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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
6396	REPORT	ANALYSIS REPORT RE MOSCOW PROJECTS UNYIELDING STANCE IN REPORTING GROMYKO VISIT [1-8] <b>R 3/3/2011 F2006-114/1</b>	8	10/5/1984	B1
6403	CABLE	092031Z OCT 84 [9] <b>D 3/3/2011 F2006-114/1</b>	1	10/9/1984	B1 B3
6397	CABLE	090724Z OCT 84 [10] <b>PAR 7/10/2008 F06-114/1; UPHELD M09-266 #6397 2/28/2017</b>	1	10/8/1984	B1 B2 B3
6398	REPORT	REPORT/ANALYSIS SOVIET COMMENTATORS RAISE POSSIBILITY OF ALTERED U.S. COURSE [11-12] <b>R 3/3/2011 F2006-114/1</b>	2	10/11/1984	B1
6399	REPORT	REPORT/ANALYSIS USSR TREATMENT OF THE U.S. ELECTION CAMPAIGN [13-25] <b>R 3/3/2011 F2006-114/1</b>	13	10/12/1984	B1
6402	REPORT	REPORT/ANALYSIS TASS NEW ANALYST REVIEWS USSR POSITION ON SUMMIT TALKS [26-29] <b>R 3/3/2011 F2006-114/1</b>	4	10/12/1984	B1
6400	CABLE	121607Z OCT 84 [32-33] <b>R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1</b>	2	10/12/1984	B1

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6405	CABLE	251449Z OCT 84 [52-53] <b>D 3/3/2011 F2006-114/1</b>	2	10/25/1984	B1 B3
6406	CABLE	011836Z NOV 84 [56-58] <b>D 3/3/2011 F2006-114/1</b>	3	11/1/1984	B1 B3

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5 OCTOBER 1984  
FB 84-10061

# Analysis Report

Moscow Projects Unyielding Stance in Reporting Gromyko Visit

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Foreign Broadcast Information Service

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NLRR F06-114/1 #6396

BY RW NARA DATE 3/3/11





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## MOSCOW PROJECTS UNYIELDING STANCE IN REPORTING GROMYKO VISIT

Soviet reports on Foreign Minister Gromyko's talks with U.S. officials indicated Moscow's willingness to hold further bilateral consultations, but Moscow media coverage during and after Gromyko's trip provided no hint of substantial change in the Soviet posture toward relations with the United States. Gromyko's address to the UN General Assembly on the eve of his conversation with President Reagan laid out a strategy of calculated inflexibility in dealing with the Reagan Administration.

## REPORTS ON TALKS

The tone of the TASS reports on the initial meetings with U.S. officials--with Secretary Shultz on the 26th and President Reagan on the 28th--was highly critical, in keeping with the language of Soviet reporting on the most recent previous high-level bilateral talks. By contrast, the tone of the TASS account of the final meeting between Gromyko and Secretary Shultz on the 29th was nonpolemical, approaching the more typically neutral language historically used in Soviet reporting on such meetings.<sup>1</sup> Such Soviet reports on meetings with foreign leaders bear all the earmarks of authoritative statements. They are handled by Soviet media in a fashion similar to that accorded statements by the leaders themselves. All of the TASS reports on Gromyko's meetings with U.S. officials were published in Soviet central newspapers, read on the nightly newscast on Soviet television, and widely publicized by Moscow radio's foreign and domestic services.

The most positive Soviet comment on Gromyko's consultations with Administration officials--and a suggestion of some satisfaction with the course they had taken--was TASS' nonpolemical assessment of his final meeting in Washington on 29 September with Secretary Shultz. According to the authorized TASS report on the meeting, they "exchanged opinions" about a number of international issues, touched on "some aspects" of bilateral

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<sup>1</sup>TASS reports on Gromyko-Shultz meetings in Stockholm last January and in Madrid in September 1983 were as critical as the accounts of Gromyko's meetings on the 26th and 28th. By contrast, the TASS account of a meeting between the two officials in October 1982, at the time of the opening of the UN General Assembly, had been complimentary, describing the talks as "businesslike and detailed."

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relations, and agreed to arrange future U.S.-Soviet consultations "if the need should arise." TASS did not characterize the atmosphere of this meeting or of any other meetings between Gromyko and U.S. participants.

Official Soviet reports on Gromyko's 28 September discussion with President Reagan and his 26 September meeting with Secretary Shultz were much harsher. According to TASS's account of the meeting on the 28th, Gromyko described U.S. policy as leading to "a dangerous heightening of international tension" and directed toward the achievement of military superiority. After meeting with the President, the Soviet foreign minister, in a statement to the press reported by TASS, asserted that their conversation had not convinced him of any "practical positive changes" in U.S. foreign policy or of any readiness by the Administration to take "a realistic stand" on issues which must be resolved to improve bilateral relations. Gromyko took note of the President's support for more frequent meetings between the two sides, but claimed that conditions for successful talks, including "the necessary content of the talks" and "constructive goals," were absent. He concluded that the Soviet Union would continue to judge the "true intentions" of Washington by its "practical deeds."

The 26 September TASS report on Gromyko's first meeting with Shultz was similarly critical of U.S. policy. According to TASS, Gromyko asserted that U.S. policy had "seriously undermined" bilateral relations and prevented talks on any "problems of decisive importance" for peace. TASS claimed that Secretary Shultz set forth "known" U.S. positions that did not indicate "any positive changes" in U.S. policy.

Moscow's harsh treatment of the Administration also was reflected in the TASS account of Gromyko's meeting with Democratic presidential candidate Mondale on 27 September. TASS reported that Gromyko blamed Washington for the "disruption" of most arms control negotiations and criticized the Administration for "pressing ahead with the arms race" and making "preparations for war." Unlike its terse dismissal of Secretary Shultz's remarks at the meeting the day before, the report said Vice President Mondale expressed the conviction that improved U.S.-Soviet relations are "important and possible in principle." TASS cautiously praised "some ideas" presented by the Democratic candidate, saying that if they "materialized" in U.S. policy, they would "open up certain possibilities" for arms control agreements.

#### GROMYKO'S UN SPEECH

Gromyko attacked a broad range of U.S. policies in his 27 September address to the UN General Assembly and, in a message apparently designed for the longer term as well as for his meetings in Washington, suggested that Moscow would respond to any change in U.S. policy but would make no concessions in order to improve ties. Using an unusual formulation indicating Politburo concurrence, Gromyko declared that the Soviet delegation "is authorized to state" that the USSR will follow the same policy course "aimed at peace" in the future as it has in the past. He



offered no indication that Moscow might be willing to alter its positions on any of the major arms control issues or that it would consider trading concessions in one set of negotiations for gains in another:

- Space Weaponry Gromyko continued to give the highest priority to banning space weaponry. He asserted that the USSR continues to favor starting bilateral talks on limiting space weaponry "as early as possible," and he again charged the United States with "full responsibility" for the failure to convene the talks as proposed by the USSR in June. While not mentioning the Soviet demand for a moratorium on testing, he expressed "hope" that the United States would "refrain from actions which would make irreversible" a space arms race and would be willing to engage in talks "with a view to reaching an agreement."
- START and INF Despite his assertion that Moscow is "insisting" on "serious talks" on strategic and intermediate-range nuclear weapons, Gromyko offered no hint of Soviet willingness to resume the START and INF talks. He asserted without elaboration that Moscow's "proposals" on the "limitation and reduction" of strategic arms and on the "limitation" of medium-range missiles in Europe "remain valid," and he reiterated the demand that the United States "remove the obstacles it has put up in the way" of talks before negotiations can resume. Last March Chernenko defined these "obstacles" as the U.S. missile deployments in West Europe. In the absence of further Kremlin statements on the subject, that definition appears to be implicit in Gromyko's remarks.
- Stockholm Conference Outlining Moscow's position at the Stockholm Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE), Gromyko repeated standard Soviet proposals and conveyed no suggestion that Moscow might be willing to water down its opposition to the "military and technical" confidence-building measures (CBMs) demanded by NATO in exchange for Western assent to the declaratory statements on nonuse of force and no-first-use of nuclear weapons favored by the USSR. Gromyko described the CBMs proposed by NATO as a "program of poorly disguised espionage." He repeated Moscow's complaint that they are unbalanced, noting that they do not affect "a single inch of U.S. territory."
- MBFR Gromyko's brief remarks on the MBFR talks reiterated Soviet objections to NATO's April 1984 proposals, attacking the call for exchange of data on combat forces and saying that NATO had evaded the armaments reduction issue. Without consideration of the armaments question, Gromyko said, there can be "no real strengthening of security and stability on the European continent."
- Chemical Weapons Talks In his comments on the chemical weapons issue, Gromyko pointed to the USSR's 1982 proposal for a draft convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons as a "well-balanced" model for agreement. He ignored the U.S. chemical weapons treaty proposal, presented to the Geneva Disarmament Conference by Vice President Bush last April. Instead, he alluded critically to the U. S. position on



the issue by condemning "some states" for allegedly feigning interest in an agreement as a means of "concealing their plans for a chemical weapons buildup."

Gromyko coupled this reiteration of Soviet positions with a wide-ranging attack on current U.S. policies, focusing on alleged militarism and interference in the internal affairs of other states. He accused U.S. officials "at the highest official levels" of claiming the "right" to unleash a nuclear war and charged that the "central objective" of U.S. policy is to secure "military superiority." In presenting a proposed resolution on "The Inadmissibility of the Policy of State Terrorism," Gromyko left no doubt that its primary target is the United States. He claimed that some states are guilty of "flagrant violations of international law" because they "do not like the social system in some state or other" and charged that the current U.S. Administration has "no scruples about declaring legitimate any criminal ways and means if these can serve the desired ends." He concluded that "those who determine U.S. policy today" will have to do "a lot" before the "words and obligations" they assume can be trusted and that "concrete deeds rather than verbal assurances" are necessary.

