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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 3/27/2005

File Folder MATLOCH CHRON DECEMBER 1984 (5/5)

FOIA

F06-114/1

Box Number 7

YARHI-MILO

704

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
6382	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE [1-4] <i>R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1</i>	4	12/28/1984	B1
6384	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC#6382 [6-9] <i>R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1</i>	4	12/28/1984	B1
6388	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE CHERNENKO'S LETTER TO PRESIDENT REAGAN DECEMBER 20, 1984 [10-11] <i>R 3/3/2011 F2006-114/1</i>	2	12/31/1984	B1
6392	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE HAMMER [16] <i>R 2/17/2010 GUIDELINES</i>	1	12/31/1984	B1
6393	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #6392 [17] <i>R 2/17/2010 GUIDELINES</i>	1	12/31/1984	B1
6394	E-MAIL	E-MAIL PROFS MCFARLANE TO HAMMER RE HAMMER [18] <i>R 2/17/2010 GUIDELINES</i>	1	12/20/1984	B1
6395	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #6388 [20-21] <i>R 3/3/2011 F2006-114/1</i>	2	12/31/1984	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

ifm 04
MCF 1

NOT FOR SYSTEM

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

December 28, 1984

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *J&W*

SUBJECT: Geneva and Beyond: Your Discussions with Secretary Shultz

Following our brief chat this afternoon regarding your going to Geneva and your dinner with Dobrynin, I have the following thoughts which you may wish to consider as you think through your discussions with Secretary Shultz next week. (I am sharing them only with John Poindexter, and of course will not mention them to anyone else.)

Your Participation in Geneva Meetings

-- Although, so far as I can recall, it is unprecedented for the President's Assistant for National Security to attend a meeting with the Soviets not chaired by the President or himself, I believe the Secretary's action in inviting you is a good thing and that your presence will add a lot to the meeting if your role is properly defined.

-- The fact is that you know the arms control issues more thoroughly than anyone else in the USG, and furthermore, have discussed them in greater depth with the President, so that you are in the best position to know his mind.

-- It is precisely the latter, the President's intentions, which the Soviets will be looking for, and your comments will carry great weight in this regard.

-- The Soviets are likely to interpret your participation as either (1) an indication of the President's seriousness and commitment; or (2) a sign that there is division in the USG and that the Secretary must be watched.

-- We need, therefore to make sure that they draw the first rather than the second conclusion. (The presence of a large, multi-agency delegation at Geneva, though not at the actual table, tends to encourage the second.)

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR *Fob 114/1 #6382*

SECRET/SENSITIVE EYES ONLY

BY *CW* NARA DATE *11/27/07*

SECRET/SENSITIVE EYES ONLY

-- To do this, it will be important that you play a prominent role in the conversation, but one in complete harmony with what Shultz has to say.

-- I believe, therefore, that you should have a clear agreement with the Secretary regarding who covers what, and that you should aim to present roughly 40% of the U.S. position in terms of time actually spent speaking.

-- As soon as you are sure you will be going, the Soviets should be notified. This will give them an opportunity, if they choose, to add a senior official to their delegation. (They may have trouble, however, deciding just who is an appropriate counterpart, so we should give them as much time to think it over as we can.)

-- The notification can be done most rapidly by Secretary Shultz telephoning Dobrynin to say that he has persuaded you to go, and that he would appreciate his notifying Gromyko. (He should not suggest any change in the Soviet delegation, since they will make up their own minds on this in any case.)

The U.S. Delegation

-- We must make every effort to keep our group at the table as small as possible. We have already been told that Gromyko's group will be five plus interpreter (Gromyko, Karpov, Korniyenko, Dobrynin, Obukhov and Sukhodrev). We should make every effort not to exceed this.

-- On our side, Shultz, you and Nitze provide the core. We can add two more and still be in balance with the Soviet side.

-- At the risk of seeming self-serving, I would also suggest that my presence would be useful in several respects: I am the only one of our group who knows Russian well and can detect nuances left out of the translation (or asides which may not be translated). Additionally, I have observed Gromyko at some 40 or 50 meetings over a 12-year period and can provide some historical perspective to his approach and mannerisms. Finally, my presence would underscore -- in a perhaps minor, but significant sense -- your status as co-interlocutor, along with Shultz. The others will be his subordinates, and you should have a member of your staff at the table as well.

-- This leaves one slot, and I believe it should be filled by Hartman. This is important both for protocol (since Dobrynin will be there) and to maintain the reciprocal status of our Ambassador in Moscow. If he is excluded, then the Soviets will tend to disregard him as an interlocuteur valable.

SECRET/SENSITIVE EYES ONLY

Scheduling the Work

-- The presence of a large U.S. delegation, many not participating in the talks, as well as the horde of media representatives will greatly complicate budgeting the time of the participants. There will be an immediate requirement after each session to prepare a report to the President, to brief the full U.S. delegation, and to decide on next steps. After the final meeting, the Secretary must also brief the press. Since there may be only 2-3 hours between the morning and afternoon sessions, you might wish to discuss with the Secretary what procedures will be followed to ensure that everything gets done in an orderly fashion.

