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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 3/27/2005

File Folder "SIGNALS" [OCTOBER-DECEMBER, 1984] (2/3)

FOIA

F06-114/1

Box Number 7

YARHI-MILO

706

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
6407	CABLE	010856Z NOV 84 [1] R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1	1	11/1/1984	B1
6411	CABLE	271527Z NOV 84 [5-8] R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1	4	11/27/1984	B1
6408	REPORT	REPORT/ANALYZIS MOSCOW ON ARMS TALKS; OGARKOV'S REEMERGENCE; SINO-SOVIET-VIETNAMESE POLEMICS [12-34] R 3/3/2011 F2006-114/1	23	11/28/1984	B1
6414	CABLE	031506Z DEC 84 [35-37] R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1	3	12/3/1984	B1
6419	CABLE	051552Z DEC84 [39-42] D 3/3/2011 F2006-114/1	4	12/5/1984	B1 B3
6417	CABLE	051016Z DEC 84 [43-48] R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1	6	12/5/1984	B1
6418	CABLE	SAME TEXT AS DOC #6417 [49-51] R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1	3	12/5/1984	B1
6409	MEMO	KIMMITT TO MATLOCK AND RON LEHMAN [52] R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1	1	12/6/1984	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

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B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

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B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

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B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
6410	PAPER	USSR: DEVELOPMENTS DURING WEEK OF 12-18 DECEMBER (HIGHLIGHTS FROM CABLE REPORTING) [53-56] PAR 3/3/2011 F2006-114/1	4	12/12/1984	B1 B3
6422	CABLE	122212Z DEC 84 [57-59] D 3/3/2011 F2006-114/1	3	12/12/1984	B1 B3
6426	CABLE	121552Z DEC 84 [60-61] D 3/3/2011 F2006-114/1	2	12/12/1984	B1 B3
6429	CABLE	130206Z DEC 84 [62] D 3/3/2011 F2006-114/1	1	12/13/1984	B1 B3
6431	CABLE	131816Z DEC 84 [63-65] D 3/3/2011 F2006-114/1	3	12/13/1984	B1 B3
6433	CABLE	172242Z DEC 84 [67-68] D 3/3/2011 F2006-114/1	2	12/17/1984	B1 B3

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PAGE 01 TOKYO 2655 DTG: 010856Z NOV 84 PSN: 043397
EOB277 AN007389 TOR: 306/0911Z CSN: HCE354

DISTRIBUTION: CHLD-01 STEI-01 SIGU-01 KRAM-01 MALY-01 LAUX-01
SOMM-01 LINH-01 MAT-01 WOOD-01 COBB-01 WRIT-01
/012 A2

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:
SIT: PUBS VP EOB SIMS SMAL
EOB:

THE HEAVY-HANDED LINE TAKEN BY POLITBURO MEMBER KUNAYEV
HERE (TOKYO 22281). WHETHER THIS REPRESENTS A NUANCED
SHIFT IN SOVIET THINKING IS DIFFICULT FOR US TO SAY, BUT
WE THOUGHT THIS WORTH PASSING ALONG TO THE DEPT AND
OTHERS. END COMMENT.

-
MANSFIELD
BT

OP IMMED
STU8816
DE RUEHKO #2655 3060850
O 010856Z NOV 84
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3427

INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 8850
AMEMBASSY BEIJING 2089
AMEMBASSY BONN 0002
AMEMBASSY LONDON 2390
AMEMBASSY PARIS 5352
AMEMBASSY SEOUL 1864
USMISSION USNATO 2244

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ TOKYO 22655

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, UR, US, JA
SUBJECT: SOVIET SPOKESMAN CALLS FOR IMPROVED U.S.-SOVIET
TIES

1. ~~(C)~~ ENTIRE TEXT.
2. TOKYO MEDIA REPORTED NOV 1 THAT VADIM ZAGLADIN, DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE SOVIET CENTRAL COMMITTEE'S INTERNATIONAL DEPARTMENT, WHO IS VISITING JAPAN AS PART OF A SUPREME SOVIET DELEGATION, SAID THE USSR WOULD PAY CLOSE ATTENTION TO ANY NEW U.S. STATEMENTS ON RELATIONS WITH THE USSR. ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS, ZAGLADIN, IN A MEETING WITH A JAPANESE PROFESSOR HERE ON OCT 31, EXPRESSED THE VIEW THE USSR EXPECTED PRESIDENT REAGAN WOULD BE RE-ELECTED AND THAT THERE WAS A GOOD POSSIBILITY FOR AN IMPROVEMENT OF RELATIONS BETWEEN MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON IN HIS SECOND ADMINISTRATION.
3. ZAGLADIN REPORTEDLY OBSERVED THAT HISTORY SHOWED THAT THE USSR HAD BEEN ABLE TO ESTABLISH GOOD RELATIONS WITH PREVIOUS U.S. ADMINISTRATIONS EVEN WHEN RELATIONS WERE NOT GOOD AT THE OUTSET. THE PROBLEM WITH THE PRESENT ADMINISTRATION LIES NOT WITH THE PRESIDENT BUT RATHER WITH HIS POLICY ADVISORS INsofar AS U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS ARE CONCERNED AND HOPEFULLY U.S. POLICY WILL CHANGE AFTER THE ELECTION, HE ADDED.
4. NOTWITHSTANDING THIS MORE MELLOW PUBLIC ATTITUDE, ZAGLADIN REAFFIRMED THE SOVIET POSITION THAT THE U.S. MUST WITHDRAW ITS NEW MISSILES IN WESTERN EUROPE BEFORE THE INF NEGOTTATIONS COULD BE RESUMED.
5. COMMENT: ZAGLADIN'S UP-BEAT COMMENTS CONTRAST WITH

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NLRR 106-11411 #6467
BY Ad NARA DATE 11/27/07

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PAGE 01 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 7126 DTG: 221656Z NOV 84 PSN: 003610
EOB643 AN011621 TOR: 327/1732Z CSN: HCE954

IN THE SHULTZ-GROMYKO MEETING.

DISTRIBUTION: STEI-01 DOBR-01 KRAM-01 MALY-01 SOMM-01 SEST-01
ROBN-01 LENC-01 LEHC-01 LEHR-01 MAT-01
/011 A2

Q: DOES THIS MEAN THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE AGREED TO COME BACK TO THE TABLE ON INF AND START?

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:
SIT: KIMM VP SIT EOB SIMS SMAL
EOB:

A: WE HAVE CONSISTENTLY TAKEN THE POSITION THAT REDUCING NUCLEAR ARMS SHOULD BE ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT OBJECTIVES FACING BOTH COUNTRIES. WE AND THE SOVIETS HAVE NOW AGREED TO SEEK WAYS TO NEGOTIATE AGREEMENTS ON THE WHOLE RANGE OF ISSUES CONCERNING NUCLEAR FORCES, INCLUDING STRATEGIC AND INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR ARMS, AND OUTER SPACE. WE ARE CONCENTRATING ON HOW TO MOVE FORWARD, RATHER THAN ON PAST HISTORY. WE WILL NOT COMMENT FURTHER ON SUBSTANCE. THE JOINT ANNOUNCEMENT SPEAKS FOR ITSELF.

OP IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHC #7126 3271724
O 221656Z NOV 84 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

Q: WILL CHEMICAL WEAPONS, MBFR, SDI, ETC. BE ON THE AGENDA AT THESE TALKS?

TO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW NIACT IMMEDIATE 0000

A: AS WE HAVE SAID, WE WILL NOT COMMENT FURTHER ON SUBSTANCE. THE JOINT ANNOUNCEMENT SPEAKS FOR ITSELF.

UNCLAS STATE 347126

Q: WILL THE MEETING ANNOUNCED TODAY BETWEEN SECRETARY SHULTZ AND FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO BE THE PRELUDE TO A REAGAN-CHERNENKO SUMMIT?

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PREL, UR, US
SUBJECT: US-SOVIET ANNOUNCEMENT TO ENTER NEW ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS

A: THE PRESIDENT, AS YOU KNOW, HAS ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS EXPRESSED HIS WILLINGNESS TO MEET WITH MR. CHERNENKO IF THAT WOULD BE USEFUL. I THINK, HOWEVER, IT IS PREMATURE

1. THE US AND USSR HAVE AGREED TO BEGIN NEW ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS. THE FOLLOWING JOINT ANNOUNCEMENT IS BEING ISSUED IN BOTH CAPITALS:

AT THIS POINT TO SPECULATE ON WHETHER OR NOT THE SHULTZ-GROMYKO MEETING WILL LEAD TO A SUMMIT.

BEGIN TEXT

Q: DOES THIS MEAN THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE ACCEPTED PRESIDENT REAGAN'S PROPOSAL AT THE UNGA FOR "UMBRELLA TALKS" ON ARMS CONTROL?

THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION HAVE AGREED TO ENTER INTO NEW NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF REACHING MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENTS ON THE WHOLE RANGE OF QUESTIONS CONCERNING NUCLEAR AND OUTER SPACE ARMS. IN ORDER TO REACH A COMMON UNDERSTANDING AS TO THE SUBJECT AND OBJECTIVES OF SUCH NEGOTIATIONS, SECRETARY OF STATE GEORGE P. SHULTZ AND FOREIGN MINISTER ANDREI A. GROMYKO WILL MEET IN GENEVA ON JANUARY 7-8, 1985.

A: I WOULD CAUTION YOU AGAINST READING INTO THE JOINT ANNOUNCEMENT MORE OR LESS THAN IS THERE. WE HAVE NOT FORECLOSED ANY IDEAS AND LOOK FORWARD TO WORKING OUT MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE ARRANGEMENTS FOR NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS.

END TEXT

Q: CAN YOU CLARIFY WHAT PRECISELY THE PRESIDENT MEANT WHEN HE SPOKE OF AN UMBRELLA FOR ARMS CONTROL DISCUSSIONS?

2. THE FOLLOWING PRESS GUIDANCE HAS BEEN PREPARED FOR WHITE HOUSE AND DEPARTMENT SPOKESMEN. POSTS MAY DRAW ON IT IN DISCUSSIONS WITH HOST GOVERNMENTS AND THE PRESS.

A: -- THE PRESIDENT SUGGESTED IN HIS UNGA SPEECH THAT "WE NEED TO EXTEND THE ARMS CONTROL PROCESS TO BUILD A BIGGER UMBRELLA UNDER WHICH IT CAN OPERATE -- A ROAD MAP, IF YOU WILL, SHOWING WHERE, DURING THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS OR SO, INDIVIDUAL (ARMS CONTROL) EFFORTS CAN LEAD."

Q: WHAT IS THE SPECIFIC OBJECTIVE OF THE US IN SECRETARY SHULTZ'S MEETING WITH MR. GROMYKO?

-- THE PRESIDENT'S IDEA OF ESTABLISHING AN OVERARCHING FRAMEWORK FOR A BROAD CONFIDENTIAL EXCHANGE ON ALL ASPECTS OF ARMS CONTROL WAS DESIGNED TO BREAK THE LOGJAM CAUSED BY THE SOVIET WALKOUT FROM THE TALKS IN GENEVA LAST YEAR.

A: OUR OBJECTIVE IS TO RENEW A DIALOGUE THAT CAN LEAD TO MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE, VERIFIABLE ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS WHICH REDUCE THE LEVELS OF NUCLEAR AND OTHER ARMAMENTS ON BOTH SIDES AND ENHANCE INTERNATIONAL STABILITY. WE HOPE THAT THIS MEETING WILL ADVANCE SUCH A PROCESS.

-- IN THE SHORT TERM SUCH TALKS COULD HELP CLARIFY DIFFERENCES WITH THE SOVIETS AND LEAD TO THE RENEWAL OF A SERIOUS ARMS CONTROL DIALOGUE.

Q: DOES THE US HAVE A COMPREHENSIVE PROPOSAL ON ARMS REDUCTIONS TO PRESENT TO THE SOVIETS?

-- OVER THE LONGER TERM, THE FRAMEWORK COULD PROVIDE AN OVERVIEW OF INDIVIDUAL NEGOTIATIONS, AND PERHAPS ASSIST INDIVIDUAL NEGOTIATIONS IN RESOLUTION OF SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS.

