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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

**Withdrawer**

JET 3/26/2005

**File Folder** MATLOCK CHRON DECEMBER 1984 (4/5)

**FOIA**

F06-114/1

**Box Number** 7

YARHI-MILO

703

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
6347	E-MAIL	E-MAIL PROFS MARTIN TO MATLOCK; MCFARLANE TO MARTIN [5] <b>R 2/17/2010 GUIDELINES</b>	1	12/14/1984	B1
6349	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE [16-18] <b>R 3/27/2012 M266/1</b>	3	12/26/1984	B1
6350	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #6349 [21-23] <b>R 3/27/2012 M266/1</b>	3	12/26/1984	B1
6351	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #6349 [24-26] <b>R 3/27/2012 M266/1</b>	3	12/26/1984	B1
6352	MEMO	THOMAS JOHNSON RE SDI [27-28] <b>R 11/15/2007 NLRRF06-114/1</b>	2	12/20/1984	B1
6353	MEMO	THOMAS JOHNSON RE SDI [29-34]] <b>R 11/15/2007 NLRRF06-114/1</b>	6	12/20/1984	B1
6354	MEMO	SABLE TO MCFARLANE RE GORE TRIP TO MOSCOW [35] <b>R 2/17/2010 GUIDELINES</b>	1	12/26/1984	B1
6355	MEMO	LEHMAN TO MCFARLANE RE GORE TRIP TO MOSCOW [36] <b>R 2/17/2010 GUIDELINES</b>	1	12/13/1984	B1
6356	CABLE	120950Z DEC 84 [37-40] <b>R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1</b>	4	12/12/1984	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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703

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
6357	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE SDI [41-43] <i>R 1/11/2012 M125/2</i>	3	12/26/1984	B1
6358	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #6352 [44-45] <i>R 11/15/2007 NLRRF06-114/1</i>	2	12/20/1984	B1
6359	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #6353 [46-51] <i>R 11/15/2007 NLRRF06-114/1</i>	6	12/20/1984	B1
6348	MEMO	MCFARLANE TO MATLOCK RE HAMMER [6] <i>R 2/17/2010 GUIDELINES</i>	1	12/13/1984	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.



2 File C

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

December 24, 1984

Dear Mr. Hammer:

Thank you for your letters of December 8 to the President and me regarding your meeting with Chairman Chernenko and your speech at the Human Rights Conference in Madrid.

We appreciate your briefing Ambassador Hartman on your meeting. He has, of course, kept us informed.

We are encouraged by your judgment that Chairman Chernenko is ready to negotiate, and you can rest assured that we will be making every reasonable effort to get productive negotiations under way.

With best wishes for the holiday season and the New Year.

Sincerely,



Robert C. McFarlane

Mr. Armand Hammer  
Chairman and Executive Director  
Occidental Petroleum Corporation  
10889 Wilshire Boulevard  
Los Angeles, California 90024



C2

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

December 18, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Response to Mr. Armand Hammer

As requested, attached at Tab I for your signature to Mr. Hammer acknowledging his letters to you and to the President, dated December 8, 1984 (Tab II).

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab I.

Approve ✓ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments:

- Tab I Proposed Letter to Mr. Hammer
- Tab II Incoming letters to you and the President, dated December 8, 1984

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. Hammer:

Thank you for your letters of December 8 to the President and me regarding your meeting with Chairman Chernenko and your speech at the Human Rights Conference in Madrid.

We appreciate your briefing Ambassador Hartman on your meeting. He has, of course, kept us informed.

We are encouraged by your judgment that Chairman Chernenko is ready to negotiate, and you can rest assured that we will be making every reasonable effort to get productive negotiations under way.

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Sincerely,

Robert C. McFarlane

Mr. Armand Hammer  
Chairman and Executive Director  
Occidental Petroleum Corporation  
10889 Wilshire Boulevard  
Los Angeles, California 90024

System # I 4  
Package # 8980

1481

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Paul Thompson	<u>1</u>	<u>PT</u>	
Bob Kimmitt	<u>2</u>	<u>R</u>	
John Poindexter	<u>3</u>	<u>J</u>	
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall	<u>4</u>		
Bud McFarlane	<u>A</u>		<u>A</u>
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room			
<u>MARLOCK</u>	<u>4</u>		

I = Information    A = Action    R = Retain    D = Dispatch    N = No further Action

cc: VP    Meese    Baker    Deaver    Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS                      Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)

*I don't see we owe him anything  
 After what he said, I don't think  
 we should offer a meeting here.  
 Draft a letter for Paul to send back  
 and suggest he meet with Amacost. J*



MATLOCK

MSG FROM: NSWFM --CPUA TO: NSGVE --CPUA  
To: NSGVE --CPUA GEORGE VAN ERON

12/15/84 09:47:43

6947

~~SECRET~~

NOTE FROM: WILLIAM F. MARTIN

Subject: Forwarding Note 12/14/84 18:09 Armand Hammer  
Could you please print out and give Jack Matlock the following message. thanks.

Jack,

The message below from Bud response to a message I sent him from David Fisher. Armand Hammer contacted Fisher to see what the status was of his letter. David wanted me to give Bud a heads up that the letter had arrived. I mentioned to Bud that you had action on it. Bill

\*\*\* F O R W A R D E D N O T E \*\*\*

To: NSWFM --CPUA

~~SECRET~~

NOTE FROM: ROBERT MCFARLANE

Subject: Reply to Note 12/14/84 16:15 Armand Hammer  
I will welcome Jack's recommendation as to who receives Hammer--if anyone--but I do not want the President to receive him. I will do it if forced to.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

TO: Bob Kimball

SUB: Hammer letter

See attached note. I don't mind drafting a letter if I know what Bud wants to say - but a "short acknowledgement" will not do, since we have to address the question of who meets with him.

My recommendation is that Bud or John call and try to handle on the telephone so that we can avoid a meeting - Jack

DECLASSIFIED

Sec.3.4(b), E.O. 12958, as amended  
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2008

DATE 2/17/10

MEMORANDUM

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

December 13, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*  
SUBJECT: Letter from Armand Hammer

Hammer has written you and the President regarding his meeting with Chernenko and has offered to come to Washington to brief you on the meeting. In an earlier letter, he suggested Tuesday, December 11, but was told that you would be out of town.

I still feel that there is no need for the President to receive Hammer -- and indeed for him to do so following Hammer's public espousal of a "non-first-use" policy could leave the damaging impression that the President is considering such a course.

Given Hammer's prominence, however, you might wish to contact him by telephone and let him know that we would be interested in any observations he has from his meeting with Chernenko. If he insists on a meeting here, I would recommend that we steer him to Ken Dam or Mike Armacost, if possible.

Recommendation:

That you telephone Hammer in reply to the letters at Tab I.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

## Attachment:

Tab I - Letters from Armand Hammer to the President and to Mr. McFarlane

Copies: Ron Lehman  
Karna Small  
Tom Shull  
John Lenczowski  
Bill Martin

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
Sec. 3.4(b), E.O. 12958, as amended  
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2006  
BY NARA *AS*, DATE *2/7/10*

OCCIDENTAL PETROLEUM CORPORATION

10889 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD • SUITE 1600

LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90024

(213) 879-1700 • (213) 208-8800

*Matthews  
draft  
for ack*  
DEC 10 1984

ARMAND HAMMER  
CHAIRMAN AND  
CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER

December 8, 1984

The Honorable Robert C. McFarlane  
Assistant to the President for  
National Security Affairs  
The White House  
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. McFarlane:

I recognize that the crisis meetings must take up all your thoughts, but wish to reiterate my willingness to provide any insights when convenient. As you suggested, I reported to Ambassador Hartman immediately.

I have written the attached letter to President Reagan and wanted you to have a copy.

I also felt I should send a note to Secretary Armacost and Mark Palmer

As always, my very best wishes,

Sincerely,



Attachment

AH:ec



8

# 259486

3  
NAC

OCCIDENTAL PETROLEUM CORPORATION

10889 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD • SUITE 1500  
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90024  
(213) 879-1700 • (213) 208-8800

ARMAND HAMMER  
CHAIRMAN AND  
CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER

December 8, 1984

The President  
The White House  
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President:

I am in Madrid where the annual Human Rights Conference which I sponsor is currently in discussions in the halls of the Spanish Parliament. Over thirty five nations, large and small, are represented by 115 delegates--international jurists, former Presidents and Foreign Ministers, leading professors, ambassadors and others who have dedicated parts of their lives, as I have, to being in the forefront of the struggle for human rights.

Friday, after former French Premier Edgar Faure offered some kind remarks about my career and meeting with President Chernenko, I was surprised to be called suddenly to speak extemporaneously on both the meeting in Moscow and my views of the current situation in arms control.

