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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 3/22/2005

File Folder MATLOCK CHRON OCTOBER 1984 (2/2)

FOIA

F06-114/1

Box Number 6

YARHI-MILO

607

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
6182	MEMO	MEMO FOR PRESIDENT REAGAN RE SHULTZ RECOMMENDATION FOR LETTER TO CHERNENKO [1] <i>R 3/3/2011 F2006-114/1</i>	1	ND	B1
6185	MEMO	MEMO FOR ROBERT MCFARLANE RE MENSHIKOV MESSAGE ON MEETINGS WITH GROMYKO AND FUTURE STEPS [7-10] <i>R 6/23/2010 M125/2</i>	4	10/15/1984	B1
6202	PAPER	PAPER RE GRENADA CONFERENCE [22-29] <i>R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1</i>	8	ND	B1
6187	MEMO	MEMO FOR ROBERT MCFARLANE RE DAVID ROCKEFELLER'S PROPOSAL [40-47] <i>R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1</i> DOCUMENT PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O. 13233	8	10/26/1984	B1
6189	MEMO	MEMO TO ROBERT MCFARLANE AND JOHN POINDEXTER [48-49] <i>R 6/23/2010 M125/2</i>	2	10/27/1984	B1
6192	PAPER	EXCERPTS FROM STROBE TALBOT BOOK [50-53] <i>R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1</i>	4	ND	B1
6194	MEMO	MEMO FOR ROBERT MCFARLANE RE THOUGHTS ON A CHANNEL TO SOVIET LEADERSHIP [57] <i>R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1</i>	1	10/29/1984	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
6197	MEMO	A CHANNEL TO SOVIET LEADERSHIP [59-62] R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1	4	ND	B1
6199	MEMO	DRAFT TALKING POINTS [64-69] R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1	6	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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6182

MEMORANDUM

SYSTEM II
91054

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

SUBJECT: Shultz Recommendation for a Letter to Chernenko

Secretary Shultz has sent a memorandum recommending that you send a short letter to Chernenko reaffirming your basic approach to the relationship and proposing "an interim agreement including provisions that would both place restrictions on anti-satellite weapons and begin the process of reducing offensive nuclear arms" (TAB A).

I do not believe that a letter at this time would be particularly useful and also doubt that we should put the proposal mentioned in writing at this time. It is strongly opposed by Cap Weinberger. If the Soviets are interested in such an arrangement, we can be confident that they will respond in some fashion to the hint you dropped in your presentation to Gromyko. But at the moment, I believe the Soviets are still digesting the material from Gromyko's visit, as they grapple with their own leadership situation. Trying to force the pace of their deliberations at this time may do more harm than good.

My recommendation would be to wait until after the election for any further initiatives, and then to attempt to convey any substantive ideas we may have privately and informally in the first instance. If the Soviets are by then moving in the direction of establishing a broad dialogue, this would permit some adjustment of proposals on both sides to make them as palatable as possible to the other.

Recommendation

OK No

— — That you not send a letter to Chernenko at this time.

Attachment:

Tab A - Memorandum from Secretary Shultz "Follow-up to Gromyko Meetings: Letter to Chernenko"

Prepared by:
Jack F. Matlock

cc: The Vice President

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

BY RWS
DECLASSIFIED
NLR/FD6-1141 #6182
NARA DATE 3/3/11

@ 2

7626

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

October 11, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT: Proposed Presidential Letter to Minister Gromyko re Visit and Gift

Attached at Tab I is memorandum to John Hilboldt approving draft letter to Minister A. A. Gromyko.

JL John Lenczowski and *SR* Stephen Sestanovich concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the memorandum at Tab I to John Hilboldt.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I Memo to Hilboldt

Tab A Draft letter for President's Signature

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN HILBOLDT

FROM: ROBERT M. KIMMITT

SUBJECT: Proposed Presidential Letter to Minister Gromyko
re Visit and Gift

NSC approves the proposed draft letter to Minister Andrei A. Gromyko.

Attachment:

Tab A Draft letter for President's signature.

4

October 5, 1984

Dear Mr. Minister:

It was a pleasure to welcome you to the White House and to discuss issues of mutual interest. I appreciated having the opportunity to exchange views on matters of particular concern to both of our countries.

Nancy and I want to thank you and Mrs. Gromyko for the special gifts which we received following our meeting. We are grateful to both of you for these remembrances and the thoughtfulness conveyed by your gesture.

With our kind regards to you and Mrs. Gromyko,

Sincerely,

RR

RR:AVH:UEH:mds

Approved by NSC _____.

His Excellency Andrei A. Gromyko
Minister of Foreign Affairs
of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Moscow

ID # 233677 5

WHITE HOUSE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

7626

O - OUTGOING

H - INTERNAL

I - INCOMING

Date Correspondence Received (YY/MM/DD) 84109129

Name of Correspondent: Andrei Gromyko

MI Mail Report User Codes: (A) _____ (B) _____ (C) _____

Subject: Gifts for the President and Mrs. Reagan from Foreign Minister Gromyko and his wife, Lydia. (Tablecloth, Book, and Box) as well as enclosure cards sent with Blue Sheet.

ROUTE TO: Office/Agency (Staff Name)	ACTION Action Code	Tracking Date YY/MM/DD	DISPOSITION	
			Type of Response	Completion Date YY/MM/DD
<u>GU HILB</u>	<u>DD</u>	<u>8410103</u>		<u>1 1</u>
<u>NS KIMM</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>8410103</u>		<u>1 1</u>
			<u>Please advise appropriate response</u>	
			<u>Draft attached for review.</u>	
		<u>1 1</u>		<u>1 1</u>
		<u>1 1</u>		<u>1 1</u>

- ACTION CODES:**
- A - Appropriate Action
 - C - Comment/Recommendation
 - D - Draft Response
 - F - Furnish Fact Sheet to be used as Enclosure
 - I - Info Copy Only/No Action Necessary
 - R - Direct Reply w/Copy
 - S - For Signature
 - X - Interim Reply
- DISPOSITION CODES:**
- A - Answered
 - B - Non-Special Referral
 - C - Completed
 - S - Suspended
- FOR OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE:**
- Type of Response = Initials of Signer
 - Code = "A"
 - Completion Date = Date of Outgoing

Comments: _____

Keep this worksheet attached to the original incoming letter.
Send all routing updates to Central Reference (Room 75, OEOB).
Always return completed correspondence record to Central Files.
Refer questions about the correspondence tracking system to Central Reference, ext. 2590.

WHITE HOUSE GIFT UNIT

ID: 8491698 LOGGERS INITIALS: JEH DATES: LOGGED: 841003 ARRIVED: 840929

GIFT INTENDED FOR: PRESIDENT AND FIRST LADY CORRESPON. TRACKING: GU

DONOR: FOREIGN OFFICIAL

NAME: LAST GROMYKO FIRST ANDREI

PREFIX: MR. AND MRS. SUFFIX:

TITLE: MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR

ORG:

STREET:

CITY: STATE: ZIPCODE:

COUNTRY: UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT: RR FORM: DFT DATE:

SALUTATION: SPOUSE: LYDIA DMITRIEVNA

APPRAISED VALUE: NA OVER MINIMUM VALUE(O/U): U

ARRIVAL FORM: MAIL ROOM

DESCRIPTION:

MISCELLANEOUS - N.E C

ASSORTMENT: BOOK, "VASILY SURIKOV," BY V. KEMENOV; TABLECLOTH, BLACK BACKGROUND WITH MULTI-COLORED FLORAL DESIGN AND 6" BLACK FRINGE; AND A LACQUERED BOX, 5 1/2" X 3 1/2" X 2" DEEP, SCENE OF THE RUSSIAN COUNTRYSIDE ON TOP, SIDES AND BASE BLACK WITH RED INTERIOR.

DISPOSITION: ARCHIVES, FOREIGN

IF TEMP, DESIG FOR:

ARCHIVE BOX NUMBER:

COMMENTS TWO CARDS: ANDREI A. GROMYKO, MEMBER OF THE POLITBUREAU, CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE, FIRST DEPUTY CHAIRMAN, USSR COUNCIL OF MINISTERS, MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR - AND - LYDIA DMITRIEVNA GROMYKO.

STAFF GIFT INFORMATION:

STAFF MEMBER:

TITLE:

GSA #:

COUNSEL APPROVAL(Y/N):

DATE:

6185

7

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

October 15, 1984

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK

SUBJECT: Menshikov Message on Meetings with Gromyko and Future Steps

Jim Giffen, President of the US-USSR Trade and Economic Council, took me aside at a conference in Vermont Saturday evening to pass on some comments he had received from Stanislav Menshikov, Zagladin's assistant on the Soviet Central Committee staff. (You will recall my conversation with Menshikov in New York last March.) Giffen was in Moscow last week and saw Menshikov during the latter part of the week. Menshikov asked him if he knew me and when Giffen confirmed that he did, asked Giffen to pass on the following (which Giffen read from his notes):

"Tell Matlock," he said, "to review the transcript of the meetings with Gromyko and pay particular attention to Gromyko's references to the need for 'adjustments' in U.S. policy." Menshikov went on to say that they considered the conversations very useful and had noted the "eight-minute private session with the President." On the latter, he commented that the "words were fine," but that we should not expect an "experienced diplomat" like Gromyko to take them at face value unless he saw corroborating evidence.

Menshikov then said that we should also pay attention to what Chernenko had said about a "Code of Conduct of Nuclear Powers," and implied that this could be an avenue for face saving on their part to get back into broader negotiations. He then commented that the basic Soviet requirement is that we "show some respect," and went to great lengths to describe a scene from Puzo's novel The Godfather, when a person went out of his way to accommodate the Godfather on a small matter once he learned who the Godfather was.

Though not part of Menshikov's "message," several other topics of interest arose in his conversation, according to Giffen.

-- Giffen received the impression that the Soviets were frustrated by the absence of any means of discussing problems privately and confidentially. Menshikov, for example, observed that they cannot talk to anyone in the State Department without it appearing in a Gwertzman or Gelb story in a few days.

