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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 3/22/2005

File Folder MATLOCK CHRON SEPTEMBER 1984 (3/5)

FOIA

F06-114/1

Box Number 6

YARHI-MILO

603

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
6124	MEMO	MEMO FOR ROBERT MCFARLANE RE PRESIDENT REAGAN'S MEETING WITH GROMYKO: ATTENDANCE [1-2] R 2/26/2009 GUIDELINES - MO8-125/2	2	9/14/1984	B1
6125	MEMO	MEMO FOR ROBERT MCFARLANE RE PROPOSED PRESIDENTIAL LUNCH FOR SOVIET SPECIALISTS [3-4] PAR 3/3/2011 F2006-114/1	2	9/17/1984	B1 B3
6126	LIST	SUGGESTED GUEST LIST LUNCHEON MEETING ON US-SOVIET RELATIONS [6] PAR 3/3/2011 F2006-114/1	1	ND	B1 B3
6132	MEMO	MEMO FOR ROBERT MCFARLANE RE REVIEW OF GRANI MAGAZINE INTERVIEW [7-8] R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1	2	9/18/1984	B1
6135	MEMO	MEMO FOR ROBERT MCFARLANE RE SHULTZ-DOBRYNIN MEETING SEPTEMBER 18 [9] R 3/3/2011 F2006-114/1	1	9/18/1984	B1
6136	MEMO	MEMO FOR PRESIDENT REAGAN FROM ROBERT MCFARLANE RE SHULTZ-DOBRYNIN MEETING, SEPTEMBER 17, 1984 [10] R 3/3/2011 F2006-114/1	1	9/17/1984	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

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JET 3/22/2005

File Folder MATLOCK CHRON SEPTEMBER 1984 (3/5)

FOIA

F06-114/1

Box Number 6

YARHI-MILO

603

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
6137	MEMO	MEMO FOR PRESIDENT REAGAN FROM GEORGE SHULTZ RE SHULTZ-DOBRYNIN MEETING [11-12] R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1	2	9/17/1984	B1
6138	MEMO	MEMO FOR ROBERT MCFARLANE RE SHULTZ-DOBRYNIN MEETING SEPTEMBER 18 [15] PAR 3/3/2011 F2006-114/1	1	9/18/1984	B1
6139	MEMO	MEMO FOR ROBERT MCFARLANE RE BREAKFAST MEETING [16] R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1	1	9/18/1984	B1
6140	MEMO	MEMO FOR ROBERT MCFARLANE FROM CASPAR WEINBERGER RE ISSUE OF ARMS CONTROL IN PRESIDENT REAGAN'S UN SPEECH AND MEETING WITH GROMYKO [17-19] R 6/23/2010 M125/2	3	9/14/1984	B1
6141	MEMO	TALKING POINTS FOR MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR HARTMAN [22] R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1	1	ND	B1
6150	APPOINTMENTS	REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENTS [25]	1	9/21/1984	B6
6142	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #6141 [28] R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1	1	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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File Folder MATLOCK CHRON SEPTEMBER 1984 (3/5)

FOIA

F06-114/1

Box Number 6

YARHI-MILO

603

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
6143	LETTER	LETTER TO ROBERT MCFARLANE FROM CHARLES WICK RE USSR [32-34] R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1	3	9/19/1984	B1
6144	MEMO	MEMO FOR ROBERT MCFARLANE RE SHULTZ-DOBRYNIN MEETING SEPTEMBER 18 [36] (SAME AS 6138) PAR 3/3/2011 F2006-114/1	1	9/18/1984	B1
6149	MEMO	MEMO FOR ROBERT MCFARLANE RE POLICY ON SOVIET HARASSMENT OF US CITIZENS [48] R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1	1	9/21/1984	B1
6145	MEMO	MEMO FOR MICHAEL ARMACOST RE POLICY ON SOVIET HARASSMENT ON U.S. CITIZENS [49] R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1	1	9/6/1984	B1
6147	PROFILE SHEET	PROFILE SHEET RE AIR DEFENSE AND ABM RADAR [50] R 6/23/2010 M125/2	1	9/22/1984	B1
6148	E-MAIL	PROFS E-MAIL RE AIR DEFENSE AND ABM [51] R 6/23/2010 M125/2	1	9/22/1984	B1

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

September 14, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT: President's Meeting with Gromyko: Attendance

To provide the most effective atmosphere for the President's meeting with Gromyko, it will be important to hold attendance on our side to the minimum absolutely required to satisfy protocol requirements and provide a detailed record. The larger the gathering, the more tendency Gromyko will show to grandstand and strike poses.

I would anticipate that he will bring at least three persons, plus an interpreter, with him (we of course will have the list in advance, but that may not be until a couple of days before the meeting). I would expect him to bring Dobrynin, Makarov (his personal aide) and Deputy Minister Komplektov, plus Sukhodrev, his interpreter. We will have to have a few more, but we should hold the "excess" to a minimum.

These considerations, of course, do not apply to the prebrief or to the luncheon, although courtesy suggests that we should provide for a rough balance between the numbers in our party and the size of Gromyko's at the lunch. Thus, if the maximum at table is 20, I would recommend that we allow Gromyko at least eight.

Accordingly, I would recommend attendance on our side as follows:

Meeting: President
Secretary Shultz
Mr. McFarlane
Ambassador Hartman
Burt
Matlock
Interpreter

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 29, 1997
By *CS* NARA, Date *2/26/09*

✓

Prebrief:

The President
The Vice President (at his discretion)
Secretary Shultz
Secretary Weinberger (if he desires)
Mr. McFarlane
Admiral Poindexter
Ambassador Hartman
Undersecretary Armacost (if he desires)
Assistant Secretary Burt
Jack Matlock
Messrs. Meese, Baker, Deaver, at their discretion

Lunch:

The President
The Vice President
Secretary Shultz
Mr. Meese
Mr. Baker
Mr. Deaver
Mr. McFarlane
Admiral Poindexter or Undersecretary Armacost
Ambassador Hartman
Assistant Secretary Burt
Mr. Matlock
Interpreter

Gromyko plus seven

Recommendation:

That you arrange attendance at the meetings connected with the Gromyko visit on September 28 as listed above.

Approve ____

Disapprove ____

~~SECRET~~

6901

6125
Chen
3



MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

September 17, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT: Proposed Presidential Lunch for Soviet Specialists

As the President prepares for his meeting with Gromyko, he might find it useful to host a lunch to provide a means for discussing some of the broad issues with some outside specialists, along with a few from inside the Government who do not normally have access to him. Assuming that the maximum at table will be twenty, I would recommend the following guest list:

Senior Government Officials and Staff Members:

The President
The Vice President
Secretary Shultz
Mr. Meese
Mr. Baker
Mr. Deaver
Mr. McFarlane
Mr. Burt
Amb. Hartman
Mr. Matlock

"Outsiders":

(1) Persons who have dealt with Gromyko directly

Gen. Scowcroft
Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski
Helmut Sonnenfeldt (Brookings)
William Hyland (Editor, Foreign Affairs)
Walter J. Stoessel (former Ambassador to Moscow)

(2) Academic specialists knowledgeable on Soviet psychology

Dr. James Billington (Wilson Center)
Dr. Nina Tumarkin (Russian Research Center, Harvard)
Dr. Olin Robison (President, Middlebury College)
Dr. Richard Pipes (Harvard University)

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLRR F06-114/1 #6125
BY RW NARA DATE 3/3/11

~~SECRET~~

4

~~SECRET~~

2

(3) Government Officials

Robert Gates, CIA
Jeremy Azrael, State

[REDACTED]
Mark Palmer, State

This makes a total of 23, so that three could be considered alternates or as replacements for any you consider inappropriate. The list is a bipartisan one, since both Brzezinski and Robison are active Democrats (though I have not noted either very active in the campaign). You should also be aware that Dick Pipes has publically criticized the President's invitation to Gromyko (in a TV interview). Nevertheless, I believe it would be useful for the President to hear his observations.

