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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 11/27/1984

File Folder MATLOCK CHRON NOVEMBER (3/3)

FOIA

F06-114/1

Box Number 6

YARHI-MILO

610

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
6293	MEMO	MEMO FOR JOHN POINDEXTER RE MEETING WITH EDWARD FREDKIN THURSDAY NOVEMBER 29 [13-14] <i>R 6/23/2010 M125/2</i>	2	11/27/1984	B1
6294	MEMO	MEMO FOR ROBERT MCFARLANE RE PROPOSED PRESIDENTIAL TRIP TO EASTERN EUROPE [23-24] <i>R 3/3/2011 F2006-114/1</i>	2	11/28/1984	B1
6295	MEMO	MEMO FOR PRESIDENT REAGAN RE QUESTIONS FROM MARVIN KALB (SAME AS 6288 W/O ANNOTATIONS)[26] <i>R 3/3/2011 F2006-114/1</i>	1	ND	B1
6296	MEMO	MEMO FOR ROBERT MCFARLANE RE QUESTIONS FOR PRESIDENT REAGAN FROM MARVIN KALB (SAME TEXT AS 6288 W/O ANNOTATIONS)[29] <i>R 3/3/2011 F2006-114/1</i>	1	11/26/1984	B1
6297	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #6296 [30] <i>R 3/3/2011 F2006-114/1</i>	1	11/26/1984	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

7341

Chron

~~Matlock~~

November 27, 1984

Dear Margaret:

Thank you for your letter of September 28 suggesting that we discuss, during Foreign Minister Gromyko's visit, cooperation with the Soviet Union in assisting handicapped citizens. Your proposal was passed to the Soviet delegation in the meetings we held.

It seems to me that your proposal would be eminently suitable for inclusion in the activities covered by the U.S.-USSR agreement for cooperation in health. As you know, we hope that it will be possible to reactivate this agreement in the near future. When you begin discussions with the Soviet Ministry of Health regarding this agreement, I hope that you could include a proposal regarding assistance to the handicapped as part of the joint work plan.

Sincerely,



Robert C. McFarlane

The Honorable Margaret M. Heckler
Secretary of Health and Human Services
Washington, D.C. 20201



THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
WASHINGTON D C 20201

September 28, 1984

Dear Bud,

Enclosed is the proposed paragraph for the introduction of the handicapped issue in the Gromyko meetings.

There are 36 million disabled citizens in the United States, and I am sure many more in the Soviet Union. As these meetings serve the goal of general survival, they can also serve the goal of improving the personal quality of life and individual survival.

Obviously we can provide extensive elaboration on the issue of the handicapped, but I thought a more general statement introducing the issue and setting up a process of communication between the two nations would be a wiser beginning.

I hope that this issue can be raised. It would be fortuitous for both countries. I will be waiting to hear from you on what discussion actually occurred on the subject.

Sincerely,

MARGARET M. HECKLER



THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20201

September 28, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House

FROM : Margaret M. Heckler
Secretary of Health and Human Services

SUBJECT : Technology and the Disabled

Background

A significant segment of the U.S. population -- estimated at 35 million -- have physical, developmental, mental and/or emotional disabilities. Recognizing the situation, the President proclaimed 1983-1992 as the decade of the disabled with the clear intention of enhancing the quality of their lives and expanding their job opportunities.

Included in the 35 million are approximately 4 million seriously disabled whose quality of life and opportunities have historically been severely constrained. The thrust of the Presidential Proclamation is clearly aimed at all of the disabled population including the most severely disabled.

Clearly, one of the major opportunities in this field rests in the area of technology. In brief, advancing technology can address this area in two principal ways. On the one hand, it can be utilized to greatly expand communications thus significantly extending the knowledge of and (thus) exploitation of the range of services, medical approaches, local organizations and job opportunities that presently exist.

Secondly, technology can in and of itself respond to specific and particular problems of the disabled by providing "technological solutions" to the disability problems. Light-weight "portable" wheelchairs were developed from technology coming out of the NASA Program. Ocular Control Systems are presently the subject of much discussion. A variety of other possibilities exist.

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To pursue the opportunities inherent in technology vis-a-vis the problems of the disabled, I have chaired several meetings under the aegis of the President's Private Sector Initiatives with people from the aerospace/technology community including the Tandy Corporation, Boeing, TRW and General Dynamics. We have also discussed this at some length with Sir Keith Josephs (Department of Science and Education) and The Honorable Tony Newton, (Health and Social Services) on my recent trip to the U.K. There are possibilities for substantial international cooperation.

