGE TO CARRY [34] <i>R 3/3/2011 F2006-114/1</i>	1	5/10/1985	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
6557	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE PRESIDENT REAGAN LETTER TO GORBACHEV FOR BALDRIGE [35] <i>R 3/3/2011 F2006-114/1</i>	1	5/10/1985	B1
6562	MEMO	SHULTZ TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE MEETING WITH DOBRYNIN JUNE 24: GORBACHEV'S RESPONSE ON INTERIM RESTRAINT [43-44] <i>R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1</i>	2	6/25/1985	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

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MEMORANDUM

SYSTEM II
90419

Matlock
Gorbachev

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SECRET/SENSITIVE

April 16, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT: President's Reply to Gorbachev Letter of March 24

I have reviewed State's draft reply to Gorbachev, and I believe that it is not an effective response to the Gorbachev letter. Not that I object to any of the substance per se, but rather to the pedestrian approach, which is devoid of personality and reeks of being staff-written. We can do better, and I believe we should try before asking the President to approve it.

Specifically, my objections are the following:

-- It does not really engage Gorbachev in a dialogue. Now that there is a Soviet leader who reads his mail and who seems to enjoy a spirited debate, I believe that the President should engage him on some key issues. His letter provides several openings, and we should exploit them.

-- Although it was written to include items from each element on our agenda, it really comes through as a grab-bag of disparate issues. It should be tightened, made more selective, and given a focus on some of the key issues.

Although I understand that Secretary Shultz would like to provide the letter to Dobrynin tomorrow, I believe we should take more time with it and make sure it is the best we can do. (Shultz has a number of other agenda items to take up with Dobrynin, so the letter is not really necessary for the meeting.) In principle, I think it would be better to have Hartman deliver it anyway. He will be going back to Moscow next week and it would be useful to give him the opportunity to schedule a discussion with Gromyko on the basis of his consultations here.

I am working on a redraft, and hope that we can avoid undue haste in making final decisions on the text.

Recommendation:

That you suggest to Secretary Shultz that we work on the text further, with the goal of having something ready for the President by the end of the week.

Approve *JM*

Disapprove

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Declassify on: OADR

Home
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BY *RW*
NLRRC 06-11211 # 6555
DECLASSIFIED
NARA DATE 3/3/11

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8511287

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

SYSTEM II
90419

April 15, 1985

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: George P. Shultz *GPS*
SUBJECT: Reply to Gorbachev

Attached for your consideration is a draft reply to Gorbachev's March 24 letter. The letter sets forth in considerable detail our views on the main issues on the US-Soviet agenda, and closes with an invitation to Washington for a meeting in September or October.

Ambassador Dobrynin will be meeting with me Wednesday afternoon, just prior to his return to Moscow for consultations. If you agree with the approach reflected in the attached draft, I would like to be able to give Dobrynin your reply to Gorbachev at that time.

Attachment: Draft Letter to Gorbachev

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLSF 99-051 #334
BY AS, NARA, Date 4/12/02

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RECEIVED 15 APR 85 20

TO PRESIDENT

FROM SHULTZ, G

DOCDATE 15 APR 85

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By CAS NARA, Date 6/12/02

KEYWORDS USSR
HS

ARMS CONTROL

GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL S

SUBJECT: DRAFT REPLY TO GORBACHEV 24 MAR LTR

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR PRES

DUE: 16 APR 85 STATUS S FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MATLOCK

LINHARD

URGENT

COMMENTS ** URGENT ACTION; DUE BACK IN WEST WING BY 1500 ON 16 APRIL

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ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO

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SUPER SENSITIVE
8511287

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

SYSTEM II
90419

April 15, 1985

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

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Attachment: Draft Letter to Gorbachev

Authority *NLSF99-051 #334*
BY *CA*, NARA, Date *6/12/02*

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
DECL: OADR

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

4/15/85

Draft Presidential Letter to Gorbachev

Dear Mr. General Secretary:

I appreciated receiving your letter of March 24 and believe the heightened pace of our high-level dialogue in recent weeks has been useful. Vice President Bush has reported to me on your good discussion on the occasion of Chairman Chernenko's funeral. I have reviewed the records of the most recent exchanges between Secretary Shultz and Ambassador Dobrynin in Washington and Foreign Minister Gromyko and Ambassador Hartman in Moscow. I have also had reports from Congressman O'Neill on his discussions with you and Mr. Gromyko during his visit to Moscow.

I welcome the agreement that Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Gromyko will meet in Vienna on May 14. I am hopeful that they will be able to work out specific steps to move our relationship forward. As promised in the letter Speaker O'Neill passed to you, I would now like to reply to your March 24 letter at some length.

I agree with you that the task before us is to provide impetus to our relations through concerted action at the political level, and that we should focus on issues where a practical, businesslike approach can lead us forward on substantive matters. It would be a mistake to underestimate our differences and to invite needless disappointment by ignoring the difficulties before us. I hope I have made it clear in my previous correspondence with the leaders of your country that I have a strong preference for serious, quiet diplomacy as the best approach to making progress on hard issues. I welcome the willingness to pursue the same approach which you expressed in your letter.

Authority NLSF99-051 #335
BY CAJ, NARA, Date 6/21/02 ~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

I hope that the response to the tragic killing of Major Nicholson will turn out to be an example of this approach in action. I hardly need to tell you that I and all Americans were appalled at that senseless act. It makes absolutely clear the necessity to end the pattern of Soviet military actions which threaten to undo our best efforts to put our relations on a stable and constructive basis for the long term. I understand from the exchanges between our military commanders that your troops in Germany are taking measures to prevent further tragic incidents of this kind; this is a constructive first step.

In any discussion of how to avoid threats to the prospects for constructive progress in our relations, I think it is fair to point out that in recent years such threats have arisen most frequently and most seriously from various regional tensions in the world. In general, as I have stated on a number of occasions, our concern is over the pattern of threatening or using force to impose outside solutions in regional situations. At this moment in particular, I would like to discuss an issue I find particularly troubling: Afghanistan.

I believe the time has more than come to move to a political resolution of this tragic affair, one that would enable the Afghan people to live in peace without the presence of foreign troops. We support the United Nations Secretary General's effort to achieve a peaceful, negotiated settlement among the parties. We remain committed to a political solution that will deal equitably with the related issues of withdrawal of your troops to their homeland and guarantees of non-interference. Your present course will only lead to more bloodshed. We are prepared to work with you in a different direction.

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- 3 -

I am confident that the Government of Pakistan shares this approach. I want to make it very clear to you personally that Pakistan is a trusted ally of the United States. It must be completely understood that political or military threats against Pakistan are a matter of special concern to me.

As you know, I have stressed the importance of dialogue between our two governments on regional issues as a means of avoiding miscalculation, reducing the dangers of confrontation, and encouraging peaceful solutions. It was for this reason that I proposed in my UNGA speech last September that our two countries agree to periodic consultations at the policy level about regional problems. Secretary Shultz has informed me of your recent proposals for a possible series of regional discussions. We are prepared to move forward, and will be providing a detailed reply.