Although Gromyko insisted that the USSR favors "normal relations" with the United States and recalled better days both during World War II and during the 1970's, he did so primarily in order to insist that such improvement could come only if Washington changed its policies. His assertion that there are "realistically minded politicians and statesmen" in the West seemed designed to suggest that the Soviet Union would seek to cultivate these officials rather than to raise the possibility that he saw forces for improved U.S.-Soviet ties emerging within the Administration.

#### MEDIA TREATMENT

Other Soviet statements on the high-level U.S.-Soviet meetings have reinforced the impression that Moscow is not anxious to portray an improved climate for bilateral relations. The 4 October authoritative report on the weekly Politburo meeting, in an unusually strong expression of approval, applauded Gromyko's "great work" during his trip and said that the Soviet side had displayed a readiness for "serious, business-like dialogue" with Washington. But, it added, "it must be said" that the wide-ranging exchange of views "revealed no signs that would attest to the real intentions of the American side to adjust its policy course toward realism and peace."

This pessimistic view was restated in a 4 October TASS report on a press conference held at the Foreign Ministry later the same day by press spokesman Vladimir Lomeyko. Lomeyko, according to TASS, characterized the talks as "important and useful" and acknowledged that the "American Administration" had "on several occasions" expressed concern over the arms race in space. But, paraphrasing Gromyko's press statement after

his meeting with President Reagan, Lomeyko asserted that the Soviet Union could not see "practical, positive changes" in Administration policy or a desire to start negotiations "with a view to reaching an accord." Neither the account of the Politburo meeting nor the report on the press conference acknowledged that any agreement had been reached on arranging future U.S.-Soviet consultations.

Soviet media thus far have carried little followup commentary on the meetings, confining themselves primarily to summaries of the authoritative reports. The only hint of a more positive portrayal of Administration motives in seeking dialogue with Moscow came in a 1 October domestic radio commentary by Central Committee official Nikolay Shishlin. Shishlin said that "one does not wish to attribute" these meetings "merely to election motives" even though these motives exist "in force" in Washington.

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B1, B2, B3

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PAGE #1  
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[REDACTED] TO HELP REIN-  
FORCE [REDACTED] POSITION ON AIRCRAFT CARRIERS, [REDACTED] TOLD [REDACTED]  
A JOKE ABOUT AIRCRAFT CARRIERS (DESPITE NUMEROUS NAMES,  
THERE ARE REALLY ONLY TWO BASIC TYPES OF BOATS: SUBMARINES  
AND TARGETS). [REDACTED] LOVED IT.  
(CNF) [REDACTED] ALSO [REDACTED] GOVERNMENT'S  
DECISION NOT TO SEND CSCE OBSERVERS TO THE FALL EXERCISES  
IN THE FRG. [REDACTED] BELIEVES OBSERVERS PLAY A SIGNIFICANT  
ROLE IN THE CONFIDENCE BUILDING EFFORTS BETWEEN NATO AND  
THE WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES. [REDACTED] EXPECTED AN OBSERVER  
WOULD BE ALLOWED TO ATTEND UNTIL THE OTHER CSCE OBSERVERS  
DEPARTED FOR THE EXERCISES.

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DE RUFHOLA #7765 2830727  
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
COUNTRY: ~~NY~~ FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY (GE)/USSR (UR)  
SUBJ: [REDACTED] US-SOVIET  
RELATIONS TO IMPROVE (U)  
WARNING: THIS IS AN INFO REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED  
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DOI: ~~NY~~ 841002

SUMMARY: (CNF) [REDACTED] US-SOVIET  
RELATIONS WOULD BE IMPROVING SOON. THE SOVIETS EXPECTED  
PRESIDENT REAGAN TO BE REELECTED. ALSO, [REDACTED] CRITICIZED  
[REDACTED] GOVERNMENT FOR CONTRIBUTING TO THE ARMS RACE - BUILDING  
UNNECESSARY WEAPONS LIKE A LARGE AIRCRAFT CARRIER.  
[REDACTED] DISAPPOINTED THAT THE SOVIETS DID NOT  
SEND CSCE OBSERVERS TO VIEW NATO'S FALL EXERCISES.

TEXT:

[REDACTED] US-SOVIET RELATIONS HAVE BOTTOMED  
OUT AND WILL BE IMPROVING SHORTLY. [REDACTED] RESPECTS PRESIDENT  
REAGAN, AND SAID IT WAS UNFORTUNATE THAT THE SENIOR SOVIET  
LEADERS HAVE BEEN ILL. [REDACTED] GOVERNMENT  
WAS ONE HUNDRED PERCENT SURE THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN WOULD  
BE REELECTED. [REDACTED] REGARDS THE RECENT REAGAN-  
GROMYKO MEETING AS AN OPEN SIGN THAT THE SOVIETS ARE  
PREPARED TO DO BUSINESS WITH THE PRESIDENT DURING THE  
NEXT TERM.

(CNF) [REDACTED] OF THE SOVIET ARMAMENT  
POLICY. [REDACTED] LITTLE USE FOR ARMAMENT PLANNERS.  
[REDACTED] NOT UNDERSTAND OR ACCEPT SOVIET NEED FOR A LARGE  
US TYPE AIRCRAFT CARRIER. [REDACTED] THE SOVIETS SIMPLY  
WERE PRODUCING THEM BECAUSE THE US HAD LARGE CARRIERS.  
[REDACTED] ALTHOUGH THE US MAY NEED LARGE CARRIERS, THE  
SOVIETS DO NOT. [REDACTED] THE SOVIETS WANT A  
LARGE CARRIER FOR PRESTIGE FACTORS, NOT TO MEET STRATEGIC  
REQUIREMENTS. [REDACTED] GOVERNMENT WILL TRY



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## USSR-U.S.

## Soviet Commentators Raise Possibility of Altered U.S. Course

*Although Moscow's general hardline assessment of Administration intentions remains unchanged in the wake of Foreign Minister Gromyko's late September meetings with President Reagan and Secretary Shultz, two prominent Soviet commentators have hinted that Moscow may be slightly more hopeful about the future course of Reagan Administration policy.*

Moscow tentatively signaled its expectation of increased bilateral dialogue with Washington at the conclusion of Gromyko's late September talks in Washington.<sup>1</sup> At that time, TASS reported that the sides would meet by mutual agreement in the future "if the need should arise." The widely publicized TASS report on the 4 October weekly Politburo meeting, published in *Pravda* on 5 October, made no mention of any agreement on future U.S.-Soviet meetings, but CPSU Central Committee International Department deputy head Vadim Zagladin, speaking on the 6 October broadcast of Soviet television's "Studio 9" program, confirmed that such an agreement "in fact exists." Zagladin indicated that Moscow had consented to future meetings in the hope that such diplomatic contacts "will yield something."

Since Gromyko's visit to Washington, two of Moscow's more prominent commentators have retreated from the Soviet practice in recent months of dismissing all Administration statements of intent to work to improve bilateral relations as mere election rhetoric. Instead, in recent commentaries they have cautiously stated that other, more hopeful motivations may also be involved:

- Central Committee consultant Nikolay Shishlin, in a 1 October domestic radio commentary, asserted that "one does not wish to attribute these high-level Soviet-American contacts merely to election motives" even if there is "little new" in the Administration's foreign policy position.

<sup>1</sup> For an assessment of Moscow's initial treatment of Gromyko's meetings in Washington, see FBIS *Analysis Report* FB 84-10061 of 5 October 1984, "Moscow Projects Tough Stance in Reporting Gromyko Visit."

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- In more extensive remarks on the 6 October "Studio 9" program, Soviet television's senior political observer Valentin Zorin portrayed the Administration as considering an alteration of its course because of failures of U.S. foreign policy during the past four years. Although electoral considerations play "no small role" in the Administration's "campaign of peaceful rhetoric," he asserted, "there is some grain of reason" to talk about the inclination of "some circles" in Washington to draw conclusions from the failures of the past term. "However thickheaded the leaders in Washington's influential circles are," he concluded, "they ponder those failures somewhat and think about what to do to make the next term less unsuccessful, or more productive."

Zorin's current statements contrast with his own assertion in a previous "Studio 9" program last June, when he declared that "nothing will remain" of President Reagan's "peace-loving statements" if he is reelected, and with the general tenor of a 4 October article by *Izvestiya* political observer Valentin Falin which cited Western press commentary to predict that the President's "moderation" will not be "backed up by action" after the election.

**Background** Commentaries by well-connected specialists such as Shishlin and Zorin have in the past signaled changing Soviet perceptions of Administration policies. For example, in the fall of 1981, when U.S. officials began to move toward opening INF negotiations, Shishlin was the first such foreign affairs official to contend that a change for the better was under way in Washington. (U/FOUO)

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12 OCTOBER 1984  
FB M 84-10063

See p 8

File

# Special Memorandum

Soviet Treatment of the U.S. Election Campaign

(15 SEPTEMBER - 12 OCTOBER 1984)

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Soviet Treatment of the U.S. Election Campaign

(15 September - 12 October 1984)

Introduction

Soviet media have begun preparing their audiences to expect reelection of President Reagan in November. Commentators have cited U.S. public opinion polls indicating the President's strength and have directly addressed the prospects for Soviet-U.S. relations during a second Reagan term.

