

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections

This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.

Collection: Matlock, Jack F.: Files
Folder Title: Matlock Chron December 1984 (3)
Box: 7

To see more digitized collections visit:

<https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library>

To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:

<https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection>

Contact a reference archivist at: reagan.library@nara.gov

Citation Guidelines: <https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing>

National Archives Catalogue: <https://catalog.archives.gov/>

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 3/26/2005

File Folder MATLOCK CHRON DECEMBER 1984 (3/5)

FOIA

F06-114/1

Box Number 7

YARHI-MILO

702

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
6336	E-MAIL	E-MAIL PROFS ROBERT MCFARLANE TO MATLOCK [7] <i>R 6/23/2010 M125/2</i>	1	12/14/1984	B1
6337	E-MAIL	E-MAIL PROFS JOHN POINDEXTER TO MATLOCK [8] <i>R 2/26/2009 GUIDELINES - M08-125/2</i>	1	12/14/1984	B1
6338	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE PRESIDENTIAL INTERVIEW WITH USSR PRESS [9] <i>R 2/26/2009 GUIDELINES - M08-125/2</i>	1	12/12/1984	B1
6345	MEMO	HILL TO MCFARLANE [11] <i>R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1</i>	1	12/10/1984	B1
6346	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #6345 [14] <i>R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1</i>	1	12/10/1984	B1
6339	MEMO	MCFARLANE TO MATLOCK RE SUZANNE MASSIE'S SUGGESTIONS [15-16] <i>R 3/3/2011 F2006-114/1</i>	2	12/16/1983	B1
6340	MEMO	LEHMAN TO MCFARLANE [38-39] <i>R 3/3/2011 F2006-114/1</i>	2	12/20/1984	B1
6341	E-MAIL	E-MAIL PROFS KIMMITT TO MCFARLANE [40] <i>R 3/3/2011 F2006-114/1</i>	1	12/8/1984	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 3/26/2005

File Folder MATLOCK CHRON DECEMBER 1984 (3/5)

FOIA

F06-114/1

Box Number 7

YARHI-MILO

702

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
6342	MEMO	MCFARLANE TO MATLOCK RE DINNER WITH DOBRYNIN [42-44] <i>R 3/3/2011 F2006-114/1</i>	3	12/21/1984	B1
6343	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #6342 [45-47] <i>R 3/3/2011 F2006-114/1</i>	3	12/21/1984	B1
6344	E-MAIL	E-MAIL PROFS POINDEXTER TO MATLOCK [48] <i>R 2/17/2010 GUIDELINES</i>	1	12/21/1984	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

December 13, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR DONALD GREGG

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT: Navarin Basin

Regarding your memorandum of December 5 concerning Soviet interest in a joint oil drilling project in the Navarin Basin, my immediate reaction is that there are at least three complicating factors:

1. Part of the area involved is in a zone currently in dispute between the US and USSR as regards the maritime boundary. We have been negotiating with the Soviets on the issue, but it does not, at the moment, seem near resolution.

2. Interior has put up some tracts in the area for bidding by American firms. Drilling cannot of course occur until the maritime boundary is settled (except in areas not under dispute), but it is possible that the Soviets are trying to finesse resolution of the issue (and thwart Interior's bid process) by dangling joint drilling ideas with U.S. firms.

3. Any proposal for joint deepsea drilling would have to be reviewed from the standpoint of export controls on the sort of equipment involved.

These are all highly technical -- and potentially contentious -- issues politically. I would suggest that Halbouty be advised to discuss the matter with State, Interior and Commerce.

I will be glad to ask State, Interior and Commerce for comments if you wish, but Halbouty can probably get the information he needs faster if he puts it directly to the experts. Elizabeth Verville in State's Legal Adviser's office has been handling the boundary demarcation issue and would probably know who the best contacts in Interior would be. On the export control question, the authorities are at Commerce. Lionel Olmer would be an appropriate place to start.

Alternatively -- and probably more simply since so many issues are potentially involved -- we could ask EUR/SOV in State to set up a meeting of appropriate specialists with Halbouty's people.

Please let me know if you need my help in setting this up.



OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON

December 5, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR JACK MATLOCK
NSC

FROM: DON GREGG dg

SUBJECT: Navarin Basin - Joint Venture, US and
Soviet Union

The attached memorandum is self-explanatory. The Russians apparently have an interest in a joint oil drilling project in the Navarin Basin.

The Vice President would be very interested in whether you have heard anything of this possibility and what your thoughts about such a project might be. Please note that the island in question, St. Matthews, has currently been blocked from oil exploration. This in itself may jeopardize the concept. Please let me know.

Attachment



3

THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON
November 26, 1984

MEMORANDUM FROM THE VICE PRESIDENT

FOR : ADMIRAL DANIEL MURPHY

SUBJECT: Navarin Basin - Joint Venture, USA and Soviet Union.

Mike Halbouty came to see me last week. Boyden was present. Halbouty had gone to Moscow August 15, 1984 to give the keynote speech to the 27th International Geological Congress. During his speech he mentioned a "possible joint venture." Following his speech the Minister of Geology, Professor Yevgeny A. Kozlovsky, approached Halbouty to see if he felt a joint venture would be possible. Mike told him that he thought it would and that he would check. I think Mike implied that he would be checking with the President, whom he does know well, and/or with me. He told the Minister it would be a private U.S. business that would enter into the joint venture, since the U.S. side does not have a government controlled exploration and production company.

The attached map shows the area involved. The acreage on either side of the "dash" line is in dispute. The idea would be to pick out a block with equal acreage on both sides of the line.

The block would be jointly explored (geophysics) and then jointly drilled.

The closest land on our side is St. Matthew Island and there is some dispute about using it. Some acreage in the Navarin Basin already has been leased to oil companies.


Halbouty mentioned two other names:

1. Edouard A. Griaznov - Assistant to the Minister for Geology
2. Nikita Bogdanov - A Scientist that Halbouty knows well

After my meeting with Halbouty, he called Moscow asking if they were still interested telling them he had made contact here and there was interest. They will be sending him a letter shortly.

Halbouty estimates the cost to drill our well - \$40-50 million. I believe that would include the necessary seismic work.

Attachment



f

5

Michael T. Halbouty
Meeting in Moscow
15 August 1984
With



Ministry of Geology

THE 27th INTERNATIONAL
GEOLOGICAL CONGRESS

Professor

YEVGENY A. KOZLOVSKY

President,

27th International Geological Congress,
Doctor of Sciences (Tech.)

123812, Moscow,
B. Gruzinskaya ul., 4/6

Tel. 252-23-05

Edouard A. GRIAZNOV

Assistant to the Minister
for Geology of the USSR

4/6 B. Gruzinskaya
Moscow

Ministry of Geology
of the USSR

257-11-33

Wildlife Refuge Land Exchange Blocked

Conservationists Hail Judge's Decision on Alaskan Island

Associated Press

ANCHORAGE, Dec. 1—A judge's decision to block a federal land exchange that would have let oil companies use an island wildlife refuge as a base for oil drilling probably will discourage similar exchanges, conservationists say.

U.S. District Court Judge James Fitzgerald on Friday ruled the exchange invalid. It had been approved by the Interior Department under then-Secretary James G. Watt in August 1983.

Conservationists claimed that the exchange sidestepped the refuge and wilderness restrictions on use of St. Matthew Island, part of the Bering Sea Wildlife Refuge.

~~This ruling means the courts~~ have upheld the sanctity of the wilderness system" and will not allow use of the exchange provision to further development, said Susan

Alexander, regional director of the Wilderness Society. The Interior Department gave three Alaska native corporations land on St. Matthew Island in exchange for wilderness property elsewhere in Alaska.

The corporations planned to sublease property on the island to oil companies exploring the Navarin Basin, which may contain up to a billion barrels of crude oil.

Fitzgerald said approval of the exchange represented "serious errors of judgment," a misapplication of federal law and a failure to act in the public interest.

He ruled in a suit brought by the National Audubon Society and six other conservation groups that said the corporations' plans would jeopardize ~~hundreds of thousands of~~ birds and marine mammals on the island about 225 miles west of Alaska.

Plans were to build an airfield,

port and oil storage facility on the land to service the oil interests if oil were discovered.

As part of the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act of 1980, Congress gave the Interior Department authority to exchange land. Use of that statute in the St. Matthew Island exchange was a central issue in the suit.

The St. Matthew exchange "was a case where the administration was trying to use the law to provide for development," Alexander said.

"This should be a clear message to all those who might consider making a raid on the National Wildlife Refuge System that they won't be allowed to get by with it," said David Cline, Audubon Society regional vice president.

"Of all the islands in the Bering Sea, this one is extremely unique. It is the only one never occupied by humans," he said.

6336 1

MSG FROM: NSRCM --CPUA
To: NSJMP --CPUA

TO: NSGVE --CPUA

12/14/84 15:28:37

~~---SECRET---~~

NOTE FROM: ROBERT MCFARLANE
SUBJECT: System II 91272

On the idea of the President doing an interview with Pravda or Izvestia in the runup to Geneva I have two problems. First is the issue of confidentiality. Do we really want to be part of a propaganda war for the life of the negotiations? To be fair I would have to admit that we already are witness the Chernenko interviews etc. But one must ask whether we want to encourage a sustained give and take like this through the headlines for the next four years. At bottom, progress won't come from what we or they say in these interviews--indeed they may complicate the negotiation as each side takes public positions which they later find difficult to come away from in private. So while I can imagine that one interview might not be precedential, it could leave us vulnerable.

The second point is less relevant but it concerns our turndown to Kalb for an analogous interview (albeit only for US consumption). From Kalb's point of view our argument--that we want to deal in diplomatic channels--would fall apart. But think about both points; talk to Karna, Bob and Ron and get back to me please. Many thanks.

copy to Small, Matlock Sims and Ron Lehman

cc: NSGVE --CPUA

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR MO8-125/2 #6336

BY kml NARA DATE 6/25/10

4337

8

MSG FROM: NSJMP --CPUA TO: Karna Small, Jack Matlock, +12/14/84 17:17:53
To: Karna Small, Jack Matlock, Ron Lehman, Bob Sims

~~SECRET~~

NOTE FROM: JOHN POINDEXTER
SUBJECT: Presidential Interview by Soviets

Please think about this over the weekend and let's caucus right after the 0730 meeting on Monday.

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 29, 1987
By CU NARA, Date 2/26/09

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

December 12, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JSM*

SUBJECT: Presidential Interview with the Soviet Press

State has suggested, in the Hill-McFarlane Memorandum at TAB I, that we offer a Presidential interview to the Soviet press to counter the recent Soviet media blitz, which included a Chernenko interview to the Washington Post.

I think the idea is a good one, so long as we can obtain the following commitments in advance:

- That questions be submitted in advance;
- That a brief meeting will be arranged for two or three follow-up questions;
- That there be an advance commitment to run the full text of the written questions and answers in Pravda or Izvestia or both.

I would recommend that, if the President agrees to this, Larry Speakes or Bob Sims notify the TASS correspondent accredited to the White House or the Press Officer at the Soviet Embassy that an interview could be granted on the conditions noted above, if there is interest.

Karna *KS* and Ron Lehman *RL* concur.

Recommendation:

That you discuss the question with the President at a 9:30 meeting and if he agrees, that you arrange with Speakes to take the next step.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Tab I Hill-McFarlane Memorandum of December 10, 1984

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By CW NARA, Date 7/26/89

National Security Council
The White House

10

System # _____

Package # _____



	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Paul Thompson	_____	_____	_____
Bob Kimmitt	1	K	_____
John Poindexter	2	K	Advance
Tom Shull	_____	_____	_____
Wilma Hall	_____	_____	_____
Bud McFarlane	_____	_____	_____
Bob Kimmitt	3	K	_____
NSC Secretariat	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
MATLOCK	4	_____	_____

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

This is what I want to accomplish with a 30 Dec speech (amongst other things).
[Signature]



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

December 10, 1984

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Countering the Soviet Media Blitz: A Presidential
Interview with the Soviet Press

The Soviets have been quite active in using Chernenko as the center of a media blitz designed to seize the propaganda high ground before the Geneva Shultz-Gromyko meeting. He has met with and issued statements through Armand Hammer, British Labour leader Neil Kinnock and Austrian Foreign Minister Sinowatz; sent a message to a physicians group; and made formal statements in the RSFSR and Supreme Soviets and other fora. Perhaps the most notable effort to directly influence American and world public opinion has been his two interviews with Dusko Doder of the Washington Post and Marvin Kalb of NBC. We expect this "Chernenko public affairs blitz" to continue in the weeks ahead, with its central point that everything is up to the U.S. side, in order to put pressure on us in the leadup to the Geneva meetings.