-- I would suggest that the Secretary plan to caucus with meeting participants immediately after each session in order to assign work responsibilities and also to decide whether any aspects of the meeting should not be conveyed to other members of the U.S. delegation. (Though I doubt this this will prove necessary, there should be a fail-safe mechanism to ensure that those in the room are aware of any details which should not be discussed with colleagues.) Alternatively, the rule could be established in advance that only the Secretary and you will brief anyone until written guidance has been prepared and approved by the two of you.

-- I would also recommend that sufficient time be left following the last meeting to get all ducks in a row before Shultz's departure. I believe that a second session on the 8th is a virtual certainty, and am concerned that a departure early that evening could unnecessarily compress the time available to wrap up everything. In addition to briefing the press, you and the Secretary will have to devote time to deciding in detail on the content of the briefings Nitze will provide the Allies at Brussels, and we should make sure that time is available for due reflection before everyone rushes off.

Your Trip to London

-- The idea of your stopping by to brief Thatcher on SDI is an excellent one, assuming that a private meeting with her can be arranged.

-- The only potential problem I can see is that, if your trip to London is widely known, it could give some offense to the other Allies, who might assume that the purpose is to give her preferential treatment in briefing on Geneva.

-- It will be difficult to keep the London trip secret, since it will be known that you were with Shultz in Geneva, and that you did not return with him. (His arrival at Andrews will presumably be covered by the media.)

SECRET/SENSITIVE EYES ONLY

4

SECRET/SENSITIVE EYES ONLY

-- A possible alternative would be for you to brief Thatcher on the way to Geneva -- which could possibly be done without attracting public attention -- and even if it did, would be less likely to cause offense to the other Allies than a private meeting just after Geneva. This would require an appointment on Saturday the 5th and departure for London the night of the 4th. Such a schedule would allow you to arrive in Geneva the night of the 5th or the morning of the 6th to participate in any last-minute discussions with Shultz before the Monday meeting.

Beyond Geneva: A Confidential Channel

-- Dobrynin was right in his comments to you at his dinner that we need a private channel if we are to make any real progress in resolving important problems with the Soviets.

-- However, we should continue to refuse it if it involves Dobrynin alone. This simply gives the Soviets too many advantages. A reciprocal arrangement, however, could be most beneficial to both sides.

-- If the Soviets are serious about negotiating, they will accept a reciprocal arrangement, despite their obvious and understandable preference for an arrangement which gives them access to our policy makers and denies us the same to theirs.

-- Ideally, we should arrange to use both our Ambassadors in this capacity, with each having access comparable to the other. Achieving this should be an operational objective for 1985.


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SECRET/SENSITIVE EYES ONLY



National Security Council
The White House

System #

EYES

Package #

ONLY

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Paul Thompson			
Bob Kimmitt			
John Poindexter	1	JF	
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room	2	JF	DACOM TO 1300
JP	3	JF	

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

December 28, 1984

INFORMATION

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SUBJECT:

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DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06714/1 #6384

BY CW NARA DATE 4/27/07~~SECRET/SENSITIVE EYES ONLY~~

SECRET/SENSITIVE EYES ONLY

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SECRET/SENSITIVE

December 31, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*SUBJECT: Chernenko's Letter to the President
of December 20, 1984

Secretary Shultz has forwarded a Memorandum for the President with a letter from Chernenko dated December 20 (TAB A).

Chernenko's letter is clearly meant to be a scene-setter for the Geneva talks. He does not, however, go into the substance of the Soviet position other than to stress the importance of dealing with the question of "space strike weapons," which he calls "the key link in this whole chain [of negotiations]." We can take this as confirmation that Gromyko will indeed concentrate on SDI and ASAT in his presentation.

Although Chernenko mentions elsewhere in the letter "the issue of non-militarization of outer space," the use of the term "strike space weapons," represents a shift toward a more precise definition of what the Soviets are after. Strictly speaking, the Russian phrase for "strike space weapons" could be translated just as accurately as "strike weapons in space" -- that is, it implies that ground-based or air-based weapons are not necessarily included, even if directed at objects in space.

Chernenko also accepts in principle consultations on regional issues and "revitalizing" bilateral U.S.-Soviet relations, but does not commit himself to specific meetings or topics. He provided no reaction to some of the specific suggestions in the President's letter of December 7, for example regarding meetings of foreign ministers following Geneva, and the possibility of Nitze meeting periodically with a counterpart. Presumably, the Soviet intent is to discuss these matters at Geneva.

I do not believe this letter requires a reply before the meeting in Geneva. As soon as we have had time to assess the outcome of Geneva, however, it might be useful for the President to send a letter summarizing our position in light of the Geneva meeting and making any further suggestions he might have at that time.

I attach a Memorandum for the President forwarding the letter and the Shultz memorandum, in case the President has not already seen this correspondence.

SECRET/SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/1 #6388

BY RW NARA DATE 3/3/11

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Ron
Ron Lehman concurs.

Recommendation:

That you forward the memorandum at TAB I to the President.

