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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

**Withdrawer**

JET 9/14/1984

**File Folder** MATLOCK CHRON SEPTEMBER 1983 (2/5)

**FOIA**

F06-114/1

**Box Number** 6

YARHI-MILO

602

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
6076	MEMO	MEMO FOR ROBERT MCFARLANE RE VISIT OF ROMANIAN REPRESENTATIVE [18] <b>R 3/3/2011 F2006-114/1</b>	1	9/11/1984	B1
6077	MEMO	MEMO FOR DONALD GREGG RE APPOINT WITH GEORGE BUSH DURING VISIT OF ROMANIAN REPRESENTATIVE [19] <b>R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1</b>	1	ND	B1
6073	MEMO	MEMO FOR ROBERT MCFARLANE RE VISIT BY ROMANIAN REPRESENTATIVE [20-21] <b>R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1</b>	2	9/8/1984	B1
6080	BIO	[22-23] <b>D 3/3/2011 F2006-114/1</b>	1	ND	B1 B3 B6
6078	MEMO	MEMO FOR ROBERT MCFARLANE RE GROMYKO VISIT [29] <b>R 3/3/2011 F2006-114/1</b>	1	9/12/1984	B1
6079	MEMO	MEMO FOR JOHN SIMPSON RE GROMYKO VISIT [31] <b>R 6/23/2010 M125/2</b>	1	ND	B1
6074	MEMO	MEMO FOR ROBERT MCFARLANE RE GROMYKO VISIT [32] <b>R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1</b>	1	9/12/1984	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
6071	MEMO	MEMO FOR ROBERT MCFARLANE RE PRESIDENT REAGAN MEETING WITH GROMYKO: BACKGROUND MATERIAL [38-39] <i>R</i> 3/3/2011 <i>F2006-114/1</i>	2	9/14/1984	B1
6075	REPORT	RE GROMYKO [40-44] <i>R</i> 11/27/2007 <i>NLRRF06-114/1</i>	5	9/14/1984	B1
6072	MEMO	WHAT TO EXPECT [45-54] <i>D</i> 3/3/2011 <i>F2006-114/1</i>	10	9/14/1984	B1 B3 B6

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

RECEIVED 11 SEP 84 08

TO MCFARLANE

FROM HILL, C

DOCDATE 10 SEP 84

6759

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997

By CAJ NARA, Date 6/10/02

KEYWORDS: USSR

MEDIA

GROMYKO, ANDREI

AP

SUBJECT: ANNOUNCEMENT OF PRES MTG W/ GROMYKO 28 SEP

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR MCFARLANE DUE: 11 SEP 84 STATUS S FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MATLOCK

LENCZOWSKI

SESTANOVICH

THOMPSON

SMALL

MARTIN

KIMMITT

COMMENTS

REF# 8424853

LOG

NSCIFID

( CL )

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

*NSC/S C 11 Sept per J Matlock OBE*

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE (C)



~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH GROMYKO

President Reagan has invited Soviet Deputy Premier (and Foreign Minister) Andrei Gromyko to meet with him at the White House on September 28. Mr. Gromyko has accepted.

The meeting will be in addition to the the meeting between Secretary Shultz and Mr. Gromyko in New York on September 26. The President invited him to Washington because he believes it is important to use this opportunity to confer on a range of issues of international importance.

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997  
By CS NARA, Date 6/10/02

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~



Washington, D.C. 20520

September 10, 1984

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

SEP 10 1984 11:53

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE  
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Announcement of the President's Meeting With Gromyko

Attached is a draft announcement for use by the White House Press Spokesman on Tuesday on the September 28 meeting between the President and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko.

Charles Hill  
Executive Secretary

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~  
DECL: OADR

POSSIBLE QUESTIONS & ANSWERS for REAGAN - GROMYKO MEETING  
September 28, 1984

jjm02 7/11/84  
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- Q. How was the meeting decided? Did you make the first offer to meet, or did they.
- A. The possibility of a meeting was discussed in diplomatic channels. As host, I issued the formal invitation.
- Q. What do you think will come up at the meeting? Will you try to set a new date for ASAT talks in Vienna? Will you try to get the Soviets to agree to ASAT talks along with discussions of offensive weapons (or will you back off of that precondition)? Will you expect to sign other agreements? What (bilateral, cultural, etc.)?
- A. I expect to discuss our desire to move our relationship on to a more positive track and to explore ideas we have along those lines. Certainly we won't be signing any agreements.
- Q. Does this represent a real "thaw" in U.S.-Soviet relations? How do you see it?
- A. The meeting simply indicates that we are in communication with the Soviet Government. We hope it will lead to an improvement in relations, but we'll have to wait and see.
- Q. Why do you think the Soviets are willing to meet with you now...in a political campaign? Do you think they've decided you're going to win and they'd better get started now?
- A. These meetings had been a tradition in the past, although in recent years particular events made them impossible. We are just resuming a pattern of contact which proved useful in the past.
- Q. Will you raise the issue of Sakharov with Gromyko? What about arms control violations?
- A. I will not be announcing in advance the particular items I will take up. The meeting will be confidential.
- Q. Will you still release the GAC report next week -- even though that might "poison the well" right now with meetings coming up?
- A. This is a question still under consideration and I have made no decision as yet.
- Q. Mondale and Ferraro say that war and peace are the big issues (next to deficits) in the campaign -- and continually point out that you are the first President not to have met with the Soviets. Is this an effort to blunt that criticism?
- A. I don't accept the validity of the criticism, because throughout my Administration we have been in continual contact with the Soviet leadership, by my own correspondence and by meetings conducted by the Vice President and the Secretary of State. I decided to invite Mr. Gromyko to a meeting because I thought it would be useful in terms of U.S.-Soviet relations.

