

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections

This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.

Collection: Matlock, Jack F.: Files
Folder Title: Matlock Chron September 1984 (1)
Box: 6

To see more digitized collections visit:

<https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library>

To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:

<https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection>

Contact a reference archivist at: reagan.library@nara.gov

Citation Guidelines: <https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing>

National Archives Catalogue: <https://catalog.archives.gov/>

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 3/21/2005

File Folder MATLOCK CHRON SEPTEMBER 1984 (1/5)

FOIA

F06-114/1

Box Number 6

YARHI-MILO

601

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
6055	MEMO	MEMO FOR ROBERT MCFARLANE RE ESTABLISHING A CHANNEL WITH THE USSR [2-3] R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1	2	9/4/1984	B1
6056	MEMO	MEMO FOR WALT RAYMOND RE RFE [10] R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1 DOCUMENT PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O. 13233	1	9/5/1984	B1
6057	MEMO	MEMO FROM WALK RAYMOND RE RFE/RF BROADCASTING [11] R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1 DOCUMENT PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O. 13233	1	8/30/1984	B1
6058	LETTER	LETTER TO CHARLES WICK FROM ROBERT MCFARLANE RE USSR PROPAGANDA [12] R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1	1	9/5/1984	B1
6059	NOTE	NOTE FROM ROBERT KIMMITT ON PRESIDENT REAGAN NOTE ON MATLOCK PAPER #6399 [21] R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1	1	8/30/1984	B1
6060	MEMO	MEMO FOR ROBERT MCFARLANE RE GROMYKO'S EARLY ARRIVAL [23] R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1	1	9/6/1984	B1
6061	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #6060 [24] R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1	1	9/6/1984	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 3/21/2005

File Folder MATLOCK CHRON SEPTEMBER 1984 (1/5)

FOIA

F06-114/1

Box Number 6

YARHI-MILO

601

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
6062	MEMO	MEMO FROM ROBERT MCFARLANE RE GROMYKO'S EARLY ARRIVAL [26] R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1	1	9/5/1984	B1
6063	MEMO	MEMO FOR ROBERT MCFARLANE RE OGARKOV REMOVAL [29] R 3/3/2011 F2006-114/1	1	9/6/1984	B1
6064	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #6063 [30] R 3/3/2011 F2006-114/1	1	9/6/1984	B1
6065	MEMO	MEMO FOR ROBERT MCFARLANE RE SAKHAROV, FREDKIN, AND PC'S TO USSR [31-32] R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1	2	9/6/1984	B1
6070	LETTER	SAME TEXT AS DOC #6069 [33] R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1	1	9/8/1984	B1
6066	MEMO	MEMO FOR ROBERT MCFARLANE RE FBI REPORT ON USSR PLAN TO CANCEL LONG TERM GRAIN AGREEMENT [48-49] R 3/3/2011 F2006-114/1	2	9/7/1984	B1
6067	LETTER	LETTER FROM ROBERT MCFARLANE TO WILLIAM WEBSTER RE FBI REPORT ON USSR PLAN TO CANCEL LONG TERM GRAIN AGREEMENT [50] R 8/20/2007 NLRRF06-114/1	1	9/7/1984	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 3/21/2005

File Folder MATLOCK CHRON SEPTEMBER 1984 (1/5)

FOIA

F06-114/1

Box Number 6

YARHI-MILO

601

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
6068	MEMO	MEMO FROM WILLIAM WEBSTER TO ROBERT MCFARLANE RE FBI REPORT ON USSR PLAN TO CANCEL LONG TERM GRAIN AGREEMENT [51-53] PAR 8/20/2007 NLRRF06-114/1	3	8/29/1984	B1 B7(D)
6069	CABLE	082109Z SEP 84 [54-55] R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1	2	9/8/1984	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

FITTE HOUSE
SHINGTON

~~EXES ONLY~~

Chrom File —

Sept, 1784

PRESERVATION COPY

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

September 4, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK

SUBJECT: Establishing a Private Channel with the Soviets

While it is encouraging that Secretary Shultz has decided that a private channel could be useful, I do not believe that the idea of proposing one to Gromyko (or inviting him to propose one) is the way to proceed if we want one that is effective and which does not give Dobrynin a monopoly over both directions of the messages.

Private channels are useful basically for two reasons:

(1) They would allow us to work out compromises privately and informally, giving the Soviet leadership the possibility of avoiding accusations that they are compromising on principles; and

(2) If properly established, they would allow us to communicate directly with elements of the Soviet bureaucracy outside the Foreign Ministry.

When and if the Soviet leadership has decided that they want improved relations, they will desire a private channel, largely for the first reason. But if we put the ball in their court, by working through Gromyko, we can be sure that he will arrange any channel established so that it is maintained under his control, thus depriving us of the second advantage -- which could ultimately prove very useful to us. Also, if we accept Dobrynin as the channel, we in effect give him a monopoly over communications in both directions. This is something we should never do again, since (particularly in the absence of frequent high-level direct meetings), we would have absolutely no control over the spin he puts on our messages.

I believe that any effort to establish a private channel should be made directly to the Soviet agency with which we wish to communicate. The obvious target for us is the Central Committee apparatus, which provides the staff support for the General Secretary (and other Central Committee Secretaries such as, for example, Gorbachev).

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

Declassify: OADR

NLRR F06-114/1 #6055

RV CW NADA DATE 11/21/87

Such efforts undoubtedly would be reported to Gromyko, and if they come from someone in State, he would have solid bureaucratic ground to turn it off, since it is his formal duty to deal with foreign ministries. An effort by the White House to communicate with the CC Secretariat is different, however. Since it is, roughly, counterpart to counterpart, Gromyko would in effect have to argue that the Secretariat personnel cannot be relied upon to deal with us. This would be more difficult for him to do, and Zagladin's willingness to meet with me in February and to have Menshikov meet me in March shows that it is not out of the question. (You will recall that Menshikov pointed out that the contact had been approved by the Politburo, including Gromyko, and that Zagladin was authorized to receive messages through Hartman provided they were from me -- but only under that condition.) I take this as confirmation that the bureaucratic factors mentioned above are in fact operative.