Approve

Disapprove

*President saw
an advance copy
on 12/24/84.*

Attachments:

Tab I - Memorandum to the President

Tab A - Shultz-President Memorandum with Letter from Chernenko
of December 20, 1984

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

JWC CHRO
12UNCLASSIFIED

December 31, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

THROUGH: ROBERT M. KIMMITT

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT: Invitation to Bilderberg Conference, May 9-12

I have received an invitation to participate in the 1985 Bilderberg Meeting at Rye Brook, New York, from May 9-12. The agenda will include social and economic trends on both sides of the Atlantic, the state of the Atlantic Alliance and how to deal with the Soviet bloc.

Since the Bilderberg group normally includes a number of influential figures, I believe it will be useful for me to attend.

My travel expenses would be reimbursed by the American Friends of Bilderberg, Inc., a non-profit organization.

Recommendation:

That you approve my participation in the Bilderberg Meeting at Rye Brook, New York, May 9-12, 1985.

Approve K Disapprove

Attachment:

Jack: Recall we may be with President in Europe for post-Summit travel on 5-12 May.

Tab I - Letter of Invitation from Theodore L. Eliot, Jr. *Bob*

cc: Administrative Office

1/9/85

13

1. TRAVELER'S NAME: JACK F. MATLOCK

2. PURPOSE(S), EVENT(S), DATE(S): To attend the 1985 Bilderberg Mtg. at Rye Brook, New York, from May 9-12.

3. ITINERARY (Please Attach Copy of Proposed Itinerary): Washington-Arrowood in Rye Brook, New York - Washington

DEPARTURE DATE o/a May 8 RETURN DATE o/a May 13

TIME TIME

4. MODE OF TRANSPORTATION:

GOV AIR COMMERCIAL AIR XX POV RAIL OTHER

5. ESTIMATED EXPENSES:

TRANSPORTATION PER DIEM OTHER TOTAL TRIP COST

6. WHO PAYS EXPENSES: NSC OTHER XX

7. IF NOT NSC, DESCRIBE SOURCE AND ARRANGEMENTS: The American Friends of Bilderberg Inc. will cover all expenses.

8. WILL FAMILY MEMBER ACCOMPANY YOU: YES NO XX

9. IF SO, WHO PAYS FOR FAMILY MEMBER (If Travel Not Paid by Traveler, Describe Source and Arrangements):

10. TRAVEL ADVANCE REQUESTED: \$ NO

11. REMARKS (Use This Space to Indicate Any Additional Items You Would Like to Appear on Your Travel Orders):

12. TRAVELER'S SIGNATURE:

13. APPROVALS:

14
0016 1213

Officers and Directors
Henry J. Heinz, II, President
Theodore L. Eliot, Jr., Secretary
Jack F. Bennett, Treasurer
David Rockefeller
Joseph H. Williams

American Friends of Bilderberg, Inc.

477 Madison Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10022 · (212) 752-6515 · Cable - MURDENCO Telex - 236554 ADFI UR

November 29, 1984

Mr. Jack F. Matlock, Jr.
Senior Director
European and Russian Affairs
National Security Council
368 Old Executive Office Building
Washington, D. C. 20500

Dear Jack:

I am writing to invite you to participate in the 1985 Bilderberg Meeting which will take place at Arrowwood in Rye Brook, New York beginning with [REDACTED] and ending at lunchtime on Sunday, May 12.

The agenda will include discussions on divergent social and economic trends on the two sides of the Atlantic, the state of the Atlantic Alliance and how we should deal with the Soviet bloc and with the developing countries. Among the panelists who have so far agreed to participate are Rolf Dahrendorf, Harold Lever and Zbig Brzezinski. We hope to have Walter Wriston, Lawrence Eagleburger, Francis Pym, Helmut Schmidt and Franz Joseph Strauss.

Among the attendees will be membership of the International Steering Committee and Advisory Group listed below, joined by distinguished invitees. We will have about 30 Americans and 80 from Europe and Canada. I enclose a report of this year's conference at Saltsjobaden, Sweden to give you an impression of the distinction of the participation and the quality of the discussion. We expect to have strong representation from the Administration and new Congressional leadership, professional experts and private business and labor leadership concerned with the international scene.

I want to stress that we expect all participants to be present for the entire proceedings. Private discussions and socializing are vital to achieving the purpose of Bilderberg and to making possible a rewarding, enjoyable weekend for all participants.

15

The International Steering Committee members look forward to having you at Arrowwood. We believe you would make a valuable contribution to the discussions and to the furthering of trans-Atlantic ties, which is the underlying purpose of Bilderberg.

Please reply at your earliest convenience in order to help us assemble a delegation of the desired caliber and balance.

Sincerely yours,



Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.
Honorary Secretary-General
for the United States

MEMORANDUM

Matlock
SYSTEM II
91323
16
Dec. 84
CHROY

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

December 31, 1984

SECRET

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK

SUBJECT: Armand Hammer Interest in Inviting Soviet Deputy Prime Minister Nuriev to U.S.

Secretary Block has requested your advice on a letter he received from Armand Hammer requesting Block's support for Hammer's plan to invite Deputy Prime Minister Nuriev -- who has overall supervision of agriculture -- to the United States.

Though I am not enamored of Hammer's free-wheeling in dealing with the Soviets, I see no real harm in approving this visit, given Nuriev's responsibilities. Presumably, we would have to see to it that he has some high-level meetings in Washington, but that should present no great problem unless there is an unexpected nose-dive in U.S.-Soviet relations (in which case, Nuriev probably would not come anyway).