I sum, I would suggest making Azrael, [REDACTED] and Palmer alternates, and including the others in the initial invitations.

Recommendation:

That you approve the Schedule Proposal at TAB I.

Approve ___ Disapprove ___

Attachment:

Tab I - Schedule Proposal

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(1)
FOIA(b)(3)

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SCHEDULE PROPOSAL

TO: FREDERICK J. RYAN, Director
 Presidential Appointments and Scheduling

FROM: Robert M. Kimmitt

REQUEST: Luncheon

PURPOSE: To review state of U.S.-Soviet Relations

BACKGROUND: It would be useful for the President to discuss the state of U.S.-Soviet Relations with a group of specialists from outside the Government before his meeting with Gromyko.

PREVIOUS PARTICIPATION: None with this specific group

DATE & TIME: September 22, 1984; 1:00 P.M.

LOCATION: Family Dining Room

PARTICIPANTS: See attached list

OUTLINE OF EVENTS: President greets guests and invites informal discussion of U.S.-Soviet relations during lunch

REMARKS REQUIRED: To be supplied

MEDIA COVERAGE: None; staff photographer

RECOMMENDED BY: Robert C. McFarlane

OPPOSED BY: None

PROJECT OFFICER: Robert M. Kimmitt/Jack F. Matlock

b1 24 10

LUNCHEON MEETING ON US-SOVIET RELATIONS

Suggested Guest List

The President
The Vice President
Secretary Shultz
Mr. Meese
Mr. Baker
Mr. Deaver
Mr. McFarlane
Richard R. Burt, Assistant Secretary of State
Amb. Arthur A. Hartman
Jack F. Matlock, NSC

Gen. Brent Scowcroft
Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski
Helmut Sonnenfeldt (Brookings)
William Hyland (Editor, Foreign Affairs)
Walter J. Stoessel (former Ambassador to Moscow)
Dr. James Billington (Wilson Center)
Dr. Nina Tumarkin (Russian Research Center, Harvard)
Dr. Olin Robison (President, Middlebury College)
Dr. Richard Pipes (Harvard Univeristy)
Robert Gates, CIA

Alternates:

Dr. Jeremy Azrael, State
[REDACTED]
Robie Mark Palmer, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State

(1)
FOIA(b)(3)

Matlock
Chen
7

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

September 18, 1984

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: JOHN LENCZOWSKI JL

SUBJECT: Review of Grani Magazine Interview

My recommendations for changes in this interview are restricted to the answer to the first question.

Somewhere in this answer, some explicit distinction should be made between Russia and the Soviet Union. What is missing is that taboo word "communism." When the President said "evil empire," he was referring to the communist system and not the Russian nation. Without this distinction, this answer just beats around the bush. I suggest the following wording be inserted following the third paragraph on page 2:

The President most emphatically does not see the Russian people or the Russian nation as an "evil empire." What he was referring to was the communist system which has victimized the Russians in its efforts to crush their culture, religion, historical traditions, and human rights. It is communism and its aggressive actions that pose a threat to the United States and the Free World. It is this threat against which the United States is committed to defend itself. Without communism, there would be no necessary reason why the United States should expect any threat from the land of the Russians, whose traditional concerns have no cause to extend to the Western Hemisphere.

cc: Jack Matlock
Walt Raymond
Steve Sestanovich

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
NLRREF06-114/1 #6132
BY CS NARA DATE 11/27/07

This is not a naive belief. In Russia, for example, didn't the February Revolution show that there are always pressures for change in any national tradition? These pressures were in fact rather great in the generation prior to 1917: they had already produced major changes in Russian politics and society. It seems likely to me that, given a chance to develop, they would have had far-reaching positive effects. In fact, had they been allowed to unfold fully, they would have become part of what we mean today by "the Russian tradition."

The Soviet regime cut your democratic development short. To my mind what that shows is not the true character of Russian tradition. It proves (which hardly needed proving!) that a state with all power in its hands can thwart pressures for democratic change.

We believe, in short, that Russians have as much right to govern themselves, and as much ability to do so, as any other people.

Finally, your term "THE enemy" leads me to remind you that, whatever difficulties may exist today in US-Soviet relations, Americans don't aspire to a relationship of confrontation. To the contrary, as the world's two greatest powers, our first (and shared) responsibility is to keep the peace. This was the message of President Reagan's speech on January 16 of this year.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

September 18, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *SM*

SUBJECT: Shultz-Dobrynin Meeting September 18

Secretary Shultz has submitted the memorandum to the President at Tab A reporting on his meeting with Dobrynin yesterday.

The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the meetings with Gromyko next week. Dobrynin was very general in his comments on what Gromyko would want to discuss, mentioning only an "appraisal of the US-Soviet relationship," issues in the correspondence with Chernenko and "the demilitarization of outer space."

You should note also that Dobrynin stated that Gromyko would be available in the afternoon for another meeting with Secretary Shultz, if desired. The Secretary left the question open, but we should do some preliminary thinking about what criteria we should apply in deciding whether there should be a final meeting with Shultz the afternoon of the 28th.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the attached memorandum to the President.

Approve ___ Disapprove ___

Attachments:

Tab I - Memorandum to the President

Tab A - Shultz-President Memorandum of September 17, 1984

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR F06-114/1 #635
BY RW NARA DATE 3/3/11

~~SECRET~~

6136

10

MEMORANDUM

SYSTEM II
90981

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

SUBJECT: Secretary Shultz's Meeting with Dobrynin,
September 17, 1984

Secretary Shultz has submitted the attached memorandum (Tab A) on his meeting with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin yesterday.

The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the meetings with Gromyko next week. Dobrynin was very general in his comments on what Gromyko would want to discuss, mentioning only an "appraisal of the U.S.-Soviet relationship," issues in the correspondence with Chernenko and "the demilitarization of outer space."

You should note also that Dobrynin stated that Gromyko would be available in the afternoon for another meeting with Secretary Shultz, if desired. George left the question open, and we should do some preliminary thinking about what criteria to apply in deciding whether George should agree to a follow-up meeting after the meeting and lunch with you.

Attachment:

Tab A - Memorandum from Secretary Shultz of September 17, 1984

Prepared by:
Jack F. Matlock

cc: The Vice President

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/1 #6136

BY 011 10/11/84

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

September 17, 1984

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

DECLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

NLRR FOI 114/1 #6137

FROM: George P. Shultz *WMS*BY *CV* NARA DATE *11/27/07*

SUBJECT: My Meeting Today With Ambassador Dobrynin

Looking toward our upcoming meetings with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko, I called in Ambassador Dobrynin today. I told him you are looking forward to your meeting with Gromyko in order to discuss your views of the US-Soviet relationship and your hopes for the future. I said you would also probably want to discuss arms control issues, particularly those raised in conjunction with the Vienna talks proposal, some regional questions, human rights, and bilateral topics.

