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File Folder "SIGNALS" [OCTOBER-DECEMBER 1984] (3/3)

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| ID | Doc Type | Document Description | No of Pages | Doc Date | Restrictions |
|------|----------|--|-------------|------------|--------------|
| 6452 | MEMO | NITZE RE ARMS CONTOL [1] R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1 | 1 | 12/18/1984 | B1 |
| 6453 | PAPER | SESSION IV: POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS [2-10] R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1 DOCUMENT PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O. 13233 | 9 | ND | B1 |
| 6477 | CABLE | 181411Z DEC 84 [11-17] D 3/3/2011 F2006-114/1 | 7 | 12/18/1984 | B1 B3 |
| 6462 | CABLE | 192055Z DEC 84 [18-19] R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1 | 2 | 12/19/1984 | B1 |
| 6454 | MEMO | USSR COMMENTS ON JANUARY ARMS TALKS [20-23] D 3/3/2011 F2006-114/1 | 4 | 12/20/1984 | B1 B3 |
| 6466 | CABLE | 201808Z DEC 84 [24-26] R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1 | 3 | 12/20/1984 | B1 |
| 6470 | CABLE | 201626Z DEC 84 [27-32] R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1 | 6 | 12/20/1984 | B1 |
| 6457 | MEMO | USSR COMMENTS ON JANUARY ARMS TALKS [33-38] D 3/3/2011 F2006-114/1 | 6 | 12/27/1984 | B1 B3 |

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| ID | Doc Type | Document Description | No of Pages | Doc Date | Restrictions |
|------|----------|---|-------------|------------|--------------|
| 6482 | REPORT | REPORT/ANALYSIS USSR ARBATOV VIEWS U.S. APPROACH TO COMING ARMS TALKS [39-41] <i>R</i> 3/3/2011 <i>F2006-114/1</i> | 3 | 12/22/1984 | B1 |
| 6479 | CABLE | 241456Z DEC 84 [42] <i>D</i> 3/3/2011 <i>F2006-114/1</i> | 1 | 12/24/1984 | B1 B3 |
| 6472 | CABLE | 271542Z DEC 84 [43-49] <i>R</i> 11/27/2007 <i>NLRRF06-114/1</i> | 7 | 12/27/1984 | B1 |
| 6474 | CABLE | SAME TEXT AS DOC #6472 [50-56] <i>R</i> 11/27/2007 <i>NLRRF06-114/1</i> | 7 | 12/27/1984 | B1 |
| 6480 | CABLE | 281817Z DEC 84 [59] <i>D</i> 3/3/2011 <i>F2006-114/1</i> | 1 | 12/28/1984 | B1 B3 |
| 6481 | CABLE | 290008Z DEC 84 [60-62] <i>D</i> 3/3/2011 <i>F2006-114/1</i> | 3 | 12/29/1984 | B1 B3 |

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For the next five to ten years our objectives should be a radical reduction in the power of existing and planned offensive nuclear arms as well as the effective limitation of defensive nuclear arms whether land, sea, air or space-based. We should even now be looking forward to a period of transition beginning five or ten years from now, to effective non-nuclear defensive forces, including defenses against offensive nuclear arms. This period of transition should lead to the eventual elimination of all nuclear arms, both offensive and defensive. A nuclear-free world is an ultimate objective to which we, the Soviet Union, and all other nations, can agree.

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Session IV: Policy Implications for Arms Control Negotiations

General Brent Scowcroft:

Scowcroft noted that since 1967 in some ways we have come a long way and in some ways not much had changed. He was inclined to agree with Colin Gray that the Soviets had not very much changed their stripes on the question of the offense-defense relationship. From their point of view the ABM Treaty had been a cosmetic attempt to stop technical developments on the U.S. side, and one could make the same case now. Earlier the U.S. worried primarily about a Soviet ABM breakout. Now this prospect is benign because we were the ones who had this capability. The Soviets are now worried about ABM breakout in much the same way as we did earlier. Thus it would be useful to revisit our own reactions to the prospect of ABM deployments during this earlier period. Our primary reaction was MIRVs which could defeat ABMs. In the arms control negotiations we continued to argue for MIRVs, even when it was clear that we would get an ABM Treaty. We did this both to provide leverage on the Soviets to agree to the ABM limitations we wanted and to police the agreement once it entered into force.

The Soviets did not want to couple offense and defense. We could penetrate ABMs easier than they could since we had MIRVs. Thus it is instructive to look at our original reaction to ABMs.

In looking at SDI in a strategic sense, there are trade-offs that have to be considered. There is no question that SDI adds uncertainty, which can enhance deterrence; but we should also look at what SDI can provoke-- i.e., a destabilizing offense-defense competition. We do not look at SDI often enough in this sense.

Johnny Foster has already pointed out that we can use SDI to get what we want. SDI may drive both sides back to assured destruction. SDI can greatly lessen the value of each individual warhead. Therefore, there will be a strong incentive to use warheads against population rather than against ICBMs because of the exchange ratio. Johnny Foster had also pointed out that booster intercept makes a highly MIRVed force relatively useless. Therefore, both sides may want to go the route of Midgetman. Therefore, we ought to look at the possibility of trading de-MIRVing in exchange for boost-phase intercept.

We should not view the ABM Treaty as the Holy Grail. It has served a useful purpose by encouraging us to pursue useful R&D and saved us from spending a lot of money on systems that would

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not have worked very well. However, if we can enhance stability or gain an edge, the ABM Treaty should not prevent us from doing so. On the other hand we should not throw out the ABM Treaty if we do not know the features of the new regime which would replace it. The ABM Treaty is a good treaty. It has some loopholes, for example ASAT and the ATBM loophole, which we built in to protect SAM-D. The Soviets may be taking advantage of this loophole with their SA-12.

Turning to the question of Allies, Scowcroft said that he had seldom seen greater unity in Europe than was now present regarding the fear of SDI. European fears are traditionally of two types -- that they will be entrapped in a U.S. - Soviet conflict or will be abandoned as the superpowers make a bilateral deal. SDI has the peculiar facility of stimulating both of these fears. On the one hand SDI might lead the U.S. to play the role of a cowboy, behaving recklessly around the world; or on the other hand it might lead the U.S. to withdraw and tell Europe to go it alone. Europeans are also concerned about the expense of SDI. They would like the U.S. to spend more for NATO and fear that an offense-defense race would reduce the resources available for NATO. The Europeans view the SDI as the latest crazy American fad, and they have barely gotten used to flexible response.

On the substance of negotiations, Scowcroft said that the format to be used depends upon our goals. On the one hand, we could use SDI in the negotiations. On the other hand, our goal could be to avoid involving SDI in the negotiations, in which case we would try to separate SDI and pursue a separate agreement on offense. The U.S. and the Soviet Union are approaching the negotiations from diametrically opposite points of view. The Soviets would like to kill SDI with no cost to themselves while the U.S. hopes to keep it off the table. Thus, the sides are far apart.

Even if the Soviets are willing to pay a relatively high price, we have great problems. It is difficult to see how the Soviets would agree to any far-reaching limitations on offense (for example on warheads and throw-weight) if they have to look over their shoulder at SDI and feel the need to be able to penetrate it. One likely outcome of this situation is a cosmetic agreement. This could come about if both sides want an agreement; the Soviets agree to a modest agreement which would amount to a modified SALT II and U.S., in a rush to Detente II, agrees. Scowcroft said he would not be at all surprised if the negotiations take that direction. He regretted having said so publicly, and hoped this would not complicate negotiations.