Since we have not followed up on the March meeting, we cannot be sure that the arrangements worked out earlier are still acceptable. However, if we have something substantial to say, I believe the route to try initially is the one used before; if the Soviets reject it, then it will be a signal that they are not ready for a private channel in the full sense. If they are willing, however, such a mode of communication could be very useful to us if (as appears very likely) the Soviets are on the brink of another transition. The CC Secretariat will be in the vortex of any maneuvering; the Foreign Ministry will be very much off on the side .

Testing Soviet willingness to reactivate the channel established earlier would be very simple. With Secretary Shultz's approval, I could ask Hartman by secure telephone to pass a proposal to Zagladin that the two of us meet. If he accepted, it would mean that they are willing to activate the contact.

In sum, I recommend:

1. That Secretary Shultz be dissuaded from mentioning the matter of private channels to Gromyko or anyone in his party, and
2. That I be authorized to proceed as outlined above if we wish to test Soviet willingness to establish a channel.

Before anything is decided or done, it might be useful if I had the opportunity to discuss privately with Secretary Shultz and you some of the tactical considerations in establishing and maintaining a special channel.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

September 5, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR KARNA SMALL

FROM:

JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT:

Briefing Notes for McFarlane

Talking points for Bud McFarlane's appearance on the McNeil-Lehrer program, in response to the questions in your memo, follow below.

- Q. Some of the charges we hear these (campaign) days are that Ronald Reagan is the first President not to have met with a Soviet leader -- and not to have signed an arms control treaty with them. Why is this?
- A. On the first point, the President has made it clear for a long time that he has been willing to arrange a meeting. In 1982, he invited Brezhnev to come to the Special Session of the UNGA and to meet at that time. And he has been willing to meet with Brezhnev's successors. Of course, any meeting should be properly prepared to achieve positive results, but that could have been worked out rapidly if the Soviet leaders had been willing and able to meet. What some people seem to forget is that we have had three different Soviet leaders during this Administration, and some have been seriously ill for extended periods. So if there has been no meeting, it is not because of the President's choice.

On the second point, it seems to me that the question is not the number of agreements -- which ignores whether they are useful or important -- but whether our policies improve the prospects for peace. We believe that the world is in fact safer in terms of a possible U.S.-Soviet military confrontation than it has been for many years.

Of course we want to conclude agreements to reduce arms, and we are working hard to do so. But we believe that agreements for the sake of agreements would do more harm than good.

Finally, I must say that I consider it irresponsible for any American political figure to suggest -- even indirectly -- that an American President should be judged by his willingness to please our Soviet adversaries.

5

Q. Do you think that you'll have a better chance of signing an arms control agreement after the election? Why?

A. We hope so. Our efforts to negotiate fair, balanced and verifiable agreements will not flag. I believe that reaching agreements to reduce arms is in the interest of both our countries -- and the whole world. Therefore, we hope and believe the Soviet Government will come back to the negotiating table.

Q. What do you know about the health of Chernenko? We hear that he appeared in public yesterday, but there were no photos or Western reporters present -- what do you know about him now?

A. I don't think it is appropriate for me to speculate on the health of foreign leaders.


Q. The East German leader has just cancelled his visit to West Germany -- most everyone says that it was because of Soviet pressure. What is your view? What does this mean for the future of relations between East and West Germany?

A. The Soviets made it pretty clear that they were worried about the development of closer ties between the two German states, and this obviously could have been a factor in Mr. Honecher's decision. But I don't believe that the future of relations between East and West Germany is dependent upon any particular visit. Certainly, I don't see it as harming the Federal Republic in any way.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 5, 1984

rec'd 3:30 pm
9/4/84
v



MEMORANDUM FOR JACK MATLOCK

FROM: KARNA SMALL *KS*
SUBJECT: Briefing notes for McFarlane

Tomorrow evening, September 6, Bud will be appearing on the McNeil-Lehrer program in a general interview that could cover several subjects (depending on the news flow). In discussions with the Producer, it seems like they will be spending a good portion of the interview on US-Soviet relations. It's always hard to anticipate questions, but could you put together a few short talking points to cover the following question areas:

- Q. Some of the charges we hear these (campaign) days are that Ronald Reagan is the first President not to have met with a Soviet leader - and not to have signed an arms control treaty with them. Why is this?
- Q. Do you think that you'll have a better chance of signing an arms control agreement after the election? Why?
- Q. What do you know about the health of Chernenko? We hear that he appeared in public yesterday, but there were no photos or western reporters present -- what do you know about him now?
- Q. The East German leader has just cancelled his visit to West Germany - most everyone says that it was because of Soviet pressure. What is your view? What does this mean for the future of relations between East and West Germany?

(plus any other points you think they might raise)

Could I have the points by noon tomorrow so I can put them together for Bud before the show.

Many thanks!

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

September 5, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR KARNA SMALL

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT: Briefing Notes for McFarlane

Talking points for Bud McFarlane's appearance on the McNeil-Lehrer program, in response to the questions in your memo, follow below.

- Q. Some of the charges we hear these (campaign) days are that Ronald Reagan is the first President not to have met with a Soviet leader -- and not to have signed an arms control treaty with them. Why is this?
- A. On the first point, the President has made it clear for a long time that he has been willing to arrange a meeting. In 1982, he invited Brezhnev to come to the Special Session of the UNGA and to meet at that time. And he has been willing to meet with Brezhnev's successors. Of course, any meeting should be properly prepared to achieve positive results, but that could have been worked out rapidly if the Soviet leaders had been willing and able to meet. What some people seem to forget is that we have had three different Soviet leaders during this Administration, and some have been seriously ill for extended periods. So if there has been no meeting, it is not because of the President's choice.

On the second point, it seems to me that the question is not the number of agreements -- which ignores whether they are useful or important -- but whether our policies improve the prospects for peace. We believe that the world is in fact safer in terms of a possible U.S.-Soviet military confrontation than it has been for many years.

Of course we want to conclude agreements to reduce arms, and we are working hard to do so. But we believe that agreements for the sake of agreements would do more harm than good.