Dobrynin reported that following his vacation, Gromyko was also eager to talk with us. He essentially accepted my agenda, but did ask if you really needed to raise human rights. I responded that you did and that you would want to explain to Gromyko why they were important to us. Dobrynin said Gromyko would want to give you his appraisal of the US-Soviet relationship and to address the issues raised in your correspondence with Chernenko.

In discussing plans for my meeting with Gromyko in New York, I told Dobrynin we would want to go through our agenda in some detail, as Gromyko and I had usefully done in Stockholm. I also told him that we believed their Vienna Talks proposal had held some promise as a way of organizing discussions on the issues involved, and offered some hope of reenergizing our negotiations; we should therefore pick up on these discussions again, this time in private. Dobrynin replied that they were interested in talking about the demilitarization of outer space and he probed for further indications of our thinking.

We discussed modalities of both meetings. I confirmed that you would meet with Gromyko from 10:00 to 12:00 on Friday and then host a lunch for him. Dobrynin said that he and First Deputy Foreign Minister Korniyenko would sit in on the meeting (and, of course, lunch). He asked if I was considering a second session with Gromyko before he left, noting that Gromyko would be available Friday afternoon and until late afternoon on Saturday, when he had to leave Washington for return to Moscow. I confirmed I would be available in that period, and we agreed that an additional meeting could be arranged if needed.

12

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

- 2 -

Finally, I raised the question of the five Americans detained several days ago on the Siberian coast. I emphasized the men should be released right away so that their detention does not become an irritant in our relationship. Dobrynin noted that our Embassy had been in telephone contact with the captain of the vessel earlier today, but he clearly registered my point, saying that he also hoped the issue would be resolved quickly.

National Security Council
The White House

13

84 SEP 25 9:20

System # _____

Package # _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Paul Thompson	1	[Signature]	
Bob Kimmitt	2	K	
John Poindexter			
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room			
Malloch	3		I

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: (VP) Meese Baker Deaver Other Thompson

COMMENTS Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

Per our discussion

14

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

September 19, 1984

~~SECRET~~ Attachment

TO: Paul Thompson

Attached is the most recent example of a memorandum I was asked to prepare, only to have it almost immediately returned with an "OBE" notation.

I hope you will be able to institute some kind of system which will avoid this type of time-consuming effort, especially with so many other urgent matters at hand.

Jack Matlock

cc: John Poindexter
Bob Kimmitt

~~SECRET~~ Attachment

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

10/29/85

Jack: Bud gets an advance copy of all Cabinet correspondence. On rare occasion, he sends it directly to President. If I learn of it, I will inform staff via Secretariat ASAP -- though often I learn of it after the fact. In no way is this a reflection on Paul (who was gone last week); if anyone is to blame, it is I. Bob 9/25

Matlock 11/38 15

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

File

SECRET/SENSITIVE

September 18, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT: Shultz-Dobrynin Meeting September 18

Secretary Shultz has submitted the memorandum to the President at Tab A reporting on his meeting with Dobrynin yesterday.

The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the meetings with Gromyko next week. Dobrynin was very general in his comments on what Gromyko would want to discuss, mentioning only an "appraisal of the US-Soviet relationship," issues in the correspondence with Chernenko and "the demilitarization of outer space."


You should note also that Dobrynin stated that Gromyko would be available in the afternoon for another meeting with Secretary Shultz, if desired. The Secretary left the question open, but we should do some preliminary thinking about what criteria we should apply in deciding whether there should be a final meeting with Shultz the afternoon of the 28th.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the attached memorandum to the President.

Approve Disapprove

OBE: Bud sent copy to Pres



Attachments:

RM 9/18

Tab I - Memorandum to the President

Tab A - Shultz-President Memorandum of September 17, 1984

*As Attached
Sec. 3.3 (b)(1)
E.O. 12958
1952b*

SECRET/SENSITIVE
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLRR FOI-11411#6138
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~~MATLOCK~~ 76
Chron

MEMORANDUM

SYSTEM II
90984

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

September 18, 1984

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT: Your Breakfast Meeting, September 19, 1984

Not discussed
gave copy of UNGA speech to Cap & Georg
calling comment by col today
9-19-84

~~Gromyko Meetings~~: Defense has asked that this be a topic at the meeting and Secretary Shultz may argue that we need more arms control "substance" in the meeting, or in the President's UNGA speech, or both.

Secretary Weinberger's views regarding the UNGA speech were summarized in his September 14 letter to you (Tab I).

Secretary Shultz is being urged by his staff to press for something more than we have a present, in both the UNGA speech and the private meetings, such as (1) an announcement that the President will go to Helsinki on the anniversary of the signing of the Final Act next year, and (2) a proposal to institutionalize regional consultations. (I have no strong objections to either of these, but I don't think they buy us very much.) He may also wish to discuss the "emissary" or standing commission ideas.

I would recommend that, if the topic of the Gromyko meetings is raised, you summarize the status of preparations as they now stand and raise any remaining substantive issues which you consider appropriate for the occasion.

Attachment:

Tab I - Secretary Weinberger's Memorandum of September 14.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
NLR 906-1141, #6139
BY CW NARA DATE 11/27/07

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SYSTEM II
90976

6140



WASHINGTON, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

PC 3

14 SEP 1984

Bud

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: The Issue of Arms Control in the President's UN Speech and in His Meeting with Gromyko (U)

(S) What needs to be done now at the UN and with Gromyko is quite different from the issue before us when we responded to the possibility of Vienna talks in September. At this time, we can and should take a broader, longer-term view, seeking to reshape US-Soviet relations on arms control in a more fundamental way.

(S) Given the present turmoil and uncertainty at the top of the Soviet government, and given the proximity of our elections, I believe it would be a mistake to use the forthcoming meeting with Gromyko or the UN speech to present specific, short-term arms proposals to the Soviets. Specific proposals aimed at the next six to twelve months of negotiations can be presented far more effectively after the elections.

(S) The theme of the "arms control" part of the President's UN speech (and of his discussion with Gromyko) should be a broad one. We should stress the need to develop a long-term charter for US-Soviet relations in general and for arms control in particular. In other words, we first need a program for arms control before we need more arms control proposals.

(S) Specifically, the President's speech at the United Nations should present the following themes:

- The United States, the Soviet Union, and other major powers, must make a fresh effort to advance the prospects for peace and disarmament.
- The diplomacy of arms control has focussed a great deal on proposals and counter-proposals for various measures, and on the many differences of the proposed measures, without being able to develop common long-term objectives. To realize the potential promise of genuine arms control, the nations will have to take a long journey together. They must agree on a common road map. The ultimate, and only really important objective is to secure a real and a major reduction in arms of all kinds, down to levels of parity, and all agreements must be fully verifiable.

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR Mo8-175/2 #6140
BY KML NARA DATE 6/25/10

SEC DEF CONTR No. X32

- The United States is ready to meet with the Soviet Union (and with other powers as appropriate) to develop a plan for disarmament and for strengthening the peace that will take us into the next century. This plan should guide us on the steps we must take the first few years, and beyond, and it will show the goals we should reach in five years, in ten years, and at the end of this century. We need to insure that the arms reduction measures we manage to agree on will have a cumulative effect, that they can survive moments of crisis and tension, and that they will truly lead to a safer world. In the last two decades, there were many prolonged arms control negotiations and quite a few agreements. But as we total up this whole effort, we find that progress fell far short of our hopes. None of them really reduced arms. Most provided for some attempts to limit the ratio of expansion, but along the lines desired by the Soviets. The necessary consensus on this broad objective was in fact lacking; and even some other agreements that we signed were violated.