We believe it would be useful to consider appropriate ways to counter these moves by some increased Presidential efforts openly focussed toward the Soviet audience. One possibility would be for the President to give an interview to a Soviet correspondent to reciprocate the Doder and Kalb interviews. An interview with Izvestia or another central Soviet newspaper consisting of written and oral answers would be so obviously reciprocal the Soviets might print his comments in toto.

This sort of interview would provide the President an ideal method to communicate his peaceful intentions directly to the Soviet people and to the world at large. The basic message, we believe, should be that the President is committed to resolving problems and reducing tensions in all areas of the US-Soviet relationship on the basis of mutual benefit on substantive issues, and that this will be our approach to the upcoming discussions focussed on arms control in Geneva. We would, of course, publicize the interview and VOA can help keep the Soviets honest by broadcasting the full text of the interview in Russian. In addition to seizing the high ground just prior to the meeting in Geneva, this sort of reciprocal approach would fit well with our ongoing effort to negotiate some media reciprocity with the Soviets in the new exchanges agreement.

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/1 #6315

Charles Hill
Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

BY CW MADE DATE 11/27/07

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

National Security Council
The White House

12

System # II
Package # 91272

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Paul Thompson	_____	_____	_____
Bob Kimmitt	<u>1</u>	<u>K</u>	_____
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Tom Shull	_____	_____	_____
Wilma Hall	_____	_____	_____
Bud McFarlane	_____	_____	_____
Bob Kimmitt	_____	_____	_____
NSC Secretariat	<u>2</u>	_____	<u>STUFF</u>
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

Action Mallock
Cmt Small
 R. Lehman
dfo Sims (send red tag)

13

SYSTEM II PROFILE

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

ID 8491272

RECEIVED 11 DEC 84 10

TO MCFARLANE

FROM HILL, C

DOCDATE 10 DEC 84

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997

By CAJ NARA, Date 6/11/02

KEYWORDS: USSR

MEDIA

SUBJECT: COUNTERING THE SOVIET MEDIA BLITZ - PRES INTERVIEW W/ THE SOVIET PRESS

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR MCFARLANE DUE: STATUS S FILES SII

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
MATLOCK	SMALL	LEHMAN, R
		SIMS

COMMENTS

RLF# 8433468 LOG NSCIFID (E /)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO

DISPATCH _____ W/ATTCH FILE _____ (C)



United States Department of State
 SYSTEM II
 Washington, D.C. 20520 91272

December 10, 1984

SECRET/SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
 THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Countering the Soviet Media Blitz: A Presidential
 Interview with the Soviet Press

The Soviets have been quite active in using Chernenko as the center of a media blitz designed to seize the propaganda high ground before the Geneva Shultz-Gromyko meeting. He has met with and issued statements through Armand Hammer, British Labour leader Neil Kinnock and Austrian Foreign Minister Sinowatz; sent a message to a physicians group; and made formal statements in the RSFSR and Supreme Soviets and other fora. Perhaps the most notable effort to directly influence American and world public opinion has been his two interviews with Dusko Doder of the Washington Post and Marvin Kalb of NBC. We expect this "Chernenko public affairs blitz" to continue in the weeks ahead, with its central point that everything is up to the U.S. side, in order to put pressure on us in the leadup to the Geneva meetings.

We believe it would be useful to consider appropriate ways to counter these moves by some increased Presidential efforts openly focussed toward the Soviet audience. One possibility would be for the President to give an interview to a Soviet correspondent to reciprocate the Doder and Kalb interviews. An interview with Izvestia or another central Soviet newspaper consisting of written and oral answers would be so obviously reciprocal the Soviets might print his comments in toto.

This sort of interview would provide the President an ideal method to communicate his peaceful intentions directly to the Soviet people and to the world at large. The basic message, we believe, should be that the President is committed to resolving problems and reducing tensions in all areas of the US-Soviet relationship on the basis of mutual benefit on substantive issues, and that this will be our approach to the upcoming discussions focussed on arms control in Geneva. We would, of course, publicize the interview and VOA can help keep the Soviets honest by broadcasting the full text of the interview in Russian. In addition to seizing the high ground just prior to the meeting in Geneva, this sort of reciprocal approach would fit well with our ongoing effort to negotiate some media reciprocity with the Soviets in the new exchanges agreement.

DECLASSIFIED

Charles Hill
 Charles Hill
 Executive Secretary

NLRR F06-114/1 #6346

BY CS NARA DATE 11/27/07

SECRET/SENSITIVE

6339 15

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL/EYES ONLY~~

December 16, 1983

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JCM*

SUBJECT: Suzanne Massie's Suggestions

I agree with several of Mrs. Massie's basic points, but have serious reservations about her specific suggestions as to how to handle them.

- I agree:
- (1) that cultural exchanges are in our interest;
 - (2) that there is widespread anxiety among Soviet intellectuals about U.S. intentions; and
 - (3) that the authorities would probably welcome resumption of negotiations on an exchange agreement if it is offered in the right way (though I doubt that the impact would be as great as Mrs. Massie assumes).

I see real problems with using Mrs. Massie as an official emissary, however:

--I believe we have adequate means to take an informal sounding of the Soviet attitude toward a proposal to resume exchange negotiations, if we wish to do so. Hartman can see Demichev or Arbatov as easily as Mrs. Massie can.

--If we want a "special emissary" to talk to Andropov or those close to him, Brent Scowcroft is much better qualified to deal with the central questions of the relationship. To name someone else in addition would be confusing, and almost certainly counterproductive.

--Designation by the President and conferral of diplomatic status and "authority" is a bad idea in principle and probably unworkable in practice.

--Regarding Mrs. Massie's second step, I doubt that we need another presidential commission to examine the content of a proposed exchanges agreement. We already have a Presidential Commission which deals with international cultural exchanges. Its members are not sufficiently specialized in their background or experience to vet this kind of detail, but naming another commission (aside from the general question of how much proliferation of this practice is desirable) would be seen as duplicative--and perhaps an insult to the existing commission.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

BY *RWS* NARRA DATE 3/3/11
NLR/F06-1141 #6339
DECLASSIFIED

14

Having said this, I would see no great harm, and perhaps some limited benefit, if we could arrange for Mrs. Massie to go to Moscow strictly unofficially, but with a general message that she has discussed the questions of cultural and informational exchanges with senior officials of the Administration, has found that there is a willingness to consider ways to move ahead to expand them, and would be prepared to relay any ideas her Soviet interlocutors might have regarding desirable next steps in this area. In this context she might ask what the Soviet reaction would be if we should propose a resumption of negotiations on an agreement. She should, however, not ask to see anyone more senior than Minister of Culture Demichev.

On the "second step," I would see no objection to consulting Mrs. Massie unofficially (or even naming her officially as an NSC consultant) on the text of a proposed exchange agreement. She might well have something to contribute in this area.

The way you respond to Mrs. Massie will also depend importantly on your judgment as to whether we will in fact be prepared to resume negotiations on the cultural exchanges agreement in the near future. If you are sanguine on this score, and if you wish to be as responsive as possible to her suggestions, then I would recommend the following:

- (1) That we offer to name her a consultant to the NSC;
- (2) That we suggest travel to Moscow in that capacity, for general consultations as outlined above, in close coordination with the Embassy; and
- (3) That we give her a role in advising on the content of any draft agreement we might propose.

Before we proceed with such an offer, however, I should discuss with Bob Kimmitt the technicalities of naming her as a consultant and the ground rules for financing her travel. I suspect that the formalities (including security clearance) would take much too long to make travel toward the end of the year, as she suggests, feasible.

** Marylinda
Dud*

Alternatively, you could reply to her by thanking her for her ideas, assuring her that we will give priority consideration to resuming negotiations on cultural exchanges, and offering to stay in touch as plans move forward.

RECOMMENDATION:

(1) That you authorize me to discuss with Bob Kimmitt the technicalities of naming Mrs. Massie a consultant and arranging for her to travel to Moscow, and if this seems feasible, to draft a letter proposing this.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

(2) Alternatively, that I draft a letter welcoming her ideas but declining her offer to act as an emissary.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

*I am
generally
supportive
of this idea
but I have
a few
reservations
with
you
I am
not
sure
I can
take
the
responsibility
for
this
I am
not
sure
I can
take
the
responsibility
for
this*

*Bob Kimmitt also to
approv... to
people
can
any
work
for
you
please
me
orally
well
you
back
to
her
soon*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

1/10

17

Jack,

Please follow-up
on Bud's request.

Thank you.

Tom

SUZANNE MASSIE
60 WEST CLINTON AVENUE
IRVINGTON, NEW YORK 10533

Matlock for
recommendation
I don't mind
5 min at a 9:30
January 8, 1984.
spoke if you
should get worth -
while.

Dear Mr. MacFarlane,

I regret, but fully understand that the pressure of your schedule did not permit us to meet when I was in Washington on Friday. I hope that a meeting with you will be possible at some future date before my departure.

I am aware that Jack Matlock has fully informed you of our conversations and of my feeling that it is extremely important for me to see the President even if only for a short time before I leave on this mission. Nevertheless, I wish to explain to you directly my reasons for feeling so strongly about this.

It is my considered assessment, knowing the Russians as I do, that it is vital to the potential success of this initiative for me to be able to say that I have seen the President and that he has personally assured me of his interest in the resumption of dialogue between our two countries on the subject of cultural exchange. For Russians, personal contact is far more important than it is for us, a psychology that we often do not completely understand or share. For them, everything is decided at the top, and only at the top. If I say that I have spoken with the President's highest advisors but am forced to admit that I have not seen him personally, the results will not be the same. Not only will it diminish my credibility, but far more importantly I fear, it will reflect on his. As you are aware, an important part of the problem for them now is not only the question of issues and substance, but the matter of style and personality. They simply do not understand our President and do not trust him. Because of this they are deeply suspicious of his motives and all of his initiatives, however reasonable.

M
1-10-84


19
Mr. MacFarlane 2.

Given the state of communication between our countries at this time, this will not be an easy perception to dispel. My task of persuasion will be made much more difficult if I have to say that I have never actually met him. I know them. Their reaction may very well be, " We trust you, but if you have never met him, why do you trust him? How do you know this is a genuine gesture?" It will make it much easier for them to dismiss this initiative as " just another American ploy", rather than the sincere and genuine action I know it to be.

I hope you will give me the fullest support as I believe you understand that I would not presume on the President's time if I did not think a face to face meeting to be a necessary and perhaps vital ingredient in the success of this mission.

Thank you for your trust in me. I shall do my best to serve the interests of our nation and of peace.

Sincerely,


Suzanne Massie

20
SUZANNE MASSIE
60 WEST CLINTON AVENUE
IRVINGTON, N. Y. 10533

The Honorable Robert C. MacFarlane
The White House
Washington D.C. 20500

TO BE OPENED ONLY BY WILMA HALL

21

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 14, 1983

FOR: AMB JACK MATLOCK

FROM: Wilma Hall *wjh*

Mr. McFarlane has asked that I send the attached package from Suzanne Massie to you asking for your recommendation. He also notes that he would like to encourage her.

Please prepare an appropriate response for Mr. McFarlane's signature.

Many thanks.

I thought you might be interested in seeing this letter which Scoop wrote before my latest trip, which I eventually took in Sept.

23

SUZANNE MASSIE
1 WEST 67TH STREET
NEW YORK, N. Y. 10023

December 3, 1983

The Honorable Robert C. McFarlane
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. McFarlane:

As you requested, I am writing to outline some of the points and proposals we discussed during our meeting on November 30th.

I believe that an important step toward thawing the chill that has developed in our relations with the Soviet Union would be the resumption of talks on cultural exchange.

I. I would be willing to help this process in any way that I can. Because of my books and extensive lecturing, I am known by the American public as someone who understands and loves Russian culture and the Russian people, but who has consistently adopted a firm and even a hard line toward the aggressive actions of the Soviet government both abroad and toward its own people.

The Soviet authorities are well aware of my position and I believe that their initiative and timing in granting me a visa after so many years of refusal, reflects a desire on their part to open new cultural avenues. During my recent visit, despite the tension in our official relations, they went out of their way to make it possible for me to accomplish all the goals of my trip. I have now asked for the necessary permissions to write a book about the history and restoration of the palace of Pavlovsk outside Leningrad, a project in which they expressed interest when first proposed many years ago, and now again. As a result, I may now be in a position to build some bridges toward the resumption of cultural dialogue between our two nations.

I have carefully considered the points you brought up during our meeting. If I were to make a trip, I would wish to go not as a member of any governmental agency, but as a private citizen, designated by the president as a special cultural envoy with diplomatic status and authority.

The purpose of my trip would be to explore, without loss of face for either side, the mood and willingness of the Soviet Union to resume talks on exchange begun in August before the Korean Airline disaster. The trip should be low key and discreet.

24

The Honorable Robert C. McFarlane
December 3, 1983

Page Two

It might also serve as the occasion to deliver a private message from the President to Chairman Andropov expressing in a general manner his views on the usefulness of broader exchange between our countries as a means of reducing tensions and promoting peace.