Finally, I must say that I consider it irresponsible for any American political figure to suggest -- even indirectly -- that an American President should be judged by his willingness to please our Soviet adversaries.

Q. Do you think that you'll have a better chance of signing an arms control agreement after the election? Why?

A. We hope so. Our efforts to negotiate fair, balanced and verifiable agreements will not flag. I believe that reaching agreements to reduce arms is in the interest of both our countries -- and the whole world. Therefore, we hope and believe the Soviet Government will come back to the negotiating table.

Q. What do you know about the health of Chernenko? We hear that he appeared in public yesterday, but there were no photos or Western reporters present -- what do you know about him now?

A. I don't think it is appropriate for me to speculate on the health of foreign leaders.

Q. The East German leader has just cancelled his visit to West Germany -- most everyone says that it was because of Soviet pressure. What is your view? What does this mean for the future of relations between East and West Germany?

A. The Soviets made it pretty clear that they were worried about the development of closer ties between the two German states, and this obviously could have been a factor in Mr. Honecher's decision. But I don't believe that the future of relations between East and West Germany is dependent upon any particular visit. Certainly, I don't see it as harming the Federal Republic in any way.

add 30
9/4/84
9

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 5, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR JACK MATLOCK

FROM: KARNA SMALIK *KS*

SUBJECT: Briefing notes for McFarlane

Tomorrow evening, September 6, Bud will be appearing on the McNeil-Lehrer program in a general interview that could cover several subjects (depending on the news flow). In discussions with the Producer, it seems like they will be spending a good portion of the interview on US-Soviet relations. It's always hard to anticipate questions, but could you put together a few short talking points to cover the following question areas:

- Q. Some of the charges we hear these (campaign) days are that Ronald Reagan is the first President not to have met with a Soviet leader - and not to have signed an arms control treaty with them. Why is this?
- Q. Do you think that you'll have a better chance of signing an arms control agreement after the election? Why?
- Q. What do you know about the health of Chernenko? We hear that he appeared in public yesterday, but there were no photos or western reporters present -- what do you know about him now?
- Q. The East German leader has just cancelled his visit to West Germany - most everyone says that it was because of Soviet pressure. What is your view? What does this mean for the future of relations between East and West Germany?

(plus any other points you think they might raise)

Could I have the points by noon tomorrow so I can put them together for Bud before the show.

Many thanks!

9/5/84 10
C

~~CONF ID~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

TO: Walt Rayment

I am most dubious about "hardening" RFE's treatment of the Hungarian regime.

They have pushed their independence about as far as they can, at this point. Why beat up on them? How does that fit a policy of differentiation? What sort of incentive does it provide for those regimes not so far along. (One payoff for liberalization should be some easing of pressure from RFE.)

I think it is basically unwise to have an RFE Director with an emotional stake in one of the Services. Makes for poor judgment - and bad management -

Jack

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/1 #6056

BY CAS NARA DATE 11/27/07

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

August 30, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR JACK MATLOCK
STEVE STEINER

FROM: WALT RAYMOND *WR*

SUBJECT: RFE/RL Broadcasting

Attached herewith is a New York Times article of August 30. It is not a profound piece of journalism, but it points up continued internal bickering within RFE/RL. The issue which I think is the most serious involves Hungarian broadcasting. Joe Szabados had the reputation of being the best RFE National Programming Director. A recent detailed analysis of RFE programming (attached) was performed by BIB, and it gave very high praise to the Hungarian Service. The analysis was performed by Pal Lendvai (aka Stephen Walter). There have been criticisms by Steve Gereban and others who have felt that Szabados was too "detentist" and should be more critical of the Hungarian regime. Lendvai's analysis argues that with the comparatively more open access to news in Hungary, it is absolutely essential for RFE to maintain its credibility that its reporting be balanced, fair, and accurate. George Urban has argued that one can still do more and remain fair and credible. For example, he believes one should not ignore the fact that Hungary is still a communist regime occupied by thousands of Soviet soldiers. A cable from Embassy Budapest is attached which comments on possible "change in editorial tone to one which is 'noticeably more critical and hard.'" The Embassy reporting is fragmentary. We have also received a communication from our Consulate in Munich which comments that "Szabados has been unhappy for some time as a result of the pressure from George Urban, a sort of super Hungarian Service Director, to make the Service harder hitting on Budapest." The Consulate concludes "The Hungarian Service is indeed becoming more hardline, and this is not by accident."

The Jim Markham article in the New York Times of August 30 suggests that we are just beginning to see press play on this change concerning broadcasting to Hungary. There will be those who support this Administration who will be very pleased with this change. My principal concern is whether this change is in fact consistent with U.S. national policy to Hungary. I would appreciate your views and would encourage careful discussion with the Department of State. I will be in Munich in October -- and may also visit Hungary -- and would be most interested in your analysis and policy recommendations. We can also discuss this with George Urban at the RFE/RL review session on September 20 at the NSC.

Attachments

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NLRR F06-714/1 #6057

~~SECRET~~

~~Attaches~~ 12
Chon

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 5, 1984

~~SECRET~~

Dear Charlie:

The President asked me to call your attention to the enclosed article by Professor Nina Tumarkin of Harvard entitled "Does the Soviet Union Fear the United States?". It analyzes the contrast between the fear of ordinary people, affected by Soviet propaganda, and that of the rulers who manipulate the propaganda to serve their own ends.

I am aware that many of the themes which would undercut the Soviet propaganda image of a belligerent America are already major components of the Agency's and VOA's output. Still, it might be useful to give some further thought to whether there is more we can do along these lines, such as more material on our historical restraint in using force, the defensive nature of our military modernization, and our good will toward the Russian (and other Soviet) people(s).

With best regards,

Sincerely,

Robert C. McFarlane

Attachment:

"Does the Soviet Union Fear the United States?" by Nina Tumarkin.

The Honorable Charles Z. Wick
Director
United States Information Agency
400 C Street, S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20547

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR FOI 714/1 #4058

BY CAS NARA DATE 11/27/07

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DOES THE SOVIET UNION FEAR THE UNITED STATES?