I will not burden you with my full remarks, but will say that I said that I believed that as a result of your opening statement last January, an historic window has been raised where now, at the height of your powers, there is an opportunity, absent over a decade, to move closer to mutual understanding and mutual reduction of armaments. I described you as a strong man whose vision in building our defenses has now brought the Russians to a point where serious negotiations are possible.

I said I viewed you as warm-hearted and earnest and that with your powers in America you alone could finally make a signpost treaty--a benchmark if you will--which could pass the Senate where others have failed ratification. This treaty could take into consideration the possibility of violation by conventional force attack which in turn could result in tactical nuclear response. Lastly, I said that I am neither a diplomat nor a warrior, but a businessman accustomed to finding solutions to problems, who earnestly seeks a legacy of peace. I see now an opportunity for a contract that will let us grant to all people that one great inalienable human right--peace.

To my astonishment, all of these sophisticated men and women rose in continuous applause, evidencing more than I have ever seen the hunger people have for the security of knowing nuclear confrontation is not their legacy to their children and grand children.

I felt compelled to share this thought with you. Indeed, by the time you receive this, you may have read some of it in the papers since the press has been daily beseiging me since the Chernenko meeting.

I stated to the press that I travelled to Moscow as a private citizen and carried no message.

Neither do I return with any message other than the statement President Chernenko gave me Tuesday.

I was very courteously received by Messrs. McFarlane, Armacost and Palmer in briefings before I left and have notified them that I am immediately available on my return to the U.S. Tuesday morning.

My meeting with President Chernenko lasted much longer than planned and offered some interesting insights, much of which I reported to Ambassador Hartman at dinner at his Embassy.

Whether it be that "no first use" is one more bargaining chip is something I must leave to the experts, but I have a very positive feeling that President Chernenko is ready to negotiate. My knowledge of the Russian character and the Soviet system of government, gained over 63 years, leads me to the conclusion that you and Mr. Chernenko in a face to face meeting can overcome the difficulties that I see ahead. I am convinced you are the one man who can do it and be remembered as the President who gave mankind its basic human right--the right to peace.

Respectfully,



AH:ec



THE WHITE HOUSE  
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

INCOMING

DATE RECEIVED DECEMBER 10, 1984

NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: THE HONORABLE ARMAND HAMMER

SUBJECT REGARDING THE PRESIDENT'S UPCOMING MEETING  
WITH PRESIDENT CHERNENKO

ROUTE TO: OFFICE/AGENCY (STAFF NAME)	ACTION		DISPOSITION	
	ACT CODE	DATE YY/MM/DD	TYPE RESP	C COMPLETED D YY/MM/DD
ROBERT C MCFARLANE	ORG	84/12/10		/ /
REFERRAL NOTE: _____		/ /		/ /
REFERRAL NOTE: _____		/ /		/ /
REFERRAL NOTE: _____		/ /		/ /
REFERRAL NOTE: _____		/ /		/ /
REFERRAL NOTE: _____		/ /		/ /

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

ADDITIONAL CORRESPONDENTS: MEDIA:L INDIVIDUAL CODES: \_\_\_\_\_

MI MAIL USER CODES: (A) \_\_\_\_\_ (B) \_\_\_\_\_ (C) \_\_\_\_\_

- \*\*\*\*\*
- |                          |                      |                      |   |
|--------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|---|
| *ACTION CODES:           | *DISPOSITION CODES:  | *OUTGOING            | * |
| *                        | *                    | * CORRESPONDENCE     | * |
| *A-APPROPRIATE ACTION    | *A-ANSWERED          | *TYPE RESP=INITIALS  | * |
| *C-COMMENT/RECOM         | *B-NON-SPEC-REFERRAL | * OF SIGNER          | * |
| *D-DRAFT RESPONSE        | *C-COMPLETED         | * CODE = A           | * |
| *F-FURNISH FACT SHEET    | *S-SUSPENDED         | *COMPLETED = DATE OF | * |
| *I-INFO COPY/NO ACT NEC* |                      | * OUTGOING           | * |
| *R-DIRECT REPLY W/COPY * |                      |                      | * |
| *S-FOR-SIGNATURE         |                      |                      | * |
| *X-INTERIM REPLY         |                      |                      | * |
- \*\*\*\*\*

REFER QUESTIONS AND ROUTING UPDATES TO CENTRAL REFERENCE  
(ROOM 75, OEOB) EXT. 2590  
KEEP THIS WORKSHEET ATTACHED TO THE ORIGINAL INCOMING  
LETTER AT ALL TIMES AND SEND COMPLETED RECORD TO RECORDS  
MANAGEMENT.



OCCIDENTAL PETROLEUM CORPORATION

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LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90024

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*Matthews  
draft  
for ack*  
DEC 10 1984

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Attachment

AH:ec

12

OCCIDENTAL PETROLEUM CORPORATION

10889 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD • SUITE 1500  
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90024  
(213) 879-1700 • (213) 208-8800

ARMAND HAMMER  
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CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER

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Respectfully,



AH:ec



~~SECRET~~ URGENT

Jack Matlock  
Eyes Only  
~~Bob [unclear]~~

~~SECRET~~

URGENT

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

CAS 6/10/02

14

PRESERVATION COPY

— 15  
—  
THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

EYES ONLY

Jack,

This is an interesting  
paper -- lot so good thoughts.  
As you stated there are  
some points with which  
I disagree but I do think  
substance is basically  
correct.

J

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997  
By Cts NARA, Date 6/11/02



6349

14

NOT FOR SYSTEM

MEMORANDUM

COPY FOR ADM. POINDEXTER  
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

December 26, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *from*

SUBJECT: SDI, Geneva and the Europeans

The interagency staffing of options for Geneva is most impressive in many respects, but in my judgment some considerations have not been adequately explored up to now. Since these are fundamental not only to our negotiating position, but also to the viability of SDI with the Allies and Congress, I would like to point them out.

1. There seems a tendency to consider any limitation on SDI as fatal to the program. I do not believe that this is the case, and in fact that an effort not to allow it to be touched in any respect could undermine the effectiveness of the program itself, and also make it impossible to get the levels of offensive weapons down.

-- What is essential, in my view, is ensuring that no limitations be placed on research. Since verification is impossible in this area, we should insist that research continue unrestrained on both sides.

-- This would leave such matters as types of demonstrations permitted, timing of possible deployments, and perhaps bans on testing certain types of devices (e.g. nuclear) in space as possible topics for negotiation, in the context of offensive weapons reduction.

2. The staff papers I have seen up to now also give insufficient attention to the likely Soviet reaction in the short and medium term to various U.S. options.

-- It is particularly fallacious, in my view, to argue that the cost/benefit ratio of defense and offense will inevitably force the Soviets toward a defensive strategy. First of all, we don't really know what the cost/benefit ratio will be when we have not even developed the defensive systems. But even if this ratio favored the defense, costs have never been a determining factor in Soviet minds. They generally do what they are capable of doing, and hang the cost.

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M2-66 # 6349

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

BY KML NARA DATE 3/27/12



~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

-- Therefore, we should give more attention to how the Soviets are likely to react in the short and medium term if we fail to present a negotiable proposal in the space area.

-- Such failures have plagued our negotiating postures in the past -- as when we insisted on the right to MIRV in the early 1970's, failing to foresee that in the long run MIRV technology would increase the threat of the Soviet heavy missiles without compensating U.S. advantage. We could make an analogous mistake today if we insist on preserving all options without regard to the impact certain technologies have on future Soviet capabilities.

-- What seems clear is that if the Soviets are convinced that we have embarked on a Manhattan-type project in SDI which could produce a breakthrough in a decade, they will refuse any substantial reductions in ICBM warheads (and perhaps actually increase them), and also move to expand their terminal BMD defenses, which they can deploy more rapidly than we can, since we have cancelled hardsite prototyping and development.

3. While the papers recognize the necessity of briefing the Allies and Congress, the success of these endeavors depends critically on the content of the consultations.

-- Virtually everyone agrees on the necessity of a research program in SDI. If we keep this the basis of our approach, we will be dealing from the high ground.

-- Some types of SDI demonstrations are likely, however, to be highly controversial, as are some potential programs (e.g., those involving nuclear devices in space or automated space battle stations). If we are seen to be in effect blocking offensive weapons reduction by insisting on these types of things in the near term, then we are likely to be unconvincing with both the Allies and Congress.

-- Therefore, an effort to preserve all options could in fact bring us the worst of both offensive and defensive worlds in the medium term: no offensive reductions, but political and budgetary constraints on us, and a Soviet nation-wide terminal defense system before we could deploy one ourselves.