In addition to avoiding and managing negative developments that threaten the prospects for progress, I believe we should focus our energies also on issues where mutually beneficial forward movement could and should be possible. We have made progress in certain areas, thereby demonstrating that we can work together on specific issues despite our differences on other issues. As I mentioned in the letter Speaker O'Neill carried, I see opportunities in every area of our relationship, and I would like to suggest some of them for your consideration.

The interrelated issues under negotiation at Geneva provide us with our greatest challenge and our greatest opportunity. These negotiations have just begun. I would like to believe that the Soviet side, like the American side, is committed to serious, substantive exchanges, with full respect for the confidentiality so necessary for the talks to be successful.

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- 4 -

Our negotiators have very flexible instructions to work with your negotiators in drafting agreements that can lead to radical reductions in nuclear weapons and, ultimately, toward their complete elimination. This is why, to be absolutely frank, we were disappointed in your public espousal April 8 of a proposal that we had earlier made clear was one-sided and unacceptable. I could not agree more with the point in your letter about conducting business in a manner not aimed at deepening differences and making policies to revitalize the situation.

With regard to defensive and space weapons and strategic stability, I want to point out some facts. The Soviet Union already has deployed ABM and anti-satellite systems. Judging by your research programs in the defensive field, you also appreciate the potential further contribution that defensive systems could make toward the establishment of a more stable balance. The research being done as part of my Strategic Defense Initiative holds great promise for enhancing the security not just of our two countries but of all mankind. It is my hope that we will be able to discuss these issues and their interrelationships in a frank and thoughtful manner in Geneva. Direct, personal involvement at our level will be needed if we are to be successful.

I suggest that we also give new attention to other negotiations and discussions underway between us in the security and arms control field. We know that some progress has been made in the Stockholm Conference toward narrowing our differences. Meaningful progress toward an agreement should be possible even this year on the basis of the framework which I have already suggested both privately in this channel and publicly in Dublin last June. Specifically, the United States will consider the

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Soviet proposal for a declaration on the non-use of force as long as the Soviet Union is prepared to consider the concrete measures needed to put that principle into action. Unfortunately, the response of your representatives to date to this offer has not been encouraging. I hope that we may soon see a more favorable attitude toward this idea and toward the confidence-building measures that we and our allies have introduced.

One area where our two countries have been able to work together for mutual advantage has been the area of nuclear non-proliferation. Our consultations in this area have been constructive and useful. I think that we ought to recognize their good work and seek to build upon it in order to strengthen the non-proliferation regime.

One pressing issue of concern to us both is the use of chemical weaponry in the Iran-Iraq War. This situation illustrates the importance of curbing the spread of chemical weapons, and I suggest that it might be useful in the near future for our experts to meet and examine ways in which we might cooperate on this topic. Of course, the lasting solution to this problem will be achievement of a complete global ban on these terrible weapons, and I ask you also to consider carefully the proposed treaty we have advanced in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.

We continue to feel that it would be in both our interests to arrive at an equitable and balanced agreement in the MBFR talks in Vienna which would reduce the level of conventional forces in central Europe.

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- 6 -

In addition to the implementation of our agreement on upgrading the Direct Communications Link, which is proceeding on schedule, we hope we can expand our ability to communicate rapidly during the time of crisis into other areas. We remain ready to discuss with you a number of concrete proposals in this field.

There are several important bilateral issues on which we can make progress relatively quickly if we seize the opportunities now before us. We should be able to conclude an agreement on improving safety measures in the North Pacific at an early meeting and move to discussions of civil aviation issues. Our efforts to negotiate a new cultural exchanges agreement have, after six months, reached the point where only a handful of issues remain to be resolved. And we are ready to move forward at the earliest possible date to open our respective consulates in New York and Kiev. I am also hopeful that the meeting of our Joint Commercial Commission in May will succeed in identifying areas of non-strategic trade that could be substantially increased.

Finally, let me turn to an issue of great importance to me and to all Americans. As the Vice President informed you in Moscow, we believe strongly that human rights are an important element of our bilateral relationship. While we recognize your sensitivities on this question, human rights is an issue that must be addressed. Last year we suggested that Ambassador Hartman meet periodically with Deputy Foreign Minister Korniyenko to discuss confidentially our mutual concerns. I am also prepared to appoint rapporteurs as you suggested to the Vice President, perhaps someone to join Ambassador Hartman in such a meeting. Whatever procedures we ultimately establish, I hope we can agree that this channel will be used for trying seriously to

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resolve human rights problems and not for exchanging propaganda. Progress in this field will create a positive environment for progress in a number of other areas.

I have taken the liberty of speaking candidly in this letter. I take it that you agree with me that is the best approach, and I hope we can continue to speak frankly in our future correspondence. Let me close by reaffirming the value I place in these letters and my desire to use this correspondence to build stronger relations between the two of us and between our two countries.

Finally, I was glad to receive your views on a meeting between the two of us. In the spirit of your suggestion that we return to the question of time and place of such a meeting, let me suggest that we meet in Washington this fall, in either September or October. We also look forward to the meeting between Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Gromyko in Vienna in May, which we hope will provide an opportunity for us to move forward across the agenda I have discussed in this letter.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

1580M

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. General Secretary:

As I mentioned in my letter of April 4, delivered by Speaker O'Neill, I have given careful thought to your letter of March 24 and wish to take this opportunity to address the questions you raised and to mention others which I feel deserve your attention. Given the heavy responsibilities we both bear to preserve peace in the world and life on this planet, I am sure that you will agree that we must communicate with each other frankly and openly so that we can understand each other's point of view clearly. I write in that spirit.

I had thought that we agreed on the necessity of improving relations between our countries, and I welcomed your judgment that it is possible to do so. Our countries share an overriding interest in avoiding war between us, and -- as you pointed out -- the immediate task we face is to find a way to provide a political impetus to move these relations in a positive direction.

Unfortunately, certain recent events have begun to cast doubt on the desire of your government to improve relations. In particular, I have in mind the public retraction of the commitment made earlier by a responsible Soviet official to take steps to make certain that lethal force is not used against members of the United States Military Liaison Mission in Germany.

Mr. General Secretary, this matter has importance beyond the tragic loss of life which has occurred. It involves fundamental principles which must be observed if we are to narrow our differences and resolve problems in our countries' relations. For

Authority NLSF 99-05 / 7-33/6
BY CJD, NARA, Date 6/12/02
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this reason, I will give you my views in detail. The principles are those of dealing with each other on the basis of equality and reciprocity. The current Soviet position recognizes neither of these principles.

Now, I can understand that accidents occur in life which do not reflect the intention of political authorities. But when they do, it is the responsibility of the relevant political authorities to take appropriate corrective action.