There is an old Russian peasant proverb, "Don't take your garbage out of the hut." Its meaning: when you wield power, do so in secret. This proverb remains the operating principle of the Politburo, which is shrouded in secrecy (in striking contrast to American presidents who rush to publish their memoirs as soon as they leave office). It is therefore impossible to gauge what that small coterie of septuagenarians thinks and feels about the United States. But some of the psychological components of Soviet high politics can be illuminated through a long study of Soviet history. And ordinary Russians are garrulous and animated people; they are quite ready to tell the interested visitor what they think. I am an historian, fluent in Russian, and have just returned from a two-week trip to the Ukraine. I would like to share with you my impression of the Soviet people's attitudes toward the United States, and my speculations about the views held by the men at the top.

July is a wonderful month to visit the Ukraine. The weather is balmy and the fields lush. Farmers' markets are well-stocked with produce grown on small, privately-owned plots and sold by old peasant women, babushki, whose wrinkled faces peer out of colorful flowered scarves. In the small river town of Cherkassy I came upon an outdoor market. Two babushki immediately recognized me as a foreigner and asked where I was from. "The United States," I said, smiling broadly over an enormous pile of carrots. "Why does your country want war?" one of them asked. "We only want peace, war is bad for everyone," added the other woman. I assured them that my country wants peace as well, but they shook their heads in discouraged disbelief.

I was last in the Soviet Union in 1978 for five months, and during that time was never once accused of coming from a jingoistic country. But that was

before the breakdown of detente. Since that time, and particularly in the past four years, Soviet newspapers and magazines -- and political cartoons especially -- have depicted the United States as a warmongering nation pursuing an adventurist foreign policy and led by a fanatically anti-Soviet president who has made a "crusade" (they use that exact term repeatedly) of anti-Communism.

Without going to the U.S.S.R. there is no way of telling how this propaganda has been received by the people. Friends and colleagues returning from Moscow and Leningrad of late have in fact been reporting a generalized popular anxiety about the United States, and have been recounting stories much like the one I sketched above, of ordinary people, largely women, protesting the United States' purported militaristic stance. What struck me about the encounter I had in Cherkassy was that despite its small size and remote location, public fear of the United States was very much in evidence. It certainly does seem that the anti-American propaganda of the past several years has been enormously effective. My general impression is that the Soviet people -- particularly those without much sophistication -- do genuinely fear the United States, and that this fear has grown more intense since the deployment of missiles in Western Europe.

We may think, of course, that our past history best proves our peaceful intentions, since during the 1940's we never exploited our four-year monopoly of atomic weapons. Soviet propaganda, however, condemns our recent past behavior, arguing that we did use atomic weapons, twice, and that we have demonstrated our willingness to fight communism in Korea, Southeast Asia, and to some extent in Central America. Worse yet, the Soviet media labels our government fascist, which is, of course, the most hateful term possible in a country that lost twenty million to the Nazis. "They kill you on the streets of Los Angeles. What's there to see in the United States? Fascism, that!- what!" said a tiny

old crone to me as we stood in a small alley in the beautiful old port city of Odessa. She drew deeply on her cigarette and leaning heavily on her cane blew out the smoke and said, "I am a veteran of the Great Patriotic War. I have seen enough of fascism."

As distressing as this kind of negative publicity is to the concerned American, it is of small import for two reasons. For one thing, ours is a confident culture; our national self-esteem is not at all affected by what the Russians say about us. Secondly, and more important, Soviet popular fear of the United States does not in any way inform that country's politics. The fear comes from a deliberate propaganda campaign designed to portray the United States as a menace to world peace and the U.S.S.R. as a peacemaker (public gardens that used to display red flowering plants in the shape of a hammer and sickle now exhibit planted flowers that spell out the Russian word for peace). What does affect us all, of course, is the Communist Party leaders' perception of the United States. Do Mr. Chernenko and his colleagues fear our government and if so, what is the content of that fear?

There is no evidence whatsoever that the Politburo believes its own propaganda about the United States. It is hard to imagine the Kremlin's shrewd old guard actually thinking that we would be crazy enough to launch a first strike against them or against anyone else. But they do appear huffy and bellicose, an attitude that has filtered down to the quite ordinary Communist Party spokesmen with whom I interacted on my recent trip. "Why did your president call us an evil empire?" asked an English-language professor from Odessa State University of the American tourists to whom we were both lecturing during their travels through the Ukraine. This indignant professor was expressing the same prickly defensiveness that I believe operates right now at the Politburo

level. When the Soviet leaders are anxious, they act in aggressive ways, both at home and abroad. And today they appear upset and angered by what they perceive to be our government's disdainful refusal to accord them respect, and at times even legitimacy. This is where it becomes necessary to understand the psychology of the Soviet leadership.

Soviet political culture is one that includes a shockingly low self-esteem. Indeed it has often been said that the Soviet Union suffers from a massive inferiority complex. Therefore the Kremlin, unlike Washington, has an enormous need for visible proofs of world respect. When they call us names it matters little to our people or government. But when we respond in kind, they are enraged, because our government's invective feeds into a national psychology that has a high level of self-contempt. The Soviet leaders can be likened to a street bully in an urban neighborhood, the mixed-up kid who wants to have friends but is sufficiently twisted to alienate everyone, and ends up adopting offensiveness as his style, while continuing to get angry at the frustrating consequences, and to hate himself.

The men who rule the Soviet Union know full well that theirs is the only major world power with no friends and no real allies. I followed my recent trip to the U.S.S.R. with a week each in Romania and Hungary. I chatted with a variety of people. Not one had anything positive to say about their mighty Eastern neighbor; about Russia I heard only complaints, often in the form of bitter jokes. I was also struck by the fact that in neither country did anyone I asked admit to knowing the Russian language, although I know that students in both countries are required to study it.