Leadership Statements

Although Soviet leaders have continued to avoid direct comment on the election campaign, their statements and actions have demonstrated their sensitivity to electoral considerations. Such calculations were particularly evident during Foreign Minister Gromyko's September visit to the United States, when he balanced his meeting with President Reagan by a meeting with Vice President Mondale.<sup>1</sup>

Despite its increasingly evident expectation that the President will be reelected, Moscow has continued to convey its preference for Vice President Mondale, most obviously in the official TASS report of his conversation with Gromyko. The report indicated that Gromyko had blamed Washington for the "disruption" of most arms control negotiations and had criticized the Administration for "pressing ahead with the arms race" and making "preparations for war." By contrast, TASS cautiously praised "some ideas" presented by Vice President Mondale, saying that if they "materialized" in U.S. policy, they would "open up certain possibilities for arms control agreements."

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<sup>1</sup>For an analysis of Soviet treatment of Gromyko's trip, see the FBIS Analysis Report FB 84-10061 of 5 October 1984, "Moscow Projects Tough Stance in Reporting Gromyko Visit."

*This is the third in a series of monthly reports by the FBIS Analysis Group on "Soviet Treatment of the U.S. Election Campaign." The first, FB M 84-10053, was published on 10 August 1984; the second, FB M 84-10058, was published on 14 September 1984.*

Media Commentary

Soviet media appear to be adjusting their line in anticipation of a victory for the President. Commentators have begun to call attention to U.S. polls showing a large lead for the President. A CPSU Central Committee official, for example, claimed that "many people" are saying "something very serious" would have to occur for President Reagan to lose the election. Commentaries that have reported Western media judgments that Mondale won the 7 October debate with President Reagan have also cited observations to the effect that the debate will not necessarily influence the election outcome.

Moscow's judgment about the President's political strength also appears to have led some Soviet commentators to suggest the possibility that there may be an improvement in relations with the United States regardless of the election outcome. While most commentaries following Gromyko's meetings with U.S. officials have claimed that there has been no fundamental change in the Administration's foreign policy as yet, some have begun to speculate about factors which might force some modification in the Administration's approach to the Soviet Union in the long run. In the 6 October edition of Soviet television's prestigious monthly international affairs program "Studio 9," host Valentin Zorin offered two alternative explanations for the President's "peaceful rhetoric." He said some Western journalists attributed President Reagan's recent statements favoring improved U.S.-Soviet relations entirely to electoral considerations, implying that a reversal of posture is likely after the election, while others believed the President's statements were based on more enduring factors. Other Soviet commentators have been more pessimistic. For example, political observer Valentin Falin, in a 4 October IZVESTIYA article, cited a Western journalist to suggest that recent statements by the President are merely "an election posture which will not be backed by action" after 6 November.



Selected Soviet Commentary

Assessments of President Reagan and Vice President Bush

Valentin Zorin, Soviet television political observer (Soviet television, 21 Sep 84)

The Republican candidates are exploiting for their own ends a campaign of nationalistic chauvinistic hysteria which has been building up for a long time. Avoiding discussion of the acute and burning questions of U.S. society, they appeal to the basest feelings of the man in the street. . . .

An important factor in the preelection situation which is taking shape is the fact that the organizers of the Republican election campaign have substantially more capital at their disposal than the Democrats.

Aleksandr Bovin, IZVESTIYA political observer, and Vladimir Tsvetov, Soviet television political observer (Soviet domestic radio, 23 Sep 84)

Tsvetov: Reagan has been able to take advantage of the fact that he is currently in power. He has been able to take, and has been taking, government decisions that accord with the interests of one or another group of the population and thereby win new votes. . . .

Bovin: President Reagan's main trump card has been the economic upswing that has been taking place in the United States over, say, the past 18 months. . . .

Tsvetov: Reagan has probably been using publicity techniques more skillfully than Mondale. . . . These television and radio talks by Reagan and his public appearances are directed not at explaining his policy to the electorate, because it is not very complicated to explain it since it is in principle antipeople, but at selling himself to the best advantage.

Vitaliy Kobysh, chief of a sector in the CPSU Central Committee's International Information Department (LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, 26 Sep 84)

As is usual in the United States, the election campaign is taking on the nature of a show, in which how photogenic the candidate is can often be more important than his convictions, while his ability to face a television camera outweighs his arguments. Here, Mondale evidently lags behind his highly experienced rival.

The Republican Party, as it approaches the elections, represents the most reactionary and militarist U.S. circles. So reactionary and militarist that, strange as it may seem, some of the ultraconservatives are now accusing Reagan of "centrism" and of pursuing a policy of "appeasement." The peace-loving rhetoric which the U.S. President has adopted recently

has evidently failed to please that public, without misleading those for whom it was primarily designed. And this despite the fact that the platform adopted at the Republican Party convention is of a frankly bellicose, aggressive nature, proclaiming a course of achieving military superiority over the Soviet Union and toughening up the confrontation with it in all salients. . . .

Reagan's supporters also try to exploit . . . a slight slowing in the development of crisis phenomena in the country's economy. . . . The calculation is that voters from the well-to-do strata, who have received various tax concessions from the Reagan Administration, will have the decisive say in the election.

TASS report on Vice President Bush's finances (TASS, 5 Oct 84)

George Bush, the vice president of the United States of America, is mentioned in a context which the White House will hardly be happy about. . . . In 1981 he had failed to pay in full the taxes he had been obliged to pay. . . . Bush repaid the debt last June but, evidently in the belief that one [can] hardly gain political capital by tax evasion, made no mention of the incident to the press, including at a special meeting with reporters last August devoted to his financial affairs. But, as is known, every secret will out. . . . In a bid to find a way out of the embarrassing situation, Bush's staffers, THE NEW YORK TIMES writes, are trying to portray him as an ordinary taxpayer engaged in war with the bureau of internal revenue. According to official figures, the fortune of the "ordinary taxpayer" and his wife stands at \$2.1 million.

Assessments of Vice President Mondale and Congresswoman Ferraro

Zorin (Soviet television, 21 Sep 84)

The Republican leadership's preelection struggle is made easier by the fact that their political opponents, so far at least, have been unable to put forward anything resembling a complete and specific political program in the sphere of domestic and foreign policy as a real alternative to the policies of the Republicans. It is true that in the last few days the Democratic Party candidates have stepped up their criticism of the political course of the Republicans. However, they speak in somewhat muted tones about what they propose in its place. . . .

The leaders of the Democratic election campaign are now applying their maximum effort to entice [the poor], including black Americans, to the polling stations on the well-founded assumption that if they come to the polls they will vote against Reagan.

[In the opinion of a prominent specialist on U.S. election campaigns], the key to the election victory lies with the female voters . . . who



significantly outnumber male voters. It was precisely this fact which led the Democrats to nominate Geraldine Ferraro for vice president. The future will show how effective that move was.

Kobysh (Soviet domestic radio, 23 Sep 84)

Mondale, unfortunately, has been unable to counter [President Reagan's appeal] with slogans, a program, and a course that would attract the majority of Americans.

Boris Kalyagin, Soviet television political observer (Soviet television, 24 Sep 84)

The Democratic Party challenger has not so far been able to put forward a genuine alternative to the current Administration's policy. The U.S. press writes that he is not decisive enough in his criticism of Reagan's course and behaves too cautiously.

Kobysh (LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, 26 Sep 84)

The hopes of Mondale and the Democrats are . . . pinned on persuading new voters to take part in the election campaign and then to vote--voters drawn from among the poor and national minorities who have not, as a rule, participated in elections before. They simply did not believe that a change of White House incumbent would make any difference to their cheerless life. Will they change their minds this time? This is very much counted on in the Democratic candidate's camp.

Mondale attacks Reagan primarily in connection with his Administration's foreign policy course. "President Reagan is obsessed with the escalation of the nuclear arms race, and his reelection will bring the world close to nuclear war," he said in a recent speech. Such accusations by the Democratic candidate meet a response among one group of voters. Another group finds them unconvincing, if only because Mondale's own foreign policy program does not appear to them to be clear enough, or very different from Reagan's. When the former vice president, now the Democratic candidate, claims, on the one hand, that "the preservation of our planet requires true progress in arms control," and, on the other, assures us that, if elected president, he "will conduct stubborn talks and will not sign an agreement that does not ensure U.S. security," many people in America and elsewhere see it as the same old propagandist rhetoric.

Assessments of the 7 October Reagan-Mondale Debate

Yevgeniy Petko, correspondent (Soviet domestic radio, 8 Oct 84)

Many complex questions were raised during this television duel. They were addressed, first and foremost, to the incumbent President, who on this occasion appeared very uncertain in front of the television cameras. His experienced political opponent, Walter Mondale, posed acute questions to which millions of American voters are awaiting an answer. As was noted during the television duel, over 35 million inhabitants of this country are now living below the official poverty line. The tax reform embarked upon by the Reagan Administration in 1981 in the interests of the wealthy was an unusually severe blow for the least well-off Americans. Spending on medical services and social insurance programs has been irresponsibly cut. Legalized discrimination against women continues. . . .

In the view of local political observers, Walter Mondale narrowly won the duel on points, as they say in sports. However, neither Ronald Reagan nor Walter Mondale could offer a sensible alternative to the current course.

TASS report (PRAVDA, 9 Oct 84)

Reagan did everything to sell his Administration's promonopoly, antipopular course, claiming without any basis that Americans are now "living better than four years ago." . . .

Mondale accused Reagan of failing to fulfill his election promises and charged that his policy has led to "a reduction in the quality of life" in the country. . . .

Commenting on the results of the debate, the CBS television company noted that Reagan "was on the defensive." AP believes that Mondale got the upper hand over Reagan. However, the final conclusion as to which of the participants in the presidential race "gained more points" can only be drawn after the second round, to be held 21 October in Kansas City.