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

NLRR MOR-125/2 *6185

RV NADA DATE

-- When Giffen asked about the possibility of reviving Jewish emigration, Menshikov said that this could be a matter for negotiation "at the proper time." (Arbatov, who was asked the same question, simply said that "This is not the right time.")

-- Menshikov told Giffen, in response to his direct question, that Gorbachev is now in fact the "number two" official in the Party. He refused to confirm that Gorbachev would be Chernenko's successor, however, stating that "even we at the Central Committee don't know what is going on in that sphere."

-- Regarding Scowcroft's trip last spring, Giffen said that he had asked Alkhimov, Chairman of the USSR State Bank, why the Soviets had refused to see him. (Alkhimov's position is a "cabinet level" one and he is usually well informed regarding US-Soviet relations, in which he has a personal interest.) Alkhimov told Giffen that he himself had been dismayed to learn that Scowcroft was not received and had "checked it out." The explanation he had received was that they had been willing to talk to Scowcroft, but were surprised by the attempt to see Chernenko, and that if Scowcroft had taken the appointment with Komplektov, Chernenko might have seen him subsequently. Alkhimov then observed that an outsider cannot just go to Chernenko directly, but must have a sponsor in the Soviet system and that the "worst way" to arrange the meeting was through the Foreign Ministry. "Next time," he advised, "do it through the Central Committee, or -- if you wish -- I could probably arrange it if you let me know in advance." [Note: There, as here, everybody wants to get into the act!]

Comments

1. While I would not consider Giffen an appropriate or reliable "messenger" from our point of view (he has a record of taking Soviet statements too much at face value, and even of defending their positions in trade matters), I have no reason to doubt that he has reported accurately what he was told.

2. I have examined the memcons of the meetings with Gromyko and find that Gromyko's references to "adjustments" or "corrections" in U.S. policy arose in at least two contexts. In regard to resuming negotiations on offensive nuclear weapons, he stated that this could happen "as soon as the U.S. corrects its position," then made his claims regarding the alleged relevance of carrier-based aircraft. He repeated this statement toward the close of the lunch, when he said that the President should ask his experts to reexamine their views and change the U.S. position, and when this was done, to let the Soviets know. The second context was that of the Soviet proposal for negotiations on space weapons, when he also said that the U.S. should review the situation calmly and change its position. At no time, did he define precisely what he meant by a changed position, however.

3. By mentioning Chernenko's proposal for a "Code of Conduct," Menshikov may have been implying that agreement to address this

seriously could represent a "changed position" from the Soviet point of view. (In speaking to Giffen, he was doubtless being deliberately cryptic to avoid revealing details about the meetings with Gromyko.) The allusion to the Godfather was probably intended to convey that the Soviet leaders must be made to feel that we take their proposals seriously. What is most interesting about it is the obvious implication that they have the mentality of mobsters -- which, in my view, is right on the button.

4. Though we cannot be sure what sort of "adjustments" of U.S. policy the Soviets are looking for, I believe that this rather laconic message clearly indicates two things: First, that Soviet policy makers are still frustrated by what they perceive as the absence of a means of communicating privately and informally with us, and second, that they are not at this point looking for the sort of concrete moves on specific issues that State habitually pushes. What I infer from this is that they are searching for a conceptual framework for interaction with the U.S. during the second term, which would provide the basis for resuming negotiations without seeming to be backing down to US demands. Since they do not want to discuss their real aim on the record (or have it bandied about in the press), they are resorting to indirect "messages" to see if we are willing to respond and engage them in an informal, non-binding and totally private dialogue.

5. This also reinforces my previous conviction that further proposals (except for procedural ones) are premature until we have the benefit of some informal discussion. The fact is that in devising various responses, we are really shooting in the dark until we have a firmer grasp of what exactly the Soviets are looking for at this point. Their formal diplomacy often focuses on issues which are not really central to their real concerns. And although they will never bear their souls totally even in a private conversation, they are more likely to provide valuable indications privately than in formal interchanges. For example, it may well be that talking about a "Code of Conduct" is more important to them than agreement on an ASAT moratorium. And if this is the case, then the former step could be less damaging to U.S. interests than the latter.

6. Regarding the "Code of Conduct" idea, it occurs to me that it could be a key element in getting our "umbrella" concept off the ground. While I am dubious about the value of such declaratory statements in and of themselves, they can provide a rationale and framework for a change in Soviet policy. It seems to me that a carefully worded "Code" could be a cheap price to pay for successful negotiations on reducing offensive weapons. Even a statement which does not go beyond past commitments could be important to the Soviet leaders since it would "show respect" (it is their proposal, after all), and could be used publicly to argue that the U.S. position has changed in a way that permits the resumption of negotiations.

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7. These, however, are only possibilities. We really cannot know without talking it over with them privately -- and under conditions that they are confident provide assurance against leaks. Unless and until we establish a private dialogue, anything we (or they) propose will really be a form of blind man's bluff, but in this case, with both sides blindfolded.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

FILE SEALED

~~S/S - Eyes Only~~

Chosen File
(There are in sealed envelope)

Oct. 15, 1984

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

CS 6/10/02

PRESERVATION COPY

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~7806~~ 12
F 84-1116

UNCLASSIFIED

October 16, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Request for Publication Clearance

The U.S. Navy Postgraduate School at Monterey has requested permission to publish remarks which I made at a conference on the Grenada documents and Soviet policy in August.

Since my comments were theoretical and analytical -- and of course do not draw on classified information -- I see no objection to publication as part of a scholarly symposium.

Recommendation:

That permission be granted to publish the paper at TAB I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment:

Tab I - "Comment on Aspaturian Paper," by Jack F. Matlock

13

COMMENT ON ASPATURIAN PAPER

by

Jack F. Matlock, Jr.,
Special Assistant to the President for National Security

Professor Aspaturian has provided a thorough, and in my opinion, very sound analysis of the light the Grenada documents cast on the Soviet alliance system. In reading his paper and pondering the message of the Grenada documents, several broader questions came to mind, and I would like to use Professor Aspaturian's study as a springboard to present some of them.

The first relates to the old but persistent question of whether the Soviet Union is a traditional great power or a new sort of revolutionary communist power. Another way of putting this is to ask how important ideology is to the Soviet decision makers.

The Grenada documents present almost exclusively the Grenadan view. But one is struck when reading them by the depth of the Grenadan conviction that ideological appearances were extremely important to the Soviets. Now the Grenadans, of course, could have been mistaken. But if we think about the Soviet categories of third-world states which Professor Aspaturian has described so lucidly, we recognize immediately that these categories are based largely on ideological factors. So the Grenadans do not seem to have been totally misled on this point.

This suggests to me that, when we deal with the Soviet Union, we are dealing with a country different in nature from a traditional expansionist great power.

At the same time, it is clear that one does not adequately define the Soviet Union's foreign policy by saying that it is that of an ideological state. Ideology has its place in a definition, but if we go beyond the Grenada documents and look at the record of Soviet foreign policy in general, one of the things that strikes us is that many of the principal characteristics of Great Russian foreign policy have been fused with Leninist concepts.

For this reason, the debate over whether the Soviet Union is an ideological or traditional power seems to me a sterile one. Surely the answer is that the Soviet Union is both; both in a sense not of an incoherent mixture, but of an amalgam. The Grenada documents reflect more of the ideological element, yet even from a traditional Russian point of view, there would be value, ideology entirely aside, to having a potential base (or at least an irritant) close to the United States so long as the U.S. was postulated as the principal adversary in a bipolar world.

The second question is: If ideology is important to the Soviets, does it represent anything more than a post hoc rationalization? In other words, is the real motivation geopolitical and the ideology only something like icing applied to a cake after it has come out of the oven?

I ask this question because most of us who have spent time in the Soviet Union find that one of the rarest commodities in that scarcity-ridden country is a person who really believes in the ideology. Most Soviet citizens seem totally cynical about it -- and about the motivations of those charged with purveying it. Dialectical materialism and the ideology as a whole probably comprise the most taught and least learned subject in the

educational curriculum. Diamat seems to be treated with derision by students -- an obligatory waste of time, useful only as raw material for bitter jokes. And even Soviet officials do not leave the impression that they put great stock in the ideology personally. In short, one senses none of the revolutionary élan today which observers described in the 1920's and 1930's.

The loss of revolutionary élan is, however, not the whole story. For the fact is that those who run the system cannot give up the ideology, whether they believe it or not. They cannot because it provides the sole source of their own legitimacy as rulers. Their power does not stem from constitutional processes; it can only be justified on ideological grounds, both to their own people and to the world at large. When so much at home seems to be either unsuccessful or inconsistent with the proclaimed ideology, it becomes important to the rulers to claim victories of the ideology abroad. Such claims have a legitimizing impact and contribute an important element to Soviet objectives which were absent from the motivations of monarchs and would be absent from those of a real (as opposed to pseudo) constitutional republic.

Leninist ideology has, moreover, struck deeper roots than the pattern of cynical manipulation which we often observe would suggest. The fact is that so much Soviet discourse has been forced into the mold of Leninist reasoning that it affects the thinking even of those who would privately profess disbelief in its fundamental tenets. Entirely aside from its use as a propaganda tool, it provides a framework for looking at the world and analysing developments. While the ideology does not often answer concrete policy questions in clear-cut fashion -- and it

can be manipulated to justify virtually any policy decision -- it does act to define options and channel decisions in certain directions.

The way the Soviets define their alliance system provides a good example of applying ideology for geopolitical ends. Professor Aspaturian has provided a clear description of the way the Soviets define the various gradations of their alliance countries. These gradations rest on ideology but have important geopolitical implications. When we hear the Soviets speaking of the "irreversibility of socialist gains," we read that as the code expression for the Brezhnev doctrine. And it is, for those countries that have been declared "socialist," or part of the "socialist commonwealth," and which border on the Soviet Union. In these cases the ultimate guarantee is the Soviet Army.