With the meeting that is presently scheduled with the leaders of the Soviet Union, it strikes me as an excellent opportunity for the United States and the Soviet Union to cooperate in the exchange of technology that would be beneficial to handicapped people throughout the world. The benefits of such an exchange of medical technology in assisting the handicapped would lend itself well to significant cooperative efforts that would be especially effective to both countries and perhaps would pave the way for further cooperation in other areas as we move toward a responsible Arms Control Agreement at some point in the future.

7341



THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20201

34 SEP 25 P 1: 17

September 28, 1984

Dear Bud,

Enclosed is the proposed paragraph for the introduction of the handicapped issue in the Gromyko meetings.

There are 36 million disabled citizens in the United States, and I am sure many more in the Soviet Union. As these meetings serve the goal of general survival, they can also serve the goal of improving the personal quality of life and individual survival.

Obviously we can provide extensive elaboration on the issue of the handicapped, but I thought a more general statement introducing the issue and setting up a process of communication between the two nations would be a wiser beginning.

I hope that this issue can be raised. It would be fortuitous for both countries. I will be waiting to hear from you on what discussion actually occurred on the subject.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Margaret".

MARGARET M. HECKLER

In order to foster cooperation between our respective nations (USSR/USA) which will apply our joint resources toward achieving humanitarian goals - it is proposed that the USSR and the USA initiate discussion between the appropriate ministry(s)/secretary(s) to develop and through joint effort to assist the handicapped citizenry of our respective nations.

National Security Council
The White House

1423 7

System # 1

Package # 7341
copy

3. PER LL

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Paul Thompson	<u>1</u>	<u>✓</u>	
Bob Kimmitt	<u>2</u>	<u>K</u>	
John Poindexter	<u>3</u>		
Tom Shull	<u>4</u>		
Wilma Hall	<u>5</u>		<u>20 Nov 11/3</u>
Bud McFarlane	<u>6</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>A</u>
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room			

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other

COMMENTS Should be seen by:

*I did last but to send
pick up of
most many
if he did
M*

Amb Matlock 11/5/84

Please answer
Rom's question and
then return package
for dispatch.

Thank you,
Rosie

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

November 8, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM:

JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SIGNED

SUBJECT:

Secretary Heckler's Proposed Paragraph on
Handicapped Technology for Gromyko Meeting

Secretary Heckler, in a letter dated September 28 (Tab II), suggested to you some wording on assisting the handicapped to be included in the meetings we held with Foreign Minister Gromyko. Following receipt of your note on my previous memorandum, I checked with Rick Burt and learned that he did, indeed, pass the proposal to the Soviet delegation. Therefore, I have revised your letter to Secretary Heckler accordingly.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the attached letter to Secretary Heckler.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments:

- Tab I Reply to Heckler
- Tab II Incoming letter from Heckler
- Tab III Background papers

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

November 27, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Letter from Patricia B. Snyder

Patricia Snyder has written you a letter (Tab II) informing you of her plans to propose staging an American play in the Moscow Musical Theater for Children.

Attached is a letter of acknowledgment (Tab I), should you wish to send one.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab I.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachment:

Tab I Proposed letter of acknowledgment to Patricia Snyder

Tab II Incoming letter from Patricia Snyder

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Dear Patricia:

I appreciated your letter of November 23 in which you described your plans for taking Raggedy Ann to Moscow.


This seems a very worthy project and I hope you are able to bring it to fruition.

Thanks for keeping me informed.

Sincerely,

Robert C. McFarlane

Ms. Patricia B. Snyder
Producing Director
ESIPA
Empire State Plaza
Albany, New York 12223



120
11

ESIPA

November 23, 1984

NOV 26 1984

Mattlock

RCM HAS SEEN

71-26-84

Mr. Robert C. McFarlane
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20500

Dear Mr. McFarlane:

As you will recall, we met last spring in Washington at Queen Noor's table during the Arab Women's Cultural and Educational Benefit. Thank you so much for the kind letter you sent regarding our program.