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Marj disc

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

September 10, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT: Intern for European and Soviet Affairs Office

Nicholas Klissas, currently a Presidential Management Intern at the JCS, has approached me about the possibility of serving as an intern in my office. I have spoken with him, and am sure he would be a great help with number of projects I have in mind.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the appointment of Nick Klissas as an intern to work in the European and Soviet Affairs office.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_



Middleton

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 10, 1984

Dear Buck:

Thanks for taking the time to send on the interesting study of potential Soviet power in Northeast Asia by Maj. Charles Hillebrand.

I have passed it to Jack Matlock, Director of Eastern European and Soviet affairs, to share with his staff and am sure they will find it useful.

With best wishes.

Sincerely,

*Bob*  
Robert C. McFarlane

Dr. Lawrence E. Grinter  
Professor of National Security Affairs  
Department of the Air Force  
Air Command and Staff College  
Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

September 7, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM TO ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK

SUBJECT: Study of Pakistan/USSR Relations

Dr. Lawrence E. Grinter, Professor of National Security at the Air Force Air Command and Staff College, has sent you a study investigating Soviet power projections in Northeast Asia (Tab A). A short note of thanks to him is attached.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign and forward the note to Dr. Grinter at Tab I.

Approve   ✓   Disapprove       

Attachments:

- Tab I Note to Dr. Grinter
- Tab A Incoming Letter



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE (AU)  
MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, AL 36112

SEP 4 1984

29 August 1984

*Kemp for ack pls*

Honorable Robert C. McFarlane  
Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs  
The White House  
Washington DC 20500

Dear Bud

As promised in May, when we forwarded Major Mike McConnell's study of Pakistan-US relations, more of our national security policy studies are now back from the printer.

Enclosed is a meticulously researched, and compelling, analysis of Soviet power projection in Northeast Asia by Major Charles Hillebrand, USAF. After presenting Mackinder's and Spykman's concepts of geopolitical dominance of the Eurasian heartland and rimlands, Major Hillebrand investigates Soviet power projection in Northeast Asia to determine if there is a pattern to Soviet activity. His conclusion, that Soviet behavior indeed correlates closely to Spykman's dictum, will be of interest to your staff I am sure. Having recently rotated from an assignment with the Combined Forces Command in Seoul, Korea, Major Hillebrand has joined our ACSC faculty.

More studies will be forwarded.

With best wishes, I am

Sincerely yours

*Buck*

LAWRENCE E. GRINTER  
Professor of National Security Affairs

Enclosure




AIR COMMAND  
AND  
STAFF COLLEGE

STUDENT REPORT

THE RIMLAND OF NORTHEAST ASIA: A  
STUDY OF SOVIET POWER PROJECTION

MAJ. CHARLES D. HILLEBRAND 84-1260

*"insights into tomorrow"*





MEMORANDUM

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

September 10, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NSC STAFF

FROM: ROBERT M. KIMMITT *Bob*

SUBJECT: Preparation of Briefing Materials for  
Use by the President in Candidate Debates

Attached is a memo from Fred Fielding regarding the preparation of briefing materials for use by the President in candidate debates. Please read the memo carefully and refer any questions you may have to Paul Thompson.

Thank you.


Attachment



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

September 6, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR ALL WHITE HOUSE STAFF

FROM: FRED F. FIELDING   
COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Preparation of Briefing Materials for  
Use by the President in Candidate Debates

It is very likely that the President will debate the Democratic Presidential nominee, Walter Mondale, sometime during the 1984 general election period. The purpose of this memorandum is to advise you of the legal and policy limitations on your activities in preparation of the briefing materials for the President's use in such debate.

As everyone should be aware by now, only those Government employees paid from the appropriations for the White House Office, or appointed to their current positions by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate, may engage in partisan political activity. All others are subject to the Hatch Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 7321 - 7327, and are precluded from engaging in partisan political activity. Thus, most employees of the Office of Policy Development, the National Security Council, the Council of Economic Advisers, the Office of Management and Budget, and all other Executive departments and agencies are subject to the Hatch Act.

The Special Counsel of the Merit Systems Protection Board has taken the position that "hatched" employees may not write or prepare any materials that will be used only for political purposes. Such employees may, however, prepare briefing materials on official Administration policies and proposals for use by Administration officials, even when such materials might be included in partisan political statements. Moreover, the Special Counsel has stated that although "hatched" employees may not prepare responses to candidate questionnaires sent to the President, they may review such responses (as prepared by campaign or non-hatched Administration officials) for consistency with Administration positions and policies.

Accordingly, this Administration will observe the following guidelines in the preparation of briefing materials for use by the President in a candidate debate:

1. Individuals or offices may be requested to prepare background or briefing materials for use in the Presidential debates only by the following people: James A. Baker, III, Richard G. Darman, Michael Baroody, and Robert Sims.



2. No Reagan-Bush '84 officials shall request White House or other government employees to prepare briefing materials for use in the Presidential debates; Reagan-Bush '84 officials may forward materials prepared by them to the White House through the office of Richard Darman.

3. Briefing materials specially prepared for use by the President in a candidate debate shall not be composed or typed by government employees subject to the Hatch Act; however, such employees may review briefing materials in their areas of expertise for consistency with Administration policies or positions.

4. Hatched employees may continue to prepare (i.e., compose and/or type) statements of Administration position and policy for use by "non-hatched" Administration officials.

cc: Margaret D. Tutwiler (for transmittal to Reagan-Bush '84)  
Members of the Cabinet



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jfms4

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

September 11, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JLM*

SUBJECT: Letter to Rep. Dante Fascell Regarding  
Andrei Sakharov

In light of the President having received a second letter from Rep. Fascell regarding the plight of Andrei Sakharov and Yelena Bonner, I again reviewed the proposed response prepared by the Department of State, and concur with it as corrected. Please forward the memorandum at TAB I to Kathy Jaffke with the proposed response and previous correspondence.