"Irreversibility" can be looked at in other ways also. If one examines the sort of changes the Soviets encourage in those countries which are soliciting Soviet support, or trying to become members of the "socialist camp" -- obviously the aim of the Grenadan leaders -- we see pressure for internal changes which, if fully implemented, tend to be irreversible. The Soviets tend to push for two things: formation of a "vanguard party" and socialization of the economy.

The Soviets distrust charismatic leaders, though they often use them. The reason is clear: they are hard to control and if they get into trouble domestically and are toppled, the country tends to move in the opposite direction. The Soviet experience with Sukarno, Nasser, Nkrumah and others has made them cautious about investing too much in the left-leaning charismatic leader.

What is less likely to go sour -- from the Soviet point of view -- than an individual, egocentric leader? A "vanguard party," highly bureaucratized and in control of all significant sources of power in the country fills the bill. It is much more difficult to topple than the individual leader, and can be sold to the individual leader as a reliable mechanism for staying in power. Ethiopia provides a classic example of Soviet pressure on a client to build a "vanguard party."

Socialization of the economy is closely associated with establishment of a vanguard party, although strong pressure from the Soviets in this direction may sometimes be delayed for tactical reasons. It may have been greater in the early 1960's, but a lot of these "experiments" ran aground and tended to be expensive to the Soviets. But I believe that when the time comes, they will always push for an increasing socialization of the economy.

Is this merely a drive for ideological consistency? In part, perhaps, but not entirely. There are good practical reasons for it if the Soviets want to build irreversibility into the process. The fact is that when the economy of a country is socialized, many groups which could compete for power or for influence over policy are destroyed. If they are not destroyed, they can threaten a system moving toward totalitarianism.

If you look at a country after a few years of this process, you find that many changes tend in practice to be irreversible. A country which has gone through a period of socialization and centralization of economic decision making has great difficulty in turning the clock back to a pluralistic economic system if

there is political change at the top. The foreign investor has been chased out, and what successor can bring him back without offending local nationalism? Nationalism is a powerful barrier to this. And if the local middle class has been eliminated or seriously weakened, the problem of developing an indigenous private sector is enormously difficult. So a successor regime has limited possibilities of becoming another South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan or Ivory Coast. These, of course, are the Third-World countries which in fact have made the spectacular gains in economic development, and none have followed the route of socialization.

Soviet ideology as it is practiced really has little to do with Marxism -- aside from some of its vocabulary. It has almost everything to do with Leninism. Certainly Leninism is an outgrowth of Marxism, but it is a form which many Marxists would not recognize as legitimate. Eduard Bernstein and Rosa Luxemburg would not, and in view of his later writings, one can doubt that Friedrich Engels would. I think we make a real mistake in adopting uncritically the Soviet term "Marxist-Leninist," as if the two were virtually synonymous. It is a Soviet claim that even non-Marxists should not accept, since it leads to confused thinking about the real issues.

The point here is that Leninism is an ideology which is particularly useful to a leader having trouble staying in power. This ideology, buttressed with military hardware and free mercenaries, is what the Soviets offer to Third-World leaders in trouble with their own people. It is not a formula for developing an economy or solving social problems. It does not solve them; it exacerbates them. It is a formula for staying in

power no matter how poorly you serve real national needs, if you control a "vanguard party," and through it your military. (This stage is sometimes not reached before the military read the writing on the wall and take over, but if enough Cuban troops are around, even this risk is minimal, as the experience of Congo-Brazzaville demonstrates.)

The Marxist side of the ideology -- the socio-economic theory -- is largely propaganda eyewash. It is useful domestically for a while until people see that reality does not match the theory, and is doubtless of some use internationally with groups like the Socialist International, inclined to see a kinship between "Marxists" of one type and those of another. The actual kinship is non-existent.

This leads to one final thought. In pondering how to deal with the Soviet Union or in analyzing Soviet foreign policy, we do ourselves a disservice if we classify views as "left" or "right." Is there any legitimate reason for a liberal and a conservative in the democratic tradition to disagree on the nature of Soviet power? Or, for that matter, for a European Social Democrat and Christian Democrat to do so? The nature of Soviet power has nothing to do with the left/right distinction as it is usually defined. The proper distinction is a different one, and that is between a totalitarian system and a system which is not totalitarian. If a system is totalitarian, it makes little difference whether it claims antecedents on the left or right extreme of the political spectrum. In either case it is the antithesis of democracy and should be seen as such by all those who espouse democracy.

We should abandon thinking based on faulty preconceptions, look at the facts as they are, and conduct our policy debates on the basis of those facts rather than misleading preconceptions.



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA 93943

21
IN REPLY REFER TO

NC4(56Va)pmc
28 August 1984

Ambassador Jack F. Matlock, Jr.
OEOB Room 36
National Security Council
White House
Washington, DC 20506

Dear Jack:

Once again let me thank you for your invaluable contribution to the recent conference on "Soviet/Cuban Strategy in the Third World after Grenada". I hope that you found the exchange of ideas and opinions stimulating and rewarding.

I am forwarding the rough draft transcript of the tapes made during the conference. Your outstanding presentation provided many valuable insights to be taken into consideration in the compilation of the final conference report. The tape quality was not the best, and general noise sometimes drowned out specific words. Therefore, you may wish to review the transcript, perhaps reorganize your discussion points, or rephrase a sentence. However, even in its present form, the transcript does convey the ideas that you wished to impart in regard to the subject.

The faculty and students are looking forward to seeing you again, perhaps at the next conference, and Virginia and I look forward to welcoming you at our residence in Carmel Valley.

Warmest regards,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Jiri", is located below the typed name.

JIRI VALENTA
Associate Professor and Coordinator
Soviet and East European Studies
Department of National Security Affairs

1 Encl: Transcript

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So much of the documentation that is available now in the Grenada papers has to do with the ideological sphere. It might be useful to think a moment back to the old argument that is still going on: Is the Soviet Union a traditional imperial power, or is it sort of a revolutionary communist power? Another way to put it is how important is ideology to them?

It seems to me that although we have largely the Grenadian view in the documents, it is clearly implicit that the ideological appearance of things was assumed to be significant to the Soviets. In their own classification, which is very clear of socialist-oriented revolutionary democratic states, or the vanguard party type states, these definitions rest largely on ideological considerations. It seems to me that these do provide arguments, at the very least, that ideology is not something that can be ignored. This does suggest to us that we are dealing with something of a different nature, when we deal with the Soviet Union, than a traditional expansionist great power.

At the same time, it seems clear that you don't exhaust a definition of Soviet Union's foreign policy by saying that it is a Leninist state (or some would say Marxist/Leninist, or communist, or totalitarian). This may be part of it, but if we go beyond the Grenada documents, one of the things that we see there is that in the 60+ years of Soviet

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rule, a fusion of many of the principle characteristics of great Russian foreign policy with aspects of Marxist ideology, particularly the Leninist aspects. That is why the argument mentioned earlier seems to be relatively fruitless. It seems to me that it is both; both, in a sense not of an incoherent mixture, but of an amalgam. In the Grenada documents we do see reflected more of the ideological side, and yet even from a traditional Russian great power point of view, in a bipolar world, there would be some value, ideology entirely aside, to having a potential base, or to having an irritant close to the United States as long as the U.S. was postulated as the principal adversary.

A second question would be that if ideology is important to the Soviets, if it is sort of an amalgam of attitudes, some of which are more traditional than Marxist or Leninist, then is this anything more than a post-hawk rationalization? I ask this question because it has often seemed to many of us who have spent some time in the Soviet Union that is that you just really do not find people who believe in Marxism. They are awfully cynical about it. Dialectical materialism and the whole ideological side of things must be one of the most taught and one of the least learned or listened to subjects. DIAL was sort of a joke to students; something you were supposed to attend, and rarely paid much attention to. So you get the impression in dealing with Soviet officials, nonofficials, and even party hacks. that they

do not really believe much of this ideology anymore. That impression can be a little misleading in that we do not have a revolutionary _____ internally of the sort that you might have had in the 1920's, or even among a certain segment in the early 1930's. That is very clear.

On the other hand, it does seem that the regime is really unable to give up the importance of ideology because it provides the sole legitimacy for its very distant ports power. That power does not stem from constitutional means as we define them, and to the degree that they are defensible at all to their own people in the external world; it has to be based on ideological grounds. When so much at home seems to be unsuccessful, presumed victories or claimed victories abroad of the ideology do become very important as a legitimizing force, and therefore is something that goes beyond purely Russian interests as, say, they would have been defined in a 19th century context.

But go further. It seems that this is more than simply looking at ideology as serving post-hawk justification of what you want to do any, preferably on other grounds. The ideology which has been taught, often ineffectually, has become so much a part of the discourse that it has begun to shape thinking. If it is no longer a dynamic motivating force, it does have the function of providing a framework for looking at the world and analyzing it as a basis upon which one can make decisions.

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The ideology does not give a yes or no answer, but it does channel certain options. I think that the material we have in these Grenada documents, peripheral as they may be in some respects, do reinforce this view.

Aside from the legitimating force that ideology has, it seems that there is also something else here in the way that the Soviets looked at the world, and at their entire alliance system. I do agree that the Soviets define their alliance countries with various gradations -- as has been pointed out. Often when we hear the Soviets speaking of the irreversibility of socialist gains, I think we read that as the code word for the Brezhnev Doctrine. It often can be -- certainly for those countries that have been declared socialist, or part of the socialist commonwealth, and which border on the Soviet Union, or on another member of the Warsaw Pact. Clearly the ultimate sanction or guarantee is the Red Army, and either their invasion or the threat of invasion if necessary.

It seems to me that irreversibility can be looked at in other ways, also. If you look at the sort of changes that the Soviets try to encourage in those countries which are attempting to solicit their support, or trying to become members of the socialist world (not the commonwealth in the narrow sense but of the sort that we got in the Grenada leadership), when this happens one sees that always at the proper time the Soviets tend to push for two things: First of all for the formation of a vanguard party. The Soviets do distrust the charismatic leader, but they try to use them.