Zorin (Soviet television, 10 Oct 84)

The Western press is concentrating today on who emerged the victor from this contest of words. And they are coming to the conclusion that despite Reagan's professional experience of speaking on screen, despite the many days of preparation during which the President laid aside all other business, Mondale came out on top in the verbal duel. In front of all America the master of the White House appeared deeply on the defensive. He was unable to find any convincing arguments in defense of his political course. The unsubstantiated assertion that today Americans allegedly live better than they did four years ago, when the present Administration came to power, fails because of the existence of mass unemployment in the country, . . . the 35 million Americans who are on the lists of the poorest, and other facts just as eloquent. . . .



Mondale nevertheless did not venture to concentrate attention on the fact that the reason for the budget deficits is the arms race, which is being irresponsibly built up by the Washington Administration. . . .

It is as yet premature to make judgments on the final results of the debate, or on what influence they will have on the voting of the electorate, whether they can increase the not very great interest of many Americans in the forthcoming elections.

#### Prospects and Predictions

Zorin (Soviet television, 21 Sep 84)

If one is to believe the figures given in numerous polls being published currently in the U.S. press, Reagan is in the lead at the present stage in the election race. . . . However, it would be premature to make any forecasts now about the possible outcome of the election on 6 November. The most experienced political observers are stressing that in the time left until the election the situation may yet change, particularly if a noticeable deterioration in the country's economic situation occurs in the coming weeks.

Bovin (Soviet domestic radio, 23 Sep 84)

Reagan is now 15-20 points ahead of Mondale among the population . . . according to one poll. . . . [The U.S. President] is elected by the Americans and we have to deal with the person who will be in the White House. Our position in this regard is clear. We are ready to talk with any U.S. president and are ready to try to reach agreements with him, but naturally only with an observance of the principle of equal security and only with account being taken of both U.S. and our own vital interests.

Kobysh (LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, 26 Sep 84)

They say that predicting the results of the U.S. elections with certainty is a thankless task. But recently many people have also been saying that something very serious would have to happen to make Reagan yield his place in the White House to his rival.

TASS report on President Reagan's speech to the UN General Assembly (PRAVDA, 26 Sep 84)

[The President's speech] contained no indication of any change in the essence of the present U.S. policy. . . . The President's words concerning peace were only meant to camouflage Washington's basic foreign policy guidelines and its interventionist policy in all regions of the world. . . . As to his statement that there exists no reasonable



alternative to U.S.-Soviet talks on arms control and other problems, he did not put forward any realistic ideas or proposals on this question. . . .

The UN rostrum was actually used by Reagan for his political electioneering aims. That was the reason behind his attempt to present his old policy in a new, more attractive package without changing its essence.

Nikolay Shishlin, CPSU Central Committee consultant (Soviet domestic radio, 1 Oct 84)

As is known, meetings between Comrade Gromyko and American statesmen also took place. . . . Naturally, one does not wish to attribute these high-level Soviet-American contacts merely to election motives which exist in force in the present American situation. But, on a practical level--and this must be said--it is clear that there is little new in the U.S. foreign policy line.

Valentin Falin, IZVESTIYA political observer (IZVESTIYA, 4 Oct 84)

There is something sly in R. Reagan's sudden complaisance. The seasoned NEW YORK TIMES observer J. Oakes puts it plainly: "Reagan's newly acquired 'moderation' is clearly an election posture which will not be backed by action after the elections. If it were otherwise, he could not honestly campaign on the (rightwing radical) Republican Party platform." . . . Many thinking Americans wonder how long this vote-catching scenario will run and rightly note that to overcome the present dangerous exacerbation something more than speeches is needed.

Zorin, Vadim Zagladin, first deputy chief of the CPSU Central Committee's International Department, and Colonel General Nikolay Chervov, chief of a directorate of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff (Soviet television, 6 Oct 84)

Zagladin: It would of course be very good if the peaceableness that Mr. Reagan demonstrated in his UN speech were not for show, that it really marked some sobering up and a return to a reasonable policy. However, unfortunately, for the time being I cannot possibly say that such a turnaround is occurring.

I want to say that we have noticed changes in the vocabulary and we take into consideration that the vocabulary also has a certain significance. But in this case it seems to me that a change in vocabulary is primarily an effect of the election campaign. Second, it is an aspiration to or an attempt to respond to public opinion on the activity of the Administration, both public opinion in the United States and elsewhere--including the allied countries--in order to put a new face on the old policy of confrontation. . . .

However, most important of course are not words but deeds; yet changes in deeds, as distinct from words, we have not seen at all. . . . [An agreement on diplomatic contacts] exists, and we will carry out such contacts in the hope that they will yield something. But we understand full well that contacts alone are not a sign of progress. Contacts will make sense in terms of progress only when they are full of definite and concrete political substance, when they have definite political precepts and political results. . . .

Zorin: In the West now there are many arguments about what there is behind this campaign of peaceful rhetoric of the Washington leadership. Some political observers, political scientists say that really everything comes down to the electoral campaign, that the leadership of the Republican Party wants to be sure of victory in the 6 November elections, and insofar as a certain part of the American public is alarmed by Washington's course, efforts are being made to calm that section of the public. There are specialists who say that they do not deny the election factor, but they say that it is an unquestionable fact that in the field of foreign policy the last four years were surprisingly unsuccessful for Washington. Washington has suffered a number of serious defeats and the balance sheet of Washington's foreign policy for these four years is definitely unfavorable. However thickheaded the leaders in Washington's influential circles are, they ponder those failures somewhat and think about what to do to make the next term less unsuccessful, or more productive.

Well, I think that on the first point of view, concerning election considerations, everything is correct. There is no doubt that election considerations do play a role and not a small one, and it is no accident that the campaign of peaceful rhetoric came exactly at the closing stage of the electoral campaign. However, apparently there is some grain of reason in the considerations of those who speak about the aspiration of some circles in Washington to draw some conclusions from the failures of the past term. What kind of conclusions will be made only time will tell, but it is unquestionably obvious that Washington is finding it very difficult to overlook really serious failures in the foreign policy course in the past term. . . .

Chervov: There are now sufficiently many statements made by the U.S. leaders about their supposed readiness for constructive talks on disarmament problems. However they remain simply words and promises. There is nothing concrete behind them. So far there have not been any positive changes in the U.S. position, neither on nuclear, conventional, nor chemical weapons. The United States has not budged from the zero and intermediate options on the issue of intermediate-range nuclear weapons. There have also been no changes on the issue of limiting and reducing strategic weapons. . . .



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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Zagladin: More than 80 percent [of the U.S. population] oppose confrontation and support a return to normal relations with the USSR. . . . The very fact that there are enormous masses of people--together with active organizations and forces that are really waging a struggle and acting--who are not acting yet, but are already of a different frame of mind, is also of significance, particularly in the United States where of course it affects the election campaign.

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MATLOCK 24

TASS NEWS ANALYST REVIEWS SOVIET POSITION ON SUMMIT TALKS

TAKE 1 OF 2 -- TASS ON TALKS

LD121709 MOSCOW TASS IN ENGLISH 1655 GMT 12 OCT 84

(+FABRICATIONS AND FACTS+ -- TASS HEADLINE)

(TEXT) MOSCOW OCTOBER 12 TASS -- TASS POLITICAL NEWS ANALYST  
SERGEY KULIK WRITES:

IN THE RECENT TIME REPRESENTATIVES OF THE AMERICAN  
ADMINISTRATION REPEATEDLY TRIED TO DEMONSTRATE OSTENTATIOUS  
+DISAPPOINTMENT+ WITH THE LACK OF SOVIET-AMERICAN SUMMIT CONTACTS,  
DELIBERATELY EMPHASISING WASHINGTON'S ALLEGED DESIRE TO HAVE SUCH A  
MEETING AND TRYING IN VAIN TO LAY RESPONSIBILITY ON SOVIET SIDE FOR  
ITS HAVING NOT YET BEEN HELD. VICE PRESIDENT GEORGE BUSH MADE YET  
ANOTHER SUCH ATTEMPT. IN THE ELECTION DEBATE WITH HIS RIVAL FROM  
THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY MRS. GERALDINE FERRARO HE ASSERTED WITHOUT  
ADDUCING ANY PROOF THAT ALLEGEDLY THE SOVIET UNION IS RESPONSIBLE  
FOR THE LACK OF MOSCOW-WASHINGTON SUMMIT CONTACTS.

MEANWHILE ONE SHOULD TURN ONLY TO THE LATEST HISTORY OF SOVIET-  
AMERICAN RELATIONS TO UNDERSTAND THAT IT IS EXACTLY MOSCOW WHICH  
CONSISTENTLY ADVOCATED THE DEVELOPMENT AND CONSOLIDATION OF  
RELATIONS WITH WASHINGTON. THUS, LEONID BREZHNEV IN HIS REPORT TO  
THE 26TH CONGRESS, SPEAKING ON THE USE OF THE ACTIVE DIALOGUE WITH  
THE UNITED STATES AT ALL LEVELS, SPECIALLY EMPHASISED THAT THE  
DECISIVE LINK HERE ARE MEETINGS AT THE SUMMIT LEVEL.

TRUE AS IT IS TO THE PRINCIPLE OF CONTINUITY IN FOREIGN POLICY,  
THE SOVIET UNION DECLARED THROUGH THE MOUTH OF YURIY ANDROPOV: +WE  
BELIEVED AND BELIEVE THAT SUMMIT MEETINGS HAVE SERIOUS SIGNIFICANCE  
FOR SOLUTION OF COMPLICATED PROBLEMS... THERE IS NO NEED TO CONVINC  
US OF USEFULNESS AND EXPEDIENCY OF THE DIALOGUE. THIS IS OUR  
POLICY. BU THE DIALOGUE SHOULD BE CONDUCTED ON A PAR, BUT NOT FROM  
THE POSITION OF STRENGTH, AS RONALD REAGAN PROPOSES+.