- It is also essential for long-term progress on arms control to agree on a steady reduction in military secrecy. (Explain why movement to an "open world" is critical for arms control verification.) To make possible the progressive implementation of a long-term arms control program leading to a safer peace, the US proposes a comprehensive schedule to move towards an "open world." This should include:
 - o An agreed calendar for specific reductions in secrecy measures for the next twenty years.
 - o A commitment to move ahead, far more vigorously than has been the case, with negotiations on military observers and exchange visits.
 - o An annual exchange of military five-year plans, subject to JCS and DCI review and approval.

- Thus, the arms control program "for the journey towards a safe peace at the beginning of the next century" will have three elements: (1) the series of cumulative arms reduction measures, (2) a schedule to reduce secrecy, and (3) full verifiability of everything agreed on.

(U) If you feel that these above suggestions would serve the President's objectives, you might want to task someone to see how they might be phrased as part of the UN speech.

Sap.

c
D

6924 re-do

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

September 18, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT: President's Meeting with Ambassador Hartman
(Friday, September 21 - 11:30 a.m.)

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum from you to the President for his meeting with Ambassador Hartman, scheduled for Friday, September 21.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the memorandum at Tab I.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments:

- Tab I Meeting memorandum
- Tab A Talking Points/cards
- Tab II Background

cy Martin

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

21

6924

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR ARTHUR HARTMAN

DATE: September 21, 1984
LOCATION: Oval Office
TIME: 11:30 a.m. to 12:00 noon
FROM: ROBERT C. McFARLANE

I. PURPOSE:

To review U.S.-Soviet relations with Ambassador Hartman.

II. BACKGROUND:

The meeting will give the President the opportunity to discuss the current state of U.S.-Soviet relations in advance of his meeting with Gromyko.

III. PARTICIPANTS:

The President
Secretary of State George P. Shultz
Robert C. McFarlane
Ambassador Arthur A. Hartman
Jack F. Matlock, NSC
Messrs. Meese, Baker and Deaver, at their discretion

IV. PRESS PLAN:

White House photo.

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS:

The President greets Amb. Hartman and initiates a discussion of the current state of U.S.-Soviet relations.

Attachment:

Tab A Talking Points/card

Prepared by:
Jack F. Matlock

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 27, 1997
By CRJ NARA, Date 6/10/06

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TALKING POINTS

- Glad you're available for consultation before my meeting with Gromyko next week.
- Do you think Gromyko will have anything new to say?
- How do you think we can best get them back in a negotiating mode, without running after them or making substantive concessions in advance?
- Do you think Chernenko will last much longer?
- Is Gorbachev (GOR-BAH-CHOF) likely to succeed him? What sort of a leader would he be?
- I understand that the Soviet regime has made a lot of propaganda about our hostile intent, and that the Russian people are frightened. What can we do about this, to set the record straight?

MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR HARTMAN

- GLAD YOU'RE AVAILABLE FOR CONSULTATION BEFORE MY MEETING WITH GROMYKO NEXT WEEK.
- DO YOU THINK GROMYKO WILL HAVE ANYTHING NEW TO SAY?
- HOW DO YOU THINK WE CAN BEST GET THEM BACK IN A NEGOTIATING MODE, WITHOUT RUNNING AFTER THEM OR MAKING SUBSTANTIVE CONCESSIONS IN ADVANCE?
- DO YOU THINK CHERNENKO WILL LAST MUCH LONGER?
- IS GORBACHEV (GOR-BAH-CHOF) LIKELY TO SUCCEED HIM? WHAT SORT OF A LEADER WOULD HE BE?
- I UNDERSTAND THAT THE SOV REGIME HAS MADE A LOT OF PROPAGANDA ABOUT OUR HOSTILE INTENT, & THAT THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE ARE FRIGHTENED. WHAT CAN WE DO ABOUT THIS, TO SET RECORD STRAIGHT?

DECLASSIFIED/RELEASED

NLRR F06-114/1 #6141

BY CJS NARA DATE 11/27/07

6924
23

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

9/14/84

20

MEMORANDUM

TO: ROBERT MCFARLANE

FROM: FREDERICK J. RYAN, JR. *FJR*

SUBJ: APPROVED PRESIDENTIAL ACTIVITY

MEETING: with Ambassador Arthur Hartman

DATE: September 21, 1984

TIME: 11:30 am

DURATION: 30 minutes

LOCATION: Oval Office

REMARKS REQUIRED: Talking points to be covered in briefing paper

MEDIA COVERAGE: If any, coordinate with Press Office

FIRST LADY PARTICIPATION: No

NOTE: PROJECT OFFICER, SEE ATTACHED CHECKLIST

- | | | |
|---------------|-------------------|------------|
| cc: R. Darman | J. Rosebush | R. Kimmitt |
| R. Deprospero | R. Scouten | |
| B. Elliott | B. Shaddix | |
| D. Fischer | W. Sittmann | |
| C. Fuller | L. Speakes | |
| W. Henkel | WHCA Audio/Visual | |
| E. Hickey | WHCA Operations | |
| G. Hodges | A. Wrobleski | |
| C. McCain | Nell Yates | |
| B. Oglesby | | |

24

MSG FROM: NSRMK --CPUA TO: NSGVE --CPUA
To: NSPBT --CPUA

09/15/84 10:32:56

~~SECRET~~

NOTE FROM: Robert M. Kimmitt
SUBJECT: longrange readout

1. #5865 Mtg with Air Force Association Enlisted Council - Outstanding Airmen of 1984. Approved for administrative time for the week of September 17-21. Request came from elsewhere in the White House and will be handled by other WH entity. Info Linhard.

2. #5776 Presidential address at Air Force Association Convention Dinner - turned down. Info Linhard.

3. #6818 Diplomatic Credentials Ceremony - scheduled for October 15 at 4:30pm for 30 minutes. Date may shift pending decision on Presidential political travel that week, but planning should begin based on Oct. 15 date. Action Martin.

4. #6786 Mtg with President Fernando Belaunde of Peru - decision deferred pending schedule of 1st Presidential debate. Deaver will advise early next week. Action Burghardt.

5. #6815 Mtg with Ambassador Hartman - scheduled for September 21 at 11:30am for 30 minutes in the Oval Office. Action Matlock.

6. #6612 Mtg with Japanese Finance Minister Noboru Takeshita - approved as brief meeting at the hotel prior to IMF address on September 25. Action Sigur.

7. #6056 redo - Mtg with U.S. National Committee for Pacific Economic Cooperation - scheduled for Tuesday, September 18 at 9:45am for 10 minutes in the Rose Garden. Action Sigur and Martin.

cc: NSRA	--CPUA	NSFEG	--CPUA
NSGVE	--CPUA	NSCEC	--CPUA
NSTCS	--CPUA	NSCMB	--CPUA
NSJMD	--CPUA	NSWGH	--CPUA
NSDFP	--CPUA	NSWFM	--CPUA

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 29, 1997
By Ad NARA, Date 6/10/02

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

September 18, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JGM*SUBJECT: President's Meeting with Ambassador Hartman
(Friday, September 21 - 11:30 a.m.)