John Lenczowski, Sven Kraemer, Walt Raymond and Chris Lehman concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the memorandum at TAB I to Ms. Jaffke.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments:

TAB I Memo to Kathy Jaffke, with attachments



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

MEMORANDUM FOR KATHY JAFFKE

FROM: ROBERT M. KIMMITT

SUBJECT: Letter to Rep. Dante Fascell Regarding the Plight  
of Andrei Sakharov and Yelena Bonner

We have reviewed the September 6 letter to the President from Rep. Fascell regarding the condition of Andrei Sakharov and his wife, Yelena Bonner, and concur that the letter is still appropriate with the alteration you suggest.

Attachments

## THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 10, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR:

ROBERT M. KIMMITT

FROM:

KATHY RATTE JAFFKE *KRJ*

SUBJECT:

Letter from Dante Fascell  
Regarding the Plight of Andrei  
Sakharov and Yelena Bonner

By way of your August 31 memo to Sally Kelly, I received your proposed response to Chairman Fascell's July 25 letter to the President regarding Andrei Sakharov and Yelena Bonner. On Friday, September 7, a follow-up letter was hand-delivered from Mr. Fascell.

I would appreciate it if NSC would review the September 6 letter and advise me whether any changes need to be made to the original draft which you forwarded. If the substance is to remain unchanged, I will just modify the beginning of the draft to indicate that this response is to both the August 10 and the September 6 correspondence.

The response has been typed and is ready to go forward for signature as soon as I hear from you.

For your easy reference, I am attaching a copy of the entire file.

DANTE B. FASCELL  
CHAIRMAN

ROBERT DOLE  
CO-CHAIRMAN

COMMISSION ON  
SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE  
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

R. SPENCER OLIVER  
STAFF DIRECTOR

SAMUEL G. WISE  
DEPUTY STAFF DIRECTOR

237 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2

(202) 225-1901

September 6, 1984

The Honorable Ronald Reagan  
President of the United States  
The White House  
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

I am writing to you once again to urge that the United States Government use every available channel -- including the military security talks in Stockholm -- to forcefully and publicly protest the treatment of Nobel Laureate Andrei Sakharov and his wife Elena Bonner at the hands of the Soviet authorities.

Mr. President, in a letter of May 8, I asked you to use the Stockholm Conference, then in session, as a forum to publicly address the issue of the Sakharovs. Unfortunately, this was not done during the remaining eight weeks of that session of the conference which concluded on July 6. Regrettably, your representative at the Stockholm talks, Ambassador James Goodby, never formally raised the Sakharov issue during the conference proceedings, but instead, in a move implying lower priority, merely circulated informally a joint Congressional resolution on the Sakharovs together with a short cover letter to the other conference participants. Since that time, I have not yet received a response from you on this important subject, only two polite, but non-committal notes from a member of your legislative staff and one from the Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative and Intergovernmental Affairs.

Mr. President, I sincerely believe that the question of the fate of Dr. Sakharov and Elena Bonner requires your personal attention. Since May, the situation of the Sakharovs has significantly worsened and has reached the point where it cannot be ignored in forums such as Stockholm. Dr. Sakharov has been further isolated in his forced exile in Gorky and his wife has been subjected to criminal proceedings. The United States has repeatedly emphasized, throughout the history of the CSCE process, that all baskets of the Helsinki Final Act are of equal importance and that human rights problems cannot be separated from military security issues. When the next session




September 6, 1984

of the Stockholm meeting convenes on Tuesday, September 11, we will have another opportunity to demonstrate this vital linkage, an opportunity which cannot be missed. It is of upmost importance that the U.S. delegation to this significant CSCE conference make the tragic plight of the Saknarovs a main focus of its initial speech during the opening week of the next session. Only by making such a bold, forceful step on behalf of the Sakharovs can the United States Government be said to have taken, as your Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs wrote in his June 4, 1984 letter to me, "all possible steps to bring their plight to the attention of the Soviets and the world community before it is too late."

Mr. President, I urge you to instruct the U.S. delegation to formally express the United States Government's concern for the fate of Andrei Sakharov and Elena Bonner in our delegation's opening speech at the Stockholm Conference next week.

In my opinion, if this is not done, it will be yet another signal to our allies and adversaries alike that the United States no longer considers the human rights provisions of the Helsinki Accords to be as important as other provisions dealing with trade, commerce and military security. Such a signal would be tragic for the millions of people who look to the Helsinki Accords as a small ray of hope for an improvement in their lives in the years to come. Surely those improvements will only come if the United States firmly and forthrightly maintains its position that the success or failure of the Helsinki Accords is finally and inextricably linked to the recognition that human rights, peace and security are inseparable.

Sincerely,

  
DANTE B. FASCELL  
Chairman

DBF/ms



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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

September 11, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT: Appointment with President for Manea Manescu,  
Vice President of Romanian Council of State

State has recommended a brief meeting or photo opportunity with the President for Manea Manescu, a personal representative of Romanian President Ceasescu, when the former is in Washington September 20-23.

Although I believe a brief meeting with the President would be appropriate given Romania's action in defying Soviet wishes with regard to the Olympics, I believe a meeting with the Vice President would be more appropriate.

Therefore, if the Vice President's schedule permits, I would recommend that a meeting be scheduled with him during Manescu's stay in the United States.

RECOMMENDATION:

That Bob Kimmitt forward the memo at Tab I to Donald Gregg in the Vice President's office.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments:

Tab I Kimmitt memo to Donald Gregg

Tab A Incoming Correspondence

~~SECRET~~  
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
NLRR F060-114/1 #6074  
BY RW NARA DATE 3/3/11

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. DONALD P. GREGG

FROM: ROBERT M. KIMMITT

SUBJECT: Request for Appointment with the Vice  
President (U)

The State Department has recommended a brief meeting or photo opportunity with the President or Vice President for Manea Manescu, a personal representative of Romanian President Ceausescu, when the former is in Washington September 20-23. (S)

Given Romania's action in defying Soviet wishes with regard to the Olympics, we believe a meeting with the Vice President would be appropriate. (S)

Therefore, if the Vice President's schedule permits, we would recommend that a meeting be scheduled with him during Manescu's stay in the United States. (S)

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/1 #6077

BY CW NARA DATE 11/27/07



September 8, 1984

~~SECRET~~ 22

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. McFARLANE  
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Visit to Washington by Special Representative of  
Romanian President Ceausescu: Request for Appointment  
with the President

Manea Manescu, a Vice President of the Romanian Council of State and member of the Romanian Communist Party's inner-circle Political Executive Committee, is coming to Washington September 21-30 as a special representative of President Ceausescu. The Department strongly recommends that the President receive Manescu for a short courtesy visit and photo opportunity. If that is not possible, the Department believes that the Vice President should receive Manescu.