I would ask to meet with Chairman Andropov, Pyotr Demichev, Minister of Culture, and with Georgy Arbatov and his colleagues at the USA Institute, most of whom I already know, and with whom I have discussed the resumption of cultural exchanges.

II. If the results of this first step are positive, the second step would be to work out the timing and forum for such talks to take place officially.

In preparation for this second step, we in the United States need to determine more precisely our long range national objectives for such exchanges. This might be accomplished by the creation of a special presidential commission which would:

- a) Articulate such priorities and goals.
- b) Consider the image of our country we wish to present to a new generation in the Soviet Union.
- c) Make recommendations concerning the kinds of American exhibits, programs and individuals we would send to the Soviet Union.
- d) Consider ways to broaden the number and variety of Soviet citizens we would like to invite to the United States.

III. There is opposition in some quarters of the Soviet government to any cultural exchange, but almost all Soviet officials pay at least lip service to the desire for such exchanges, and of course the majority of Soviet people would enthusiastically welcome it.

In the United States, I know from my travels around the country

25

The Honorable Robert C. McFarlane
December 3, 1983

Page Three

that exchange enjoys wide public support. Moreover, since my return, I have, during the past weeks, met with many members of Congress and I am certain that there is strong bi-partisan support for new cultural initiatives. For example, as a direct result of one of these meetings, Representative Daniel Glickman called for a special Order of Congress on the 50th anniversary of diplomatic recognition of the USSR by the US. (I enclose the text of these speeches for your information.

After the Christmas recess, at the request of Senators Cohen and Heinz, I will be speaking to other senators on the subject of cultural exchange and our relations with the USSR and I have been asked to meet with another group of congressmen early in January.

IV. Given the current situation in the USSR, it is impossible to predict the Soviet response to this overture. However, we would lose nothing by making this gesture and might gain a great deal. From the talks I had in October, I know that the Soviets were not closed to the idea of discussing new cultural exchanges at that time, and were eager for some evidence of US flexibility. At this time, when the dialogue between the US and the USSR over arms has reached an impasse which the Soviets may not be willing or able soon to overcome, it is important that we offer them in a non-military form, both a sign of our willingness to ameliorate our relations and an opportunity for them to respond. Therefore, I suggest that such a trip should take place as soon as possible, precisely because of the uncertain political consequences of Andropov's health. We need to feel out the changing terrain. The reaction of the Soviet Union to a positive move on our part on such a relatively uncontroversial subject as cultural exchange might be an indication of future attitudes about far more sensitive issues. A particularly symbolic time for such a mission might be the Christmas season, December 26-January 1st or Orthodox Christmas which is celebrated on January 7th.

I enjoyed our conversation and look forward to hearing from you.

Sincerely,



Suzanne Massie

SM:jk
enc.

HENRY M. JACKSON
WASHINGTON

ROOM 711
SENATE HART OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510
(202) 224-3441

United States Senate
WASHINGTON, D.C.

20
COMMITTEES:
ARMED SERVICES
ENERGY AND
NATURAL RESOURCES
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
INTELLIGENCE

April 11, 1983

The Honorable Arthur A. Hartman
American Embassy
APO New York 09862

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

I wanted you to have this special word from me about the visit which Suzanne Massie will be paying to the Soviet Union from May 3 through May 18. This seems to me one of the most interesting and potentially constructive recent private American visits.

Suzanne has become, as you know, a distinguished expert on Russian history, culture and art. As researcher and editor of her husband's book Nicholas and Alexandra, author of The Living Mirror, Five Young Poets of Leningrad, and of Land of the Firebird: Beauty of Old Russia, Suzanne is known for her scholarship and interpretive skills both by the American public and in many circles in the Soviet Union.


Following up on her earlier trips, she is looking forward to meetings with key Soviet officials in the field of restoration, and to visiting some of the newly restored sites in Moscow and Leningrad. She expects to be staying at the National Hotel in Moscow, May 3 to May 9, and will be in Leningrad from May 9 to May 18.

Suzanne and her family have been long and close friends of mine. I respect her highly as a person of great charm, outgoing, straightforward and reliable -- fully aware of the complexities and uncertainties in U.S.-USSR relations.

I will deeply appreciate whatever assistance and courtesies you can appropriately render to make Suzanne Massie's visit as productive as possible.

With best regards.

Sincerely yours,


Henry M. Jackson, U.S.S.

such as Latvia and subjugating them completely to the dominance of the Russian majority.

I believe we must reject such a process of Soviet colonization just as throughout our history we have rejected all other forms of colonization. Our resolute refusal to legitimize the Soviet seizure of Latvia is a fact which gives moral strength to the long-suffering, but brave people of Latvia who continue to fight the efforts of Sovietization. Let our commemoration of the 65th anniversary of Latvian Independence Day be a symbol of hope and a signal that no amount of time will ever shake our commitment to the Latvian struggle for their independence and freedom.●

● Mr. RITTER. Mr. Speaker, I am proud to join with my colleagues in solemn observance of the 65th anniversary of Latvian Independence Day. While we share in this day with Latvians throughout the world, I believe it is important that we also remember those brave men and women who continue to live in Soviet-dominated Latvia today. Their struggle for freedom and basic human rights is the struggle of all freedom-loving people everywhere.

As World War I ended, Latvia declared its independence from the newly formed Soviet regime. Throughout Latvia, men and women began to build a nation that had been torn apart by strife and war. Few nations had such a formidable challenge as the Latvians in transforming a hard-fought independence into a judicious and benevolent government for all the people. After overcoming great obstacles a new nation was formed and a people were united in their independence.

During the interwar years, Latvia enjoyed a prosperous and productive existence. Output in virtually every sector markedly improved. As a member of the League of Nations, Latvia enjoyed good relations in the international family of nations.

However, as the dark clouds of war began to menacingly spread across Europe, small nations such as Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia became inevitably embroiled in the power struggles being waged in war-planning rooms of Moscow and Berlin. Although neutral, the Soviet Union invaded these countries in mid-1940, unlawfully ending their independence. One year later, the Soviets, anticipating a Nazi takeover of the Baltic countries began a mass deportation of tens of thousands of Baltic people. They were laying the groundwork for a future occupation and the fulfillment of their diabolical plans. Whole families were forever broken apart, others were sent to Siberia to live the rest of their lives literally in slavery, and still others were summarily executed. That week has come to be known as the Baltic Holocaust and it is a wound that not even time will heal.

After the war ended, the horror continued as thousands more were sent to the Gulags. Today, it is no coincidence that a large percentage of people living in these occupied countries are not of Baltic descent. The Soviets have tried repeatedly to russify the Baltic peoples. And they have failed. The culture, religion and traditions of these great peoples is still alive and each new generation continues the hope for a one day free Latvia.

Latvians are a fiercely proud people who have not yielded to the injustices of their Soviet occupiers. We can never forget their struggle or the struggle of their neighbor countries. I am proud to say that the United States has never recognized the Baltic countries as part of the Soviet Union.

I am currently sponsoring House Concurrent Resolution 192 which expresses the sense of Congress that the President should take all steps necessary to bring the question of self-determination of the Baltic States before the United Nations. Many other Members of Congress have joined as co-sponsors and it is my hope that this resolution will be passed before the U.N. Human Rights Session convenes in February. We in Congress have an integral role to play in keeping the hopes of all oppressed peoples before world attention. I invite you to join me on this resolution.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. PORTER) is recognized for 60 minutes.

[Mr. PORTER addressed the House. His remarks will appear hereafter in the Extension of Remarks.]

THE 50TH ANNIVERSARY OF UNITED STATES-SOVIET RELATIONS

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Kansas (Mr. GLICKMAN) is recognized for 60 minutes.

GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. GLICKMAN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks on the subject of my special order.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Kansas?

There was no objection.

Mr. GLICKMAN. Mr. Speaker, the hour is late but the subject is quite important, and I am sorry that a number of my colleagues who were supposed to be here tonight and have submitted statements for the RECORD could not stay because of the late hour.

Mr. Speaker, my colleagues and I have called for this evening's special order to reflect on the 50th anniversary of the establishment of formal diplomatic ties between the United States and the Soviet Union. A 50th anniversary is traditionally the golden an-

niversary; regrettably, the gold in this relationship is badly tarnished.

Since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the imposition of martial law in Poland, and, most recently, the shooting down of Korean air flight 007, United States-Soviet relations have grown progressively worse. Today there is considerably less trade, no cultural exchange and scant bilateral cooperation. Within the last 18 months, four of the eight science cooperation agreements with the Soviets have expired and have not been renewed. Two others are scheduled to run out next year.

A recent article in the New York Times revealed that 10 Russian college students scheduled to take classes at the State University of Albany, N.Y., this fall have not left Moscow, and there is now doubt whether the student exchange will be completed. Although the delay, in part, is attributable to the banning of Aeroflot, the Soviet airline, from landing in the United States or Canada, an official from the State University said that she had received word from American students studying in Moscow that the delay in the departure of the Russians—the only 10 Soviet undergraduate students to see America this year—could also be attributable to the tensions between the two countries.

Political dialog has been largely silenced and diplomatic contacts are severely strained. According to an American, just returned from Moscow, in the Soviet Foreign Ministry there is a new joke that Ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin here in Washington has "joined the ranks of the unemployed in America," because there is now so little for him to do here. The few ongoing contacts exist because of arms control negotiations in Geneva and our sales of grain to the Soviets. Recent events in Lebanon and Grenada now present questions about the future of even these relationships.

We cannot close our eyes to the Soviets' international aggression or their censorable internal repression, nor can we stress strongly enough that many of the breaches in United States-Soviet relations are the result of Russian misconduct. I also realize that as long as this Nation and the Soviet Union each remain true to the principles upon which they were founded, rivalry and disagreement will continue. The world's surfeit of sophisticated weaponry, however, makes that rivalry extremely dangerous, and that makes continued diplomatic, cultural, and trade contacts with the Soviet Union absolutely essential to the prevention of nuclear war and to any hope of achieving real peace in any of the world's trouble spots.

We also need to do our best to have access to the formulation of opinions by the Soviet people, particularly to the extent that we can encourage them to share the same frustrations, the same concerns that Americans do

the threat that nuclear war poses to the future of the human adventure as the only relevant question in American policy toward the U.S.S.R. The other pole of the argument sees a totalitarian state, organized on Leninist principles, massively repressing its own people, and armed beyond any reasonable defensive needs. In the aftermath of the KAL 007 incident, this deep division in America was clearly unveiled. There were calls to make the U.S.S.R. a pariah nation; to sequester it, in effect, from the community of nations until it radically changed its behavior in the world. Conversely, other voices talked of the historic "paranoia" of the Soviet Union about the security of its borders, and counselled extreme circumspection so that similar incidents would not lead to the ultimate disaster.

What was tragically missing from that debate, as from the past 15 years of argument over United States-Soviet relations, was a third voice: one which recognized the grave threat posed to American security and Western democratic values by an armed, totalitarian power with world-historical ambitions; one which recognized that merely confirming the Soviet geopolitical agenda would heighten, not minimize, the dangers of war; but one which asked—What can America do to change the present course of Soviet policy and make agreement between our two countries possible on the full range of issues that stand between us: arms reductions leading to mutual and verifiable disarmament, international institutions capable of resolving conflict without the use or threat of mass violence, the protection of basic human rights, the amelioration of the pressing need for social, economic, and political development in the Third World?

The real tragedy of our present domestic division on United States-Soviet relations is not that one pole of the argument is right, and the other wrong. The tragedy is that there are important elements of truth in each polar position, but no third voice to gather them together, create new agreement within our own country, and thus equip us for the long term, difficult, crucial task of coping with Soviet power in ways that enhance the world's prospects for peace and security, for liberty and prosperity.

That third voice could be raised in this Congress. It would be one of the most important contributions we in the Congress could make to both the foreign policy of the United States and the health of American political culture as it debates that policy. What notes would that third voice sound? What policy directions would it suggest are worthy of exploration, by those on both sides of the present debate who wish to work together for a new American consensus on United States-Soviet relations?

That changes in the present course of Soviet policy are absolutely necessary for the world's peace and security is a proposition that should need little more than assertion. But the next, and more important, question, is: Can there be change in the U.S.S.R.? And this leads to the crucial policy question: What can the United States do, in its formal and public diplomacy, and through its nongovernmental organizations, to help make that desirable change possible?

When many Americans look at the Soviet Union today, they see a monolithic society, run by State police terror against its own citizens, and virtually impervious to change. That description of the present Soviet regime is accurate; but the conclusion drawn from it is mistaken. For despite the best efforts of Soviet leaders since 1917, Soviet society is not monolithic. Newman's axiom, that change is the law of life, is just as true of the U.S.S.R. as of any other society. That change will take place is certain; the issue is the direction change will take.