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum from you to the President for his meeting with Ambassador Hartman, scheduled for Friday, September 21.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the memorandum at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I Meeting memorandum
Tab A Talking Points/cards

DECLASSIFIED

By *CVJ* NARA, Date *6/10/02*
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR ARTHUR HARTMAN

DATE: September 21, 1984
 LOCATION: Oval Office
 TIME: 11:30 A.M. to 12:00 noon
 FROM: ROBERT C. McFARLANE

I. PURPOSE:

To review U.S.-Soviet relations with Ambassador Hartman.

II. BACKGROUND:

The meeting will give the President the opportunity to discuss the current state of U.S.-Soviet relations in advance of his meeting with Gromyko.

III. PARTICIPANTS:

The President
 Robert C. McFarlane
 Ambassador Hartman
 Jack F. Matlock, NSC
 Meese, Baker, Deaver, at their discretion

IV. PRESS PLAN:

Release White House staff photo.

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS:

The President greets Amb. Hartman and initiates a discussion of the current state of U.S.-Soviet relations.

Attachment:

Tab A Talking Points/card

Prepared by:
Jack F. Matlock

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By CW NARA, Date 6/10/02

28

TALKING POINTS

- Glad you're available for consultation before my meeting with Gromyko next week.
- Do you think Gromyko will have anything new to say?
- How do you think we can best get them back in a negotiating mode, without running after them or making substantive concessions in advance?
- Do you think Chernenko will last much longer?
- Is Gorbachev (GOR-BAH-CHOF) likely to succeed him? What sort of a leader would he be?
- I understand that the Soviet regime has made a lot of propaganda about our hostile intent, and that the Russian people are frightened. What can we do about this, to set the record straight?


MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR HARTMAN

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DECLASSIFIED/RE(CASD)

NLRRF06-1141 #6142

BY CV NARA DATE 11/27/07



6924
29

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

9/14/84

MEMORANDUM

TO: ROBERT MCFARLANE

FROM: FREDERICK J. RYAN, JR. *FJR*

SUBJ: APPROVED PRESIDENTIAL ACTIVITY

MEETING: with Ambassador Arthur Hartman

DATE: September 21, 1984

TIME: 11:30 am

DURATION: 30 minutes

LOCATION: Oval Office

REMARKS REQUIRED: Talking points to be covered in briefing paper

MEDIA COVERAGE: If any, coordinate with Press Office

FIRST LADY
PARTICIPATION: No

NOTE: PROJECT OFFICER, SEE ATTACHED CHECKLIST

- | | | |
|---------------|-------------------|------------|
| cc: R. Darman | J. Rosebush | R. Kimmitt |
| R. Deprospero | R. Scouten | |
| B. Elliott | B. Shaddix | |
| D. Fischer | W. Sittmann | |
| C. Fuller | L. Speakes | |
| W. Henkel | WHCA Audio/Visual | |
| E. Hickey | WHCA Operations | |
| G. Hodges | A. Wrobleski | |
| C. McCain | Nell Yates | |
| B. Oglesby | | |

MSG FROM: NSRMK --CPUA TO: NSGVE --CPUA
To: NSPBT --CPUA

09/15/84 10:32:56

~~SECRET~~

NOTE FROM: Robert M. Kimmitt
SUBJECT: longrange readout

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cc: NSRA	--CPUA	NSFEG	--CPUA
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NSJMD	--CPUA	NSWGH	--CPUA
NSDFP	--CPUA	NSWFM	--CPUA

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By CAS NARA, Date 6/10/02

RECEIVED 24 AUG 84 19

TO MCFARLANE

FROM MATLOCK

DOCDATE 24 AUG 84

MATLOCK

31 AUG 84

MCFARLANE

05 SEP 84

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997

By CHS NARA, Date 6/10/02

KEYWORDS: USSR

USIA

TUMARKIN, NINA

VOA

MEDIA

SUBJECT: ARTICLE ON SOVIET FEAR OF US

INTERNAL NSC ROUTING

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE: 2

Matlock

FOR ACTION

FOR CONC'

MCFARLANE

No action necessary
info to
Walt Raymond
Steve Sestanovich
John Lenczowski

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG 8406853

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE
-	9/22	Recd USIA Comments-Add-on	
Matlock	S 9/22	Any Action Necessary	9/26
NSC/S	C 24 Sept	No action necessary per JM - copies sent Raymond Sestanovich Lenczowski	

United States
Information
Agency

Washington, D.C. 20547

Office of the Director

6399



~~SECRET~~

September 19, 1984

Dear Bud:

My staff and I have had time to reflect more fully on Professor Tumarkin's remarks on war psychosis in the Soviet Union, and I am sending a somewhat fuller reply than my brief note of last week.

The Tumarkin essay was particularly informative about ordinary, everyday Soviet citizens who--all our information indicates--do not take an active interest in international politics, do not actively seek out knowledge about it, and are probably the most susceptible to Soviet government propaganda. While we are of course very concerned with this group, it is clear that the opinion of military, party, industrial, cultural, and scientific cadres as well as what we in this country call the "informed public" is more important to the Soviet leadership because these groups are critical to the functioning of the regime.

We can best reach these groups as well as the general Soviet population by strengthening a number of programs already in progress, by pushing for continued innovation and upgrading of the means available to reach the Soviet population, and by refining our message to them. The themes you suggested in your note--our historical restraint in using force, the defensive nature of our military modernization, our good will toward the Russian and other Soviet peoples--are all themes we invoke constantly and will continue to invoke. We should also draw upon the substantial reservoir of good will that most Soviet citizens hold toward the U.S. as part of shared experiences such as World War II. We should reassert that our extensive net of bilateral contacts with Soviet citizens and institutions, particularly in the U.S. private sector, and our efforts to conclude a comprehensive exchanges agreement are evidence that we have been and are ready to speak to one another. We should emphasize that we stand ready to expand such contacts.

We must continue to upgrade our facilities, especially VOA. We should strive to gain access to more of the people we wish to influence through exchanges, exhibits, and publications, all of which are part of the new exchanges agreement we are currently

The Honorable
Robert C. McFarlane
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
The White House

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR Feb-7-14/1 #6143

BY CU NARA DATE 11/27/07

~~SECRET~~

Classified by: Charles Z. Wick
Declassify or Downgrade on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

negotiating with the Soviets. We will continue to expose the cynical manipulation of their own people in which the Soviet leaders engage, and emphasize the open nature of our society where Soviet leaders at the highest levels can gain access to public media while our own Ambassador is prevented from making his traditional July 4 speech on Soviet television. Indeed, as our own media are being inundated with Soviet spokesmen, it would be useful to keep pointing out that Americans do not have similar opportunities to reach the Soviet people through their media.

Finally, we must be careful in our programs and products of the sensitivity of the Soviet people. It will serve our interests to explain that we share their fundamental desire for peace and cooperation to reduce international tensions, and that we appreciate the difference between Soviet leaders and the Soviet people.