A: THE US GOVERNMENT IS READY FOR GENUINE GIVE-AND-TAKE WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF REACHING CONCRETE AGREEMENTS WITH THE SOVIETS. WE HAVE CONTINUED OUR OWN INTERNAL STUDIES ON ARMS CONTROL DURING THE PAST YEAR. THESE STUDIES HAVE ADDRESSED THE WHOLE RANGE OF QUESTIONS (CONCERNING NUCLEAR ARMS AND OUTER SPACE) ADDRESSED IN THE JOINT ANNOUNCEMENT, AND RELATED SUBJECTS THAT WILL BE ADDRESSED

Q: DOES THIS STEP BY THE SOVIETS REPRESENT A VINDICATION OF THE PRESIDENT'S ARMS CONTROL STRATEGY?

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A: THE PRESIDENT IS PLEASED THAT THE SOVIETS, FOR WHATEVER REASON, HAVE AGREED TO RESUME AN ARMS CONTROL DIALOGUE WITH THE US. WE HAVE BEEN URGING SUCH A STEP FOR SOME TIME. THE PRESIDENT IS KEENLY AWARE THAT NEGOTIATING VERIFIABLE ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS WILL TAKE TIME AND REQUIRE HARD BARGAINING.

Q: DOES THIS MEAN THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE ABANDONED THEIR PRECONDITION THAT US INF BE WITHDRAWN BEFORE ARMS

NEGOTIATIONS CAN PROCEED?

A: I WILL REFER YOU AGAIN TO THE JOINT ANNOUNCEMENT. IT SAYS THAT THE TWO NATIONS HAVE AGREED TO ENTER NEGOTIATIONS ON THE WHOLE RANGE OF QUESTIONS ON NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL. IT SAYS NOTHING ABOUT PRECONDITIONS.

Q: WHY HAVE THE SOVIETS DECIDED TO TALK TO THE US ABOUT ARMS CONTROL AT THIS TIME?

A: YOU WILL HAVE TO ASK THE SOVIETS.

Q: DOES THIS REPRESENT AN OUTGROWTH OF FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO'S MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT IN SEPTEMBER?

A: THE PRESIDENT OUTLINED TO MR. GROMYKO PERSONALLY AND FORCEFULLY HIS VIEWS ON US-SOVIET RELATIONS AND ARMS CONTROL IN PARTICULAR. WE HOPE THT THIS MEETING HAD AN IMPACT ON SOVIET POLICY CALCULATIONS.

Q: HAVE WE INFORMED THE ALLIES OF THIS DEVELOPMENT?

A: YES.

Q: IS A MORATORIUM ON THE TESTING OF ANTI-SATELLITE WEAPONS PART OF THIS AGREEMENT TO MEET?

A: NO.

Q: WHAT WILL BE THE ROLE OF AMBASSADORS ROWNY AND NITZE IN THE NEW NEGOTIATIONS?

A: THE SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH MR. GROMYKO WILL ADDRESS THE OVERALL QUESTION OF NEGOTIATING ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS WITH THE SOVIETS. NO SPECIFIC DECISIONS HAVE BEEN MADE ABOUT THE FORMAT FOR FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS.

Q: IS THE ADMINISTRATION GOING TO APPOINT AN ARMS CONTROL "CZAR" OR SPECIAL NEGOTIATOR TO CONDUCT FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS? IF SO, WHO WILL IT BE?

A: THE PUBLIC PERCEPTION OF A "CZAR" WAS THAT HE WOULD BOTH MANAGE THE ARMS CONTROL EFFORT AND CONDUCT THE NEGOTIATIONS. WE HAVE NOT CREATED SUCH A POSITION. WITH REGARD TO THE TALKS THEMSELVES, NO DECISIONS HAVE BEEN MADE ON THE FORMAT.

Q: WHAT IS THE NEXT STEP AFTER THE SHULTZ-GROMYKO MEETING?

A: THAT IS ONE OF THE ISSUES THE TWO FOREIGN MINISTERS WILL BE ADDRESSING AND I AM NOT GOING TO TRY TO SPECULATE OR PREJUDGE THE MATTERS THEY WILL HAVE UNDER DISCUSSION.

Q: HAS AMBASSADOR HARTMAN MET WITH FOREIGN MINISTER

GROMYKO TO DISCUSS THIS SUBJECT?

A: AMBASSADOR HARTMAN MET WITH FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO ON MONDAY. HE CONVEYED THE ADMINISTRATION'S VIEWS ON THIS AND OTHER ISSUES TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER.

Q: IS THIS A VICTORY FOR US POLICY?

A: WE WOULD NOT PUT IT IN THOSE TERMS. WHAT IS IMPORTANT IS THAT BOTH COUNTRIES HAVE DECIDED TO HOLD NEGOTIATIONS WHICH ARE IN THEIR (BEGIN UNDERSCORE) MUTUAL (END UNDERSCORE) INTERESTS.

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SOVIET-US

MOSCOW (AP) -- THE SOVIET ANNOUNCEMENT THURSDAY OF A JANUARY MEETING BETWEEN U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE GEORGE SHULTZ AND HIS COUNTERPART, ANDREI GROMYKO, WAS CAREFULLY WORDED TO CONVEY THE MESSAGE THAT THE KREMLIN HAS NOT GIVEN UP ANY OF ITS MAJOR POSITIONS ON DISARMAMENT.

THE ANNOUNCEMENT WAS READ TO NEWS CORRESPONDENTS IN MOSCOW BY VLADIMIR LOMEIKO, CHIEF OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY PRESS DEPARTMENT, WHILE THE U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT WAS SIMULTANEOUSLY SAYING THE SAME THING IN WASHINGTON, D.C.

THE JOINT ANNOUNCEMENT SAID: "THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA HAVE AGREED TO ENTER NEW NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE AIM OF ACHIEVING MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE ACCORDS ON THE ENTIRE COMPLEX QUESTIONS CONCERNING NUCLEAR AND SPACE WEAPONS. THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE U.S.S.R. ANDREI GROMYKO AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE OF THE UNITED STATES GEORGE SHULTZ WILL MEET IN GENEVA ON JAN. 7-8, 1985, IN ORDER TO WORK OUT A JOINT UNDERSTANDING OF THE SUBJECT AND AIMS OF SUCH TALKS."

LOMEIKO THEN ANSWERED A FEW QUESTIONS, STRESSING THAT THE JANUARY DISCUSSIONS WILL BE "COMPLETELY NEW" AND NOT A RENEWAL OF U.S.-SOVIET MISSILE REDUCTION TALKS. THE SOVIETS WALKED OUT OF THOSE TALKS IN GENEVA A YEAR AGO TO PROTEST THE START OF DEPLOYMENT OF MEDIUM-RANGE NUCLEAR MISSILES IN NATO COUNTRIES.

LOMEIKO SAID SPECIFICALLY THAT THE DISCUSSIONS ON MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES COULD NOT RESUME UNLESS THE U.S.-MADE ROCKETS ARE DISMANTLED, A CONDITION THAT THE UNITED STATES HAS REJECTED. THE SOVIETS ALSO ENDED NEGOTIATIONS LAST FALL ON LONG-RANGE MISSILES.

"I WANT TO DIRECT EVERYONE'S ATTENTION TO THE TEXT IN WHICH EVERYTHING WAS VERY CLEARLY STATED," LOMEIKO SAID. "WE ARE NOT TALKING ABOUT RESUMED NEGOTIATIONS. AS FAR AS THOSE NEGOTIATIONS GO, THE SITUATION HAS NOT CHANGED. THEY ARE ONLY POSSIBLE GIVEN THE REMOVAL OF THE NATO ROCKETS."

HOWEVER, LOMEIKO SEEMED TO LEAVE OPEN THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE EUROPEAN MISSILE ISSUE COULD BE ABSORBED INTO OTHER, BROADER NEGOTIATIONS, AS THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION HAS PROPOSED, DEPENDING UPON THE RESULTS OF THE TWO-DAY MEETING BETWEEN SHULTZ AND GROMYKO.

ASKED SPECIFICALLY IF THE GENEVA MEETING CONSTITUTED A RENEWAL OF U.S.-SOVIET NEGOTIATIONS, LOMEIKO REPLIED:

"I WOULD LIKE TO STRESS AGAIN THAT SUCH REPORTS DO NOT CORRESPOND TO REALITY. THE QUESTION IS NOT THE RESUMPTION OF TALKS BETWEEN THE U.S.S.R. AND THE U.S.A., BUT ABOUT NEW TALKS, COMPLETELY NEW TALKS, WITH THE PURPOSE OF ACHIEVING MUTUALLY AGREEABLE ACCORDS ON THE WHOLE COMPLEX OF QUESTIONS RELATED TO NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMAMENTS."

LOMEIKO SAID THAT IF THE U.S.-MADE MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES HAD BEEN WITHDRAWN FROM WESTERN EUROPE AS MOSCOW DEMANDED, THE EUROMISSILE TALKS COULD HAVE CONTINUED.

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Matlock 5

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 04 MOSCOW 5040
SIT031 AN005189

DTG: 271527Z NOV 84 PSN: 011594
TOR: 332/1946Z

DISTRIBUTION: MCF JP KIMM VP SIT EOB MATL /010
WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLIST

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OP IMMED
UTS8245
DE RUEHMO #5040 3321527
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FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4688

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NLRR FOI-1141, #6411
BY CN NARA DATE 11/27/07

EXDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: OADR
TAGS: FADM, PREL, UR, US
SUBJECT: LOOKING TOWARD GENEVA

EXDIS

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. AS WE MAKE OUR PREPARATIONS FOR GENEVA, I WANTED TO MAKE A FEW POINTS WHICH MAY BE MORE APPARENT HERE THAN IN THE WASHINGTON FRAY.
3. THE JURY IS STILL OUT ON WHY THE SOVIETS HAVE COME BACK TO ARMS CONTROL AS QUICKLY AS THEY HAVE. I DOUBT THEY EXPECT EARLY OR DRAMATIC PROGRESS, AND THEY CAN HARDLY BELIEVE THAT A SECOND REAGAN

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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DTG: 271527Z NOV 84 PSN: 011594

ADMINISTRATION WILL BE MORE SUSCEPTIBLE TO PRESSURE THAN THE FIRST. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE SOVIETS PRESUMABLY KNOW THAT THEY WILL NEED SOME DEGREE OF CREDIBILITY IF THEY ARE TO REAP THE PUBLIC AFFAIRS BENEFITS OF HAVING RETURNED TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE IN THE FIRST PLACE. THIS SUGGESTS THEY MAY ULTIMATELY BE MORE WILLING TO BARGAIN SERIOUSLY THAN THE LAST TIME AROUND. TIME WILL TELL.

4. AS WELCOME AS THEIR WILLINGNESS TO TALK IS, HOWEVER, IT BRINGS TO AN END THE FREE RIDE WE HAVE HAD FOR THE PAST YEAR ON ARMS CONTROL POLICY. FROM NOW ON, MUCH MORE PUBLIC SCRUTINY WILL BE FOCUSED ON OUR POSITIONS, AND THE SOVIETS WILL REGAIN GREAT LATITUDE TO MANIPULATE PUBLIC OPINION AT OUR EXPENSE. UNLESS WE ARE CAREFUL, IN SHORT, THE GENEVA MEETING COULD RESULT IN OUR LOSS OF THE TACTICAL HIGH GROUND ON ARMS CONTROL WHICH WE HAVE HELD SINCE THEY BROKE OFF NEGOTIATIONS LAST NOVEMBER.

5. THE BEST WAY TO PREVENT THIS IS TO ENSURE WE HAVE A CREDIBLE SUBSTANTIVE BRIEF WHEN WE SIT DOWN ACROSS FROM GROMYKO JANUARY 7. THE LANGUAGE OF LAST WEEK'S JOINT ANNOUNCEMENT WAS BROAD ENOUGH TO ALLOW FOR A WIDE RANGE OF OUTCOMES. THE BEST FROM OUR STANDPOINT WOULD BE AN AGREED FRAMEWORK AND SET OF OBJECTIVES FOR FOLLOW-UP TALKS. I BELIEVE THIS IS AN ACHIEVABLE GOAL, BUT IT WILL NOT COME EASILY; HAVING TURNED A FRESH PAGE, WE STAND AT A CRUCIAL POINT NOT UNLIKE GLASSBORO OR VLADIVOSTOK.