While the leadership of the U.S.S.R. sees itself as underappreciated, isolated, and maligned, it appears convinced that the United States is unable

or unwilling to understand how the Soviet Union sees the world. The fear of looking foolish, clumsy or brutish runs very deep with them. They were enraged by the political fallout from last year's downing of KAL 007. Their press dwelt obsessively on the "anti-Soviet hysteria" that was "whipped up" by the Reagan administration. I suspect that Messrs. Chernenko, Gromyko, et al are genuinely worried that some terrible humiliation might come their way at any moment because of what they perceive to be the American government's refusal to recognize their status as a superpower. To them, being a superpower means having the freedom to deepen their security, if not through expansion, then at the very least through the inevitable proliferation of anti-American regimes, such as that of the Sandinistas. The Soviets see us as impossibly rigid and unrealistic, incapable of accepting political changes that are not to our liking — particularly in Central America. Moreover, they fear our possible exploitation of their evident economic woes and the concomitant erosion of popular solidarity with the regime. For reasons both within and beyond their control, they are deeply insecure. At the very bottom of this insecurity lies a profoundly pessimistic view of human nature. Their belief that people are low and untrustworthy comes from a centuries-old Russian peasant culture and in part from the precepts of the Russian Orthodox church. It contrasts strikingly with the eighteenth-century Enlightenment philosophy on which our government was founded — with its faith in progress and in the rationality and innate goodness of man.

With its vestiges of traditional culture, Soviet society today remains a far more conservative one than our own. Based on the old-fashioned virtues of patriotism, respect for authority, and loyalty to family and friends, Soviet social values are worlds away from the obsessive narcissistic quest for self-actualization that one encounters, for example, on the California

old values are eroding, enthusiasm for revolutionary legends and heroes has long since waned, and even the heroic memory of World War II is fading. In every Soviet town old men shuffle through the streets displaying rows of war medals on worn suit jackets of brown or grey -- but no one so much as glances at them. This is a most vulnerable transition period in the history of Soviet society and psychology. Communist ideology is drained of all dynamism; social and political apathy is evident to the sensitive observer; and the most coveted cultural artifacts come from the West, especially the United States.

If the mighty and powerful in the Soviet Union do fear something American, they fear not our arsenal, but our culture. The Party leadership, the wider political establishment, and even to a certain extent a possible majority of Soviet people over fifty-five, see America as corrupting their nation's spirit with a flashy and seductive culture based on materialism, self-indulgence, a cult of youth, and a shocking moral lassitude. Indeed it is ironic that the evil empire of "Godless Communists" should assail our culture on moral grounds. But it does.

As a long-time scholar of Soviet history I am convinced that the Soviet Union's greatest asset has been not its economy, nor its technology, nor even its natural resources -- but its people. I agree with the novelist, Alexander Solzhenitsyn, who maintains that the U.S.S.R.'s six decades of suffering has produced a people with a greater strength and depth of spirit than the people of Western countries. The people of the Soviet Union know how to sacrifice and how to endure hardship. Without their courage the U.S.S.R. would be a very poor country indeed. The possibility that Western culture might erode that popular spirit must be truly frightening for Mr. Chernenko and his colleagues to contemplate. The Soviet people, by and large, admire American culture and fear our weapons. Their leaders, in contrast, respect our military might, but

I believe that our government ought not to encourage any of these fears. When the Soviet people are fearful, they draw more closely around their leaders. When the leaders are frightened they become angry, and take that anger out on their own people and -- to the extent possible -- on the rest on the world.



Nina Tumarkin
Russian Research Center
Harvard University

August 1984

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY

~~SECRET~~

August 31, 1984

ACTION

SIGNED

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT: Letter to Wick with Tumarkin Article

Attached is a letter to Charlie Wick forwarding the article by Nina Tumarkin, as you requested in your PROFs note.

Walt Raymond concurs.

Recommendation:

That you sign the letter at Tab I.

• Approve Disapprove

Attachments:

- Tab I - Letter to Wick with Tumarkin article
- Tab II - Original package

6399

21

MSG FROM: NSRMK --CPUA TO: NSRA --CPUA
To: NSRA --CPUA

08/30/84 12:35:00

-- ~~SECRET~~ --

NOTE FROM: Robert M. Kimmitt

Subject: Forwarding Note 08/30/84 10:51 President's Note on Matlock Paper #639 print.

* * * F O R W A R D E D N O T E * * *

To: NSRMK --CPUA

-- ~~SECRET~~ --

NOTE FROM: ROBERT MCFARLANE

SUBJECT: President's Note on Matlock Paper #6399

I believe the President's point is to have VOA (and putatively PFE/RL) focus on making clear our peaceful purposes to the Russian people such as through pieces on our restraint throughout history and the substance of our policies now from Southern Africa to arms control. That seems to me a good idea but one I would assume already is infused in VOA broadcasting. Jack, you might think about this; and whether we can drive home our peaceful purposes more effectively. John Lenczowski and Steve might have some ideas. In any event I would like to send the paper to Charlie Wick with an interpretative note per this memo and any other thoughts you might have.

Many thanks.

Jack: Please
submit as early as
possible on Friday 8/31.

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR FOI 114/1 #6059

BY CH NARA DATE 11/27/07

August 24, 1984

Jack/Bob/see 22
PPPS
10/10
RR

UNCLASSIFIED

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT: Article on Soviet Fear of U.S.

Professor Nina Tumarkin, a member of the history department at Harvard who has specialized on Soviet internal propaganda, sent me an article she wrote following a trip to the Soviet Union this summer which I believe you will find of interest.

Tumarkin examines the question of Soviet fear of the U.S., and comes to the conclusion that while ordinary citizens fear our military might (as the result of regime propaganda), the Soviet rulers, on the other hand, fear our culture -- while respecting our military strength.

Although I am not sure the contrast between the attitudes of rulers and ruled is quite as stark as Tumarkin presents it, I believe there is a lot of truth in what she says.

Attachment:

Tab I - "Does the Soviet Union Fear the United States?"

*Bob - This is very revealing
& confirms much of what I've been trying to say
but didn't have the knowledge or the words.*

RR
*P.S. Maybe Charles Wick's outfit should
see this -*

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Matlock
Chron
SYSTEM II
90949
23
September 6, 1984
Handy Park
Buel

~~SECRET/EYES ONLY~~

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*
SUBJECT: Gromyko's Early Arrival

Our Embassy in Moscow has been informed that Gromyko will probably depart Moscow on September 18. Although no arrival time was given, he usually flies direct, which would mean he plans to arrive in New York the 18th. Therefore, he would in fact be in New York for a meeting with the Rockefeller group on the 19th. Since his comments at this meeting could be relevant to the meetings the following week, we should arrange to obtain a prompt read-out, either from Rockefeller or one of the participants.