The purpose of this letter is to bring you up to date on a new ESIPA project which you might be interested to learn about. In September I was invited to meet with Deputy Minister of Culture, George Ivanov, in Moscow. We discussed an exchange between our theatre, The Empire State Institute for the Performing Arts-State University of New York, and a theatre from Moscow and or Leningrad. Tentatively they will perform in our theatre in 1985-86 and we will tour to Moscow and Leningrad in 1986-87. It is also possible that the tour plans might reverse and we would tour in 1985-86 and they in 1986-87. I have kept Mr. John Zimmerman, the United States Cultural Officer for the Soviet Union, up to date and he has been most helpful with communications between our Institute and the Ministry of Culture in Moscow through the diplomatic pouch.

To give you a little background, in 1974 I directed a production of The Wizard of Oz which toured to Moscow under the sponsorship of The State University of New York and the Soviet Ministry of Culture, with underwriting from the Chase Manhattan Bank and Finnair. At that time Walter Stoessel was our ambassador to the Soviet Union. Our performances were received most enthusiastically and prior to our departure from Moscow we were invited for a return engagement. During the interim, between 1974 and 1976, our theatre program moved from the State University of New York Albany campus and was instituted as a State mandated professional theatre as part of the State University of New York university-wide programs. Two years ago I was approached


by Natalia Sats, the Director of the Moscow Musical Theatre for Children, regarding the possibility of an exchange between her company and our company and was invited to Moscow to discuss the possibility last spring. Unfortunately our schedule at ESIPA was so hectic it was impossible for me to get away until September of this year.

The work that we would take to Moscow would be a new production of Raggedy Ann. The book has been written by William Gibson and the lyrics and score by Joe Raposo. Mr. Raposo has informed me that he has spoken to Mrs. Reagan about this exchange. As you may know, Mr. Raposo has written the music for Mrs. Reagan's Foster Grandparents Program.

We will continue to work through Mr. Zimmerman, but since I had the pleasure of meeting you last spring and since discussions between the Soviet Union and the United States are commencing, I thought I would communicate this information directly to you.

The State University of New York Chancellor, Clifton R. Wharton, Jr., to whom I report, is most supportive about this project and we would all like to see it realized. If you have any suggestions, I would be most pleased to receive them.

Sincerely,



Patricia B. Snyder
Producing Director

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

November 27, 1984

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL POINDEXTER

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Edward Fredkin
Thursday, November 29; 2:00 P.M.

As background for your meeting with Fredkin, you may wish to review two recent letters I have received from him. The first, at TAB I, reviews his thoughts on the desirability of encouraging Soviet interest in greatly expanded use of PC's. This is presumably what he would like to talk to you about in the main.

As you know, he has also made some efforts with the Soviets in regard to Sakharov -- in response to a call I made to him on Bud's instructions after the Sakharov family contacted the Vice President with a request to do so. His current thoughts on that problem are in the letter at TAB II. As you will see, he is primarily concerned with bolstering his credibility with the Soviets in dealing with the issue. To do this, he suggests that ability to deliver a visa for Bogdanov -- one of his principal interlocutors on the subject -- could be helpful.

In case he should raise the latter question during the meeting, you should be aware of the following. Bogdanov, one of Arbatov's deputies, is certainly a KGB officer, though his duties seem more akin to those of the DDI side of the house than those of DDO. He has been refused a visa a couple of times recently because of FBI objections, but my impression is that he is not considered a "hard core" refusal, since there is no evidence that he runs or plans covert operations. He has, in fact, been a moderately useful channel in the past for working out visa problems of American scholars and the like, and is willing to speculate privately to Americans he knows on internal Soviet developments, sometimes providing useful insights. (He was, for example, helpful to Ty Cobb in 1981 in putting him in contact with Central Committee officials.) For these reasons, we may find it in our interest to issue a visa to him sometime in the coming months, but I believe that this would depend on the specific circumstances of his planned travel. I would recommend against making any commitment on this score to Fredkin, but it might not be out of place to indicate that we could be flexible concerning Bogdanov's visa under appropriate circumstances.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M08-125/2 # 6293

BY KML NARA DATE 6/25/10

14

Regarding Fredkin's efforts on behalf of Sakharov, I believe we should thank him for his efforts and say that, if any Soviet proposals should be forthcoming, we will look at them with an open and sympathetic mind. In the meantime, however, it would be well to keep that ball in the Soviet court, and avoid specific advance commitments.