I have checked with State/EUR and they concur that the visit should be approved.

Doug McMinn concurs.

Recommendation:

That you notify Secretary Block that we have no objection to his supporting Hammer's invitation to Nuriev.

Approve *[Signature]*

Disapprove _____

Passed to Ray Lett on 1/8/85

Attachment:

Tab I -- RCM Prompt Note and Hammer letter to Block

RMK

DECLASSIFIED
Sec. 3.4(b), E.O. 12958, as amended
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2008
BY NARA *[Signature]*, DATE 2/17/10

SECRET

JHC
17

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

December 31, 1984

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Approve ___ Disapprove ___

Attachment:

Tab I -- RCM Prompt Note and Hammer letter to Block

DECLASSIFIED
Sec.3.4(b), E.O. 12958, as amended
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2006
BY NARA [initials], DATE 2/17/10

~~SECRET~~

MSG FROM: NSRMK --CPUA TO: NSBTM --CPUA
To: NSBTM --CPUA

12/20/84 10:03:22

-- ~~SECRET~~ --

NOTE FROM: Robert M. Kimmitt
Subject: Forwarding Note 12/19/84 16:26 Hammer-Interest in Soviet DepPrim Min V
print out and send with package to matlock.

* * * F O R W A R D E D N O T E * * *

To: NSRMK --CPUA

-- ~~SECRET~~ --

NOTE FROM: ROBERT MCFARLANE
SUBJECT: Hammer-Interest in Soviet DepPrim Min Visit here

Armand Hammer has called (and written to) Jack Block urging that he invite a
Sov DepPrimMin (Nuriev--sic) who has the portfolio for overseeing agriculture
(senio to the Min of Ag according to Hammer) sometime next year. Block will
send us to the letter. Please staff it to Jack for a quick turnaround. Many
thanks.

cc: NSRMK --CPUA

NSJMP --CPUA

DECLASSIFIED
Sec.3.4(b), E.O. 13526, as amended
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2008
BY NARA CL, DATE 2/17/10

OCCIDENTAL PETROLEUM CORPORATION

10889 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD · SUITE 1600

LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90024

(213) 208-8800

DEC 19 5:25

December 18, 1984

ARMAND HAMMER
CHAIRMAN AND
CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER

The Honorable John Block
Secretary of Agriculture
Department of Agriculture
Washington, DC

Dear John:

It was good talking to you Monday, however briefly. I hope when you get the decks cleared away for the next four years we may have the chance for a good long meeting. I am glad you think that my idea to have Deputy Prime Minister Nuriev visit the United States as my guest is a good one. I am pleased that you will support application to the State Department for the necessary visas. He will be accompanied by five or six assistants, and I will put a plane at his disposal, as well as make room for any necessary State Department personnel. Naturally, I will pay all the expenses of the visit.

I would be very pleased if you could map out places for him to visit. He is in charge of the Agri complex of the U.S.S.R., which includes not only farming, but also manufacture of tractors, canneries, and everything else concerning food supplies. I believe his visit could lead to purchases of equipment in the U.S.

I met Minister Nuriev after I saw President Chernenko, who is aware of his possible visit and supports it. Mr. Nuriev is the superior of Minister Mesyats with whom you made a very great hit during his visit. The agreement you signed has, I note, been in papers everywhere I have travelled in the world in the past two weeks.

Minister Nuriev's proposed visit would have significance because of his rank. He would be the second Deputy Prime Minister to come here, Mr. Gromyko's visit being the first.

I spoke with Ambassador Dobrynin about this Monday. He leaves January 2nd for Moscow to prepare for the Shultz-Gromyko meeting. It would be very helpful if he could bring with him State Department clearance for the proposed Nuriev visit.

As always, my warmest best wishes,

Sincerely,



AH:ec

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

December 31, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*SUBJECT: Chernenko's Letter to the President
of December 20, 1984

Secretary Shultz has forwarded a Memorandum for the President with a letter from Chernenko dated December 20 (TAB A).

Chernenko's letter is clearly meant to be a scene-setter for the Geneva talks. He does not, however, go into the substance of the Soviet position other than to stress the importance of dealing with the question of "space strike weapons," which he calls "the key link in this whole chain [of negotiations]." We can take this as confirmation that Gromyko will indeed concentrate on SDI and ASAT in his presentation.

Although Chernenko mentions elsewhere in the letter "the issue of non-militarization of outer space," the use of the term "strike space weapons," represents a shift toward a more precise definition of what the Soviets are after. Strictly speaking, the Russian phrase for "strike space weapons" could be translated just as accurately as "strike weapons in space" -- that is, it implies that ground-based or air-based weapons are not necessarily included, even if directed at objects in space.

Chernenko also accepts in principle consultations on regional issues and "revitalizing" bilateral U.S.-Soviet relations, but does not commit himself to specific meetings or topics. He provided no reaction to some of the specific suggestions in the President's letter of December 7, for example regarding meetings of foreign ministers following Geneva, and the possibility of Nitze meeting periodically with a counterpart. Presumably, the Soviet intent is to discuss these matters at Geneva.