As you know, we have been engaged in our own research on this subject for some time. We are planning and have under way several activities which bear on this problem as well as that of communicating with the Soviet peoples:

- o We are discussing with NASA the possibility of coordinated direct satellite broadcasting with VOA.
- o We have initiated discussions with Ford Aerospace about the development of low-cost consumer DBS antennae and other ways to broadcast to Soviet listeners how dishes can be constructed cheaply and easily. We recognize that there are diplomatic and legal problems here, but we are nonetheless proceeding on the technical front. We understand that "home-made" dishes developed by Ford's space group are being used in India.
- o We will be coming out shortly with the latest in our series of analyses of Soviet perceptions which includes information on the issue of war psychosis in the Soviet Union.
- o We are keeping a close watch on Soviet media in order to track trends in the propaganda campaigns which encourage war fears.
- o We will be in contact with FBIS on the importance of keeping this issue high on their watch list.
- o Our media elements will be extensively covering the President's UNGA speech and his meeting with Foreign Minister Gromyko with the goal of conveying to the Soviet people our peaceful intentions. Of course, all of the Agency's assets, including Worldnet and VOA, will be used to transmit the President's speech to the world.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~


-3-

- o Soviet war psychosis will be discussed at the next IIC meeting, tentatively planned for early October.
- o We are reactivating our New Directions Advisory Committee, chaired by Norman Podhoretz, to discuss these issues. In addition to Mr. Podhoretz, this group includes prominent writer and social commentator Michael Novak, the noted historian Gertrude Himmelfarb, former Executive Director of the American Political Science Association Evron Kirkpatrick, and one of the outstanding experts on democratic philosophy Robert Nisbet.
- o We are working on USIA's response to the NSDD 130 section on communicating with closed societies, which will explore the political and technical opportunities and obstacles, particularly regarding television, for us to get our message across to the Soviet peoples.

As always, I encourage my staff to examine its work and to seek out new approaches. I can assure you that we will continue to study the challenge the Tumarkin piece raises and consult closely with the NSC and the Department on what to do about it. You will be receiving our analyses and recommendations.

With best regards,

Sincerely,



Charles Z. Wick
Director

~~SECRET~~

c 35

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

September 19, 1984

~~SECRET~~ Attachment

TO: Paul Thompson

Attached is the most recent example of a memorandum I was asked to prepare, only to have it almost immediately returned with an "OBE" notation.

I hope you will be able to institute some kind of system which will avoid this type of time-consuming effort, especially with so many other urgent matters at hand.


Jack Matlock

cc: John Poindexter
Bob Kimmitt

~~SECRET~~ Attachment

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

7/19/05

Matlock 6144 34

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SECRET/SENSITIVE

September 18, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JSM*

SUBJECT: Shultz-Dobrynin Meeting September 18

Secretary Shultz has submitted the memorandum to the President at Tab A reporting on his meeting with Dobrynin yesterday.

The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the meetings with Gromyko next week. Dobrynin was very general in his comments on what Gromyko would want to discuss, mentioning only an "appraisal of the US-Soviet relationship," issues in the correspondence with Chernenko and "the demilitarization of outer space."

You should note also that Dobrynin stated that Gromyko would be available in the afternoon for another meeting with Secretary Shultz, if desired. The Secretary left the question open, but we should do some preliminary thinking about what criteria we should apply in deciding whether there should be a final meeting with Shultz the afternoon of the 28th.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the attached memorandum to the President.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

*OBE: Bud sent
copy to Pres*

Attachments:



call 9/18

Tab I - Memorandum to the President

Tab A - Shultz-President Memorandum of September 17, 1984

*As Amended
E.O. 13526
13526
Sec. 3.3(b)(1)*

SECRET/SENSITIVE

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLRR F06-114/1 #6144
BY *RW* NARA DATE 3/3/11

c31

7005

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

September 19, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK 

SUBJECT: Proposed Letter to Congress of Russian Americans
Re Difference between Soviet Communists and
Russian People

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum for your signature to Sally Kelley forwarding the revised text (Tab A) of a letter to Mr. Avisov regarding the difference between Soviet Communists and the Russian people.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the Tab I memo forwarding the draft reply to Sally Kelley.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

- Tab I Memo to Kelley
- Tab A Revised letter to Mr. Avisov
- Tab B Background papers

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

MEMORANDUM FOR SALLY KELLEY

FROM: ROBERT M. KIMMITT

SUBJECT: Proposed Letter to Congress of Russian Americans
Re difference between Soviet Communists and
Russian People

Mr. George Avisov, representing the Congress of Russian Americans, wrote the President a letter underlining the difference between Soviet Communists and the Russian people. Attached at Tab A is a suggested reply, amended.

Attachments

- Tab A Draft Reply
- Tab B Background Papers

Dear Mr. Avisov:

On behalf of the President, I would like to assure you that the President and his Cabinet are fully cognizant of the difference between Soviet Communists and the Russian people. Indeed he shares your aversion to the confusion of these terms. In no way did the President mean to imply, in his microphone test, that he regards Soviet Communists and the Russian people as one and the same.

As you well know, the President is very sympathetic to those forced to suffer under Communism. We agree with your statement that "the Russian people must know that we are their friends." It is because of the President's concern for the Russian people, and for the many other nationalities that make up the Soviet Union, that we are so concerned with the state of human rights within the Soviet Union. Although our influence with the Soviet government is limited, we are constantly striving to express our concern over the basic freedoms and dignity of the Soviet peoples in such a way as to demonstrate the worldwide concern over these issues and maintain what influence we have as expressed in the Helsinki Accords.

You can be certain that the President will continue to express his high regard and concern for the Russian people. *express his high regard and concern for the Russian people*
~~I hope this letter has been of some reassurance to you.~~
Thank you for bringing your ^{thoughts} ~~concerns~~ to our attention.

White House Staff

Mr. George B. Avisov,
Vice Chairman,
Congress of Russian-Americans, Inc.,
P.O. Box 818,
Nyack, New York.

7305 40

UNCLASSIFIED
(Classification)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
TRANSMITTAL FORM

S/S 8424828

Date September 18, 1984

For: Mr. Robert C. McFarlane
National Security Council
The White House

Reference:

To: President Reagan From: Mr. George B. Avisov

Date: 8/28/84 Subject: "Off the Air Remarks"

WH Referral Dated: 9/10/84 NSC ID# 246085
(if any)

 The attached item was sent directly to the
Department of State.

Action Taken:

- X A draft reply is attached.
 A draft reply will be forwarded.
 A translation is attached.
 An information copy of a direct reply is attached.
 We believe no response is necessary for the reason
cited below.
 The Department of State has no objection to the
proposed travel.
 Other.

Remarks:


Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

UNCLASSIFIED
(Classification)



8424828

246085

41

CONGRESS OF RUSSIAN-AMERICANS, INC.

P.O. BOX 818 □ NYACK, NY 10960 □ (914) 358-7117

L. Kojalis

-page 1-

RUSSIAN-AMERICAN HALL OF FAME

- 1978 — V. Zworykin, Ph.D.†
"Father of Television"
- 1979 — A. Tolstoy, Ph.D.†
Humanitarian and Writer
- 1980 — V. Leontief, Ph.D.
Nobel laureate
- 1981 — S. Jaroff
Don Cossack's Choir
- 1983 — A. Danilova
Prima ballerina assoluta

President Ronald Reagan
The White House
Washington, DC 20025

28 August, 1984

Dear Mr. President:

Notwithstanding our most profound devotion and respect for you and our greatest admiration for your tremendous achievements, leadership, wisdom and understanding, we deem it our duty to respectfully go on record and submit this reaction of the Congress of Russian Americans with regards to the joke you recently made during the testing of microphones, and which was "obligingly" and certainly, unsolicitously, broadcast by the media around the World stirring up hornets nests in various places.