I have recently been given a very thoughtful paper on this subject by Tom Johnson of West Point. Johnson is a physicist who worked on SDI matters for Keyworth for a couple of years, has followed SDI developments closely, and knows the Soviet position well. (He recently made a trip to Moscow on Velikhov's invitation.) His views are close to Johnny Foster's, and he wrote the paper at Foster's suggestion. Although I do not endorse all of Johnson's ideas, I believe that Johnson has explained some factors better than the official staff papers I have seen. (Instead of the unilateral statements he suggests, I would consider these more appropriate as elements in a joint

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

U.S.-Soviet statement which contained commitments to offensive weapons reduction.)

Although I know this is a very hectic time for you, I would urge you to read the attached paper, since I believe it contains some excellent ideas which should be explored before we proceed to Geneva.

Recommendation:

That you read the paper at TAB I and pass it on to Secretary Shultz and Paul Nitze for consideration.

Approve \_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_

Attachment:

Tab I - "Negotiating Position on SDI," by Thomas H. Johnson, December 20, 1984.

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

19

I



Eyes Only  
JFHOS - S01

Eyes Only  
Natlott  
12/28

~~MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE~~

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

CAS 6/10/02



63501

2

NOT FOR SYSTEM

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

December 26, 1984

ACTION

DECLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

NLRR M2166 \* 6350

FROM: JACK MATLOCK

BY KML NARA DATE 3/27/12

SUBJECT: SDI, Geneva and the Europeans

The interagency staffing of options for Geneva is most impressive in many respects, but in my judgment some considerations have not been adequately explored up to now. Since these are fundamental not only to our negotiating position, but also to the viability of SDI with the Allies and Congress, I would like to point them out.

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-- This would leave such matters as types of demonstrations permitted, timing of possible deployments, and perhaps bans on testing certain types of devices (e.g. nuclear) in space as possible topics for negotiation, in the context of offensive weapons reduction.

2. The staff papers I have seen up to now also give insufficient attention to the likely Soviet reaction in the short and medium term to various U.S. options.

-- It is particularly fallacious, in my view, to argue that the cost/benefit ratio of defense and offense will inevitably force the Soviets toward a defensive strategy. First of all, we don't really know what the cost/benefit ratio will be when we have not even developed the defensive systems. But even if this ratio favored the defense, costs have never been a determining factor in Soviet minds. They generally do what they are capable of doing, and hang the cost.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

-- Therefore, we should give more attention to how the Soviets are likely to react in the short and medium term if we fail to present a negotiable proposal in the space area.

-- Such failures have plagued our negotiating postures in the past -- as when we insisted on the right to MIRV in the early 1970's, failing to foresee that in the long run MIRV technology would increase the threat of the Soviet heavy missiles without compensating U.S. advantage. We could make an analogous mistake today if we insist on preserving all options without regard to the impact certain technologies have on future Soviet capabilities.

-- What seems clear is that if the Soviets are convinced that we have embarked on a Manhattan-type project in SDI which could produce a breakthrough in a decade, they will refuse any substantial reductions in ICBM warheads (and perhaps actually increase them), and also move to expand their terminal BMD defenses, which they can deploy more rapidly than we can, since we have cancelled hardsite prototyping and development.

3. While the papers recognize the necessity of briefing the Allies and Congress, the success of these endeavors depends critically on the content of the consultations.

-- Virtually everyone agrees on the necessity of a research program in SDI. If we keep this the basis of our approach, we will be dealing from the high ground.

-- Some types of SDI demonstrations are likely, however, to be highly controversial, as are some potential programs (e.g., those involving nuclear devices in space or automated space battle stations). If we are seen to be in effect blocking offensive weapons reduction by insisting on these types of things in the near term, then we are likely to be unconvincing with both the Allies and Congress.

-- Therefore, an effort to preserve all options could in fact bring us the worst of both offensive and defensive worlds in the medium term: no offensive reductions, but political and budgetary constraints on us, and a Soviet nation-wide terminal defense system before we could deploy one ourselves.

I have recently been given a very thoughtful paper on this subject by Tom Johnson of West Point. Johnson is a physicist who worked on SDI matters for Keyworth for a couple of years, has followed SDI developments closely, and knows the Soviet position well. (He recently made a trip to Moscow on Velikhov's invitation.) His views are close to Johnny Foster's, and he wrote the paper at Foster's suggestion. Although I do not endorse all of Johnson's ideas, I believe that Johnson has explained some factors better than the official staff papers I have seen. (Instead of the unilateral statements he suggests, I would consider these more appropriate as elements in a joint



23

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

U.S.-Soviet statement which contained commitments to offensive weapons reduction.)

Although I know this is a very hectic time for you, I would urge you to read the attached paper, since I believe it contains some excellent ideas which should be explored before we proceed to Geneva.

Recommendation:

That you read the paper at TAB I and pass it on to Secretary Shultz and Paul Nitze for consideration.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachment:

Tab I - "Negotiating Position on SDI," by Thomas H. Johnson, December 20, 1984.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

MEMORANDUM

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

December 26, 1984

ACTION

DECLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

NLRR M2106 # 6351

FROM: JACK MATLOCK

BY KRL NARA DATE 3/27/12

SUBJECT: SDI, Geneva and the Europeans

The interagency staffing of options for Geneva is most impressive in many respects, but in my judgment some considerations have not been adequately explored up to now. Since these are fundamental not only to our negotiating position, but also to the viability of SDI with the Allies and Congress, I would like to point them out.

1. There seems a tendency to consider any limitation on SDI as fatal to the program. I do not believe that this is the case, and in fact that an effort not to allow it to be touched in any respect could undermine the effectiveness of the program itself, and also make it impossible to get the levels of offensive weapons down.

-- What is essential, in my view, is ensuring that no limitations be placed on research. Since verification is impossible in this area, we should insist that research continue unrestrained on both sides.

-- This would leave such matters as types of demonstrations permitted, timing of possible deployments, and perhaps bans on testing certain types of devices (e.g. nuclear) in space as possible topics for negotiation, in the context of offensive weapons reduction.

2. The staff papers I have seen up to now also give insufficient attention to the likely Soviet reaction in the short and medium term to various U.S. options.

-- It is particularly fallacious, in my view, to argue that the cost/benefit ratio of defense and offense will inevitably force the Soviets toward a defensive strategy. First of all, we don't really know what the cost/benefit ratio will be when we have not even developed the defensive systems. But even if this ratio favored the defense, costs have never been a determining factor in Soviet minds. They generally do what they are capable of doing, and hang the cost.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~



~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

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~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~



24

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Recommendation:

That you read the paper at TAB I and pass it on to Secretary Shultz and Paul Nitze for consideration.

Approve \_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_

Attachment:

Tab I - "Negotiating Position on SDI," by Thomas H. Johnson, December 20, 1984.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

REF ID:  
ATTENTION OF

20 December 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Negotiating Position on SDI

The question posed is: Can we establish a negotiating position on SDI which offers the Russians substantive issues for potential trading, yet which does not materially place the SDI in jeopardy? I will summarize here a recommended position which does this, assuming that the SDI is what the President asked for on 23 March 1983: a long-range R&D program to determine if a nationwide missile defense is possible, and how to build one. The logic supporting these recommendations and details of their interpretation are presented in the longer memorandum, "An Arms-Control Context for SDI," attached.

The recommendations are in three classes: unilateral statements, elements for negotiation, and near-term proposals.

Unilateral Statements

1. The SDI program will not violate the ABM Treaty.
2. The SDI will not violate the treaty barring nuclear weapons in space.

Elements for Negotiation -- positions at the outset:

3. We are willing to discuss limitations on large-scale demonstrations of space-based technologies, particularly demonstrations in space.
4. We are willing to discuss limitations of space battle stations for BMD.

Near-Term Proposals

5. Tell the Russians that we will consider bans on testing and deployment of space-based ASATs, but not of ground-based or air-based ASATs.
6. We should revitalize our conventional hard-site BMD development program, and prototype a working system. When we have an adequate benchmark, we should consider the relative benefits of re-negotiating the ABM Treaty limits, in terms of numbers (of sites, interceptors and radars) and basing (mobility and deception), for "conventional" hard-site defense of ICBM silos.

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
NLRR #06-114/1 #6352

BY ON NARA DATE 11/15/07

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20 December 1984

The effect of the first two statements is to establish our bona fide intent with the Russians, or allies and Congress. The effect of the second two is to offer the Russians negotiations on elements which will appear to them to be substantive but which will not injure the SDI if traded away. The effect of the fifth is to satisfy pressure, both domestic and international, for ASAT negotiations with a position which is far more restrictive to the Soviets than to us. The effect of the last is to deny the Soviets sole near-term possession of defensive capabilities, and to attempt to redress ICBM vulnerability.



THOMAS H. JOHNSON  
Director, Science Research Laboratory



29

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY  
WEST POINT, NEW YORK 10996

REPLY TO  
ATTENTION OF

20 December 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: An Arms-Control Context for SDI

The assumptions linking SDI and arms-reduction negotiations seem to be these:

- (1) The President wishes to make significant gains in negotiating reductions in offensive arms.
- (2) The President wishes to continue with the SDI as a strong program.
- (3) The Russians will not negotiate seriously on offensive arms unless we are willing to negotiate seriously on SDI.