I do not believe this letter requires a reply before the meeting in Geneva. As soon as we have had time to assess the outcome of Geneva, however, it might be useful for the President to send a letter summarizing our position in light of the Geneva meeting and making any further suggestions he might have at that time.

I attach a Memorandum for the President forwarding the letter and the Shultz memorandum, in case the President has not already seen this correspondence.

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

NLRR FD06-11411#6395

BY RW NARA DATE 3/3/11

Ron
Ron Lehman concurs.

Recommendation:

That you forward the memorandum at TAB I to the President.

Approve

Disapprove

*President saw
an advance copy
on 12/24/84.*

Attachments:

- Tab I - Memorandum to the President
- Tab A - Shultz-President Memorandum with Letter from Chernenko of December 20, 1984

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

TO: Bob Kimmitt

FROM: Jack Matlock

- Since submitting the memo originally, I have learned that I can travel (Super Apex) for \$418. round trip if I stay 7 days. Since I'd like to take a day or 2 leave, that would be OK with me.
- Since I will be doing USG business on the trip, I would prefer not to ask Ditchley to defray the travel expenses. When the program in London is set, the Embassy, State or USIA will certainly pick up the per diem - and perhaps the travel.
- However since the cost is modest (under \$500.) I would request approval at this time so that the Apex ticket can be purchased.

Jack

National Security Council
The White House

System # I.

Package # 0015

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Paul Thompson	<u>1</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	
Bob Kimmitt	<u>2</u>	<u>K</u>	
John Poindexter			
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room			
<u>Hatlock</u>	<u>3</u>		<u>A</u>

I = Information	<u>A = Action</u>	R = Retain	D = Dispatch	N = No further Action
-----------------	-------------------	------------	--------------	-----------------------

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

Jack: ① Ditchley generally pays for the expenses of our participants -- Gaston Seger most recently. Could you double check with them on that.

② Also, could State or USA cover this because of additional days in London?

③ Finally, on air fare. So that coaches business?

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

UNCLASSIFIED

December 31, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

THROUGH: ROBERT M. KIMMITT

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT: Invitation to Attend Ditchley Conference

I have been invited to participate in a conference at Ditchley Park, England, on "The Next Four Years in East-West Relations," to be held March 1-3.

Although I normally do not accept invitations to conferences when the sponsors do not pay travel costs, I believe that this one may well justify the use of NSC funds for my travel. The Ditchley Foundation normally assembles a very prestigious group of opinion makers -- particularly from the U.K., but also from the Continent -- and the topic at this conference is one of key importance in keeping Allied opinion in step with our policies. The fact that Marshall Shulman is scheduled to chair the conference makes it particularly important to have someone there who can articulate the Administrations's point of view.

Also, for some time, Embassy London has been asking if I could spend a couple of days in London to support their public diplomacy program, by talking informally with opinion makers (on background) regarding our approach to East-West relations. If I travel to England for the Ditchley Conference, I would propose that I plan a day or two in London before or after the conference for scheduling by the Embassy for this purpose.

Recommendation:

That you approve my travel to Ditchley for the conference March 1-3 at NSC expense, and for one to two days' consultation at Embassy London preceding or following the conference.

Approve RMK Disapprove

Attachment:

Thanks for seeking the lower fare, Jack.

Tab I - Letter from American Ditchley Foundation

cc: Administrative Office

Bob
1/31/85

NSC STAFF TRAVEL AUTHORIZATION

DATE: January 31, 1985

- 1. TRAVELER'S NAME: JACK F. MATLOCK
- 2. PURPOSE(S), EVENT(S), DATE(S): To attend Conference at Ditchley Park, England on "The Next Four Years in East-West Relations," to be held on March 1-3.

- 3. ITINERARY (Please Attach Copy of Proposed Itinerary):
Washing, D.C.-London/Ditchley Park, England - Washington, D.C.

DEPARTURE DATE o/a Feb. 28 RETURN DATE o/a March 7
 TIME LV 9:00 PM TIME 1:40 PM

- 4. MODE OF TRANSPORTATION:
 GOV AIR COMMERCIAL AIR XX POV RAIL OTHER

- 5. ESTIMATED EXPENSES:
 TRANSPORTATION \$421 PER DIEM OTHER \$50 TOTAL TRIP COST 471

- 6. WHO PAYS EXPENSES: NSC XX OTHER

- 7. IF NOT NSC, DESCRIBE SOURCE AND ARRANGEMENTS:

- 8. WILL FAMILY MEMBER ACCOMPANY YOU: YES X NO

- 9. IF SO, WHO PAYS FOR FAMILY MEMBER (If Travel Not Paid by Traveler, Describe Source and Arrangements): Traveler

- 10. TRAVEL ADVANCE REQUESTED: \$ None

- 11. REMARKS (Use This Space to Indicate Any Additional Items You Would Like to Appear on Your Travel Orders):

- 12. TRAVELER'S SIGNATURE: Jack F. Matlock

TRAVEL OF JACK F. MATLOCK -- TO ATTEND CONFERENCE AT
DITCHLEY, PARK, ENGLAND -- MARCH 1 - 3, 1985

ITINERARY

Feb. 28 9:00 PM Depart Wash., D.C. on PANAM #106
March 1 9:00 AM Arrive London

March 7 10:15 AM - Depart London on PANAM #107
March 7 1:40 PM - Arrive Wash., D.C.