Attachments:

Tab I - Letter from Fredkin of November 15, 1984, regarding PC's in the Soviet Union

Tab II - Letter from Fredkin of November 15, 1984, regarding his efforts on behalf of Sakharov

11/19/84 15

FREDKIN ENTERPRISES

15 November, 1984

The Honorable Jack F. Matlock
National Security Council
Old Executive Office Building
Washington, DC, 20506

Dear Jack,

I have been proceeding on the project to introduce Personal Computers into the Soviet Union and other Socialist Countries. I have witnessed at first hand the dilemma faced by the authorities in the USSR, as they try to come to grips with the personal computer and the consequences of its widespread introduction into the USSR. Many leading persons are in favor of a large program to move the USSR into this modern age, but many others are very apprehensive. Some of those who lead the effort to introduce personal computers are well aware that they are marching down a path that must inevitably lead to social and economic changes that are in conflict with the present structure of the country.

Within the USSR I have come into contact with a whole spectrum of attitudes. Some take a very hard-line attitude about protecting the whole panoply of tight central control that the USSR exercises over information. This control extends to access, copying, printing, originating and distributing information. Others want to change, to move in directions similar to what Hungary has done, where I saw Western papers, magazines and books freely available, despite the fact that they are forbidden in the USSR. Those pushing for the introduction of personal computers are clearly working for the liberalization of the USSR from within. We have proven over and over again that we cannot liberalize the USSR by threats and external pressures. It seems that we have an amazing opportunity to aid those who want to liberalize that society from within, by simply allowing them to have their way: they want to flood the USSR with what is the greatest engine for the American way of life, the personal computer. In some way, it's as though the USSR had asked us to send over 1,000,000 American school teachers, along with all the American textbooks and teaching materials, to teach Soviet students in Soviet schools! Would we embargo these teachers on the grounds that such education would aid their war making abilities?

I had one meeting involving the head of the ministry primarily responsible for the construction of computers in the USSR. He was not very happy with being called to a meeting on a Saturday, and even more unhappy at the subject matter of the meeting. He assured everyone present that if the country wanted personal computers, his ministry would manufacture all the personal

computers needed; there would be no need for any foreign assistance. Some personal computers are currently in production, and others will soon be. Evidently the cooperation of a major state body with authority over the manufacture of computers is a necessary step if a factory is to be purchased from the west.

Mean while, a great deal of activity is going on. High level Soviet delegations have started making visits to the major European computer manufacturers. They have made inquiries about both the purchase of personal computers, and about the purchase of a factory. These companies are starting the preparation of proposals to the USSR.

There is an absolute and definite bias towards working with the European companies. The reasons are as follows:

1. They have had good experiences with European companies, versus bad experiences with US companies, due to export restrictions being imposed mid-project.
2. The US action and the European reaction vis-a-vis the pipeline project.
3. The obvious fact that the US is leading and even imposing the embargo efforts.
4. Great feelings of bitterness towards and mistrust of President Reagan, which seems widespread and everpresent among leading Soviet persons.

It has repeatedly been made very clear to me, that they would not be willing to deal with any US company for part of a personal computer factory on the basis that the US company had simply obtained an export license. This is because of experiences where the US has sometimes withdrawn such a license midway through a project. They have indicated that in order to be able to rely on the US as a major supplier on such a project, the US would have to agree to allow the contracts, once approved by the US government, to proceed to completion independant of future changes in US export control policy.

I have found that a major effect of the embargo on current Soviet users of IBM PC-XTs is not so much to prevent their acquisition of hardware and software (they can simply have people buy things in European computer stores and take them home with them) as to embitter them against the US because they must obtain their machines by illegitimate means, as though they were criminals.

Currently, the USSR, especially the Academy of Sciences, is most anxious to purchase personal computer systems on a legitimate basis. We have discussed the nature of the kinds of configurations they would like to buy. They are particularly interested in word processing, spreadsheets and integrated systems such as Framework or Symphony. They want to buy assortments of printers and monitors so that they can see which


can best be adapted to the Cyrillic alphabet. They want to enter into cooperative arrangements with US software publishers, both to facilitate the translation of systems into Russian, and to explore the possibility of distributing Soviet software in the US.

The US should want to support those who wish to see Soviet society move in the direction of following the American lead in using personal computers; allowing for decentralized decision making, local printing, networking for rapid communication of memos and papers. American personal computers are designed to implement and enhance a free society's uses of information. If the USSR doesn't move in the direction of personal computers, they will proceed with their current plans to provide computational facilities through tightly controlled central computers. In these time shared facilities, each user works at a terminal connected to a computer that records centrally everything he does. Central policy determines who has access to what, what may be printed on the centrally located and controlled printers and allows everything to be closely monitored.