Manescu is being sent to Washington to get a first-hand impression of U.S.-Romanian bilateral relations for Ceausescu. In recent months, Romania has made impressive gestures for improved relations with the U.S.:

-- Conspicuously, Romania was the only Warsaw Pact state to break ranks with the Soviet-sponsored Olympics boycott;

-- Romanian Jewish emigration to Israel, as well as emigration approvals for the FRG and U.S., have been maintained at record levels;

-- The Romanians have continued to put forward an INF position which differs from the Soviet line, and prompted a Soviet disavowal;

-- After five years of apparently fruitless high-level interventions by the U.S., the Romanians quietly released dissident priest Father Gheorghe Calciu (Romania's leading human rights cause celebre) from prison on August 20.

The Department believes we need to send a clear signal to Ceausescu showing we appreciate and encourage these aspects of Romanian policy which differ from Soviet positions, even though the Romanian internal scene remains tough and restrictive. Ceausescu may have genuine doubts about where we stand: our concerns about technology transfer and other factors have made it hard for us to show responsiveness to Romanian requests.

~~SECRET~~

DECL:OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR Feb-114/1 #6073

CV RE DATE 11/27/07

~~SECRET~~

21

The President's receiving Manescu would be a strong and well-deserved signal to Ceausescu, and let the other East Europeans know that there are real incentives for independent views.

Attachments:

- A. Biographic sketch -- Manea Manescu
- B. Bucharest 5682

*Covey*

Charles Hill  
Executive Secretary

~~SECRET~~



MEMORANDUM

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

September 12, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT: Ambassador Hartman Appointment Request

Art Hartman will be in Washington September 17-21, and I believe it would be useful for him to have a brief meeting with the President.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize the Scheduling Request at Tab I.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachment

Tab I Scheduling Request

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTONSCHEDULE PROPOSAL

September 12, 1984

TO: FREDERICK J. RYAN, Director  
Presidential Appointments and Scheduling

FROM: Robert M. Kimmitt

REQUEST: Meeting with Ambassador Hartman

PURPOSE: To discuss President's Meeting with Gromyko

BACKGROUND: Ambassador Hartman will be in Washington September 17-21, which provides an opportunity for the President to hear his views on prospects for the President's meeting with Gromyko.

PREVIOUS PARTICIPATION: Hartman last met with the President May 11.

DATE & TIME: Sept. 17, 18 or 21 for 30 minutes

LOCATION: Oval Office

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
The Vice President  
Mr. McFarlane  
Ambassador Hartman  
Jack F. Matlock  
Meese, Baker, Deaver at their discretion

OUTLINE OF EVENTS: The President greets Hartman and discusses prospects for the Gromyko meeting with him.

REMARKS REQUIRED: None

MEDIA COVERAGE: Staff Photographer

RECOMMENDED BY: Robert C. McFarlane

OPPOSED BY: None

PROJECT OFFICER: Robert M. Kimmitt/Jack F. Matlock

C  
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## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

September 12, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

THROUGH: ROBERT M. KIMMITT

FROM: JACK MATLOCK

SUBJECT: Invitation to Participate in a Conference  
of the American Association for the Advancement  
of Slavic Studies (AAASS)

The American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies (AAASS) will hold its annual meeting in New York, November 1-4. I have been invited to attend the meeting, or as much of it as I can get away for, and act as a discussant in a panel. The meeting will include virtually all the academic specialists in the field, and I think it would be useful to put forward the Administration's views on the topics they will be discussing.

The Association does not have a travel budget, so travel expenses would have to be funded by the NSC.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That you approve my participation in the AAASS annual meeting provided developments at the time do not require my presence here.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

2. That the NSC fund round trip air fare and three nights' accommodations in New York City.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

## Attachment:

Tab I Letter of Invitation

cc: Patricia Blauth  
Administrative Office

6788  
27

Columbia University in the City of New York | New York, N. Y. 10027

RESEARCH INSTITUTE ON INTERNATIONAL CHANGE

420 West 118th Street

September 5, 1984

Ambassador Jack Matlock  
Special Assistant to the President  
National Security Council  
Old Executive Building  
Washington, D.C. 20506

Dear Jack:

I very much enjoyed seeing you in Monterey. Listening to your observations at the Valentas' party was particularly instructive.

The AAASS panel I mentioned to you is scheduled for ~~Friday, November 2~~ from ~~10:30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m.~~ The present line-up is enclosed.

If you can get away, it would be great to have you as one of the two discussants. You and Prof. Fiszman would each have 10 minutes. (The panelists get 15 minutes.) We will then circulate an appropriate announcement at the convention itself to let the peaceloving masses of academics know of your participation.

I will try to call you a week or so before the convention to find out if you expect Presidents Reagan and Chernenko to give you a day off. I think the panel is sufficiently unimportant to assure their cooperation.

With best personal regards,

Encl.

Cordially,



Charles Gati



AAASS panel--Friday, November 2, 1984, 10:30-a.m.-12:30 p.m.