We can be certain of this because there are multiple pressures within Soviet society today that make change inevitable. The Soviet leadership will undergo an important, and perhaps profound, generational change over the next decade. The last of the Stalinist generation will die, and a new generation of leaders—no less committed to the maintenance of their power, but not formed in the crucible of the 1930s purge trials and the seering experiences of World War II—will come to power. This new generation of leaders will have to deal with massive, systemic problems in Soviet society. The agricultural system remains in chronic disarray; a country that was once the world's leading grain exporter is not its leading grain importer. Soviet science and technology lag behind the democratic West in virtually all the frontier fields of applied human intelligence: microbiology, cybernetics, robotics. The Soviet work force is plagued by alcoholism. The inefficiencies of Soviet medical practice and family planning are such that the average Soviet woman can expect to undergo at least six abortions during her fertile years. Contrary to the expectations of Marx and Lenin, religion is not withering away in the communist state, but is enjoying a remarkable renaissance, particularly among the young. Then there are the profound demographic changes that the Soviet Union will experience over the next 20 years. By the turn of the century, the majority population of the world's last empire will no longer be ethnic Russian. Tensions and pressures for change in the traditional pattern of ethnic relationships within the U.S.S.R. are already evident, not only in the southern tier of Soviet Islamic republics, but throughout the Baltic States, the Ukraine, Byelorussia, and Georgia.

The Soviet Union of 2000 will thus be inevitably different from the Soviet Union of 1983, even as today's Soviet Union is different from the U.S.S.R. of 1938, or 1917. The only question is the direction change will take, and whether it will make agreement between our two countries more or less likely.

For change in the U.S.S.R. to make agreement with the United States more likely, though, the most important change that must take place is in the present Soviet political system. As we face that system, and as it acts in the world, the most important of its characteristics is not its Marxism—the official ideology may still shape Soviet foreign policy, but the old revolutionary fervor is long gone—but its Leninism. According to Leninist doctrine, there can be only one center of power in the state. Through that doctrine, the 14 members of the Politburo of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee own and operate the U.S.S.R. In light of that doctrine, every attempt is made to break down the distinction between public and private life in the country. A humane genius like Andrei Sakharov, whose scientific work contributed no little to the Soviet Union's present world position, is caught in the web of this Leninist refusal to allow the sphere of the private and the personal any sway in public affairs. Sakharov, and thousands of others, are even denied the right of personal conscience, since it is assumed that any right thinking is totally in accord with the Politburo's line. Dissenting thought is, objectively, insanity; hence the abuse of psychiatry and the gross use of psychiatric drugs on those who dissent.

It is this Leninist character of the U.S.S.R. that must be altered if the Soviet Union is to come into agreement with the United States on a world safe for peace and security, for liberty and prosperity. What kind of change is possible? Solzhenitsyn is most probably correct in his claim that a change in the Soviet Union from Leninism to Western-style democracy is highly unlikely, given Russian cultural and historical factors. But the Soviet Union need not become a parliamentary democracy overnight for it to change its present course in world affairs. What is necessary, as University of California political scientist Aaron Wildavsky has recently written, is a slow process of pluralization in the U.S.S.R.: The development of other centers of power and influence that could be brought to bear on the decisionmaking of the party leadership, speaking for the Soviet people's deep desire for peace, for a much greater degree of material prosperity, for a measure of human freedom. Pluralizing the centers of power in the U.S.S.R. thus seems an entirely appropriate goal for U.S. policy to encourage and assist, for it is the precondition to the Soviet Government's taking a new, and more desirable,

course in the world affairs. For so long as the members of the Politburo are responsible only to each other and to their internal power struggles, for just that long will Soviet policy continue on its present, dangerous course. As other centers of power come into the Kremlin's policy calculations, though, we can hope to see positive change: For such a process of pluralization could lead the U.S.S.R. to concentrate more heavily on its grave domestic problems, and more on approaches to world conflicts that lessen the danger of military confrontation and thus lessen the need for military hardware.

How could the policy of the United States aid in pluralizing the centers of power in the U.S.S.R.? We cannot do this directly; but we may be able to help the process along obliquely. Several possibilities come to mind in the area of our public diplomacy, that is, the U.S. Government's address to the people of the U.S.S.R.

Strengthening our broadcast capabilities into the Soviet Union, through the Voice of America and Radio Liberty, could be an important component of a policy of pluralization. Telling the truth about America—which is the job of the VOA—and telling the truth about news within the Soviet Union—which is the task of Radio Liberty—are essential checks against the complete victory of the Leninist model of governance. The Soviet Union currently spends more on jamming American broadcasts into its country than we spend on all of our international broadcasting to the U.S.S.R.; moreover, we have not been very supportive of our own efforts here, for the VOA is in some cases using transmitters captured from the Germans in 1945. Enhancing this broadcast capability, adding new hours of informational, religious, and cultural programming to our Soviet-language services, helping the Voice of America and Radio Liberty develop the technical capacity to better resist Soviet jamming: All of these are ways in which American policy can help open windows in the closed society of the Soviet Union. Such an effort would also be completely consistent with our rights and responsibilities under the Helsinki Final Act.

Professional, technical, and scholarly exchange programs can also be the occasion to open closed windows in the U.S.S.R. and, even if modestly, help pluralize power in the Soviet Union. These programs have human, academic, and occasionally commercial value in their own right. Could they also become instruments in a policy of pluralization? The Soviet Union needs access to Western knowledge and Western technological capabilities, access often provided through exchange programs. Might we consider altering the rules governing such exchanges so that the Soviets involved are those who actually deserve to participate, rather than only those who are politically acceptable to the Soviet

Government? American academic associations have had some modest success in pursuing this goal, for the Soviet need for knowledge can occasionally override the Soviet leadership's concern for Leninist controls. The challenge would be to create such new rules for United States-Soviet exchange in ways that do not jeopardize legitimate scholarly interests, but that also provide some measure of help and relief for Soviet academics and technologists—and, thereby, help pluralize power in the Soviet Union.

American voluntary organizations could also play an important role in efforts to pluralize the U.S.S.R., and in some cases may be more effective than government. The commitment of the American Jewish community to relieving the burdens of Soviet Jewry should be matched by similar commitments and actions by American Christians and American Muslims. The American peace movement could be enormously helpful to the project of pluralization if it would become the international voice of those courageous Soviet peace activists who have broken with the official, Party-run peace movement in the U.S.S.R. No one doubts that the people of the U.S.S.R. want peace and peace and security just as badly as do the people of the United States; the difficulty is that the Soviet people, under present conditions, have little if any impact on the policy of their government. Those Americans who wish to channel the common human yearning for peace into meaningful political channels, and who wish to do so by reaching across national borders in human solidarity with the people of the U.S.S.R., are a potentially powerful instrument for not just understanding, but for change—if their actions challenge the present Soviet agenda rather than confirming it, and if their actions give more effective voice within Soviet politics to the people of the U.S.S.R.

Trust will not be the final basis on which United States-Soviet agreement rests; mutual self-interest will be, and should be, our guide, particularly in the field of national security and peace strategy. Fears of a nuclear war by accident or miscalculation are not the private preserve of move producers. There are short-term steps that we could take to lessen this threat, steps that would also enhance the ability of the United States and the Soviet Union to work together for mutually desirable goals. My late colleague from the State of Washington, Senator Henry M. Jackson, took the lead with others in the Senate in proposing a Joint United States-Soviet Crisis Consultation Center that would build on the existing hotline arrangements to lessen the danger of war through accident or miscalculation. Such a center is squarely in the interest of both countries. It is in the interest of the world. It would set a model for cooperation that might be replicated over time in other, equally dangerous areas

of United States-Soviet conflict. Fortright American leadership toward the development of a Crisis Consultation Center would also demonstrate to the world the priority which the United States gives to effective action that reduces the peril of nuclear war. I would urge the administration to give this concept the most careful study, and then to make its creation and implementation among the highest priorities of American peace and security policy.

I have focused here on the need for change in Soviet policy, and how that change might be conceived so that new consensus, bipartisan consensus, on America's role in the superpower competition might be built. We should also be clear that our own policy requires change, and that our own public debate needs a new injection of reason. We can no longer afford the luxury of oscillation between a too-benign view of Soviet purposes and power, and a view of the Soviet Union so harsh that it precludes the possibility of any agreement between us. We need, in the Congress, a new spirit of bipartisanship, so that proposals from a Republican administration are not automatically rejected by Democrats, and Democratic proposals are not dismissed out of hand by Republicans in the executive and legislative branches. There is no need here to emphasize the stakes of the contest in which we are engaged—and in which we will be engaged for the foreseeable future. There are no quick fixes, psychological or political. There will be costs as well as benefits in the kind of approach to United States-Soviet relations I am suggesting here. I believe the American people are willing, indeed eager, to bear those costs if they believe in the possibility of an enormous benefit: a changed course for Soviet policy, leading to the possibility of meaningful agreement between our two countries on making the world safe for conflict.

The wise management of that conflict is the hardest test ever faced by the American republic: hardest, because of the degree of threat posed by the Soviet Union, because of the immense danger of nuclear holocaust, because of the long-term patience and purposefulness that is required of us. I believe that the American people will meet the challenge of that test if their political leadership shows the ability to break out of today's polarized debate and define new and better ground on which American policy toward the Soviet Union can be designed and implemented. I hope that the American people demand that much of us. I hope we show ourselves capable of assuming such leadership as they, and the world, deserve.

● Ms. KAPTUR. Mr. Speaker, I join with my colleagues today in marking the 50th anniversary of the establishment of formal diplomatic ties between the United States and the Soviet Union. Because of the impor-

tance of maintaining meaningful communication with the Soviets, I feel that it is crucial to reflect upon the past, present and future of United States-Soviet relations.

George Kennan is one of the most knowledgeable experts in this country on our relations with the Soviet Union. Therefore, today I would like to share with my colleagues a recent article by George Kennan which appeared in the *New Yorker*. The article follows:

BREAKING THE SPELL

Soviet-American relations, in consequence of a process of deterioration that has been going on for several years, are today in what can only be called a dreadful and dangerous condition. Civility and privacy of communication between the two governments seem to have largely broken down. Reactions on each side to statements and actions of the other side have been allowed to become permeated with antagonism, suspicion, and cynicism. Public discussion of the relations between the two countries has become almost totally militarized, at least in this country: militarized to a point where the casual reader or listener is compelled to conclude that some sort of military showdown is the only conceivable denouement of their various differences—the only one worth considering and discussing. Can anyone mistake, or doubt, the ominous meaning of such a state of affairs? The phenomena just described, occurring in the relations between two highly armed great powers, are the familiar characteristics, the unerring characteristics, of a march toward war—that, and nothing else. The danger would be intolerable even if the two countries were armed only with what are called conventional weapons. The history of the past century has shown that the damage produced by armed conflict between highly industrialized great powers in the modern age, even without the use of nuclear armaments, is so appalling that it is doubtful whether Western civilization could survive another such catastrophe. But this danger is now increased many times over by the nature of the weapons that the two countries hold in their hands. Either of these two factors—the nature of the weaponry, the state of the political relations—would be a danger in itself. The two in combination present a shadow greater than any that has ever before darkened the face of Western civilization.

Is this state of affairs really necessary? Is it unavoidable from the standpoint of the American policymaker? Is there no way we could hope to cope with it other than by a continuing an intensified weapons race of indefinite duration? The casual reader or listener is led to believe that there is not. If, however, there is something that could be done, what is it? There are those in Washington who would argue that the present situation flows automatically from the nature of the regime that confronts us in Moscow, and is therefore unavoidable. To support their view, they would point to a given image of that regime. Goethe's Mephistopheles observes cynically, in the second part of "Faust," that "in the end we are all dependent on monsters of our own creation." And so it is with the image of the Soviet regime which has come to inform American policy. It is an image of unmitigated darkness, with which we are all familiar: that of a group of men already dominating and misruling a large part of the world and motivated only by a relentless determination to bring still more peoples under their domination. By those who cultivate

this image, no rational motivation is suggested for so savage and unquenchable a thirst for power. The men who suffer this thirst, one is allowed to conclude, were simply born with it—the products, presumably, of some sort of negative genetic miracle. In any case, since they were born with it and are unable to help themselves, there is no way—or so we are told—that they could be reasoned with; no basis on which they could usefully be approached; no language they could be expected to understand other than that of intimidation by superior military force. Only by the spectre of such a force—an overwhelmingly superior nuclear force, in particular—could these men be "deterred" from committing all sorts of acts of aggression or intimidation with a view to subjugating other peoples and eventually to conquering the world. There are alleged to be no other inhibitions, no other considerations, no other interests that could be expected to restrain them from such behavior.