6. THE PROBLEM -- AS HAS BEEN MADE CLEAR TO ME IN MY DISCUSSIONS HERE WITH GROMYKO AND IN SOVIET MEDIA

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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COMMENTARY ON THE GENEVA MEETING -- IS THAT THE SOVIETS REMAIN HIGHLY SKEPTICAL THAT WE WILL BE PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE AGREEMENTS THEY CAN LIVE WITH. GROMYKO WILL THEREFORE BE DETERMINED IN GENEVA TO COMMIT US IN ADVANCE TO PRINCIPLES GOVERNING FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS, AND EVEN THE OUTCOMES OF SUCH NEGOTIATIONS, WHICH WILL GUARANTEE SOVIET DISIDERATA. UNLESS WE CAN FIND SOME MEANS OF RECONCILING SUCH AN APPROACH WITH OUR OWN PREFERENCE FOR DEFINING AGENDA AND PROCEDURAL QUESTIONS, THE GENEVA MEETING COULD WELL END IN STALEMATE AMID SOVIET CHARGES THAT WE ARE SEEKING SIMPLY TO "TALK ABOUT TALKS".

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7. TO AVOID THIS, -- AND TO MAXIMIZE CHANCES THAT WHATEVER NEGOTIATIONS FLOW FROM GENEVA WILL ACHIEVE RESULTS -- WE WILL NEED TO BE PREPARED TO GIVE GROMYKO A FAIRLY CLEAR, COGENT IDEA OF WHERE THE PROCESS WE HAVE IN MIND MAY LEAD IN SPECIFIC AREAS. THIS DOESN'T MEAN WE SHOULD TELEGRAPH OUR NEGOTIATIONS STRATEGY OR POSITIONS. IT DOES MEAN THAT, AS REGARDS STRATEGIC ARMS, FOR EXAMPLE, WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO SKETCH CONVINCINGLY OUR VIEWS OF THE PARAMETERS OF AN EQUITABLE AGREEMENT. GIVING GROMYKO SOMETHING CONCRETE TO FOCUS ON COULD WELL MAKE IT EASIER FOR HIM TO GIVE GROUND ON SUCH "PROCEDURAL" ISSUES AS THE SHAPE OF FUTURE AGENDA, WHICH MIGHT OTHERWISE

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BECOME BOGGED DOWN IN SEMANTIC ARGUMENTS' (A LA "MILITARIZATION" VS. "DEMILITARIZATION" OF SPACE). MORE IMPORTANT, IT WOULD PREEMPT CHARGES THAT OUR APPROACH WAS NOT A SERIOUS ONE.

8. I REALIZE THAT A DECISION TO BE MORE CONCRETE ON THE SUBSTANCE OF OUR POSITIONS WILL NOT BE AN

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 04 OF 04 MOSCOW 5040

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EXDIS

EASY ONE TO MAKE IN WASHINGTON, AND THAT WHATEVER COURSE WE CHOOSE WILL BE THE SUBJECT OF SPIRITED BUREAUCRATIC DEBATE. I ONLY HOPE WE CAN DO A BETTER JOB OF KEEPING THAT DEBATE IN HOUSE THAN WE HAVE THUS FAR. WHEN THE SOVIETS ARE ABLE TO READ IN DETAIL WHO IS DOING WHAT TO WHOM IN OUR INTERNAL STRUGGLES OVER POLICY, THEY ARE ABLE TO FINE TUNE THEIR NEGOTIATING POSITIONS AND PROPAGANDA FOR MAXIMUM EFFECT. AS THE SAYING GOES IN BRIDGE, "ONE PEEK IS WORTH A DOZEN FINESSES". GROMYKO WILL BE A TOUGH ENOUGH ADVERSARY IN GENEVA WITHOUT OUR PLAYING FROM AN OPEN HAND. HARTMAN
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~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

November 27, 1984

TO:

WALT RAYMOND
RON LEHMAN
SVEN KRAEMER
BOB LINHARD
BILL WRIGHT
CHRIS LEHMAN
TY COBB
JACK MATLOCK
JOHN LENCZOWSKI
PETER SOMMER
GASTON SIGUR

FROM:

STEVE STEINER

10

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

November 27, 1984

STATEMENT BY THE PRINCIPAL DEPUTY PRESS SECRETARY

In his meeting with British Labor Leader Neil Kinnock yesterday, Mr. Chernenko is reported to have said that Moscow is prepared to dismantle some of its medium range missiles based in the European part of the USSR, and that the coming negotiations with the U.S. would deal with "the entire complex of interconnected questions" regarding weapons in space and strategic and medium-range nuclear weapons.

His description of the subject matter to be addressed first and foremost in these discussions appears to be consistent with the views we have expressed in our statements, and we look forward to further exploration of the issues in diplomatic channels.

On another matter some of you have asked about, our senior arms control group met at the White House yesterday with Bud McFarlane. As you know, it is composed of key representatives of State, Defense, ACDA, the JCS, CIA and NSC. This group will continue to meet two or three times a week to prepare for the negotiations.

The President will meet with National Security Council principals on arms control issues about once a week between now and the January 7-8 Shultz-Gromyko talks, and he will continue his personal involvement as the negotiations take shape and proceed in the months ahead. The President's next NSC meeting on arms control -- his first since the new talks were agreed upon -- will probably take place late this week.

The President will also be in communication with other western leaders with arms control on the agenda. As you know, we have already announced meetings with Chancellor Kohl for this Friday, with Prime Minister Nakasone January 2 in Los Angeles, and with Prime Minister Wilfried Martens of Belgium on January 14.

The President remains fully committed to moving the negotiating process along. He will be reviewing studies on Soviet objectives and their likely strategies in the negotiations, and providing guidance to our negotiators on our objectives and our strategy for pursuing them.

Some of you also asked about our views on the value of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) as we approach these negotiations. Since the advent of nuclear weapons, we have largely depended upon the threat of prompt nuclear retaliation to

deter aggression. This approach has worked and we, along with our allies, have succeeded in protecting western security for more than three decades. At the same time, we are constantly searching for better ways to strengthen peace and stability.

On March 23, 1983, the President announced a decision to take an important first step toward investigating the possibility of an alternative future which did not rely solely on nuclear retaliation for our security. This involves an intensified research program aimed at establishing how we might eliminate the threat posed by nuclear armed ballistic missiles.

The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) is a research program consistent with all our treaty commitments, including the 1972 ABM Treaty. The United States is committed to the negotiation of equal and verifiable agreements which bring real reductions in the nuclear arsenals of both sides. To that end, the President has offered the Soviet Union the most comprehensive set of arms control proposals in history. We are working tirelessly for the success of these efforts, but we can and must be prepared to go further. It is intended that our research efforts under the SDI complement these arms reduction efforts and help to pave the way to a more stable and secure world.

In the near term, SDI research and development responds to the massive Soviet ABM effort, which includes actual deployments, and thus, provides a powerful deterrent to a Soviet breakout of the ABM Treaty. In the long term, SDI may be the means by which both the United States and the Soviet Union can safely agree to very deep reductions, and perhaps someday, even the elimination, of offensive nuclear arms.

In short, through the SDI research program the President has called on the best scientific minds in our country to turn their collective talents toward the cause of strengthening world peace by establishing the feasibility of rendering nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete. In doing so the United States seeks neither military superiority or political advantage. Our single purpose with this initiative is to search for ways to make the world a safer place.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 12

28 November 1984
FB TM 84-048



Trends

This issue includes . . .

- Moscow on arms talks
- Ogarkov's reemergence
- Sino-Soviet-Vietnamese polemics

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This report examines selected foreign media, with emphasis on the controlled media of communist countries. The analyses are based exclusively on media content and behavior and are issued without coordination with other U.S. Government components.

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USSR-U.S.**Moscow Adjusts Stance To Accommodate Renewed Arms Talks**

In agreeing to talks with the United States encompassing space weaponry and strategic and intermediate-range nuclear arms, Moscow has in effect abandoned its earlier preconditions for the opening of negotiations on these issues, but Soviet media have provided few clues about Moscow's intentions or expectations regarding the talks.

Authoritative Soviet statements emphasize that the upcoming discussions represent a totally "new" forum, presumably to obscure the fact that Moscow has dropped earlier preconditions for a resumption of START and INF talks in Geneva. A brief 22 November TASS report broadcast on Soviet television and radio the same day and published in the central press the following day announced that the United States and the USSR had agreed to begin "new talks" on the "entire complex of questions concerning nuclear and space weapons." According to TASS, Secretary Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko will meet in Geneva on 7-8 January to work out a "joint understanding of the subject and aims" of the talks.

Foreign Ministry spokesman Vladimir Lomeyko, according to a TASS report on his press conference the same day, again emphasized that these are not a "resumption" of the INF talks (abruptly interrupted by Moscow in November 1983) but "new talks." When pressed by a Western correspondent about the validity of Moscow's earlier insistence on the removal of the missiles before engaging in talks on medium-range nuclear weapons, Lomeyko sidestepped the question by insisting that resumption of the INF talks was not the issue. The Shultz-Gromyko meetings in January, he said, would deal with "what questions will be discussed at the new talks." Apparently seeking to claim credit for initiating the January talks, Moscow has not described the discussions as "umbrella" talks—an approach previously suggested by the United States—or acknowledged any U.S. role in proposing comprehensive arms talks.

General Secretary Chernenko has discussed the scope of the proposed talks but has not elaborated Soviet priorities and intentions. According to the authoritative TASS report on his 26 November meeting with British Labor Party leader Neil Kinnock, Chernenko said the USSR "recently addressed a proposal to President Reagan" that the United States and the Soviet Union start negotiations on the "entire complex of interconnected questions of the nonmilitarization of outer space and on the reduction of strategic nuclear arms and medium-range nuclear weapons." He asserted that the "future would show" if the United States is prepared for "constructive talks."

Since the announcement of the Shultz-Gromyko talks, Moscow has quietly modified its posture on the arms control issues to be discussed:

- **Space Weaponry.** Moscow has dropped its insistence on a moratorium on the testing of space arms as a prerequisite for talks on the issue, but has reaffirmed its high priority for limiting space weaponry. In a 26 November dinner speech honoring visiting Austrian Chancellor Sinowatz, Premier Tikhonov claimed it is "especially important to prevent the militarization of space" but did not elaborate. Only two days before the announcement of the January talks, a Moscow radio broadcast in English reaffirmed the Soviet demand that talks on banning weapons in space be accompanied by a moratorium.
- **START.** Although Chernenko included the limitation of strategic weapons in his agenda for the January talks, there has been no further elaboration on this issue.
- **INF.** Despite its unspoken willingness to drop an earlier demand for the withdrawal of the "obstacles" as a precondition to negotiations, Moscow has hinted that it will adopt a tough bargaining posture on the Euromissiles issue. In his remarks to the Labor Party delegation, Chernenko suggested that in any agreement Moscow would regard the "operational-tactical missiles" it has deployed in Czechoslovakia and East Germany since the beginning of NATO's missile deployments—not its SS-20's—as the proper candidates for matching reductions of U.S. Euromissiles in an agreement. Moreover, Chernenko's reference to equality between the "Warsaw Treaty countries and NATO members"—presumably including France—suggests that Moscow will continue to insist on the inclusion of British and French strategic forces in the computation of the strategic and medium-range nuclear balance.

**Other Leadership
Statements**

Even after the announcement of the Gromyko-Shultz talks, Soviet leaders have continued to publicly express skepticism about U.S. intentions. Finance Minister Garbuzov, in a widely publicized 27 November speech to the Supreme Soviet, justified a 12-percent increase in publicly acknowledged Soviet defense expenditures by attacking alleged U.S. aggressiveness. The U.S. Administration, he charged, is increasing international tension, using "crude military force," and fueling the arms race "to an extremely dangerous degree" while "hiding behind false assurances of its love of peace." Similarly, Politburo member Viktor Grishin criticized U.S. policies in harsh terms in a speech in Mongolia on the 26th, reported on Moscow radio's domestic service. He charged that the United States is attempting to "ensure military superiority" and "reverse the course of history through a notorious 'crusade' against socialism." Claiming that such policies had forced the Soviet Union to strengthen the country's defenses, he warned that "no lovers of military adventures will succeed in taking us unaware."