THREE IMAGES OF THE FUTURE OF EASTERN EUROPE (roundtable)

Chair: Charles Gati, Union College and Columbia University

"The Evolving Soviet Image of Eastern Europe"  
Vernon V. Aspaturian, Pennsylvania State University

"West European Perceptions of Eastern Europe"  
Angela Stent, Georgetown University

"East European Visions of the Region's Future"  
F. Stephen Larrabee, Institute on East-West Security Studies

Discussants: Joseph Fiszman, University of Oregon  
Jack Matlock, National Security Council  
(or Charles Gati)

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

September 12, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JGM*

SUBJECT: Secret Service Protection for Foreign Minister Gromyko

State has alerted us that the Soviets, both here and in New York, have requested Secret Service protection for Foreign Minister Gromyko during his U.S. visit, September 18-29. Such protection has been provided in the past, most recently in 1982.

I concur with State's assessment that the sensitivity and importance of this visit warrant Secret Service protection for the Foreign Minister.

At Tab I is a memorandum from you to John Simpson, Director of the U.S. Secret Service, requesting that protection.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to Mr. Simpson at Tab I requesting Secret Service protection for Foreign Minister Gromyko.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments:

- Tab I Memorandum to John Simpson
- Tab II Incoming from State

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Declassify on: OADR

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BY RW NARA DATE 3/3/11

National Security Council  
The White House

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	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Paul Thompson	1	✓	
Bob Kimmitt	2	K	
John Poindexter	3	J	
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
Bob Kimmitt	4	K	A
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room			
Matlock	5		A per

I = Information    A = Action    R = Retain    D = Dispatch    N = No further Action

cc: VP    Meese    Baker    Deaver    Other \_\_\_\_\_ JMP note

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_

Is this the correct channel or  
(Date/Time)  
do we need to go through  
someone here?

It should be for Bud's  
signature "For the President"  
To the Secret Service    cc Sec Treas  
Ed Hickey

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON~~CONFIDENTIAL~~MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN SIMPSON  
Director  
United States Secret ServiceSUBJECT: Secret Service Protection for  
Foreign Minister Gromyko (C)

Soviet diplomatic representatives, both here and in New York, have requested Secret Service protection for Foreign Minister Gromyko during his visit to the United States, September 18-29.

The President agrees that given the importance and sensitivity of the Foreign Minister's mission, such protection would be appropriate.

Please make the necessary arrangements to provide Secret Service protection for Foreign Minister Gromyko.

FOR THE PRESIDENT:

cc: The Secretary of the Treasury  
Edward Hickey~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

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NLRR 108-125/2 #6079BY KML NARA DATE 6/25/10



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

September 12, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE  
THE WHITE HOUSESUBJECT: Secret Service Protection for Foreign Minister  
Gromyko

Both the Soviets here and in New York have requested Secret Service protection for Foreign Minister Gromyko during his September 18-29 visit to New York and Washington. Such protection was provided during prior Gromyko visits (most recently in 1982). In view of the sensitivity and importance of his mission, we believe that Secret Service protection for Gromyko is necessary and ask that you convey our request for this coverage to the appropriate officials.

*to mcfarlane*  
Charles Hill  
Executive Secretary

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/1 #6074

BY C/S NARA DATE 11/07/07~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECL:OADR:

POSSIBLE Q & AS

For ROBERT McFARLANE on the TODAY Show  
September 13, 1984

- Q. In the upcoming Reagan/Gromyko meeting, what is realistic to expect out of that? What are we prepared to discuss at length? (Setting new date for ASAT talks? Any specific treaties? Planning a Summit, etc?)
- A. We hope the meeting will give the President the opportunity to explain our desire to improve relations, and to obtain a clearer idea of Soviet views and objectives. Since the meeting will be confidential, I don't want to list specific topics we have in mind, but you can be sure the President will make clear his commitment to peace and to a policy of working pragmatically to solve problems in the relationship.
- Q. What can you tell us about the leadership struggle in the Soviet Union? Chernenko appears to be hospitalized, according to reports -- what does this mean? Do you anticipate yet another leadership change soon? How soon? Who's up and who's down right now? (How strong and how influential is Gromyko?)
- A. It would be quite improper for me to speculate on the internal workings of a foreign government. What is important is that we are prepared to deal with the Soviet Government as it exists, with the people in place there.
- Mr. Gromyko has been in office longer than any of his counterparts, so he is a thoroughly experienced statesman. Certainly, he is in a position to speak for the Soviet Government with complete authority.
- Q. Why do you think the Soviets agreed to this meeting right now in a political campaign? Many say this will really help Reagan.
- A. Elections are so important to us Americans that we sometimes err in thinking that foreigners are as mesmerized by them as we are. I don't think the campaign is relevant to either side's decision to have a meeting. It is a natural thing to do in normal circumstances, and has been a tradition in the past, interrupted only when specific events made such meetings impossible.



- Q. But won't it in fact help the President in his campaign?
- A. I don't know why it should, except to the degree that some may have been taken in by the charge that we lack the means of communicating with the Soviet Government -- a charge that never had any basis. But the campaign had nothing to do with the President's decision to invite the Foreign Minister to a meeting. He would have done so, given the same circumstances, whether an election was coming up or not.
- Q. Have there been many violations of arms control agreements? Are you going to release the GAC report next week? Don't you think that might "poison the well" for the Gromyko meetings?
- A. The Administration reported to the Congress last January on several Soviet violations, or likely violations, of arms control agreements. Now, the Congress has requested an unclassified version of a report made by an advisory committee to the President, and we are working on it in response to the Congressional request.

Let me say two things in this connection. The first is that calling attention to violations, when we think they have occurred, is not an attack on the arms control process. The right sort of arms control agreements can be useful, and examining problems with past agreements helps us work on better ones in the future. You can't do this if you ignore flaws in past agreements. And there have also been agreements which have worked well, in whole or in large part.

Second, I don't believe that it is sound practice to try to conceal problems from Congress or the American people. The Soviet record in adhering to agreements is a factor which must be taken into account if people are to understand the real world. We shouldn't behave like ostriches when we enter negotiations with a powerful country.

It seems to me -- and to the President -- that the overall lesson to be drawn from these reports is not that the arms control process is impossible, but that we must negotiate better agreements in the future. They reinforce our conviction that the key question is not how many agreements you can sign, but whether the agreements reached really improve security, lower arms, or contribute to a better relationship.