Regarding the NBC blitz, I doubt that Gromyko will agree to appear. He is smart enough to realize that such an appearance could be counterproductive from his point of view; if he comes on too "soft" it will look like the President's policy is working, and if he blasts us, our public is likely to be offended. (Think what the RNC or some political action groups could do with a poster showing a scowling Gromyko and the caption: "Is this the man you want to choose your President?")

Even if Gromyko should agree to appear, I believe the situation would be manageable. Presumably, NBC would like to get Shultz back-to-back with him in that event, and we should make sure that the Secretary appears if this should happen. (Either Speakes or Hughes should keep close tabs on NBC's plans to make sure appropriate counterparts are provided if Gromyko or other prominent Soviets appear.)

In sum, I don't think we need to worry overly about Gromyko hurting us with a TV appearance, so long as we follow closely just what is going on and are prepared to supply some balance as the events develop.

Regarding the NBC series, Art Hartman (who is in town at present) just called to say that he would be on the Today show in the morning. He originally accepted when the network told him that Dobrynin would be on. He now is informed that Dobrynin will not appear, but that Arbatov will do the honors. (Dobrynin's refusal fits his usual practice of not appearing on U.S. television, so that we will not use his appearances to press for Hartman's access in Moscow.)

~~SECRET/EYES ONLY~~
Declassify: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR Feb-11-41 #6060

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET/EYES ONLY~~

September 6, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
 FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*
 SUBJECT: Gromyko's Early Arrival

DECLASSIFIED
 MLRR F06-114/1 140061
 BY CN NARA DATE 11/27/07

Our Embassy in Moscow has been informed that Gromyko will probably depart Moscow on September 18. Although no arrival time was given, he usually flies direct, which would mean he plans to arrive in New York the 18th. Therefore, he would in fact be in New York for a meeting with the Rockefeller group on the 19th. Since his comments at this meeting could be relevant to the meetings the following week, we should arrange to obtain a prompt read-out, either from Rockefeller or one of the participants.

Regarding the NBC blitz, I doubt that Gromyko will agree to appear. He is smart enough to realize that such an appearance could be counterproductive from his point of view; if he comes on too "soft" it will look like the President's policy is working, and if he blasts us, our public is likely to be offended. (Think what the RNC or some political action groups could do with a poster showing a scowling Gromyko and the caption: "Is this the man you want to choose your President?")

Even if Gromyko should agree to appear, I believe the situation would be manageable. Presumably, NBC would like to get Shultz back-to-back with him in that event, and we should make sure that the Secretary appears if this should happen. (Either Speakes or Hughes should keep close tabs on NBC's plans to make sure appropriate counterparts are provided if Gromyko or other prominent Soviets appear.)

In sum, I don't think we need to worry overly about Gromyko hurting us with a TV appearance, so long as we follow closely just what is going on and are prepared to supply some balance as the events develop.

Regarding the NBC series, Art Hartman (who is in town at present) just called to say that he would be on the Today show in the morning. He originally accepted when the network told him that Dobrynin would be on. He now is informed that Dobrynin will not appear, but that Arbatov will do the honors. (Dobrynin's refusal fits his usual practice of not appearing on U.S. television, so that we will not use his appearances to press for Hartman's access in Moscow.)

~~SECRET/EYES ONLY~~
 Declassify: OADR

URGENT

Matlock

National Security Council
The White House

25

System # II

Package # 90949

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Paul Thompson			
Bob Kimmitt	1	IC sent to	
John Poindexter			
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall	2		
Bud McFarlane	3		I
Bob Kimmitt	4		
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room			
<u>MATLOCK</u>			

JMP
 PLS
 G Matlock
 105 for [unclear]
 [unclear] [unclear]



I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

Bob -
 will this
 be in the
 system?

-> R
Yes Sys II Matlock only

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SECRET-EYES ONLY

September 5, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR JACK MATLOCK

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

SUBJECT: Gromyko's Early Arrival??

During the Shultz meeting today, he mentioned that David Rockefeller had mentioned to him that Dobrynin had proposed that Gromyko meet with Rockefeller's group (he has ginned up a group -- Kissinger, and one or two other Soviet thinkers who fancy that they may be able to serve as "interlocutors") on Sept 19 repeat 19th. That is a week before the Shultz-Gromyko meeting and before the UNGA even starts. It suggests to me that maybe NBC has scored with its Soviet extravaganza and will feature Gromyko on national television in a US blast -- terrific. Please think about this and try to see how we can influence the presence of balanced people on the show -- that will be hard. Also give your estimate of what Gromyko's strategy will be. It seems to me that Gromyko ought to be able to read polls and that that would seem to discount a heavy negative blast -- but I could be wrong. We should also give some thought to how we ought to try to shape the meeting with the Rockefeller group.

Many thanks.

SECRET-EYES ONLY

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

NLRR Feb-11-1 #6062
BY CW NARA DATE 11/27/09

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

84 AUG 30 P 6: 00

August 30, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR MICHAEL DEEVER
BUD MCFARLANE ✓
LARRY SPEAKES

FROM:

Bob
BOB SIMS

SUBJECT: NBC "Blitz" on US/Soviet Relations

The NBC "TODAY" Show, in separate contacts with Mike Deaver and Larry Speakes, asked for a Presidential interview in connection with a series of programs on US/Soviet relations. The request was declined and referred to the State Department.