Most importantly, it would be such a good thing if the US could be seen as taking the lead in this area, rather than being dragged along by our European allies. If, in particular, President Reagan could be seen as implementing such policies as a gesture of goodwill, it could have a very beneficial effect on the Soviet image of the President, and it could be a small step towards opening doors to discussions in other areas of mutual interest.

If the US acts to allow the export of personal computer systems similar to the IBM-PC-XT, it must be done in a logical way. It is not just the personal computers themselves that constitute a personal computer system. Such systems must include software, hardware and peripherals all designed to work with the personal computer. An effective policy would involve the granting of routine and prompt approval to a class of personal computers, similar to the IBM-PC-XT and to the software, hardware and peripherals that are available in stores all over the world. Examples include printers, plotters, telephone communication modems, memory boards, monitors, keyboards, spreadsheet programs, word processing software, educational software, etc. If the accessories and software face an export bottleneck, then the opportunity will be as effectively thwarted as if the IBM-PC-XT itself faced a bottleneck. The two should go hand in hand; both or neither.

Sincerley yours,


Edward Fredkin
Chairman

NEW CHIPS

FEATURES:

Data General/One Preview
 Ciarcia's Voice Recognition
 Go Board for the Mac
 AGAT: A Russian Apple
 A Travesty Generator

REVIEWS:

HP 150
 Columbia Portable
 PC FORTHS

KERNEL:

Pournelle, Raike
 Pountain, Ciarcia
 BYTE West Coast
 Mathematical Recreations



18

EXPORTING TO THE U.S.S.R.

and the

United States
 Department of Commerce
 Control Program

*JACK -
 Along with allowing the
 IBM-PC-XT, it will be
 necessary to have some
 general rule that also
 allows the accessories that
 are ordinarily used for
 common PC systems.
 CL 1565A, 1564A and other
 rules effectively eliminate most
 PC accessories.*

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
 International Trade Administration
 Office of Export Administration
 Washington, D.C. 20230

FREDKIN ENTERPRISES

19
15 November, 1984

The Honorable Jack F. Matlock
National Security Council
Old Executive Office Building
Washington, DC, 20506

Dear Jack,

During my last visit, I wrote and gave to Velikhov and Bogdanov, a memo that suggested an approach where I had one Soviet person, someone like a Soviet Jack Matlock, who was willing to interface with me on issues such as the Sakharov case. The advice I was given was that I should be patient; that things were happening. One very good thing was that Bogdanov assured me that senior officials who had seen my paper or who had spoken to me were all convinced that I was honestly trying to find a fair way to make progress. This was very encouraging to me, as just a couple of days before, a researcher in the Academy of Sciences told me that he thought that people were very upset with me. The reason he gave was that someone had been around to ask him many questions about me. He assumed that as a result, no further progress would be made in other areas, such as those related to commerce or science. He also was sure that I would be hassled at customs when I left the USSR. He was quite wrong on all points.

I don't know exactly what to do next in the USSR. I have been advised not to press too hard, that I have put some possibilities into motion and that with time and luck, good things can happen. The luck seems to be related to a difficult issue. They imply that a solution cannot be forthcoming while it is being stridently demanded by the West. They say they will not yield to pressure. They imply that if the pressure is off, then progress may occur.

It is my belief that the enormous pressure exerted by the West has certainly constrained and affected Soviet freedom of action on the Sakharov issue. Who knows what might have happened to the Sakharovs if the West had been silent? They have noticed that the State Department has let up to a great extent, and I believe that they appreciate that fact. Of course, some cynics may believe that the Sakharovs are finally being forgotten by the West.

I believe that the USSR must understand that the restraint of the State Department is a deliberate policy, subject to reversal; that it is aimed at giving this situation an opportunity to find a partial resolution. They must not either wait too long, or take this as an opportunity to invoke some new repressive measures. The big problem is that much of what might happen is

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clearly outside of the control of either the governments of the US or the USSR. Its a good time to tiptoe. If the Sakharovs manage to do something new that infuriates the Soviet leadership, then there will not be any progress.