For decades, members of our respective military liaison missions in Germany operated pursuant to the Huebner-Malinin agreement without a fatal incident. That encouraging record was broken when an unarmed member of our mission was killed by a Soviet soldier. Our military personnel are instructed categorically and in writing (in orders provided to your commander) never to use lethal force against members of the Soviet Military Liaison Mission, regardless of circumstances. Our forces in the Federal Republic of Germany have never done so, even though Soviet military personnel have been apprehended repeatedly in restricted military areas. In fact, some Soviet officers were discovered in a prohibited area just three days before the fatal shooting of our officer and were escorted courteously and safely from the area.

The position which your Government most recently presented to us, therefore, is neither reciprocal in its effect nor does it reflect a willingness to deal as equals. Instead of accepting the responsibility to insure that members of the United States Military Liaison Mission receive the same protection as that we accord members of the Soviet Military Liaison Mission, what we see is the assertion of a "right" to use lethal force under certain circumstances, determined unilaterally by the Soviet side, and in practice by enlisted men in the Soviet armed forces.

Now I will offer no comment on the desirability of allowing subordinate officials -- and indeed even rank-and-file soldiers -- to make decisions which can affect relations between great nations. If

you choose to permit this, that is your prerogative. But in that case, your Government cannot escape responsibility for faulty acts of judgment by individuals acting in accord with standing orders.

I hope that you will reconsider the position your Government has taken on this matter, and take steps to see to it that your military personnel guarantee the safety of their American, British and French counterparts in Germany just as American, British and French military personnel guarantee the safety of their Soviet colleagues. If your Government is unwilling or unable to abide by even this elementary rule of reciprocity, the conclusion we will be forced to draw will inevitably affect the prospects for settling other issues. The American people see this tragedy through the eyes of the widow and an eight-year-old child. Consequently it will remain a penetrating and enduring problem until it is properly resolved.

Your letter mentioned a number of other important principles, but here too our agreement on the principle should not be allowed to obscure the fact that, in our opinion, the principle cited has not been observed on the Soviet side. For example I could not agree more with your statement that each social system should prove its advantages not by force, but by peaceful competition, and that all people have the right to go their chosen way without imposition from the outside. But if this is true, what are we to think of Soviet military actions in Afghanistan or of your country's policy of supplying arms to minority elements in other countries which are attempting to impose their will on a nation by force? Can this be considered consistent with that important principle?

Mr. General Secretary, my purpose in pointing this out is not to engage in a debate over questions on which we disagree, but simply to illustrate the fact that agreement on a principle is one thing, and practical efforts to apply it another. Since we seem to agree on many principles, we must

devote our main effort to closing the gap between principle and practice.

In this regard, I am pleased to note that we both seem to be in agreement on the desirability of more direct consultation on various regional issues. That is a healthy sign, and I would hope that these consultations can be used to avoid the development of situations which might bring us to dangerous confrontations. I believe we should not be discouraged if, at present, our positions seem far apart. This is to be expected, given our differing interests and the impact of past events. The important thing is to make sure we each have a clear understanding of the other's point of view and act in a manner which does not provoke unintended reaction by the other.

One situation which has had a profoundly negative impact on our relations is the conflict in Afghanistan. Isn't it long overdue to reach a political resolution of this tragic affair? I cannot believe that it is impossible to find a solution which protects the legitimate interests of all parties, that of the Afghan people to live in peace under a government of their own choosing, and that of the Soviet Union to ensure that its southern border is secure. We support the United Nations Secretary General's effort to achieve a negotiated settlement, and would like to see a political solution that will deal equitably with the related issues of withdrawal of your troops to their homeland and guarantees of non-interference. I fear that your present course will only lead to more bloodshed, but I want you to know that I am prepared to work with you to move the region toward peace, if you desire.

Above all, we must see to it that the conflict in Afghanistan does not expand. Pakistan is a trusted ally of the United States and I am sure you recognize the grave danger which would ensue from any political or military threats against that country.

Turning to another of your comments, I must confess that I am perplexed by what you meant by your observation that trust "will not be enhanced

if, for example, one were to talk as if in two languages...." Of course, this is true. And, if I am to be candid, I would be compelled to admit that Soviet words and actions do not always seem to us to be speaking the same language. But I know that this is not what you intended to suggest. I also am sure that you did not intend to suggest that expressing our respective philosophies or our views of actions taken by the other is inconsistent with practical efforts to improve the relationship. For, after all, it has been the Party which you head which has always insisted not only on the right but indeed the duty to conduct what it calls an ideological struggle.

However this may be, your remarks highlight the need for us to act so as to bolster confidence rather than to undermine it. In this regard, I must tell you that I found the proposal you made publicly on April 7 -- and particularly the manner in which it was made -- unhelpful. As for the substance of the proposal, I find no significant element in it which we have not made clear in the past is unacceptable to us. I will not burden this letter with a reiteration of the reasons, since I am certain your experts are well aware of them. I cannot help but wonder what the purpose could have been in presenting a proposal which is, in its essence, not only an old one, but one which was known to provide no basis for serious negotiation. Certainly, it does not foster a climate conducive to finding realistic solutions to difficult questions. Past experience suggests that the best way to solve such issues is to work them out privately.

This brings me to the negotiations which have begun in Geneva. They have not made the progress we had hoped. It may now be appropriate to give them the political impetus about which we both have spoken. Let me tell you frankly and directly how I view them.

First, the January agreement by our Foreign Ministers to begin new negotiations was a good one. The problem has not been the terms of reference on the basis of which our negotiators met, even though each side may in some instances

interpret the wording of the joint statement somewhat differently in its application to specifics. The problem is, rather, that your negotiators have not yet begun to discuss concretely how we can translate our commitment to a radical reduction of nuclear arsenals into concrete, practical agreements.

A particular obstacle to progress has been the demand by Soviet negotiators that, in effect, the United States agree to ban research on advanced defensive systems before other topics are dealt with seriously. I hope that I have misunderstood the Soviet position on this point, because, if that is the Soviet position, no progress will be possible. For reasons we have explained repeatedly and in detail, we see no way that a ban on research efforts can be verified. Indeed in Geneva, Foreign Minister Gromyko acknowledged the difficulty of verifying such a ban on research. Nor do we think such a ban would be in the interest of either of our countries. To hold the negotiations hostage to an impossible demand creates an insurmountable obstacle from the outset. I sincerely hope that this is not your intent, since it cannot be in the interest of either of our countries. In fact, it is inconsistent with your own actions -- with the strategic defense you already deploy around Moscow and with your own major research program in strategic defense.

In this regard, I was struck by the characterization of our Strategic Defense Initiative which you made during your meeting with Speaker O'Neill's delegation -- that this research program has an offensive purpose for an attack on the Soviet Union. I can assure you that you are profoundly mistaken on this point. The truth is precisely the opposite. We believe that it is important to explore the technical feasibility of defensive systems which might ultimately give all of us the means to protect our people more safely than do those we have at present, and to provide the means of moving to the total abolition of nuclear weapons, an objective on which we are agreed. I must ask you, how are we ever practically to achieve that noble aim if nations

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have no defense against the uncertainty that all nuclear weapons might not have been removed from world arsenals? Life provides no guarantee against some future madman getting his hands on nuclear weapons, the technology of which is already, unfortunately, far too widely known and knowledge of which cannot be erased from human minds.