On the subject of Congress and the U.S. public, Scowcroft said SDI is popular with the public, and that the fact of negotiations reassures the public by persuading

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them that people are behaving responsibly and not trying to blow up the world. A sizeable portion of the public believes that we already have such defenses and that the idea that we would prohibit defenses is an arms control fantasy. Thus the main problem is Congress, which definitely wants arms control and will use our strategic programs to force the Administration to pursue arms control. If the MX is killed, the Soviets will have enormous incentives to sit back and see if the same thing would happen to SDI.

Both the U.S. and the USSR have problems as far as resources are concerned. This is not a new situation. However, the U.S. SDI program means that a Soviet technician can now say to the Politburo that this confirms the priority which must be devoted to Soviet defense efforts. The Soviets have shown that they can stick to such long term efforts, but can the U.S. persevere for the one, two, three decades required? He was not optimistic on this score.

Dr. Colin Gray

Gray said that the possible dangers of the period of transition to defense dominance have frequently been noted. For example, the Left and the British and French point out that the last time the Soviets faced a situation of great inferiority they precipitated the Cuban missile crisis. Earlier, Germany during the period 1912-14, had perceived that early action was in their interest because the situation would rapidly become worse for them later. Gray said that these examples were not relevant to SDI. The Germans had plans for achieving victory in 40 days. For the Soviets, "today" will never be good enough to take action against a maturing SDI.

Gray agreed with Scowcroft's point about Midgetman. We are soon facing major engineering decisions in the Midgetman program; before we lock ourselves in, we must think about the non-permissive environment that it could face due to a Soviet SDI.

Gray characterized the ABM Treaty as doing the wrong things badly. The Treaty forbids the establishment of a base for a nationwide defense. The Soviets are already working on such a base and the President has said that a nationwide defense is a good idea. It would be a big mistake to foreclose SDI in exchange for a START or INF agreement. The best we can get on offense will be a marginal tinkering, while at stake in the SDI program is the capability to make a major difference in the strategic situation and in damage to the US in the event of a

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war. If we foreclose our freedom of action in SDI in exchange for an ASAT agreement made for political convenience, we will have traded something of major significance for something which is either of trivial or harmful significance. If we were to consider negotiating part of SDI in 1984 or 1985, the only thing of proportional value would be the relevance of the entire Soviet missile force. Thus it is absurd to consider negotiating away SDI.

Space arms control beyond some trivial Incidents In Space arrangements cannot be serious because of technical overlap. Gray presumed that the White House understands that nothing could be agreed to on ASAT beyond certain trivial arrangements. It is possible that the Administration will need some arms control agreement for expediency, but what is the likelihood that the Soviets would give us even a trivial framework which General Abrahamson could use in Congress to help support the SDI program? Gray saw no hope that this could happen--that is, that we could negotiate an agreement on offense only.

There does exist a major arms control story to SDI, but the U.S. must earn it. What possible incentive could we give the Soviets to assist us in this? As Abrahamson had pointed out, the Soviets might be made to see a growing obsolescence in their offensive forces by the early 1990s. They might see the U.S. as having a good offense and a pretty good defense, with the situation getting even worse for them in the future. This might provide such an incentive. Relative leaky defenses could favor the Soviets. They care primarily about themselves and have better access to the periphery of Eurasia than we do. On the other hand, the U.S. would have little confidence in leaky defenses, because we would place greater value on our cities than they would. He was not saying that the Soviets would buy such an arrangement, but one could make that case.

Soviet reactions to SDI will include attempting to gain the technology through spying, technological transfer, etc. as well as hints of breakout. In the near term they could put us at a disadvantage. While we might be able to field a great SDI system by 2010, the Soviets could embarrass us in the 1990s. So it is important that we make the Soviets understand that they are going to have more trouble down the road.

Returning to the question of the ABM Treaty, Gray remarked that if the President is serious about SDI, he must face the consequences for the Treaty. If we continually say that we are in compliance with the Treaty, Congress will see us as not serious. He said that he would like to know that the President will do whatever is required whenever he is told that the technology is ready. The President should understand there are no constraints on air defense, ASAT or ATBM. If alibis are

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needed for U.S. misbehaviour, one could invoke Soviet misbehavior under the Treaty. If we are willing to take a broad interpretation of the terms of the Treaty or to piggyback SDI testing, we could do quite a lot under the terms of the Treaty. Of course, such behavior would be considered un-American.

DISCUSSION

Ambassador Rowny pointed out that the Soviets had never said that we must go back to SALT II. Early in START the Soviets had recognized that limiting launchers was not sufficient. Thus, Moscow propaganda was not supported by Soviet experts who have not pushed SALT II in the START negotiations. He also said that his guarded optimism should not be interpreted as a belief that we must give up SDI in these negotiations. On the contrary, sufficient leverage now exists to achieve an agreement independent of SDI. For example, the Soviets have over-invested in certain types of systems and are paranoid about U.S. ALCMs. Thus, the leverage provided by our offensive programs should be sufficient and we do not need SDI as trading material.

Gray asked whether this would still be the case if MX were lost.

Rowny replied that the loss of MX would not be helpful. The Soviets know the capabilities of the MX and take it seriously; so should we. The loss of MX would be important, but not fatal to our negotiating efforts.

Scowcroft, in response to Rowny's earlier comment, said that he had in mind that the Soviets would continue to advocate something which could be called "SALT II plus." He was not saying that the Soviets would insist upon a return to the SALT II Treaty itself.

Carnesale noted that both Gray and Scowcroft had found it unlikely that the Soviets would be interested in significant reductions in the near-term, and asked if there was general agreement on this point. There was no disagreement with this among the participants. However, Spahr said he could think of a scenario that might cause us problems. The Soviets might offer us something better than their previous START position, but would make it contingent upon no SDI just as they had made their earlier position contingent upon no US INF deployments.

Mobbs observed that if we are the least bit interested in negotiating on SDI, we would probably be forced to use most of our leverage merely to ensure that the defensive constraints were binding on the Soviets. We would need to stop R&D and

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this would raise very difficult problems in terms of Soviet compliance.

Sloss said that he heartily agreed with this but did not think the Soviets wanted to shut off R&D. What they would like, of course, is to stop our R&D but not theirs. In any case, one could do a lot of R&D within the terms of the ABM Treaty. Our problem now and for the past 12 years is doing what is allowed. Thus, the problem is not Soviet violations of constraints but the asymmetry with which the two sides pursue what is allowed. The U.S. simply will not do what it is allowed to do.

Mobbs remarked that his point had been that since the U.S. would not do everything that is allowed, such R&D should be banned.

Stansbury noted that we are trying to work out some of the rough edges of the ABM Treaty. The ideal situation would be if our testing activities come up against the Treaty constraints about the same time that we make a decision to deploy. Sloss and Gardner observed that one could proceed for a time within these constraints, but there is obviously a tension between the Treaty and SDI.

Scowcroft observed that it was not true that we would have no problems if there were no limits on defense. We had pursued ABM programs because of the ABM Treaty. Safeguard was not built to protect U.S. citizens, but as a bargaining chip in the SALT negotiations.