It is the third assumption which seems to make the first two logically incompatible, and to place us in a bimodal situation with regard to SDI: preserve it, and undermine the negotiations; or consider it fair territory for trading, and thus lose it. The problem, then, is whether there is a middle ground.

WHAT IS THE SDI?

I believe the key to this dilemma lies in the definition of the SDI. Is it:

- (a) A long-range R&D program to determine whether nationwide defense is possible, and how it could be done?
- or (b) A goal-oriented development program specifically charged to produce (that is, design and deploy) a nationwide defense, either as soon as possible or within some fixed timespan?

If the correct answer is (b), then the dilemma above is real, for we cannot in good faith profess that we have anything to bargain with unless we intend to give up the whole thing. If, on the other hand, the correct answer is (a),

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BY CN NARA DATE 11/15/07

20 December 1984

then there are a good many things which we could realistically discuss with the Russians, things which would not materially damage the SDI or retard its success, but which would provide the Russians with real incentive to bargain (given their manifest concern over SDI).

Definition (a) is in fact consonant with the President's expressed desire on strategic defense: "...a long-term research and development program to begin to achieve our ultimate goal of eliminating the threat posed by strategic nuclear missiles." The significance and wisdom of this formulation lie in the fact that it recognizes the actual state of technology: We don't know today what sort of system will accomplish the objective of nationwide defense, nor even whether it can actually be accomplished.

An important turning point in the logic is a recognition of this fact, which is a strong consensus among real experts in the field. It was said plainly in the report of the Fletcher Commission, and it was said in the year-long DOD study of BMD chaired by Johnny Foster (which concluded about the time of the Fletcher Commission). If you accept the fact that we do not know yet about the feasibility of nationwide defense, then the logical orientation of the SDI is (a). In either case, you must begin with R&D to provide the data for analysis and evaluation of alternatives. The real difference between (a) and (b) is thus that in (b) we have already decided that some defense which satisfies our criterion will be found and that we will deploy it. The general argument in favor of (b) is that, having decided now to go ahead full steam, we can speed up the process by doing, in parallel with the R&D to get the answers, all the advanced development and testing technology will allow. Much of that work will be wasted because it will pertain to systems that don't show up in the final solution, but we will move toward deployment faster. In fact, this argument is not correct. Parallel demos of undeveloped technology nearly always prove disastrous to the programs they belong to. The demos destroy the alternatives of what because they overrun their parts and suck up the money for nothing. Having thus destroyed the potentially more promising options, they leave one with a commitment to a second-rate solution, engineered into a system as soon as possible; thus we get the poor version of the poor option.

We must pause a moment in the argument to make an important distinction about demonstrations and testing. The goal enunciated by the President is nationwide missile defense. A different goal, enunciated by prominent SDI supporters from Senator Garn to Henry Kissinger, has been reinforcement of deterrence by reducing vulnerability of our military forces. This latter job is something we can do with existing technology--interceptor missiles with nuclear warheads--and we can test our systems without violating the ABM Treaty. Because of strictly numerical limitations, we can't deploy a viable system without violating or revising the treaty. I shall discuss the relevance of this near-term technology at the end of the memo. The important distinction is that when I speak of big demonstrations now I am speaking of demos of immature technology, proposals for things which, after considerable further improvement, may be part of solving the problem of nationwide defense, but whose pursuit now actually constitutes a danger to the success of the SDI.

Thus far I have argued that R&D is the indispensable core of the SDI in the near future, by which I mean at least five to ten years. I have also



20 December 1984

suggested that (a) is thus the logical SDI strategy. I will now make several points about disadvantages of (b) which I claim settle the case. I will then show how choosing (a) gives the U.S. a plausible negotiating position to satisfy both the President's wishes. Finally, I will address the question of what we should be doing in the near term.

Disadvantages of SDI Definition (b)

I shall enumerate five severe disadvantages of this approach.

(1) Arms Control Dilemma As explained above, approach (b) reduces us to the bimodal position of bargaining with the whole SDI or refusing to discuss it. If the interpretation of the Russian position is correct, we cannot keep SDI and achieve arms reductions.

(2) Domestic Risks The SDI has already attracted an entirely disproportionate amount of public criticism and comment. Because of domestic politics, going ahead with (b) now means that we risk losing the entire SDI. Maintaining an R&D program as requested by the President largely defuses further criticism, since even most liberal critics admit that absolute defense would be good if it were possible, and object to various problems of transition. But announcing that we know now that it will work is doubly dangerous. First, this contention can be disproved to the satisfaction of any good scientist, and in debate to any intelligent congressman. Second, the Administration opens itself to a variety of criticisms based on the unstable nature of partial defenses and transitions, arguments which have been made thus far only as possibilities: in short, a highly effective rallying-point will have been created for enemies of the program. Particularly in its currently-constituted form, the SDI is not strong enough technically or programmatically to deal with either of these problems; the combination of them is very likely to permit the enemies of strategic defense to wreck the

Product For reasons explained in the section above, demos of immature technologies are not merely wasteful, they actually lead to a poor solution to the proposed task. In short, if we get any nationwide defense at all, we will have elected to develop one which comprises a poorly integrated complex of poorly selected ideas. It won't work well, and it will rapidly become dangerously obsolete. All this also adds to the disadvantage above.

(4) Ally problems Our allies have expressed sizeable fears about the success and implications of SDI. Although these fears are not well-founded, they are real. If SDI is publicly elevated to demonstration-and-test status, and if any of these demos fail, the allies will become truculent in their attitude toward SDI. Thus, definition (b) places great pressure on all the demos to succeed, distorting the technical plan (degrading or delaying the objective) and needlessly risking the credibility of the entire SDI. Giving alliance politics leverage as a criterion in managing the SDI is another way of gambling with its success.

(5) Real Soviet Responses If we understand the Russians correctly, they are seriously worried about the SDI. So far this is fine. But if we proceed



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20 December 1984

with a large program of tests and demos which may not lead anywhere, and which will certainly not lead anywhere for some time, what will be their response? Since the ABM Treaty, the U.S. has had no deployed missile defense. The Soviets have a limited BMD deployment, twice upgraded. They could proliferate this system easily. Perhaps more important, the Soviets also have an interceptor system, the SA-12, which represents a powerful, current military capability. It has performance to spare in killing Pershing II, and it probably could have (with additional acquisition radar) disturbingly good performance against SLBMs. They are building SA-12 as anti-Pershing weapons through a loophole in the Treaty. If the Soviet response to SDI(b) is to proliferate SA-12 as an anti-SLBM, they will have a real defense capability while we have one on paper. Our lead-time to deployment of any similar system is longer than five years.

#### Advantages of SDI Definition (a)

Choosing (a) minimizes the problems (2), (4) and (5) and eliminates (3). The pertinent question is, what does it do for (1)? It allows us to adopt the following bargaining position with the Russians:

1. We will not violate the ABM Treaty. We are embarked on long-term R&D, and so are you. If we reach a positive answer sometime in the future, and decide that a system based upon that answer is good enough to be worth deploying, we will give the required notice before withdrawing from the Treaty. We believe that you would do the same, which is why the withdrawal clause was mutually agreed to. Meanwhile, our R&D efforts will respect the limits of the Treaty. We would like to know the character and extent of your R&D programs, since ours has been announced and yours remains a very large but completely secret undertaking.
2. We will not violate the treaty banning weapons of mass destruction.
3. We are willing to discuss limitations on large-scale demonstration of SDI-relevant technologies, particularly demonstrations in space.
4. We are willing to discuss limitations of space battle stations for BMD.

The first two items will not interfere materially with our R&D program and can be volunteered unilaterally. The effect will be to establish our bona fide intent with the Russians, with our allies, and with Congress. The ABM Treaty continues to be valuable to us as a tripwire to Soviet BMD breakout or SA-12 deployments as SLBM defense, at least until we have a near-term capability of our own.

The third item comprises a large class of elaborate space demos almost all of which are premature or can be tested other ways. Specifics are complex for a memo of this length, but there are only a few limited prerogatives which we would have to retain in order for our R&D of the next ten years or so to lead us to the answers we need. Presumably the new treaty, like the ABM Treaty, would have a renewal time or withdrawal clause in case we reach a stage where



20 December 1984

big tests in space are essential. Thus, there is a large number of things here which will appear to be substantive to the Russians but whose loss would not injure SDI, and which we can bargain with in good faith, one item at a time.