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR Fol 114/#6702

BY RW NARA DATE 3/9/1



AND, FINALLY, AN UNAMBIGUOUS CALL WAS MADE TO THE UNITED STATES AND ITS ALLIES BY GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE, PRESIDENT OF THE PRESIDUM OF THE USSR SUPREME SOVIET KONSTANTIN CHERNENKO: +IT IS HIGH TIME TO REAFFIRM BY CONCRETE DEEDS ONE'S SHARE OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE DESTINIES OF THE WORLD; TO REALISE LACK OF PROSPECTS OF THE POLICY FROM THE POSITIONS OF STRENGTH; OF THE STAKE ON THE ARMS RACE; TO DISPLAY REAL BUT NOT OSTENTATIOUS READINESS FOR THE DIALOGUE, FOR NEGOTIATIONS TO FIND MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS OF QUESTIONS ON WHICH MANKIND'S FUTURE DEPENDS. ON THE SIDE OF THE SOVIET UNION THERE IS NO LACK OF SUCH READINESS+.

THESE PRONOUNCEMENTS AS THEY ARE BY TOP SOVIET LEADERS PATENTLY SHOW THAT OUR COUNTRY HAS BEEN READY ALL THE RECENT YEARS TO MAINTAIN GOOD TRADITIONS OF SOVIET-AMERICAN SUMMIT MEETINGS, WHICH EARLIER TOOK PLACE IN MOSCOW, WASHINGTON, AND THEN AGAIN IN MOSCOW, VLADIVOSTOK, HELSINKI AND VIENNA. AND WHEREVER AND WHENEVER THE NEXT SUCH DIALOGUE IS HELD, THE USSR WOULD DO THE UTMOST TO PROMOTE SOLUTION OF THE MOST BURNING QUESTIONS OF THE PRESENT -- PRESERVATION OF PEACE.

(MORE)  
 12 OCT 1750Z KEH  
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FBIS 084 13333

(NOTE REFERENCE IN LAST GRAF TO REAGAN-GROMYKO MEETING)

TAKE 2 OF 2 -- 083 (TASS ON TALKS)

///PRESERVATION OF PEACE.

LD121713

(TEXT) BUT IT SHOULD BE NOTED WITH REGRET THAT AMERICAN DIPLOMACY RELEASING SOME VAGUE IDEAS ON A SOVIET-AMERICAN SUMMIT MEETING AT THE SAME TIME DID THE UTMOST TO SEE TO IT THAT SUCH A MEETING COULD NOT BE HELD IN A CONSTRUCTIVE ATMOSPHERE OF CONFIDENCE AND WILL FOR PEACE. THE UNITED STATES DEPLOYED CRUISE MISSILES IN WESTERN EUROPE. IT UNLEASHED THE MALICIOUS ANTI-SOVIET CAMPAIGN AND DID THE UTMOST TO BRING THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS BACK INTO THE COLD WAR CHANNEL. THE WHITE HOUSE TURNED A DEAF EAR TO THE SOVIET PROPOSAL ON ADOPTION OF THE +CODE OF CONDUCT+ BETWEEN NUCLEAR POWERS AND OPPOSED THE SOVIET INITIATIVES AIMED AT PREVENTION OF MILITARISATION OF OUTER SPACE, AT RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS ON FULL AND UNIVERSAL PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS.

ALL THAT, NATURALLY, WAS NOT MENTIONED IN HIS PUBLICITY ELECTION SPEECH BY VICE PRESIDENT GEORGE BUSH. AND MEANWHILE, EXACTLY THIS EXPLAINS THE FACT WHY REAGAN PROVED TO BE THE ONLY AMERICAN PRESIDENT IN THE PAST FORTY YEARS WHO DID NOT MEET THE TOP SOVIET LEADER.

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OBVIOUSLY, RELEVANT PREREQUISITES ARE NECESSARY FOR HOLDING A MEETING BETWEEN TOP LEADERS OF THE TWO LEADING POWERS. WHAT IS REQUIRED ABOVE ALL IS A CERTAIN EXTENT OF MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING ON MAJOR QUESTIONS WHICH DETERMINE THE STATE OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES AND THE GENERAL INTERNATIONAL SITUATION.

IT IS ALSO NECESSARY THAT BOTH SIDES SHOULD HAVE THE DESIRE TO REALLY STRIVE FOR POSITIVE CHANGES, AND STILL BETTER -- FOR FUNDAMENTAL IMPROVEMENT IN MUTUAL RELATIONS. IF ONE VIEWS THE STATE OF AFFAIRS FROM THIS POINT OF VIEW, IT BECOMES CLEAR: THE DISCOURSE OF AMERICAN LEADERS ON A MEETING ARE BACKED BY NOTHING. THE U.S. POLICY IN QUESTIONS OF RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION PURSUES NO CONSTRUCTIVE AIMS. MOREOVER, IT IS ORIENTED IN AN ABSOLUTELY OPPOSITE DIRECTION.

FRESH EVIDENCE OF THAT WAS THE STAND TAKEN BY PRESIDENT REAGAN IN THE COURSE OF HIS RECENT WASHINGTON MEETING WITH MEMBER OF THE POLITICAL BUREAU OF THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE, FIRST DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE USSR, FOREIGN MINISTER ANDREY GROMYKO. THE EXCHANGE OF OPINIONS WHICH WAS HELD ON KEY QUESTIONS OF SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS AND IN THIS CONNECTION THE STATE OF AFFAIRS IN THE WORLD DID NOT REVEAL SIGNS THAT WOULD TESTIFY TO THE REAL INTENTION OF THE AMERICAN SIDE TO CORRECT ITS POLICY TOWARDS REALISM AND PEACEABILITY. GENERAL STATEMENTS IN FAVOUR OF MORE CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONS WITH THE USSR WHICH WERE MADE FROM THE AMERICAN SIDE ARE NOT BACKED UP BY CONCRETE ACTIONS.

(ENDALL)

12 OCT 1754Z KEH

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✓  
**NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL**

October 16, 1984

Mr. Ambassador:

Sandy Vershbow from State called  
in the following message.

What were the proposals of Chernenko?

1. Ratification of the nuclear testing treaties.
2. Nuclear freeze.
3. Ban on chemical weapons.
4. Norms of conduct between nuclear powers (includes no first-use etc.)

We cannot find any proposals in May.

end.

ma



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Rec 10/18/84

Jack:

Tom Niles agreed you  
should have this on the  
familiar personal - only,  
day-hold basis.

Tom Simons

~~SECRET~~  
Department of State

INCOMING TELEGRAM

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 CCO-00 /008.W  
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FM USMISSION USBERLIN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0697

S E C R E T USBERLIN 03073

ROGER CHANNEL

EUR FOR NILES

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS:  
SUBJECT: PRISONER EXCHANGE

REF: STATE

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: NILES AND BARKLEY MET WITH VOGEL OCTOBER 11 FOR LUNCH IN WEST BERLIN FOR DISCUSSION WHICH, ON BALANCE, WAS ENCOURAGING REGARDING OUTLOOK FOR PRISONER EXCHANGE. VOGEL ALSO PROVIDED INTRIGUING HINTS REGARDING LEADERSHIP CHANGES IN MOSCOW, INCLUDING POSSIBILITY OF DEAL FOR SHCHARANSKIY AND EVENTUALLY, PERHAPS, SAKHAROV. HIS COMMENTS ON INNER-GERMAN RELATIONS, INCLUDING SITUATION IN FRG'S PRAGUE EMBASSY (NOW REPEATED IN BUDAPEST, ACCORDING TO VOGEL) WERE, AS USUAL, INTERESTING. HE ALSO RAISED CASE OF GDR CITIZEN ARRESTED AFTER JUNE 27 VISIT TO US EMBASSY. END SUMMARY.

3. PRISONER EXCHANGE.

A. GENERAL. PRIOR TO CONSIDERATION OF U.S. LIST, VOGEL MADE CLEAR THAT HIS PRINCIPALS WERE INTERESTED IN EXCHANGES AND FLEXIBLE AS TO MODALITIES, I.E., THEY COULD MOVE AHEAD WITH A LARGER PACKAGE OR DEAL WITH AGENTS HELD BY THE U.S. SERIATIM. NILES/BARKLEY STRESSED DISTINCTION BETWEEN INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS SUCH AS KOSTADINOV AND PERSONS CURRENTLY BEING HELD IN EAST. VOGEL ACCEPTED POINT, BUT ADDED THAT IT SHOULD NOT BE EXAGGERATED. ON HIS SIDE, VOGEL SAID THAT U.S. SHOULD KEEP DEMANDS REASONABLE IF WE WERE TO BE SEEN AS "SERIOUS".

B. KOSTADINOV/ZACHARSKI. VOGEL'S INITIAL REACTION TO LIST (REFTEL) WAS SURPRISE AT ITS LENGTH, IN LIGHT OF EARLIER DISCUSSIONS, AND DOUBT THAT OFFER OF KOSTADINOV ALONE WOULD PRODUCE ANY PERSONS HELD IN POLAND. HE UNDERTOOK, HOWEVER, TO CHECK AGAIN REGARDING POLISH ATTITUDES. NILES/BARKLEY NOTED THAT SUPREME COURT HAD REJECTED KOSTADINOV'S APPEAL AND THAT TRIAL WOULD NOW PROCEED. THEY ALSO SUGGESTED THAT DEAL FOR KOSTADINOV WOULD BE POSSIBLE DURING NARROW "WINDOW" PRIOR TO BEGINNING OF TRIAL, AFTER WHICH SITUATION WOULD CHANGE ABRUPTLY. VOGEL INDICATED UNDERSTANDING ON BOTH POINTS AND UNDERTOOK TO GET BACK TO BARKLEY DURING WEEK OF OCTOBER 15.

C. ZEHE. NILES OBSERVED THAT ONE OF ZEHE'S AMERICAN ATTORNEYS HAD RECENTLY RAISED POSSIBILITY OF AN EXCHANGE, SOMETHING WHICH WE HAD UNDERSTOOD WAS NO LONGER A GDR PROPOSAL. VOGEL DENIED THAT GDR WISHED TO WAIT UNTIL VARIOUS CHALLENGES POSED BY ZEHE'S DEFENSE WERE DECIDED BEFORE DISCUSSING AN EXCHANGE. BARKLEY AND NILES EXPRESSED CONFIDENCE THAT COURT WOULD REJECT DEFENSE MOTIONS; IN ANY EVENT, THEY NOTED, EVEN IF RULING WENT AGAINST US, THE CASE WOULD BE APPEALED UP TO THE SUPREME COURT, IF NECESSARY, DURING WHICH TIME ZEHE WOULD HAVE TO REMAIN WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT. VOGEL

INDICATED UNDERSTANDING OF THESE POINTS AND WENT ON TO EXPLAIN THAT THE GDR (VOGEL INCLUDED) AND ZEHE'S AMERICAN ATTORNEYS HAD DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVES ON THE CASE, WITH THE GDR INTERESTED IN GETTING ZEHE BACK AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, WHATEVER THE CIRCUMSTANCES. HE ALSO ACKNOWLEDGED THAT ZEHE'S AMERICAN LAWYERS WERE PRIMARILY INTERESTED IN TRYING THE CASE. (COMMENT: CLEARLY, THERE IS A CHANCE TO REOPEN ZEHE CASE, AND STRIKING REASONABLY GOOD DEAL. VOGEL IS OBVIOUSLY AWARE OF WEAKNESSES IN OUR CASE; HOWEVER, HE ALSO MADE CLEAR, PARTLY THROUGH A JOKE, THAT HE RECOGNIZES SUBSTANTIAL UNCERTAINTIES IN THE OUTCOME. HE ALSO NOTED THAT GDR WAS NOT KEEN ON THE PUBLICITY INVOLVED IN A COURT CASE. END COMMENT.)

D. MICKELSON. VOGEL CONFIRMED THAT MICKELSON HAD BEEN WORKING FOR KGB. ONE OF HER GDR RELATIVES PLANNED TO CALL ON VOGEL SHORTLY, AND HE SAID HE PLANNED TO RAISE ISSUE WITH THE SOVIETS (THROUGH WHAT CHANNEL HE DID NOT SAY).

E. OGORODNIKOVA CASE. NILES ASKED IF VOGEL WAS AWARE OF LOS ANGELES ARRESTS; VOGEL CLAIMED THIS CAME AS NEWS TO HIM. NILES GAVE HIM NAMES OF SOVIETS INVOLVED.

4. SOVIET DEVELOPMENTS AND SHCHARANSKIY. UNEXPECTEDLY, VOGEL VOLUNTEERED COMMENT THAT BY END OF OCTOBER HE MIGHT RPT MIGHT HAVE SOMETHING ON SHCHARANSKIY AND MAYBE EVEN ON SAKHAROV. IN RESPONSE TO NILES' QUESTION, HE EXPLAINED THAT CHIEF OF GDR LAWYERS GROUP (NOT FURTHER IDENTIFIED) HAD TWICE RAISED CASE WITH KGB CHIEF CHEBRIKOV, WHO ON BOTH OCCASIONS ANSWERED, IN EFFECT, "NOT NOW." VOGEL WENT ON TO EXPLAIN THAT HE KNEW OF PLANNED DEVELOPMENTS IN MOSCOW DURING OCTOBER, WHICH COULD CREATE MORE PROPITIUS CONDITONS. EXPANDING ON THIS POINT, VOGEL INDICATED THAT THE GDR INTERPRETED RECENT STATEMENT ON GORBACHEV'S POSITION AS CPSU SECOND SECRETARY AS EQUIVALENT TO SAYING THAT THERE ARE NOW "TWO GENERAL SECRETARIES," ONE OF WHOM MAY SOON RETIRE. VOGEL ALSO CONTENDED THAT HONECKER HAD ORIENTED HIS POLICY BASED ON THE PRESUMPTION OF A GENERATIONAL CHANGE IN THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP. HE DECLINED FURTHER COMMENT, ASIDE FROM REMARK THAT HE EXPECTED RESOLUTION OF ISSUE DURING OCTOBER.

5. FILATOV. NILES STRESSED OUR GREAT INTEREST IN FILATOV AND ASKED VOGEL WHETHER ANYTHING COULD BE DONE IN THIS CASE. VOGEL SAID HE WAS ABSOLUTELY CONFIDENT THAT FILATOV WAS DEAD AND SAID HE COULD NOT HELP US.

6. INNER-GERMAN DEVELOPMENTS. VOGEL WAS SURPRISINGLY OPTIMISTIC THAT PRAGUE AND BUDAPEST CHANCERY PROBLEMS WOULD BE RESOLVED. HE NOTED THAT VISIT BY HONECKER TO FINLAND AND BY TOP FOREIGN OFFICIALS TO GDR STIMULATED MOVEMENT TOWARD A RESOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM. SIX OF THE GDR CITIZENS IN PRAGUE EMBASSY WERE DEMANDING DIRECT DEPARTURE TO FRG OR AUSTRIA. FORTUNATELY, VOGEL SAID, ALL OF THE PERSONS WHO HAD PREVIOUSLY SOUGHT TO DEPART THE GDR VIA THE EMBASSY ASYLUM ROUTE WERE NOW IN THE WEST; THIS HOPEFULLY WOULD HELP PERSUADE THOSE IN PRAGUE TO RETURN TO THE GDR ON THE BASIS OF A PROMISE TO BE ALLOWED TO EMIGRATE WITHIN A GIVEN PERIOD.

7. ON OUTLOOK FOR FRG-GDR RELATIONS IN GENERAL, VOGEL WAS CAUTIOUS. HE TOOK THE FAMILIAR LINE THAT NO MAJOR PROGRESS WAS POSSIBLE UNTIL US-SOVIET RELATIONS IMPROVED. HOWEVER, ON THIS ASPECT, HE SAID HE WAS MORE OPTIMISTIC FOLLOWING THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH GROMYKO.

8. COMMENT. VOGEL'S PRINCIPALS ARE BY ALL APPEARANCES IN A DEALING FRAME OF MIND. ON BASIS OF HIS REMARKS, WE SEE GOOD POSSIBILITY THAT PACKAGE INVOLVING KOSTADINOV AND ZACHARSKI, ON OUR SIDE, COULD PRODUCE MOST, IF NOT ALL, OF THOSE ON THE LIST TRANSMITTED REFTEL (MINUS FILATOV).

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 067141 #0600  
BY CAI NARA DATE 11/27/07

~~SECRET~~  
*Department of State*

INCOMING  
TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 OF 02


ADDITION OF ZEHE WOULD PRODUCE MORE, BUT WE MIGHT WANT  
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INCLUDING MRS. HICKELSON), PARTICULARLY IF THE OCTOBER  
EVENTS EXPECTED BY VOGEL PRODUCE A CHANGE IN SIGNALS ON  
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срочно выполнена напряженная программа по перевалке норильских медно-никелевых руд на суда Мурманского пароходства.

▲ **ТЮМЕНЬ.** Около 100 тысяч тонн сверхпланового жидкого топлива отправил перерабатывающим предприятиям краснознаменный коллектив нефтегазодобывающего управления «Мамонтовнефть». Правофланговыми со-

канала «Иртыш — Караганда». Уже в первые годы освоения площадей земледельцы совхоза стали получать самые высокие в области урожаи ценной продовольственной культуры. А в нынешнем году каждый из 700 гектаров картофельных плантаций дал по 220 центнеров клубней.

(По сообщениям корр. «Правды»).

## ДЕЖИ- ИЧЕСКУЮ ЕННОСТЬ

изма, когда совершенствуются все политическая, духовная жизни, дает усилению идейной убежденности культуры, духовной зрелости. этой многогранной работы партии, ний ее XXVI съезда, последующих комитета, является вооружение трудическим мировоззрением, идеями

вания показывают, что и сейчас селения находится под влиянием рковные организации, учитывая те е произошли в сознании веруюлистической действительности, моия и культы, ведут поиск утонлюдей, особенно на молодежь.

о реакционные круги империализелигию в политических целях провиях, как отмечается в постановПленума ЦК КПСС, необходимо научно-материалистических взгляания атеистическому воспитанию, научно-материалистического миропюдей, партия проявляет особую рдых атеистических убеждений мо-классового чутья, умения стойко идеологии. КПСС учит планомерду к атеистическому воспитанию его единство и взаимосвязь с по-ственным, эстетическим воспита-ленинское указание — бороться о идейным и только идейным ору-слесом.

# Ответы К. У. Черненко на вопросы газеты «Вашингтон пост»

Руководитель московского бюро американской газеты «Вашингтон пост» Д. Додер обратился к К. У. Черненко с просьбой ответить на вопросы, касающиеся советско-американских отношений — темы, как указывается в этом обращении, волнующей не только читателей «Вашингтон пост», но и миллионы людей всего мира.

Ниже приводятся ответы К. У. Черненко.

**Вопрос.** Президент Рейган сказал, что США готовы возобновить диалог с Советским Союзом по широкому кругу вопросов, включая контроль над вооружениями. Как относится Советский Союз к выраженной президентом Рейганом готовности к переговорам?