Media Commentary

Soviet media have continued to attack a broad range of U.S. policies but have manifested a few signs of optimism for arms control talks. According to a 27 November TASS summary, a *Literaturnaya Gazeta* article by Leonid Zamyatin, the head of the CPSU Central Committee's International Information Department, praised the January talks as "a step" in the "necessary and correct direction," but cautioned that the "real test" of U.S. intentions will be Washington's attitude toward "specific proposals made by the Soviet side." Moscow radio commentator Boris Andrianov and a commentator for the party journal *Kommunist*, Vadim Nekrasov, provided the most optimistic Soviet appraisals of the prospects for the talks on a 25 November domestic radio program. Andrianov said that now that the U.S. elections are over, an atmosphere "capable of encouraging a businesslike approach" is being created. Nekrasov agreed, suggesting that U.S. public opinion has made it "much more difficult" for Washington "to refuse serious talks" with the Soviet Union, but, he added, the talks will "not be easy or straightforward" because the Administration has not cast aside "its errors regarding military superiority" over the Soviet Union. (U/FOUO)

USSR

Ogarkov Moderates Line Following Dismissal

In his first public pronouncement since being removed as the chief of the General Staff in early September, Marshal Nikolay Ogarkov has backed away from his previous emphasis on the urgency of strengthening Soviet defenses. Writing in the latest issue of the leading military-political journal, Ogarkov argued that it is irrational to expand nuclear weapon stockpiles and that various international factors are coming together to "neutralize" the threat of nuclear war. The mild tone of Ogarkov's article comes in the midst of conflicting signs over the intentions of the Soviet leadership in the area of defense spending.

The appearance of the article suggests that despite his demotion, Ogarkov is still an influential figure in the Soviet military. The article, in a November issue of *Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil* (*Communist of the Armed Forces*, No. 21), identified Ogarkov by his marshal's rank, but gave no indication of his new post. It was signed to press on 19 October, a week after Ogarkov first reappeared in public following his 6 September demotion. On 12 October Ogarkov was reported by the East German and Czechoslovak media to have met with GDR President Honecker. Despite the publicity for the meeting in East Europe, it was ignored by the Soviet media.

Although Ogarkov's latest article drew upon and developed important points raised in his last major public pronouncement, a 9 May Victory Day interview in *Krasnaya Zvezda*, its conclusions differed in a number of significant respects. Both pieces used the Soviet victory in World War II as a point of departure to discuss recent trends in military affairs. In both articles he indicated that the current level of nuclear deterrence possessed by the two major powers has resulted in considerable stability, pointing out the "paradox" that despite the growth of nuclear arsenals the possibility of carrying out a disarming first strike has been sharply reduced. In his May interview, however,

he appeared to conclude that these developments necessitated an increased emphasis on Soviet conventional forces and the development of weapons using new technologies. The present article omitted these points.¹

In his current article Ogarkov appeared to go beyond his May interview in asserting that a buildup of nuclear forces would not strengthen Soviet security. Arguing in general terms that appeared to apply equally to the United States and the Soviet Union, he stated that "excessively large stockpiles of nuclear weapons" do not guarantee security, "but rather the reverse," they increase the danger of an aggressor being subjected to "crushing retribution" from the victim of an attack. Ogarkov reasserted that it is now "impossible" for one of the main nuclear powers to destroy all of its opponent's strategic weapons in a single attack, making "an immediate crushing response" inevitable. He stated that retaliation "under present conditions" will make it "impossible for the aggressor subsequently to wage war or to conduct any serious operations," casting doubt on the entire notion of fighting a war beyond the first exchange of strategic strikes.

Ogarkov also added a new component to his discussion of the impact of nuclear weapons by expressly denying that nuclear war can ever serve as a rational means of pursuing policy goals. Quoting Chernenko's April 1981 remark that "it is criminal to view thermonuclear war as a rational, almost 'legitimate' continuation of policy," he argued that the development of nuclear weapons has "posed in a new way the question of the expediency of war as a means of achieving a political end."² Although these assertions are consistent with current Soviet policy, Ogarkov is the only top Soviet political or military leader known to have repeated this Chernenko statement. Ogarkov's position appears to run counter to longstanding military assertions that war, including nuclear war, can be an outgrowth of policy. That proposition was reaffirmed by a leading military spokesman, Lieutenant General D. A. Volkogonov, in a book published in 1984 on Marxist-Leninist teachings on war.

Perhaps the most striking aspect of Ogarkov's article is his assertion that various "sociopolitical" factors are combining with strategic factors to "neutralize" the danger of a new world war. In keeping with his past writings, Ogarkov asserted that Soviet economic and military might remain "the main

¹ Ogarkov's Victory Day interview was discussed in the 23 May 1984 *Trends*, pages 8-10.

² Chernenko's statement is discussed in the *Trends* of 6 May 1981, pages 6-9.

restraining factor" deterring aggression. He went on, however, to invoke a melange of international political factors—communist parties abroad, the nonaligned countries, and the "national liberation" and "antiwar" movements—as contributing to peace by "considerably restricting the freedom of action" of those who might unleash war. While these political factors are sometimes cited by Soviet civilian commentators, they have been largely ignored by military spokesmen. Moreover, Ogarkov's overall assessment that military and sociopolitical factors can neutralize the threat of war appears to contrast with the more general assessment that current international tensions and the arms race are increasing the danger of war.³

Ogarkov's moderation was also evident in his apparent satisfaction with the existing level of the Soviet defense effort. Unlike his May interview and his earlier writings, the current article conspicuously avoided either calling for greater military preparedness and the strengthening of the country's defenses, or warning of the need to match the West in military research and development. Moreover, it appeared sympathetic with the possibility of reducing military arsenals, stating that increasing nuclear stockpiles is becoming "pointless" and that "for the first time in history" the major opponents now confront each other with "a surplus of military and above all nuclear potentials."

Defense Spending The moderate tone of Ogarkov's article comes against the background of conflicting indications of the regime's position on defense allocations. Editorials published in *Pravda* and *Krasnaya Zvezda* on the eve of his dismissal on 6 September suggested that the party leadership had just overruled proposals to divert resources from consumer welfare to defense.⁴ Soon, however, signs began to appear that there was intensified pressure to increase defense spending:

- Ukrainian party leader Shcherbitskiy took up the cause of greater resources for defense in a pair of speeches at the end of September.
- Foreign Minister Gromyko, in a major address on the eve of the 7 November anniversary, called for "unflagging attention" to strengthening defense, pledging that the armed forces will have "everything necessary" at their disposal.

³ For earlier evidence of controversy over the threat of war, see the 27 June 1984 *Trends*, pages 1-3.

⁴ These editorials are discussed in the 12 September 1984 *Trends*, pages 1-4.

- This was followed by a strong endorsement of defense requirements in Chernenko's speech to a 15 November Politburo session confirming the plan and budget for the coming year.
- At the 27 November session of the Supreme Soviet, Minister of Finance Garbuzov announced a 12-percent increase in the 1985 budget expenditures for defense. This was the first time since 1970 that the Soviet leadership has increased this largely symbolic figure. (U/FOUO)

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China-Indochina-USSR

Beijing Restrained in Reaction to Vietnamese Offensive

China has responded to Hanoi's recent attack on the Kampuchean resistance camp at Nong Chan by renewing publicity to hostilities on the Sino-Vietnamese border. Beijing's attention to the border situation, however, has been distinctly less ominous than its depiction of escalating hostilities there last spring under similar circumstances. Hanoi on the other hand has sought to convey the impression of heightening tension along the Sino-Vietnamese border, pointing to new Chinese provocations and an alleged Chinese military buildup there to support its case.

At a regular Wednesday press briefing, the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman on 21 November stated that China "strongly condemns" Vietnam's "premeditated . . . aggression" and "firmly supports" the Kampuchean and Thai people. According to Xinhua, the spokesman noted that in addition to an "invasion" of Thailand earlier in the month and the recent attack on areas under the control of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea, Vietnamese troops "also stepped up their military provocations along the Sino-Vietnamese border." In a separate dispatch the same day, Xinhua reported that Vietnam began shelling Chinese territory in Yunnan Province on the 18th—the day Vietnam attacked the Cambodian resistance settlement of Nong Chan—and announced that a Vietnamese "incursion" into China was "utterly routed." On the 23d, Xinhua reported that Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Liu Shuqing had "strongly condemned" the Vietnamese attack on Nong Chan.

While thus making a clear link between SRV actions in Kampuchea and the renewal of hostilities on Vietnam's own northern border, the Foreign Ministry statement was more restrained in tenor than authoritative Chinese reaction to the developments last April that culminated in a round of sharp military clashes between the two countries. A PRC Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement at that time termed a late March Vietnamese intrusion into Thailand a "serious threat" to peace and a "serious provocation against all

justice-upholding countries." It concluded by "sternly" warning Vietnam that "people of various countries of the world will absolutely not tolerate their outrages." This month's statement included no such explicit warnings.

Beijing's account of SRV provocations against China also painted a less ominous picture of the situation on the common border. The 21 November Foreign Ministry statement merely noted that Vietnam had "stepped up military provocations along the Sino-Vietnamese border," while last April a second Foreign Ministry spokesman statement—issued two days after the first—"demanded" that Vietnam "immediately stop" its provocations against China (Xinhua, 4 April). Accompanying media reports announced Chinese artillery counterattacks on Vietnam from points in Guangxi and Yunnan Provinces.

Motives

Beijing's relatively restrained public response to Hanoi's recent actions may conceivably be prompted by an expectation of limited Vietnamese success against the Kampuchean resistance. On 22 November, Xinhua claimed that Vietnamese forces had been "forced to make a partial retreat" from Nong Chan in the face of "counterattacks by resistance forces" and that on the 26th the resistance forces "had retaken some three-fifths of the camp." However, Beijing has also noted reports that a "major Vietnamese offensive" against Ampil—another Kampuchean resistance camp—is imminent (Xinhua, 24 November), and there has been no indication in the media that the Chinese expect a less vigorous dry season offensive by the Vietnamese this year.

More importantly, Beijing also may be practicing restraint with an eye toward Moscow, particularly the rescheduling of Soviet First Deputy Premier Arkhipov's visit to China. The trip was postponed at the last minute by Moscow last May following intensified Sino-Vietnamese border clashes and President Reagan's visit to Beijing. Xinhua on 11 October cited Deng Xiaoping reiterating that the Chinese invitation to Arkhipov still stands. The Japanese paper *Nihon Keizai Shimbun* on the 26th reported statements by General Secretary Hu Yaobang that the timing of Arkhipov's visit was under discussion.

Beijing's muted response to Soviet Politburo candidate member Dolgikh's Southeast Asian tour comports with this conclusion. Beijing has noted Vietnamese criticism of China voiced during Dolgikh's trip (Xinhua, 18 November) and has twice pointed out that the visit occurred while Vietnam was attacking Kampuchean resistance forces (Xinhua, 23 and 24 November).

However, Chinese media have ignored the Dolgikh statement, reported by Hanoi radio on 15 November, that normalization of relations with China should not be at the expense of third countries, although similar remarks by Chernenko and other Soviet leaders in the past have come under sharp attack from Beijing. The Chinese also have refrained from using the Dolgikh visit to point up Soviet support for Vietnamese actions.

**Vietnamese
Portrayal**

China's low-key response contrasts sharply with the picture painted by Vietnam. Hanoi renewed its attention to the Sino-Vietnamese border on 2 November in a Hanoi radio report of alleged Chinese provocations during October. In addition to the customary description of alleged incidents, the report suggested that China was escalating its war preparations by keeping a "large force of Chinese regulars" on the border and building new military transportation roads there.

Hanoi sought to sharpen the image of increased Chinese war preparations in a 13 November communique from the SRV Commission To Investigate PRC War Crimes. The communique—the first since June, when Hanoi had also called attention to an alleged Chinese military buildup on the border—claimed that Beijing has moved five more divisions close to the border. And, on 25 November Hanoi radio called the border situation in Ha Tuyen Province "very tense," charging that China recently massed "more than seven divisions" opposite three districts of that province in preparation for new incursions.