The fourth item represents an apparently large restriction which, if handled properly, is none at all; thus we can appear to be offering a lot. Teller's dictum says that satellite battle stations are all cheaper to shoot down than they are to put in place. Some people may argue with this dictum, but the real experts (Johnny Foster, for example) agree with it. We should be careful to preserve special cases, however: satellites which do not themselves house weapons systems but which may be key parts of BMD systems. Two examples are: relay mirrors for ground-based lasers and high-altitude satellites containing decoy discrimination techniques, such as particle beams.

Thus, the latter two items do contain sensitive details which must be handled carefully by experts, but they offer up what appears to be considerable ground for bargaining. None of what we are actually offering should damage the attainment of SDI's goals.

A potential disadvantage of SDI(a) will no doubt be raised, so I should comment on it here. There is a contention that a program without big demonstrations can never get sufficiently big appropriations, or maintain its technological momentum for long. As far as the appropriations go, I have already argued that the demos themselves represent a threat to the health, if not the life, of the program. The early demos constitute more of a danger than an assistance. Note that big chemical laser proponents have tried for years to get funding for big space demos. Not only have they not succeeded, but the chemical laser program has demonstrated negligible progress during the period. As far as technological progress, it is true that some big projects are necessary, but we can build plenty of big projects in laboratories or on the ground (big ground-based lasers, for example). Such projects can serve as technological centurypieces for Congress, if such are really deemed necessary.

Near-Term Proposals

I recommend that we consider an additional position for discussion with the Russians:

- 5. We will consider bans on testing and deployment of space-based ASATs, but not of ground-based or air-based ASATs.

and an additional course of action, which might lead to discussion with the Russians:

- 6. We should revitalize our conventional hard-site BMD development program, and prototype a working system. When we have an adequate benchmark, we should consider the relative benefits of re-negotiating the ABM Treaty limits, in terms of numbers (of sites, interceptors and radars) and basing (mobility and deception), for "conventional" hard-site defense of ICBM silos.



20 December 1984

Position 5 permits us to refine and upgrade our current ASAT and to develop and upgrade ground-based laser ASATs. It prevents the Soviets from threatening our high-altitude satellites with anything but a large ground-based laser, a technology in which we have a substantial lead. In short, there is no real reason why we would prefer space-based ASATs over the ones we have now in development. This agreement would permit the Soviets to keep the ASATs we can't verify anyhow, but stop them from developing ones we can actually verify.

Position 6 essentially argues that we close the gap on the Soviets' existing advantage in real military capability for missile defense. We can actually construct a defense that will provide sufficient ICBM survivability, but it will require changing several limits in the ABM Treaty -- changing a few numbers, but leaving it qualitatively the same. The Soviets have a big lead-time-to-deployment advantage (4-7 years), because we never prototyped our system. More important, when SDI started up, conventional hard-site -- the only BMD system with demonstrated military effectiveness -- was cancelled.

Such a system could address the principal concern of Dr. Kissinger and Senator Garn, and do it sooner than any result from the nationwide defense program is likely to be ready. Everyone agrees that terminal hard-site defense of ICBMs is stabilizing. The technology to do that job, to eliminate the unstable vulnerability, is actually available. Critics will be concerned about meddling with the Treaty, but not nearly so concerned as if we embarked on SDI(b), in which we would effectively be announcing an intention to withdraw from the treaty, and for an objective those same critics regard as destabilizing rather than stabilizing.

There is absolutely no reason why we should permit the Soviets to maintain and improve their capability while we throw ours away, just because we hope to get something better. There is, however, good reason for concern about the Soviet capability, because of the linkage between offense and defense. In the current situation, not only the success of the US effort -- an important objective -- is uncertain -- reductions in offensive arms will act to the benefit of the USSR unless we can have the option for an equivalent defense, to deter or match Soviet BMD breakout. At the very least, we must be able to evaluate the capability of their defense by more reliable means than paper studies.

Whether or not we pursue actually deploying hard-site, we should revive our activities in "conventional" hard-site BMD, prototype a system, keep modernizing it, and test pen-aids against it to insure we can get through Russian defenses. We should not allow the Russians a large unilateral advantage in defensive capability in the near term. While we are looking for the better thing, let us keep the good one.

THOMAS H. JOHNSON  
Director, Science Research Laboratory

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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6354 35  
Chris  
Matlock

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

December 26, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: RONALD K. SABLE *R*

SUBJECT: Senator (Elect) Gore's Trip to Moscow/Follow-up

During your visit with Senator (Elect) Gore in advance of his trip to Moscow, you indicated you would welcome discussions with him upon his return. Jack Matlock has reported (Tab I) Gore was effective and agrees that it would be good for you to meet with Gore again. Matlock further indicated it may be useful for a Gore photo-op call on the President following your meeting. In fact, Gore's assistant, Leon Fuerth, contacted Ron Lehman and myself indicating Gore is asking for a meeting with the President. On reflection, Ron Lehman and Jack Matlock now believe that a meeting with the President is not necessary.

- Though Gore was effective in his discussions, he will have nothing new to say.

- As a freshman Senator, visiting privately with the President gives Gore significant credibility.

- We may need the "Presidential visit" down stream, as we get close to votes on MX and SDI.

*RK* *JM* *PT*  
Ron Lehman, Jack Matlock and Pam Turner concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That we schedule Gore to see you during one of the times reserved for Congressional consultation in January.

Agree *Done* Disagree \_\_\_\_\_

That a decision on a Gore meeting with the President be deferred until we get closer to March Capitol Hill activities.

Agree  Disagree \_\_\_\_\_

Attachment

Tab I Matlock memo to McFarlane, Dec 13, 1984

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
Sec. 3.4(b), E.O. 12958, as amended  
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2006  
BY NARA *AS*, DATE *2/17/10*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



MEMORANDUM

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→ 6355  
Lehman, C 30

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

December 13, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

THROUGH: CHRIS LEHMAN  
FROM: JACK MATLOCK *Jaw*  
SUBJECT: Albert Gore's Trip to Moscow

Embassy Moscow has reported (Tab I) that Gore was extremely effective in presenting American views on arms control issues during his recent trip to Moscow, and recommends that he be received by you -- and if possible the President to report on his trip.

Given the fact that Gore seems to have performed very responsibly in Moscow, and that he may be in a position to influence Senate consideration of defense-related issues when the Congress reconvenes, I believe it might be useful for you to invite him over next week to brief you on his trip. Although the President's calendar is doubtless very crowded, you might also wish to consider the possibility of arranging a five or ten-minute call. *ok*

*Rm*  
Ron Lehman concurs.

Recommendation:

That you invite Senator-elect Gore to brief you on his trip to the Soviet Union and consider seeking a brief meeting for him with the President.

Approve

Disapprove

Attachment:

Tab I - Moscow 15730 of December 12, 1984

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
Sec. 3.4(b), E.O. 12958, as amended  
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2006  
BY NARA *CS*, DATE *2/17/10*

*check w/ Ogelsby*



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
SECRETARIAT

PAGE 01 OF 01  
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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 15739

EXDIS

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PARM, OREP

REF: STATE 356411

*Quint*  
*M. A. G. J.*

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATION. CONGRESSMAN (AND SENATOR-ELECT) GORE HAS BEEN EXTREMELY EFFECTIVE IN PRESENTING AMERICAN VIEWS ON ARMS CONTROL TO SOVIET SPECIALISTS. HE WAS GIVEN AN ORTHODOX BUT AUTHORITY-OUTLINE OF SOVIET POSITIONS, WITH STRESS ON SPACE-RELATED ISSUES. WE RECOMMEND THAT A SENIOR US OFFICIAL MEET WITH HIM ON HIS RETURN. END SUMMARY.

3. CONGRESSMAN ALBERT GORE, JR., VISITED MOSCOW FROM DECEMBER 5 - 11 FOR DISCUSSIONS ON ARMS CONTROL. HE WAS ACCOMPANIED BY HIS WIFE AND STAFF MEMBER LEON FUERTH.

4. GORE HELD FOUR SUBSTANTIVE MEETINGS:

- OLEG BYKOV, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, INSTITUTE OF THE WORLD ECONOMY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, DECEMBER 6.

- AVUGUST EDUARDOVICH VOSS, CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF NATIONALITIES, SUPREME SOVIET, AND SERGEI ANDREYEVICH LOSEV, SUPREME SOVIET DEPUTY, DECEMBER 7.

- ANDREY KOKOSHIN, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, AND ALEKSEI VASILYEV, DIRECTOR OF POLITICAL-MILITARY DEPARTMENT, INSTITUTE OF THE USA AND CANADA, DECEMBER 7.

- GEORGIY MARKOVICH KORNIYENKO, FIRST DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER; AMBASSADOR VIKTOR PAVLOVICH KARPOV, START NEGOTIATOR; ALEKSANDR ALEKSANDROVICH BESSMERTNYKH, CHIEF OF MFA USA DEPARTMENT;

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BY CA NARA DATE 11/27/07

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
SECRETARIAT

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DTG: 120950Z DEC 84 PSN: 038122

AND COLONEL-GENERAL NIKOLAY FEDOROVICH CHERVOV,  
GENERAL STAFF, DECEMBER 10.