Well, if this image had been applied thirty or forty years ago to the regime of Joseph Stalin it might have been nearer to reality (although even then it would have been in some respects wide of the mark). Applied to the Soviet leadership of the year 1983, it is seriously overdrawn: a caricature rather than a reflection of what really exists, and misleading and pernicious as a foundation for national policy. Beyond that, it is deeply and needlessly offensive to the people in question. But how much truth, if any, is there in it?

The Soviet regime has always been marked by a whole series of characteristics that complicated, and were bound to complicate, its relations with the West. Some of these were inherited. Many-sided estrangement from the West was nothing new in Russian history. It was an outstanding feature of the old Grand Duchy of Moscow—pious, xenophobic, eternally suspicious of the heretical foreigner. Two hundred years of Petersburg rule broke down this estrangement only in part, and primarily among the educated classes: the nobility, the gentry, commercial circles, and the liberal intelligentsia. And then the Russian Revolution, occurring in all the agony of the First World War, and marked, as it was, by the return of the capital to Moscow and the political destruction or elimination of precisely the more cosmopolitan elements of the population, intensified the estrangement enormously, substituting a militant ideological antagonism for the onetime religious abhorrence of the West, and discovering a new form of dangerous heresy in the Marxist vision of capitalism. This militancy, to be sure, soon began to fade under the impact with reality; but the rhetoric, in itself an impediment to normal relations, remained. And the years of Stalinist horror were no help. This fearsome Stalinist despotism, a grotesque anomaly in the modern world, could no more stand free association with the Western countries than could the court of old Muscovy in the days of Ivan the Terrible. And the traces of Stalinism, while today much faded and partly obliterated, are still not wholly absent from the Soviet scene.

All in all, then, the Soviet regime never was, and is not today, one with which the United States could expect to have anything other than a complex and often difficult relationship. It is a regime marked by a relatively high sense of insecurity. It has a tendency to overdo in the cultivation of military strength. It is unduly sensitive to the slightest influence or involvement of outside powers in regions just beyond its lengthy borders. It has neurotic passion for secrecy and, as a product of that passion, a positive obsession with espionage, both offensive

and defensive—an obsession that has interfered with its relations with the West, and has even damaged the regime's own interests, more often and more seriously, than the regime has until lately brought itself to recognize. The penetration by a Soviet submarine into sensitive Swedish waters and the recent shooting down of the Korean airliner are striking examples of the over-indulgence in this obsession; and one hopes that the Soviet leaders will learn from the world reaction to these events what harm they do themselves when they let military considerations ride roughshod over wider interests.

To continue with this listing of the negative factors: Soviet negotiating techniques often appear, particularly to those not familiar with them, to be stiff, awkward, secretive, and unpredictable. Above all, they are lacking in the useful lubrication that comes from informal personal association and exchanges among negotiators. And there are, too, specific Soviet policies that grate severely on Western sensibilities. The Soviet leaders do indeed make efforts to gain influence and authority among the regimes and peoples of the Third World. While the methods they employ do not seem to differ greatly from those of other major powers, including us, and while their efforts in their direction have not met, generally speaking, with any very alarming measure of success, these practices naturally arouse concern and resentment in large sections of our official community. And then, of course, there is the fact that the Soviet leaders insist on maintaining a monopoly of political power in their own country and proceed harshly against those who appear to challenge or threaten that monopoly; and, beyond that, they unquestionably use their military hegemony to support and to maintain in power in Eastern Europe, insofar as it is possible, regimes similarly inspired and similarly resistant to liberalizing tendencies. All this is obviously a constant thorn in the flesh of much Western opinion.

And, finally, there is the phenomenon, familiar to all foreign representatives and observers in Russia, of the curious dual personality that the Soviet regime presents to the resident foreigner: the facade that is composed of people—often amiable and charming people—authorized to associate and communicate with the outside world; and, behind that facade, never visible but always perceptible, the inner, conspiratorial personality, of whose inscrutable attitudes and intentions the foreigner is never quite sure, and which for that reason probably incurs more suspicion than it deserves.

Now, these, and others that could be named, are formidable difficulties. Of course they limit the relationship. And of course they have to be taken into consideration by Western policymakers. But there are certain aspects of them that deserve to be kept in mind. First, most of them are not new. Some have been there since the outset of the Soviet-American relationship. All of us who have served in Moscow have had to contend with them. We were taught, in fact, to regard them as the more intractable parts of the problem. General George Marshall, I recall, used to say to us, "Don't fight the problem," by which he meant, I believe, "Don't fight against the problem as a whole, for it includes elements that you cannot hope to change; find out which elements, if any, are susceptible to your influence, and concentrate on them." Second, many of these difficulties are actually less acute today than they were many years ago. This shows that they are not theoretically unsusceptible to change. Perhaps, if they are approached with patience and understanding,

they can become even less pronounced in future years. Third, the negative factors are counterbalanced by a number of encouraging ones in both the psychology and the situation of the Soviet leadership.

Of these, the most important consists of the many persuasive indications that that leadership, however complicated its relations with the West may be, does not want a major war—that it has a serious interest in avoiding such a war, and will, given a chance, go quite far together with us to avoid it. The term "interest" does not mean, in this case, an abstract devotion to the principle of peace as a moral ideal. It means a consciousness on the part of these men that certain of the things they most deeply care about would not be served by Russia's involvement in another great war. Anyone who tries to put himself in the position of the Soviet leaders will at once recognize the force of this point. Even if they should be as evilly motivated as they are sometimes seen to be, these men are not free agents, wholly detached from the manifold complexities and contradictions that invariably go with the exercise of vast power. They constitute the government of a great country. They have a direct responsibility for the shaping of its society and its economic life. It is from the successful development of this society and this economy that they derive their strength. They cannot play fast and loose with either. Beyond that, they live and operate in a highly complex international environment. There is no single consideration that would serve to persuade these men that their interests would not be served by opening the Pandora's box of another world war; rather, there are dozens of considerations—and these quite aside from any so-called "military deterrence"—that would dissuade them from such a venture. The view that sees them as supremely independent, wholly on top of all their other problems, and madly riveted to dreams of world conquest to the point where it is exclusively by the interposition of overwhelming opposing military force that they could be dissuaded from striking out in all directions with acts of aggression or intimidation—this view is, if one will forgive my language, simply childish, inexcusably childish, unworthy of people charged with the responsibility of conducting the affairs of a great power in an endangered world. Surely American statesmen can do better than this in penetrating, with their imaginations and their powers of analysis, the true complexity of the forces that come to bear on the decisions of another great government, and in forming a realistic idea of the motivation of that government's conduct. And surely if they were to make this effort what they would then see would be more reassuring than what, in the absence of it, they are led by their fears to assume.

Nor is the area of common interest between the Soviet Union and the United States limited to the need of both countries to see world peace preserved. Both are great industrial powers. As such, they have a growing number of common problems. Prominent among these are the environmental ones. Both countries occupy major portions of the environmentally endangered Northern Hemisphere. The Soviet leaders are no less aware than we are of the extent to which this hemisphere, if it escapes nuclear disaster, will still be threatened in the most serious way by environmental pollution and deterioration. They know that these problems will not be mastered just by measures taken within any single country—that the solution will require international collaboration, particularly between the two greatest industrial powers of the hemisphere.

And the environmental questions are only examples of the many problems and challenges that all the great industrial societies of this age, including the United States and the Soviet Union, are coming to have in common. There are the truly revolutionary effects, in some ways promising and in some ways terrifying, of the present revolution in communications on education, on the organization of life, on the human spirit and the human fibre. The Soviet Union is no less affected by this revolution than we are. It is such problems that unite—they are the ones on which we and the Soviet Union can collaborate. And they are the problems of the future. The others—the ones flowing from the ideological conflicts of the turn of the century which produced the Russian Revolution—are the problems of the past.

Those are some of the pros and cons of the Soviet-American relationship; and if these pros and cons are stacked up against each other what one gets is, naturally, a mixed pattern, embracing serious differences of out-look and interest but also embracing positive possibilities that are not negligible. It is a pattern that, of course, leaves no room for exaggerated hopes, or for fulsome and hypocritical pretenses to a friendship that does not, and cannot, fully exist. The pattern embraces problems that will not be solved by just any summit meeting. But it also affords no justification for some of the extremes of pessimism we see around us today: no justification for the conclusion that it is only by some ultimate military showdown that the various Soviet-American differences can be resolved; and no justification for the overdrawn image of the Soviet leadership to which reference has here been made. Americans lived for more than a century at peace with the empire of the czars. Despite the addition of several seriously complicating factors during the present century, they have lived for some six and a half decades at peace with the Soviet Union. In the mixed pattern we have just had occasion to note, there is nothing to suggest that these two countries should not be able to continue to live at peace with each other for an indefinite number of decades into the future.

This cannot, of course, be assured by the state of relations we have before us today. The prospects for a peaceful development of Soviet-American relations are not theoretically hopeless, but they could easily become just that if we are unable to rise above some of the morbid nuclear preoccupations that now seem to possess us—if we are unable to see the positive possibilities behind the negative, military ones, and are unable to give to those positive ones a chance to take shape and to realize themselves. No one questions the fundamental importance of the outstanding questions of arms control. These represent the greatest and most urgent single problem we have before us in our relations with the Soviet Union. Without progress in this respects, there can, of course, be little hope of a peaceful future. But it is vitally important to remember that there are other dimensions to the Soviet-American relationship than the military one; and that not only are these other dimensions of sufficient importance to warrant attention in their own right but unless they, too, can be recognized, and cultivated, and their favorable possibilities taken advantage of, the arms talks themselves are unlikely to have any adequate and enduring success. The two aspects of the relationship are complementary. Progress in the one is indispensable to progress in the other.

What could be done, then, to place this relationship on a sounder, less frightening, and more hopeful basis than it rests on today? One starts, of course, from the recog-

niton that as of this moment things are royally fouled up. Any efforts to straighten them out would unavoidably take time. There are some who believe that nothing that could be undertaken from the American side in the period before the next election could restore the atmosphere necessary to provide prospects for success. Possibly, in any case, to remove all those sources of tension which are theoretically susceptible of removal would certainly be a task of years, not months. But it is never too early to make a beginning; and nothing prevents us from considering what sort of agenda might be necessary if one wanted to embark on that course.

Some of this flows, by implication, from what has already been said. We could try, first of all, to restore the full confidentiality and the civility of communication between the two governments. And we could cease treating the Soviet Union as though we were, out of one pocket, at peace with it and, out of the other, at war. We could lift the heavy dead hand from Soviet-American trade and proceed, with the usual, minimal security precautions, to permit that normal and useful branch of human activity to develop in response to its own economic requirements. We have no need to be trying to set back the economy or depress the living standards of any other great people; nor is such an effort in keeping with the American tradition.

We could take a much bolder, more hopeful, and more promising position in matters of arms control. This does not mean embracing in any way the principle of unilateral disarmament. We could acknowledge (and it is high time we did) that the nuclear weapon is a useless one; that it could not conceivably be used without bringing catastrophe upon whatever country initiated its use, along with untold millions of people elsewhere. Acknowledging this, we could reject all dreams of nuclear superiority and see what we could do about reducing existing nuclear arsenals, with a view to their eventual elimination. A number of approaches have been suggested: a freeze, deep cuts, the so-called "build-down," a comprehensive test-ban treaty, others as well. These are not alternatives. They are complementary. Any or all of them would be useful. But to get on with any of them we would have to learn to treat the problem as a whole in our negotiations with the Russians, not cut it up into a series of fragmented technical talks; to treat it at the senior political level, where it belongs, not in periodic encounters between politically helpless experts; and to treat it—initially, at least—in an atmosphere of complete confidentiality, not in a series of public posturings before various domestic political constituencies.

And then, while we were working on the more positive and hopeful possibilities, we could set out to take advantage of those areas where the peaceful interests of the two powers do coincide and where possibilities for collaboration do exist. What have we to lose? If my memory is correct, we once had thirteen separate agreements for collaboration and personal exchanges in a whole series of cultural and scientific fields. A number of them proved fruitful; some, we are told, did not. I hold no brief for the retention of the ones that did not. But many of the thirteen, including certain of the useful ones, have been allowed to lapse. These could be restored, and others could be added. There are many possibilities in the scientific field, some of which exist in rudimentary form and all of which could be extended: Possibilities for collaboration on environmental problems, on the study of the

Arctic and the Antarctic, on oceanographic research, on public health, on nuclear fusion. The entire great area of the uses of outer space—this vast umbrella that protects every man, woman, and child on our planet—ought to be not only demilitarized but genuinely internationalized; and these two great countries could well be taking a major collaborative part in that internationalization, rather than each speculating how it might exploit this medium to the detriment of the other party, and perhaps to the detriment of humanity as a whole.

These are those who will say, "Yes, we once had such agreements, but we did not get as much information out of them as the Russians did." The answer to this objection is clear. If the acquisition of military intelligence is the only reason one can see for entering into such agreements with another country, then they had better be omitted. But if one is prepared to place one's hopes on their long-term effects—their effects in bringing people together in a collaborative relationship and helping them to see one another as human beings, not as some species of demon, then many of these arrangements will provide a more hopeful perspective than the most ambitious of our efforts to learn how to destroy each other.