**Ответ.** Слова о готовности американской администрации к переговорам мы слышали и раньше, но они ни разу не подтвердились реальными делами, которые свидетельствовали бы о действительном желании договориться на справедливой и взаимоприемлемой основе хотя бы по одному из существенных вопросов наших отношений — особенно в области ограничения вооружений и уменьшения военной опасности.

Выдвигаемые же нами конкретные предложения всякий раз наталкивались на глухую стену. Приведу примеры.

Так было в марте этого года, когда мы назвали целый комплекс проблем. Достижение договоренности по ним или хотя бы по некоторым из них означало бы реальный сдвиг и в советско-американских отношениях и в международной обстановке в целом. Но от ответа на наши предложения просто уходили.

Так было в июне, когда мы предложили договориться о предотвращении милитаризации космического пространства. На этот раз нам ответили, но чем? Попытались подменить сам предмет переговоров, предложили обсуждать вопросы, касающиеся ядерного оружия, то есть те вопросы, переговоры по которым велись ранее в Женеве, но были взорваны самими Соединенными Штатами. При этом США не только отказывались устранить брешейства, созданные размещением новых американских ракет в Западной Европе, но и продолжают их развертывание.

А как же с космосом? Вместо недопущения там гонки вооружений нам предлагалось заняться выработкой каких-то правил такой гонки, по существу легализовать ее. На это, понятно, пойти мы не можем. Наша цель — действительно мирный космос, и мы этой цели будем настойчиво добиваться.

**Таковы факты.** Теперь об упомянутом вами заявлении президента Рейгана. Если сказанное президентом о готовности к переговорам не просто тактический ход, то хочу заявить, что за Советским Союзом дело не станет. К серьезным, деловым переговорам мы всегда были готовы и заявляли об этом не раз.

Мы готовы приступить к переговорам с целью выработки и заключения соглашения о предотвращении милитаризации космоса, включая полный отказ от противоспутниковых систем, с установлением со дня начала переговоров взаимного моратория на испытания и развертывание космических вооружений. Именно так мы формулировали наше предложение с самого начала. Ответ за Вашингтоном.

Остается в силе и советское предложение о том, чтобы ядерные державы заморозили все имеющиеся у них ядерные вооружения в количественном и качественном отношениях. Договоренность по этому вопросу означала бы взаимное прекращение наращивания всех компонентов имеющихся ядерных arsenалов, включая средства доставки и ядерные боеприпасы. Гонка ядерных вооружений тем самым была бы остановлена. Это решающим образом облегчило бы последующие до-

говоренности о сокращении таких вооружений вплоть до полной их ликвидации. В Белом доме по-прежнему находится наше официальное предложение о том, чтобы СССР и США в первую очередь договорились между собой о замораживании своих ядерных вооружений и таким образом подали пример другим ядерным державам.

Есть реальная возможность довести до конца выработку соглашения о полном и всеобщем запрете испытаний ядерного оружия. Не будет таких испытаний, значит не будет совершенствоваться это оружие, гонка ядерных вооружений будет поставлена на тормоза. США и здесь могли бы делом доказать искренность своих заявлений в пользу ограничения ядерных вооружений. Доказать это они могут и ратификацией советско-американских договоров о подземных ядерных взрывах. Договоры эти подписаны еще в 1974 и 1976 годах. Именно ратификацией, а не приглашением, о чем ведет речь американская сторона, наблюдателей, которые бесстрастно фиксировали бы сами взрывы.

Советский Союз не раз обращался к Вашингтону с призывом последовать нашему примеру, взять на себя обязательство не применять ядерное оружие первыми. Каждый раз

оттуда слышалось «нет». Представим себе обратную ситуацию: США берут обязательство насчет неприменения ядерного оружия первыми и призывают нас поступить так же, а мы говорим «нет», нам это не подходит, мы оставляем за собой право на первый ядерный удар. Что бы в таком случае люди в США подумали о наших намерениях? Двух мнений на этот счет быть не может.

Я назвал несколько наиболее актуальных вопросов, относящихся к прекращению гонки вооружений, укреплению безопасности. Есть и другие важные вопросы, которые, я полагаю, хорошо известны президенту. Все они требуют решения, приложения конкретных усилий. Слова же о готовности к переговорам, не подкрепленные практическими делами, остаются всего лишь словами.

Полагаю, что сказанное мной отвечает на ваш вопрос.

**Вопрос.** Существует широко распространенное мнение, что недавно наметился сдвиг, который может привести к улучшению советско-американских отношений. Что Вы думаете по этому поводу и какие перспективы Вы видите для этих отношений на предстоящий период?

**Ответ.** В мире действительно широко распространены настроения в пользу сдвига к

лучшему в советско-американских отношениях. Это, на наш взгляд, отражает растущее понимание значения этих отношений, особенно в нынешней международной обстановке.

К сожалению, оснований говорить о подобном сдвиге, как о факте, в советско-американских отношениях пока нет. Возможен ли он? На этот вопрос ответу однозначно: да, возможен. Решение тех проблем, о которых я говорил выше, помогло бы этому.

Убежден, что вообще нет разумной альтернативы конструктивному развитию советско-американских отношений. При этом мы не закрываем глаза на то, что у нас разные общественные системы, разные мировоззрения. Но если постоянно помнить об ответственности, которая лежит на наших двух странах, если ориентировать политику на мир, а не на войну, то эти различия не только не исключают, а, напротив, требуют нахождения взаимопонимания.

Мне приходилось уже говорить и хочу вновь подчеркнуть: мы за добрые отношения с США, и опыт говорит, что они могут быть таковыми. Для этого необходимо обоюдное желание строить отношения на равных, к взаимной выгоде и к пользе для дела мира.

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

October 22, 1984

TO:

RON LEHMAN  
SVEN KRAEMER  
BOB LINHARD  
JACK MATLOCK  
TY COBB  
PETER SOMMER  
JOHN LENCZOWSKI  
WALT RAYMOND  
STEVE SESTANOVICH

FROM:

STEVE STEINER

46

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

October 17, 1984

STATEMENT BY THE PRINCIPAL DEPUTY PRESS SECRETARY

We agree with President Chernenko that there is no sound alternative to constructive development in relations between our two countries. We are pleased to see the emphasis he puts on positive possibilities for US-Soviet relations. We will be studying his remarks carefully and, as was agreed during Deputy Prime Minister Gromyko's recent meeting with President Reagan, we will be pursuing our dialogue with the Soviet Union and exploring the possibilities for progress through diplomatic channels.

President Reagan has repeatedly demonstrated that we are ready for cooperation with the Soviet Union. In April 1981 he sent a handwritten letter to President Brezhnev describing his feelings about the issue of war and peace, and to ask President Brezhnev to join him in removing the obstacles to peace. Since then, the United States has made practical proposals for forward movement in all areas of the relationship, including arms control.

Over the past year, for instance, the United States and its Allies have put forward new proposals for limits on strategic weapons, on intermediate range nuclear weapons, on chemical weapons, and on conventional forces. On June 4 in Dublin, President Reagan stated our willingness to discuss the Soviet proposal for a mutual non-use-of-force commitment, if this would lead to serious negotiation on the Western proposals for practical steps to enhance confidence and reduce the risk of surprise attack in Europe. This summer we accepted a Soviet proposal to begin space arms control negotiations in Vienna without preconditions. At the United Nations last month President Reagan reiterated his desire to move forward in these fields and put forward a number of concrete new proposals for US-Soviet cooperation. In his subsequent meeting with Deputy Prime Minister Gromyko, the President emphasized our strong desire to move to a more productive dialogue across the board, and put forward specific suggestions as to how we might do so.

We cannot agree with President Chernenko's version of recent history. It is the Soviet Union which has broken off negotiations on nuclear arms, and backed away from its own proposal to begin space arms control talks. The United States stands ready to negotiate on these and other issues, but we cannot concur in the apparent Soviet view that it is incumbent upon the United States to pay a price so that the Soviet Union will come back to the nuclear negotiating table.

President Chernenko has stated that improvements in the US-Soviet relationship depend on deeds, not words. We agree. When the Soviet Union is prepared to move from public exchanges to private negotiations and concrete agreements, they will find us ready.

# # #



23 October 1984  
 FB M 84-10064

**CHERNENKO CONTINUES GRADUAL REORIENTATION OF PUBLIC POSTURE**

*The moderate tone of Soviet General Secretary Chernenko's WASHINGTON POST interview is the latest sign of a developing concern in the Kremlin to project increased interest in dialogue with the Reagan Administration. The unusual effort Moscow made to present Chernenko's restrained message to the American audience during the final stages of the U.S. election campaign suggests a desire to press the Administration to make commitments or concessions that will affect its policy if it retains power.*

Chernenko's interview, published by THE WASHINGTON POST on 17 October and by Soviet central newspapers the following day, builds on an approach favoring increased bilateral interaction first signaled in Moscow's June space weapons proposal and later reinforced in Foreign Minister Gromyko's September visit to the White House.

The tone of Chernenko's remarks was nonpolemical and considerably less critical than other recent leadership statements on U.S. policy, including the general secretary's own 2 September PRAVDA interview. He repeatedly emphasized Moscow's desire for dialogue and improved relations. Citing the President's expression of readiness for talks with the Soviet Union, Chernenko insisted that if President Reagan's expression of interest in dialogue was "not merely a tactical move, I wish to state that the Soviet Union will not be found wanting." Although he accused the Administration of failing to support its expression of readiness for talks with "real deeds" and complained that the Administration has not only refused to "remove the obstacles created by the deployment of new U.S. missiles" in West Europe but is continuing to deploy them, he did not echo other Soviet leadership statements impugning U.S. intentions and motivations.