SECRETARY SHULTZ INTERVIEWED BY JANE PAULEY AND MARVIN KALB

**PAULEY:** In the midst of our special examination of the Soviet-American new cold war, the big news this week has been that President Reagan will meet with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko. The hint was first dropped here on Today on Monday morning and confirmed before the day was over. Gromyko's American counterpart, Secretary of State George Shultz, is in our Washington studio now along with NBC News Chief Diplomatic Correspondent Marvin Kalb. Good morning gentlemen, Mr. Secretary, earlier in the week a former Secretary of State suggested off the record that the Soviets were maybe beginning a new peace offensive. Do you think so?

**SHULTZ:** Well, it remains to be seen. It would certainly be welcome, but the point is that we're going to have this meeting and we've had meetings in the past, as I have, and I think it will be useful.

**KALB:** Mr. Secretary, why do you think that Gromyko accepted the President's invitation?

**SHULTZ:** Well, I suppose that he wants to have a dialogue as well. He's here in this country. It's the first time he has been here in two years, and up until these meetings in Washington with the Soviet Foreign Minister were stopped during the Carter-Mondale Administration he regularly came here. So, it's reinstating that process.

**KALB:** Well, of course, that process went on. As you point out, it was stopped in 1979 and '80, but it did go on for a long time before that.

**SHULTZ:** Yes, it did.



KALB: Why was it that this President did not resume that procedure in 1981 and '2 when he had a chance to?

SHULTZ: Well, I don't know in 1981. I wasn't here in 1982. It really wasn't an issue. It was quite interesting to me, as you see the interplay of discussions with the Soviet Union and traumatic events, that at the height of the furor and outrage over the shooting down of the Korean Airliner President Reagan sent our negotiators back to Geneva. And I think in doing that he showed that on the one hand he had a very great concern and sense of outrage about that behavior of the Soviet Union, but he put the importance of getting somewhere in our relationship, and in particular the field of arms control at a very high level.

KALB: Mr. Secretary, I sometimes find a sort of split personality in the Administration regarding arms control. There are people who want it--pushing for it--and there are other people who are not. For example, there is going to be this report put out where as many as 18 violations will be cited of the Soviet Union against arms control agreements since 1958. There are a number of people who will point that out to you in the Administration. Why have an arms control agreement if they're going to hunt it? What is your own view?

SHULTZ: My view is that we should on the one hand learn from past experience in concluding agreements with the Soviet Union and try to improve those agreements, and on the other hand that the subject is of immense importance. And to cease trying would be very wrong.

KALB: Have there in fact been, to your knowledge, 18 violations of arms control agreements?

SHULTZ: Well, I don't want to comment on that report--

KALB: Have there been violations?

SHULTZ: --Hasn't been released. There are problems with a radar that I think has been fairly heavily publicized in connection with the ABM Treaty. We're discussing that with the Soviet Union, and there have been other instances that one can call attention to. There have also been agreements that have worked. For example, right now the agreement on our willingness to sell and their desire to buy grain is an agreement that has worked to our mutual advantage. But the reason why agreements are kept is that they work to the mutual advantage of both parties. When you design an agreement you have to have that on your mind.

KALB: Could you just tell us whether--simple terms--there have been many violations, as claimed in this report?

SHULTZ: Well, there are all sorts of categories of things. Some seem to be pretty direct violations. Others seem to be cases where the Soviet Union very cleverly in the negotiations left something that if we had a lawyer here he would say it was a loophole. But it was designed for something they intended to do. So, in a technical sense one might say, "Well, he didn't quite violate the agreement, but in the spirit of the



agreement it certainly is a pattern of behavior that doesn't fit." And there are other things where the agreement is loose and difficult to interpret, but at any rate it is certainly a very important question, and it does, I think, pose a challenge of designing agreements that are to a certain extent self-enforcing because they operate in the mutual interest of both parties, and highlights the importance of good provisions for verification.

**KALB:** Mr. Secretary, we've got about a half-minute left. In this series that NBC is doing right now in Moscow and about relations, do you think that we're being used by the Russians?

**SHULTZ:** No, I don't think so. I think it's a real service to improve the level of understanding of the American people about the Soviet Union and about our relationship. As a matter of fact, there is a small appropriation that we've managed to get to support study, and I'm going to go out later in October to Rand Corporation and help them inaugurate their program. So, we're a little ahead of them.

**KALB:** Okay, well thank you very much for that kudo, Mr. Secretary, and for joining us.

**FOLLOW-UP TO INTERVIEW WITH SECRETARY SHULTZ** - The Secretary did not give numbers, but he did confirm that there have been violations of existing arms control agreements with the U.S. One key violation cited by the Secretary concerns radars the Russians are building that were specifically ruled out by the ABM Treaty of 1972. The Administrations really have two minds on this pattern of Soviet violations. The ultra-conservatives want the report out to undercut arms control agreements in the spirit of them. The moderates running the President's re-election campaign objected only to the timing of the release, feeling it would damage and confuse the campaign. (Marvin Kalb)

**MIDEAST** - Iraq claims that its navy has attacked a convoy of ships in the Persian Gulf. The ships were said to be heading for an Iranian oil port. Iraq claims to have destroyed four of the ships, presumably all oil tankers. (John Palmer)

Drafted: PA/PC/SPS:JBarbour  
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

September 14, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JSM*

SUBJECT: President's Meeting with Gromyko: Background Material

We have just received, from State and CIA, two studies of Gromyko which might be useful for the President's weekend reading, since they supply background information on the materials we will be supplying next week. The first, at TAB A, is an assessment of Gromyko the man which was prepared at State. The second (TAB B) is a run-down prepared by CIA of the sort of issues Gromyko may raise. I also attach at TAB II the latest CIA biography of Gromyko. Much in it is duplicated in the State paper; I selected the latter for the President since I believe it is somewhat better focused on matters directly relevant to the meeting. Both, however, are good papers, and you may wish to substitute the CIA paper for State's at TAB A, if in your judgment it would be of greater interest to the President.