Hanoi has also sought to make the point that Beijing's actions on the Sino-Vietnamese border are linked to Vietnamese successes against resistance forces in Kampuchea. A 22 November Hanoi radio article by station editor Vu Dinh Vinh charged that Beijing is again seeking to cover up its war preparations on the Sino-Vietnamese border by "distorting" the situation at the Kampuchean-Thai border. He further implied that China's actions are an attempt to boost the morale of the Kampuchean resistance forces following their 18 November defeat at the Nong Chan resistance camp at the hands of the Heng Samrin and Vietnamese forces. A 27 November *Nhan Dan* commentary similarly linked new tension on the Sino-Vietnamese border to Vietnamese activities in Kampuchea, suggesting that China's 21 November Foreign Ministry statement denouncing the attack on Nong Chan was yet another attempt to "prepare public opinion" for "new acts of military adventurism" on the Sino-Vietnamese border. (U/FOUO)

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Dolgikh Reaffirms Support for Vietnam on China, Kampuchea

The recent visit to Indochina by a high-level Soviet delegation appeared aimed at allaying Hanoi's concerns regarding Moscow's intentions toward China. Soviet statements during the visits offered warm expressions of support for Vietnam against China, but they remained consistent with the restraint that continues to characterize Soviet leadership statements on China.

A USSR Supreme Soviet delegation led by CPSU Politburo candidate member and Central Committee Secretary Vladimir Dolgikh recently paid a 12-day "official friendship" visit to Indochina, stopping in Vietnam from 12 to 17 November, in Laos from the 17th to the 20th, and in Kampuchea from 20 to 22 November. In each country Dolgikh reached "complete unity of views" in talks on bilateral and international issues with his hosts, according to the media of both the USSR and the Indochinese countries. Dolgikh also had courtesy meetings with the three Indochinese party chiefs, attended a banquet and rally in each capital, visited Soviet-aided economic projects, and hosted a farewell banquet for each of his hosts. Each visit also was capped by the issuance of a joint communique.

Coming in the wake of the fifth round of Sino-Soviet talks, Dolgikh's visit appears consistent with Moscow's efforts in recent years to offer Vietnam visible expressions of Soviet support in a context of efforts to improve Sino-Soviet relations. Presumably to the same end, Moscow had welcomed SRV Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach on an "official visit" late last month shortly after the conclusion of the fifth round of Sino-Soviet talks. On the eve of the first session of the Sino-Soviet talks in 1982, Moscow welcomed the Vietnamese president to Moscow. And last year, after the third round of talks, CPSU Politburo member and First Deputy Premier Aliyev visited Hanoi. Other meetings between Soviet and Vietnamese representatives also appeared timed to coincide with the Sino-Soviet consultations.

China Issue

During his visit Dolgikh offered Hanoi slightly warmer expressions of Soviet support on the China issue. In his speech to a 12 November Hanoi banquet, carried by *Pravda* on the 14th, for example, Dolgikh assured the Vietnamese that they can "count on" Moscow's "assistance and support" in their attempts to "relax tensions" in

Southeast Asia. He declared further that "nobody in the West or East"—an apparent warning to the United States and China—can "undermine" the Soviet-Vietnamese relationship. Moscow's willingness to publicize these warnings to the United States and China stands in contrast to its circumspection on this issue during Aliyev's visit to Vietnam last fall. According to Vietnamese accounts, Aliyev had cautioned that no country should try to "test" the Soviet-Vietnamese relationship or use it for a "political bargain." Soviet media ignored these statements.¹

In his speech to a Hanoi rally on the 13th, carried by *Pravda* the following day, Dolgikh also linked assurances of Soviet support to CPSU General Secretary Chernenko personally. He noted that prior to the delegation's departure Chernenko had specifically asked Dolgikh to "tell" the Vietnamese that Moscow will continue to pursue an "unchanging course of international solidarity and all-round support" for Vietnam.

The 17 November joint communique marking Dolgikh's visit to Hanoi also went further than either the joint communique released following SRV Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach's visit to Moscow last month or the joint statement released following the Aliyev visit last year in reflecting Soviet support for Vietnam on the China issue. In contrast to the earlier two documents, the communique on the Dolgikh visit included a formal acknowledgment that Moscow "welcomed" Vietnam's successes in "defending their motherland against outside encroachments," a pointed reference to Vietnam's tense border with China.

Despite these new assurances of Soviet support for Vietnam, Dolgikh, according to Soviet accounts, treated China with rhetorical restraint. He failed, for example, to repeat the direct criticisms of China that were made by CPSU General Secretary Chernenko during meetings with the Vietnamese and Lao party chiefs last summer.² And, he used only codewords when criticizing Beijing. In his 12 November Hanoi banquet speech, for example, he agreed with Hanoi that the present tense situation in Southeast Asia is caused by the "forces of imperialism and hegemonism."

Similarly, Dolgikh in his rally speech on the 13th offered no new assurances to Hanoi on the Sino-Soviet normalization question, an issue that had been a source of contention between Hanoi and Moscow. Instead he simply repeated

¹ The Aliyev visit is discussed in the *Trends* of 9 November 1983, pages 20-23.

² See the *Trends* of 13 June 1984, pages 3-7.

Moscow's standard promise that the normalization of Sino-Soviet relations will not be at the "expense of the interests of its friends and allies." On other aspects of the China question, the joint SRV-USSR communique was basically in accord with the communiqués issued following the Thach and Aliyev visits.

The expressions of Soviet support for Vietnam against China appear to have struck a responsive chord in Hanoi, which failed to use Dolgikh's visit to reaffirm earlier signs of concern regarding Moscow's efforts to improve relations with Beijing. In fact, only Nguyen Huu Tho, SRV National Assembly chairman and Dolgikh's official host during the visit, referred directly to Beijing. In his 12 November banquet speech, Tho routinely noted Vietnam's determination to defeat "all schemes and acts of the reactionaries within the Beijing ruling circles." During Aliyev's visit last year, Vietnamese leaders had pointedly reminded Moscow throughout the visit that Vietnam continues to be threatened by China's policy of "expansionism and hegemonism."

Kampuchea Issue Like Aliyev's visit to Hanoi last year, Dolgikh's trip to Indochina has renewed Soviet affirmations of support for the Kampuchean regime of Heng Samrin. The joint USSR-PRK statement on the visit, carried by *Pravda* on 23 November, reaffirmed Moscow's "principled line" of giving Kampuchea "all-round support" for building the country and "consolidating its revolutionary gains." It expressed Moscow's "indignation" about the continued existence of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea and claimed that attempts to "reverse" the situation in Kampuchea are "futile." The statement also repeated Moscow's standard line condemning UN interference in the internal affairs of Kampuchea and demanding that the People's Republic of Kampuchea be given its "legitimate" place at the United Nations.

In addition, Dolgikh's remarks and the joint communiqués at each stop repeatedly underlined Moscow's support for Indochinese proposals to settle the Kampuchean situation and relax regional tensions—proposals that have been rejected by Indochina's noncommunist Southeast Asian neighbors and China. And, Dolgikh at every stop underscored Moscow's "support" for a "firm alliance" among the three Indochinese countries calling it a "sure and powerful weapon" in their struggle to build socialism and defend their countries against outside encroachments. (U/FOUO)

Communist Relations

Moscow Stresses Need for Greater Communist Unity

The Chernenko regime appears to be continuing efforts begun under Andropov to press East European communist parties to follow Moscow's line in foreign and domestic issues. This stress on conformity was recently evident in an authoritative editorial article implicitly emphasizing the primacy of Moscow in the world communist movement and in another article that specifically attacked Yugoslavia. Both articles drew sharp responses from Belgrade, which asserted that Moscow is returning to antiquated policies it previously rejected.

Moscow demonstrated its concern over weak bloc support for its foreign policy in an editorial article in an October (No. 15) issue of its most authoritative journal, *Kommunist*. The article pointed out that policy cohesion has assumed "extraordinary importance" in view of the current international situation. Showing no tolerance for independence, it asserted that "fraternal parties" are "simply bound" to show cohesion in the face of imperialist efforts to split the communist movement and that "history would not forgive" any other course. Apparently reflecting concern that other parties are not living up to agreed upon positions, it complained of the "nonacceptance of joint actions" and of efforts to introduce new interpretations of agreements in order to "repudiate collective discussions."

Evidently responding to recent assertions of independence within the bloc, the editorial article strongly reaffirmed that goals of international communism must always take precedence over narrow national interests. Rejecting "national narrowmindedness" as unacceptable, it stressed the "everlasting significance" of common interests for all communists and said that "internationalism and only internationalism" can be the basis of the communist movement. Unlike other recent authoritative Soviet statements on internationalism, the editorial did not balance its assertions on this score with a recognition of the independence, full equality, and sovereignty of each party.

The editorial's emphasis on internationalism appeared to directly refute the more independent lines of Yugoslavia and Romania and recent assertions of the importance of national interests by top Hungarian party leaders that were replayed in the GDR press.¹

The *Kommunist* article also underscored the CPSU's primacy in the communist movement. While denying that the CPSU occupies a privileged position, it appeared to assert Moscow's leading role by pointing out that there are "certain specific characteristics" of the CPSU that are "impossible" for other parties to ignore. It pointed out that the CPSU has the most experience in building socialism, the greatest military and economic power, the broadest international ties, and a special "responsibility" to other parties.

The editorial also appeared to stress the need for greater conformity in internal policy despite its disavowals of a desire to impose any model. Placing strong emphasis on the importance of the general laws and principles of socialism, it stated that any deviation from them is "unthinkable" and could "jeopardize the cause" of socialism. Apparently reflecting concern over new approaches to solving internal problems that Moscow finds unpalatable, it warned against political expediency and "neglect of theory." It also ridiculed "false claims of innovations" and declared that discussions that attempt to contrast "'new' paths with 'old' ones" can cause "political damage."

The Soviet emphasis on bloc conformity appears to date back to the Andropov regime. At a June 1983 plenum, Andropov strongly argued for "strengthening cooperation and cohesion" within the bloc both in internal and foreign policy. CPSU Secretary Zimyanin echoed this theme in a July 1983 address marking the 80th anniversary of the Bolshevik party in which he stressed the importance of the Soviet model for other parties. Most recently Soviet intolerance of diversity within the bloc was spelled out in an article by the first deputy head of the CPSU bloc relations department, Oleg Rakhmanin, in the April issue of *Voprosy Istorii KPSS (Questions of the History of the CPSU)*. That article, however, went to greater lengths than the *Kommunist* editorial to acknowledge the independence and sovereignty of all communist parties.²

¹ For a discussion of the debate over national interests, see the *Trends* of 4 April 1984, pages 10-11, and 9 May 1984, pages 6-8.

² Soviet statements on bloc relations are discussed in the *Trends* of 3 August 1983, pages 10-12, and 9 May 1984, pages 6-8.

**Attack on
Yugoslavia**

Moscow used a recent article on World War II in an apparent effort to signal its current dissatisfaction with Yugoslavia's independent line. The article in the October issue of the international affairs monthly *Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn* sharply criticized a Yugoslav book for not giving sufficient credit to Moscow for its role in establishing Yugoslav independence and by implication for its role in the communist movement as a whole. The article went beyond the book under review and professed not to understand why some Yugoslav authors persist in trying to "blacken" Soviet wartime policy. It stated that the latest tract goes "even further" than past Yugoslav "distortions" by claiming Moscow tried to slow that country's revolutionary struggle.

Yugoslav Reaction

Reflecting characteristic Yugoslav sensitivity to Soviet criticism, Belgrade portrayed both Soviet articles as slights to Yugoslav independence and throwbacks to old-line policies. An article in the Belgrade daily *Politika* of 27 October by that paper's Moscow correspondent Dusan Pesic said that the *Kommunist* article espoused "certain old and obsolete views" that the postwar history of the communist movement has since "significantly corrected." It cited as examples the article's "repeated call for monolithic unity," its failure to note achievements of socialist countries outside the bloc, and its refusal to say why some parties have refused to attend international meetings.