5. AMBASSADOR HARTMAN HOSTED A LUNCHEON FOR THE  
GORE DELEGATION DECEMBER 11. THAT EVENING, THEY  
VISITED WITH A GROUP OF MOSCOW'S LEADING  
REFUSENIKS, INCLUDING ALEKSANDR LERNER AND  
YURIY KOSHAROVSKIY.

6. IN HIS MEETINGS WITH SOVIET OFFICIALS AND  
ACADEMICS, CONGRESSMAN GORE REPEATEDLY EMPHASIZED:

- THE PARAMOUNT IMPORTANCE OF STABILITY.
- THE NEED TO REMOVE FEARS OF A FIRST NUCLEAR STRIKE ON BOTH SIDES.
- THE SERIOUS APPROACH OF THE PRESIDENT AND ADMINISTRATION TO THE UPCOMING GENEVA TALKS.
- US INTEREST IN TRADE OFFS BETWEEN US ADVANTAGES IN STRATEGIC BOMBERS AND SOVIET ADVANTAGES IN ACCURATE MISSILE WARHEADS.
- US INTEREST IN AVOIDING A COMPETITION IN SEA-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES.
- US CONCERN OVER ACCURATE SOVIET MISSILES, THE SS-20, THE SOVIET ASAT, SOVIET MILITARY EXERCISES, AND SOVIET COMPLIANCE WITH ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS.

7. HIS SOVIET INTERLOCUTORS EMPHASIZED:

- CONCERN OVER THE COMBINATION OF THE US STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE WITH THE US BUILDUP IN OFFENSIVE WEAPONS HAVING COUNTERFORCE CAPABILITIES.
- THAT AGREEMENTS ON OFFENSIVE WEAPONS WILL BE HARDER TO ACHIEVE IF THE UNITED STATES IS DETERMINED TO PUSH AHEAD WITH THE SDI.
- THAT THE SOVIET MILITARY RESPONSE TO SDI COULD INVOLVE AN OFFENSIVE BUILDUP.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
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E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PARM, OREP  
SUBJECT: CODEL GORE WRAP-UP

8. WITH REGARD TO THE SHULTZ-GROMYKO TALKS,  
CONG. GORE WAS TOLD THAT:

- THE SOVIET UNION WILL NOT BE FOUND WANTING  
IF THE UNITED STATES IS SERIOUS.

- MEANS OF LOWERING FEARS OF A FIRST STRIKE  
ARE A MATTER FOR NEGOTIATION.

- THE TALKS SHOULD DETERMINE THE "SUBJECT  
AND OBJECTIVES" OF NEGOTIATIONS ON SPACE  
WEAPONS AND STRATEGIC AND INTERMEDIATE-RANGE  
WEAPONS.

- THE ISSUES ARE INTER-RELATED.

- AN AGREEMENT WOULD BE THE FIRST STEP TOWARD  
ENDING THE ARMS RACE AND ELIMINATING NUCLEAR  
WEAPONS ENTIRELY.

9. CONG. GORE INTENDS TO BRIEF SENIOR OFFICIALS  
IN WASHINGTON IN DETAIL ON HIS DISCUSSIONS.  
MEMORANDA OF CONVERSATIONS WILL BE POUCHED TO  
THE DEPARTMENT (EUR/SOV).

10. THE CODEL HAS NOT REVIEWED THIS TELGRAM.

11. COMMENT: SENATOR GORE WAS EXTREMELY  
EFFECTIVE IN CONVEYING THE AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE  
ON ARMS CONTROL TO HIS SOVIET INTERLOCUTORS.  
HE REPEATEDLY SHOWED THAT HE KNOWS THE ISSUES AND  
DID NOT SHRINK FROM SETTING THE RECORD STRAIGHT  
IN THE FACE OF SOVIET DISTORTIONS. HIS CRITICISMS  
OF SOVIET PRACTICES AND SUPPORT FOR THE  
ADMINISTRATION'S ARMS CONTROL POLICY HAD PARTICULAR  
FORCE, COMING FROM ONE WHO DOES NOT ALWAYS AGREE  
WITH THE ADMINISTRATION. I BELIEVE THE PRESIDENT  
AND/OR THE SECRETARY WOULD FIND IT USEFUL TO HEAR

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
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HIS IMPRESSIONS DIRECTLY, AND BELIEVE IT WOULD BE  
APPROPRIATE FOR THEM OR A SUITABLY SENIOR  
ADMINISTRATION REPRESENTATIVE TO EXPRESS APPRECIATION  
FOR AN EXTREMELY EFFECTIVE PERFORMANCE HERE.  
HARTMAN  
BT

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MEMORANDUM

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

December 26, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK

SUBJECT: SDI, Geneva and the Europeans

The interagency staffing of options for Geneva is most impressive in many respects, but in my judgment some considerations have not been adequately explored up to now. Since these are fundamental not only to our negotiating position, but also to the viability of SDI with the Allies and Congress, I would like to point them out.

1. There seems a tendency to consider any limitation on SDI as fatal to the program. I do not believe that this is the case, and in fact that an effort not to allow it to be touched in any respect could undermine the effectiveness of the program itself, and also make it impossible to get the levels of offensive weapons down.

-- What is essential, in my view, is ensuring that no limitations be placed on research. Since verification is impossible in this area, we should insist that research continue unrestrained on both sides.

-- This would leave such matters as types of demonstrations permitted, timing of possible deployments, and perhaps bans on testing certain types of devices (e.g. nuclear) in space as possible topics for negotiation, in the context of offensive weapons reduction.

2. The staff papers I have seen up to now also give insufficient attention to the likely Soviet reaction in the short and medium term to various U.S. options.

-- It is particularly fallacious, in my view, to argue that the cost/benefit ratio of defense and offense will inevitably force the Soviets toward a defensive strategy. First of all, we don't really know what the cost/benefit ratio will be when we have not even developed the defensive systems. But even if this ratio favored the defense, costs have never been a determining factor in Soviet minds. They generally do what they are capable of doing, and hang the cost.

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-- Therefore, we should give more attention to how the Soviets are likely to react in the short and medium term if we fail to present a negotiable proposal in the space area.

-- Such failures have plagued our negotiating postures in the past -- as when we insisted on the right to MIRV in the early 1970's, failing to foresee that in the long run MIRV technology would increase the threat of the Soviet heavy missiles without compensating U.S. advantage. We could make an analogous mistake today if we insist on preserving all options without regard to the impact certain technologies have on future Soviet capabilities.

-- What seems clear is that if the Soviets are convinced that we have embarked on a Manhattan-type project in SDI which could produce a breakthrough in a decade, they will refuse any substantial reductions in ICBM warheads (and perhaps actually increase them), and also move to expand their terminal BMD defenses, which they can deploy more rapidly than we can, since we have cancelled hardsite prototyping and development.

3. While the papers recognize the necessity of briefing the Allies and Congress, the success of these endeavors depends critically on the content of the consultations.

-- Virtually everyone agrees on the necessity of a research program in SDI. If we keep this the basis of our approach, we will be dealing from the high ground.

-- Some types of SDI demonstrations are likely, however, to be highly controversial, as are some potential programs (e.g.; those involving nuclear devices in space or automated space battle stations). If we are seen to be in effect blocking offensive weapons reduction by insisting on these types of things in the near term, then we are likely to be unconvincing with both the Allies and Congress.

-- Therefore, an effort to preserve all options could in fact bring us the worst of both offensive and defensive worlds in the medium term: no offensive reductions, but political and budgetary constraints on us, and a Soviet nation-wide terminal defense system before we could deploy one ourselves.

I have recently been given a very thoughtful paper on this subject by Tom Johnson of West Point. Johnson is a physicist who worked on SDI matters for Keyworth for a couple of years, has followed SDI developments closely, and knows the Soviet position well. (He recently made a trip to Moscow on Velikhov's invitation.) His views are close to Johnny Foster's, and he wrote the paper at Foster's suggestion. Although I do not endorse all of Johnson's ideas, I believe that Johnson has explained some factors better than the official staff papers I have seen. (Instead of the unilateral statements he suggests, I would consider these more appropriate as elements in a joint



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U.S.-Soviet statement which contained commitments to offensive weapons reduction.)

Although I know this is a very hectic time for you, I would urge you to read the attached paper, since I believe it contains some excellent ideas which should be explored before we proceed to Geneva.