I have basically worked at communicating what I consider to be the facts. I have found certain people in the USSR who are willing to listen and to come around to a recognition of those facts. I was greatly hampered in the begining by not really understanding their perspective. Now that I do, I no longer fall into the trap of saying what they expect from an American and of having to listen to their stock answers.

I must admit that I could accomplish much more if they were convinced that I represented something more than just another person trying to do good. If I can prove effective, then my ability to be more convincing would be enhanced. A good example is Bogdanov. He has taken the time to understand my position better than anyone else. He has implied that he is in touch with those who can frame policy decisions. On the other hand, I have no credentials; no portfolio, nor do I desire any. What I would like, is for them to realize that I have a way to communicate reasonable suggestions to those in power in the US, and that, on occasion some of my suggestions result in action. In Bogdanov's case, if we could figure out a way to get him a visa for a trip to the US, I would gain a great deal of credibility in his eyes. That credibility could be put to good use, and would likely more than compensate for whatever negative aspects are involved in such a visit.

I think that you are the ideal person in the USA, for me to communicate with. What I need now is the possibility of gaining more credibility in the USSR. If it becomes possible for me to get connected to someone such as Zagladin or Menshikov, then I would be able to cement that relationship by proving myself understanding and effective. The best way to accomplish this would be for you and I to discuss the possible concepts that I might bring up in some future discussions with a counterpart to you in the USSR, so that I have an idea in advance of the probability that a "suggestion" I might make to you, would be well received in the USA.

What you have seen from me, so far, is all a result of that first phone call to me. The Sakharov problem is truly a knotty one; worth working on, but very difficult. I believe that my talents and contacts can also prove useful and even more productive in other areas, and I would like to offer to you my services to work in the interests of better international relations and in directions that help lead away from conflicts that threaten world peace.

In spite of my proposal to hold that unusual press conference with regard to Sakharov, I believe that my ability to accomplish things is related to both my lack of notoriety and my lack of official connection to one side or the other. I want to protect

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those positions, yet work towards becoming more effective in accomplishing my goals.

I would like to thank you very much for all your help, but especially for listening to me. For that, I am very much in your debt. I implore you to call on me to do any work towards making this a better and safer world.

Sincerely yours,



Edward Fredkin

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

→ ~~Matlock~~
Chron
22

ACTION

November 27, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: KARNAS SM SMALL / JACK ^{TC} MATLOCK / TY COBB

SUBJECT: Request from TASS for Backgrounder/Interview

As we discussed some time ago, the Associated Press has an exchange program with TASS; as part of that, they are bringing over Sergei Losev, the Director-General of TASS to New York from December 4-10. Losev made only one request for his stay in the US and that was to meet with you. Jack Koehler, an Executive with AP (and strong Reagan supporter) contacted me to try to set this up.

Coincidentally, the local TASS reporter, Alexander Shalnev, who engaged in a bit of verbal sparring with Ty Cobb during a briefing last month, put in a request to interview you, or Jack Matlock. During the exchange with Shalnev, Ty made the point that the Russian people rarely have an opportunity to read the views and opinions of members of our Administration, while the US public often reads the full comments of Chernenko and others (as printed in the Washington Post, or aired on NBC).

When we first discussed the TASS request, you asked me to get Jack Matlock's opinion. Jack has suggested two options:

OPTION I: That you grant an on-the-record interview with questions provided in advance, with the understanding that either Pravda or Izvestia will print the entire interview, as the Washington Post printed Chernenko's.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

OPTION II: That you meet with Losev off the record to explain U.S. policy and discuss the possibility of information exchange.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

RECOMMENDATION

That you select either Option I, or Option II.
(NOTE: Wilma has tentatively set aside some time at 1:30 on December 4 when you might be able to meet with Losev.)

Chron
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November 28, 1984

~~SECRET~~ → TO JACK

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

THROUGH: WILLIAM F. MARTIN *WFM*

FROM: PAULA DOBRIANSKY *PD*

SUBJECT: Proposed Presidential Trip to Eastern Europe

Per your suggestion, I have examined the idea of a Presidential trip to Eastern Europe in early 1985. Such a trip could provide the following major benefits:

- Bolster the President's image as a leader committed to peace and dialogue.
- Highlight the continuity of our differentiation policy toward Eastern Europe, building upon the significant progress made in the last four years.
- Prompt the resolution of outstanding bilateral problems (i.e., human rights, economic matters) and provide a foundation for durable improvement in East-West relations.