Foster noted that the SDI bug is out of the bottle. It could either stop or it could go ahead. If it stopped, we would be worse off than if we had not started down this road in the first place. On the other hand, if SDI goes ahead, we might end up with a defensive capability against missiles and this technology might also help with air defense. It could also force offensive levels downward. However, this all depends on getting the program, and we will have no leverage if there is no program. This should be explained clearly to Congress at an early date. Rowny recalled that he had talked about this to certain Democratic senators last summer, and they had replied that they would like to return to this subject after the election. We ought to get back to the goal of building greater bipartisan support.

Woolsey said he was concerned that we may be defining our strategy and systems around the OSD organization chart. Boost-phase intercept may be interesting, but it is difficult to move the country on this issue as long as defenses are focused on

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this part of SDI. Much of the country is at odds with the concept of total defense. Perhaps we could build a coalition by unpacking SDI and looking at its components.

We might make more progress in building political support by moving incrementally from the low end of SDI rather than talking in terms of perfection based upon boost-phase interception in space. We might be able to get more support over the longer term for boost-phase intercept if we can avoid clashes over the Treaty. Woolsey said he was skeptical of getting Soviet limitations in exchange for giving up boost-phase intercepts in space. But one could hypothesize that the Soviets might over the long-term agree to move away from large, liquid-fueled, MIRVed ICBMs in exchange for a ban on boost-phase intercepts in space. We could have an area/terminal or terminal/area system, some hard-site defenses or some defense against accidental launches even in the context of arms control.

Our problem is like trying to get through a set of slalom gates, some of which are set at 90 degrees to others. There might be a path through these if we can keep the ABM Treaty and build our case around terminal defense. If we allow the issue to be joined over whether one is for or against defense, when both sides understand defense to mean primarily boost-phase intercepts, we will never get anywhere.

Sloss felt that Woolsey was on the right track. Most people favor defense and favor spending money on defensive technologies. In fact we were investigating most of these technologies before SDI. One mistake we may have made is that we have attempted to describe the ultimate system before carrying out the necessary scientific exploration. People run into trouble when they try to describe a space-based, boost-phase intercept system. The other major problem is the price tag. We say that we need \$26 billion over the next three to five years to reach a conclusion. It is absolutely essential that the Administration be able to describe some intermediate goals for our efforts over the next decade.

Gray said that he also was attracted to Woolsey's ideas, but that the problem as far as OSD is concerned is that an intermediate system is a solution looking for a problem. No one is asking for this sort of intermediate help from SDI.

Garthoff said that we could not roll back the situation to the pre-SDI era. There are three alternatives for SDI--pursue it, re-define it, or abandon it. If we are going to abandon it eventually, we should negotiate some restraints on the Soviets in this area. The problem of how to formulate limitations involves much more than verification. We could ban flight testing and deployment of space weapons and ASAT and we could tighten up the restrictions in the ABM Treaty as far as testing

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in an ASAT mode is concerned. There would, of course, be questions as to what to do about ATBMs. Garthoff said he would not exclude the idea of opening up the Treaty in the area of terminal defenses. This would be difficult and the Soviets would probably resist it initially, but one could not rule out reaching some agreement here. Separating the two phases of SDI would open up a range of possibilities for arms control.

General Rankine remarked that he saw considerable risk in decoupling the two phases of SDI. The President had talked about a total defense and this depends upon boost-phase intercepts. If we only deploy a defense of MX in order to get more survivable RVs, the Soviets will also have this defense and these additional RVs will not get through. Thus it is perilous to give up part of SDI.

Linhard said that the Soviets are pragmatists. They do not talk about SDI but about the militarization of space. If one looks at what the Soviets have done in the defensive area over the past 15 years, there are few gaps. If we are worried about Soviet breakout from the ABM Treaty, we should not attempt to compete in traditional technologies. If one considers the offense, the Soviets are moving ahead with both rail- and land-based mobile ICBMs, and the U.S. could probably not do the same. Thus in both offense and defense, the U.S. can compete but is not prepared to do so. However, we do have the technology to change the rules and leapfrog the Soviets. The Soviets, on the other hand, want to keep the rules as they are.

Foster remarked that he did not think that the Soviets have boost-phase intercepts in mind in their programs. They want to keep weapons out of space in order to have their own C3I.

Rankine did not agree with this point, observing that the U.S. is far more dependent on space than the Soviets. Thus the Soviets have a high incentive to take out our eyes and ears in space.

Courtney observed that it is not clear whether arms control is the enemy of SDI or whether it can help SDI. If one postulates a future move to deploy an SDI system, it would be useful to begin through arms control to reduce warheads in order to get momentum for the transition period. The fact that MX is being viewed as bargaining leverage is not good, but perhaps it is necessary. Because of Congressional considerations, perhaps the same could be said for SDI.

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CARNESALE'S SUMMATION

Carnesale summarized the discussion by listing a number of issues which had been raised but not fully resolved:

- what is the purpose of SDI?
- what are the goals of the intermediate stages of SDI?
- how do we get from here to there and how do we maintain public support for SDI over the long term?
- the problem is one of Soviet defenses, not US defenses, and that the Soviet are experts at "creative legalism" with respect to the ABM Treaty. The fact is that the Soviets can always do more than we can in this regard
- There was no real discussion of stability. One should ask how does stability relate to different types of defenses and how do uncertainties relate to stability?
- the problem of Allied opposition to SDI
- the problem of negotiations and how to deal with the likelihood that no meaningful reductions can be achieved in the near term because we and the Soviets are coming at SDI from opposite poles.
- the problem of modifications to the ABM Treaty
- should we attempt to maintain the momentum of SDI by building from the top down or the bottom up? We cannot stay in compliance with the ABM Treaty for ever. At the same time, we cannot make changes overnight.



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NODIS
E. O. 12356 DECL OADR
TAGS: PREL, UR, US, IS, SY
SUBJECT: DARTMOUTH GROUP PARTICIPANTS PASS MESSAGE
FROM SOVIETS TO UNDERSECRETARY ARMACOST

REF. MOSCOW 14846 (NOTAL)

1. ~~(S-ENTIRE TEXT)~~
2. FORMER ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS HAL SAUNDERS AND FORMER AMBASSDOR ROBERT NEUMANN CALLED ON UNDERSECRETARY ARMACOST ON THURSDAY, DECEMBER 13, TO PROVIDE A DEBRIEF OF THE NOVEMBER, 1984 ROUND OF THE DARTMOUTH CONFERENCE TASK FORCE ON REGIONAL CONFLICT HELD IN LENINGRAD. AFTER PROVIDING ARMACOST WITH A GENERAL READOUT ALONG LINES OF REFTTEL, SAUNDERS INDICATED THAT ORIENTAL INSTITUTE HEAD PRIMAKOV HAD ASKED FOR A PRIVATE SESSION WITH SAUNDERS AND NEUMANN. PRIMAKOV NOTED THAT IN 1983 HE HAD USED A SIMILAR SESSION TO PASS A PRIVATE MESSAGE AND HE UNDERTOOK TO DO SO AGAIN THIS YEAR. SAUNDERS PASSED TO ARMACOST THE TEXT OF A PAPER WHICH HE AND NEUMANN HAD PREPARED DESCRIBING THE MEETING WITH PRIMAKOV AND THE "MESSAGE." SAUNDERS AND NEUMANN NOTED THAT THIS YEAR'S MESSAGE WAS MORE GENERAL THAN LAST YEAR'S ON SOVIET INTERESTS IN SYRIA, AND THEY SUGGESTED THAT ITS INTENT MAY BE MORE TO KEEP THE CHANNEL ACTIVE THAN TO PASS ALONG ANY SPECIFIC INFORMATION. BY THE SAME TOKEN IT MAY BE AN INDICATION OF SOVIET INTEREST IN PICKING UP THE OFFER OF REGIONAL EXPERTS TALKS ON THE MIDDLE EAST. TEXT FOLLOWS BELOW.