This point seems, at one time, to have been clearly understood by the Soviet Government. I note that Foreign Minister Gromyko told the United Nations General Assembly in 1962 that anti-missile defenses could be the key to a successful agreement reducing offensive missiles. They would, he said then, "guard against the eventuality ... of someone deciding to violate the treaty and conceal missiles or combat aircraft." Not only has your government said that missile defenses are good; you have acted on this belief as well. Not only have you deployed an operational ABM system, but you have upgraded it and you are pursuing an active research program.

Of course, I recognize that, in theory, the sudden deployment of effective defenses by one side in a strategic environment characterized by large numbers of "first-strike" weapons could be considered as potentially threatening by the other side. Nevertheless, such a theoretical supposition has no basis in reality, at least so far as the United States is concerned. Our scientists tell me that the United States will require some years of further research to determine whether potentially effective defensive systems can be identified which are worthy of consideration for deployment. If some options should at some time in the future be identified, development of them by the United States could occur only following negotiations with other countries, including your own, and following thorough and open policy debates in the United States itself. And if the decision to deploy should be positive, then further years would pass until the systems could actually be deployed. So there is no possibility of a sudden, secretive, destabilizing move by the United States. During the research period our governments will have ample time to phase out

systems which could pose a "first-strike" threat and to develop a common understanding regarding the place of possible new systems in a safer, more stable, arrangement. If such defensive systems are identified that would not be permitted by the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, the United States intends to follow the procedures agreed upon at the time the Treaty was negotiated in 1972. In particular, Agreed Statement D attached to that Treaty calls upon the party developing a system based upon other physical principles to consult with the other party pursuant to Article XIII, with a view to working out pertinent limitations which could be adopted by amendment to the Treaty pursuant to Article XIV. I presume that it continues to be the intention of the Soviet Union to abide by Agreed Statement D in the event the long-continuing Soviet program in research on directed energy weapons were to have favorable results.

I hope this discussion will assist you in joining me in a search for practical steps to invigorate the negotiations in Geneva. One approach which I believe holds promise would be for our negotiators on strategic and intermediate-range nuclear systems to intensify their efforts to agree on specific reductions in the numbers of existing and future forces, with particular attention to those each of us find most threatening, while the negotiators dealing with defensive and space weapons concentrate on measures which prevent the erosion of the ABM Treaty and strengthen the role that Treaty can play in preserving stability as we move toward a world without nuclear weapons. Proceeding in this fashion might avoid a fruitless debate on generalities and open the way to concrete, practical solutions which meet the concerns of both sides.

I believe we also should give new attention to other negotiations and discussions underway in the security and arms control field. We know that some progress has been made in the Stockholm Conference toward narrowing our differences. An

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agreement should be possible this year on the basis of the framework which we have discussed with your predecessors. Specifically, we are willing to consider the Soviet proposal for a declaration reaffirming the principle not to use force, if the Soviet Union is prepared to negotiate agreements which will give concrete new meaning to that principle. Unfortunately, the response of your representatives to this offer has not been encouraging up to now. I hope that we may soon see a more favorable attitude toward this idea and toward the confidence-building measures that we and our allies have proposed.

One pressing issue of concern to us both is the use of chemical weaponry in the Iran-Iraq war. This situation illustrates the importance of curbing the spread of chemical weapons, and I suggest that it might be useful in the near future for our experts to meet and examine ways in which we might cooperate on this topic. A verifiable complete global ban on these terrible weapons would provide a lasting solution, and I would ask you therefore to give further study to the draft treaty we have advanced in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.

Steps to improve our bilateral relationship are also important, not only because of the benefits which agreements in themselves can bring, but also because of the contribution they can make to a more confident working relationship in general.

Several of these issues seem ripe for rapid settlement. For example, we should be able to conclude an agreement on improving safety measures in the North Pacific at an early meeting and move to discussions of civil aviation issues. We are ready to move forward promptly to open our respective consulates in New York and Kiev. Our efforts to negotiate a new exchanges agreement have, after six months, reached the point where only a handful of issues remain to be resolved. But if I had to characterize these remaining issues, I would say that they result from efforts on our side to raise our sights and look to more, not fewer, exchanges. Shouldn't we try to improve on past practices in this area? I am also hopeful

that the meeting of our Joint Commercial Commission in May will succeed in identifying areas in which trade can increase substantially, but it is clear that this is likely to happen only if we succeed in improving the political atmosphere.

Finally, let me turn to an issue of great importance to me and to all Americans. As the Vice President informed you in Moscow, we believe strongly that strict observance of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and of the Helsinki Final Act is an important element of our bilateral relationship. Last year we suggested that Ambassador Hartman meet periodically with Deputy Foreign Minister Korniyenko to discuss confidentially how we might achieve greater mutual understanding in this area. I am also prepared to appoint rapporteurs as you suggested to the Vice President, perhaps someone to join Ambassador Hartman in such meetings. Whatever procedures we ultimately establish, I hope we can agree to try, each in accord with his own legal structure, to resolve problems in this area. If we can find a way to eliminate the conditions which give rise to public recrimination, we will have taken a giant step forward in creating an atmosphere conducive to solving many other problems.

I was glad to receive your views on a meeting between the two of us, and agree that major formal agreements are not necessary to justify one. I assume that you will get back in touch with me when you are ready to discuss time and place. I am pleased that arrangements have been made for Secretary Shultz to meet Foreign Minister Gromyko in Vienna next month, and hope that they will be able to move us toward solutions of the problems I have mentioned as well as others on the broad agenda before us.

As I stated at the outset, I have written you in candor. I believe that our heavy responsibilities require us to communicate directly and without guile or circumlocution. I hope you will give me your frank view of these questions and call to my attention any others which you consider require our personal involvement. I sincerely hope that

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we can use this correspondence to provide a new impetus to the whole range of efforts to build

confidence and to solve the critical problems which have increased tension between our countries.

Sincerely,

His Excellency
Mikhail Sergeyeovich Gorbachev
General Secretary of the Central Committee
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
The Kremlin
Moscow

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MSG FROM: NSRCM --CPUA TO: Matlock
To: Matlock

+04/30/85 16:19:10

~~-- SECRET --~~

NOTE FROM: ROBERT MCFARLANE
SUBJECT: Letter to Gorbachev

Jack please add the following sentence to the letter to Gorbachev on page three in the first full paragraph after the sentence ending "...settling other issues." and rerun the letter. Many thanks.