However, they have a lot of bad experience in dealing with charismatic leaders. The Sukarnos, Nassars, etc. have learned that you just do not put too much capital there because this can go sour very fast.

What is less likely to go sour? Less likely to go sour is a vanguard party, highly bureaucratized, and one which does not depend on Soviet support alone. While they may defer strong pressure for a while on a government to socialize the economy totally, this pressure was greater in the early 1960's. But again, a lot of these experiments ran aground and tended to be extremely expensive. They may be holding back some now. But I think that when the time comes, they will always push for an increasing socialization of the economy.

Why is this? It is not entirely ideological consistency as such, but at the basis there is a very good reason for it. When you go through a thorough socialization of the economy of a country, you do remove thereby many possibly competing elements of power, which, if these elements asserted themselves later, could take over, or could produce a downfall of that system.

If you look at a country after a few years of this process, you will find that many of these things in practice are truly irreversible. A country that has gone through a period of socialization such as _____, with Soviet encouragement, put Ghana throughly flat on its back, as Ghana has been for over a decade.

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There is no going back because the middle class has been destroyed or totally discredited. The foreign investor has been chased out, and what successor wants to bring them back in? Nationalism is a factor. You find that successor regimes really do not have the option in many cases of turning back the clock. Therefore, they do not have the option anymore of becoming another South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, or Ivory Coast. These are the countries which have, in fact, been able to make more spectacular developments.

Ideology really has very little to do with Marxism. It has almost everything to do with Leninism. For public presentation of views, we probably make a mistake in automatically ^{coupling} accepting the terms Marxism and Leninism. Certainly Leninism is an outgrowth from, or an expression of Marxism, although it is a form that would hardly be recognized, not only by Edward Bernstein, but also by Rosa Luxembourgh and many others who certainly consider themselves good Marxists.

Yet the point here is that ^{Leninism} ~~it~~ is an ideology which is particularly useful to a leader having trouble staying in power. This is something the Soviets offer. It is not really a formula for economic development, or for solving social problems. It does not solve them, but exacerbates them. It is a formula for staying in power if you have the vanguard party, and you control it, and it

controls the military--a stage that some countries have not reached rapidly enough when their military turns against them. I think that the Soviets have watched this too.

This is the real appeal to leaders in the Third World. The Marxist side of it, you might say the social theory or the economic theory, is largely public relations eyewash. It is useful domestically for a while until people see that things are not working out, and is undoubtedly of some use internationally with groups like the Socialist International that see a certain kinship between Marxists of one type and Marxists of another. Whereas, this kinship might be almost nonexistent.

This leads to one final thought. In dealing with these issues (that is how to deal with the Soviet Union or in analyzing Soviet foreign policy) we do ourselves a great disservice in speaking of liberal views and conservative views. I do not know why there should be any liberal view or conservative view of the nature of Soviet power. I can understand that we might disagree on it intellectually. It seems that we fall into a dangerous bad analysis by looking at a Leninist form of totalitarianism as sort of an extreme on-the-left; and at Fascism as an extreme on-the-right, or other dictatorships. If you happen to feel a little more drawn to the left, you make excuses for your side, and visa versa.

Frankly, I think that the facts do not fit that analysis. You really have a contrast between a totalitarian type of

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society, and one in which there is no pluralism allowed in principle, and those in which at least pluralism is a principle, and there is some ability of society to develop that principle. That seems to be the real dichotomy that we face. Why does a liberal view have to differ from a conservative view in this regard? So often our discourses, particularly in policy decisions, are colored by our perceptions of whether we are liberal or conservative, and as such, what are we supposed to think about these things? This is not the basis from which to approach problem solving.

We should try to put stereotypes of that kind behind us, and look at facts for what they are, and debate what to do about them on the basis of those facts rather than on preconceptions.

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File in chron

We agree with President Chernenko that there is no sound alternative to constructive development in relations between our two countries. We are pleased to see the emphasis he puts on positive possibilities for US-Soviet relations. We will be studying his remarks carefully and, as was agreed during Deputy Prime Minister Gromyko's recent meeting with President Reagan, we will be pursuing our dialogue with the Soviet Union and exploring the possibilities for progress through diplomatic channels.

President Reagan has repeatedly demonstrated that we are ready for cooperation with the Soviet Union. In April, 1981 he wrote from his hospital bed to tell President Brezhnev how he felt about the issue of war and peace, and to ask President Brezhnev to join him in removing the obstacles to peace. Since then, the United States has made practical proposals for forward movement in all areas of the relationship, including arms control.

Over the past year, for instance, the United States and its Allies have put forward new proposals for limits on strategic weapons, on intermediate range nuclear weapons, on chemical weapons, and on conventional forces. On June 4 in Dublin, President Reagan stated our willingness to discuss the Soviet proposal for a mutual non-use-of-force commitment, if this would

lead to serious negotiation on the Western proposals for practical steps to enhance confidence and reduce the risk of surprise attack in Europe. This summer we accepted a Soviet proposal to begin space arms control negotiations in Vienna without preconditions. At the United Nations last month President Reagan reiterated his desire to move forward in these fields and put forward a number of concrete new proposals for US-Soviet cooperation. In his subsequent meeting with Deputy Prime Minister Gromyko, the President emphasized our strong desire to move to a more productive dialogue across the board, and put forward specific suggestions as to how we might do so.

We cannot agree with President Chernenko's version of recent history. It is the Soviet Union which has broken off negotiations on nuclear arms, and backed away from its own proposal to begin space arms control talks. The United States stands ready to negotiate on these and other issues, but we cannot concur in the apparent Soviet view that it is incumbent upon the United States to pay a price so that the Soviet Union will come back to the nuclear negotiating table.

President Chernenko has stated that improvements in the US-Soviet relationship depend on deeds, not words. We agree. When the Soviet Union is prepared to move from public exchanges to private negotiation and concrete agreements, they will find us ready.

[If asked about specific Soviet proposals]

Space Weapons: The United States accepted the Soviet proposal in June without preconditions. We are prepared to initiate talks on this subject at anytime, but of course will not accept preconditions or make concessions in advance of negotiation.

-- A nuclear freeze would preserve an unstable balance and seriously handicap efforts to achieve real reductions in nuclear weapons. Moreover, verification of a freeze involving production and testing is probably impossible and at best would require lengthy negotiations on counting rules and verification measures, efforts better spent to reduce arms. We want more than a propaganda slogan; we want real reductions.

-- On TTBT/PNET we have proposed to Moscow a number of times that we discuss improving the verification provisions of these treaties to assure compliance. Although the Soviets have not taken us up on that offer, acceptance of the President's UNGA proposal that we exchange observers to monitor nuclear tests would be a positive step in that direction.

-- On no first use of nuclear weapons, the United States and our NATO allies have stated that we will not use any weapons except in response to aggression. A no-first-use declaration concerning nuclear weapons would provide no guarantee that an aggressor possessing nuclear weapons would not in fact use them

first in a time of crisis. To adopt such a policy would effectively withdraw the American nuclear umbrella over Europe, which has guaranteed peace in Europe for over thirty-five years.

Q: Is there anything new in the Chernenko Interview?

A: Substantively, no. But we welcome the constructive tone.

Q: Chernenko referred to proposals made in March. What were these?

A: In a speech in March, he proposed:

- Ratification of the nuclear testing treaties (TTBT and PNET)
- A nuclear freeze
- A ban on chemical weapons
- Agreement on norms of conduct among nuclear powers, including a no-first-use pledge.

I would note that the United States subsequently tabled a proposed treaty to ban chemical weapons at the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva. This was one of the many "deeds" the United States has in fact done in the interests of arms control.

Q: What about holding negotiations on space arms control?

A: We have told the Soviets that we are ready to discuss space arms control, including anti-satellite weapons, any time and at any place. We have set no preconditions for the talks. The President has also indicated that we are prepared to consider what mutual restraints are appropriate during the negotiations, but we cannot accept them as a precondition for the talks.

Q: What has happened in our follow-up meetings with the Soviets after the Gromyko meetings?

A: We remain in touch with the Soviets through our respective Embassies in Moscow and Washington. I am not going to go into the details of our diplomatic exchanges with the Soviets. Let me just say again that we are committed to pursuing the dialogue energetically through diplomatic channels.

Q: What can you tell us about Chernenko's health?

A: I think Dusko Doder of the Washington Post provided his impressions of Mr. Chernenko's health. I have nothing further to add.

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
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 17, 1984

Dear Mr. Iversa:

Thank you for sending me Defense Thought 2001. I am very pleased to have this collection of essays and look forward to reading these "thoughts" in connection with our defense effort.

Sincerely,



Jack F. Matlock, Jr.
Special Assistant to
the President

Mr. Dick Iversa
Gould, Inc., Government Marketing
Suite 900
1755 Jefferson Davis Highway
Arlington, Virginia 22202

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 17, 1984

Dear Bob:

Thank you for your letter of October 9 and the invitation to participate in the Seventh German-American Roundtable Conference to be held at the Madison Hotel. Your description of the meetings and issues to be discussed promises to be a useful get together of prominent invitees.

Although I can never be absolutely certain that my time will not be preempted at the last minute, I shall certainly plan to attend as many sessions as my schedule permits. If unexpected developments should make this impossible, I will let you know immediately.

I look forward to participating in the conference and send my best personal regards.

Sincerely,



Jack F. Matlock, Jr.
Special Assistant to
the President
European and Soviet Affairs

Mr. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr.
President
Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc.
1612 K Street, N.W., Suite 1204
Washington, D.C. 20006

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Mr. Jack Matlock
The White House
Washington, DC 20009

MARSHALL Herbert RL-20776
Individual

*mlh
10/17/84*

Reviewer's Signature: _____

Date Needed by: *10/15 or ASAP*

Your comments are requested on the criteria discussed in the cover letter. Please use additional sheets if needed.

Professor Marshall's project is a worthy one which would fill a real need for an extensive bilingual anthology of important Russian poetry during the Soviet period.