John Hughes at State has looked into NBC's overall plans, which turn out to be extensive. He reports that:

- NBC is planning a ten day blitz on US/Soviet relations. They have been negotiating with the Soviets for several months to permit their network television news programs to broadcast live from Moscow during this period.
- "MEET THE PRESS" has requested Andrei Gromyko to appear on their program on September 9. They have not received a response to the invitation. We have been told informally that if Gromyko declines, they will request Secretary Shultz.
- The "TODAY" Show will have Bryant Gumbel appearing from Moscow on the program from September 10 through 14. Jane Pauley will be in New York. On Monday, September 10, "TODAY" has requested an interview with Gromyko. If he declines, they will air a taped segment on Gromyko's career. Following that tape, they will have brief interviews with former Secretaries of State Kissinger, Rusk, and Vance. They would like to interview Secretary Shultz that day also, but State's view is the Secretary should not engage in a public discussion of his Soviet counterpart.
- Throughout the week, the "TODAY" Show will have interviews with former President Ford. They have requested interviews with Carter and Nixon also, but have not received responses from them. Walter Mondale will tape a segment for "TODAY". A date for airing his segment has not been established; however, NBC indicates he will not appear on Monday, September 10.
- The Sakharov stepchildren will be in a segment on the "TODAY" Show and the show will also have an interview with

theatrical producer Joseph Papp, who will be in Moscow that week. An Iowa farmer whose uncle entertained Krushchev on his farm years ago will be featured in a segment.

- NBC Nightly News will have US/Soviet segments throughout the week.
- Perhaps related to this blitz, an NBC Special on "Star Wars", reported by Marvin Kalb, is due to be aired September 8. Secretary Weinberger and former Secretary of Defense McNamara participated in a debate for this show.

We have asked State to take the lead in ensuring a coordinated Administration effort to deal with NBC on the US/Soviet programs.

- cc:
- Mike McManus
 - Pete Teeley
 - Karna Small
 - Jack Matlock
 - Ron Lehman
 - Kim Hoggard

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

September 6, 1984

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JSM*

SUBJECT: Ogarkov Removal

The intelligence community is in the throes of trying to reach a judgment on Ogarkov's removal and will presumably have a considered piece available in the morning. The basic problem in judging the implications of this move is the paucity of information: as if now we literally have nothing more than the brief public announcement. In the meantime, I offer the following very tentative thoughts.

1. The announcement implies that Ogarkov's removal is not in connection with a promotion (e.g., to replace Ustinov as Minister of Defense) or a more-or-less lateral transfer (e.g., as CINC Warsaw Pact Forces). In either of these cases, the promotion or transfer is normally announced first, or at least simultaneously with, the announcement of a replacement.
2. These circumstances lead one to suspect that Ogarkov is being demoted. And if that is the case, one must suspect that it is either for policy reasons, or as part of a leadership power struggle.
3. Akhromeyev was Ogarkov's most senior deputy, and therefore was, in bureaucratic terms, the logical successor. He has been more active in the past than the other deputies in speaking with foreign visitors, particularly on arms control matters. However, I am not aware of any information available which would give us a fix on possible policy differences between him and Ogarkov.
4. Although it is intriguing to speculate as to what this might mean for a succession, I see little point in it at this time, since we know too little to do more than imagine conceivable scenarios. The important thing to note is that it may be connected in some way with a policy or power struggle. If so, we will have to wait for future events before we can judge what it is about. At a minimum, however, this sudden move, and the cryptic announcement, do reinforce the growing impression that major changes may be afoot in the Soviet leadership.

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR FD6-114/1 #6063

BY RW NARA DATE 3/3/11

6064

30

6675

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

September 6, 1984

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JSM*

SUBJECT: Ogarkov Removal

The intelligence community is in the throes of trying to reach a judgment on Ogarkov's removal and will presumably have a considered piece available in the morning. The basic problem in judging the implications of this move is the paucity of information: as if now we literally have nothing more than the brief public announcement. In the meantime, I offer the following very tentative thoughts.

1. The announcement implies that Ogarkov's removal is not in connection with a promotion (e.g., to replace Ustinov as Minister of Defense) or a more-or-less lateral transfer (e.g., as CINC Warsaw Pact Forces). In either of these cases, the promotion or transfer is normally announced first, or at least simultaneously with, the announcement of a replacement.

2. These circumstances lead one to suspect that Ogarkov is being demoted. And if that is the case, one must suspect that it is either for policy reasons, or as part of a leadership power struggle.

3. Akhromeyev was Ogarkov's most senior deputy, and therefore was, in bureaucratic terms, the logical successor. He has been more active in the past than the other deputies in speaking with foreign visitors, particularly on arms control matters. However, I am not aware of any information available which would give us a fix on possible policy differences between him and Ogarkov.

4. Although it is intriguing to speculate as to what this might mean for a succession, I see little point in it at this time, since we know too little to do more than imagine conceivable scenarios. The important thing to note is that it may be connected in some way with a policy or power struggle. If so, we will have to wait for future events before we can judge what it is about. At a minimum, however, this sudden move, and the cryptic announcement, do reinforce the growing impression that major changes may be afoot in the Soviet leadership.

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

NLRR FD6114/1 #6064

BY RW NARA DATE 3/3/11

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

September 6, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JSM*

SUBJECT: Sakharov, Fredkin and PC's to USSR

You will recall that, a couple of weekends back, you asked me to telephone Edward Fredkin in Boston in response to a call from Tanya Yankelevich to the Vice President. As I reported at the time, I did so, and encouraged him to make representations on behalf of Sakharov if he was inclined to do so. He briefed me at that time on discussions he had had with Velikhov and others about the possibility of constructing a large manufacturing facility for minicomputers, and I made it clear that no advance assurances could be given on how such a proposal would be regarded from the export license point of view.

I have now received a message from Fredkin, relayed through our Charge in Moscow, concerning his discussions with Velikhov (TAB II). Specifically, Fredkin asks if he can be given assurance of rapid approval of an export license for 100 IBM PC-XT's, which the Academy of Sciences says it wants to study the feasibility of large-scale introduction of PC's into the Soviet economy. Fredkin feels that a favorable action on this would strengthen his hand in making an appeal for Sakharov, and also that it would not provide the Soviets with any technology that they do not already have, since they have already acquired a number of IBM PC's -- a item which is so widely available that effective export control is quite impossible.