Such collaborative arrangements require, as a rule, formalized agreements. There are some who question whether we can trust the Soviet government to live up to such agreements when it makes them. When I hear this question asked, I am surprised. We now have six and a half decades of experience to go on, and the answer provided by this experience is reasonably clear. You can conclude useful agreements with the Soviet side, and they will respect them—on condition, however, that the terms be clear and specific, not general; that as little as possible be left to interpretation; that questions of motivation, and particularly professions of noble principle, be left aside; and that the other contracting party show a serious and continued interest in their observance.

Finally, there is the question of "human rights." American sympathies are, of course, engaged in behalf of people who fall afoul of any great political police system. This neither requires nor deserves any concealment. But if what we are talking about is the official interrelationship of great governments a choice must be made between the interests of democratization in Russia and the interest of world peace. In the face of this choice, there can be only one answer. Democracy is a matter of tradition, of custom, of what people are used to, of what they understand, and expect. It is not something that can be suddenly grafted onto an unprepared people—particularly not from outside, and particularly not by precept, preaching, and pressure rather than by example. It is not a concept familiar to the mass of the Russian people; and whoever subordinates the interests of world peace to the chimera of an early democratization of the Soviet Union will assuredly sacrifice the first of those values without promoting the second. By the nature of things, democratization not only can but must wait; world peace cannot. If what we want to achieve is a liberalization of the political regime prevailing in the Soviet Union, then it is to example rather than to precept that we must look; and we could start by tackling, with far greater resolution and courage than we have shown to date, some of the glaring deficiencies in our own society.

These, then, are the directions in which we could move, if we wanted to ease the situation. We have, I reiterate, so little to lose. At the end of our present path of unlimited military confrontation lies no visible destination but failure and horror. There are no

alternatives to this path which would not be preferable to it. What is needed here is only the will—the courage, the boldness, the affirmation of life—to break the evil spell that the severed atom has cast upon us all; to declare our independence of the nightmares of nuclear danger; to turn our minds and hearts to better things.

The foregoing observations flow from an involvement with Soviet-American relations on this writer's part which goes back over a longer span of years than that of anyone else now in public life on either side, except for that of Averell Harriman. In the course of these years—there are fifty-five of them—I have seen this relationship in some of its better times; particularly at the time of the establishment of diplomatic relations, just a half century ago; and again during our association with the Soviet Union in the waging of the Second World War. I have also seen it in some of the most bitter and disheartening moments it has known—have not only seen it in such moments but felt some of its more painful effects upon my own person. Precisely for this reason, I think I know as much as anyone about the difficulties that the relationship involves. Yet at no time in the course of these fifty-five years have I lost my confidence in its constructive possibilities. For all their historical and ideological differences, these two peoples—the Russians and the Americans—complement each other; they need each other; they can enrich each other; together, granted the requisite insight and restraint, they can do more than any other two powers to assure world peace. The rest of the world needs their forbearance with each other and their peaceful collaboration. Their allies need it. They themselves need it. They can have it if they want it. If only this could be recognized, we could perfectly well go forward to face the challenges that the true situation presents, and to shoulder, soberly but cheerfully, and without all the melodramatics of offended virtue, the burdens it imposes. —George Kennan. ●

● Mr. PATTERSON. Mr. Speaker, I want to commend my colleague from Kansas and our other colleagues who encouraged Members to speak today on the 50th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic ties between the United States and the Soviet Union. It is indeed important to continue to use these diplomatic ties and all of our available means of communication to continue a dialog with the Soviet Union aimed at making our world safer and more just.

My colleagues pointed out the observation of Dr. James Allen Billington, director of the Woodrow Wilson International Center, that a new generation of potential Soviet leaders is waiting in the wings. A post-war, post-Stalinist generation. This successor generation may perhaps offer some hope for a less paranoid, more reasonable, more peaceable Soviet Union. Our survival demands that we at least try to communicate with the upcoming generation of leaders.

We should also keep in mind that there is a growing group of young dissidents coming of age in the Soviet Union. Their existence provides a continual challenge to the rigid Soviet leadership to look inward and face the U.S.S.R.'s pressing domestic problems. Just as it is important to maintain contact with the Soviet leaders, so is it

important to maintain relations with the Soviet people—including the courageous dissident minority.

I met just yesterday with a gentleman from my home district. Mr. Kenneth Levin, who told me of his efforts to meet with the family of Lev Elbert, a young refusenik, during a recent visit to Moscow. Despite harassment by Soviet authorities, Mr. Levin and his family persevered. These people-to-people encounters are important and I commend the Levins for their dedication and effort. We must try to live at peace, while at the same time we continue to emphasize the inherent rights of all people to freedom and justice. It is incumbent upon us—our leaders and our citizens alike—to try to keep open all channels of communications with the Soviet Union. I am proud that my constituents have made such an effort to do so. ●

● Mr. LEVINE of California. Mr. Speaker, today marks the 50th anniversary of the establishment of formal diplomatic ties between the United States and the Soviet Union. Sadly, this anniversary comes at a time when things are not well between the two superpowers.

Perhaps the words that can best characterize the state of United States-Soviet relations are tense, antagonistic, and suspicious. Clearly, we are engaged in an unhealthy competition to achieve goals of questionable benefit to humankind.

Relations between our two nations have never been without their considerable problems, but perhaps rarely in our relationship have our problems been so considerable. They are exacerbated by our mutual, unrelenting but ever-elusive struggle toward military and nuclear superiority, and our suspicion and fear that the other might be the first to commence a nuclear conflagration the likes of which we have never seen from which it would be impossible to recover.

The sad state of our relationship is evidenced first and most obviously in the tension between the two countries. There are other signs as well. They include an absence of any meaningful dialog between the two countries and strained diplomatic contacts. Today there is reduced trade between the two nations and cultural exchanges and bilateral cooperation have been brought to a near standstill. Accommodations have not been reached on the nuclear arms talks between the two countries and rhetoric flies freely about just whose fault it is.

Anniversaries are often used as a time to reassess the status and direction of things. Perhaps this would be a good time to begin to reassess the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. Neither country is without some responsibility for the frayed state of our relationship. Perhaps it is time to begin to look at common interests and common goals toward which we can work together.

about the disastrous consequences of nuclear war. In fact, earlier this week, a disparate group of Members of the Congress attended a meeting also attended by Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin. During that session, our colleague ELLIOTT LEVITAS and I urged the Ambassador to do whatever he could to encourage the showing of the upcoming television program "The Day After" on Soviet television. Having seen a preview of that film, there is no question but that it does very effectively capture the fears that stir in the hearts of many Americans about the disaster which nuclear war would create. There is a concern by some in this country that that same feeling might not exist in the minds of Soviets because they have been encouraged to believe that such a war is indeed survivable. The ultimate goal of our interrelationships must be to change the minds of the Soviet people, if they do indeed believe that such a war is survivable, and those of their leaders as well. That will then immeasurably increase the likelihood of achieving a much safer world. To do that, we must maintain contacts; otherwise, no minds will be changed.

In a piece for the Washington Post entitled "Now Get Ready for the Real Crisis," Raymond Garthoff, a Russian-speaking retired foreign service officer, reflected on the ominous portendings of the growing chill in United States-Soviet relations. After 2 weeks of speaking with a wide variety of Russian officials and ordinary people, he writes:

This escalating deployment of new weapons is one reflection of the deterioration relationship between Moscow and Washington. These new deployments don't mean that the Russians will be looking for opportunities to use their weapons, but that is not the only danger.

The principal risk lies not in the possibility that the leadership in Moscow or Washington will intentionally challenge its adversary with bold new initiatives to probe his resolution. This seems unlikely—although it is what both Soviet and American leaders suspect of each other. The greater danger will come from the reactions of both superpowers to unpredictable new situations or crises triggered by events beyond the control of Moscow or Washington. The deterioration of relations has reduced still further the thin margin of restraint that cushions the reactions of both powers in such situations.

So has the door of communication between the United States and the Soviet Union slammed shut? Not quite, but it does appear that the door is coming perilously close to closing. Realizing the importance of keeping that door open, I recently reflected on the question of why and how we must continue to talk to the Russians in an article for the Wichita Eagle-Beacon. I would like to share it with my colleagues at this time:

BETWEEN RUSSIA AND THE UNITED STATES: A CLOSING DOOR

The movie is set in Lawrence, Kansas, and it chronicles a nuclear war. The destruction is mindboggling. The familiar setting brings

home clearly the tragedy of a nuclear attack because the setting is home; the setting is Kansas. On November 20, ABC will show that movie "The Day After." Perhaps it will cause others, as it did me, to think about the implications of the arms race, to view in the context of a potential disaster what can happen if the two superpowers do not come to terms with their awesome power and the potential for destroying the human race if we do not learn to live with each other.

In July of this year, Yuri Zhukov, a member of the Supreme Soviet and Chairman of the Soviet Peace Committee, made the comment to me during a congressional trip to the Soviet Union, that "your President is too provincial. . . calling us an evil empire and engaging in nasty, polarizing rhetoric." The irony of that comment made by a man known as "the butcher of Moscow" was not lost around the luncheon table in the Kremlin. I responded to Zhukov that Kremlin leaders, including Yuri Andropov, were guilty of much uglier rhetoric. Zhukov's response was "perhaps you are right, but you Americans do not show us respect." He then described a meeting with Richard Nixon over ten years ago in the same room where we were eating, and where the Test Ban Treaty had been signed at the very same time the United States was placing mines in Haiphong Harbor in Vietnam. Zhukov said, "Even at the identical time you were placing our ships at risk in the harbor, Nixon at least showed us courage and particularly the respect by coming here to the Kremlin."

Zhukov's comment was very significant. He was telling me that as a Russian, he didn't necessarily care to be loved, just respected. Later, our Soviet "expects" from the State Department accompanying us on the trip said that I had "discovered" a very significant fact about the way the Soviets view their relationship with the West, particularly the United States. My discovery was nothing more than reaching the knowledge that we must deal with nations as we would with individuals, remembering that simply recognizing the other's point of view is the first step in communicating. And although it may be a cliché, communication is the key to resolving the impending disaster we could be facing. The door that separates the two most powerful countries on earth is open now only a slight crack; if it closes shut, the consequences are unthinkable.

Nuclear war would not in all probability start by reason of an intentional first strike attack by one superpower against the other but a miscalculation based on the misinterpretation of the other side's motives and could end in a holocaust. That miscalculation could literally come from something so simple a perception as not being shown respect.

After forming this realization of the Soviet Union, and deciding to learn a bit more about our major adversary, I have come up with a few suggestions to deal with them, to open up communications with them, and to modify our methods of communications to foster a new era of superpower detente. First, we need to realize that we are dealing with two Russias. There is the old hard line dialogue with the remaining Stalinist leadership like the Andropovs. They have experienced war and want some agreement with us, but they will push us as far as they can and try to get as much as they can. They experienced power and politics in one of the most repressive times of all history and are probably the group most sensitive to not being "respected."

The second Russia is post-war, post-Stalinist. These Russian leaders did not experience the war, at least not in a leadership context. This new generation potentially

can move away from the aggressive adventures of Poland and Afghanistan toward an emphasis on their own domestic problems. They did not experience the political purges either and there are signs that this part of the Russian leadership, who will be in charge one day, may be more attuned to cooperation if it means improving their economic problems. The successor generation then, could conceivably be approached to set in motion an opening up of lines of communication beneficial to both of us. For example, the signing of the recent grain agreement should be matched by bilateral cultural and scientific exchanges. And while we must guard against exporting strategic knowledge and secret technology, neither should we refuse to enter such accords in health care, agriculture or energy research simply because they don't work 100% in our favor alone. There are many ways in which we can talk, can cooperate without harming ourselves.

We must then, on the one hand speak in harsh, direct specifics with the old Stalinists who will rule Russia until the end of this decade, realizing that a little common sense understanding of their need for "respect" and a mutual cooling of hot political rhetoric might reduce tensions a bit. At the same time, while keeping a strong military posture, we must search out non-military ways to cooperate with the post-Stalinists whose interests will be more and more focused on a disastrous domestic economy, and whose background is not steeped in warlike tradition and political genocide.

We are, after all, two nations armed with the awesome power to annihilate the world. Each of us knows so little about the other, its history, its culture and its ideals. But since it is impossible to talk through a closed door, we must work to open that door. In this era of conflict in Lebanon and Grenada, where the superpower tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union underlie almost every brush fire and confrontation that is occurring in the world, there are no miracle answers to prevent the nuclear holocaust portrayed in the ABC movie. There are no absolute solutions to prevent a future "incident," like the shooting down of the Korean airliner, or the invasion of an island nation, from snowballing into the unthinkable. But we must try to find those answers and look for the miracles, to not do so could turn move fiction into fact and actors playing roles of dying Kansans into the real thing.