I am now working on talking points for the President, and expect to have my first draft to you tomorrow (September 15). CIA is working on a film on Gromyko, which it expects to finish by September 21, so it will be available for the President to view the weekend before he sees Gromyko.

Recommendation:

That you forward the Memorandum at Tab I to the President.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments:

- Tab I Memorandum to the President
  - Tab A State Assessment of Gromyko
  - Tab B CIA Background Issue Paper
- Tab II CIA Biography of Gromyko

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Declassify on: OADR

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MEMORANDUM

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Gromyko: Background Material

As you begin thinking about your meeting with Gromyko, the two papers attached may be useful as general background. The first describes Gromyko as a person and negotiator and the second reviews the issues which Gromyko is most likely to have on his mind.

Attachments:

Tab A "Andrei Gromyko: The Consummate Soviet Diplomat"  
Tab B "What to Expect from Gromyko"

Prepared by:  
Jack Matlock

cc: Vice President

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR



ANDREI GROMYKO: THE CONSUMMATE SOVIET DIPLOMAT

Westerners have always found the dour Soviet Foreign Minister a formidable adversary. A man with experience going back 45 years, he is a talented diplomat with a prodigious memory. Gromyko's rise to the top of the Soviet political hierarchy was also facilitated by his boundless loyalty to his political masters. He is a tough and stubborn negotiator, a skill cultivated in his long years in the Soviet bureaucratic jungle, yet given to occasional humor. He takes personally the decline in US-Soviet relations--which he views as central to world affairs--blaming the Reagan Administration for undoing what he had been instrumental in accomplishing.

\* \* \* \*

Master Craftsman. Gromyko's long professional career--he has served 45 years in the Soviet foreign service, 27 as foreign minister, as well as 11 in the Politburo--has helped cultivate the image of the world's most experienced diplomat. He has been personally involved in every major East-West crisis since World War II. has met in the Oval Office with eight US Presidents, starting with FDR, and negotiated with 13 Secretaries of State, going back to Cordell Hull. And he headed every Soviet delegation to the UN General Assembly from 1962-82. (From 1970 until 1978, he used his UN trips as an occasion to meet with the US President in Washington.)

His diplomatic skills, the product of this long experience, are legendary. Gromyko is well known for his prodigious memory and a virtually unlimited capacity for detail. A former French Foreign Minister who met often with him said: "Gromyko never took a note, never looked at a folder, or turned to his assistants for advice." In March 1983, he stood for two hours at a lecturn in a Moscow auditorium and fielded questions from the foreign press, without notes and without stumbling. Henry Kissinger has written that

Normally, Gromyko knew every shade of a subject; it was suicidal to negotiate with him without mastering the record or the issues.

As a negotiator, he is "indefatigable and imperturbable," according to Kissinger; "when he lost his temper, one knew it was carefully planned." His outbursts are usually a calculated move to break his opponents composure. He will posture for show, as he did when he threw his glasses on the table in apparent rage when Secretary Shultz insisted on discussing the

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KAL tragedy during bilateral meetings in Madrid last September. But he will be cool, reasonable and relaxed if he wants the talks to be successful. He is also a pragmatic diplomat, not an ideologue, and avoids making ideological statements. He is not above engaging in deception. On October 18, 1962, as Soviet missiles were being installed in Cuba, he told President Kennedy that Soviet military assistance to Castro was solely for defensive purposes. If it were otherwise, he assured the President, "the Soviet government would have never become involved" in rendering such assistance.

Master Survivor and Politician. Gromyko's long career is also testimony to his extraordinary political skills. He is unique in the Politburo in that he has no significant political base in the Communist Party or in the military or the KGB. His rise is the product both of loyalty to whoever was on top and his vast professional expertise. He has served Stalin, Molotov, Khrushchev and Brezhnev, and served them well, a talent which helped him survive bitter internecine Party warfare. He was a major supporter of Brezhnev's detente policy and currently is a bitter critic of the US.

His loyalty is as legendary as is his competence. The price of survival included being the victim of public mockery and crude jokes. Khrushchev once boasted to de Gaulle that if Gromyko were ordered to drop his trousers and sit on a block of ice "for months," he would do so. Brezhnev also made Gromyko the butt of his humor. Neither Khrushchev nor Brezhnev left any doubt that Gromyko's unswerving loyalty to the wishes of his leaders was one of his greatest assets.

Throughout the years of abuse, Gromyko successfully masked his feelings and continued to be the "irreplaceable bureaucrat." Presumably to help deal with such indignities, he cultivated the dour, often sour countenance for which he is famous--a skill also useful for negotiations (and poker) as well. But he had it at the start--Washington diplomats had already begun to call him "Old Stone Face" in the 1940's. This nickname, wrote Dean Acheson in his memoirs

accurately describe an impenetrable mask which may well have contributed to his amazing and unique record of survival amid the changes and chances of life in Russia from 1909 to the present.



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In an era that destroyed brilliant minds in every field, Gromyko survived by wrapping his expertise in a cloak of orthodoxy and unassertiveness. He made himself into a technocrat who did not threaten anyone; this style was the basis of much of his career.

Gromyko is more than a mere survivor. Previously chief manager of Soviet foreign policy, he now is its chief architect. His dominance in the foreign policy arena is, however, recent. Under Brezhnev, Gromyko had a key, but clearly secondary, role. Brezhnev dominated Politburo decision-making while Gromyko, at Brezhnev's request, handled specific negotiations. Only in his later years did Brezhnev come to rely more heavily on Gromyko who then did not hesitate to interject his own comments or correct Brezhnev during negotiations. At the Carter-Brezhnev summit in 1979, Brezhnev turned more than once to Gromyko to ask whether he had performed satisfactorily.