This trip would also be of major domestic significance. Although signs of progress in U.S.-Soviet relations have recently emerged, it is unlikely that we can make rapid progress. Arms control negotiations and other bilateral U.S.-Soviet discussions will probably be a long and arduous process. Visible success in East-West dialogue manifested in a visit to Eastern Europe would serve to relieve pressure from the President while U.S.-Soviet negotiations are ensuing. In fact, it could bolster our negotiating leverage.

The most ideal time for the trip would be in April 1985, as it would serve as an excellent prelude to discussions on East-West trade at the Bonn summit (May 2 - 4). Also, in light of our present relations with Eastern Europe, it would be appropriate for the President to travel to Yugoslavia, Hungary and Romania. The current state of U.S. relations with the German Democratic Republic, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia do not justify their inclusion in the President's itinerary. Although the President's personal popularity in Poland is extraordinarily high, the current unsettled state of Polish developments and lack of substantial progress toward national reconciliation preclude the President from visiting Poland at this time.

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BY RW NARA DATE 3/3/11

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Attached at Tab I is the background paper I have prepared which depicts the visit's setting, sets forth the overall themes and objectives, and proposes a broad public diplomacy strategy. At Tab II, is a brief suggested itinerary.

Don Fortier concurs with the above but suggests the trip be limited to Hungary and Yugoslavia. He recommends that Turkey be added to the trip's itinerary.

Jack Matlock concurs in general with the proposal, but feels that there are also downsides involved in a Presidential visit to Eastern Europe in 1985. Romania presents the thorniest problem, since a visit there will be seen by many as an endorsement of a regime which has close to the worst human rights record in Eastern Europe. While a visit would reward Romania for its welcome decision on the Olympics and its independent foreign policy stance, one wonders whether other, less controversial, gestures are not available. (It does seem incongruous to deny an export license for an antiquated disk-drive facility, yet produce a Presidential visit which, internally and in Eastern Europe as a whole, tends to signal a seal of approval on Ceausescu's Stalinist rule.)

Hungary and Yugoslavia present fewer problems, but it would be unwise to arrange a visit to Hungary without one to another Warsaw Pact country, and there is no realistic candidate except Romania. It should also be recognized that a Presidential visit to Hungary will require an invitation for Kadar to visit here -- a move which will be very controversial domestically.

Yugoslavia is also going through a period of backsliding on human rights and is beset by other political and economic problems. A Presidential visit would likely produce heightened Yugoslav expectations for increased U.S. assistance solving Yugoslavia's current financial difficulties. Nevertheless, these factors are probably manageable, and a Presidential visit could be used as leverage to ameliorate the current Yugoslav crackdown on dissidents.

In sum, Jack would recommend considering as an alternative to a trip to Eastern Europe, one to Spain and Portugal -- with perhaps Yugoslavia also, but without Romania and Hungary. There has not been a Presidential visit to Spain since Eisenhower's meeting with Franco and, according to Tom Enders, the Spaniards are asking why a democratic Spain does not deserve at best equal attention. A visit to Spain could also be used to win acceptance of NATO membership and the one to Lisbon to reward one of our most faithful allies, who often feels unappreciated.

RECOMMENDATION

That you review my background paper, and that we meet to discuss the proposed Presidential trip to Eastern Europe.

Approve



Disapprove

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25

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

November 30, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JF*

SUBJECT: Questions for the President from Marvin Kalb

As directed, attached at TAB I is a memorandum from you and Larry Speakes to the President recommending that he not respond to Mr. Kalb's questions (TAB A).

Small, Kraemer, Menges and *S* Sims concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the memorandum at TAB I to the President.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments:

TAB I Memorandum to the President

TAB A Mr. Kalb's Letter to the President, November 21

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By *CAS* NARA, Date *6/10/02*

MEMORANDUM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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8562

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. McFARLANE AND LARRY SPEAKES ^{LS}

SUBJECT: Questions for the President from Marvin Kalb

Issue

Whether to answer five written questions submitted by NBC correspondent Marvin Kalb (TAB A).

Facts

Kalb hopes that you will answer his questions -- as Chernenko did a set of questions he submitted a few weeks ago.