Professor Marshall is an experienced translator who has rendered faithfully much poetry from Russian and other languages. Professor Marshall takes care not only to translate poetry accurately but to preserve insofar as possible the metric scheme and rhyme of the original. At times this inevitably produces translations which have less depth than the original since it is impossible to reproduce the rhythm and rhyme in English without some distortion of total effect produced by the original. Nevertheless, Professor Marshall is unquestionably one of the better translators working in the field today, and an anthology which he would produce would doubtless be very useful to students and to their poetry readers who have less than a native command of the Russian language. Since it would be bilingual, those readers with some knowledge of Russian could use the translations as a stepping-stone to the original text.

While I feel the project is a very worthy one, it appears to be that the projected cost may be excessive. It would seem that some of the poetry has already been translated by Professor Marshall, and I must wonder whether the project really requires a year of full-time work. For this reason, while I would recommend support for the project, I am not certain that the amount of support the application requests would be warranted.

Ambassador Jack F. Matlock

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

RETURN

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Jack Matlock
Eyes Only

Father to Bud

Done

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~Mr. Robert C. McFarlane
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs~~

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OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

CAO 4/10/02

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

October 26, 1984

→ John FYI #40
Eyes Only

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JW*
SUBJECT: David Rockefeller's Proposal

I see serious problems with Rockefeller's proposal to Gromyko for a "consultative group." The basic problem is that there is no potential counterpart group in the Soviet Union. Anyone who would be named on their side will in fact be a government official, who will be required to exercise discipline in their comments to reflect official Soviet views -- or to test "new ideas" which are considered to have some tactical advantage. The group for the U.S. side would be under no such restraint, so that the inevitable result would be that we would be forced into a two-front negotiation, both with the Soviets and with a group of prominent American citizens, three of whom have no recognizable competence in arms control issues.

It is not clear from the memo that Kissinger has agreed to participate in such a group. If he did, he could doubtless exercise a restraining influence on the others. But even so, I think it would be a mistake to associate the Administration with the effort. I hope Rockefeller has misinterpreted Secretary Shultz's view of the project (the memorandum indicates that the Secretary had "responded favorably"-- page 3).

As you know, I believe informal contacts with the Soviets to be important -- indeed essential, if we are to make progress. But these should be conducted on our side by persons who can speak for the Administration by virtue of an official position.

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BY CN NARA DATE 11/27/07

→ Jack Matlock
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PRO MEMORIA

Meeting of Foreign Minister A. A. Gromyko with Mr. David Rockefeller,
September 19, 1984.

Soviet Mission to the United Nations, New York.

Attending: Ambassador Anatolii Dobrynin, Mr. S. Frederick Starr

After Mr. Gromyko welcomed his guests, Mr. Rockefeller spoke of the perilous state of world affairs and of the great need for people of good will on all sides to act to improve the situation by seeking solutions to divisive problems. In such an effort even small steps forward should be welcomed.

Mr. Gromyko expressed his view that even small steps are useful, especially when the situation at hand is so grave.

Mr. Rockefeller noted that Mr. Gromyko and he had met twice before, and reminded the Soviet Minister of his participation in the first Dartmouth Conference that took place at the height of the missile crisis in 1962. In spite of the serious crisis at that time, both sides continued to talk and to benefit from such dialogue. Subsequent to that meeting Mr. Rockefeller had participated in ten further sessions of the Dartmouth Conference, and, through his role at the Chase Bank, had been actively involved in the US-USSR Trade and Economic Council.

Mr. Gromyko stated that the parallel to the missile crisis was appropriate, and recalled how he and President Kennedy, in the hours of greatest strain, had met at the White House and held substantial

conversations. "States and peoples must be in contact, especially if they are great powers. They must be willing to exchange views in the most difficult times as a means of solving their differences. You have chosen a good example from the past. Our countries succeeded then. It was difficult, very difficult, but we did succeed."

Mr. Rockefeller acknowledged again that all dialogue was useful. As Mr. Dobrynin knows, though, members of the Dartmouth group, while well-informed and serious people, are generally not positioned in such a way as to be able readily to brief the top leaders of their respective governments on the proceedings. Conscious of this, many of Mr. Rockefeller's friends who care deeply about questions of war and peace had suggested to him that it might be of benefit to convene a small gathering of well-informed and influential persons from the two countries. The American side of such a group, he continued, might be made up of people who are well known and respected in the government but who do not presently hold official posts. He suggested that comparable persons might be identified in the USSR. Provided such people could be convened and their conversations organized around a carefully considered agenda, such a "consultative group," Mr. Rockefeller suggested, might be useful to senior officials in both the US and the USSR.

Mr. Rockefeller then digressed to explain the origins of his proposal. He noted that the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, of which he is Chairman, had recently named a panel headed by David Rockefeller, Jr. to consider the thrust of the Fund's work over the coming decade. This panel had identified arms control and East-West relations as among the highest priorities for the Fund.

Mr. Rockefeller also acknowledged Father Theodore Hesburgh, his

friend of many years, who put forth the proposal for a new form of Soviet-American dialogue.

When Mr. Gromyko enquired whether Father Hesburgh was an American, Mr. Rockefeller provided a biographical sketch of Notre Dame's President.

Mr. Rockefeller then underscored the fact that the proposal for a consultative group had been made before President Reagan's July speech on Soviet-American relations, and that while the situation had changed somewhat since then, the improvement was only partial. Meanwhile, he (DR) had met with Secretary of State Shultz, who had responded favorably to the proposal, and also with Ambassador Dobrynin. Mr. Dobrynin had stressed that it would be essential for the US group to be made up of people who were closely acquainted with Mr. Reagan's views and who were respected by him; the Soviet group must also be made up of similarly placed people lest the proposed consultative group be indistinguishable from similar efforts in the past.

Mr. Rockefeller concluded by suggesting that a small planning session attended by four people from each side might work out the agenda, meeting place and time, and composition of the consultative group. Specifically, he proposed that the American planning group consist of Messrs. Hesburgh, Kissinger, Rockefeller, and Starr.

At this point Mr. Gromyko enquired about the agenda for the proposed consultative group, and also asked whether the group would be "on an ad hoc basis."

Mr. Rockefeller responded with the report that Father Hesburgh had proposed that attention be given to issues on which the US and USSR have a community of interest, e.g. the environment, agriculture, etc. We should not stop at these issues, however, Mr. Rockefeller suggested, but should proceed to consider questions on which fundamental differences exist, e.g.

arms, the use of space, etc.

At this, Mr. Gromyko averred that he understood Mr. Rockefeller's general proposal, but that he wanted to pose the "question of questions": "At the present time we are both sliding down into an abyss. Must we continue further along this course? Or, rather, is there not some way of avoiding the abyss, of drawing back from it? This, in my view, is the question of questions. Will the proposed consultative group take up general issues of various sorts that might seem readily soluble, or will it deal concretely with the problem of the senseless scale of armaments in our two countries? Will this group pass by such big questions or address them? Will it be able to work on reducing the tensions between our two countries and cutting back arms?"

"If you want to make a useful contribution, then you must work to stop the arms race. It will be useless for these wise and respectable people to pass by this issue in order to talk about the environment and other such matters."

"The situation today has an ugly character. It is like a person who is not satisfied to have a gun in each hand, or even twenty guns, but insists on two hundred or a thousand."

"Before expressing my view on your proposal, I want to know your answer to this: Will your consultative group take up these difficult issues?"

Mr. Rockefeller responded that no subject would be taboo in the group.

Mr. Gromyko interjected, "Yes, yes, you have more than answered my question already."

Mr. Rockefeller underscored the point that the consultative group would be able to take up any issue, but that it would in no way serve as a substitute for normal government-to-government relations, nor would it

pretend to interpose itself on such relations or do anything that would obviate the need for governmental action.

Mr. Gromyko then asked for further clarification on the notion of excluding governmental officials from the group.

Mr. Rockefeller acknowledged that this situation differs greatly in the two countries, but that the American side would not propose to include anyone currently in Congress or serving the Administration. However, he continued, such people as Henry Kissinger would certainly be able to speak with knowledge and authority.

Mr. Gromyko smilingly acknowledged that, "Yes, Henry can do anything." In a different vein, Mr. Gromyko then recounted the story of the unofficial meeting of Soviet and American astronauts that occurred in France this year. As a consequence of their discussions they announced their opposition to the placement of arms in space.

At this point Mr. Gromyko paused for several moments and then stated, "This idea is of great interest." (NB: the interpreter neglected to translate "great," a fact noted by Mr. Dobrynin when he repeated the phrase "great interest" in Russian to Mr. Starr.)

"It would be easier to put the project on a firm footing," Mr. Gromyko continued, "if you could tell me how many and who would participate in the consultative group."

Mr. Rockefeller repeated the names of the four Americans who he proposed would work with four Soviets on the agenda. If the planning group succeeds, he continued, then the consultative group of some eight or ten persons from each side might be formed. Mr. Rockefeller also stressed that the four proposed American participants in the planning group enjoy the respect of the present Administration.

Mr. Gromyko again returned to the question of participation by elected

officials. Mr. Rockefeller reported Secretary of State Shultz' feeling that those currently serving in the American government should be excluded. Speaking of the Soviet side, Mr. Rockefeller emphasized the need for participants who are policy-makers rather than technicians. "For example, I know Mr. Arbatov well and respect him highly, but perhaps we should be speaking of a different type of person than those who have traditionally come to such international conferences."

Mr. Gromyko then enquired when the two delegations of four members might hold its first meeting.

Mr. Starr interjected that the notion of a smaller group had been put forward only as a means of planning for the somewhat larger meeting. As such it would probably meet only once, and "as a means to an end."

Mr. Rockefeller then proposed an early meeting of the planning group, perhaps even in October. Mr. Gromyko countered with a somewhat later date "so as not to collide with your domestic affairs."

Mr. Gromyko also enquired whether scientists would be included in the consultative group. This might be desirable, Mr. Rockefeller replied, but it would depend upon the agenda.