COST OF TICKET: \$418 + \$3 Tax = \$421

THE AMERICAN DITCHLEY FOUNDATION

477 Madison Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10022
Phone (212) 752-6515
Telex 236554 Cable Address: MURDENCO

Honorary Directors
George S. Franklin
Henry J. Heinz, II, KBE
Louis B. Warren, CBE

Officers and Directors
Cyrus R. Vance
Chairman
Hoyt Ammidon, CBE
President
Keith Hight
Vice President
J. G. Clarke
Treasurer

John Brademas
Mrs. Anne Cox Chambers
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Robert G. Engel
Douglas Fairbanks, Jr.
Richard N. Gardner
Mrs. Rita E. Hauser
Sir Reginald Hibbert, GCMG
Lord Hunt of Tanworth, GCB
Philip M. Kaiser
William F. May
Dr. Elizabeth J. McCormack
Donald F. McHenry

12/7 28
Peter S. Paine, Jr.
Elliot Richardson
William Matson Roth
Dr. Donna E. Shalala
Stephen Stamas
Mrs. Ronald Tree
Sir H.D.H. Wills, CBE, TD, DL
Paul Guth
Secretary
Charles W. Muller
Administrative Director
Carol S. Arnold
Assistant Secretary

December 4, 1984

Mr. Jack F. Matlock
Special Assistant to
the President
National Security Council
Washington, D. C. 20506

Dear Mr. Matlock:

The Ditchley Foundations will hold a conference on "The Next Four Years in East-West Relations" March 1-3, 1985 at Ditchley Park, England, and I am writing to ask if you would be available to attend.

Professor Marshall Shulman will chair the conference. The Terms of Reference are enclosed.

If you wish to participate, please let me know and I will advise Sir Reginald Hibbert. I would appreciate your mailing me a brief biography to be used with the list of participants.

We look forward to having you at Ditchley Park.

Sincerely,


Charles W. Muller

enclosure

29

THE DITCHLEY FOUNDATIONS

CONFERENCE ON

THE NEXT FOUR YEARS IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS

1-3 March, 1985

TERMS OF REFERENCE

1. To assess the state of the relationship between the superpowers and the ways in which it might evolve over the four years of the incoming United States Presidency, with particular attention to the following points:

(a) the capacity of the Soviet leadership to break out of its current siege mentality. Are the Soviet leaders weighed down by age, factional struggles, and the inflexibility of the system; or will they achieve a new stability once the lengthy transition from Brezhnev's generation to the next is achieved; or are there reasons to expect longer term changes in the Soviet system and Soviet society?

(b) the respective general aims and preoccupations of the United States and Soviet governments and the extent of the readiness of each to make some accommodation for the other: the main priorities of the United States government on the one hand and the Soviet government on the other at home and abroad.

(c) the military rivalry: are there economic or political limits to military spending: which are the areas of military development which are likely to receive priority? If there are spending limits what are their effects on Soviet foreign policy?

(d) the prospects for arms control talks: under what conditions can negotiations on nuclear force limitations be expected to resume? In what political circumstances and under what technical framework? How can arms control in outer space be introduced, and fitted into this framework? How can negotiations on conventional forces (MFBR, CDE) best be pursued? How can the present negotiations on chemical weapons be brought to a successful conclusion?

(e) Soviet priorities and aims in the different regions of the world and the United States reaction to them: Europe, Middle East, South Asia, South-East Asia, East and North-East Asia, Central and South America, Africa: is there scope for dialogue about the situations in these areas, or about a general code of conduct which could be applied in all crisis areas? Does the Soviet Union nurture real hopes of having the edge in superpower competition?

(f) factors which might work in favour of cooperation (eg trade, scientific and technical exchanges) and factors which militate against it (eg human rights issues, crises in Eastern Europe or the third world, uneven levels of technological advance between the US, USSR, Japan and Europe): are there any bilateral elements which might contribute to better political relations between the United States and the Soviet Union?

2. To consider how the interests of the allies of the two superpowers are likely to interact with those of the superpowers themselves, with particular attention to the following points:

(a) the nature of the leading roles played by the US and USSR within their own alliances and in international politics, and the extent to which they are being modified.

(b) the extent to which the European allies of the US have interests in East/West relations which are not necessarily identical with those of the US and require accommodation and management: economic difficulties in meeting NATO defence spending targets, the FRG's need for Ostpolitik, France's independent attitude, new internal political trends in European countries, stirrings about European defence cooperation a growth of non-conformity among some of the smaller members of NATO.

(c) the Soviet Union's economic and other difficulties in Eastern Europe ranging from the growing feeling that Soviet performance and policies do not correspond with Eastern European hopes for their own future, to immediate difficulties in some countries: the extent to which these can be influenced by Western policies.

(d) the importance of dialogue and, if possible, relaxation of tension for countries in both east and west Europe: for which side is detente in Europe most dangerous?