"The American people see this tragedy through the eyes of the widow and an eight year old child. Consequently it will remain a penetrating and enduring problem until it is properly resolved."

cc: NSJMP --CPUA

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 29, 1997

By CAS NARA, Date 6/12/02

VE Day

24

May 8 '85

Book up material

KIMMIT

Send to Matlock 25

FBIS 101

USSR: GORBACHEV CABLES REAGAN ON WWII VICTORY ANNIVERSARY

LD081645 MOSCOW TASS IN ENGLISH 1641 GMT 8 MAY 85

(TEXT) MOSCOW MAY 8 TASS -- MIKHAIL GORBACHEV HAS SENT A TELEGRAM TO U.S. PRESIDENT RONALD REAGAN, SAYING:

"ESTEEMED MR PRESIDENT,

"MARKING THE DAY OF THE GREAT VICTORY OVER HITLERITE FASCISM, WHICH WAS WON 40 YEARS AGO BY THE SOVIET PEOPLE AND THE PEOPLES OF OTHER ALLIED COUNTRIES, WE REMEMBER ALSO THE SPIRIT OF COOPERATION, WHICH UNITED US ALL IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST THE COMMON ENEMY. WE DO JUSTICE TO THE CONTRIBUTION MADE BY THE AMERICAN PEOPLE TO ACHIEVING THE VICTORY, TO THE MEMORY OF THOSE AMERICANS WHO FELL ON THE BATTLEFIELDS.

"ALSO TODAY ALL SHOULD REMEMBER THE MAIN LESSON OF THAT MOST RUTHLESS AND DEVASTATING WAR EVER KNOWN BY MANKIND. THE ESSENCE OF THAT LESSON IS THAT A RESPONSIBLE APPROACH TO PRESERVING PEACE AND STRENGTHENING INTERNATIONAL SECURITY IS REQUIRED FROM ALL STATES AND THEIR LEADERS. THE SOVIET UNION IS PREPARED TO COOPERATE WITH THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO ACCOMPLISH ON THIS BASIS THE TASK OF PREVENTING A NUCLEAR CATASTROPHE AND FULLY ELIMINATING NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

"THE PEOPLES OF THE USA AND OTHER COUNTRIES MAY REST ASSURED THAT THE SOVIET UNION WILL CONTINUE SEEKING THIS NOBLE GOAL.

"RESPECTFULLY,

"M. GORBACHEV."

8 MAY 1713Z NLJ

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR FOI-11411 #6563

BY RW NARA DATE 3/3/11

Amb Matlock

26

FYI

This was Rod Tagged by the Stroom to McF

Doug Dean

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

Doug 27
Doug

PAGE 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 5933
SIT383 AN009281

DTG: 071310Z MAY 85
TOR: 127/1915Z

EXDIS

DISTRIBUTION: MCF JP KIMM VP SIT EOB /009
WHSR COMMENT: REDTAG/SENT TO MCF

EXDIS

FLASH
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DE RUEHMO #5933 1271311
Z 071310Z MAY 85 ZFF4
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO AMEMBASSY MADRID FLASH 3197
AMCONSUL STRASBOURG FLASH 0006
SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 0163

EXDIS

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ MOSCOW 05933

EXDIS

EXDIS
FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMB HARTMAN

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, UR, US
SUBJECT: US MESSAGE ON V-E DAY

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT).
2. YOU ARE BY NOW AWARE THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE TOLD US THEY ARE NO LONGER INTERESTED IN AN EXCHANGE OF V-E DAY MESSAGES. WHILE IT IS NOT CLEAR PRECISELY WHAT LED THEM TO THIS CONCLUSION, I SEE NO REASON WHY WE SHOULD LET THEM CENSOR US.

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/1 #6558
BY C1 NARA DATE 11/27/07

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 MOSCOW 59332

DTG: 071310Z MAY 85 PSN: 07426

EXDIS

3. I REALIZE THAT THE PRESIDENT'S STRASBOURG SPEECH IS PROBABLY LOCKED UP AT THIS POINT, AND THAT IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE TO INCORPORATE OUR INTENDED V-E DAY MESSAGE INTO HIS TEXT. I STRONGLY URGE, HOWEVER, THAT THE PRESIDENT FIND A WAY TO ADD A REFERENCE TO THE SOVIETS' SCUTTling OF THIS WORTHY INITIATIVE. SOMETHING ALONG THE FOLLOWING LINES IS WHAT I HAVE IN MIND.

BEGIN TEXT:

EXDIS

IT HAD BEEN OUR INTENTION ON THIS ANNIVERSARY OF THE END OF THE WAR IN EUROPE TO EXCHANGE WITH THE SOVIET UNION MESSAGES COMMEMORATING THE OCCASION. UNFORTUNATELY, WE FOUND OUT SHORTLY BEFORE THE EXCHANGE WOULD HAVE TAKEN PLACE THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT WAS NOT PREPARED TO GO THROUGH WITH THE IDEA. I REGRET THIS. BUT I WOULD LIKE TO TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO SEND A PERSONAL MESSAGE TO THE SOVIET PEOPLE.

EXDIS

FORTY YEARS AFTER THE GUNS FELL SILENT IN EUROPE, AMERICA REMEMBERS THE TERRIBLE PRICE, AT WHICH THE SUBSEQUENT PEACE WAS PURCHASED. ALONG WITH OUR OWN SACRIFICES, WE REMEMBER THOSE OF ALL OUR ALLIES, INCLUDING THE VALIANT SOVIET PEOPLE. MAY WE NEVER FORGET THE LESSONS OF OUR COMMON STRUGGLE IN WORLD WAR II. MAY THOSE LESSONS SERVE AS GUIDE-POSTS FOR FUTURE EFFORTS TO PRESERVE AND SECURE THE PEACE FOR OUR GENERATION, AND FOR GENERATIONS TO COME.

EXDIS

END TEXT.

HARTMAN

BT

INTERNAL NSC ROUTING 9

File

Mistake:

(Deborah
Mar 8)



1 Mr President
 Last week you approved
 no attendance at Parades
 & receptions but a letter to
 Gorbachev commemorating VE
 day as the beginning of peace.

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
 THE WHITE HOUSE

Buel

SUBJECT: Presidential Message on VE-Day

Yes RR No

Per the NSC's request, the Department suggests the following message from the President to General Secretary Gorbachev on the occasion of VE Day. After the President approves the text, the Department recommends sending it via cable to Embassy Moscow for delivery, with no signed original.

Begin draft text:

Dear Mr. General Secretary:

The 40th Anniversary of the victory in Europe is an occasion for both our countries to remember the sacrifice of those men and women everywhere who gave the last full measure of devotion to the cause of fighting tyranny. Together with our other allies, our two countries played a full part in that long struggle. We demonstrated that despite our differences we can join together in successful common efforts.

I believe we should also see this solemn occasion as an opportunity to look forward to the future with vision and hope. I would like our countries to join in rededication to the task of overcoming the differences and resolving the problems between us, and in renewed progress toward the goals of making peace more stable and eliminating nuclear weapons from the face of the earth. By pursuing those goals, we will truly honor those whose memory we commemorate today.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

End text.