The *Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn* criticism of the Yugoslav book drew an even sharper response. Another article by *Politika*'s Moscow correspondent on 11 October charged that *Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn*'s arguments were "unfortunately reminiscent of certain, luckily overcome, past times" and "can hardly be acceptable among equal interlocutors." Broadening the significance of the attack, the author asked rhetorically if it was written "only for a scientific, historical need." The authors of the Yugoslav book under attack refuted the criticism at length in a new journal *Knjizevni Glasnik*. Excerpts of their response were also published in the *Politika* of 26 October. (U/FOUO)

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China

Beijing Scores Abuses of New Economic Reforms

Promulgation of a dramatic economic reform package at the CPC Central Committee plenum last month has been followed by a stream of commentary aimed at shaping and guiding its implementation. While the plenum decision authorizing the reforms had indicated leadership concern over both opposition prompted by the reforms' impact on vested economic and bureaucratic interests and political resistance to them on ideological grounds, recent commentary has focused on problems springing from cadre ignorance and greed rather than political controversy. In that regard, the Dengist leadership appears particularly concerned about the inflationary effect of price reforms and has strongly reiterated its resolve to keep prices under control.

Recent media commentary has strongly attacked a variety of administrative and economic abuses associated with the greater enterprise independence and price reform decreed by the party plenum last month. An authoritative Commentator article in the party daily *Renmin Ribao* on 8 November complained about cadres who have provoked "unhealthy phenomena" by "rushing headlong into 'reform'" and others who merely "changed signboards" while actually retaining powers that should have been delegated. Commentator also complained that some enterprises have gone too far by raising prices without authorization. These abuses, the article said, do not fall under the normal deviations that occur during reform, but reflect cadre ignorance of the "true meaning of reform."

Specific abuses have been cited in some media accounts, including the use of official position and state funds for commercial gain, the acceptance of bribes, financial fraud, and speculation. A circular issued by the party's Central Discipline Inspection Commission on 16 November and publicized by Xinhua on the 17th criticized cadres for practicing "fraud" or sham reform, "seeking only appearance and reporting no bad news" and "fishing for fame and compliments" rather than engaging in genuine reform.

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Some recent commentaries describing problems arising from cadre ineptitude and greed have played down ideological resistance. Indeed, a 15 November editorial in the Guangzhou party organ *Nanfang Ribao* said that the party leadership there had "found it relatively easy" to "unify its thinking" on the spirit of the recent Third Plenum and was "relatively quick to accept it." The editorial hailed this as a "notable change" from cadre response to the agricultural reforms introduced by the landmark 11th CPC Third Plenum in 1978.

Attribution of implementation problems to ignorance and self-interest rather than to ideological resistance or political opposition contrasts with the reform leadership's own predictions in initial commentary following the plenum. A 26 October *Renmin Ribao* Commentator's article published shortly after the plenum and party General Secretary Hu Yaobang's remarks in Shandong Province during a 21-27 October visit recalled that rural reforms, now described as well on track, had been obstructed "at every step" by "habitual, ideological prejudices within the party" and that the present economic reforms would "inevitably meet with this problem." According to a long Xinhua 28 October account of his Shandong inspection trip, Hu dwelled on potential ideological resistance, particularly among cadres in the economic work departments at both central and regional levels who remained committed to "old leadership and work methods."

Price Reform Recent central and provincial media treatment of problems in implementing the reforms has focused clearly on the politically sensitive price reform issue. Provincial media accounts, which in some respects antedate central attention on this question, have complained of price reform violations and "rumors" among the people of impending inflation. Central and regional media have sought to reaffirm the leadership's concern to allay popular anxiety on this score and, while implicitly acknowledging that prices are rising, have asserted that Beijing is responding quickly and effectively to stem abuses and honor the commitment in the plenum document itself to manage price adjustments carefully and control inflationary pressures.

For example, Hunan radio on 9 November reported that some units and individuals "arbitrarily raised prices under all sorts of pretexts" in some localities. Because they took advantage of new provisions for floating and negotiated prices, the prices of "some commodities went out of control," the "socialist market was greatly disturbed," and the "interests of the state and

consumers were infringed upon." The commentary reported that inspection teams in Hengyang had checked the prices of "foodstuffs with which the masses are concerned" and "prevented rumors from spreading." While citing a need to "adjust unreasonable price relations," the commentary emphasized that "not all prices will be raised or lowered in turn."

This acknowledgment that some prices are in fact rising was echoed implicitly in a *Renmin Ribao* article of 9 November. The article contrasted the need to eliminate "vicious inflation" in the postliberation period with current realities. "We used to take 'stabilization of prices' as the sole principle in our work," the article stated, but stabilization "does not mean freezing prices," and with the "constant change in the production costs," prices "will be adjusted accordingly." A Commentator's article, pegged to a report on illegal price increases by some units in Xian, called for "severe handling" of those who would "seize the opportunity provided by reform" to raise prices arbitrarily. Such behavior, said Commentator, not only has bad economic effects but also "ruins the reputation of reform."

A 10 November *Renmin Ribao* Commentator article similarly sought only to allay "the fears of some people" that price reform might result in "a nationwide price increase," insisting that price reform was "a structural adjustment" that will "make prices more reasonable." Reiterating assurances from the plenum decision, Commentator stressed that the government would proceed "with an extremely careful attitude" to formulate "feasible and well-conceived plans" and execute them in "a planned, step-by-step and controlled manner."

Inflationary pressures also were acknowledged in a 12 November *Zhongguo Xinwen She* commentary on price reform intended for overseas Chinese audiences. It reminded readers that commodity prices "have always been a hot topic for street gossip" in cities, but a "responsible person" of the State Administration of Commodity Prices had recently confirmed that prices of "high-grade and durable consumer goods will not be raised." The article declared that "resolute measures" were being taken to "stop the unhealthy practice of wantonly increasing prices" and that "top leaders" had called for "exposure of those 'black sheep' who have taken advantage of reforms" to harm the public interest. Acknowledging local media reports that on the eve of price reform a "small number of people" had "driven up prices and thus disrupted the market," the article stated that the State Administration of Commodity Prices had issued a circular requiring pricing departments in all localities to send price inspection personnel to grass-roots units to supervise pricing policy and stem such practices. (U/FOUO)

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GENEVA FOR USSCC; STOCKHOLM ALSO FOR CDE

HQ SPACE COMMAND FOR POLAD

E.O. 12345: DECL: OADR
TAGS: MNUC, PARM, INF, ASAT, START
SUBJECT: SOVIET COMMENTARY ON ARMS CONTROL TALKS

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY. SEVERAL PRESS COMMENTARIES ON THE
UPCOMING SHULTZ-GROMYKO TALKS STRESS THAT THE
SOVIET UNION IS READY FOR A CONSTRUCTIVE DIALOG;
WHETHER ONE OCCURS IS UP TO THE UNITED STATES.
THE COMMENTARIES REPORT THAT A MAJOR DEBATE OVER
ARMS CONTROL POLICY IS UNDERWAY IN THE UNITED
STATES. THEY NOTE BOTH POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE
DEVELOPMENTS, BUT RESERVE JUDGMENT ABOUT ITS
OUTCOME. THE MILITARY NEWSPAPER, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA,
IS THE MOST PESSIMISTIC, HOWEVER, ABOUT THE

CHANCES FOR A REAL CHANGE IN US APPROACH TO
ARMS CONTROL. THE COMMENTARIES PROVIDE LITTLE
INSIGHT INTO THE DETAILS OF THE SOVIET APPROACH,
BUT AN ARTICLE ON SPACE WEAPONS IN PRAVDA
CASTIGATES THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE
AND REITERATES THE SOVIETS' CALL FOR A COMPREHENSIVE
BAN ON SPACE WEAPONS. END SUMMARY.

3. PRAVDA'S INTERNATIONAL OBSERVER TOMAS
KOLESNICHENKO ASKS "WHICH CUP WEIGHS MORE?" IN
DISCUSSING THE US APPROACH TO THE TALKS. IN A
DECEMBER 2 COMMENTARY HE SAYS THREE FACTORS
IMPEL THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION TOWARD SERIOUS
NEGOTIATIONS: PUBLIC OPINION, ALLIED PRESSURE,
AND THE BUDGET DEFICIT. ON THE OTHER SIDE OF
THE SCALE HE FINDS "THE WEIGHT OF THE PAST." HE
DENIES THAT THE OUTCOME OF THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN THE
"TWO RICHARDS," BURT AND PERLE, WILL DETERMINE
THE US POSITION, EMPHASIZING THAT THE PRESIDENT MAKES
THE ULTIMATE DECISION. ###
THE US WILL NOT ADOPT
A MORATORIUM ON INF DEPLOYMENTS "DO NOT ###
NEVERTHELESS, HE SAYS TIME WILL TELL WHAT COURSE
THE ADMINISTRATION WILL FOLLOW. "THE SOVIET UNION
HAS TAKEN ITS STEP. THEREFORE, IT IS NOW
UP TO THE US ADMINISTRATION."

4. A FRONT PAGE EDITORIAL IN IZVESTIYA
DECEMBER 1 HAS THE SAME THEME. YURIY BANDURA
WRITES THAT US AGREEMENT TO BEGIN NEGOTIATIONS
IS A HOPEFUL SIGN, BUT ONLY IF WASHINGTON REALLY
INTENDS TO CONDUCT AN HONEST DIALOG.

5. "THUS FAR, THERE ARE FEW SIGNS WHICH GIVE RISE
TO HOPE," ACCORDING TO A NOVEMBER 30 COMMENTARY IN
SOVIETSKAYA ROSSIYA. VALERIY KOSOVAN SUMMARIZES
A LOS ANGELES TIMES ARTICLE WHICH POINTED OUT
THAT THE ADMINISTRATION DOES NOT INTEND TO
CHANGE ITS PLANS FOR INF DEPLOYMENTS OR TESTING SPACE
WEAPONS. AT THE SAME TIME, KOSOVAN SAYS THAT
SOME RECENT STATEMENTS BY SENIOR US OFFICIALS
"INSPIRE OPTIMISM."

6. THE MOST PESSIMISTIC COMMENTARY IS IN THE
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GENEVA FOR USSCC; STOCKHOLM ALSO FOR CDE

HQ SPACE COMMAND FOR POLAD

E.O. 12345: DECL: OADR
TAGS: MNUC, PARM, INF, ASAT, START
SUBJECT: SOVIET COMMENTARY ON ARMS CONTROL TALKS

DECEMBER 2 EDITION OF KRASNAYA ZVEZDA. COLONEL M. PONOMAREV SAYS THE WHITE HOUSE NOW HAS THE CHANCE TO SHOW THE SINCERITY OF ITS INTEREST IN ARMS LIMITATION. HE EMPHASIZES, HOWEVER, THE INFLUENCE OF THE "MOST REACTIONARY AND AGGRESSIVE CIRCLES OF THE USA." HE TOO, SUMMARIZES THE LOS ANGELES TIMES ARTICLE, AND HE ADDS THAT OFFICIAL STATEMENTS INDICATE NO INCLINATION ON THE PART OF WASHINGTON TO GIVE UP THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE. PONOMAREV SUMMARIZES AT LENGTH THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION PROPOSALS FOR THE SECOND TERM, ASSERTING THAT THEY APPEAL TO "THOSE WHO NOW DETERMINE THE POLICY OF THE WASHINGTON ADMINISTRATION, ABOVE ALL MILITARY

POLICY." HE ASSERTS THE STANDARD LINE THAT THE FUTURE WILL SHOW WHAT POSITION WASHINGTON ADOPTS, BUT HE STRESSES THAT REACTIONARY CIRCLES "POSSESS MUCH POWER AND THEIR INFLUENCE IN WASHINGTON IS VERY STRONG".

7. THE COMMENTARIES SAY LITTLE ABOUT THE SOVIET NEGOTIATING POSITION, EXCEPT THAT THE USSR WILL NOT BE FOUND WANTING IF THE UNITED STATES IS SERIOUS. BOTH PONOMAREV AND KOSOVAN REPEAT THE PROPOSALS WHICH CHERNENKO MADE IN HIS NBC INTERVIEW: AN AGREEMENT TO PREVENT THE MILITARIZATION OF SPACE A NUCLEAR FREEZE, AND A COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST BAN. THESE ARE NOT PRESENTED, HOWEVER, AS NECESSARILY ON THE AGENDA OF THE TALKS IN GENEVA.