The mildness of Chernenko's criticism is especially obvious when compared with Gromyko's 27 September address to the United Nations and with Chernenko's own early September PRAVDA interview. In that interview, laced with charges that U.S. policy is designed to aggravate the international situation, Chernenko accused Washington of declaring "moral everything it regards as permissible for itself, even going as far as the overthrow of legitimate governments, the policy of state terrorism, and the waging of undeclared wars."

On the substantive level, Chernenko offered neither new proposals nor hints of flexibility on established Soviet positions regarding bilateral issues.

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Echoing a formula he had used before, he emphasized that progress on four specific arms control questions could "help" bring about a "shift" in Soviet-U.S. relations:

- Space weaponry. Chernenko reasserted the Soviet position on space weapons negotiations, including the Soviet demand--rejected by the United States--that there be a mutual moratorium on testing and deployment of space weaponry beginning at the very start of the talks.
- Nuclear freeze. Chernenko repeated the Soviet proposal of June 1983 for a quantitative and qualitative freeze on nuclear weapons arsenals.
- Nuclear weapons tests. Chernenko urged the United States to ratify the treaties on underground nuclear testing signed in 1974 and 1976 and implicitly rejected any attempt to renegotiate the verification provisions of the treaties, saying that any U.S. intention to limit testing should be indicated by adopting the treaties and "not by inviting observers, as suggested by the American side."
- No first use of nuclear weapons. Chernenko called on the Administration to adopt a pledge not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, as the Soviet Government did in June 1982.

On several previous occasions, Chernenko had similarly suggested that progress on such issues could lead to a broader improvement in Soviet-U.S. relations. In his 2 September PRAVDA interview the general secretary said that an agreement on banning space weaponry would "facilitate the solution of questions of limiting and reducing other strategic armaments." In his 2 March election speech he said "it is not ruled out" that agreement on a range of bilateral and multilateral arms control issues, including the ones he cited in his latest interview, would signal a "real drastic change" in Soviet-U.S. relations.

The notion that progress on arms control issues other than INF and START could facilitate a broader advance surfaced first in a 25 January PRAVDA interview attributed to General Secretary Andropov less than three weeks before his death. Andropov was cited as saying that agreement on these issues would "create a favorable situation for tackling other questions."

Other Soviet leaders have avoided this formulation and instead have insisted more bluntly that improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations depends on major changes in U.S. policies. Gromyko declared in his UN speech, for example, that Moscow would follow the "same policy course" in the future as it has in the past and asserted that "those who determine U.S. policy" would have to do "a lot" before the "words and obligations" they assume can be trusted.

## HANDLING OF INTERVIEW

The interviewer and the face-to-face format were apparently chosen to assure prominent media coverage in Washington and to create the impression in the United States that the Administration, not the Soviet leadership, stands in the path of improved bilateral relations. Chernenko himself implied that one of his goals in the interview was to foster the impression of Soviet willingness to meet the United States halfway when, in the oral part of the interview, he described the conversation as one of the Soviet Union's "practical steps" on the "important road" toward peace. The apparent intent of this remark was to suggest that now it is the Administration's turn to take a reciprocal "practical step."

Soviet media handling of the interview has differed little from the type of treatment typically given to set piece interviews with a general secretary. Soviet central newspapers, television, and radio broadcasts to both foreign and domestic audiences have publicized only the written questions and answers. The PRAVDA headline was similar to those used for the written interview with Chernenko by U.S. journalist Joseph Kingsbury-Smith last June and PRAVDA interviews with the general secretary in June and September. The only indication in Soviet media that THE WASHINGTON POST reporter conducted part of the interview in person came in a still photo of the participants shown on the 17 October nightly television newscast.

Soviet leaders have rarely granted such face-to-face audiences to a Western journalist. The conduct of Chernenko's interview closely followed the most recent precedent--an interview with the publisher of the West German weekly magazine DER SPIEGEL granted by General Secretary Andropov in April 1983. That interview, focusing primary attention on the INF issue, was obviously intended to have its main impact on West Germany, which Moscow was pressuring to refuse deployment of U.S. Pershing II missiles. Then too, Leonid Zamyatin, the chief of the CPSU Central Committee's International Information Department, and Andrey Aleksandrov, an aide to the general secretary, were the only other Soviet officials present, according to a 20 April PRAVDA report of the conversation.<sup>1</sup> In contrast to the current case, however, portions of Andropov's oral remarks to DER SPIEGEL were included in Soviet accounts of the interview.

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<sup>1</sup>The caption for a photograph of the interview published in DER SPIEGEL indicated that CPSU Central Committee official Nikolay Portugalov was also present, but his position next to the German interviewer Augstein and the failure of PRAVDA to mention his presence suggests that he was acting as interpreter. He served as a correspondent in Bonn in the mid-1970's.



## COMMENT SINCE THE INTERVIEW

Followup Soviet commentary on U.S. policy, both by members of the leadership and by low-level media commentators, has not shown any significantly increased restraint toward the Administration in the wake of Chernenko's interview. In 18 October remarks in Yugoslavia, as reported by TASS, Politburo member Viktor Grishin accused U.S. "imperialism" of pursuing an "adventuristic and militarist course of seeking military superiority" over the USSR and its allies. A 20 October TASS statement, echoing the charges made in a 19 October press briefing at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, rebutted the accusations of Soviet violations of arms control treaties contained in the recently released report of the General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament, detailed alleged U.S. violations of these agreements, and concluded that "such actions" do not correspond to "statements of U.S. leaders" expressing a desire for peace and a willingness to negotiate new treaties. Lower level Soviet commentary on the United States has continued to attack the Administration much as it did before the interview. An 18 October TASS commentary cited a U.S. journalist to accuse President Reagan of "distorting facts" about the arms race and opposing arms control "at heart."

Soviet media commentary on reaction to the interview has alleged that the Administration's response has been limited to rhetoric. An 18 October Soviet television commentary, for example, said that a "White House representative" had agreed with Chernenko's assertion that there is no "sensible alternative to the constructive development" of bilateral relations but had also "virtually rejected" the "basic" Soviet proposals. A TASS roundup, published in PRAVDA on 19 October, echoed these observations and accused the BBC of distorting Chernenko's remarks by claiming that if the United States adopts one of the four proposals mentioned by the general secretary Moscow will return to negotiations previously held in Geneva. Instead, TASS insisted, for talks to begin "the United States must remove the obstacles" it created "by deploying new American missiles in West Europe."



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TO Ambassador Matlock

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Per Your Request

Message:

From: Martha Brown



# Soviet softening on arms is seen

By William Beecher  
Globe Staff

WASHINGTON — The Soviet Union has made a policy decision to explore actively a more forthcoming arms control relationship with the United States, according to a well-placed Soviet bloc diplomat.

The first step, he said yesterday, was the decision to send Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko to Washington. The second was signaled both by what President Konstantin Chernenko said and what he consciously omitted in an interview last week with the Washington Post.

The diplomat, who in the past has often accurately reflected Kremlin thinking, said the very fact of the Chernenko interview should lay to rest rumors that he is about to step down because of illness, while the substance suggests that a shift to a more conciliatory foreign policy is now being tested.

In an interview yesterday, the diplomat said it was no accident that Chernenko failed to reiterate insistence that the United States remove all Pershing 2 and cruise missiles from Europe before any deal could be made on Euromissiles. Earlier, Gromyko had omitted both that precondition and insistence that the United States agree to a moratorium on antisatellite tests before starting space talks during eight hours of private talks with President Ronald Reagan and Secretary of State George Shultz, but American analysts were left to guess whether those omissions were either intentional or significant.

The diplomat said the Russians assume Reagan will be re-elected but that if he wants a new

relationship he should by early next year move to strike a deal on at least one of the four proposals that Chernenko mentioned in his newspaper interview.

"It that occurs, a momentum will have been established where everything in the way of larger arms control issues will be on the table," he declared.

The diplomat said Chernenko, after a bout of illness last summer, has reasserted himself and leads the faction that wants to explore progress in arms control and other issues with the United States.

He claimed that Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov was unceremoniously transferred from his posts of deputy defense minister and chief of staff of the armed forces because he was part of the military-civilian leadership group which totally distrusted any thaw with the Reagan Administration and argued instead for new weapons aimed at preventing the United States from "driving [the Soviets] into the corner." That group is in the minority, the diplomat said.

A senior American policy-maker, when apprised of the details of the interview with the diplomat, said it sounded authoritative and is consistent with the US analysis of the meaning of recent Soviet moves.

In addition, the US official said, while there had been some speculation in high places that Chernenko might step aside at the special Central Committee meeting in Moscow this week, he made the principal talk on shifts in agricultural policy while Second Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, who has been in charge of Soviet agriculture and is seen as the likely heir apparent, didn't even address the session. "It looks as if Chernenko has reasserted himself."

Yesterday the diplomat conceded that two of Chernenko's four points in the Washington Post interview — a freeze on nuclear weapons and a pledge on non-first use of nuclear weapons — were probably nonstarters from an American point of view.

But if the Administration wants to show good faith, he insisted it should move on one or both of the other two points. One called for ratification of the Threshold Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions treaties of 1974 and 1976 respectively. The other called for negotiations to ban space weapons.

On both those issues, Reagan hinted at American flexibility in his recent address before the United Nations and officials yesterday said they are prepared to spell out US thinking when Soviet Ambassador Anatoli Dobrynin meets with Shultz within the next few days. That would be the first important meeting between the two sides since Gromyko was in Washington.

The Soviet bloc diplomat said that if a small agreement could be worked out by early next year, among possible next steps would be: space talks in Vienna and either a separate deal on medium-range Euromissiles or a move to merge those missiles into resumed strategic weapons negotiations.