Finally, Mr. Gromyko asked if it would be appropriate to include a scholar who happened to be a member of the Soviet parliament, such as Mr. Arbatov. Mr. Rockefeller underscored his high regard for Mr. Arbatov but suggested that the proposed consultative group might provide the occasion for involving "new faces."

Mr. Rockefeller also stated that the proposed meeting should be confidential and its deliberations closed to the press, to which Mr. Gromyko offered no objection.

Finally, Mr. Gromyko characterized the proposed group as being

"parallel," without specifying whether he meant parallel to the Dartmouth Conference or to official channels of contact. Assuming that Mr. Gromyko meant the former, Mr. Rockefeller repeated that his intention was not to establish yet another conference but to bring together a different type of group "tied into the highest levels of the two governments."

With this, Mr. Gromyko waved his hand, smiled, and said "O.k.--fine. Now here is one final question, an easy one. What, in your opinion has given rise to the warlike stance that your country--better your Administration--has taken vis-à-vis the Soviet Union?"

Mr. Rockefeller stated his belief that Americans are genuinely upset by actions taken by the Soviet Union and, rightly or wrongly, consider those actions hostile to the interests of the United States. This, he suggested, accounts for the stance of the Administration, although he suggested that it does not account for either the methods that have been adopted or the level of decibels with which that stance has been expressed.

Mr. Gromyko concluded the meeting by thanking his guests and expressing his pleasure at the opportunity to meet. "You should know," he stated, "that the Soviet Union has absolutely no hostile intentions regarding the United States. It has not sharpened its sword for you Americans, and it is not about to do so. If this is understood and accepted here, then all will be well."

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PERSONAL / EYES ONLY → Jack Matlock
eyes only
Oct 27, 1984

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

TO: RCM and JP
FROM: Jack Matlock
Bud and John:

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I have not had time to read all of Strobe
Talbott's book - and I presume you haven't
either. However, I have spot checked
some passages covering events of which
I was familiar and find them shocking
examples of indiscretion in the USG
at senior levels. I attach two such
for your attention.

The first is an example of leaking
direct quotation, from a highly-classified
cable with very limited distribution
(NODIS).

The second is even more egregious since
it includes details known only to senior
officials (unless they were indiscreet enough
to provide them to subordinates) and
were twisted in a way (either by the
leaker or by Talbott) to put the President
in a bad light.

Aside from the domestic political impli-
cations of such leaks, they greatly com-
plicate our ability to deal with the
Soviets in normal channels, since

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BY KML NARA DATE 6/25/10

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they indicate that anything said to us in confidence could find its way into print (probably out of context) in a short period of time.

The net result is that, in spilling our guts in public we not only provide the Soviets with insights into our interagency squabbles which gives them a tactical advantage, but also reinforces the enormous barrier that already exists to introducing some degree of candor into the dialogue.

There is no simple answer to this problem, of course. But unless we devise a better way to deal with it, we will face even greater problems ~~than~~ if we move into a more intensive negotiating pattern with the Soviets.

Jack
No about it.

Bud —

This kind of detail has to come from Bud. J

about formal adherence." He acknowledged that the idea also appealed to him "as a compromise to satisfy those in the Administration who have been pushing for renunciation [of SALT]."

Richard Perle pointed out that this was no time to be sending the Soviets mixed signals. Nor was it a good idea to give them a pretext for accusing the U.S. of playing fast and loose with the rules and procedures of SALT, which the Administration, thanks to Burt, had now publicly vowed not to undercut. Perle, who prided himself on being far tougher than Burt when it mattered, relished this opportunity to appear more reasonable and moderate on an issue that was purely tactical.

Burt also found it necessary to deal with a suggestion that the Administration should reopen at the SCC the old issue of the SS-19 and the Soviets' refusal nine years before to categorize it as a heavy missile. As another of his compromises, Burt decided to "lay down a marker showing that the SS-19 episode is an example of how the Soviets have distorted the spirit of agreements," but to do so through diplomatic channels rather than at the SCC in Geneva. Off went a cable to the U.S. embassy in Moscow instructing the chargé d'affaires, Jack Matlock, to inform the Soviet Foreign Ministry that certain activities in the past would not be acceptable in the future. He had a list with a number of "points of example." No. 1 on the list was the SS-19 as a violation of the spirit of the SALT I provision on heavy missiles. The SS-19 affair, said Matlock, "shows how an activity that runs contrary to declared interpretations can undermine confidence."

Matlock's host, Deputy Foreign Minister Georgi Kornienko, was incensed that the U.S. would bring up this dokhlyi vopros—this "rotten, stinking question" (the adjective *dokhlyi* is often used of carrion).

That was that. However it may have smelled to Kornienko, the issue had been aired, and Burt congratulated himself on finding a way to do it that did not further foul the atmosphere of the Standing Consultative Commission.

The Typhoon Codes and Rusty Barrels

It was just as well that the American SCC delegation was spared having to drag up at the session in May any extraneous and provocative pieces of old business. There was plenty of other business that was fully appropriate to the commission's agenda. The most delicate problem concerned the Soviets' employment of codes in the testing of their latest submarine-launched ballistic missile, designated by NATO the SS-NX-20, for the new Typhoon submarine.

SALT II prohibited any use of codes that "impeded" the other side's ability to monitor compliance with the treaty. Codes were not, however, banned altogether, since the Soviet Union insisted it had a right to protect

Example of providing direct quotation from a SECRET/NODIS cable to an unauthorized person.

(Undermines our ability to maintain confidentiality of our diplomatic exchanges, even when those involved are discreet.)

Literal quotations from cable.

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The State Department representatives, Burt and Howe, were willing to talk philosophy, too, but with a very different thrust from Perle's. Howe, a Navy man, spoke a number of times about the need to "rechart our course" and "trim our sails"—meaning, let's go for a far less ambitious agreement than the one the Administration had been seeking in START.

The meeting ended in the creation of yet another interagency committee that spent the next few months refining alternatives of the framework approach for eventual consideration by the National Security Council. The State Department, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff all had their preferred variations of the original Goodby plan, with minor adjustments and differences; ACDA and the Chiefs wanted a separate subceiling for heavy ICBMs at half the current Soviet level, while State was still trying to restrict heavies indirectly.* But what mattered was that Perle and the Office of the Secretary of Defense refused to join in the process, and did their best to block it.

Example of leaking to Talbott precise details of a matter known to very few in the bureaucracy.

Shultz wanted to suggest the framework approach to Andrei Gromyko during a meeting in Stockholm in mid-January, but he did not dare raise that possibility in the normal interagency process, where Perle would be waiting in ambush. So Shultz did something that hardly came naturally to him and that underscored the failure of Reagan's cherished goal (originally shared by Shultz) of governing by Cabinet consensus: Shultz bypassed the rest of the government and went directly to the President.

Burt and Howe had prepared a set of talking points for the meeting with Gromyko. The talking points included one page—No. 3 in the sheaf of papers that Shultz would take to Stockholm—outlining the framework approach. The other agencies submitted their own proposed talking points. By and large, they stressed American concern over Soviet compliance with SALT, asserted American flexibility in the vaguest terms, and invited the Soviets to show more flexibility of their own in START. Shultz took the whole batch to the President and McFarlane and displayed them as an example of how divided the government still was. Reagan asked in some exasperation, "Can't you just mix them together, George?" That, of course, had been the way out of previous interagency impasses.

Note Long had was designed to make the President look bad.

Shultz replied that he would, of course, stress to Gromyko those points on which all the agencies agreed, but that he needed "some kind of a hook

*Yet another variation of the framework approach was being promoted by Zbigniew Brzezinski. In a newspaper article at the end of January, he urged the Administration to shift "from a comprehensive agreement to a limited interim agreement, confined to a few aggregate categories"—strategic launchers and warheads. Reagan heard Brzezinski expound on this plan on a Sunday television talk show and telephoned him to say it sounded interesting. With this expression of presidential interest, the Brzezinski variant of the framework approach was added to those being considered in the interagency process.

in case Gromyko nibbles." Reagan was looking for diplomatic gestures that would be compatible with the tone he was setting in his January 16 speech, so he authorized Shultz to use Page 3 of the State Department talking points if Gromyko did nibble.

The five hours that Shultz spent with Gromyko in Stockholm were not a successful fishing expedition, at least on the issue of nuclear arms control. The negotiations on conventional arms reductions in Europe—the Mutual Balanced Force Reduction talks, which the Soviets had also suspended—might be resumed in Vienna in March, and the Administration prepared to see if progress could be made there. But on START and INF, Gromyko was so unforthcoming that Shultz felt unable to say more than that a comprehensive, "technical" agreement was proving elusive and so perhaps there should be a "conceptual" agreement first. This was as close as he felt he could appropriately come to making use of his presidential authorization to raise the possibility of the framework plan.

Not true //

After the Stockholm meeting, Shultz told McFarlane and Caspar Weinberger over breakfast how "tough and difficult" Gromyko had been on nuclear arms control. McFarlane expressed regret and frustration that Gromyko's attitude had made it impossible for Shultz to sound him out on "our new approach." McFarlane was careful not to call it a new proposal. Nonetheless, Weinberger pricked up his ears: the discussion confirmed his already aroused suspicion that the State Department had embarked on some new departure of its own.

"This is outrageous!" Perle complained when he learned what had happened. "The Office of the Secretary of Defense is entitled to a full read-out of that meeting! We're being steamrollered!" He began talking once again about resigning from the government.

Yet Burt and Howe were feeling anything but smug. They could hardly be complacent in the knowledge that the State Department was able to present its plans to the President only by hiding them from the Pentagon. As it was, Shultz had gotten only the vaguest of blessings from Reagan to explore new paths; there was no interagency consensus; without a consensus, there could be no concrete proposal; and without a proposal, the U.S. had little with which to lure the Soviets into a genuine negotiation.

!!