3. BEGIN TEXT.

INFORMAL SOVIET POINTS

IN DECEMBER 1983 DURING A MEETING OF THE DARTMOUTH CONFERENCE TASK FORCE ON REGIONAL CONFLICT, A KEY SOVIET PARTICIPANT CALLED TWO U. S. PARTICIPANTS (NEUMANN AND SAUNDERS) INDIVIDUALLY OUT OF A MEETING TO MAKE SEVERAL

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PRECISELY STATED POINTS ABOUT SOVIET INTERESTS IN SYRIA. THIS WAS AT A TIME WHEN FIGHTING IN LEBANON, INCLUDING U.S. INVOLVEMENT, WAS AT A PEAK. THE STATEMENT WAS MADE IN SUCH A WAY AND WITH SUCH PRECISION THAT IT WAS CLEARLY INITIATED OR AUTHORIZED BY THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT. THE "MESSAGE" WAS DELIVERED TO KEY FIGURES IN THE ADMINISTRATION AND STATE DEPARTMENT. A PARAGRAPH DESCRIBING THIS LATER APPEARED IN NEWSWEEK (NOT FROM THE DARTMOUTH PARTICIPANTS), AND THE SOVIETS NOTED THAT STORY. AT THE NOVEMBER 1984 MEETING IN LENINGRAD, NEUMANN AND SAUNDERS WERE INVITED BY THE SAME SOVIET TO A PRIVATE LATE EVENING DISCUSSION. NOTING THAT THE DECEMBER 1983 "MESSAGE" HAD OBVIOUSLY BEEN DELIVERED, HE SAID HE HAD SEVERAL CURRENT POINTS TO MAKE. TRANSLATING FROM NOTES IN RUSSIAN, HE READ THE FOLLOWING:

(1.) IN THE U. S. S. R. THERE IS A TREND TO INTENSIFY CONFRONTATION IN ALL FIELDS BECAUSE WE HAVE TRIED TO COMMUNICATE AND WE HAVE HAD NO RESPONSE. WE WILL SEE WHO WILL WIN AND WHO WILL LOSE.

(2.) THE ESTIMATE OF SOVIET MILITARY MEN IS THAT THE U. S. IS TRYING TO ACHIEVE SUPERIORITY -- NOT JUST TO PRESSURE US BUT REAL PREPARATIONS FOR NUCLEAR WAR. OUR PEOPLE ARE ALREADY DEVELOPING THE "COMPLEX OF 1941" (SIC) AND WE DON'T WANT TO BE UNPREPARED WITHOUT PLANS.

(3.) IF THIS SITUATION WILL CONTINUE, WE SHALL THINK OF LOWERING THE LEVEL OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR DECISION MAKING ON NUCLEAR WAR. WE SHALL SHIFT DECISIONS TO "OTHER BODIES" AND TO LEVELS LOWER THAN AT PRESENT. WE HAVEN'T DONE THIS YET. (NOTE: WHEN QUESTIONED WHETHER THIS MEANT AUTOMATIC DECISION FOR NUCLEAR WAR, HE STUCK STRICTLY TO THE SCRIPT AND DID NOT WANT TO GO BEYOND.)

(4.) WE APPRECIATE YOUR CONVEYING THE MESSAGE (ON SOVIET INTERESTS IN SYRIA) LAST DECEMBER. THAT SUBJECT IS STILL VALID. YOU AREN'T EAGER TO SEE ISRAEL ATTACK SYRIA, BUT IT IS ONE OF ISRAEL'S OPTIONS WHICH ISRAEL IS SERIOUSLY CONSIDERING. IT IS NECESSARY TO AVOID THAT SITUATION. IT COULD ESCALATE. WE DON'T WANT TO BE INVOLVED.

(5.) WE ARE OPEN FOR CONTACTS ON THE MIDDLE EAST. WHEN WE COULD HAVE REAL CONTACTS, IT IS NOT NECESSARY FOR US TO FOLLOW ALL THE LINES OF OUR ALLIES. WE CAN BE FLEXIBLE. END TEXT.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 LONDON 27779

EXDIS

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, UR, UK
SUBJECT: FCO IMPRESSIONS OF GORBACHEV

EXDIS

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. IN A MEETING DECEMBER 20, FCO MINISTER OF STATE MALCOLM RIFKIND OFFERED ME SOME IMPRESSIONS OF GORBACHEV TO FLESH OUT THE FCO'S SUBSTANTIVE BRIEFINGS (SEPTEL).

EXDIS

3. RIFKIND SAID THAT GORBACHEV IMPRESSED HIS INTERLOCUTERS AS FRIENDLY AND CHARMING, BUT NONETHELESS A DEDICATED, CONVINCED COMMUNIST WHO DID NOT GIVE ON ANYTHING THAT MATTERS. NEVERTHELESS, HE GAVE HMG THE IMPRESSION OF SOMEONE WITH WHOM THEY COULD DO BUSINESS. IN ALMOST ALL INSTANCES DURING HIS VISIT, HE EXUDED CHARM, FRIENDLINESS, AND INTELLIGENCE. HE APPEARED MODERATELY RELAXED AND EVEN SPONTANEOUS. IN TALKS WITH THATCHER AND HOWE, HE DISPLAYED CONSIDERABLE SELF CONFIDENCE, NEVER READING FROM A PREPARED TEXT, BUT ONLY OCCASIONALLY GLANCING AT A SMALL PERSONAL NOTEBOOK WHICH CONTAINED COPIOUS DETAILS. AIDES, ESPECIALLY LEONID ZAMYATIN, WERE COMFORTABLE IN INTERRUPTING GORBACHEV TO HELP HIM MAKE A POINT, EVEN WHEN NOT CALLED UPON. GORBACHEV SEEMED TO WELCOME THESE INTERVENTIONS AND APPEARED ESPECIALLY WARM WITH ZAMYATIN.

4. DURING THE EVENING RIFKIND ACCOMPANIED HIM TO THE THEATRE, GORBACHEV SEEMED VERY RELAXED AND DISCUSSED HIS PERSONAL LIFE, MENTIONING HE WAS BROUGHT UP BY HIS GRANDMOTHER WHO BELIEVED IN GOD AND HAD YOUNG MIKHAIL BAPTIZED. IN FACT, ON ONE WALL OF HIS GRANDMOTHER'S HOUSE, BEHIND PORTRAITS OF LENIN AND STALIN, HUNG ICONS! HOWEVER, GORBACHEV HIMSELF IS NOT A BELIEVER. OVER DINNER, GORBACHEV DRANK WINE, BUT AT THE THEATRE ORANGE

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JUICE. AS FAR AS THE FCO COULD TELL, GORBACHEV UNDERSTANDS ONLY A FEW WORDS OF ENGLISH, BUT HIS WIFE KNOWS A BIT MORE.