Recommendation:

That you read the paper at TAB I and pass it on to Secretary Shultz and Paul Nitze for consideration.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachment:

Tab I - "Negotiating Position on SDI," by Thomas H. Johnson, December 20, 1984.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY  
WEST POINT, NEW YORK 10996

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REPLY TO  
ATTENTION OF

20 December 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Negotiating Position on SDI

The question posed is: Can we establish a negotiating position on SDI which offers the Russians substantive issues for potential trading, yet which does not materially place the SDI in jeopardy? I will summarize here a recommended position which does this, assuming that the SDI is what the President asked for on 23 March 1983: a long-range R&D program to determine if a nationwide missile defense is possible, and how to build one. The logic supporting these recommendations and details of their interpretation are presented in the longer memorandum, "An Arms-Control Context for SDI," attached.

The recommendations are in three classes: unilateral statements, elements for negotiation, and near-term proposals.

Unilateral Statements

1. The SDI program will not violate the ABM Treaty.
2. The SDI will not violate the treaty barring nuclear weapons in space.

Elements for Negotiation -- positions at the outset:

3. We are willing to discuss limitations on large-scale demonstrations of SDI-relevant technologies, particularly demonstrations in space.
4. We are willing to discuss limitations of space battle stations for BMD.

Near-Term Proposals

5. Tell the Russians that we will consider bans on testing and deployment of space-based ASATs, but not of ground-based or air-based ASATs.
6. We should revitalize our conventional hardsite BMD development program, and prototype a working system. When we have an adequate benchmark, we should consider the relative benefits of re-negotiating the ABM Treaty limits, in terms of numbers (of sites, interceptors and radars) and basing (mobility and deception), for "conventional" hardsite defense of ICBM silos.

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20 December 1984

The effect of the first two statements is to establish our bona fide intent with the Russians, or allies and Congress. The effect of the second two is to offer the Russians negotiations on elements which will appear to them to be substantive but which will not injure the SDI if traded away. The effect of the fifth is to satisfy pressure, both domestic and international, for ASAT negotiations with a position which is far more restrictive to the Soviets than to us. The effect of the last is to deny the Soviets sole near-term possession of defensive capabilities, and to attempt to redress ICBM vulnerability.



THOMAS H. JOHNSON  
Director, Science Research Laboratory



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY  
WEST POINT, NEW YORK 10996

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REPLY TO  
ATTENTION OF

20 December 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: An Arms-Control Context for SDI

The assumptions linking SDI and arms-reduction negotiations seem to be these:

- (1) The President wishes to make significant gains in negotiating reductions in offensive arms.
- (2) The President wishes to continue with the SDI as a strong program.
- (3) The Russians will not negotiate seriously on offensive arms unless we are willing to negotiate seriously on SDI.

It is the third assumption which seems to make the first two logically incompatible, and to place us in a bimodal situation with regard to SDI: preserve it, and undermine the negotiations; or consider it fair territory for trading, and thus lose it. The problem, then, is whether there is a middle ground.

WHAT IS THE SDI?

I believe the key to this dilemma lies in the definition of the SDI. Is the SDI

- (a) A long-range R&D program to determine whether nationwide defense is possible, and how it could be done?
- or (b) A goal-oriented development program specifically charged to produce (that is, design and deploy) a nationwide defense, either as soon as possible or within some fixed timespan?

If the correct answer is (b), then the dilemma above is real, for we cannot in good faith profess that we have anything to bargain with unless we intend to give up the whole thing. If, on the other hand, the correct answer is (a),

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20 December 1984

then there are a good many things which we could realistically discuss with the Russians, things which would not materially damage the SDI or retard its success, but which would provide the Russians with real incentive to bargain (given their manifest concern over SDI).

Definition (a) is in fact consonant with the President's expressed desire on strategic defense: "...a long-term research and development program to begin to achieve our ultimate goal of eliminating the threat posed by strategic nuclear missiles." The significance and wisdom of this formulation lie in the fact that it recognizes the actual state of technology: We don't know today what sort of system will accomplish the objective of nationwide defense, nor even whether it can actually be accomplished.

An important turning point in the logic is a recognition of this fact, which is a strong consensus among real experts in the field. It was said plainly in the report of the Fletcher Commission, and it was said in the year-long DOD study of BMD chaired by Johnny Foster (which concluded about the time of the Fletcher Commission). If you accept the fact that we do not know yet about the feasibility of nationwide defense, then the logical orientation of the SDI is (a). In either case, you must begin with R&D to provide the data for analysis and evaluation of alternatives. The real difference between (a) and (b) is thus that in (b) we have already decided that some defense which satisfies our criterion will be found and that we will deploy it. The general argument in favor of (b) is that, having decided now to go ahead full steam, we can speed up the process by doing, in parallel with the R&D to get the answers, all the advanced development and testing technology will allow. Much of that work will be wasted because it will pertain to systems that don't show up in the final solution, but we will move toward deployment faster. In fact, this argument is not correct. Parallel demos of undeveloped technology nearly always prove disastrous to the programs they belong to. The demos change the direction of work because they overrun their costs and suck up the money from the R&D. Having thus destroyed the potentially more promising options, they leave one with a commitment to a second-rate solution, engineered into a system too soon; thus we get the poor version of the poor option.

We must pause a moment in the argument to make an important distinction about demonstrations and testing. The goal enunciated by the President is nationwide missile defense. A different goal, enunciated by prominent SDI supporters from Senator Garn to Henry Kissinger, has been reinforcement of deterrence by reducing vulnerability of our military forces. This latter job is something we can do with existing technology--interceptor missiles with nuclear warheads--and we can test our systems without violating the ABM Treaty. Because of strictly numerical limitations, we can't deploy a viable system without violating or revising the treaty. I shall discuss the relevance of this near-term technology at the end of the memo. The important distinction is that when I speak of big demonstrations now I am speaking of demos of immature technology, proposals for things which, after considerable further improvement, may be part of solving the problem of nationwide defense, but whose pursuit now actually constitutes a danger to the success of the SDI.

Thus far I have argued that R&D is the indispensable core of the SDI in the near future, by which I mean at least five to ten years. I have also



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20 December 1984

suggested that (a) is thus the logical SDI strategy. I will now make several points about disadvantages of (b) which I claim settle the case. I will then show how choosing (a) gives the U.S. a plausible negotiating position to satisfy both the President's wishes. Finally, I will address the question of what we should be doing in the near term.

#### Disadvantages of SDI Definition (b)

I shall enumerate five severe disadvantages of this approach.

(1) Arms Control Dilemma As explained above, approach (b) reduces us to the bimodal position of bargaining with the whole SDI or refusing to discuss it. If the interpretation of the Russian position is correct, we cannot keep SDI and achieve arms reductions.

(2) Domestic Risks The SDI has already attracted an entirely disproportionate amount of public criticism and comment. Because of domestic politics, going ahead with (b) now means that we risk losing the entire SDI. Maintaining an R&D program as requested by the President largely defuses further criticism, since even most liberal critics admit that absolute defense would be good if it were possible, and object to various problems of transition. But announcing that we know now that it will work is doubly dangerous. First, this contention can be disproved to the satisfaction of any good scientist, and in debate to any intelligent congressman. Second, the Administration opens itself to a variety of criticisms based on the unstable nature of partial defenses and transitions, arguments which have been made thus far only as possibilities: in short, a highly effective rallying-point will have been created for enemies of the program. Particularly in its currently-constituted form, the SDI is not strong enough technically or programmatically to deal with either of these problems; the combination of them is very likely to permit the enemies of strategic defense to wreck the entire effort.

(3) Poor Product For reasons explained in the section above, demos of immature technologies are not merely wasteful, they actually lead to a poor solution to the proposed task. In short, if we get any nationwide defense at all, we will have elected to develop one which comprises a poorly integrated complex of poorly selected ideas. It won't work well, and it will rapidly become dangerously obsolete. All this also adds to the disadvantage above.

(4) Ally problems Our allies have expressed sizeable fears about the success and implications of SDI. Although these fears are not well-founded, they are real. If SDI is publicly elevated to demonstration-and-test status, and if any of these demos fail, the allies will become truculent in their attitude toward SDI. Thus, definition (b) places great pressure on all the demos to succeed, distorting the technical plan (degrading or delaying the objective) and needlessly risking the credibility of the entire SDI. Giving alliance politics leverage as a criterion in managing the SDI is another way of gambling with its success.

(5) Real Soviet Responses If we understand the Russians correctly, they are seriously worried about the SDI. So far this is fine. But if we proceed



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20 December 1984

with a large program of tests and demos which may not lead anywhere, and which will certainly not lead anywhere for some time, what will be their response? Since the ABM Treaty, the U.S. has had no deployed missile defense. The Soviets have a limited BMD deployment, twice upgraded. They could proliferate this system easily. Perhaps more important, the Soviets also have an interceptor system, the SA-12, which represents a powerful, current military capability. It has performance to spare in killing Pershing II, and it probably could have (with additional acquisition radar) disturbingly good performance against SLBMs. They are building SA-12 as anti-Pershing weapons through a loophole in the Treaty. If the Soviet response to SDI(b) is to proliferate SA-12 as an anti-SLBM, they will have a real defense capability while we have one on paper. Our lead-time to deployment of any similar system is longer than five years.