We do not presume to join the "hornets" or claim that the President of the United States should not joke about "abolishing the Soviet Union", etc. But the alleged remark was reported to state: "To abolish Russia forever...". Not the Soviet Government, not the Communist slave-driving totalitarianism, but Russia, -- the nation, the Russian people -- the first and the greatest victim of international Communism, struggling and suffering under a devilish yoke for the past 67 years.

Of course, the joking remark was promptly transmitted and widely disseminated in the USSR verbatim, as for once -- no "interpretation" or fabrications by Soviet propoganda was necessary, except, perhaps, to omit the fact that it was a totally unofficial joke.

The 250 million slaves in the Soviet Union (even those who listen to short-wave radio) may now believe that the American President wants to "exterminate the Russian people" not Communism...

Mr. President: We all know what happened on the Eastern Front during World War II. When invading the USSR in 1941, Hitler declared that it was a crusade against World Communists, that he was going to liberate Russian people from Soviet domination... and hundreds of thousands of officers and men defected to the German enemy. Some believed Hitler, others chose the lesser of the two evils.

However, encouraged by the initial successes of his armies, Hitler dropped the liberation mask and openly and boastfully proclaimed that he was fighting Russia and the Russians... And, in response, was stopped at Stalingrad and pushed back all the way to Berlin.

Russian people must know that we are their friends and we must try our utmost to have them for our allies, not alienate or threaten them in any way, even in jest. They hate their slave-driving Soviet Government and the KGB and abhor the Communist regime. These should be our enemies, not the people subjugated by them.

Mr. President, during the recent convention of the Congress of Russian Americans in St. Petersburg, Fla., you assured our chairman E.V.Pribitkin, who had the honor of talking with you on the phone,

BOARD OF DIRECTORS

- Chairman
E. Pribitkin
- 1st Vice Chairman
P. Budzilovich
- 2nd Vice Chairman
G. Avisov
- Treasurer
M. Dobrowsky
- Secretary
E. Jarkoff
- E. Alexandrov
- T. Bobrinsky
- A. Bogolubov
- V. Dutikov
- K. Kally
- B. Kossovsky
- N. Koziakini
- V. Petrov
- V. Politis
- Very Rev. B. Vlasenko

CHAPLAINS

- Very Rev. A. Kiselev
- Very Rev. M. Kovach

REGIONAL REPRESENTATIVES

- New England
K. Kostukevich
- New York Metropolitan
I. Dutikov
- New York Upstate
B. Kossovsky
- Washington, D.C.
V. Petrov
- South-East
Very Rev. B. Vlasenko
- North-West
G. Avisov
- South-West
I. Awtamonow
- Indiana
I. Korolenko
- Illinois
A. Bezkorovainy
- N. Carolina
G. Fesenko
- Wyoming
S. Kasakov
- Oregon
A. Kennedy

128M

that your Cabinet and staff are fully cognizant of the importance of differentiating between the terms "Russia" and "Russians" on the one hand and "Soviet Union" and "Communists" on the other.

Of course, we are confident that the "abolishment of Russia" remark was unintentional and a joke, but we would feel very much obliged if you could find it possible to reemphasize and stress at some suitable occasion, the importance of this difference not only to the people of Soviet Union, but also to the United States and the entire World.

Sincerely yours.

George B. Avisov

George B. Avisov, Vice Chairman
(By direction)

Copy: E.V.Pribitkin, CRA Chairman
Linas Kojelis, The White House
Vl. Bukovsky, Hoover Institution

43
8424828

T H E W H I T E H O U S E O F F I C E

REFERRAL

SEPTEMBER 10, 1984

TO: DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ACTION REQUESTED:

DRAFT REPLY FOR SIGNATURE OF WHITE HOUSE STAFF MEMBER

DESCRIPTION OF INCOMING:

ID: 246085

MEDIA: LETTER, DATED AUGUST 28, 1984

TO: PRESIDENT REAGAN

FROM: MR. GEORGE B. AVISOV
VICE CHAIRMAN
CONGRESS OF RUSSIAN-AMERICANS, INC.
POST OFFICE BOX 818
NYACK NY 10960

SUBJECT: WRITES CONCERNING THE PRESIDENT'S "OFF THE
AIR" REMARKS OF AUG 11 84

PROMPT ACTION IS ESSENTIAL -- IF REQUIRED ACTION HAS NOT BEEN
TAKEN WITHIN 9 WORKING DAYS OF RECEIPT, PLEASE TELEPHONE THE
UNDERSIGNED AT 456-7486.

RETURN CORRESPONDENCE, WORKSHEET AND COPY OF RESPONSE
(OR DRAFT) TO:
AGENCY LIAISON, ROOM 91, THE WHITE HOUSE

SALLY KELLEY
DIRECTOR OF AGENCY LIAISON
PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE

44
9/20

Karna
Small

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

September 20

NOTE TO JACK MATLOCK

FROM: KARNA

TO: Karna Small
I think this is
excellent - and
a definite
improvement.
(I did not have
time to re-write
myself and only
did a few quick
fixes.) - This one
has my
suggestion
for whatever
that may
be
worth
for

19, 1984

I wanted you to be aware that after we had your excellent comments on the proposed RR toast at the UNGA reception Sunday night - which we submitted to speechwriters - Steve Steiner had a lot of other comments, incorporating much of the State Dept's first draft. Those comments came in late, and we did not submit them along with yours, but indicated to speechwriters that additional comments might be forthcoming.

Reception for Heads of

incorporate elements of
na's draft for the
September 23. I think
stantive point of view
s expressing our dissat-
n many ways, particular-
we get this message

Steve became upset, evidently, as we asked that his comments be made directly on the speechwriters draft (and there was a bit of confusion on this point I'm afraid). Anyway, now as you can see, he has submitted a new toast on his own to Kimmitt. I don't know if Kimmitt has transmitted these to speechwriters, but I do think your views should be made known - if you have problems with this.

it understandably it was
points. What I have
tive points from State
e in a way which makes
uded all comments made
by Karna earlier. Both
little bit, but other-

Thanks.

fusion today, but I
nd be able to deal
ncorporated these
oach to the UN.

That you send the memo at Tab I to Ben Elliott with the comprehensive NSC response.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

- Tab I Memo to Darman
- Tab A Presidential Remarks

cc: Karna Small

C 45

7077

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

September 21, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

THROUGH: ROBERT M. KIMMITT

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK

SUBJECT: Travel to New York to Attend Shultz Briefing

As you know, Secretary Shultz has requested that I attend a briefing in New York on September 25 in preparation for the meeting he will have with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko. NSC to pay all actual costs (see Travel Authorization form). Please note that I must stay at the Harley to be with the State contingent with whom I will be working.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you approve funding for this trip.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

cc: Pat Blauth, Administration Office

NSC STAFF TRAVEL AUTHORIZATION

DATE: September 21, 1984

- 1. TRAVELER'S NAME: Jack F. Matlock
- 2. PURPOSE(S), EVENT(S), DATE(S): To attend a briefing for Secretary Schultz in preparation for the meeting he will have with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko.

3. ITINERARY (Please Attach Copy of Proposed Itinerary): _____

DEPARTURE DATE Sept 25 RETURN DATE Sept 26
 TIME a.m. TIME p.m.