Nicholas Platt
 Nicholas Platt
 Executive Secretary

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR FOI-114/1 #6559

BY CI NARA DATE 11/27/07

~~SECRET~~
 DECL: OADR

~~SECRET~~
CLASSIFICATION

CIRCLE ONE BELOW

IMMEDIATE

95 MAY 6 P 6: 02

MODE

PAGES 1

SECURE FAX # 29

DTG 062130Z

PRIORITY

ADMIN FAX # _____

RELEASER _____

ROUTINE

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

RECORD # _____

FROM/LOCATION

1. COMCEN/MADRID

TO/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. WHSR

TOR: 06215Z

INFORMATION ADDRESSEES/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

- 1. _____
- 2. _____

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS:

~~SECRET~~
CLASSIFICATION

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May 11, 1985
The President to
Gorbachev.

90495

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 10, 1985

MR. PRESIDENT:

NSC has requested the
attached be signed by
tomorrow.

After you have had an
opportunity to review
and sign the letter,
could you please have
an usher return it with
the PDB to the Sit Room

Thank you.

DC

David L. Chew

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/1#6560

BY RW NARA DATE 3/3/11

II: 90495

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

David Chew,

5/10

We would like to get this to Camp David and signed tomorrow morning, since Jack Inthorn leaves on Sunday. Suggest that it go up and be delivered with Sat PDB about 0900.

John

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/1 #656d

BY RW NARA DATE 3/3/11

May 10, 1985

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SIGNED

FROM: ROBERT C. McFARLANE *RF*
SUBJECT: Letter to Gorbachev for Secretary Baldrige
to Carry

Issue

Whether to sign a letter to Gorbachev for Mac Baldrige to present if, after the Shultz-Gromyko meeting, you approve Mac's going to Moscow May 20-21.

Facts

Mac may be in Moscow for a meeting of the Joint Commercial Commission and wishes to have a letter from you to Gorbachev in case a meeting with Gorbachev is arranged. Mac departed today for visits to China and India before the Moscow meeting. Ambassador Matlock, of our staff, leaves on Sunday to join Mac and would carry this letter.

Discussion

The letter expresses your interest in an expansion of peaceful trade with the Soviet Union, but makes clear that this will depend upon the parallel improvement of the overall relationship. The reference to your previous correspondence makes clear that Soviet human rights behavior is particularly relevant.

Recommendation

That you sign the letter at Tab A.

OK No
RR _____

Prepared by:
Jack F. Matlock

Attachment:
Tab A - Letter to Gorbacheve

cc: Vice President

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR F06-114/1 #6556
BY RW NARA DATE 3/3/11

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

May 10, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT: Presidential Letter to Gorbachev for Baldrige

Commerce has requested a letter from the President to Gorbachev for Secretary Baldrige to deliver in case he is granted an appointment.

I have made some changes in the Commerce/State draft to reflect elements of the previous correspondence. In particular, I have made the reference to emigration indirect (though unmistakable), since I believe that direct mention in a letter which will have wider distribution in the Soviet bureaucracy than the confidential correspondence would be counterproductive.

If the letter is signed before my departure from Washington May 12, I can hand carry it to Moscow.

Roger Robinson is out of town.

Recommendation:

That you forward the memorandum at TAB I to the President, with the recommendation that he sign the letter.

Approve *JM*

Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I - Memorandum to the President

Tab A - Letter to Gorbachev

Tab II - Commerce/State draft of letter, showing changes

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR F06-114/1 #6557
BY RW NARA DATE 3/3/11

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SYSTEM II
90495

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DRAFT LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT TO GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV
TO BE CONVEYED IN PERSON BY SECRETARY BALDRIGE IN MOSCOW,
PROBABLY MAY 22.....Revised 5/6/85 and Cleared by State/EUR

His Excellency
Mikhail Gorbachev
General Secretary
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
The Kremlin
Moscow

Dear Mr. General Secretary:

Secretary Baldrige's visit to Moscow provides me the opportunity to repeat to you my desire for a more constructive working relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. An expansion of peaceful trade can and should be an important part of an improved relationship between our countries .

I place great significance on the discussions between Secretary Baldrige and Minister Patolichev in Moscow. They are holding the first meeting of our Joint Commercial Commission in seven years, and their meeting reflects the judgment of both our governments that an expansion of our peaceful trade is now appropriate. It is my hope that their achievements will result not only in increased trade, but also in an increased desire to seek greater cooperation in areas other than trade.

I have asked Secretary Baldrige to have pragmatic discussions with Minister Patolichev, so that the meeting of our Joint Commercial Commission will result in concrete actions by both sides to expand trade where that is now possible. To leave no doubt that the United States favors the expansion of peaceful trade with the Soviet Union, I have also authorized Secretary Baldrige to join with Minister Patolichev in a public statement on the development of trade relations.

Authority NLSFC19-051 #344
BY CTJ, NARA, Date 6/12/02

CONFIDENTIAL

While I believe there are some ~~modest trade~~ actions we can take now, I ~~must stress~~ that there can ~~be~~ be a fundamental change in our trade relationship without parallel improvements in other aspects of our relationship. ~~As one example, resumption of a substantial flow of emigration from the USSR,~~ would contribute greatly to a climate in which a more complete development of trade and economic cooperation would be possible.

It is my hope that upon his return from Moscow Secretary Baldrige will be able to report to me that there are areas in which both our countries can benefit from commercial cooperation and that there is ^{Soviet} interest in parallel improvements in other parts of our relationship. Given such progress, I believe that the development of our trade relationship is a question in which you and I could usefully take a continuing personal interest. I will welcome any suggestions you may have in this regard.

I have mentioned in my previous letters some of the areas in which improvements

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
The Under Secretary for International Trade
Washington, D.C. 20230

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MAY 9 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR AMBASSADOR MATLOCK
Special Assistant to the President
for National Security AffairsFROM: Lionel H. Olmer *LHO*
SUBJECT: Secretary's Meeting with Ambassador Dobrynin

Ambassador Dobrynin met briefly with Secretary Baldrige May 8 to discuss the upcoming Joint Commercial Commission (JCC) meeting. Dobrynin said Moscow was working hard preparing for the meeting, and he believed we would see positive results. He asked what the Secretary thought would be accomplished, and was told that we believed we could solve some practical problems in exchange for Soviet actions, but that MFN or any other fundamental changes in trade couldn't come without major improvements in other parts of the relationship. (C)

Dobrynin said he understood, and that he thought the effort to talk positively on trade was good. He believed the meeting would be worthwhile to both sides. At the end of the meeting the Secretary was told that they were working to arrange a meeting for him with Gorbachev, and that they were assuming he would convey a letter from the President at such a meeting. (C)

CLASSIFIED BY FRANKLIN J. VARGO
DECLASSIFY ON OADR~~CONFIDENTIAL~~Authority NLSF99-051 #345
BY CAJ, NARA, Date 6/12/02
DECLASSIFIED

June 22 39
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JFM07
40

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

June 26, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT: Gorbachev's Response to President's Letter on Interim Restraint

In a meeting with Secretary Shultz Monday, Dobrynin delivered a letter from Gorbachev which replies to the President's letter of June 10 explaining his decision on interim restraint.

I concur with the Secretary's analysis of the letter, in particular that it seems to have been written in the Foreign Ministry, and is designed primarily for the record. Given the harshness of some of the language which was drafted to refute charges of Soviet non-compliance, Gorbachev did reassert that he is "full of resolve to strive to find a solution" [to the "central issue of security"] and endorsed once more the President's earlier appeal for a "joint search for ways to improve Soviet-American relations." This is a typically Soviet way of trying to keep the door open.

Attached is a brief memo to the President forwarding the reply and Secretary Shultz's comments on it.

Recommendation:

That you forward the memorandum at TAB I to the President.

Approve ___ Disapprove ___

Attachments:

TAB I Memorandum to the President

TAB A Memorandum from Secretary Shultz and Gorbachev Reply

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
Declassify: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: NIS 97-007 #94
BY: *CAF*, NARA, Date: 6/12/02

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

41
SYSTEM II
90713

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

SUBJECT: Gorbachev's Reply to Your Letter Explaining Your
Interim Restraint Decision

In a meeting Monday, Dobrynin delivered to George Shultz a reply from Gorbachev to your letter of June 10 explaining your interim restraint decision.

As George points out, the letter seems to have been staff written in the Foreign Ministry for the record. While it rejects charges of Soviet non-compliance in harsh language, Gorbachev was careful to conclude by reiterating a desire to work out problems in the relationship.

We are now working with State on a draft reply to this and Gorbachev's earlier letter.

Attachment:

Tab A Memorandum from Secretary Shultz and translation of letter from Gorbachev dated June 22.

Prepared by:
Jack F. Matlock

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
Declassify: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: NLS897-001 #91
BY: GAN, NARA, Date: 6/12/02

DECLASSIFIED

SUPER SENSITIVE
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43

MLRR #06-1141, #6502

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

90713

BY CW NARA DATE 11/27/07

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

June 25, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: George P. Shultz *GPS*

SUBJECT: My Meeting with Dobrynin June 24:
Gorbachev's Response on Interim Restraint

Dobrynin came in yesterday evening to deliver Gorbachev's response to your June 10 letter on interim restraint. His English translation and the original Russian text are attached. After looking through the letter, I commented that it seemed extremely contentious, but we would respond to it carefully in due course.

The letter is long and worth more analysis, but at first glance the main point seems to be that the Soviets will not recognize any right of ours to depart from the provisions of SALT II and other arms control agreements by unilateral decision. Most of the letter is a catalogue, written very much in Gromyko's style, of things we have done that make them suspicious that this is our real intention. The steps we have taken give them every right to break commitments, the letter says, but they have not done so in the hope that "sober reasoning" and US self-interest would bring more restraint from us, and this has happened "to a certain, though not to a full, extent." By implication, your interim restraint decision reflects such restraint, but they remain suspicious that they are being asked to agree we have a right to violate commitments in response to violations they deny having made. The letter denies in advance that we have any such right, and says they will wait and see how we act in the future: "It depends on the American side how things will shape up further, and we shall make the appropriate conclusions."

Dobrynin drew attention to the concluding paragraphs of the letter, where Gorbachev states that "arms limitation has been and will be the central issue both in our relations and as far as the further development of the entire international situation is concerned." Thus our two countries have a "special responsibility," he goes on to say, and they remain committed to working with us on a "solution to the central issues of security on the basis of equality and equal security." This is the strongest language on the importance of arms control and US-Soviet negotiations for the world generally that I have seen from the Soviets, and it suggests that we do in fact have a good deal of leverage in negotiations if we can maintain our strength and steadiness.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
DECL:OADR

Dobrynin had no other instructions, either on a meeting with you or anything else, but we had a relaxed exchange in which I made a number of points.

I noted there had been several occasions where we seemed on the verge of having things get better, and then something happened to throw us off course -- most recently, their shooting of Major Nicholson and their subsequent handling of the incident. It was a disturbing pattern. Looking at bilateral issues, we were not specific on any one, but agreed that with the right atmosphere there were a number of things that could be resolved easily. On regional issues, we agreed that not much had been accomplished in our talks, but that those on southern Africa had perhaps been more constructive than before. I was interested that he thought Afghanistan issues might well be pursued further. Perhaps things Rajiv Gandhi said here have registered in the Soviet Union. In connection with the Middle East, I brought up the hostage problem and called attention to the importance of Syria's role in Lebanon. He had nothing to say on Syria, but remarked that hijacking and hostage taking were outside the bounds of civilized behavior. I suggested that his government might say so.

In conclusion, we also discussed the upcoming meetings in Helsinki and the possibility of meetings here with Gromyko in the fall, as opportunities to move things along. He will be going back to Moscow for his summer leave next week, and I may have another conversation with him before that.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Translation from the Russian

His Excellency
Ronald W. Reagan
President of the United States of America
Washington, D.C.

June 22, 1985

Dear Mr. President:

In connection with your letter of June 10, in which you outline the U.S. Government's decision on the SALT II Treaty made public the same day, I deem it necessary to express the viewpoint of the Soviet leadership on this matter.

I shall start by stating that your version of the past and present state of affairs in the key areas of Soviet-American relations, that of the limitation and reduction of strategic arms, cannot withstand comparison with the actual facts. Evidently, it was not by chance that you chose 1982 as your point of reference, the year when the American side declared its readiness to comply with the main provisions of the SALT II Treaty, unratified by the United States. Unfortunately, however, it was not this that determined the general course of your administration's policy and its practical actions with regard to strategic armaments.

It is hard to avoid the thought that a choice of a different kind had been made earlier, when it was stated outright that you did not consider yourself bound by the obligations assumed by your predecessors under agreements with the Soviet Union. This was perceived by others, and in the United States too, as repudiation of the arms limitations process and the search for agreements.

This was confirmed in practice: an intensive nuclear arms race was initiated in the United States. Precisely through this race, it would seem, and began to see and continues to see to this day the main means for achieving "prevailing" positions in the world under the guise of assuring U.S. national security.

In this sense, the few steps of the American side that you mentioned that went in a different direction and took account of the realities of today's world, are they not just temporary, "interim?"

It is not for the sake of polemics, but in order to restore the full picture of what has occurred, that I would like to return briefly to what has been done by the United States with regard to the current regime for strategic stability.

One cannot dispute the fact that the American side created an ambiguous situation whereby the SALT II Treaty, one of the pillars of our relationship in the security sphere, was turned into a semi-functioning document that the U.S., moreover, is now threatening to nullify step by step. How can one then talk about predictability of conduct and assess with sufficient confidence the other side's intentions?