(e) the degree to which the US and the Soviet Union have need of allies in parts of the world other than Europe especially in the east Asian and Pacific region: countries which they respectively seek as allies and the regional confrontations which sometimes ensue: the contribution which the European partners of the US can make to stability and resistance to the Soviet Union in other regions of the world.

RECEIVED 19 DEC 84 12

TO PRESIDENT

FROM ANDERSON, ROBERT O

DOCDATE 21 NOV 84

CLARK, D

00 00

Matlock
Chow

KEYWORDS: EUROPE EAST

EUROPE WEST

SUBJECT: FWDS ASPEN INSTITUTE INTL GRP PAPER RE MANAGING EAST - WEST CONFLICT
/ A FRAMEWORK FOR SUSTAINED ENGAGEMENT

ACTION: MEMO KIMMITT TO HIGGINS

DUE: 20 DEC 84 STATUS S FILES WH

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MATLOCK

COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSCIFID (CM *CH*)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
<i>McFarlane</i>	<i>T 1/3</i>	<i>For Decision</i>		
	<i>C 1/05</i>	<i>Kimmit</i>		<i>RK, JM</i>

4/20/84

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE (C)

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

UNCLASSIFIED

December 31, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCEARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SIGNED

SUBJECT: Robert O. Anderson Letter to the President
Forwarding an Aspen Institute Report on Managing
the East-West Conflict

Robert O. Anderson of Atlantic Richfield has written the President to forward a statement of the Aspen Institute International Group, which he chaired, entitled Managing East-West Conflict: A Framework for Sustained Engagement.

Given the fact that the statement was signed by persons such as Helmut Schmidt, Bruno Kreisky, Pierre Trudeau, Jim Callaghan, Edward Heath and Shirley Williams -- not to speak of Cyrus Vance, Robert McNamara and Elliot Richardson -- it is remarkably realistic and not given to the sort of one-sided attack on U.S. policies in which several of the signatories have engaged in other contexts. In fact, it can be read as highly supportive of the sort of policies we are following.

Much of the credit for the moderation and overall supportive cast of this document belongs to Herb Okun, who is temporarily on loan to the Aspen Institute, and who managed, by influencing the drafting process, to produce and get agreement on a much more solid document than the other participants, if left to their own devices, would have produced.

In view of Anderson's prominence, and that of many of the signatories, I believe it would be appropriate to acknowledge the report with a letter signed by the President. This would doubtless be satisfying to Anderson (who, as you know, has peppered us with numerous suggestions which we were unable to take), and also could have a salutary effect on at least some of the signatories.

Recommendation:

That you authorize the Kimmitt-Higgins Memo at Tab I recommending that the Anderson letter be answered by the letter from the President at Tab A.

Approve RMK Disapprove

Attachments:

- Tab I - Kimmitt-Higgins Memo
- Tab A - Letter from President to Robert O. Anderson
- Tab II - Higgins-Kimmitt Memorandum with letter from Anderson and enclosure

National Security Council
The White House

34 gff

System #

I

Package #

9180

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Paul Thompson	<u>1</u>	<u>4</u>	
Bob Kimmitt	<u>2</u>	<u>K</u>	
John Poindexter			
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat	<u>3</u>		<u>D</u>
Situation Room			

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

January 5, 1985

UNCLASSIFIEDACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANNE HIGGINS

FROM: ROBERT M. KIMMITT Boh

SUBJECT: Robert O. Anderson Letter to the President
Forwarding an Aspen Institute Report on Managing
the East-West Conflict

In reference to your memorandum regarding the letter to the President from Robert O. Anderson, which conveyed a copy of the report of the Aspen Institute International Group on managing East-West Relations, we believe it would be appropriate to reply with a letter signed by the President.

The report contains an approach to East-West relations largely consistent with our current policy, and given the prominence of the group which signed it, as well as Anderson's own status, a Presidential letter praising the group for its efforts could be helpful in promoting understanding of our policy.

A letter to Anderson for the President's signature is attached.

Enclosure:

Tab A - Letter to Robert O. Anderson from the President

36

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Dear Bob:

Thank you for sending me a copy of the statement of the Aspen Institute International Group, "Managing East-West Conflict: A Framework for Sustained Engagement." I read it with interest and admiration.

I believe your distinguished group's approach is generally consistent with my own thinking. As set forth in your statement, sustained engagement based on strength and negotiating flexibility is a constructive and realistic Western policy for dealing with the Communist countries. We have nothing to fear from dealing squarely with them on all problems. The group's strong endorsement of increasing Western teamwork is in accord with my own views and I appreciate your offering practical suggestions for achieving it. I especially welcome the faith your group expresses in Western values and the confidence you display that our system will prevail in peace.

Please convey my personal appreciation to the members of the Group. I know many of them well, and I look forward to working with you and them in the months and years ahead.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Robert O. Anderson
Box 1000
Roswell, New Mexico 88201

31
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Date

To: Carol Cleveland/NSC

Please review this letter and return it to me with any comments or recommendations you have.

DUNCAN CLARK
Presidential Correspondence
Office
Room 98, x7610

DRAFT/Date Dec 13, 1987

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS: 38

RR/ _____ / _____ / _____
(Drafter) (Rev. I) (Rev. II)

Enclosures: Return to RDC

AVH/ RDC / AVH

Other: See E clear with NS

Dear Mr. Anderson:

On behalf of President Reagan, I want to thank you for forwarding to him a copy of "Managing East-West Conflict: A Framework for Sustained Engagement", a Statement of the Aspen Institute International Group.

President Reagan shares your concern for world peace, and he is determined to do everything consistent with our national interest to pursue a path of negotiations with the Soviet Union on all matters, including arms control, on which agreements are possible. Your report has been shared with the President's advisers in this area, and it will receive careful attention.

With the President's best wishes,

S/AVH
ANNE HIGGINS

718
ROBERT O. ANDERSON

Box 1000

ROSWELL, NEW MEXICO

88201

381

The President
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

I have the honor to transmit to you a Statement of the Aspen Institute International Group, "Managing East-West Conflict: A Framework for Sustained Engagement". The Statement is the fruit of almost two years of deliberations by a distinguished non-partisan group of statesmen, past and present, from the Western democracies and Japan.

The Aspen Group was animated by the spirit that the West can do what has to be done, that by boldly taking the initiative in dealing with the East we can rally our people, work closely together as governments, pursue common policies more effectively, defend our values, and challenge the East to cooperate in areas, however limited, where interests are parallel.

Our Statement's proposals for "sustained engagement", we believe, stem from a realistic concern over the dangers we face weighed against the confidence we have that freedom can and will prevail peacefully. This profound faith and historical confidence sustained us in our work and enabled the Group - in spite of its diverse political views - to forge a consensus on how to deal with the East.

Allow me, Mr. President, to wish you all the best as you set forth once again on your historic task.

Sincerely,

November 21, 1984

THE WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

40

INCOMING

DATE RECEIVED: NOVEMBER 26, 1984

NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: MR. ROBERT O. ANDERSON

SUBJECT ENCLOSURES A STATEMENT OF THE ASPEN INSTITUTE,
MANAGING EAST-WEST CONFLICT: A FRAMEWORK FOR
SUSTAINED ENGAGEMENT.

ROUTE TO: OFFICE/AGENCY (STAFF NAME)	ACTION		DISPOSITION	
	ACT CODE	DATE YY/MM/DD	TYPE RESP	C COMPLETED D YY/MM/DD
MARY JO JACOBI	ORG	84/11/26		/ /
REFERRAL NOTE:		/ /		/ /
REFERRAL NOTE:		/ /		/ /
REFERRAL NOTE:		/ /		/ /
REFERRAL NOTE:		/ /		/ /
REFERRAL NOTE:		/ /		/ /

COMMENTS

ADDITIONAL CORRESPONDENTS: MEDIA:L INDIVIDUAL CODES:

PL MAT USER CODES: (A) (B) (C)

```

*****
*ACTION CODES:          *DISPOSITION CODES:          *OUTGOING          *
*                       *                       * CORRESPONDENCE:  *
*A-APPROPRIATE ACTION  *A-ANSWERED          *TYPE RESP=INITIALS *
*C-COMMENT/RECOM       *B-NON-SPEC-REFERRAL *   OF SIGNER      *
*D-DRAFT RESPONSE      *C-COMPLETED        *   CODE = A       *
*F-FURNISH FACT SHEET  *S-SUSPENDED        *COMPLETED = DATE OF *
*I-INFO COPY/NO ACT NEC*                       *   OUTGOING      *
*R-DIRECT REPLY W/COPY *                       *                   *
*S-FOR-SIGNATURE       *                       *                   *
*X-INTERIM REPLY       *                       *                   *
*****

```

REFER QUESTIONS AND ROUTING UPDATES TO CENTRAL REFERENCE
(ROOM 75, OEOB) EXT. 2590
KEEP THIS WORKSHEET ATTACHED TO THE ORIGINAL INCOMING
LETTER AT ALL TIMES AND SEND COMPLETED RECORD TO RECORDS
MANAGEMENT.

→ File with
Crown. My
memo -

ROBERT O. ANDERSON
Box 1000
ROSWELL, NEW MEXICO
88201

...orella & says
this ltr is in the Q1
system -- she has
folders around &
as soon as it
surfaces, she will
send it to you.
M.A.

JK

The President
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

I have the honor to transmit to you a Statement of the Aspen Institute International Group, "Managing East-West Conflict: A Framework for Sustained Engagement". The Statement is the fruit of almost two years of deliberations by a distinguished non-partisan group of statesmen, past and present, from the Western democracies and Japan.

The Aspen Group was animated by the spirit that the West can do what has to be done, that by boldly taking the initiative in dealing with the East we can rally our people, work closely together as governments, pursue common policies more effectively, defend our values, and challenge the East to cooperate in areas, however limited, where interests are parallel.

Our Statement's proposals for "sustained engagement", we believe, stem from a realistic concern over the dangers we face weighed against the confidence we have that freedom can and will prevail peacefully. This profound faith and historical confidence sustained us in our work and enabled the Group - in spite of its diverse political views - to forge a consensus on how to deal with the East.

Allow me, Mr. President, to wish you all the best as you set forth once again on your historic task.

Sincerely,

12/18/84

Anderson

I still have not
gotten this letter.
I need to do answer
promptly. Please try
to track it down
ASAP.