8. A LONG ARTICLE IN PRAVDA DECEMBER 3, HOWEVER, GIVES SOVIET VIEWS ON SPACE WEAPONS. IT MAKES THE POINT THAT THE TALKS WILL CONCERN THE INTERRELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SPACE AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS. REITERATING THE FORMER SOVIET POSITION YU. CHEPLYGIN STRESSES THAT A TOTAL BAN ON "SPACE STRIKE WEAPONS" - INCLUDING ANTI-SATELLITE AND ANTI-MISSILE WEAPONS - IS NEEDED; PARTIAL MEASURES ARE NOT ENOUGH. HE DOES NOT, HOWEVER, DEMAND THAT A MORATORIUM ON TESTING SPACE WEAPONS ACCOMPANY THE NEGOTIATIONS. HE MERELY NOTES THAT THE SOVIET UNION UNILATERALLY ADOPTED A MORATORIUM ON LAUNCHING ANTI-SATELLITE WEAPONS "AS LONG AS OTHER STATES ACT IN THE SAME WAY." HE OBSERVES THAT THE US HAS TESTED ITS ASAT INTERCEPTOR TWICE THIS YEAR, WITHOUT DRAWING ANY CONCLUSIONS ABOUT THE CURRENT STATUS OF THE SOVIET MORATORIUM.

9. HE ATTACKS US SPACE PROGRAMS, AND PARTICULARLY THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE (SDI), ON THE GROUNDS THAT THEY ARE PART OF AN EFFORT TO ACHIEVE MILITARY SUPERIORITY OVER THE USSR. HE ARGUES THAT THE SDI IS INTENDED TO PROTECT MISSILE SILOS AND COMMAND CENTERS, THEREBY CREATING THE CAPABILITY FOR A FIRST STRIKE WITH IMPUNITY. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SDI WILL LEAD TO THE "COMPLETE UNDERMINING" OF EXISTING CONTROL AGREEMENTS, INCLUDING THE ABM TREATY, THE LIMITED TEST BAN TREATY, THE OUTER SPACE TREATY, AND THE ENMOD CONVENTION. SDI WILL ALSO LEAD TO AN INTENSIFICATION OF THE OFFENSIVE ARMS RACE, HE SAYS, BECAUSE "THE OTHER SIDE" WILL BE FORCED TO DEVELOP WEAPONS CAPABLE OF PENETRATING BT

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SIGNAL STRONG INTEREST IN A COMPREHENSIVE BAN ON SPACE WEAPONS AND THEY EMPHASIZE THE INTERRELATIONSHIP OF THE ISSUES TO BE DISCUSSED. CONTINUED REFERENCES TO CHERNENKO'S NBC INTERVIEW MAY INDICATE THAT THE PROPOSALS HE MADE THEN WILL BE ON THE SOVIET AGENDA, ALTHOUGH SOVIET STATEMENTS WHICH DIRECTLY CONCERN THE AGENDA FOR THE TALKS HAVE NOT INCLUDED NUCLEAR TESTING. END COMMENT.
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GENEVA FOR USSCC; STOCKHOLM ALSO FOR CDE

HQ SPACE COMMAND FOR POLAD

E.O. 12345: DECL: OADR
TAGS: MNUC, PARM, INF, ASAT, START
SUBJECT: SOVIET COMMENTARY ON ARMS CONTROL TALKS

THE "SHIELD." HE WARNS THAT THE USSR IS CAPABLE OF RESPONDING ADEQUATELY TO ANY THREAT TO ITS SECURITY. CHEPLYGIN CALLS FOR STRICT OBSERVANCE OF PAST AGREEMENTS AND REJECTION OF THE CREATION OF A LARGE SCALE MISSILE DEFENSE.

10. COMMENT: IN THE SOVIET VIEW, THE SUCCESS OF THE TALKS IN JANUARY DEPENDS ON THE ATTITUDE OF THE UNITED STATES AND THAT ATTITUDE IS NOT YET CLEAR. THE SOVIETS ARE OBVIOUSLY FOLLOWING THE US PRESS WITH SPECIAL CARE AT THIS TIME, LOOKING FOR CLUES ABOUT THE US POSITION. AS FOR THEIR OWN, THEY



...-CHERNENKO (EMBARGOED) (SCHEDULED)

CHERNENKO SAYS SOVIET READY FOR RADICAL SOLUTIONS TO ARMS RACE
(RELEASE AT 1 P.M. EST DEC 5)

MOSCOW, DEC 5; REUTER - PRESIDENT KONSTANTIN CHERNENKO SAID
TODAY THE SOVIET UNION WAS PREPARED TO ADOPT RADICAL SOLUTIONS
TO THE ARMS RACE AND ITS TOP PRIORITY WAS A BAN ON SPACE
WEAPONS.

IN A MESSAGE TO A GROUP CALLED INTERNATIONAL PHYSICIANS FOR
THE PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR WAR, PUBLISHED TODAY, HE SAID THE
SOVIET UNION HOPED TO REACH UNDERSTANDINGS IN ITS FORTHCOMING
TALKS WITH THE UNITED STATES.

SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER ANDREI GROMYKO IS TO MEET WITH
SECRETARY OF STATE GEORGE SHULTZ IN GENEVA NEXT MONTH TO
DISCUSS THE RESUMPTION OF ARMS CONTROL TALKS BETWEEN THE TWO
COUNTRIES.

"RESOLVING THE QUESTION OF SPACE WEAPONS IS NOW OF PRIMARY
IMPORTANCE," CHERNENKO SAID. "MILITARIZATION OF OUTER SPACE,
IF NOT SECURELY BLOCKED, WOULD CANCEL EVERYTHING THAT HAS SO
FAR BEEN ACHIEVED IN THE FIELD OF ARMS LIMITATION.

"THE SOVIET UNION IS PREPARED TO GO FOR THE MOST RADICAL
SOLUTIONS WHICH WOULD ALLOW ADVANCE ALONG THE WAYS LEADING TO
THE CESSATION OF THE ARMS RACE; THE PROHIBITION AND,
EVENTUALLY, COMPLETE ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS."

YESTERDAY, AMERICAN INDUSTRIALIST ARMAND HAMMER QUOTED
CHERNENKO AS TELLING HIM HE ACCEPTED THE IDEA OF A SUMMIT
MEETING WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN, BUT CHERNENKO DID NOT REFER TO A
SUMMIT IN HIS STATEMENT TODAY.

HE REPEATED THE SOVIET VIEW THAT "LEADERS OF CERTAIN STATES"
WERE DETERMINED TO ACHIEVE MILITARY SUPERIORITY, WHICH MOSCOW
WOULD NEVER ALLOW.

WESTERN MILITARY EXPERTS BELIEVE THE SOVIET UNION IS RELUCTANT
TO BE DRAWN INTO A NEW ARMS RACE IN WHICH IT WOULD HAVE
DIFFICULTY COMPETING WITH THE UNITED STATES FINANCIALLY AND
TECHNOLOGICALLY.

CHERNENKO SAID THE SOVIET UNION WANTED TO COOPERATE WITH THOSE
WHO BELIEVED IN DETENTE RATHER THAN IN "NEW STAGES OF NUCLEAR
COMPETITION."

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

MATLOCK



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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PARM, UR, US
SUBJECT: KORNIYENKO ON GENEVA

EXDIS

1. ~~(C~~ - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. SUMMARY--IN A RECENT MEETING WITH A WESTERN
AMBASSADOR, FIRST DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER
KORNIYENKO PROVIDED THE MOST AUTHORITATIVE SOVIET
STATEMENT THUS FAR ON MOSCOW'S VIEW OF THE
GENEVA MEETING. KORNIYENKO UNDERSCORED SOVIET
DETERMINATION THAT THE MEETING DEAL WITH SUBSTANCE
AND NOT BE LIMITED TO DISCUSSION OF PROCEDURES
FOR CONTINUING THE ARMS CONTROL DIALOGUE.
HE REJECTED THE IDEA THAT THE 1985 EXPIRATION

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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EXD
DIS

OF THE UNRATIFIED SALT II TREATY JUSTIFIES GIVING PRIORITY TO NEGOTIATION OF A NEW AGREEMENT ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS. ASSERTING THAT ALL MAJOR ISSUES MUST BE ADDRESSED TOGETHER, KORNIYENKO STATED THAT THERE COULD BE NO AGREEMENT ON OFFENSIVE ARMS WITHOUT AGREEMENTS ON THE OTHER MAJOR COMPONENTS OF THE ARMS CONTROL AGENDA. END SUMMARY.

EXD
DIS

3. FRENCH AMBASSADOR ARNAUD (STRICTLY PROTECT) HAS BRIEFED THE AMBASSADOR ON A DECEMBER 3 MEETING BETWEEN ARNAUD AND FIRST DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER KORNIYENKO. ARNAUD SAID THAT HE ENTERED THE MEETING INTENDING TO PRESS KORNIYENKO HARD ON THE SOVIET APPROACH TO THE UPCOMING MEETING BETWEEN GROMYKO AND SECRETARY SHULTZ.

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5. WHEN ARNAUD RAISED THE POSSIBILITY OF NEGOTIATING OUTER SPACE CBMS, KORNIYENKO RESPONDED THAT SUCH STEPS IN THEMSELVES WOULD NOT BE ADEQUATE. THE SOVIET SIDE

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WOULD INSIST ON SUBSTANTIVE AGREEMENTS OF THE KIND THAT MIGHT INVOLVE THE "CONTROL OR BANNING" OF TESTS OF OUTER SPACE WEAPONS. KORNIYENKO DID NOT EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY THAT CBMS MIGHT PLAY A ROLE AS AN ELEMENT IN SUCH AN OVERALL APPROACH TO OUTER SPACE ARMS CONTROL.

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8. WHEN ASKED WHETHER THE SOVIET SIDE DID NOT SEE SOME MERIT IN PRESIDENT REAGAN'S PROPOSAL FOR AN EXCHANGE OF OBSERVERS AT NUCLEAR WEAPONS TEST SITES, KORNIYENKO

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REPLIED THAT THIS WAS "TOTALLY UNNECESSARY." AGREEMENTS
LIMITING NUCLEAR TESTING COULD BE ADEQUATELY VERIFIED
WITH NTM ALONE, KORNIYENKO ASSERTED.

9. ARNAUD SUGGESTED THAT THE US HAD MADE A "GENEROUS"
OFFER TO SHARE TECHNOLOGY THAT MIGHT BE DEVELOPED UNDER
SDI. KORNIYENKO SAID THERE WAS NO NEED TO BE GENEROUS
BECAUSE THERE WAS IN FACT NO NEED FOR SDI AT ALL.

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E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PARM, UR, US
SUBJECT: KORNIYENKO ON GENEVA

ARNAUD NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT KORNIYENKO DID NOT CLAIM THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS NOT INTERESTED IN ACCESS TO SDI TECHNOLOGY.

10. COMMENT: KORNIYENKO'S STATEMENTS ARE THE MOST AUTHORITATIVE OFFICIAL STATEMENT THUS FAR ON MOSCOW'S OBJECTIVES FOR THE GENEVA MEETING AND BEYOND. HIS ASSERTION THAT THE GENEVA MEETING MUST DEAL WITH SUBSTANCE AND HIS COOLNESS TOWARD THE NOTION OF A SPECIAL NEGOTIATOR SUGGEST THAT GROMYKO WILL RESIST EFFORTS TO KEEP THE FOCUS OF THE JANUARY MEETING ON PROCEDURES FOR CARRYING THE ARMS CONTROL DIALOGUE FORWARD. IF KORNIYENKO'S VIEWS ARE AN ACCURATE GUIDE TO HIS MINISTER'S

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THINKING, GROMYKO IS LIKELY TO PUSH FROM THE OUTSET FOR US AGREEMENT TO SUCH BROAD SUBSTANTIVE CONCEPTS AS "ORGANIC LINKAGE" BETWEEN AN AGREEMENT OF OFFENSIVE ARMS AND AGREEMENTS ON OUTER SPACE WEAPONS. IN THIS CONNECTION, KORNIYENKO'S ASSERTION THAT THERE CAN BE NO AGREEMENT ON STRATEGIC WEAPONS WITHOUT AGREEMENTS IN THE OTHER MAJOR ARMS CONTROL AREAS (PRESUMABLY INF AND SPACE WEAPONS) STRIKES US AS PARTICULARLY NOTEWORTHY.