● Mr. PRITCHARD. Mr. Speaker, one of the great dangers in U.S./Soviet relations today lies, not in Moscow or Leningrad or Vladivostok, but in Washington, D.C. and Seattle and Peoria. That danger is the profound and passionate disagreement in our own country on the nature of the threat posed by Soviet power and purpose, and what America can do to gain agreement with our principal adversary on the pursuit of a humane world agenda.

The consensus on America's relationship with the Soviet Union that sustained the policy of containment from 1949 through the mid-1960s has shattered rather than consensus, what we now experience has been aptly called fragmentation by James Rosenau of the University of Southern California: the broken, fragmented pieces of the old consensus have re-integrated into sharply divided, polar positions. One pole of the debate sees

Surely the control of nuclear weapons, or at least control over our rivalry for nuclear superiority, is one of those goals. Are not the United States and the Soviet Union afraid enough of each other already? Would not it be to our mutual interest to work together toward that goal?

There are many things for which we have rightly criticized the Soviet Union. For example, their treatment of Soviet Jews and other minorities has given them a deplorable human rights record—one that is in violation of internationally recognized human rights agreements and accords. The Soviets have attempted, through the use of military might, to oppress the people of Afghanistan and Poland. The shooting down of the Korean airliner with 269 men, women, and children aboard was an act of aggression the heinousness of which defies description.

We do not approve of these actions—in fact many, myself included, have strongly condemned them. But, ultimately, we must realize that, like it or not, we are neighbors on a very small planet. Today we have weapons that can destroy each other from across the globe in less time than it takes to walk from the White House to the U.S. Capitol Building. That is a sobering thought.

Given the past history of the relationship between our two countries, it is difficult to be optimistic about readily establishing a harmonious relationship. We might find some hope, however, from the fact that the Soviet Union and the United States have never fought in a war against each other. But instead of engaging in saber rattling and brinkmanship, we ought to be taking steps to insure that we never do. Surely, the time must come when we learn to live with each other peacefully if we are ever to insure a tomorrow. ●

Mr. WIRTH. Mr. Speaker, today marks the 50th anniversary of the establishment of formal diplomatic ties between the United States and the Soviet Union. It is a telling fact that it took 10 years after the birth of the Soviet Union for diplomatic relations to be fully instituted between our two governments. Since that date, the course of these relations have, for the most part, been far from cordial. There remains between our two countries a profound clash of purpose in international affairs, a lasting difference in our view of what constitutes a stable, just and productive international order, and most significantly, an atmosphere of profound distrust. Recent events—the shooting down of Korean air flight 007 by the Soviet Union and their continued presence in Afghanistan—have only increased the already tense atmosphere between our two nations. No matter what our opinion of the Soviet Union may be, and I share with the vast majority of American citizens an abhorrence of the Soviet system, we must continue in our

search for ways to moderate our mutual distrust in the interests of our joint survival.

The survival of our two states is not simply a bilateral matter, but one of international necessity. Together we have the capability to end all life on this planet. This fact alone should be enough for one to realize that a dialog between our two countries must continue. This dialog should be continuous, informal, practical, and nonceremonial. Results will not come quickly, success will not arrive soon, but I believe that through these discussions we will make this world a safer place to live.

The primary objective for achieving peaceful competition should be balanced, mutually verifiable and just arms control agreement. This commitment touches not only the balance of destruction, but the one credible source of Soviet strength in the world: their military power. This power—not economic resources, not solid political alliances, not ideological appeal—is the key to Soviet influence in the affairs of other nations. If we engage in a constructive dialog by lowering the rhetoric and achieving a reduction of armaments, we can deflate the ominous perception of the Soviet Union both to ourselves and the rest of the world community.

We must also renew our cultural and scientific exchanges. Programs such as these allow individuals to gain a human perspective of their counterparts, free of ideological trappings and governmental polemics. At the same time we should attempt to improve trade relations in the Soviet Union. By seeing the Soviet Union enter the international commercial order, accepting its rules, and gaining a stake in its viability, they will become less menacing to Western values and political goals, more committed to evolutionary progress, and less prone to exploit upheaval and subsidize subversion.

This course will not be an easy objective, but its final goal will be worthy of the efforts taken to attain it. On this 50th anniversary of U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations, I call on my colleagues to promote better understanding between our nations. ●

□ 2310

BANKRUPTCY: THE CRISIS THAT WON'T GO AWAY—II

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from New York (Mr. FISH) is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. FISH. Mr. Speaker, yesterday, in discussing the crisis in bankruptcy, I warned the House that as of April 1, 1984, there will be no qualified bankruptcy judges available to preside in the U.S. bankruptcy courts. I also reviewed the rehabilitative and other objectives of the bankruptcy code, the enormous volume of pending cases, and some of the policy determinations taken by the Congress in enacting the

1978 Reform Act. The key decision then was to establish an independent bankruptcy court system with unified jurisdiction over all matters arising in bankruptcy or related thereto, presided over by judges appointed by the President for 14-year terms commencing April 1, 1984. Today I shall address myself to what went wrong.

In January 1980, the Northern Pipeline Construction Co. filed a petition for a chapter 11 reorganization in the U.S. bankruptcy court in Minnesota. Two months later it returned to that court to file a breach of contract suit against Marathon Pipe Line Co. Marathon sought to dismiss the case on the ground that the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 unconstitutionally conferred the judicial power of the United States on judges who lack the life tenure and protection against reduction of salaries required by article III of the Constitution. The bankruptcy court denied the motion, but it was granted on appeal by the district court and a direct appeal to the Supreme Court followed.

On June 28, 1982, the Supreme Court held in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. against Marathon Pipe Line Co. that Congress had indeed exceeded its authority in the 1978 act when it gave broad powers to the bankruptcy court but failed at the same time to confer on its judges the two attributes specified by article III of the Constitution—life tenure during good behavior and a guarantee against reduction of salary while in office. These fundamental requirements insure the independence of Federal judges against the pressures of the political process. In this way the Founding Fathers made certain that we have a strong and unbiased judiciary and public confidence in the rule of law.

The House was well aware of the constitutional mandate and it acted accordingly. The Judiciary Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights the full Judiciary Committee, and the House as a whole all concluded in 1978 that article III court status was constitutionally required for the new bankruptcy court system. In conference, however, the Senate insisted that the bankruptcy judges should be appointed to 14-year terms commencing in 1984. Unfortunately, the other body prevailed on this issue. Thus the stage was set for Marathon.

The Supreme Court's order in the Marathon case became effective after the second extension of its stay expired on December 24, 1982. Since then, the bankruptcy courts have been operating under an interim rule promulgated by the Administrative Office of U.S. Courts and adopted by the various district courts.

Under the interim rule, all cases arising under title 11—the Bankruptcy Code—and all cases related thereto are referred by the District Court to the bankruptcy judges of the district. Orders and judgments by the bank-



JACK Matlock

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 5, 1984

FOR: JACK MATLOCK

FROM: Wilma Hall

When I tried to reach Suzanne Massie to say that Mr. McFarlane regretted that he would be unable to meet or talk with her, she was already enroute to D.C. Unfortunately, his schedule has not permitted him to return her call and much as he would like to meet/talk with her, he really will not be able to do so for the next couple of weeks anyway.

Could you please explain all this and say that I tried to reach her and am sorry I missed her. Thanks a bunch. I know RCM has discussed all this with you and unless you have something unforeseen come up, believe everything is under control with you working directly with Mrs. Massie. Let me know if I can help in any way.

Thanks again.

Wil

January 4, 1984

RCM:

Jack Matlock called --

He has talked with Suzanne Massie and is taking care of making arrangements for her to go to Moscow through Charlie Wick.

Suzanne is coming to Washington on Friday and Matlock will meet with her. She is, however, pressing for another opportunity to talk with you -- and has renewed her request with both Matlock and again with me to see you.

Matlock feels confident that he can convey your views but felt obligated to pass on her request.

Shall I schedule?

✓ Matlock should handle; regret that RCM's heavy schedule precludes mtg

Other: _____

Wilma

ofc: 212/496-1786
res: 914/591-9005

~~SECRET~~

Chrom Matlock
SYSTEM II
91308

6340 38

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

December 20, 1984

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: RON LEHMAN *R*

SUBJECT: European Support for SDI

In reference to your profs note on the need to prepare Europe for SDI, I would note that the SDI package has a section specifically addressing this. While we are not yet satisfied with the level of detail, it outlines our current approach and we are working with State to improve it. The SDI Public Diplomacy Action Plan (also in the SDI Bible) also identifies items like an SDI speakers' corps that would help us in Europe. Also the consultation paper prepared for our next Senior Arms Control meeting by Jack Chain contains higher level policy considerations related to this issue. In your talking points for the SACG, we had recommended that you instruct that these efforts also be fleshed out further.

You are correct that we need early missions to Europe by thoughtful SDI advocates. You would be ideal. Experience with recent efforts makes clear that we must have effective advocates and Peter Sommer and Jack Matlock plan to feature your role in their in their revised paper on your possible trip to Europe. Our best luck has been with the Germans where Richard Perle, Rick Burt and I have worked at all levels. Fred Ikle has already been to Europe on this issue and the results were mixed. Abrahamson's trip to NATO was helpful overall and was strengthened in the end by Perle's interventions on the policy implications. Burt and Dobbins have been very effective in formal meetings, but have been particularly ineffective in working the British and French problem. Some worry that State is working its own private agenda.

Outside spokesmen can be particularly helpful, but we must be careful. Fred Hoffman, who works for Albert Wohlstetter and Fred Ikle, took a European tour which included the disastrous IISS conference. Fred Hoffman is not as bad as reports would indicate and can be worked with, but he continues to press the ATBM issue on the Europeans. Needless to say, that does not help right now. Publication of the SDI White House pamphlet will be helpful in making clear what our policy position is. Implementation of the SDI Public Diplomacy will also help. As you will remember, the

SECRET
Declassify by: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR F06-114/1 #6340
BY RW NARA DATE 3/3/11

MSG FROM: NSRMK --CPUA TO: NSBTM --CPUA
To: NSPBT --CPUA

12/18/84 10:07:06

6341 40

~~SECRET~~

NOTE FROM: Robert M. Kimmitt
Subject: Forwarding Note 12/18/84 09:48 Follow up to Thatcher meeting
please task to rlehman, comment to sommer, cobb, matlock, fortier, rye, and
raymond, info to linhard, steiner and small.put in sys 2.
* * * F O R W A R D E D N O T E * * *
To: NSRMK --CPUA

~~SECRET~~

NOTE FROM: ROBERT MCFARLANE
SUBJECT: Follow up to Thatcher meeting

It seems to me that in view of Thatcher and Mitterand statements on SDI
(although for reasons related to preserving their SLBM programs) we need to
consider how to avoid further erosion of European support for SDI and our arms
control positions more generally. This suggests the value of an early mission
by a thoughtful SDI advocate from within or outside the USG (or perhaps both)
to Europe in the near future. We could send someone like Ikle to several
European capitals. A visit by me could also help. We could consider another
Abrahamson trip and others by outsiders like Wohlstetter or others.

Need answer

While it will be essential for the President to set the tone in the Thatcher
meeting, we must sustain it through letters from him to counterparts in Europe
in which he might propose the visit(s). Please ask Ron to think about this
and to talk to Don and Jack and get me a proposal. He should also talk to Ikle
and anyone else he believes worthwhile. Many thanks.

cc: NSJMP --CPUA

cc: NSGVE --CPUA NSBTM --CPUA

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR FD06-114/1 #6341
BY RW NARA DATE 3/3/11

By Hand to
Matlock
Eyes Only
RCM

PRESERVATION COPY

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

CAS 6/10/02

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

December 21, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JW*

SUBJECT: Your Dinner with Dobrynin, December 21, 1984

Dobrynin will doubtless wish to discuss with you preparations for the meetings in Geneva and will attempt to obtain as much of a preview of our position as he can. Substantively, I believe you should stick pretty much to what you said in your backgrounder yesterday, but probe for the Soviet position (which Dobrynin may, in fact, not be able to predict in detail even if he were allowed to) and convey some truths about our assessment of the Soviet position up to now.

It would also be a good occasion to make clear our position on maintaining reciprocity in contacts, while desiring broad and intensive communication, and to solicit Dobrynin's comments on the impact of Ustinov's death.

I would suggest talking points on these subjects as follows:

Arms Control and Geneva

-- Stress the seriousness of our approach and the importance of getting the levels of offensive weapons down.

-- Recognize the connection of offensive and defensive systems and stress that we welcome the opportunity to initiate a searching discussion of this relationship.

-- Point out that we do not understand what the Soviets mean by their term "the militarization of space."