#### Advantages of SDI Definition (a)

Choosing (a) minimizes the problems (2), (4) and (5) and eliminates (3). The pertinent question is, what does it do for (1)? It allows us to adopt the following bargaining position with the Russians:

1. We will not violate the ABM Treaty. We are embarked on long-term R&D, and so are you. If we reach a positive answer sometime in the future, and decide that a system based upon that answer is good enough to be worth deploying, we will give the required notice before withdrawing from the Treaty. We believe that you would do the same, which is why the withdrawal clause was mutually agreed to. Meanwhile, our R&D efforts will respect the limits of the Treaty. We would like to know the character and extent of your R&D programs, since ours has been announced and yours remains a very large but completely secret undertaking.
2. We will not violate the treaty banning weapons of mass destruction in space.
3. We are willing to discuss limitations on large-scale demonstration of SDI-relevant technologies, particularly demonstrations in space.
4. We are willing to discuss limitations of space battle stations for BMD.

The first two items will not interfere materially with our R&D program and can be volunteered unilaterally. The effect will be to establish our bona fide intent with the Russians, with our allies, and with Congress. The ABM Treaty continues to be valuable to us as a tripwire to Soviet BMD breakout or SA-12 deployments as SLBM defense, at least until we have a near-term capability of our own.

The third item comprises a large class of elaborate space demos almost all of which are premature or can be tested other ways. Specifics are complex for a memo of this length, but there are only a few limited prerogatives which we would have to retain in order for our R&D of the next ten years or so to lead us to the answers we need. Presumably the new treaty, like the ABM Treaty, would have a renewal time or withdrawal clause in case we reach a stage where



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big tests in space are essential. Thus, there is a large number of things here which will appear to be substantive to the Russians but whose loss would not injure SDI, and which we can bargain with in good faith, one item at a time.

The fourth item represents an apparently large restriction which, if handled properly, is none at all; thus we can appear to be offering a lot. Teller's dictum says that satellite battle stations are all cheaper to shoot down than they are to put in place. Some people may argue with this dictum, but the real experts (Johnny Foster, for example) agree with it. We should be careful to preserve special cases, however: satellites which do not themselves house weapons systems but which may be key parts of BMD systems. Two examples are: relay mirrors for ground-based lasers and high-altitude satellites containing decoy discrimination techniques, such as particle beams.

Thus, the latter two items do contain sensitive details which must be handled carefully by experts, but they offer up what appears to be considerable ground for bargaining. None of what we are actually offering should damage the attainment of SDI's goals.

A potential disadvantage of SDI(a) will no doubt be raised, so I should comment on it here. There is a contention that a program without big demonstrations can never get sufficiently big appropriations, or maintain its technological momentum for long. As far as the appropriations go, I have already argued that the demos themselves represent a threat to the health, if not the life, of the program. The early demos constitute more of a danger than an assistance. Note that big chemical laser proponents have tried for years to get funding for big space demos. Not only have they not succeeded, but the chemical laser program has demonstrated negligible progress during the period. As far as technological momentum, it is true that some big projects are necessary, but we can build plenty of big projects in laboratories or on the ground (big ground-based lasers, for example). Such projects can serve as technological centerpieces for Congress, if such are really deemed necessary.

#### Near-Term Proposals

I recommend that we consider an additional position for discussion with the Russians:

5. We will consider bans on testing and deployment of space-based ASATs, but not of ground-based or air-based ASATs.

and an additional course of action, which might lead to discussion with the Russians:

6. We should revitalize our conventional hardsite BMD development program, and prototype a working system. When we have an adequate benchmark, we should consider the relative benefits of re-negotiating the ABM Treaty limits, in terms of numbers (of sites, interceptors and radars) and basing (mobility and deception), for "conventional" hardsite defense of ICBM silos.



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Position 5 permits us to refine and upgrade our current ASAT and to develop and upgrade ground-based laser ASATs. It prevents the Soviets from threatening our high-altitude satellites with anything but a large ground-based laser, a technology in which we have a substantial lead. In short, there is no real reason why we would prefer space-based ASATs over the ones we have now in development. This agreement would permit the Soviets to keep the ASATs we can't verify anyhow, but stop them from developing ones we can actually verify.

Position 6 essentially argues that we close the gap on the Soviets' existing advantage in real military capability for missile defense. We can actually construct a defense that will provide sufficient ICBM survivability, but it will require changing several limits in the ABM Treaty -- changing a few numbers, but leaving it qualitatively the same. The Soviets have a big lead-time-to-deployment advantage (4-7 years), because we never prototyped our system. More important, when SDI started up, conventional hardsite -- the only BMD system with demonstrated military effectiveness -- was cancelled.

Such a system could address the principal concern of Dr. Kissinger and Senator Garn, and do it sooner than any result from the nationwide defense program is likely to be ready. Everyone agrees that terminal hardsite defense of ICBMs is stabilizing. The technology to do that job, to eliminate the unstable vulnerability, is actually available. Critics will be concerned about meddling with the Treaty, but not nearly so concerned as if we embarked on SDI(b), in which we would effectively be announcing an intention to withdraw from the treaty, and for an objective those same critics regard as destabilizing rather than stabilizing.

There is absolutely no reason why we should permit the Soviets to maintain and improve their capability while we throw ours away, just because we hope to get something better. There is, however, good reason for concern about the Soviet capability, because of the linkage between offense and defense. In the interim between now and the success of the SDI effort -- an interval whose length is uncertain -- reductions in offensive arms will act to the benefit of the USSR unless we can have the option for an equivalent defense, to deter or match Soviet BMD breakout. At the very least, we must be able to evaluate the capability of their defense by more reliable means than paper studies.

Whether or not we pursue actually deploying hardsite, we should revive our activities in "conventional" hardsite BMD, prototype a system, keep modernizing it, and test pen-aids against it to insure we can get through Russian defenses. We should not allow the Russians a large unilateral advantage in defensive capability in the near term. While we are looking for the better thing, let us keep the good one.



THOMAS H. JOHNSON  
Director, Science Research Laboratory

Matlock

JF-CHAW  
52

GIF

National Security Council  
The White House

System # I  
Package # 9330  
1496

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Paul Thompson	<u>1</u>	<u>Δ</u>	
Bob Kimmitt			
John Poindexter	<u>2</u>	<u>Δ</u>	
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane	<u>3</u>	<u>/</u>	<u>A</u>
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat	<u>4</u>		<u>N</u>
Situation Room			

I = Information    A = Action    R = Retain    D = Dispatch    N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)

I wasn't certain who to send to go. Jack, Ron Karne & me.



INTERNATIONAL SECURITY - II

December 27, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

THROUGH: ROBERT M. KIMMITT

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Request for Travel Orders

I request approval of the attached travel authorization to accompany Secretary of State George P. Shultz to Geneva for the forthcoming meetings with Soviet Prime Minister Gromyko on January 5 - 9, 1985.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you approve attached travel request.

Approve

*JFM*

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachment

cc: Administration Office

DATE: 12/27/84

1. TRAVELER'S NAME: Jack F. Matlock

2. PURPOSE(S), EVENT(S), DATE(S): To accompany Secretary of State George P. Shultz to Geneva and participate in the forthcoming meetings with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko from January 5 - 9, 1985.

3. ITINERARY (Please Attach Copy of Proposed Itinerary): WASHINGTON - GENEVA - WASHINGTON

DEPARTURE DATE o/a 1/5/85 RETURN DATE o/a 1/9/85  
TIME TIME

4. MODE OF TRANSPORTATION:  
GOV AIR XX COMMERCIAL AIR \_\_\_\_\_ POV \_\_\_\_\_ RAIL \_\_\_\_\_ OTHER \_\_\_\_\_

5. ESTIMATED EXPENSES:  
TRANSPORTATION \_\_\_\_\_ PER DIEM \$410.- OTHER \$100.- TOTAL TRIP COST \$510.00

6. WHO PAYS EXPENSES: NSC XX OTHER \_\_\_\_\_

7. IF NOT NSC, DESCRIBE SOURCE AND ARRANGEMENTS:

8. WILL FAMILY MEMBER ACCOMPANY YOU: YES \_\_\_\_\_ NO XX

9. IF SO, WHO PAYS FOR FAMILY MEMBER (If Travel Not Paid by Traveler, Describe Source and Arrangements):

10. TRAVEL ADVANCE REQUESTED: \$ \_\_\_\_\_

11. REMARKS (Use This Space to Indicate Any Additional Items You Would Like to Appear on Your Travel Orders):

12. TRAVELER'S SIGNATURE: *Jack F. Matlock*

13. APPROVALS: