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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

**Withdrawer**

JET 3/26/2005

**File Folder** MATLOCK CHRON DECEMBER 1984 (2/5)

**FOIA**

F06-114/1

**Box Number** 7

YARHI-MILO

701

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
6326	MEMO	MEMO FOR ROBERT MCFARLANE RE PRESIDENTIAL LETTER TO CHERNENKO [1] <i>R 3/3/2011 F2006-114/1</i>	1	9/6/1984	B1
6327	MEMO	MEMO FOR PRESIDENT REAGAN RE LETTER TO CHERNENKO [2] <i>R 3/3/2011 F2006-114/1</i>	1	ND	B1
6328	MEMO	MEMO FOR ROBERT MCFARLANE RE REPLY TO CHERNENKO LETTER ON NICARAGUA [17] <i>R 3/3/2011 F2006-114/1</i>	1	12/7/1984	B1
6329	MEMO	MEMO FOR PRESIDENT REAGAN RE REPLY TO CHERNENKO LETTER ON NICARAGUA [18] <i>R 3/3/2011 F2006-114/1</i>	1	ND	B1
6330	MEMO	MEMO FOR ROBERT MCFARLANE RE SHULTZ MEETING WITH DOBRYNIN, DECEMBER 7, 1984 [38-39] <i>R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1</i>	2	12/7/1984	B1
6334	MEMO	MEMO FOR PRESIDENT REAGAN FROM GEORGE SHULTZ RE MEETING WITH DOBRYNIN [41] <i>R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1</i>	1	12/7/1984	B1
6335	MEMO	MEMO TO JOHN POINDEXTER RE USSR [42] <i>D 3/3/2011 F2006-114/1</i>	1	ND	B1 B3

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

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JET 3/26/2005

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**FOIA**

F06-114/1

**Box Number** 7

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
6331	PAPER	PAPER ON USSR [43-47] <b>D 3/3/2011 F2006-114/1</b>	5	12/10/1984	B1 B3
6332	MEMO	MEMO FOR ROBERT MCFARLANE RE AL GORE TRIP TO MOSCOW [48] <b>R 2/17/2010 GUIDELINES</b>	1	12/13/1984	B1
6333	CABLE	120950Z DEC 84 [49-52] <b>R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1</b>	4	12/12/1984	B1

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SECRET/SENSITIVE

December 6, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT: Presidential Letter to Chernenko

Secretary Shultz has submitted a draft letter to Chernenko in reply to Chernenko's letter of November 17. It attempts to restate the points on which both sides agree (as reflected in the President's letter of November 15 and Chernenko's of November 17), proposes possible follow-up meetings between Shultz and Gromyko, mentions the President's action in naming Paul Nitze to assist Shultz and suggests supplementary meetings, following Geneva, between Nitze and a counterpart.

Secretary Shultz would like to deliver the letter to Dobrynin tomorrow, if the President approves it.

I believe the letter is appropriate at this time, both to nail down the points of agreement and to put on record more specifically our proposal for regular meetings of special representatives. It would also serve to keep a certain momentum in Presidential correspondence with Chernenko which could be useful. The State draft looks basically fine, but Ron and I have made some changes to update it and protect our options on the role of foreign ministers. Our changes are noted on the draft at Tab II.

*RV*  
Ron Lehman concurs.

Recommendation:

That you forward the memorandum at Tab I to the President.

Approve  Disapprove

Attachments:

- Tab I - Memorandum to the President
- Tab A - Letter to Chernenko for signature
- Tab B - Shultz-President Memorandum entitled "Letter to Chernenko"
- Tab II - Original State draft of letter showing changes

SECRET/SENSITIVE

Declassify on: OADR

BY *RWS* NLR/F06-114/#63210  
NARA DATE 3/3/11  
DECLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM

SYSTEM II  
91237

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

SUBJECT: Letter to Chernenko

George Shultz has recommended that you send a letter to Chernenko in reply to his letter of November 17. The purpose would be to restate the points on which both sides agree (as reflected in your letter of November 15 and Chernenko's of November 17), to propose possible follow-up meetings between Shultz and Gromyko, to mention your action in naming Paul Nitze to assist George and to suggest supplementary meetings, following Geneva, between Nitze and a counterpart.

George would like to deliver the letter to Dobrynin at their meeting December 7, if you approve.

I believe the letter is appropriate at this time, both to nail down the points of agreement and to put on record more specifically our proposal for regular meetings of special representatives. It would also serve to keep a certain momentum in your correspondence with Chernenko which could be useful.

Recommendation:

That you sign the letter at TAB A.

OK            No

—                —

Attachments:

Tab A - Letter to Chernenko for signature  
Tab B - Shultz-President Memorandum entitled "Letter to Chernenko"

Prepared by:  
Jack F. Matlock

cc: The Vice President

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~  
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
NLRR FD06-1141 #6327  
BY RW NARA DATE 3/3/11

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Our two countries have now announced the beginning of new negotiations on the whole range of questions concerning nuclear and outer space weapons, as you proposed in your letter of November 17. The common ground reflected in your letter and mine of November 15 encourages me to hope for substantial progress in the difficult task we are undertaking together. Let me comment briefly on those areas where there appears to be a coincidence of views.

First, we agree on the objective of eventually liquidating nuclear arms, as you put it. It seems to me that this common objective should stimulate and guide the effort to begin the process of reducing these arsenals.

Second, we agree on the need to negotiate what you call resolute and immediate practical measures to move forward on the real issues we are facing. Such measures, and, in particular, good results in the negotiations we have now agreed to undertake, would have a positive impact on the world situation and our relations, as you say. As Secretary Shultz and I explained to Foreign Minister Gromyko here in Washington, the suggestions which I made in my United Nations address were developed to meet this need, and I recalled them in my letter for that reason.

Third, having referred in my letter to the fact that space weapons and offensive nuclear arms are "inherently related," I was struck by your statement that "there is an organic, and I would say, objective relationship between these issues." I believe it will be important, as we proceed, to seek better understanding of precisely how they are related, in order to permit productive negotiations.

DECLASSIFIED / (E/CASE)  
Authority NLS F99-051 #299  
BY CH, NARA, Date 6/10/02

George Shultz will go to Geneva prepared to negotiate a mutual understanding on the subjects and objectives of follow-on negotiations. I therefore hope that the Geneva meeting will set in motion negotiations which will result in mutually acceptable agreements to begin reductions. This is a crucial first step toward the objective of reducing the threat of nuclear weapons and ultimately eliminating such weapons entirely. The Geneva meeting will begin the process. It must deal with procedural issues, but I believe it important that we also get down to real substance.

Secretary Shultz will have concrete ideas to present in Geneva. I hope that you share my view of the urgent need to focus on the substance of the critical issues to be covered, and that Foreign Minister Gromyko will be prepared to explain your own thinking on strategic and intermediate-range weapons and on outer space as well. I would envisage following up on the January session during subsequent meetings between our Foreign Ministers. This could assist us in moving the negotiations forward quickly.

I have recently designated Mr. Paul Nitze to work with George Shultz as he prepares for the meeting in Geneva. Depending on the results of the Geneva meeting, we might find that it would be useful for Mr. Nitze to meet periodically with a counterpart from your side to develop specific proposals or resolve problems in the various arms control negotiations underway at a given time. This is a matter that can be discussed during the January meeting, but if you have any immediate thoughts on the idea, I would of course welcome them.

I hope that our agreement to begin arms control negotiations will have a favorable effect on our efforts to achieve progress in other areas of our relationship. As I noted in my letter of November 15, I think it could be useful for both our countries to establish a more intensive dialogue on regional issues, including regularized meetings at the policy level. Similarly, more active cooperation in the cultural, economic and scholarly fields, and to expand contacts between our peoples, would be of mutual benefit, and is worthy of our best efforts. In this latter

connection, I am encouraged by the Soviet Union's expressed readiness to join with us in discussions designed to lead toward meetings of the joint commissions established under our bilateral cooperative agreements in the areas of agriculture, housing and the environment. And here I should say once again that steps by the Soviet Union to resolve outstanding problems in the humanitarian field could have a positive impact on our effort to improve relations in every other area.

In closing, let me state as strongly as I can my personal commitment to make the results we have agreed to seek as productive, as concrete and as beneficial as possible. I intend to give my personal attention to the arms control negotiations that our Foreign Ministers will seek to launch in Geneva. I will wish to use our correspondence to discuss particularly difficult issues with you, and I hope you will feel free to do the same.

Sincerely,

His Excellency  
Konstantin Ustinovich Chernenko  
Chairman of the Presidium of the  
Supreme Soviet of the Union of  
Soviet Socialist Republics  
Moscow



THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

SYSTEM II  
91237

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT  
FROM: George P. Shultz  
SUBJECT: Letter to Chernenko

We owe a response to Chernenko's letter of November 17, in which he agreed to open new negotiations with the objective of reaching mutually acceptable agreements on the full range of arms control issues. Your response offers an opportunity to build on the momentum we have now developed. Specifically, I suggest that you stress your personal interest in seeing our new negotiating effort succeed and outline further your views on the scope and form negotiations might take. The Soviet Embassy has asked pointedly whether there will be an answer to Chernenko's last letter, and we have an interest in keeping your correspondence with him active, since you will almost certainly need to use it to break logjams as negotiations proceed.

We have prepared the attached draft letter to Chernenko which builds on his last letter and sets forth our views in three areas:

-- the points on arms control negotiations on which we now agree, including the inherent relationship between offensive weapons and space weapons;

-- our readiness to hold follow-up meetings between Gromyko and myself if necessary after Geneva, alternating between Moscow and Washington; and

-- a restatement of the utility of designating special representatives to work with me and Gromyko in the negotiations.

Another key message in the letter is that we intend at Geneva not just to talk about the procedures for starting new negotiations, but to get into the substance of the issues involved in the search for mutually acceptable agreements in the nuclear and space weapons fields. (In this connection, I will want to discuss with you in greater detail the specific proposals I would like to be able to present to Gromyko at the January meeting.)

The letter also reiterates our hope that arms control will have a favorable impact on efforts to achieve progress in other areas of our relationship. It then touches briefly on regional and bilateral issues, and makes the point again that resolution of human rights issues could have a positive impact on improving relations in every other area.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~  
DECL: OADR

Authority NUS F99-051 #302  
DECLASSIFIED  
by CAJ, NARA, Date 6/10/02

Draft Letter to Chernenko

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Our two countries have now announced the beginning of new negotiations on the whole range of questions concerning nuclear and outer space weapons, as you proposed in your letter of November 17. The common ground reflected in your letter and mine of November 15 encourages me to hope for substantial progress in the difficult task we are undertaking together. Let me comment briefly on those areas where there appears to be a coincidence of views.

First, we agree on the objective of eventually liquidating nuclear arms, as you put it. It seems to me that this common objective should stimulate and guide the effort to begin the process of reducing these ~~weapons~~ <sup>arsenals.</sup>

Second, we agree on the need to negotiate what you call resolute and immediate practical measures to move forward on the real issues we are facing. Such measures, and, in particular, good results in the negotiations we have now agreed to undertake, would have a positive impact on the world situation and our relations, as you say. As Secretary Shultz and I explained to Foreign Minister Gromyko here in Washington, the suggestions which I made in my United Nations address were developed to meet this need, and I recalled them in my letter for that reason.

Third, having referred in my letter to the fact that space weapons and offensive nuclear arms are "inherently related," I was struck ~~by~~ <sup>by</sup> your statement that "there is an organic, and I would say, objective relationship between these issues." I believe it will be important, as we proceed, to seek better understanding of precisely how they are related, in order to permit productive negotiations.

George Shultz will go to Geneva prepared to negotiate a mutual understanding on the subjects and objectives of follow-on negotiations. I therefore hope that the Geneva meeting will set in motion negotiations which will result in mutually acceptable agreements to begin reductions. This is a crucial first step toward the objective of reducing the threat of nuclear weapons and ultimately eliminating such weapons entirely. The Geneva meeting will begin the process. It ~~will~~ <sup>must</sup> deal to ~~some degree~~ with procedural issues, but I ~~also~~ believe it important that we <sup>also</sup> get down to real substance. ~~from the first.~~

Secretary Shultz will have concrete ideas to present in Geneva. I hope that you share my view of the urgent need to focus on the substance of the critical issues to be covered, and that Foreign Minister Gromyko will be prepared to explain your own thinking on strategic and intermediate-range weapons and on outer space as well. ~~If more than one meeting proves necessary,~~ I would envisage following up on the January session <sup>during subsequent</sup> with further meetings between our Foreign Ministers, ~~alternating between our two capitals.~~ This <sup>c</sup> ~~would~~ <sup>assist</sup> allow us ~~to~~ <sup>in</sup> ~~move~~ <sup>ing</sup> the negotiations forward quickly, ~~ensuring that they get off to a good start.~~

9

~~[Between now and the time our ministers meet, I look forward to further exchanges between our sides on ways to approach these talks and the issues to be discussed.]~~ ~~one approach~~ I have ~~recently~~ recently considering ~~is to~~ designate <sup>d</sup> ~~Mr. Paul Nitze~~ <sup>Mr. Paul Nitze</sup> as he prepares for the meeting in Geneva, to work with George Shultz on the negotiations. ~~I believe it might be helpful for both sides to name such representatives.~~ Depending on the results of the <sup>Geneva</sup> ~~first meeting between Foreign Ministers,~~ we might <sup>find</sup> ~~decide~~ that ~~these special negotiators could have a continuing role in developing~~ <sup>it would be useful for Mr. Nitze to meet periodically with a counterpart from your side to</sup> specific proposals or resolve problems in the various arms control negotiations underway at a given time. This is a matter that can be discussed ~~before and during the January meeting,~~ <sup>but if you have any immediate thoughts</sup> ~~in order to assess its practicality~~ <sup>on the idea, I would of course welcome them.</sup>

I hope that our agreement to begin arms control negotiations will have a favorable effect on our efforts to achieve progress in other areas of our relationship. As I noted in my letter of November 15, I think it could be useful for both our countries to establish an intensive dialogue on regional issues, including regularized meetings at the policy level. Similarly, more active cooperation in the cultural, economic and scholarly fields, and to expand contacts between our peoples, would be of mutual benefit, and is worthy of our best efforts. In this latter connection, I am encouraged by the Soviet Union's expressed readiness to join with us in discussions designed to lead toward meetings of the joint commissions established under our bilateral cooperative agreements in the areas of agriculture, housing and the environment. And here I should say once again that steps by the Soviet Union to resolve outstanding problems

10

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

- 4 -

in the humanitarian field could have a positive impact on our efforts to improve relations in every other area.

In closing, let me state as strongly as I can my personal commitment to make the results we have agreed to seek as productive, as concrete and as beneficial as possible. I intend to give my personal attention to the arms control negotiations that our Foreign Ministers will seek to launch in Geneva. I will wish to use our correspondence to discuss particularly difficult issues with you, and I hope you will feel free to do the same.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

His Excellency  
Konstantin Ustinovich Chernenko  
Chairman, Presidium of the Supreme Soviet  
of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics  
Moscow

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

RECEIVED 04 DEC 84 15

TO MCFARLANE FROM ARMACOST, M

DOCDATE 28 NOV 84

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997  
By CRD NARA, Date 6/10/02

KEYWORDS: USSR ARMS CONTROL CHERNENKO, KONSTANTI  
HS

SUBJECT: DRAFT PRES LTR TO CHERNENKO RE ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR MCFARLANE DUE: STATUS S FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MATLOCK

LEHMAN, R

COMMENTS

RLF# 8432561

LOG 8491234

NSCIFID

( B / )

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO

DISPATCH \_\_\_\_\_ W/ATTCH FILE \_\_\_\_\_ (C)

Sec-Pres revised in P 11/29.  
Action Memo sent to Secretary  
by 11/30-5a.m. pouch. mvs

12  
SUPER SENSITIVE **8432561**  
United States Department of State

Washington, D. C. 20520



DIST:  
S  
D  
P  
S/S

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

'84 NOV 28 P7:16

**ACTION MEMORANDUM**

S/S *11/28*

NOV 28 1984

TO: The Secretary  
THROUGH: P - Michael H. Armacost *MA*  
FROM: EUR - Richard Burt *RB*  
SUBJECT: Presidential Letter to Chernenko

REDIST.  
11/29

S  
D  
P  
EUR  
PM  
S/S

We have drafted a letter from the President to Chernenko in response to the Soviet leader's letter of November 17 in which he agreed to begin new arms control negotiations. Our draft attempts to build on the momentum we have developed and outline further our views on the scope and form negotiations might take in Geneva and beyond. A key message in the letter is that we intend at Geneva not just to talk about the procedures for starting new negotiations, but to get into the substance of the issues involved in the search for mutually acceptable agreements in the nuclear and space weapons' fields.

A memorandum from you to the President covers the text and explains the rationale behind the current draft.

Recommendation

That you sign the attached memorandum to the President enclosing a draft letter to Chernenko.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Drafted: EUR/SOV: JFTefft *JFT*  
11/28/84 Ext. 20821 3299M  
Cleared: EUR/SOV: TWSimons *TWS*  
EUR: MPalmer *MP*  
P: WHCourtney *WHC*

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NISF99-051 #304  
BY CH, NARA, Date 6/10/02

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~  
DECL: OADR

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

December 6, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK

SUBJECT: Suzanne Massie's Letter to the President

I believe that we can most usefully consult Suzanne again when and if we have concluded the Cultural Exchange Agreement with the Soviet Union. She has some good ideas for programs, but these cannot be planned actively until we have an agreement.

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum to the President, forwarding a self-explanatory reply to Ms. Massie (Tab A). The incoming letter is at Tab B.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the memorandum at Tab I to the President.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments:

- Tab I Memorandum to the President
- Tab A Proposed response
- Tab B Incoming letter from Suzanne Massie, November 8



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE  
SUBJECT: Letter from Suzanne Massie

Issue

Proposed reply to letter from Suzanne Massie.

Facts

Suzanne Massie sent you a letter on November 18 (Tab B), in which she congratulates you on your reelection and offers her assistance in facilitating U.S.-Soviet relations.

Discussion

Attached at Tab A is a proposed reply which acknowledges Ms. Massie's letter and indicates that Jack Matlock and I will stay in touch with her. I believe that we can most usefully consult Ms. Massie when and if we have concluded the Cultural Exchange Agreement with the Soviet Union.

RECOMMENDATION

OK    No

—    —    That you sign the letter to Suzanne Massie at Tab A.

Prepared by:  
Jack Matlock

Attachments:

Tab A    Proposed response  
Tab B    Incoming letter, November 18

15

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Dear Suzanne:

Thank you very much for your kind letter of November 8 and for your congratulations.

I very much appreciate the help you have given us in moving our relations with the Soviet Union toward a more constructive course. I too hope that some new opportunities are now opening up and am pleased that you stand ready to help out.

I have asked Bud McFarlane and Jack Matlock to stay in touch with you so that we can continue to benefit from your advice.

With warm regards,

Sincerely,

Ms. Suzanne Massie  
1 West 67th Street  
New York, New York 10023

2627 16  
SUZANNE MASSIE  
1 WEST 67TH STREET  
NEW YORK, N. Y. 10023

November 8, 1984

Dear Mr. President,

I simply want to add these few words of personal congratulations to the chorus that is flooding in upon you.

It is an awesome and wonderful personal victory but also such an exciting opportunity for new and bold achievements for our nation. All my best wishes go with you as you begin the challenge of your new term. In the field that I know best, I believe that there may now be some new opportunities in our relations with the Soviet Union. Please know that if I can in any way be useful to you, I stand always ready to help further these in any way that I can.

May God bless you as you lead our great country.

Sincerely,

  
Suzanne Massie

President Ronald Reagan  
The White House  
Washington, D.C.

Let me know if I  
should answer this in view of her  
offer.  
RR

17

SYSTEM II  
91234

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

December 7, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT: Reply to Chernenko Letter on Nicaragua

State has submitted a draft reply to Chernenko's letter of November 16, 1984, regarding Nicaragua. You will recall that this letter was delivered just a day before the letter of November 17 which proposed the Geneva meeting of foreign ministers.

The purpose of Chernenko's letter on Nicaragua was probably to indicate to us that an invasion of Nicaragua would cause a delay of the negotiations which his subsequent letter proposed. Since the Soviets handled the matter separately from the arms control issues, it would be appropriate for us to do so as well. Chernenko's letter offers the President the opportunity to place our position on the record, and -- more importantly -- to reiterate and expand our warning regarding the supply of jet aircraft. State's draft letter has, accordingly, been amended as John Poindexter suggested by amplifying the warning regarding "jet fighter aircraft" with the addition of "or jet aircraft that can be converted for combat use."

I believe this letter should be delivered a day or two following delivery of the President's reply to Chernenko's letter of November 17 which dealt with the Geneva meeting.

Recommendation:

That you forward the attached memorandum to the President.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments:

- Tab I - Memorandum to the President
- Tab A - Letter to Chernenko regarding Nicaragua
- Tab B - Shultz-President Memorandum of December 3, 1984

**DECLASSIFIED**

NLRR FD6-114/1#6328

BY RW NARA DATE 3/3/11

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

SUBJECT: Reply to Chernenko Letter on Nicaragua

You will recall that Chernenko sent you a letter November 16 accusing the United States of hostile intent toward Nicaragua. This letter was delivered just a day before his letter to you proposing the meeting of foreign ministers to discuss arms control.

George Shultz has sent over a memorandum recommending that you reply to the letter, keeping this subject separate from your correspondence regarding the Geneva meeting and other subjects. I agree with George's recommendation, particularly since I believe that Chernenko's letter gives you an opportunity to reiterate in the most authoritative fashion the unacceptability of supplying jet aircraft to Nicaragua which could be used for combat.

Recommendation

That you sign the letter at Tab A to Chernenko.

OK                      No

—                              —

Attachments:

- Tab A - Letter to Chernenko regarding Nicaragua
- Tab B - Shultz-President Memorandum of December 3, 1984

Prepared by:  
Jack F. Matlock

cc: Vice President

BY RWJ NARA DATE 3/3/11

NLR/F06-1141 #0309

DECLASSIFIED

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. Chairman:

In response to your letter of November 16, I want you to know that I, too, believe that an escalation of tension serves no one's interest and that such an escalation, if continued, would inevitably affect relations between our two countries.

Our policy toward Nicaragua is clear. We will not sit by idly while the Sandinista regime, aided by the Soviet Union, Cuba, and other states which maintain close relations with your country, provides material and other support to insurgent and terrorist groups in the region. Neither can we and other countries whose interests are affected fail to be concerned by the massive and destabilizing amount of weaponry which Nicaragua itself has acquired or by the presence of large numbers of foreign military advisors. It is particularly clear that recent arms shipments to Nicaragua have exacerbated an already tense situation.

A subject of grave concern to us in recent weeks has, of course, been the question of combat aircraft for Nicaragua. As we have informed the Soviet Union on several occasions, the acquisition by Nicaragua of jet fighter aircraft or jet aircraft that can be converted for combat use would be unacceptable to the United States. I was therefore pleased to see from your letter that malicious designs involving shipment of Soviet combat aircraft to Nicaragua are not part of Soviet policy, and welcome this clarification as a useful step forward in our relations.

DECLASSIFIED (RE/AFSC)  
Auth: NLSF99-051 #292  
BY C/S, NARA, Date 6/10/02

I agree with you that the Nicaraguan people, as all people, must be given the opportunity to live in peace and exercise their inalienable rights. The Sandinista junta, therefore, owes it to its citizens and to the international community to fulfill the commitments which it undertook in its July 12, 1979, statement to the Organization of American States. It is unrealistic to expect other interested states to have full confidence in Nicaragua's intentions until those commitments are observed.

I wish to reaffirm to you my strong conviction that the Nicaragua problem should be resolved in the context of a negotiated settlement. The Contadora group of nations has defined the problems of the region and has made substantial progress in developing a treaty to meet these concerns. I applaud these efforts and give them my unqualified support. In the period ahead, we should know whether they will succeed. Much will depend on Nicaragua's willingness to moderate its behavior of the past five years. I am sure that you join me in the hope that the Contadora effort will bear fruit. It is clearly in both our interests to see reduction, rather than escalation of tensions in Central America.

Sincerely,

His Excellency  
Konstantin Ustinovich Chernenko  
Chairman of the Presidium of the  
Supreme Soviet of the Union of  
Soviet Socialist Republics  
Moscow

National Security Council  
The White House

21

System #

II

Package #

91234

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Paul Thompson			
Bob Kimmitt	1	K	
John Poindexter			
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat	2		Route to
Situation Room			Matlock -- entire package.

I = Information    A = Action    R = Retain    D = Dispatch    N = No further Action

cc: VP    Meese    Baker    Deaver    Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_

(Date/Time)



22

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

SYSTEM II  
91234

34 NOV 2 4 31 33

December 3, 1984

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: George P. Shultz *GPS*

SUBJECT: Reply to Chernenko Letter on Nicaragua

We need to reply to Soviet Chairman Chernenko's November 16 letter to you on Nicaragua. Chernenko states his "growing concern" about developments in the region, and warns that increased tensions in Central America will have an impact on the course of US-Soviet relations. The letter avoids a hostile tone, but is highly, if indirectly, critical of United States policy toward Nicaragua. Chernenko also professes Soviet support for peaceful resolution of problems in the region, and specifically commends the Contadora process. The subject of combat aircraft for Nicaragua is addressed circuitously: the Soviet text gives no guarantees against shipment of aircraft, but disclaims any "malicious designs" on the part of the USSR.

Our reply very firmly sets the record straight concerning United States policy toward Nicaragua. Our text also acknowledges Chernenko's comments regarding the impact of tensions in Central America on US-Soviet relations, but turns these comments on linkage back at the USSR by making it clear that responsibility for the escalation of tensions in the region lies with the Soviet Union and Nicaragua.

Concerning possible shipment of combat aircraft to Nicaragua, we took advantage of Chernenko's decision to raise the topic, and put the Soviets on notice that we consider Chernenko's "clarification" a tacit assurance that the USSR will not provide such arms to Nicaragua. The reply also restates our longstanding position that shipment to Nicaragua of jet fighter aircraft would be unacceptable to the United States.

In sum, our text leaves the Soviets in no doubt as to the resolve of US policy toward Nicaragua, while reaffirming our commitment to constructive dialogue with the Soviet Union and our hope for peaceful resolution of Central American problems.

Authority *NLS F99-051 #2915*  
BY *CAS*, NARA, Date *6/15/82* ~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~  
DECL: OADR

C 23

MEMORANDUM

8885

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

December 7, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT KIMMITT

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK 

SUBJECT Statement by Herbert Hoover on Relief Given to  
Russia During the Great Famine

I have reviewed and concur in the proposed draft letter (TAB A), prepared by the State Department, to Mr. Robert L. Richmond. A memorandum for your signature to Sally Kelley is attached at TAB I.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the memorandum at TAB I to Sally Kelley.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachment:

Tab I Memorandum to Sally Kelley

Tab A Draft letter to Mr. Robert L. Richmond

24

8885

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

MEMORANDUM FOR SALLY KELLEY

FROM: ROBERT M. KIMMITT

SUBJECT: Letter to the President re Statement by Herbert Hoover on Relief Given to Russia During the Great Famine

We have reviewed and concur with the proposed letter drafted by the Department of State, to Mr. Robert L. Richmond.

Attachment:

Tab A Proposed response and incoming letter

25

SUGGESTED DRAFT REPLY

Mr. Robert L. Richmond  
P. O. Box 1854  
Sun City, Arizona 85372

Dear Mr. Richmond:

I am replying on behalf of President Reagan to your letter and attachments regarding President Hoover's involvement with US relief efforts in the early days of the Soviet Union. I am sure that you are correct in stating that such historical events are easily forgotten and bear repeating from generation to generation.

Our relations with the Soviet Union are of vital importance for all Americans, and as you state in your thoughtful letter, having such positive points of reference can be helpful in difficult negotiations. This early assistance in the supplying of seed could be viewed as a harbinger of one of the more productive aspects of US-Soviet relations--agriculture.

Your kind expression of support for the President is very much appreciated. With the backing of citizens such as yourself, our programs can go forward and produce the results we all desire.

Sincerely,

**WHITE HOUSE  
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET**

*F-6002-30*

- O - OUTGOING
- H - INTERNAL
- I - INCOMING  
Date Correspondence Received (YY/MM/DD) 84 1/10/12

Name of Correspondent:  Mr.  Mrs.  Miss Robert L. Richmond

MI Mail Report      User Codes: (A) \_\_\_\_\_ (B) \_\_\_\_\_ (C) \_\_\_\_\_

Subject: Enclose ~~copy~~ copy of a statement by former President Hoover concerning relief given to Russia during the Great Famine from 1921-1923. Also a translation of Russian scroll thanking the American people.

ROUTE TO:		ACTION	DISPOSITION			
Office/Agency	(Staff Name)	Action Code	Tracking Date YY/MM/DD	Type of Response	Code	Completion Date YY/MM/DD
	<u>Done</u> Cokell	ORIGINATOR	<u>84 11/15</u>			<u>84 1 1</u>
	<u>Do 8/1</u>	Referral Note: <u>DC</u>	<u>84 11/19</u>			<u>84 1 1</u>
		Referral Note:				
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		Referral Note:				
			<u>1 1</u>			<u>1 1</u>
		Referral Note:				

- ACTION CODES:**  
 A - Appropriate Action  
 C - Comment/Recommendation  
 D - Draft Response  
 F - Furnish Fact Sheet to be used as Enclosure  
 I - Info Copy Only/No Action Necessary  
 R - Direct Reply w/Copy  
 S - For Signature  
 X - Interim Reply
- DISPOSITION CODES:**  
 A - Answered  
 B - Non-Special Referral  
 C - Completed  
 S - Suspended
- FOR OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE:**  
 Type of Response = Initials of Signer  
 Code = "A"  
 Completion Date = Date of Outgoing

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

Keep this worksheet attached to the original incoming letter.  
 Send all routing updates to Central Reference (Room 75, OEOB).  
 Always return completed correspondence record to Central Files.  
 Refer questions about the correspondence tracking system to Central Reference, ext. 2590.

MARIE & BOB RICHMOND  
P. O. Box 1854  
Sun City, Arizona 85372

*Richmond*  
~~602-972-3770~~  
~~1977~~  
*Bob* ↗  
8431615

602 972-3770

17851 - 99<sup>th</sup> DRIVE

276760

October 9, 1984

*SLR*  
President Ronald W. Reagan  
White House  
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear President Reagan,

I feel certain that the attached will be of vital interest to you and through you to our citizenry.

As background, my father, Raymond S. Richmond, was for a number of years associated with President Herbert Hoover. He served in a variety of posts. One was as Executive Director and Secretary to Hoover's Committee on Food for the Small Democracies.

Recently, in reviewing some of my deceased father's correspondence, files and papers, I ran across the enclosed statement made by former President Hoover in July, 1959.

I believe you will agree with me when I state that there are two or three generations of Americans who know little or nothing of the generosity of the American people in respect to the philanthropic and humanitarian aid rendered to the Soviet people in the early days of their present regime.

Because you have such a "bully pulpit" and communicate so splendidly, I would like to suggest that this material contains facts and figures that ought to be much more widely known. Here again our educational system has been shamefully remiss. Here we have another prideful chapter in our heritage and yet it has not been featured in our texts and curricula since the 1930's.

After sharing this material with a number of my friends and because I feel so deeply about it, my wife and I visited the Hoover Presidential Library in West Branch, Iowa this summer. Dwight Miller, Senior Archivist at the Library, showed us the "scroll" Mr. Hoover referred to in his statement. He was good enough to provide us with a translation which I have also attached.


October 9, 1984.

It occurs to me that this information not only would aid our citizenry in their understanding, but it would provide you and your administration with an added "hole card" in your talks and negotiations with the U.S.S.R. These materials are ever so timely since so many of the Soviet leaders are in the senior age bracket, and would, therefore, have first hand awareness and/or knowledge of these facts.

Your friends and associates in the Hoover Institution in Palo Alto, as well as scholars and researchers there and in West Branch, I am sure would be eager to furnish you with added details and pertinent background. Properly handled and packaged this data would prove helpful not only in educating the American public, but would provide an added vital negotiating gambit as well.

If the pernicious malady of overconfidence doesn't take command, you will have an opportunity to lead our nation for another four critical years in the principles you articulated so well inspiring us in the all-out support of Barry Goldwater in 1964. We surely have come a long way since that turn around! Our prayers and hopes are with you. God willing, we'll win another vital one for the "Gipper"!


Most sincerely,



Robert L. Richmond

cc: Sec. George P. Shultz  
Amb. Jeane J. Kirkpatrick  
Sen. Paul Laxalt  
Sen. Barry Goldwater  
Sen. Charles H. Percy  
Congressman Bob Stump

Att: Herbert Hoover 1959 Statement  
Translation of Russian "Scroll"

*July 21: 1959* 

At the request of the Press Associations, Mr. Hoover made the following statement:

statement by Herbert Hoover

The relief of the Great Famine in Communist Russia from 1921 to 1923 was undertaken by the American people at the direct request of the Soviet Government. The American Relief Administration, under my direction, raised about \$62,000,000 and provided the Russians with over 700,000 tons of food, clothing, and medical supplies as an absolute gift. It was not a loan and not a dime was ever asked for -- or paid. The Soviet government also requested us to purchase \$10,000,000 worth of seed on their behalf which they paid for in gold, but we provided the transport free.

When the work was completed and over 20,000,000 lives had been saved from starvation and millions more from raging epidemics, the Commissars in the Kremlin -- in July 1923 -- gave a great dinner to our staff. Four of the Commissars in their speeches used this phrase: "The Union of Socialist Soviet Republics never will forget the aid rendered to them by the American People." They presented me with a great scroll of thanks. They have been trying to forget our help ever since.



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Translation of Russian Scroll

Mr. Herbert Hoover  
Chairman, American Relief Administration  
Washington, D.C.

SIR:

WHEREAS, in the period of a disastrous national catastrophe, the people of the UNITED STATES, represented by the AMERICAN RELIEF ADMINISTRATION, readily responded to the needs of the population, already emaciated by foreign intervention and blockade, in famine stricken parts of Russia and Confederated Republics;

WHEREAS the AMERICAN RELIEF ADMINISTRATION did organize, on a most extensive scale, the supply and distribution of food products and other articles of prime necessity;

WHEREAS, due to the boundless, and entirely unselfish efforts of the AMERICAN RELIEF ADMINISTRATION, millions of people of all ages were saved from death, and entire localities, including many towns, escaped a threatening fearful calamity;

WHEREAS, at this time, with the cessation of the famine, the magnificent relief work of the AMERICAN RELIEF ADMINISTRATION is being concluded;

BE IT RESOLVED BY THE COUNCIL OF THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS in the name of the millions of people who have been saved, as well as in the name of the whole working people of Soviet Russia and of the Confederated Republics and before the whole world, to this organization, to its leader MR. HERBERT HOOVER, to its representative in Russia, Colonel HASKELL, and to all the workers of the organization to express the most deeply felt sentiments of gratitude, and to state, that all the people inhabiting the UNION OF SOCIALIST SOVIET REPUBLICS never will forget the aid rendered to them by the AMERICAN PEOPLE, through the agency of the AMERICAN RELIEF ADMINISTRATION, holding it to be a pledge of the future friendship of the two nations.

ACTING PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL  
OF THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS KAMINEF

CHIEF OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE  
DEPARTMENT OF THE COUNCIL OF  
THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS N. GRBUROV

SECRETARY OF THE COUNCIL OF  
THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS L. FOTIEV

Moskow, Kremlin  
July, the 10th, 1923.

UNCLASSIFIED

8885

31

(Classification)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT  
TRANSMITTAL FORM

S/S 8431615

Date December 4, 1984

For: Mr. Robert C. McFarlane  
National Security Council  
The White House

Reference:

To: President From: Robert L. Richmond, Sun City AZ

Date: 10/9/84 Subject: Hoover statement re relief given to Russia during the great famine from 1921 to 1923

WH Referral Dated: 11/19/84 NSC ID# 276760  
(if any)

         The attached item was sent directly to the Department of State.

Action Taken:

- A draft reply is attached.
- A draft reply will be forwarded.
- A translation is attached.
- An information copy of a direct reply is attached.
- We believe no response is necessary for the reason cited below.
- The Department of State has no objection to the proposed travel.
- Other.

Remarks:



Charles Hill  
Executive Secretary

UNCLASSIFIED

(Classification)

C  
32

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 7, 1984

Dear Mr. Birnbaum:

Thank you for your recent mailgram expressing concern over the trial of Odessa Hebrew teacher Yakov Levin and Soviet media attacks against Jews in Leningrad. Let me assure you that the U.S. Government shares your concern and is closely monitoring these developments.

We have consistently condemned the Soviet Government's persecution of Jews and members of other religious faiths. Such measures are contrary to the human rights provisions of the Helsinki Final Act. We have called upon the Soviets to comply with their commitments in that agreement. In addition, we have made it unequivocally clear in bilateral exchanges with the Soviets that their abuses of individual rights have a serious detrimental effect on U.S.-Soviet relations. In their recent meetings with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko, both President Reagan and Secretary Shultz stressed our continuing concern over Soviet human rights abuses.

Unfortunately, the Soviets have been unresponsive to our representations on behalf of Soviet Jewry, labelling them as "interference" in their internal affairs. U.S. influence on Soviet persecution of Soviet Jews remains extremely limited. We are not discouraged, however, and will continue to exercise what influence we have.

We welcome hearing your views. If we can be of further assistance in this or any other matter, do not hesitate to contact us.

Sincerely,



Jack F. Matlock, Jr.  
Special Assistant to the President

Mr. Jacob Birnbaum  
National Director  
Center for Russian Jewry  
240 Cabrini Boulevard  
New York, New York 10033



~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

33

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT  
TRANSMITTAL FORM

S/S 8432382

Date December 4, 1984

For: Mr. Donald P. Gregg  
Office of the Vice President  
The White House

Reference:

To: Jack Matlock From: Jacob Birnbaum

Date: Nov 23, 1984 Subject: Trial of Yakov Levin and  
Soviet media attacks against Leningrad Jews.


WH Referral Dated: Nov. 27, 1984 NSC ID#, 0408625  
(if any)

         The attached item was sent directly to the  
Department of State.

Action Taken:

- A draft reply is attached.
- A draft reply will be forwarded.
- A translation is attached.
- An information copy of a direct reply is attached.
- We believe no response is necessary for the reason cited below.
- The Department of State has no objection to the proposed travel.
- Other.

Remarks:

  
Charles Hill  
Executive Secretary

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

(Classification)

34

Department of State

Suggested Reply

Dear Mr. Birnbaum:

Thank you for your recent mailgram expressing concern over the trial of Odessa Hebrew teacher Yakov Levin and Soviet media attacks against Jews in Leningrad. Let me assure you that the U.S. Government shares your concern and is closely monitoring these developments.

We have consistently condemned the Soviet Government's persecution of Jews and members of other religious faiths. Such measures are contrary to the human rights provisions of the Helsinki Final Act. We have called upon the Soviets to comply with their commitments in that agreement. In addition, we have made it unequivocally clear in bilateral exchanges with the Soviets that their abuses of individual rights have a serious detrimental effect on U.S.-Soviet relations. In their recent meetings with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko, both President Reagan and Secretary Shultz stressed our continuing concern over Soviet human rights abuses.

Mr. Jacob Birnbaum,

National Director,

Center for Russian Jewry

Student Struggle for Soviet Jewry,

240 Cabrini Boulevard, Apartment 5B,

New York, New York.

35

Unfortunately, the Soviets have been unresponsive to our representations on behalf of Soviet Jewry, labelling them as "interference" in their internal affairs. U.S. influence on Soviet persecution of Soviet Jews remains extremely limited. We are not discouraged, however, and will continue to exercise what influence we have.

We welcome hearing your views. If we can be of further assistance in this or any other matter, do not hesitate to contact us.

Sincerely,

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL 8432382

36  
ID 8408625

REFERRAL

DATE: 27 NOV 84

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPT OF STATE

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION:

TO: MATLOCK

SOURCE: BIRNBAUM, JACOB

DATE: 23 NOV 84

KEYWORDS: USSR

ISRAEL

MP

SUBJ: MAILGRAM TO MATLOCK FM CENTER RUSSIAN JEWRY STUDENT STRUGGLE SOVIET

-----  
REQUIRED ACTION: DRAFT REPLY FOR WH SIG

DUE DATE: 04 DEC 84

COMMENTS:

*Loretta Swanton*  
FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT 395-6870

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

*Received in S/S-I  
11/27 at 3:30 pm (CJ)*

JACOB BIRNBAUM < NATIONAL DIRECTOR  
240 CARRINI BLVD APT 5B  
NEW YORK NY 10033 23AM

31  
Western  
Union Mailgram 2

4-0314289328 11/23/84 ICS IPMRNCZ CSP WHSB  
2129287451 MGMB TDRN NEW YORK NY 100 11-23 0446P EST

Rec'd 11/26/84

8432382  
86

JACK MATLOCK  
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG  
WASHINGTON DC 20506

THE TRIAL OF YAAKOV LEVIN OF ODESSA IS THE FIRST OF SERIES DESIGNED  
DESTROY THE JEWISH STUDY GROUPS-LIFELINE OF SOVIET JEWISH RELIGIOUS  
SURVIVAL.

LAST WEEK'S VICIOUS TV ATTACK ON LENINGRAD JEWS AND CHARGES OF A  
JEWISH PLOT TO BOMB THE HERMITAGE ARE PART OF RISING CRESCENDO OF  
INCIDENTS WHICH THE ADMINISTRATION MUST NOT IGNORE DESPITE THE GROWTH  
OF US-SOVIET DISCUSSIONS ON ARMS AND TRADE. THE ADMINISTRATION MUST  
FIND WAYS OF MODIFYING THE MOST DANGEROUS ASSAULT ON JEWISH LIFE IN  
DECADES.

JACOB BIRNBAUM  
NATIONAL DIRECTOR  
CENTER FOR RUSSIAN JEWRY STUDENT STRUGGLE FOR SOVIET JEWRY

16:46 EST

MGMCMP



NLRR #06714/1 #6330

ChronMatlockSYSTEM II  
91254

38

MEMORANDUM

BY AN NARA DATE 11/27/07

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

December 7, 1984

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT: Shultz Meeting with Dobrynin, December 7, 1984

NOW HAS BEEN

Mark Palmer called me on secure to give me a readout on today's meeting between Secretary Shultz and Dobrynin. He said that the Secretary would be reporting directly to the President (and I presume that you will be present), but to make sure no details slip, here is what Palmer reported to me:

Shultz opened the meeting by saying that he had just come from the meeting of the President with Bishop Tutu and that the President had made some strong statements about apartheid in South Africa. He then turned to the Geneva meetings and said that the President and he were taking it very seriously and that they felt it offered promise for real results.

Dobrynin replied that he subscribed to everything the Secretary had said.

Shultz then said that he would be taking a rather large group with him, but that he would not have them all in the meetings; they would just be available to render advise to him. He said that he would have Nitze with him in the meeting, but this was not meant to prejudge subsequent arrangements. When Dobrynin asked who precisely would be accompanying Shultz to Geneva, the Secretary said that it would be Nitze, some of his own staff and representatives from DOD and NSC, but reiterated that only a couple of these would join him and Nitze in the meeting.

Dobrynin said he could tall the Secretary exactly who would accompany Gromyko: Korniyenko (the First Deputy Foreign Minister), Dobrynin, Karpov, Obukhov (the MFA official who took notes for Gromyko during his visit here in September), and Sukhodrev. Dobrynin added that Gromyko was prepared to stay in Geneva the afternoon of January 8 if a meeting then is needed. (Sokolov had earlier informed State that Gromyko would want to depart the afternoon of the 8th.)

Shultz said that this sounded good, and suggested a reception for both delegations the evening of January 7. Dobrynin said he understood why this could be useful but added that Gromyko had indicated that he did not wish dinners or lunches. But he

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

39

promised to float the idea of a reception and to recommend it personally.

Shultz then said that, while the meetings should focus on arms control, it would be useful to review some bilateral issues. For example, VE Day is coming up and it might be useful to discuss whether any joint commemorations would be appropriate. Dobrynin said that this would be a most welcome subject; World War II provides a "living example" of how the U.S. and USSR can cooperate and added that he would be happy to receive any thoughts we have on the subject in advance of the Geneva meeting. But, in general, he expressed doubt that Gromyko would want to spend much time on bilateral subjects.

Shultz said that he did not disagree, but suggested that perhaps a working lunch to deal with these subjects would be a good idea. He also said that Hartman will be meeting him in Germany December 15, and that if Gromyko has any further thoughts on these matters they could be conveyed through Hartman.

Dobrynin then complained about statements that Ken Adelman "and other Administration spokesmen" have been making, and cited Ken's Foreign Affairs article in particular. He also asked when they could expect a reply to Chernenko's letter of November 17. (Palmer did not mention what response, if any, Shultz gave to this.)

Comments:

1. It would appear that Dobrynin did not push hard on matters of substance, and was content to confine the discussion to modalities.
2. Shultz apparently did not go as far as his talking points in raising the possibility of subsequent meetings by special representatives. However, Gromyko's inclusion of Karpov in his delegation may indicate that the Soviets are in fact preparing for just such an eventuality.
3. Shultz did not mention the possibility of parallel talks at the Assistant Secretary level on regional and bilateral issues. This is unfortunate, since this would be one means of keeping our entire agenda up front. Unless we make such a proposal and it is accepted, I doubt that Gromyko will be willing to talk about anything other than arms control and VE Day.
4. Although Shultz did not commit us to anything regarding VE Day, his raising the subject means that it will be imperative for us to coordinate positions with the Allies before the Geneva meeting, since we will not be able to duck discussion with the Soviets at that time now that the subject has been mentioned.

SYSTEM II PROFILE

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

40  
ID 8491261

RECEIVED 08 DEC 84 13

TO PRESIDENT

FROM SHULTZ, G

DOCDATE 07 DEC 84

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 23, 1997

By CS NARA, Date 6/10/02

KEYWORDS: USSR

ARMS CONTROL

DOBRYNIN, ANATOLIY F

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF 7 DEC SHULTZ MTG W/ AMB DOBRYNIN

-----  
ACTION: APPROPRIATE ACTION

DUE:

STATUS X

FILES SII  
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FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MATLOCK

COMMENTS

REF# 8433507

LOG

NSCIFID

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ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

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DISPATCH

W/ATTCH

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8433507

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

SYSTEM II  
91261

SECRET PR: 07

24 DEC 8 12:21  
December 7, 1984

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

SITING ROOM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: George P. Shultz *GPS*

SUBJECT: My Meeting Today with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin

I met for an hour today with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin to discuss preparations for the Geneva meeting. I began by emphasizing the seriousness with which you and I are preparing for the meeting, noting that while we don't underestimate the difficulties, we are ready to move ahead as rapidly as possible.

Dobrynin gave me the list of the Soviet delegation. It will consist only of Gromyko, his deputy Korniyenko, Dobrynin, Karpov (their seasoned arms control negotiator), Foreign Ministry specialist Obukhov, and Gromyko's interpreter. I told him that I would be bringing a large group with me to Geneva to be available for consultations there, but that my negotiating team in the meetings would include Paul Nitze and not be larger than theirs. While the Soviets had earlier said Gromyko wanted to leave on the afternoon of the second day, Dobrynin told me that Gromyko now is prepared to remain for a meeting that afternoon (January 8th) if it would be useful.

On substance, Dobrynin said Gromyko is planning to concentrate primarily on arms control and does not want a lengthy discussion of the overall relationship. However, when I suggested that V-E Day events in Europe might be the kind of bilateral issue that would be worth discussing, he seemed to welcome the idea, noting that Moscow was also reviewing this issue and it might be worth some preliminary discussion even before Geneva. Dobrynin also inquired about the status of any replies to the two outstanding Chernenko letters. I told him we were working on responses. Your reply to Chernenko's November 15 letter on the overall relationship arrived later in the afternoon and we passed it to Dobrynin's deputy Sokolov.

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/1 #6334

BY *CA* NARA DATE 11/27/07

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~  
DECL: OADR

→ Matlock 48  
File

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

December 13, 1984

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

THROUGH: CHRIS LEHMAN  
FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JLW*  
SUBJECT: Albert Gore's Trip to Moscow

Embassy Moscow has reported (Tab I) that Gore was extremely effective in presenting American views on arms control issues during his recent trip to Moscow, and recommends that he be received by you -- and if possible the President to report on his trip.

Given the fact that Gore seems to have performed very responsibly in Moscow, and that he may be in a position to influence Senate consideration of defense-related issues when the Congress reconvenes, I believe it might be useful for you to invite him over next week to brief you on his trip. Although the President's calendar is doubtless very crowded, you might also wish to consider the possibility of arranging a five or ten-minute call. *ok*

*Ron*  
Ron Lehman concurs.

Recommendation:

That you invite Senator-elect Gore to brief you on his trip to the Soviet Union and consider seeking a brief meeting for him with the President.

*check w/ Ogelsby*

Approve

Disapprove

Attachment:

Tab I - Moscow 15730 of December 12, 1984

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
Sec.3.4(b), E.O. 12958, as amended  
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2006  
BY NARA *CS*, DATE *2/17/10*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

49

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
SECRETARIAT

PAGE 01 OF 02  
EOB313

[REDACTED]

DTG: 120950Z DEC 84 PSN: 038122  
TOR: 347/1347Z CSN: HCE573

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LFHR-01 MAT-01 THOM-01 /009 A4

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EOB:

STU0727  
DE RUEHMO #5739/01 3470953  
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FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5214

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 15739

EXDIS

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PARM, OREP

REF: STATE 356411

*Don't*  
*What's that?*

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATION. CONGRESSMAN (AND SENATOR-ELECT) GORE HAS BEEN EXTREMELY EFFECTIVE IN PRESENTING AMERICAN VIEWS ON ARMS CONTROL TO SOVIET SPECIALISTS. HE WAS GIVEN AN ORTHODOX BUT AUTHORITY OUTLINE OF SOVIET POSITIONS, WITH STRESS ON SPACE-RELATED ISSUES. WE RECOMMEND THAT A SENIOR US OFFICIAL MEET WITH HIM ON HIS RETURN. END SUMMARY.

3. CONGRESSMAN ALBERT GORE, JR., VISITED MOSCOW FROM DECEMBER 5 - 11 FOR DISCUSSIONS ON ARMS CONTROL. HE WAS ACCOMPANIED BY HIS WIFE AND STAFF MEMBER LEON FUERTH.

4. GORE HELD FOUR SUBSTANTIVE MEETINGS:

- OLEG BYKOV, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, INSTITUTE OF THE WORLD ECONOMY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, DECEMBER 6.

- AVGUST EDUARDOVICH VOSS, CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF NATIONALITIES, SUPREME SOVIET, AND SERGEI ANDREYEVICH LOSEV, SUPREME SOVIET DEPUTY, DECEMBER 7.

- ANDREY KOKOSHIN, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, AND ALEKSEI VASILYEV, DIRECTOR OF POLITICAL-MILITARY DEPARTMENT, INSTITUTE OF THE USA AND CANADA, DECEMBER 7.

- GEORGIY MARKOVICH KORNIYENKO, FIRST DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER; AMBASSADOR VIKTOR PAVLOVICH KARPOV, START NEGOTIATOR; ALEKSANDR ALEKSANDROVICH BESSMERTNYKH, CHIEF OF MFA USA DEPARTMENT;

BY CN NARA DATE 11/27/82  
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AND COLONEL-GENERAL NIKOLAY FEDOROVICH CHERVOV,  
GENERAL STAFF, DECEMBER 10.

5. AMBASSADOR HARTMAN HOSTED A LUNCHEON FOR THE  
GORE DELEGATION DECEMBER 11. THAT EVENING, THEY  
VISITED WITH A GROUP OF MOSCOW'S LEADING  
REFUSENIKS, INCLUDING ALEKSANDR LERNER AND  
YURIY KOSHAROVSKIY.

6. IN HIS MEETINGS WITH SOVIET OFFICIALS AND  
ACADEMICS, CONGRESSMAN GORE REPEATEDLY EMPHASIZED:

- THE PARAMOUNT IMPORTANCE OF STABILITY.
- THE NEED TO REMOVE FEARS OF A FIRST NUCLEAR STRIKE ON BOTH SIDES.
- THE SERIOUS APPROACH OF THE PRESIDENT AND ADMINISTRATION TO THE UPCOMING GENEVA TALKS.
- US INTEREST IN TRADE OFFS BETWEEN US ADVANTAGES IN STRATEGIC BOMBERS AND SOVIET ADVANTAGES IN ACCURATE MISSILE WARHEADS.
- US INTEREST IN AVOIDING A COMPETITION IN SEA-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES.
- US CONCERN OVER ACCURATE SOVIET MISSILES, THE SS-20, THE SOVIET ASAT, SOVIET MILITARY EXERCISES, AND SOVIET COMPLIANCE WITH ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS.

7. HIS SOVIET INTERLOCUTORS EMPHASIZED:

- CONCERN OVER THE COMBINATION OF THE US STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE WITH THE US BUILDUP IN OFFENSIVE WEAPONS HAVING COUNTERFORCE CAPABILITIES.

- THAT AGREEMENTS ON OFFENSIVE WEAPONS WILL BE HARDER TO ACHIEVE IF THE UNITED STATES IS DETERMINED TO PUSH AHEAD WITH THE SDI.

- THAT THE SOVIET MILITARY RESPONSE TO SDI COULD INVOLVE AN OFFENSIVE BUILDUP.

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TAGS: PARM, OREP  
SUBJECT: CODEL GORE WRAP-UP

8. WITH REGARD TO THE SHULTZ-GROMYKO TALKS,  
CONG. GORE WAS TOLD THAT:

- THE SOVIET UNION WILL NOT BE FOUND WANTING  
IF THE UNITED STATES IS SERIOUS.

- MEANS OF LOWERING FEARS OF A FIRST STRIKE  
ARE A MATTER FOR NEGOTIATION.

- THE TALKS SHOULD DETERMINE THE "SUBJECT  
AND OBJECTIVES" OF NEGOTIATIONS ON SPACE  
WEAPONS AND STRATEGIC AND INTERMEDIATE-RANGE  
WEAPONS.

- THE ISSUES ARE INTER-RELATED.

- AN AGREEMENT WOULD BE THE FIRST STEP TOWARD  
ENDING THE ARMS RACE AND ELIMINATING NUCLEAR  
WEAPONS ENTIRELY.

9. CONG. GORE INTENDS TO BRIEF SENIOR OFFICIALS  
IN WASHINGTON IN DETAIL ON HIS DISCUSSIONS.  
MEMORANDA OF CONVERSATIONS WILL BE POUCHED TO  
THE DEPARTMENT (EUR/SOV).

10. THE CODEL HAS NOT REVIEWED THIS TELGRAM.

11. COMMENT: SENATOR GORE WAS EXTREMELY  
EFFECTIVE IN CONVEYING THE AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE  
ON ARMS CONTROL TO HIS SOVIET INTERLOCUTORS.  
HE REPEATEDLY SHOWED THAT HE KNOWS THE ISSUES AND  
DID NOT SHRINK FROM SETTING THE RECORD STRAIGHT  
IN THE FACE OF SOVIET DISTORTIONS. HIS CRITICISMS  
OF SOVIET PRACTICES AND SUPPORT FOR THE  
ADMINISTRATION'S ARMS CONTROL POLICY HAD PARTICULAR  
FORCE, COMING FROM ONE WHO DOES NOT ALWAYS AGREE  
WITH THE ADMINISTRATION. I BELIEVE THE PRESIDENT  
AND/OR THE SECRETARY WOULD FIND IT USEFUL TO HEAR

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HIS IMPRESSIONS DIRECTLY, AND BELIEVE IT WOULD BE  
APPROPRIATE FOR THEM OR A SUITABLY SENIOR  
ADMINISTRATION REPRESENTATIVE TO EXPRESS APPRECIATION  
FOR AN EXTREMELY EFFECTIVE PERFORMANCE HERE.  
HARTMAN  
BT

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