-- On the one hand, we see a well-developed BMD program on their part, an operational ASAT, and a broad-based R&D program in other defensive areas. In other words they are actually doing more in this area than we are.

-- It is, therefore, disingenuous -- to say the least -- for the Soviets to imply that all this can suddenly be banned or that the only problem is U.S. programs.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/1 #6342

BY RW NARA DATE 3/3/11

-- We assume, therefore, that the word they use is not meant to apply to all military uses of space. But if that is the case, what does it apply to? We need to talk about this and get an understanding on it.

-- In the meantime, accusations that the U.S. is breaking treaties or intends to do so, or is seeking an arms race in space, are not only dishonest (given the fact that we are doing less than the Soviets in the defensive area), but also are destructive of a negotiating spirit.

-- There are many on our side who read these Soviet tactics as prima facie evidence that the Soviets are determined to achieve strategic superiority and will resist any fair agreement in order to preserve a Soviet option for a first-strike capability.

-- If we are both serious, therefore, it is important to stop the public polemics on these issues and get down to confidential, comprehensive and detailed discussions and negotiations.

-- Basically, we do not accept the Soviet position that it is up to the U.S. to "prove" its sincerity. We could make the same demand with greater justice.

On Communications and Procedures

-- We favor the most comprehensive contacts, at all levels, so that we can make the maximum progress in bridging gaps in our policies.

-- Reciprocity is and will continue to be an important element in our overall approach. This applies to contacts as well.

-- If Dobrynin feels he has lacked the contacts with the Reagan Administration which he had with some previous ones, he should understand that this is no reflection on him personally, but the result only of the policy that we must maintain similar contacts in both capitals.

-- You hope that your acceptance of his invitation to dinner will be reciprocated by a willingness of your counterpart(s) in Moscow to give our Ambassador equivalent access.

-- Given the fact that our respective assessments of the military balance differ so widely, we feel strongly that it would be useful to establish more contact between our respective military leaders and staffs. Does Dobrynin have any ideas as to how this might be achieved?

Soviet Policies and Developments

-- Will Gromyko be bringing new proposals to Geneva? What does he anticipate?

-- Does the appointment of Romanov to head the Ustinov funeral commission indicate that he is likely to be the next Minister of Defense?

-- What is Dobrynin's assessment of Soviet priorities -- both in the arms control area and in others?

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

JMC CHRON
45
6343~~SECRET~~

December 21, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK

SUBJECT: Your Dinner with Dobrynin, December 21, 1984

Dobrynin will doubtless wish to discuss with you preparations for the meetings in Geneva and will attempt to obtain as much of a preview of our position as he can. Substantively, I believe you should stick pretty much to what you said in your backgrounder yesterday, but probe for the Soviet position (which Dobrynin may, in fact, not be able to predict in detail even if he were allowed to) and convey some truths about our assessment of the Soviet position up to now.

It would also be a good occasion to make clear our position on maintaining reciprocity in contacts, while desiring broad and intensive communication, and to solicit Dobrynin's comments on the impact of Ustinov's death.

I would suggest talking points on these subjects as follows:

Arms Control and Geneva

-- Stress the seriousness of our approach and the importance of getting the levels of offensive weapons down.

-- Recognize the connection of offensive and defensive systems and stress that we welcome the opportunity to initiate a searching discussion of this relationship.

-- Point out that we do not understand what the Soviets mean by their term "the militarization of space."

-- On the one hand, we see a well-developed BMD program on their part, an operational ASAT, and a broad-based R&D program in other defensive areas. In other words they are actually doing more in this area than we are.

-- It is, therefore, disingenuous -- to say the least -- for the Soviets to imply that all this can suddenly be banned or that the only problem is U.S. programs.

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR Folio-114/1 #6343

BY RW NARA DATE 3/3/11

~~SECRET~~

-- We assume, therefore, that the word they use is not meant to apply to all military uses of space. But if that is the case, what does it apply to? We need to talk about this and get an understanding on it.

-- In the meantime, accusations that the U.S. is breaking treaties or intends to do so, or is seeking an arms race in space, are not only dishonest (given the fact that we are doing less than the Soviets in the defensive area), but also are destructive of a negotiating spirit.

-- There are many on our side who read these Soviet tactics as prima facie evidence that the Soviets are determined to achieve strategic superiority and will resist any fair agreement in order to preserve a Soviet option for a first-strike capability.

-- If we are both serious, therefore, it is important to stop the public polemics on these issues and get down to confidential, comprehensive and detailed discussions and negotiations.

-- Basically, we do not accept the Soviet position that it is up to the U.S. to "prove" its sincerity. We could make the same demand with greater justice.

On Communications and Procedures

-- We favor the most comprehensive contacts, at all levels, so that we can make the maximum progress in bridging gaps in our policies.

-- Reciprocity is and will continue to be an important element in our overall approach. This applies to contacts as well.

-- If Dobrynin feels he has lacked the contacts with the Reagan Administration which he had with some previous ones, he should understand that this is no reflection on him personally, but the result only of the policy that we must maintain similar contacts in both capitals.

-- You hope that your acceptance of his invitation to dinner will be reciprocated by a willingness of your counterpart(s) in Moscow to give our Ambassador equivalent access.

-- Given the fact that our respective assessments of the military balance differ so widely, we feel strongly that it would be useful to establish more contact between our respective military leaders and staffs. Does Dobrynin have any ideas as to how this might be achieved?

Soviet Policies and Developments

- Will Gromyko be bringing new proposals to Geneva? What does he anticipate?
- Does the appointment of Romanov to head the Ustinov funeral commission indicate that he is likely to be the next Minister of Defense?
- What is Dobrynin's assessment of Soviet priorities -- both in the arms control area and in others?

6344

48

MSG FROM: NSJMP --CPUA
To: Jack Matlock

TO: Jack Matlock

+12/21/84 11:11:52

~~-- SECRET --~~

NOTE FROM: JOHN POINDEXTER
SUBJECT: Talking Points

Bud and Jonie are having dinner tonight with Amb and Mrs. Dobrynin. Bud has asked for your thoughts on what he ought to say in that setting.

cc: NSRMK --CPUA BOB KIMMITT

DECLASSIFIED
Sec.3.4(b), E.O. 12958, as amended
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2006;
BY NARA CJ, DATE 2/17/10

Chronfile
Dec, 1984

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

EYES ONLY

Jack Matlock

EYES ONLY

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

CAJ 6/10/02

49

PRESERVATION COPY

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Chen
51

January 3, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR MICHAEL K. DEAVER

FROM: ROBERT M. KIMMITT *Bob*

SUBJECT: NBC Request for Presidential Interview on V-E Day

NBC has written to the President Tab A requesting an interview on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of V-E Day. As part of their continuing series on Soviet-American relations, NBC would like to do interviews with General Secretary Chernenko and the President on the significance of wartime cooperation for the future of the Soviet-American relationship.

The NSC has no objection, in principle, to the concept of a Presidential interview timed to coincide with the commemoration of the V-E Day anniversary. However, it is probably premature now to commit to this project. We should be able to better gauge the value of such an interview once we have evaluated the success of the Shultz-Gromyko meetings in January and have a better sense of Allied thinking with respect to the scope of desired Soviet participation in the V-E Day commemorations.

In your discussions with NBC you might also inquire whether or not the network will be able to decide on the questions, or will Chernenko simply be given a major forum from which to expound Moscow's point of view? You may also wish to ask if any thought would be given to requesting reciprocal treatment of the interviews; i.e., would Soviet TV provide equivalent treatment of the President's remarks.

Attachment:

Tab A NBC Letter to the President dated December 17, 1984

cc: Baker
Speakes

National Security Council
The White House

I 52

System # _____

Package # _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Paul Thompson	_____	_____	_____
Bob Kimmitt	1	K	_____
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Tom Shull	_____	_____	_____
Wilma Hall	_____	_____	_____
Bud McFarlane	_____	_____	_____
Bob Kimmitt	_____	_____	_____
NSC Secretariat	2	_____	Staff
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

Info Matlock
Cmt Raymond Prepare memo
 Small RMC - 7 Review
 Sims due 12/21
 Steiner
 Sommer

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 18, 1984

5/11
discussion with RK
of what he
knows 53

MEMORANDUM TO: ✓ MIKE DEEVER
BUD McFARLANE
LARRY SPEAKES

FROM: JAMES A. BAKER, III *JAB III*

The attached ~~two~~ letters are self-explanatory. They were personally brought in this morning by Lawrence Grossman, President of NBC News Division. ~~Let's discuss at your convenience whether this is something we have an interest in doing.~~

JAB, III

NBC

National Broadcasting Company, Inc.

30 Rockefeller Plaza
New York, N.Y. 10112 212-664-4611

Lawrence K. Grossman
President
News Division

December 17, 1984

President Ronald Reagan
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

There is perhaps no single event that better symbolizes the potential in American-Soviet relations than the joining of U.S. and Soviet forces at the Elbe--that moment when it became clear that Nazi Germany had been defeated and World War II had been brought to an end. With the commemoration of the 40th anniversary of that event in the Spring of 1985, I would, as President of NBC News, like to take this opportunity to invite you to participate in a special televised interview, during which you will be able to expound on the lessons drawn from such super-power cooperation in the past and the possible meaning of those lessons for the future.

For your information, Mr. President, I have also invited President Chernenko to join NBC News in another televised interview timed to commemorate the 40th anniversary of V-E Day.

For many months now, NBC News has been placing special emphasis on the issues of American-Soviet relations. In September, 1984, we reported for two weeks directly from the Soviet Union--those special segments appearing on the TODAY program and on NBC NIGHTLY NEWS. NBC News also broadcast an hour-long prime time special report on your strategic defense initiative. Last month, our Chief Diplomatic Correspondent, Marvin Kalb, received a letter from

55
NBC

President Ronald Reagan
December 17, 1984
Page 2

President Chernenko, responding to four questions about U.S.-Soviet relations; and shortly thereafter, he was first to report the scheduling of Secretary of State Shultz's Geneva meeting with Foreign Minister Gromyko. Those reports received very broad coverage on NBC News and around the world. Obviously, there is great interest in the fact that the achievement of an arms limitation agreement with the Soviet Union is one of your top priorities.

A very special program--of the importance of a televised NBC News interview with the President of the United States--could be broadcast "live" from the White House, or taped "to time," meaning it would not be edited. The timing could be arranged, with due respect to your busy schedule next Spring.

Should you and President Chernenko agree to my proposals, we would obviously plan to schedule both of the special programs in a way that would provide a truly historic opportunity for the nation and the world to get a better understanding of Soviet-American relations and the prospects for an enduring peace.

Very truly yours,

Lawrence K. Gurbman

bc: Grant Tinker
Bob McFarland
Marvin Kalb

NBC

National Broadcasting Company, Inc.

30 Rockefeller Plaza
New York, N.Y. 10112 212-664-4611

Lawrence K. Grossman
President
News Division

December 17, 1984

President Konstantin Chernenko
The Kremlin
Moscow, USSR

Dear Mr. President:

No single event better symbolizes the potential in U.S.-Soviet cooperation than the meeting of American and Soviet forces at the Elbe, completing the destruction of Nazi Germany that ended World War II. In anticipation of the fortieth anniversary of that momentous event next Spring, NBC News would like to propose a historic television program -- a special interview with you, Mr. President, during which you could, in part, expound upon the geopolitical lessons of that War and their meaning for the future of Soviet-American relations, indeed, the future of the world.

For many months now, NBC News has been concentrating on this key relationship, broadcasting last September throughout the United States and with worldwide impact, reports from the Soviet Union. These reports appeared on all NBC News programs. Two months later, NBC News highlighted your responses to questions posed by our Chief Diplomatic Correspondent, Marvin Kalb, who then was first to disclose the agreement for Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko and Secretary of State George Shultz to meet in Geneva in early January.

An NBC News television interview with you, Mr. President, would be an extraordinary opportunity to advance understanding of your policy, not only among the American people but among all peoples, since such an interview would receive worldwide distribution and attention. Should you agree to this proposal, I would,

President Konstantin Chernenko
December 17, 1984
Page 2

as President of NBC News, send a team of experts to Moscow to help work out the arrangements and technical details. Such an interview might be broadcast "live" from the Kremlin, or taped "to time", meaning there would be no editing.

I should like to add, sir, for your information, that I am extending a similar invitation to President Ronald Reagan; and if both you and he should agree individually to my proposal, then NBC News would be pleased to broadcast both interviews, providing an unprecedented opportunity for global understanding of the Soviet-American relationship. In the context of the Spring fortieth anniversary celebrations, recalling a time of Soviet-American cooperation, such interviews by the two Presidents would, I believe, surely advance not only the cause of mutual understanding between our countries, but the prospects for world peace as well.

Very truly yours,

Lawrence K. Gurdman

bc: Grant Tinker
Bob McFarland
Marvin Kalb