5. RIFKIND WAS IMPRESSED BY GORBACHEV'S SENSE OF HUMOR. SOME OF HIS RESPONSES WERE UNUSUAL FOR SOVIETS. FOR INSTANCE, WHEN HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE SOVIET UNION WERE RAISED, INSTEAD OF CLAIMING IT TO BE AN INTERNAL SOVIET MATTER, AMONG OTHER THINGS HE MENTIONED 240,000 JEWS HAD BEEN ALLOWED TO EMIGRATE AND INFERRED ALL WHO WANTED TO DEPART HAD LEFT.

6. MRS. GORBACHEV, A DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY, CAME ACROSS AS A BIT TOO CEREBRAL. SHE IS WELL READ AND UPON ARRIVAL REMARKED THAT SHE HAD ALWAYS WANTED TO VISIT THE COUNTRY OF HOBBS AND LOCKE. SHE MENTIONED GRAHAM GREENE AND A NUMBER OF OTHER WESTERN WRITERS SHE HAD READ IN TRANSLATION. SHE SEEMED TO BE A BIT UNDER STRESS -- NOT USED TO REPORTERS AND PHOTOGRAPHERS.

7. CONVERSATIONS WITH THATCHER WENT ON LONGER THAN EXPECTED AND WERE ON GENERAL ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ISSUES. GORBACHEV, WHO HAD MOST OF HIS DELEGATION PRESENT, STRESSED THAT THE SOVIETS DID NOT EXPECT BRITAIN TO DO ANYTHING AGAINST ITS NATIONAL INTEREST. THEY DO NOT BELIEVE IN UNILATERAL DISARMAMENT FOR THE U. K. AND REALIZE THAT BRITAIN HAS ITS ALLIANCES JUST AS THE SOVIETS HAVE THEIRS. (NOTE: THE SOVIETS REPEATEDLY STRESSED THE POINT ABOUT NOT WANTING UNILATERAL

BRITISH DISARMAMENT, INCLUDING IN THEIR MEETINGS WITH LABOR PARTY LEADERS.) THE SOVIETS WERE ANXIOUS TO KNOW THE BRITISH PERCEPTION OF AMERICAN SINCERITY TO GO AHEAD WITH ARMS REDUCTION TALKS AFTER THE SHULTZ-GROMYKO TALKS NEXT MONTH. RIFKIND SAID THAT GORBACHEV WAS TRYING TO LINK PROGRESS IN START AND INF TO SDI. CRUISE MISSILES AND PERSHING II'S BARELY WERE MENTIONED, ALMOST AS THOUGH THE SOVIETS HAD ACCEPTED THEM AS A FACT AND WANTED TO MOVE FORWARD WITH OTHER BUSINESS. THATCHER'S COMMENTS TO GORBACHEV WERE WHAT SHE HAS BEEN SAYING PUBLICALLY. CW AND MBFR WERE NOT SUBSTANTIVELY DISCUSSED WITH EITHER THE PM OR HOWE.

8. IN GORBACHEV'S CONCERN ABOUT SPACE WEAPONS, HE
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EXDIS

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, UR, UK
SUBJECT: FCO IMPRESSIONS OF GORBACHEV

DID NOT DISTINGUISH BETWEEN LOW LEVEL ANTI-SATELLITE WEAPONS, SPACE-BASED ABM SYSTEMS, ETC. GORBACHEV CHARACTERIZED AMERICAN AMBITION AS FOR A FIRST STRIKE CAPABILITY WITH AN IMPENETRABLE PROTECTIVE SHIELD OVERHEAD. IF THE U. S. WENT AHEAD WITH SDI WEAPONS THE SOVIETS WOULD INCREASE THE NUMBERS AND SOPHISTICATION OF THEIR WEAPONS TO ENABLE THEM TO PENETRATE ANY DEFENSE.

9. RIFKIND CLOSED BY NOTING WITH AMUSEMENT THAT ON DECEMBER 19, GORBACHEV WAS SCHEDULED TO LAY A WREATH AT MARX'S GRAVE IN HIGHGATE CEMETERY, BUT INSTEAD WENT ON A SIGHTSEEING TOUR TO ST. PAUL'S CATHEDRAL, THE TOWER OF LONDON, AND DOWNING STREET. PRICE
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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 LONDON 27762

EXDIS

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PARM, UK, UR, PDIP
SUBJECT: FCO DEBRIEF ON GORBACHEV VISIT

REF: A. LONDON 27551 (NOTAL)

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: FCO POLITICAL DIRECTOR DEREK THOMAS DEBRIEFED DCM DECEMBER 20 ON GORBACHEV'S TALKS WITH THE PRIME MINISTER AND WITH SIR GEOFFREY HOWE. HE APOLOGIZED IN ADVANCE THAT HIS BRIEFING WOULD NECESSARILY BE SOMEWHAT "SKELETAL," BUT SAID THE PRIME MINISTER WOULD INFORM THE PRESIDENT IN GREATER DETAIL DURING HER TALKS WITH HIM IN WASHINGTON DECEMBER 22. END SUMMARY.

THATCHER MEETING

3. THOMAS SAID THAT THE MEETING WITH THATCHER HAD BEGUN WITH LUNCH AND CONTINUED THROUGH THE AFTERNOON UNTIL ABOUT 6:00. THE OVERALL TONE HAD BEEN "FRIENDLY AND CONSTRUCTIVE." THATCHER FOUND GORBACHEV CONFIDENT, FLUENT AND FULL OF AUTHORITY. HE WAS UNLIKE OTHER RECENT SOVIET VISITORS IN HIS WILLINGNESS TO ENGAGE IN A GENUINE GIVE AND TAKE, PICKING UP POINTS IN THE DISCUSSION AND EXPANDING UPON THEM. SHE NOTICED THAT HE EVOKED CHERNENKO'S AUTHORITY SEVERAL TIMES, IN AN APPARENT EFFORT TO MAKE CLEAR THAT CHERNENKO WAS VERY MUCH IN CHARGE.

4. FURTHER ON ATMOSPHERICS, THOMAS SAID THAT ALTHOUGH CHERNENKO HAD BECOME QUITE IRRITATED IN EXCHANGES WITH PARLIAMENT ABOUT HUMAN RIGHTS, HE HAD REACTED CALMLY WHEN THATCHER RAISED HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES AND AFGHANISTAN. HE HAD COMMENTED

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ONLY TO THE EFFECT THAT THE SOVIETS WERE CAPABLE OF RAISING CONCERNS ABOUT BRITISH HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES, BUT DID NOT WISH TO INTERFERE IN BRITISH INTERNAL AFFAIRS.

5. THOMAS SAID THAT THE TALK WITH THATCHER HAD THE NATURE OF AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS RATHER THAN A NEGOTIATION. GORBACHEV HAD AGREED AT THE OUTSET THAT, WHILE THE TWO SIDES HAD DIFFERENT POINTS OF VIEW, IT WAS IMPORTANT TO MAKE THESE DIFFERENCES CLEAR. THIS HAD LED TO A PROTRACTED EXCHANGE ON THE VIRTUES AND VICES OF THE RESPECTIVE SYSTEMS.

CERNENKO LETTER TO THATCHER

6. ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THE THATCHER MEETING, THOMAS SAID GORBACHEV HAD PRESENTED THATCHER WITH A LETTER FROM CHERNENKO CALLING FOR AN ACTIVE AND SERIOUS EAST/WEST POLITICAL DIALOGUE, POINTING TO THE IMPORTANCE OF THE SCHULTZ/GROMYKO TALKS, AND UNDERLINING THE NECESSITY TO PREVENT AN ARMS RACE IN OUTER SPACE.

7. THE PM HAD SOUGHT TO IMPRESS ON GORBACHEV THE SINCERITY OF THE WEST'S APPROACH TO ARMS CONTROL. SHE TOLD HIM THAT THE WEST WANTED TO SEE SUBSTANTIAL NUCLEAR REDUCTION AND BALANCES AT LOWER LEVELS. THE TWO SIDES HAD AGREED ON THE NEED FOR MUCH MORE CONTACT BETWEEN HEADS OF STATE AS WELL AS AT OTHER LEVELS TO ESTABLISH THE SORT OF MUTUAL CONFIDENCE WHICH WOULD PROMOTE ARMS CONTROL, AS WELL AS IMPROVE RELATIONS ACROSS THE BOARD. THATCHER MADE THE POINT THAT WE SHOULD NOT ALLOW MISUNDERSTANDINGS TO LEAD TO ERRORS OF JUDGMENT.

8. THOMAS EMPHASIZED THAT THATCHER HAD NOT PUT HERSELF FORWARD AS AN INTERMEDIARY. SHE HAD INSTEAD STRESSED HER SOLIDARITY WITH THE PRESIDENT. GORBACHEV HAD BEEN PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN HER IMPRESSIONS OF WASHINGTON POLITICS, ESPECIALLY THE VIEWS AND PERSONALITIES OF MAJOR PLAYERS. IN AN ASIDE, THOMAS SAID IT WAS HIS IMPRESSION THAT GORBACHEV, CHERVOV, AND THE OTHER SOVIETS WERE EXTREMELY WELL-INFORMED ABOUT WHO WAS WHO IN WASHINGTON AND ABOUT THE
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EXDIS

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PARM, UK, UR, PDIP
SUBJECT: FCO DEBRIEF ON GORBACHEV VISIT

COURSE OF THE PRESENT ARMS CONTROL DEBATE.

9. THATCHER RAISED THE CASES OF SAKHAROV AND SHCHARANSKIY. GORBACHEV REPLIED WITH THE USUAL SOVIET LINE: LEGISLATION EXISTED AND THE INDIVIDUAL, AS WELL AS THE GOVERNMENT, MUST ABIDE BY IT. THOMAS NOTED THAT IN REFERRING TO SOVIET DISSIDENTS, GORBACHEV USED WHAT THE BRITISH INTERPRETER SAID WAS A VERY RUDE WORD, TONED DOWN CONSIDERABLY BY THE SOVIET INTERPRETER.

10. THATCHER ALSO ASKED ABOUT REPORTS THAT THE SOVIETS WERE PROVIDING MONEY TO THE NATIONAL UNION OF MINE WORKERS. GORBACHEV SAID THAT NO MONEY HAD PASSED FROM THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT TO THE NUM, AS FAR AS HE IS AWARE.

THE HOWE MEETING: ARMS CONTROL

11. THOMAS' DESCRIPTION OF ARMS CONTROL AT THE HOWE MEETING TRACKED CLOSELY WITH (BUT WAS LESS DETAILED THAN) OUR EARLIER READOUT FROM WESTON (REFTEL).

12. THOMAS SAID GORBACHEV -- CALLING OCCASIONALLY ON CHERVOV -- HAD OPENED WITH AN HOUR-LONG PRESENTATION OF SOVIET VIEWS. GORBACHEV HAD IDENTIFIED SPACE ARMS CONTROL AS THE MOST IMPORTANT EAST/WEST ISSUE -- AFTER "BRIDGEBUILDING". HE HAD EMPHASIZED THAT THE SHULTZ/GROMYKO EXCHANGE WOULD INAUGURATE "NEW TALKS," IN WHICH THE SOVIETS WOULD BE WILLING TO TAKE "RADICAL STEPS" -- GUIDED BY THE PRINCIPLES

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OF EQUALITY AND EQUAL SECURITY -- TO ACHIEVE NUCLEAR ARMS REDUCTIONS "FOR ALL TIME". BUT HE ALSO ARGUED THAT U.S. PERSEVERANCE WITH SDI WOULD MAKE ARMS CONTROL IMPOSSIBLE AND LEAD TO SOVIET COUNTER-MEASURES, EITHER MATCHING U.S. SYSTEMS OR OVERWHELMING THEM.

13. CHERVOV FOLLOWED WITH AN EXTENDED CRITIQUE OF SDI. THOMAS SAID THIS PRESENTATION WAS INTERESTING FOR AN EMPHASIS ON THE CONNECTION BETWEEN OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS. CHERVOV REPORTEDLY RECALLED THE FACT THAT THE ABM AND SALT TREATIES HAD BEEN SIGNED ON THE SAME DAY AS EVIDENCE THAT OFFENSE AND DEFENSE HAD ALWAYS BEEN TREATED AS TWO ASPECTS OF THE SAME PROBLEM. THOMAS SPECULATED THAT THE SOVIETS REALIZED THEIR ATTEMPT TO SEPARATE THE TWO ISSUES LAST SUMMER HAD BEEN COUNTERPRODUCTIVE, AND HAD NOW REVERSED FIELD.

14. THE HOWE MEETING ALSO INCLUDED AN EXCHANGE ON FRENCH AND BRITISH SYSTEMS (SEE REFTEL). HOWE ARGUED THAT BRITAIN NEEDED NUCLEAR WEAPONS FOR ITS OWN DEFENSE; GORBACHEV COUNTERED THAT THE SOVIETS DID NOT WISH TO SEE BRITAIN ABANDON ITS DETERRENT, BUT THOUGHT IT REASONABLE THAT IT BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.

15. THOMAS COMMENTED THAT THE SOVIET ARMS CONTROL PRESENTATION HAD BEEN VERY IMPRESSIVE. BOTH GORBACHEV AND CHERVOV HAD BEEN ARTICULATE, NEITHER HAD OVERDONE THE ISSUES, BOTH HAD SEEMED EXTREMELY WELL INFORMED. MOREOVER, THOMAS HAD

THE IMPRESSION THAT SOVIET CONCERN ABOUT SDI -- BENEATH ALL THE OBVIOUS PROPAGANDA TRAPPINGS -- WAS GENUINE, AND THAT THE SOVIETS WORRIED ABOUT THE UPSET SDI WOULD CAUSE IN A SITUATION OF NUCLEAR BALANCE WITH WHICH THEY HAD BECOME RELATIVELY COMFORTABLE.

AFGHANISTAN

16. HOWE BROUGHT UP AFGHANISTAN, MAKING THE USUAL POINTS. GORBACHEV APPEARED WELL INFORMED, AND DISCOURSED KNOWLEDGEABLY ON AFGHAN HISTORY. HE SAID HE KNEW ALL ABOUT THE AID TO THE MUHAJADIN (INCLUDING BRITISH AID) AND ABOUT THEIR TRAINING BASES. HE SAID THE SOVIETS WOULD REMAIN IN
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EXDIS

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PARM, UK, UR, PDIP
SUBJECT: FCO DEBRIEF ON GORBACHEV VISIT

AFGHANISTAN AS LONG AS THE PAKISTANIS AND IRANIANS
CONTINUED TO INTERVENE THERE. THOMAS SAID THE
ONLY HOPEFUL SIGN IN THIS EXCHANGE WAS THE
INDICATION THAT GORBACHEV HAD LISTENED AND
RESPONDED TO WHAT HOWE HAD TO SAY.

NICARAGUA

17. HOWE EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE SOVIETS
NOT CONTRIBUTING TO AN ARMS BUILDUP IN
NICARAGUA, EMPHASIZING THE REALITY OF U. S.
CONCERN. GORBACHEV AGAIN SEEMED STEEPED IN THE
HISTORY OF THE AREA. HE SAID PROBLEMS WERE NOT
THE RESULT OF A COMMUNIST PLOT BUT OF ECONOMIC
PROBLEMS. THE SOVIETS DIDN'T WANT TO INTRODUCE
TENSIONS. BUT THEY SUPPORTED THE NICARAGUAN
GOVERNMENT AND WANTED TO SEE THE CONTADORA
AGREEMENT "PROPERLY" IMPLEMENTED.

MIDDLE EAST

18. GORBACHEV RAISED THE MIDDLE EAST, SAYING
THERE WAS A NEED FOR PARTIES BOTH INSIDE AND
OUTSIDE THE AREA TO ACT RESPONSIBLY. HE THOUGHT
THE STRENGTH OF THE ISRAELI LOBBY IN THE U. S.
WOULD PREVENT AN EARLY U. S. INITIATIVE AND ARGUED
FOR A SOLUTION THROUGH "COLLECTIVE" EFFORTS.

HUMAN RIGHTS

19. HOWE SAID THE BRITISH WERE CONCERNED THAT
HELSINKI AGREEMENTS WERE NOT BEING IMPLEMENTED
FULLY. HE CITED THE CASES OF SAKHAROV AND

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SHCHARANSKIY AND THREE OTHER "ILLUSTRATIVE CASES"

-- BATURIN (A METHODIST)

-- KHOLMIANSKY (A POLITICAL DISSIDENT IMPRISONED
IN A PSYCHIATRIC HOSPITAL)

-- GERSHUNI (A JEW)

GORBACHEV SAID THE SOVIETS WERE READY TO DISCUSS
HUMAN RIGHTS AS WELL IN GREAT BRITAIN, BUT HAD
NO WISH TO INTERFERE IN BRITAIN'S INTERNAL
AFFAIRS. HE DID, HOWEVER, OFFER TO LOOK INTO
THE FAMILY REUNIFICATION HOWE HAD ALSO RAISED.

VE DAY

20. HOWE MADE A PITCH FOR AVOIDING RECRIMINATIONS
DURING VE DAY CEREMONIES, ESPECIALLY AIMED AT
THE FRG. OUR CELEBRATIONS SHOULD BE
FORWARD-LOOKING. HE ALSO THOUGHT THE 10TH
ANNIVERSARY OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT MIGHT BE AN
OCCASION TO REVIEW EUROPE'S "PEACEFUL
ACCOMPLISHMENTS" OF THE LAST FORTY YEARS.

21. THOMAS CONCLUDED BY NOTING THAT THROUGHOUT THE
CONVERSATIONS, GORBACHEV EXHIBITED A "WARMTH OF
INTEREST IN REPAIRING BILATERAL RELATIONS."
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FBI 002 (SEE 038 OF 22 DEC)

USSR: ARBATOV VIEWS U.S. APPROACH TO COMING ARMS TALKS

LD240106 MOSCOW IN ENGLISH TO NORTH AMERICA 2300 GMT 23 DEC 84

(TEXT) WE CONTINUE OUR BROADCAST WITH CERTAIN ASPECTS OF SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS REVIEWED BY DR GEORGIY ARBATOV, MEMBER OF THE USSR ACADEMY OF SCIENCES AND DIRECTOR OF ITS INSTITUTE OF UNITED STATES AND CANADA STUDIES.

(BEGIN ARBATOV RECORDING IN RUSSIAN WITH SUPERIMPOSED ENGLISH TRANSLATION) WE VIEW THE COMING TALKS AS COVERING A WHOLE COMPLEX OF ISSUES, ALL THE MAIN ELEMENTS OF THE ARMS RACE WHICH WAS TO BE STOPPED. THESE PRINCIPAL ELEMENTS INCLUDE NUCLEAR ARMS, - BOTH STRATEGIC AND INTERMEDIATE RANGE, AND WEAPONS SYSTEMS THAT CAN BE DEPLOYED IN OUTER SPACE. ALL OF THESE ARE VERY IMPORTANT PROBLEMS BUT THE ONE DESERVING THE HIGHEST PRIORITY JUST NOW IS THE PROBLEM OF SPACE WEAPONS. THE FACT IS THAT ALTHOUGH THE AMERICAN SIDE IS WILLING TO TALK ABOUT SPACE WEAPONS, IT IS IN FACT INCREASING ITS APPROPRIATIONS FOR SYSTEMS OF THIS TYPE. SUCH AN APPROACH CANNOT BUT CAUSE CONCERN AMONG ALL SOBER THINKING PEOPLE, AMERICANS INCLUDED.

LET ME DRAW YOUR ATTENTION TO A RECENT ARTICLE IN THE JOURNAL FOREIGN AFFAIRS, IN WHICH SUCH EXPERIENCED POLITICIANS AS ROBERT MCNAMARA, GERALD SMITH AND GEORGE KENNAN PRESENT CONVINCING ARGUMENTS TO SHOW THAT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO ACHIEVE THE LIMITATION, LET ALONE REDUCTION OF OFFENSIVE STRATEGIC ARMS IF ONE OR BOTH OF THE SIDES ARE ENGAGED IN BUILDING UP ANTI-MISSILE DEFENSES. AS A MATTER OF FACT, THIS WAS THE OFFICIAL VIEW OF THE UNITED STATES AT THE VERY START OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS. THAT WAS IN FACT WHY SALT I BECAME POSSIBLE, SINCE IT WAS NEGOTIATED PARALLEL WITH A TREATY DRASTICALLY CURTAILING ANTI-MISSILE DEFENSES. THE TWO TREATIES WERE CONCLUDED TOGETHER.

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BY RW NARA DATE 3/3/11

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WHILE ON THIS SUBJECT, LET ME POINT OUT THAT THE VERY POSSIBILITY OF ESTABLISHING AN EFFECTIVE ANTI-MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM IS HIGHLY QUESTIONABLE IN THE VIEW OF THE VAST MAJORITY OF EXPERTS, AND AMERICAN EXPERTS ARE NO EXCEPTION HERE. THIS IS DUE BOTH TO PURELY TECHNICAL AND TO ECONOMIC REASONS FOR THE COST OF SUCH A SYSTEM WOULD BE FANTASTIC. BUT IRRESPECTIVE OF WHETHER SUCH A SYSTEM CAN OR CANNOT BE CREATED EVEN PLANS FOR IT ARE HAVING A HIGHLY ADVERSE EFFECT ON THE WHOLE RANGE OF PROBLEMS NOW BEING TACKLED. HOW CAN WE CONDUCT NEGOTIATIONS ON SCRAPPING EXISTING MISSILES WHEN WE KNOW THAT THE OTHER SIDE IS TRYING TO BUILD UP A DEFENSE SYSTEM FOR THOSE MISSILES?

AS FOR TALK ABOUT THESE BEING DEFENSIVE WEAPONS, THIS IS TOTALLY UNCONVINCING. WHATEVER MAY BE SAID PEACE TODAY IS LARGELY THE RESULT OF DETERRENCE ON BOTH SIDES. IT RESTS ON THE PROPOSITION THAT EACH SIDE IS AWARE THAT IF IT STARTED A NUCLEAR WAR IT WOULD BE SUBJECTED TO A DEVASTATING STRIKE IN RETURN. THIS MAKES A FIRST STRIKE POINTLESS, BUT IF EITHER SIDE IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES SEEKS TO DEVELOP AN AT ALL CREDIBLE ANTI-MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM, THE LOGICAL CONCLUSION IS THAT IT COUNTS ON COMMITTING AGGRESSION WITH IMPUNITY. SUCH AN APPROACH IS OBVIOUSLY DESTABILIZING. SINCE NEITHER SIDE WANTS TO BECOME A VICTIM OF AGGRESSION, IT STANDS TO REASON THAT IT WILL MATCH SUCH EFFORTS BY BUILDING UP A DEFENSE SYSTEM OF ITS OWN AND DEVELOPING THE OFFENSIVE SYSTEMS TO OVERCOME THE OTHER SIDE'S DEFENSES.

THAT BEING SO, WHAT IS THE POINT OF DISCUSSING CUTS OF OFFENSIVE SYSTEMS? WHAT WE HAVE HERE IS A VICIOUS CYCLE. THIS IS SO OBVIOUS THAT I AM SOMETIMES ASTONISHED BY THE AMERICAN ATTITUDE ON THIS MATTER. ONE GETS THE IMPRESSION THAT MANY PEOPLE IN THE UNITED STATES HAVE BEEN HIBERNATING FOR THE PAST 15 YEARS.

SURELY ALL THESE PROBLEMS HAVE BEEN WIDELY DEBATED IN BOTH THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION SINCE THE END OF THE SIXTIES? THAT WAS WHEN IT WAS CONCLUDED THAT DEVELOPING SUCH A DEFENSE SYSTEM WOULD NOT BE A DEFENSIVE ACT AT ALL BUT WOULD A VERY DANGEROUS, AGGRESSIVE ACT. FOR AN ANTI-MISSILE SYSTEM, FAR FROM CREATING STABILITY, INCREASES THE DANGER OF A NEW WAR. YET NOW ALL THIS IS BEING DISCUSSED ALL OVER AGAIN, ALTHOUGH THE SUBSTANCE OF THE MATTER HAS NOT CHANGED IN THE LEAST. IN FACT, MORE AND MORE AUTHORITATIVE AND INFLUENTIAL STATESMEN AND EXPERTS ARE POINTING UP THE DANGERS OF SPACE-BASED WEAPONS, SAYING THAT THEY WILL MAKE IT IMPOSSIBLE TO CONDUCT ANY FRUITFUL TALKS ON ARMS LIMITATION AND REDUCTION.

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SO WHAT IS THE WAY OUT? IN MY OPINION, THE VICIOUS CIRCLE WOULD BE BROKEN IF THE PARTIES TO THE COMING TALKS, ABOVE ALL THE AMERICANS, ADOPTED A REALISTIC APPROACH TO THE MATTER. I CANNOT ANTICIPATE WHAT THE AMERICAN POSTURE AT THESE TALKS WILL BE, BUT I DO KNOW THAT IN THE UNITED STATES THERE ARE SEVERAL ENTHUSIASTS OF THE STAR WARS NOTION AND THAT THERE ARE NAIVE PEOPLE AMONG THE PUBLIC WHO'LL GIVE IT THEIR BACKING. I CAN HAZARD A GUESS ABOUT THE ORIGINS OF THIS ENTHUSIASM. IT PROBABLY STEMS FROM THE TRAUMATIC EXPERIENCE OF AMERICANS IN THE POST-WAR PERIOD. IN THE YEARS SINCE WORLD WAR II, THEY HAVE SUDDENLY DISCOVERED THAT THEY ARE NO LONGER INVULNERABLE AS THEY WERE FOR CENTURIES.

NOW IT IS BEING SUGGESTED TO THEM THAT THIS INVULNERABILITY CAN SOMEHOW BE REGAINED. BUT THE PEOPLE SUPPORTING THE STAR WARS NOTION HAVE NO IDEA OF THE KIND OF PANDORA'S BOX THEY'LL BE OPENING, OR OF THE TROUBLES FOR ALL THAT THEY WILL BE RELEASING IN THIS WAY, NOT TO USE A STRONGER WORD, THE SOVIET ATTITUDE TO EXTENDING THE ARMS RACE TO OUTER SPACE HAS BEEN SPELLED OUT VERY CLEARLY. WE WANT A BAN ON DEPLOYING ANY ARMS IN SPACE; A BAN ON ALL GROUND-BASED WEAPONS THAT COULD STRIKE AT OBJECTS IN SPACE; A BAN ON THEIR DEVELOPMENT OR RESTING (AS HEARD); AND A MORATORIUM ON THEM FOR THE PRESENT; IN OTHER WORDS WE WISH TO RULE OUT ANY POSSIBILITY OF THE ARMS RACE MOVING INTO OUTER SPACE. THAT SEEMS TO BE THE ONLY RATIONAL APPROACH. (END RECORDING)

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 04 **MOSCOW 6414**
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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 04 MOSCOW 6414

DTG: 271542Z DEC 84 PSN: 061664

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PARM, UR, US

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NEW NEGOTIATIONS "POSSIBLE"

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 04 OF 04 MOSCOW 6414

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 03 MOSCOW 6414

DTG: 271542Z DEC 84 PSN: 061667

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PARM, UR, US

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PAGE 01 OF 04 MOSCOW 6414
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12/21/84

~~Bill~~ Bill Reinchens, PL
X 2355

Baltimore, Md.
News-American

NEWS-AMERICAN

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Reagan to address Soviets

By John P. Wallach,
Hearst News Service

WASHINGTON — President Reagan will speak to the Russian people "live" and uncensored on Soviet television and Soviet leader Konstantin Chernenko will have the same opportunity to appear on U.S. television, under plans envisaged in connection with the signing of a new U.S.-Soviet cultural accord.

This was disclosed by White House officials, who said the United States has sought from the onset of negotiations in July to guarantee the same access to Soviet television that several Russian officials repeatedly have had here in appearing on the ABC-TV program "Nightline."

"There is going to be a bona fide document saying we guarantee 'X' number of appearances. We are negotiating the number," an administration source said. "The part about the president will probably not be in writing but invitations will be exchanged at the signing ceremony."

The last U.S.-Soviet cultural, scientific and educational agreement expired in 1980. The United States broke off negotiations for a follow-up accord after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. The talks were resumed in July 1984 in Moscow.

Under terms of the new draft accord, the officials said at least six or eight American policymakers will have the right to appear annually on Soviet news programs, marking the first time such access has been granted to American officials to speak directly to a Soviet audience.

Asked why the United States was insisting on these guarantees as the price for signing the new cultural pact, U.S. Information Agency Director Charles Z. Wick said, "The president inspires confidence, people like him and it demystifies this Mars-type person sponsored by the Soviet media."

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"If I know Mike Deaver (deputy chief of staff), he'll try to get this whole thing wrapped up in time for the inaugural," an administration source said. "If I were to have Reagan speaking to the Soviet people, I would want to have him do so at the moment of his greatest power — his coronation."

The official said Chernenko might speak on American television the day before the inauguration, Sunday, Jan. 20.

But a high-ranking State Department policymaker said, "While I can't rule that out totally, I don't think we are going to have a final agreement ready in time for the inaugural."

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