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E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
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SUBJECT: KORNIYENKO ON GENEVA

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. SUMMARY--IN A RECENT MEETING WITH A WESTERN AMBASSADOR, FIRST DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER KORNIYENKO PROVIDED THE MOST AUTHORITATIVE SOVIET STATEMENT THUS FAR ON MOSCOW'S VIEW OF THE GENEVA MEETING. KORNIYENKO UNDERScoreD SOVIET DETERMINATION THAT THE MEETING DEAL WITH SUBSTANCE AND NOT BE LIMITED TO DISCUSSION OF PROCEDURES FOR CONTINUING THE ARMS CONTROL DIALOGUE. HE REJECTED THE IDEA THAT THE 1985 EXPIRATION OF THE UNRATIFIED SALT II TREATY JUSTIFIES GIVING PRIORITY TO NEGOTIATION OF A NEW AGREEMENT ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS. ASSERTING THAT ALL MAJOR ISSUES MUST BE ADDRESSSED TOGETHER, KORNIYENKO STATED THAT THERE COULD BE NO AGREEMENT ON OFFENSIVE ARMS WITHOUT AGREEMENTS ON THE OTHER MAJOR COMPONENTS OF THE ARMS CONTROL AGENDA. END SUMMARY.

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3. FRENCH AMBASSADOR ARNAUD (STRICTLY PROTECT) HAS BRIEFED THE AMBASSADOR ON A DECEMBER 3 MEETING BETWEEN ARNAUD AND FIRST DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER KORNIYENKO. ARNAUD SAID THAT HE ENTERED THE MEETING INTENDING TO PRESS KORNIYENKO HARD ON THE SOVIET APPROACH TO THE UPCOMING MEETING BETWEEN GROMYKO AND SECRETARY SHULTZ.

4. ARNAUD BEGAN BY STATING THAT THE SOVIET DECISION TO ENTER NEGOTIATIONS WAS A MAJOR MOVE AND A CHANGE FROM THE PREVIOUS SOVIET POSITION THAT TALKS COULD NOT BE RESUMED AS LONG AS US INF REMAINED IN WESTERN EUROPE. KORNIYENKO REPLIED THAT THIS WAS AN OVERSTATEMENT; NEITHER SIDE HAD YET MADE ANY CHANGES IN THEIR ESTABLISHED POSITIONS. KORNIYENKO CONTINUED THAT TALKS WOULD RESUME BECAUSE THE US HAD AGREED WITH THE LONG-HELD SOVIET VIEW THAT THERE WERE "ORGANIC LINKS" BETWEEN STRATEGIC ARMS, INF, AND SPACE WEAPONS. IN RESPONSE TO ARNAUD'S QUESTIONS, KORNIYENKO STATED THAT NEITHER

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NUCLEAR TESTING NOR CHERNENKO'S PROPOSAL FOR A CODE OF CONDUCT AMONG NUCLEAR STATES WOULD BE ON THE SOVIET AGENDA FOR GENEVA.

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MEMORANDUM

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

12/17

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Jack Matlock ✓
Ron Lehman

FROM: ROBERT M. KIMMITT

SUBJECT: Secretary Shultz's Evening Report of: 72/6/84

The following excerpt is for your information only. Please do not refer to it in any discussions.

1. Soviet Comment on Geneva Talks. Bill Beecher of the Boston Globe briefed us on comments by an unnamed Soviet-bloc diplomat (Beecher tells us that it was not Dobrynin) evidently intended to suggest an extraordinarily forthcoming Soviet position at my January meeting with Gromyko. According to Beecher, the diplomat said the Soviets would: (a) agree to limited on-site inspection underground nuclear tests if the US agreed to ratify the TTBT and PNET (if so, this would be a 180-degree turnabout, and a positive response to your UNGA proposal, but requiring a firmer commitment on ratification); (b) propose "modest, phased" reductions in nuclear forces over the next 5-10 years, with INF merged into START (the Soviets, however, are still not prepared for deep cuts in land-based missiles, according to the source); (c) agree to continued discussions between special high-level envoys if the Geneva meeting does not produce final agreement on the structure of new negotiations (until now, the Soviets have been cool to the idea of special negotiators). The diplomat, predictably, said the Soviets wanted agreement that negotiations on space weapons would cover the SDI as well as ASAT, but said the Soviets did not foreclose the possibility of deploying defensive systems to protect missile silos (a shift from previous insistence on blanket "demilitarization" of space). The Soviet-bloc diplomat explains this alleged new Soviet flexibility by pointing to your reelection, the conclusion reached in Moscow that you are sincere in wanting new arms agreements, and Chernenko's improved health and political standing. We will see tomorrow whether Dobrynin takes a similarly upbeat stance in his meeting with me. (S)

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SOVIET UNION:
DEVELOPMENTS DURING WEEK OF 12-18 DECEMBER
(Highlights from Cable Reporting)

HIGHLIGHTS

o [REDACTED]

o Embassy Moscow reports that Congressman Gore was extremely effective in conveying the American perspective arms control to his Soviet interlocutors. The Soviets told Gore that the Soviet Union "will not be found wanting if the U.S. is serious" in reaching an arms agreement. (C)
(Embassy Moscow 120950 Dec)

U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS

o [REDACTED]

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
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- o Remarks by Soviet participants at a task force meeting on Arms control in early Dec 1984 suggest that the Soviets are prepared to be more flexible than in the past and that they regard the Shultz-Gromyko talks in January 1985 as a major turning point in U.S.-Soviet relations. At the Dartmouth Conference, Arbatov said that the Soviets are prepared to negotiate a full range of arms control issues and that space weapons are a major and continuing Soviet concern. (S) (State 06053 Dec)
- o General Mil'shteyn, Chief Military Analyst at IUSAC said at the Dartmouth Conference that symbolic measures such as signing the threshold ban treaty would break the deadlock between the two sides . Arbatov corrected him saying that time for symbolism is past and more substantive steps are needed. (S) (State 060530)
- o Mrs. Shcharanskiy met with Under Secretary Armacost on Dec 10 to discuss her husband's situation and request new actions by the U.S. She wants us to pressure the Soviets to release Shcharanskiy before the Shultz-Gromyko meeting. (S) (State 150740 Dec)
- o A Soviet defector entered the Soviet Embassy in Washington D.C. last week and requested assistance in returning to the Soviet Union. The Soviets plan to grant his request. 1-7 (S)(SecState 140303 Dec)

INTERNATIONAL & MILITARY ISSUES



- o In their first comment on the Kuwaiti hijacking, the Soviets referred to the hijackers as "pirates". They also mentioned that the passengers had been freed and added

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that "none had been harmed". (C) (Embassy Moscow 121459 Dec)

- o Soviet agreements with Czechoslovakia and East Germany indicate that Moscow will maintain oil deliveries to its East European allies ~~in 1985 at this year's level.~~ (C)

- o [REDACTED]

- o [REDACTED]

- o The recent expulsion of the second ranking Soviet diplomat underscores the decline in bilateral relations between Burkina and the USSR because of Soviet meddling and resentment of Moscow's tightfisted aid policy. (S)

- o [REDACTED]

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ECONOMIC ISSUES

- o The USSR is close to signing its largest industrial trade deal with Sweden. The deal includes purchase of plants for explosives production and licensing of technology. (C)

[REDACTED]

- o The editor of Voprosy Istorii has retracted an article that suggested increased private enterprise could overcome existing bottlenecks in the Soviet economy. (C)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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Prepared by: Douglas Doan x6919

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Top Soviet Aide Talks of Arms Cuts

By **LESLIE H. GELB**

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Dec. 13 — Mikhail S. Gorbachev, who is widely regarded as second-in-command in the Soviet Union, had his first substantive conversation with Americans two weeks ago and told them that Moscow was ready for reciprocal cuts in military spending with the United States.

President Reagan spoke of the possibility of such mutual budget reductions in a speech to the United Nations in September.

Mr. Gorbachev met in a Kremlin conference room Dec. 3 with Dwayne O. Andreas, the American chairman of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Trade and Economic Council, and James H. Giffen, president of the council. The council, which has Soviet and United States co-chairmen, was established in 1973 by the two Governments to make trade easier. Its members include 220 American companies and 125 Soviet foreign trade concerns.

Mr. Andreas, chairman of the Archer-Daniels-Midland Company, a food processor, and Mr. Giffen, former vice president of Armco, a steel company, provided one of the first direct accounts of the personality and interests of Mr. Gorbachev, who is generally believed to be heir-apparent to the Soviet leader and general secretary of the Communist Party, Konstantin U. Chernenko, who is 73 years old.

Mr. Gorbachev has been described by a high Soviet official as the "second general secretary," a post that does not formally exist.

Well-Informed About U.S.

The two Americans described Mr. Gorbachev as free from dogma, pragmatic, gentlemanly, with a good sense of humor, and especially well-informed about American politics and foreign policy.

They said that Mr. Gorbachev was up-to-date on the new personalities and power struggles in the United States Congress, and that he asked how the Soviet Union could make a better impression on American conservatives.

Mr. Gorbachev is to visit Britain this weekend with a Soviet parliamentary delegation. Administration officials said there was interest in the Congress for extending a similar invitation to the United States this year.

Mr. Andreas also met with Prime Minister Nikolai A. Tikhonov, and Nikolai S. Patolichev, the Minister of Foreign Trade. Mr. Andreas quoted Mr. Patolichev as saying, "I have a shopping list of \$15 billion in equipment, if we could spend less money" on military items.

Mr. Gorbachev, who has held special responsibilities in the Politburo for agriculture and the economy, is said to be about 5 feet 9 inches tall, balding and lively. At 53, he is the youngest member of the Politburo and the only one trained as a lawyer and agronomist.

Mr. Andreas said he felt that Mr. Gorbachev understood English.

Canadians who were hosts to Mr. Gorbachev last year offered similar assessments of the Russian, State Department officials said.

Mr. Andreas said Mr. Gorbachev said American foreign policy was better when it was "bipartisan," and asked if the two political parties were more likely to get along now.

The overall message from Soviet leaders with whom the two Americans had talks was that Moscow hears Mr. Reagan's statements about making arms control accord his top priority and is willing to go along with a new negotiating effort — but that the Russians remain skeptical and still think the new effort might be a political trick.

'Far-Reaching Proposals'

The Soviet officials all said their Government was ready for "far-reaching proposals, provided they were good for both sides," according to Mr. Andreas. They did not provide specifics except to say they were prepared for mutual military budget cuts.

The bulk of the conversations with Mr. Gorbachev and the others dealt with economics. Mr. Andreas quoted Mr. Gorbachev as saying, "We're in the process of preparing our new five-year plan, and if we're going to trade with the United States, we should get on with it."

Two-way trade last year had a total cost of \$2.343.1 billion. United States exports totaled \$2.002 billion, including \$1.7 billion in agricultural exports. Trade figures are larger on both sides for the first quarter of this year.

Mr. Giffen and Mr. Andreas said they gave Soviet officials a list of 15 areas — including textiles, pulp and

paper, energy, pollution control and agribusiness — where trade could be expanded. They noted that Pravda, the Communist Party newspaper, published an account of a Politburo meeting last week indicating acceptance in principle of further trade discussions.

How Everything Is Related

In Mr. Andreas's view, the Soviet Union has an economy big and strong enough that it does not need trade with the United States, "but they feel they'd like to be a first-class citizen and that means doing business with us."

In the Soviet view, according to Mr. Andreas, economics cannot be separated from the rest of Soviet-American relations, and for economic relations to prosper, the relationship must grow across the board. "They feel it is all one body," he said.

He also revealed that the Russians intend to hold a technology fair in the United States in 1986 because they feel "we underestimate them technologically."

Mr. Gorbachev met last year with John Chrystal, a banker from Coon Rapids, Iowa, in what State Department officials described as largely a courtesy call. Mr. Chrystal is a relative of Roswell Garst, the Iowa farmer and agribusinessman who was host to the Soviet leader Nikita S. Khrushchev in 1958.

→ Jack Matlock
FYI
Steve