Discussion

- Some of Kalb's questions are tricky and would be difficult to answer at this delicate stage of our negotiations with the Soviets.
- We feel it is important to shift attention more to private diplomacy in an effort to get the Shultz-Gromyko meeting off to a good start. Trading public statements with the Soviets is likely to undermine the private diplomacy we seek.

RECOMMENDATION

OK No

— — That you not respond to Kalb's questions.

Attachment:

TAB A Kalb's questions.

Prepared by:
Jack F. Matlock

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR FD06-114/1 #6295
BY RW NARA DATE 2/2/11

NBC News

NBC Television Stations Division
National Broadcasting Company, Inc.

4001 Nebraska Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20016 202-885-4598

Meet the Press

November 21, 1984

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

In light of the apparent thaw in Soviet-American relations, following your re-election, NBC News and I would be grateful for your responses to these questions.

1. What, in your view, should now be the first order of business in Soviet-American relations?

2. Under what conditions would you be prepared to meet with President Chernenko - and when?


3. Chernenko may admire "detente," as it was practiced in the 1970's; but, if you don't -- and that seems clear -- what new guiding concept, or framework, in your view, should now govern the evolution of Soviet-American relations?

4. Do you believe that a fully-verifiable arms control agreement is still a realistic goal for U.S. policy? Or, do you share the view of Kenneth Adelman, the Director of ACDA, that, given the difficulties of verification and mutual trust, a more realistic goal for the U.S. might be, in his words, "arms control without agreements."

5. As you explore a variety of options regarding U.S. policy in Central America, do you see, among them, the possibility of rapprochement with Cuba -- and, under what conditions?

Hoping to hear from you, I remain,

Very truly yours,



Marvin Kalb
Chief Diplomatic Correspondent

National Security Council
The White House

24

System #

Package # 8562

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SEQUENCE TO HAS SEEN DISPOSITION

Paul Thompson	_____	_____	_____
Bob Kimmitt	<u>1</u>	<u>K</u>	_____
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Tom Shull	_____	_____	_____
Wilma Hall	_____	_____	_____
Bud McFarlane	_____	_____	_____
Bob Kimmitt	_____	_____	_____
NSC Secretariat	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
<u>Mallock</u>	<u>2</u>	_____	<u>A</u>

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

Please have Sims get Speaker's initials first.

6296

29

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

November 26, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Questions for President from Marvin Kalb

Marvin Kalb has submitted five written questions to the President -- obviously in the hope that the President would answer as Chernenko did an earlier set of questions he submitted.

I recommend that these questions not be answered. First, some are very tricky and precise, responsive answers will be difficult to formulate at this stage of negotiation with the Soviets. Second, I believe it important to shift over attention more to the private diplomacy track, and continuing to trade public statements undermines this effort. *agree*

Small Karna *Small* Small, Bob *SK* Sims, Sven *SK* Kraemer and Constantine *SK* Menges concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That answers not be provided to Kalb's questions.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachment:

Tab I Letter to the President from Marvin Kalb

*I agree
Give me
your memo
from me
to Gary.*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR FD6-114/1 #6296

RV 011 NARA DATE 2/2/11

6297 C ✓ 30

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

November 26, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Questions for President from Marvin Kalb

Marvin Kalb has submitted five written questions to the President -- obviously in the hope that the President would answer as Chernenko did an earlier set of questions he submitted.

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Karna *K* Small, Bob *B* Sims, Sven *S* Kraemer and Constantine Menges concur. *Cen*

RECOMMENDATION

That answers not be provided to Kalb's questions.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment:

Tab I Letter to the President from Marvin Kalb

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR FOI 6-114/1 #6297
RV D. \ NADA DATE 2/2/11

NBC News

NBC Television Stations Division
National Broadcasting Company, Inc.

4001 Nebraska Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20016 202-885-4598

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November 21, 1984

The President
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2. Under what conditions would you be prepared to meet with President Chernenko - and when?

3. Chernenko may admire "detente," as it was practiced in the 1970's; but, if you don't -- and that seems clear -- what new guiding concept, or framework, in your view, should now govern the evolution of Soviet-American relations?

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5. As you explore a variety of options regarding U.S. policy in Central America, do you see, among them, the possibility of rapprochement with Cuba -- and, under what conditions?

Hoping to hear from you, I remain,

Very truly yours,


Marvin Kalb
Chief Diplomatic Correspondent



ABOARD AIR FORCE ONE

Send for staffing

to:
Matlock
Small
Sims

w/cy
me
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please.
M