It is difficult to evaluate the damage done to our relationship and to international stability as a whole by your administration's decision to break off a process of negotiations that the USSR and the U.S. assumed a legal obligation to conduct. Such an obligation is contained in the very text of the SALT II Treaty, as well as in the accompanying "Joint Statement of Principles and Basic Guidelines for Subsequent Negotiations on the Limitation of Strategic Arms."

The chain ensuring the viability of the process of curbing the arms race, put together through great effort, was consciously broken.

Today it is especially clear that this caused many promising opportunities to slip by, while some substantial elements of our relationship in this area were squandered.

The United States crossed a dangerous threshold when it preferred to cast aside the Protocol to the SALT II Treaty instead of immediately taking up, as was envisaged, the resolution of these issues which were dealt with in the Protocol. Those issues are of cardinal importance - the limitation and prohibition of entire classes of arms. It is no secret as to what guided the American side in taking this step: it wanted to gain an advantage by deploying long-range cruise missiles. As a result, already today one has to deal with thousands of such missiles. The U.S. sought to sharply tilt in its favor the fine-tuned balance of interests underlying the agreement. Now you see, I believe, that it did not work out this way. We too are deploying cruise missiles, which we had proposed to ban. But even now we are prepared to come to an agreement on such a ban, should the U.S., taking a realistic position, agree to take such an important step.

The deployment in Western Europe of new nuclear systems designed to perform strategic missions was a clear circumvention, that is non-compliance, by the American side with regard to the SALT II Treaty. In this, Mr. President, we see an attempt by the United States, taking advantage of geographic factors, to gain a virtual monopoly on the use weapons in a situation for which our country has no analogue. I know that on your side the need for some regional balance is sometimes cited. But even in

that case it is incomprehensible why the U.S. refuses to resolve this issue in a manner which would establish in the zone of Europe a balance of medium-range missiles, whereby the USSR would not have more missiles and warheads on them than are currently in the possession of England and France. Such a formula would not infringe upon anyone's interests, whereas the distortion caused by the American missiles in Europe is not a balance at all.

In broader terms, all these violations by the United States of the regime for strategic stability have one common denominator: departure from the principle of equality and equal security. This and nothing else is the reason for the lack of progress in limiting and reducing nuclear arms over the past 4-5 years.

However, I would like you to have a clear understanding of the fact that, in practice, strategic parity between our countries will be maintained. We cannot envisage nor can we permit a different situation. The question, however, is at what level parity will be maintained -- at a decreasing or an increasing one. We are for the former, for the reduction in the level of strategic confrontation. Your government, by all indications, favors the latter, evidently hoping that at some stage the U.S. will ultimately succeed in getting ahead. This is the essence of the current situation.

Should one be surprised, then, that we are conducting negotiations, yet the process of practical arms limitation remains suspended? It would probably not be too great a misfortune if this process simply remained frozen. But even that is not the case. The "star wars" program -- I must tell you this, Mr. President -- already at this stage is seriously undermining stability. We strongly advise you to halt this sharply destabilizing and dangerous program while things have not gone too far. If the situation in this area is not corrected, we shall have no choice but to take steps required by our security and that of our allies.

We are in favor, as you say, of making the best use of the chance offered by the Geneva negotiations on nuclear and space arms. Our main objective at those negotiations should be to reestablish the suspended process of limiting the arms race and to prevent its spread into new spheres.

The SALT-II Treaty is an important element of the strategic equilibrium, and one should clearly understand its role as well as the fact that, according to the well-known expression, one cannot have one's pie and eat it too.

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Your approach is determined by the fact that the strategic programs being carried out by the United States are about to collide with the limitations established by the SALT II Treaty, and the choice is being made not in favor of the Treaty, but in favor of these programs. And this cannot be disavowed or concealed, to put it bluntly, by unseemly attempts to accuse the Soviet Union of all mortal sins. It is, moreover, completely inappropriate in relations between our two countries for one to set forth conditions for the another as is done in your letter with regard to the Soviet Union.

I am saying all this frankly and unequivocally, as we have agreed.

One certainly cannot agree that the provisions of the SALT II Treaty remain in force allegedly as the result of restraint on the part of the United States. Entirely the contrary. The general attitude toward the Treaty shown by the American side and its practical actions to undermine it have given us every reason to draw appropriate conclusions and to take practical steps. We did have and continue to have moral, legal and political grounds for that.

We did not, however, give way to emotions; we showed patience, realizing the seriousness of the consequences of the path onto which we were being pushed. We hoped also that sober reasoning, as well as the self-interest of the U.S., would make the American side take a more restrained position. That was what in fact happened to a certain, though not to a full, extent. And we have treated this in businesslike fashion. Without ignoring what has been done by the American side contrary to the SALT II Treaty, we nevertheless at no time have been the initiators of politico-propagandistic campaigns of charges and accusations. We have striven to discuss seriously within the framework of the SCC the well-founded concerns we have had. We also have given exhaustive answers there to questions raised by the American side.

Unfortunately, the behavior of the other side was and continues to be utterly different. All those endless reports on imaginary Soviet violations and their publication did not and cannot serve any useful purpose, if one is guided by the task of preserving and continuing the process of arms limitation. Why mince words, the objective is quite different: to cast aspersions on the policy of the Soviet Union in general, to sow distrust toward it and to create an artificial pretext for an accelerated and uncontrolled arms race. All this became evident to us already long ago.

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One has to note that your present decision, if it were to be implemented, would be a logical continuation of that course. We would like you, Mr. President, to think all this over once again.

In any event, we shall regard the decision that you announced in the entirety of its mutually-exclusive elements which, along with the usual measures required by the Treaty, include also a claim to some "right" to violate provisions of the Treaty as the American side chooses. Neither side has such a right. I do not consider it necessary to go into specifics here, a lot has been said about it, and your military experts are well aware of the actual, rather than distorted, state of affairs.

One should not count on the fact that we will be able to come to terms with you with respect to destroying the SALT II Treaty through joint efforts. How things will develop further depends on the American side, and we shall draw the appropriate conclusions.

The question of the approach to arms limitation has been, is, and will be the central issue both in our relations and as far as the further development of the overall international situation is concerned. It is precisely here, above all, that the special responsibility borne by our two countries is manifested, as well as how each of them approaches that responsibility.

In more specific terms, it is a question of intentions with regard to one other. No matter what is being done in other spheres of our relationship, in the final analysis, whether or not it is going to be constructive and stable depends above all on whether we are going to find a solution to the central issues of security on the basis of equality and equal security.

I would like to reaffirm that, for our part, we are full of resolve to strive to find such a solution. This determines both our attitude toward those initial limitations which were arrived at earlier through painstaking joint labor, and our approach to the negotiations currently underway in Geneva and elsewhere.

I wish to say this in conclusion: one would certainly like to feel tangibly the same attitude on the part of the United States. At any rate, as I have already had a chance to note, we took seriously the thought reiterated by you in our correspondence with regard to a joint search for ways to improve Soviet-American relations and to strengthen the foundations of peace.

Sincerely,

M. Gorbachev