The President and his principal advisers, James Baker and Michael Deaver, were only dimly aware of the framework approach. Baker in particular, who was following the national-security debate more closely than others in the presidential inner circle, knew that Burt had plans to promote a new START position, but he did not regard the matter as pressing; if the debate required presidential adjudication, Baker was counting on McFarlane and the NSC staff to come up, as they had so often before, with a half-a-loaf compromise between the State Department and Pentagon posi-

tions. McFarlane's own view was that the U.S. must not seem too eager to make new concessions, especially in the face of Gromyko's intransigence in Stockholm; it was the Soviets' turn to move.

Andropov's death and replacement by Konstantin Chernenko was itself an occasion for fresh bickering in Washington. The State Department argued that the changing of the guard in the Kremlin presented a golden opportunity for a new American initiative; the Pentagon was inclined to the view that now, more than ever, the U.S. must hold to the line it had laid down so as to impress the new Soviet leadership with American consistency and resolve.

The White House itself saw the Soviet succession as an opportunity not so much for a change in policy as for an escalation in the rhetorical peace offensive. Vice-President George Bush traveled to Moscow to attend Andropov's funeral and to meet Chernenko. He proclaimed there that "the mood was good, the spirit was excellent. It signals that we can go from here." Reagan reiterated his heightened hopes for a summit.* He also stressed that the time had come for "quiet diplomacy" with the Soviets; proposals should be advanced and discussed behind closed doors, not proclaimed publicly.

These were welcome words to Shultz and Burt. But what those proposals might be, Reagan did not say. Indeed, Reagan did not know. He did know, however, that he did not want to be seen to be budging while the Soviets were still stonewalling. At an NSC meeting in late March, the President repeated a number of times that whatever new approaches he would allow his emissaries to explore, the U.S. would make "no preemptive concessions." Perle picked up the phrase and emphasized it in public as a presidential endorsement of his own dogged holding action against "progress for its own sake." The Soviets, meanwhile, were just as adamant that they would not budge unless and until the U.S. led the way with concrete concessions. Nor did they share the Administration's eagerness for movement before the American presidential election: they knew that progress of any kind, for any reason, could only help Reagan get reelected. When, therefore, Scowcroft traveled to Moscow in early March with a personal letter from Reagan to Chernenko proposing what amounted to a back channel at the highest level, the Soviet leader refused to see him, and Scowcroft declined to meet with one of Andrei Gromyko's aides instead.

Again - the leaks were used by Talbott to put the President in a bad light. (No wonder Mandale saw fit to cite the book during the debate!)

*He did so, however, in terms not likely to entice the Soviets. Meeting with American reporters over breakfast shortly after Chernenko's rise to supreme power, Reagan commented, "I've never been in Marine One [the White House helicopter] flying at a low altitude over our cities and looking down at the homes that our working people live in without fantasizing what it would be like to have Soviet leaders with me and be able to point down and say, 'That's where the workers of America live; they live like that; how long are you going to cling to that system of yours that can't provide anything like that for your people?'"

MARTIN

~~XXXXXXXXXX~~

Ms. Dwyer

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Oct. 84 65

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Jack F. Matlock Jr.
~~Room 300, C-111~~

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National Security Council
The White House

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System # _____

Package # _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Paul Thompson	_____	_____	_____
Bob Kimmitt	_____	_____	_____
John Poindexter	1	<i>J</i>	_____
Tom Shull	_____	_____	_____
Wilma Hall	_____	_____	_____
Bud McFarlane	2	<i>M</i>	_____
Bob Kimmitt	_____	_____	_____
NSC Secretariat	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
<i>JP</i>	3	<i>J</i>	_____

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____

(Date/Time)

*Bud,
I ask Jack to put this package together. I recommend you discuss with George and try to get him to agree. You could also make point about future Amb. to Moscow. (over)*

I think this contact should be made before the Arms Control person is named just so they have a heads up and understand context.

J

56A

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

October 29, 1984

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*SUBJECT: Thoughts on a Private Channel to the Soviet
Leadership

I have compiled some thoughts on the whys and hows of a private channel which may be useful to you in further discussions with Secretary Shultz and the President. They are at TAB 1. Also, I have made an initial stab at describing what I would recommend discussing in a private meeting, if it is decided to arrange one (TAB 2). The latter is very preliminary and is meant to be indicative of the way the issues would be discussed. Some of the talking points need to be elaborated in more detail (particularly those for contingency use), and some key points are subject to decision and guidance. (The more important of these are underlined.)

Even if the Soviets accept a request for a meeting, we should not expect immediate results. They will doubtless wish to feel their way a bit and to gain some experience before they rely totally on the pledges of confidentiality. But even in the early stages, it would provide them a vehicle for conveying messages if they choose to send some. The most useful thing we are likely to obtain initially, however, will be comments which will improve our ability to assess Soviet priorities among the various proposals they have made, as well as hints as to how some of our proposals could be framed to make them more palatable.

I am not sure of the reasons for Secretary Shultz's caution. If it is a fear of offending Gromyko, I would argue that the fear is misplaced: if Gromyko does not want the meeting to occur, it will not. It is more likely that he would find it acceptable since it does not violate jurisdictional distinctions as the Soviets interpret them. In any event, requesting the meeting will do nothing to complicate anything we have proposed.

If it would be helpful for me to be present when the matter is discussed (to answer questions about how it could be done and the way the Soviets look at the various issues involved), I of course will be glad to join you.

Attachments: As stated.

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A PRIVATE CHANNEL TO SOVIET LEADERSHIP:
Some Basic Considerations

Reasons for Channel:

- Need for mechanism to consult privately, informally, and off the official record.
- Need for a better feel for the factors entering into Soviet decision-making.
- Need for conveying our views to the Soviet leadership without the Foreign Ministry filter.
- Need for total confidentiality, the best insurance for which is that the public and the bureaucracy be unaware that the channel exists.

Possible Modes:

- Use of Ambassadors in both capitals.

[While this is probably the best arrangement in theory, it is not immediately available to us because of Soviet bureaucratic hang-ups. It would, additionally, require an Ambassador who is and is believed by the Soviets to be an "insider" in the decision-making process and who can deal with all the issues comfortably in Russian -- some important Soviet interlocutors are not comfortable in English and introducing interpreters undermines the informality necessary and discourages candor.]

- Use of someone thoroughly familiar with the President's thinking and the decision-making process in Washington, but outside the normal structure for diplomatic contact.

[The first qualification is necessary to ensure the reliability of the messages we send, and the accuracy of feed-back; the second to get around Soviet "turf" considerations. The latter are minimized when the contact appears to be "counterpart to counterpart."

- Use of a "special negotiator" from outside the USG.

[Potentially useful for discussions in a particular, well-defined area, but less so for broader discussions since a person not a part of the policy-making machinery would be hampered in interpreting and reacting to comments on the

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whole range of problems. It also runs a greater risk of becoming public knowledge.]

-- Use of intermediaries for specific messages.

[Useful in arranging specific deals which are delicate for one or the other side (e.g., a prisoner exchange), but of limited utility for a broader discussion since it does not provide direct contact with persons active in the decision-making process.]

Soviet Attitudes

-- They understand the need for confidential and informal consultation and will desire it if and when they are serious about solving problems.

-- They would probably prefer to establish Dobrynin as the sole interlocutor, since this would serve their interest by giving them access to our decision-making process but denying the same to us.

-- Since we have made it clear that an exclusive role for Dobrynin is not acceptable, there are indications that the Soviets will probably accept informal contacts in another form.

-- "Knowledgeable" officials have been suggesting such since the beginning of the Reagan Administration (several approaches in 1981).

-- Central Committee officials have periodically sent "messages" via third parties, implicit invitations to initiate a dialogue.

-- We were informed earlier this year that White House/Central Committee contacts had been approved by the Politburo, including Gromyko.

-- The Soviets doubtless feel "burned" by some of the earlier efforts to communicate unofficially by other means.

-- The contact with Kampelman backfired for reasons which are unclear, but our selective briefing of Allies may have played a role, since knowledge of the contact was spread very widely among NATO delegations at Madrid, their home capitals and even their Embassies in Washington.

-- Publicity given the "walk in the woods" and the subsequent informal conversations between Nitze and Kvitsinsky is likely to make the Soviets hypercautious for some time to come in dealing with U.S. negotiators on the private level.

ul

-- The facts that the abortive Scowcroft mission became public knowledge and that private comments by Soviet diplomats in Washington to senior U.S. officials reach the press rapidly also act to reinforce Soviet doubts of our ability or willingness to keep any contact completely private.

-- Once the election is over, the Soviet suspicion that we seek contacts for their own sake (i.e., just to claim that we are negotiating for a public impact) will be attenuated. If we judge that a private channel would be useful to us, it would be a good time to try again.

Basic Operating Principles

-- A private channel should not be used as a substitute for any other mode of communication, but rather as a supplement which may help both sides to make formal channels as productive as possible.

-- Both sides must insure that everything discussed in the channel, and knowledge of its very existence, is kept scrupulously confidential.

[On our side this will require direct knowledge of the channel to be limited to a very small number of the most senior officials, probably designated by name, and with a strict injunction against mentioning it to anyone not on the list, including personal aides and secretaries. Illustratively, such a list might include, in addition to the President, the Vice President, the National Security Adviser and his deputy, the Secretary of State and the Undersecretary for Political Affairs, and our Ambassador in Moscow.]

-- It should be used for tactical policy guidance, not concrete negotiations or precise commitments. At most, commitments should be in contingent form (e.g., "if you do x, we will respond with y"). Any general understandings reached would be subject to confirmation and detailed negotiation in formal channels.

-- All positions taken in the "channel" -- including general guidelines for "personal remarks" -- should be cleared in advance by the Assistant to the President for National Security and the Secretary of State, and as regards the more important issues, by the President personally.

-- A clear understanding should be reached on these matters (except those relating to internal USG procedures) at the outset, and it should be made clear that establishing the "channel" does not imply an effort to bypass any principal policymaker in either country.