Gromyko's steadily enhancing status is reflected in his rise in the hierarchy. He was made a full member of the Politburo in 1973. In May 1983, under Andropov, he became First Deputy Prime Minister and so acquired higher protocol status than a mere Foreign Minister.. Since Andropov's death in early 1984, Gromyko's role expanded still further. A ranking Soviet official recently said that because of his relative lack of experience in foreign policy matters, Chernenko had delegated full authority to Gromyko. The experience of Western diplomats tends to corroborate this view. Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau reported that during a 30-minute meeting with Chernenko after the Andropov funeral, Gromyko did most of the talking. And in a late May 1984 meeting in Moscow, German Foreign Minister Genscher found Gromyko to be aggressive and assertive, handling most of the negotiations.

Tenacious Negotiator--With a Sense of Humor. His instinct for survival in the Soviet political jungle also helped shape Gromyko's diplomatic style. As negotiator, he is well-briefed, patient and tenacious. Innate caution combined with the traditional demands of Soviet politics have produced a negotiating toughness and dogged persistence--he always knew he had to convince his chiefs and later his Politburo colleagues that he had struggled to the bitter end. Thus he is continually on guard against possible attacks by Politburo conservatives for allowing a diplomatic adversary an unnecessary concession.



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Gromyko also tends to be rigid by nature. He is visibly embarrassed when forced to change a point on which agreement has already been reached. "Renegotiation" is anathema to him. He also seems to fear being tricked at the last minute-- Kissinger wrote that in the last phase of a negotiation Gromyko seemed to be seized by "an undefinable terror" that his opposite number might pull a last-minute trick on him and he would seek to rush through the signature.

Yet by most accounts, the dour, strong willed, diplomat also has a lively, at times self-deprecating, sense of humor. This was especially in evidence during the 1972 Moscow summit.

Once in the early morning hours during a long and difficult negotiation on SALT, Kissinger jibed: "Did you hear, Gromyko, ... they launched an SS-9 (Russia's giant missile) and nothing happened?" "In this country," Gromyko shrugged, "nothing works."

When one of the American Xerox machines broke down during the negotiations, Kissinger asked Gromyko if he could have some copies made if we held up certain documents to the chandelier in St. Catherine's hall in the Kremlin. Gromyko replied without missing a beat that unfortunately the cameras were installed by the tsars; they were adequate for photographing people but not documents.

US-Soviet Relations and the Reagan Administration. US-USSR relations have long been Gromyko's central concern. He considers this relationship central to world affairs and the future role of his country. He has had long personal experience with the US--his first assignment abroad for the Soviet foreign service was at the Soviet Embassy in Washington and he was Ambassador to the US from 1943 (when he was 34!) to 1946. He speaks fluent English and uses American idiomatic expressions with ease. Gromyko maintains direct control over US-Soviet relations; he reportedly sees 90% of the cables from the Soviet Ambassador in Washington.

His deep involvement in relations between Moscow and Washington during the detente era helps explain his bitterness about the recent downturn. A communist official who attended the Conference on Disarmament in Europe in Stockholm earlier

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this year referred to him as a cranky old man who takes "personally" US criticism of Soviet foreign policy. Washington's questioning of agreements reached with the USSR during the 1970's were a special source of pique since he had a major role in negotiating most of them. He told Secretary Haig (September 1981) that the US was reneging on treaties which still "smelled of the sweat of the participants"--of Gromyko's sweat!

Gromyko charged at Stockholm last January that the Reagan Administration was destroying "with a big stick" what had been built by others, not the least himself. He clearly resents what he sees as an attempt to rob the USSR of the status and reputation won at such great cost and personal effort. He complained to Secretary Haig (September 1981) that the US should understand that the Soviet Union "by right occupied a worthy and legitimate place in the world," a fact which the Administration was seeking to deny.

In his view, US criticism of the Soviet system and its policies as well as Washington's military rearmament program have but one purpose--to deprive Moscow of its status as a world power, a status which he helped to achieve. US-Soviet relations, he repeats endlessly, must be based on equality and equal security. In other words, the Soviet system--and his accomplishments--must be treated with respect.

Drafted: MSchwartz, INR/SEE  
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

UNCLASSIFIED  
with CONFIDENTIAL Attachment

September 14, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT: Draft Presidential Radio Address  
for September 29, 1984

You have requested a draft radio address on the subject of U.S.-Soviet relations for use by the President on Saturday, September 29. It seems to me most appropriate to task State with the preparation of the initial draft.

Attached at Tab I is a memo from you to Charles Hill asking him to prepare a draft by Tuesday, September 18.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the memo to Mr. Hill at Tab I.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments:

- Tab I Memo to Hill
- Tab A Request for Draft

UNCLASSIFIED  
with CONFIDENTIAL Attachment



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. CHARLES HILL  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

SUBJECT: Draft Presidential Radio Address  
on U.S.-Soviet Relations ~~(C)~~

The President is planning to deliver a radio address on U.S.-Soviet relations on September 29. We recognize that changes may be required in the wake of the Gromyko meetings, but would appreciate receiving an initial draft no later than c.o.b. Tuesday, September 18. ~~(C)~~

Robert M. Kimmitt  
Executive Secretary

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
WHITE HOUSE  
Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997  
By OH NARA, Date 6/10/06

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

September 13, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JACK F. MATLOCK

FROM: ROBERT M. KIMMITT <sup>Bob</sup>

SUBJECT: Radio Address -- September 29, 1984

Please prepare by c.o.b. Thursday, September 20, a draft radio address for use on Saturday, September 29. The theme of the address is "US-Soviet Relations." I recognize that changes may be required in the wake of the Gromyko meetings, but we want to ensure that Speechwriters receive an agreed framework for the address as early as possible.

Once reviewed by Bud, we will send the draft to Speechwriters and concerned agencies. You may, however, begin informal coordination with these entities immediately. (If you believe we should task State for a draft, please give me a Kimmitt to Hill ASAP.) Thanks.

cc: Don Fortier  
Karna Small  
Bob Sims  
Steve Steiner  
Bill Martin  
John Lenczowski