- 4. MODE OF TRANSPORTATION:
 GOV AIR _____ COMMERCIAL AIR POV _____ RAIL _____ OTHER _____

5. ESTIMATED EXPENSES:
 Harley Hotel, single \$180+ meals
 TRANSPORTATION \$86 PER DIEM /* OTHER \$50 TOTAL TRIP COST \$316+

6. WHO PAYS EXPENSES: NSC OTHER _____
 *actual per diem: \$75.

7. IF NOT NSC, DESCRIBE SOURCE AND ARRANGEMENTS: _____

8. WILL FAMILY MEMBER ACCOMPANY YOU: YES _____ NO

9. IF SO, WHO PAYS FOR FAMILY MEMBER (If Travel Not Paid by Traveler, Describe Source and Arrangements): _____

10. TRAVEL ADVANCE REQUESTED: \$ none

11. REMARKS (Use This Space to Indicate Any Additional Items You Would Like to Appear on Your Travel Orders): _____

Request reimbursement: all actual expenses.

12. TRAVELER'S SIGNATURE: Jack F. Matlock

13. APPROVALS: _____

NSC/S PROFILE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

47
ID 8405944

RECEIVED 03 AUG 84 14

TO MCFARLANE

FROM HILL, C

DOCDATE 03 AUG 84

MATLOCK

03 AUG 84

LENCZOWSKI

07 AUG 84

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 23, 1997
By CAS NARA, Date 6/10/02

KEYWORDS: USSR

MEDIA

Q+A

SUBJECT: TRAVEL ADVISORY & PRESS Q+A RE SITUATION IN LENINGRAD

ACTION: APPROPRIATE ACTION

DUE: 26 SEP 84 STATUS S FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MATLOCK

LENCZOWSKI

SESTANOVICH

ROBINSON

SMALL

KIMMITT

THOMPSON

COMMENTS

REF# 8421924

LOG

NSCIFID

(LF)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

	-	9/22	Recd State Comments - Reopen		
Matlock	S	9/22	Any Action Necessary	9/26	
NSC/S	C	24 Sept	No action necessary per JM: copies to de Groot + Domon		

48

S/S 8424616

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520 5944



04 SEP 21 11:09

~~SECRET~~

September 21, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Policy on Soviet Harassment of U.S. Citizens

This responds to J.M. Poindexter's September 6 memorandum to Under Secretary of State Michael H. Armacost expressing concern over Soviet harassment of U.S. citizens in the USSR, particularly in Leningrad. It was requested that the Department of State convene an inter-agency meeting to develop, on a priority basis, an agreed retaliatory mechanism to be utilized promptly if our recent protests and our August 6 Leningrad travel advisory do not provide a lasting deterrent to the repetition of such incidents.

In order to examine and develop such contingency recommendations, Thomas W. Simons Jr., Director of the Office of Soviet Union Affairs, will chair an October 12 inter-agency meeting at the Department of State at 11:00 a.m. in Room 6226 to which representatives of the Department of State, CIA, FBI, DIA and NSC will be invited. The effectiveness of the travel advisory will be reviewed and recommendations for contingency retaliatory measures permissible under U.S. law will be developed. The timing of this meeting will permit us to take into account the results of our bilateral discussions with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko on this subject.

Charles Hill
Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

DECL:OADR

NLRR F06-114/1 #6149

BY CW NARA DATE 11/27/07

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

8424616 ⁴⁹

NLRR F06-114/1 #6145

BY CW NARA DATE 11/27/67 THE WHITE HOUSE

5944

ACTION: EUR

WASHINGTON

Dist To:

September 6, 1984

S ~~SECRET~~

D

P

INR

S/S

S/S-S

TMC

SL

RF (SHM)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE MICHAEL H. ARMACOST
The Under Secretary of State
for Political Affairs

SUBJECT: Policy on Soviet Harassment on U.S. Citizens (S)

We remain concerned over Soviet harassment of U.S. citizens in the USSR, particularly in Leningrad. In case our protests and travel advisory should not prove a lasting deterrent to the repetition of such incidents, we believe that we should examine, on a priority basis, what sort of retaliatory mechanism may be needed to provide for prompt retaliation for such incidents. (S)

For obvious reasons, we must not employ physical violence against individuals as a retaliatory tool. However, there would seem to be measures which do not require physical harm to individuals to bring home more effectively to the Soviet authorities the dangers to them of violating the diplomatic immunity of our personnel. Steps which merit examination include the following:

1. Detaining a Soviet intelligence official (without physical violence), and holding him in a police station until identified by other Soviet diplomatic personnel.
2. Notifying the Soviets that should there be another staged incident, the personnel quota for one of their installations in the U.S. will be decreased and that any retaliation for this will be met by proportionately greater retaliation on our part until our respective personnel are equal in numbers.

There may well be other devices which should be examined. (S)

It is recognized that it is impossible to foresee all future contingencies, and that it is undesirable to respond to incidents without consideration of all the circumstances at the time. Nevertheless, it is clear that we need an agreed mechanism which can be utilized promptly if needed in the future. (S)

It would be appreciated if the Department would convene interested agencies -- including the FBI, CIA and DIA -- to examine this question and provide recommendations for implementation. (S)

J. M. Poindexter
Deputy Assistant to the
President for National
Security Affairs

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

RECEIVED 24 SEP 84 09

TO MCFARLANE

FROM KIMMITT

DOCDATE 22 SEP 84

KEYWORDS: ABM

USSR

SUSPENSE

DECLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: CONCURRENT USE OF AIR DEFENSE & ABM RADAR

NLRR M08-125/2 #6147

BY KML NARA DATE 6/25/10

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR MCFARLANE

DUE: 25 SEP 84 STATUS S FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

LEHMAN, R

MATLOCK

FORTIER

THOMPSON

SUSPENSE

COMMENTS

REF#

ACTION OFFICER (S) AS

CL

TO

9/24

TO: Ron Lehman

I think Hartman made a valid point and I would support a decision to conclude the "Common Understanding" at the next SCC session -

Jack

NSC/S 614871231

MSG FROM: NSCEC --CPUA TO: NSGVE --CPUA
To: NSGVE --CPUA

09/22/84 14:50:16

-- SECRET --

NOTE FROM: CAROL E. CLEVELAND
Subject: Forwarding Note 09/22/84 10:15 Concurrent Use of Air Defense and

*Please log in
System I
Priority Action
for Lehman
contact:*

Please staff to the appropriate staff members and provide our office with a copy. Thanks.

*** F O R W A R D E D N O T E ***

To: NSCEC --CPUA

-- SECRET --

NOTE FROM: Robert M. Kimmitt
Subject: Forwarding Note 09/21/84 20:21 Concurrent Use of Air Defense and ABM r
please print.

*** F O R W A R D E D N O T E ***

To: NSRMK --CPUA

*MATLOCK
FUTIER
cc
thompson*

-- SECRET --

NOTE FROM: ROBERT MCFARLANE
SUBJECT: Concurrent Use of Air Defense and ABM radars.

During the Art Hartman meeting with the President, Art mentioned the agreement reached in the summer of 83 (and supported by the JCS) under which the US and Soviets would agree not to operate air defense and ABM radars concurrently. Then KAL came up and we have never implemented the agreement. Art suggested that this was something we could do to break the ice. I promised to look into it. Please ask Ron Lehman to report on the history of this issue and provide his advice as to whether there are other matters linked to the shelving of this agreement. How would the JCS feel about this now? Many thanks.

cc: NSJMP --CPUA

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR MO9-125/2 #6148

BY KML NARA DATE 6/25/10