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Steps Necessary to Activate

If we decide that we wish to explore whether the Soviets are willing to allow private contacts between the White House staff and the Central Committee staff, we can initiate the matter as follows:

-- Request Ambassador Hartman, by secure telephone, to pass a message to Zagladin that we do not fully understand some of the comments passed by his staff recently to us, and if he agrees, we feel a meeting might be useful.

-- If the Soviets want to pursue the contact, he will respond favorably and set a date; if he does not we will know that the time is not ripe from their point of view.

-- If Zagladin accepts, arrangements could be made to travel to Moscow for consultation with the Embassy (perhaps as part of a trip with other stops).

-- If he prefers to meet here or somewhere in Western Europe, that also could be arranged.

-- After setting a date, the talking points could be developed, discussed, and cleared in detail.

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DRAFT TALKING POINTS FOR PRIVATE CONVERSATION
(Preliminary)

Introduction

-- I sought the appointment because some of the messages sent recently to us (e.g. through Giffen) were not entirely clear by the time they got to us, and also because we feel a frank and completely private conversation about the future of our relations would be useful at this point.

-- In seeking this discussion, we want to make clear that we are not trying to supplant any of our normal channels of communication. But we think it will be useful to both sides to have a means of consulting privately and completely off the official record, as we try to find ways to narrow our differences.

-- One of the things that has made resolution of our differences difficult in the past has been excessive publicity of our respective positions. We think the time has come to find a way to deal candidly and off the record, in the hope that we can identify ways to proceed officially which will lead to productive results.

-- We will consider this conversation, and any that may follow, as totally private and unofficial, and will take great care that no mention of anything said reaches the public or the formal record.

-- At the same time, I will make every effort to explain the President's desires and ideas to you, and to convey to him and his closest associates any comments or suggestions you may wish to offer.

-- Now that our election is over, I trust that we can put to rest the suspicion that our earlier proposals were meant mainly for electoral effect. As we have said many times, they were not. Our policy is a steady one, and in fact the President has just received an overwhelming mandate from our voters to continue on that track.

-- The President wants me to reiterate what he told Minister Gromyko: he has no higher priority than lowering the level of nuclear weapons and forging a more productive relationship with the Soviet Union. Over the coming years, he will be playing a direct and active role in this process. Frank and informal comments and suggestions from your highest political authority will be of great use to him in devising mutually acceptable approaches. He hopes that we can use these conversations, along with those in more formal channels, to move the relationship forward.

-- It seems to us that we have reached important understandings on some very important basic principles. Mr. Gromyko described

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some as "the question of questions," and we agree. Among these are:

-- We both want to move our relations onto a more peaceful track.

-- We both agree that we must reduce the enormous stockpiles of weapons we possess.

-- We agree that this must be done without damage to the security of either side.

-- We agree that we must deal with each other on the basis of equality.

-- We agree that neither side can seek superiority over the other.

Are we correct in assuming agreement on these points?

-- [If answer is yes] Then it seems clear that our task is to find ways to implement principles upon which we already agree.

-- We have noted and carefully studied the various proposals Chairman Chernenko has made. Many of them have merit, if we can find the proper context for them.

-- We also have made numerous proposals, and obviously we think they all have great merit.

-- We have noted, however, that you seem to expect us to make move after move in advance of anything you do to improve the relationship. We have already made quite a few, to no appreciable effect. (List some)

-- Frankly, we think we have more right than the Soviet Union to ask for concrete steps to prove sincerity. In fact we haven't seen many.

-- But we must recognize that neither of us is going to respond to one-sided demands from the other. We must find a way to move in step toward narrowing our differences.

Defining Priorities

-- I'm prepared to give our current view of the specific issues before us. The President has of course studied carefully those mentioned in his correspondence with Chairman Chernenko, as well as the four issues Mr. Chernenko named in his Washington Post interview.

-- But before we get into the specifics, let me ask you frankly and directly, what precisely are you looking for? What do you want from us right now?

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[Respond and discuss as appropriate, but without going into too much detail on the individual questions.]

-- As for the President, I would list his agenda as follows:

-- Moderate and manage our competition in third areas, particularly the military aspects, which are the most dangerous. History demonstrates that failure to manage these issues can spill over into everything else. But we don't have in mind deals behind the backs of others or establishing spheres of influence. What we need at this point is at least an implicit understanding on mutual restraint. We probably couldn't codify the rules in writing to the satisfaction of both of us, but we can make a greater effort to understand the other's point of view. This is why we have proposed regular consultations on regional issues. Even if our specialists disagree on a lot of things, the pattern of consultation could help us manage our competition safely. We don't understand why you seem reluctant to agree. Maybe you could explain.

-- Reduce nuclear weapons and reach understandings which would either limit new technologies or provide for their introduction in an agreed, stabilizing fashion. We understand the positions you have taken regarding negotiations on nuclear weapons, and frankly we feel that they have brought us to a dead end in this crucial area. In proposing umbrella talks, we are trying to get us both out of that dead-end street. Do you have a problem with this proposal, and if so, what is it?

-- Improve our working relationship in a realistic manner. This includes such matters as observing the Helsinki Final Act, establishing agreed conditions for expanding trade, reviving cooperative agreements and improving contacts and the flow of information between our peoples. We've made a lot of proposals here, but you seem very reluctant to move ahead, even while accusing us of undermining what was achieved in the past.

-- Let me point out one thing about our proposals. None require any advance concessions on your part. In fact, we don't see any reason for you not to welcome them, if you are really interested in improving the relationship. Do you really have problems with them or have you simply not yet decided whether you are ready to deal with us or not?

[As regards Soviet proposals in general]

-- Surely you must recognize that some of your proposals have been designed to make them unacceptable to us. What are we to make of a demand that we remove our LRINF missiles before you will even talk to us about controlling nuclear weapons? Or

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demands for binding, ill-defined agreements before talks can even begin on weapons in space? You know these are non-starters.

-- Now, if you are serious, let's try to figure out a way we can get around these artificial "obstacles."

The Specific Issues

[Here we will need fairly detailed points to be made -- and contingency points to use in discussion. The following is just a rather cryptic start. Underlined formulations require further discussion and specific decisions.]

Umbrella Talks

-- Describe the concepts and the objectives as we would define them and press for reaction and comment.

-- Mention identity of person President is considering placing in charge.

Chernenko's Four Suggestions:

-- Given cooperation on your part, two of them should be doable (TTBT and Space talks--see details below), but you know very well that the freeze and no-first-use committment are not acceptable.

-- Regarding the freeze proposal, we really can't believe you are serious. You must understand the problems of verifying production as thoroughly as we do, and as for the rest, it is clearly better to negotiate on reductions.

-- You also understand very well the place of nuclear weapons in NATO's deterrence strategy. We obviously are going to do nothing to undermine that strategy.

-- This does not mean that we would never consider discussing the possibility of some sort of "Code of Nuclear Conduct." We already have a "Prevention of Nuclear War" agreement. And we consider the non-use-of-force provisions of the UNCharter and the Helsinki Final Act binding in respect to nuclear first strikes. Could you be more specific about what you are looking for here?

-- [If he indicates that negotiations on a "Code of Nuclear Conduct" might be an inducement to resume negotiations on nuclear weapons:] So long as it is understood that we must reserve the right to respond to a conventional attack on us or our Allies with nuclear weapons if this should prove necessary to avert defeat, we would consider the possibility of discussing such a "Code" in conjunction with broader arms control talks which included negotiations on reducing nuclear weapons.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

INF

-- We have not forgotten the issue and would like to solve it.

-- The basic issue is political: we must avoid decoupling U.S. and West European nuclear security. We do not regard this as contrary to Soviet security interests. Indeed, a decoupling could ultimately create a destabilized Europe with trends contrary to Soviet interests. If they do not feel protected by American nuclear forces, how long do you think the Germans will continue to renounce an independent deterrent of their own? Do you really want to run the risk of this issue emerging in a decade or two? You have as much interest in the coupling of American and West European security, over the longer run, as we do.

-- Now clearly, we cannot agree to an arrangement which has a decoupling effect. Therefore, we cannot agree to any of the following:

- removal of deployed missiles without an agreement;
- a change in the deployment timetable without an agreement;
- counting British and French systems;
- zero for us and something for you.

-- Otherwise, we are flexible. Note President's proposals of September, 1983.

-- Personally, I think we ought to take another look at the "walk-in-the-woods" formula. That is in the negotiating ball park. If you are interested, we would certainly be willing to give it another look.

-- We might also consider ways in which you could reduce your SS-20's and NATO would halt its deployments at a point when both sides are in balance.

-- The problem is not so much finding the right formula as agreeing on what the end result should be. Our only desire is for an equitable solution with levels as low as possible. If you can agree to that, I'm sure our negotiators can find a formula to reflect it.

START

-- Our thinking has evolved.

-- Willing to take Soviet concerns into account.

-- Examine potential for trade-offs and the build-down concept, as processes which might be useful in bridging our differences.

-- We are willing to put forward specific ideas when you are willing to listen and take them seriously.

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SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

-- Umbrella talks would be a good place for this.

[If question raised regarding the possibility of combining INF and START]

-- We feel we could reach agreement faster if we stay with the negotiations as they have already been defined.

-- If that impossible, we would not exclude some change in the negotiating format.

-- Appropriate subject for umbrella talks.

Space

-- Review our current position and readiness to sit down any time without preconditions.

-- Reiterate that progress will be difficult unless we can find way to deal with nuclear weapons concurrently.

-- Re moratorium, if he raises, ask if this is a precondition, and point out that while a precondition is unacceptable, we have already agreed to discuss what measures of mutual restraint would be appropriate during the negotiations.

-- These are also appropriate subjects for umbrella talks.

TTBT/PNET

-- Problem is improving possibilities for verification so that the treaty can be ratified without reservations.

-- This need not necessarily involve a change in the text. An exchange of delegations, as we have proposed, could provide improved means for verification. Or we could agree on certain measures which would come into effect when the treaties are ratified.

-- If you are willing to discuss how this problem can be resolved and cooperate in solving it, then it should not be too difficult to create conditions which would make ratification possible.

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