I do not believe that Fredkin's request can be accommodated. Not that the export of 100 IBM PC-XT's would do any damage (I think his arguments are sound on this), but because of the impropriety of showing favoritism in applying export control regulations. I have therefore drafted a reply to him (to be sent through Embassy Moscow), in which I explain why this is impossible, but point out that the IBM PC-XT is expected to be licensable under normal procedures by the end of the year, and express appreciation for any representations he may choose to make in regard to Sakharov.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 606-114/1 #6065

BY CA NARA DATE 11/27/07

32

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

Fredkin returns to Moscow September 7 and it would be helpful if the message could be sent by COB that day.

Recommendation:

That you approve my sending the message at Tab I.

Approve ___

Disapprove ___

Attachments:

- Tab I - Draft message to Fredkin
- Tab II - Incoming message from Fredkin

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Draft Message, Matlock to Fredkin

Dear Edward:

Thank you for the message regarding your talks in Moscow.

Your report on your conversations with the Academy of Sciences was most interesting, and I think your comments on the future implications of the introduction of large numbers of microcomputers into Soviet society are quite persuasive. The question of export licensing of manufacturing facilities, should it arise in the future, would of course require detailed examination in the U.S. Government. However, ultimate approval is certainly not beyond the realm of the possible. Obviously, any decision on a major question of this sort would be influenced by the overall political relationship at the time. While I do not wish to imply any sort of direct linkage, it is clear that the Sakharov situation does have a bearing on the political climate, and a humanitarian resolution of that tragic situation would contribute to its improvement. I would hope that this point is understood by your Soviet interlocutors.

As for your specific request, we would like to be helpful if we could, given our shared interest in resolving the Sakharov tragedy. However, it seems clear that any explicit or implicit commitment to give special treatment to an export license application would raise serious legal questions. Whether or not a profit is involved in the transaction, it could be deemed improper for any USG official to give assurances of preferential treatment, and for this reason neither I nor anyone else can do so.

My understanding of the status of revision of export license regulations is as follows. The July decision of COCOM still must be formulated in regulations, and there will be a meeting of COCOM country representatives shortly to coordinate drafting language. Subsequently, it will be the responsibility of each country to revise its own regulations. This entire process is expected to be complete before the end of the year. The specialists working on the matter anticipate that, when the regulations are revised, licenses for export of the IBM PC-XT to the Soviet Union would be available to vendors by prompt and routine approval.

We appreciate your efforts to make representations on behalf of Sakharov and trust that you will understand the constraints which make it impossible to give the sort of specific assurance you have requested. Nevertheless, the prognosis is that the transaction you contemplate should be possible without undue delay if normal procedures are followed.

Sincerely,

Jack

DECLASSIFIED/RELEASABLE

NLRREF06-114/1 #60570

BY CU NARA DATE 11/27/87

Dear Jack:

I have had many fruitful meetings with Velikhov and I am making very good progress in general. Velikhov heard my message with regard to the Sakharov situation and he seemed sympathetic to the ideas that I brought from Washington. He agreed immediately to bring these ideas to the attention of those persons in the government who could act on such problems. He has been hampered by two problems. First, as a simple practical matter, at the end of August, most of the people he would have liked to have contacted were away on vacation, but they will be back early in September. Second, with those he did get to, he encountered "pessimism". It seems that there is an "after you Alfonse" problem. Who is it that takes the first step? In my opinion, your call to me might be called a first step, but I am afraid that it may not be concrete enough for them. I am leaving today for Bratislava and Budapest and then back to Moscow on the 7th of September. I hope that when I get back to Moscow, people will be back from vacation, and that a meeting will be arranged for me to speak to some very senior person about the Sakharov situation.

I have made progress on the PC (Personal Computer) question. They seem to be actively proceeding on a path that would lead them to want to acquire several billions of dollars of non-strategic equipment in the PC area. Most of this business could go to the USA. As I explained to you on the phone, the introduction of millions of PC systems into the USSR, each with the ability to easily copy documents from one floppy disk to another and each with a printer, will result in changes in the USSR with regard to official attitudes about allowing citizens to print and make copies. Today, everything that prints or that makes copies (like a xerox machine) must be registered and controlled. As you know, the result is a dearth of copying machines in the USSR. The program being envisioned by the Academy of Sciences would absolutely bring the freedom of printing and copying to millions of Russians, to an extent that would be impossible to control. It is my considered opinion that a Soviet program to distribute millions of PCs should be in line with the long range strategic goals of the U.S. vis-a-vis the USSR.

In order to better evaluate the PC concept, they have asked me to request permission from the U.S. government for the immediate acquisition of 100 IBM-PC-XT systems. My company, Fredkin Enterprises, would buy these systems, along with accessories and software, and resell them to an agency of the USSR Ministry of Trade. These systems would be used in a project aimed at helping them to gain a better understanding of

35

the value of spending a few billion dollars for PCs. The IBM-PC-XT is the model currently in use in the USSR, in such places as the Academy of Sciences Moscow computation center. That institute has about 10 PCs now, most of which are IBM-PC-XT models, and they are planning to acquire another 20 XTs in the near future. Velikhov has an XT at home, and others have them. I have shown Kamman, at the U.S. Embassy, photos I have taken of IBM-PC-XT systems in use. These systems are easily obtained. Someone goes into a European computer store, buys them, and brings them back to the USSR. The point is, if there are any secrets in the XT, they already know them. In addition, IBM has already announced the IBM-AT which is a new and advanced personal computer that replaces the XT. Customer delivery of the IBM-PC-AT systems starts this month. At this time, the IBM-XT does not represent the forefront of PC technology.

I have a request. Instead of having the USSR purchase the models of the IBM-XT by clandestine methods, why not throw them a bone, and let them obtain them on a legitimate basis? If the U.S. could react very quickly, with a positive response to this small Soviet desire, I think that that gesture would break the ice and allow me to have a constructive meeting on the Sakharov situation. The Ministry of Trade has before it a business proposal from me covering the steps involved in moving towards the acquisition from the West of a great many computers and a factory to make personal computers, and the total value of this deal would be several billions of dollars.

While it has been proposed that my firm make a substantial profit on the sale of these 100 sample PC systems, it may make sense for me to forego that profit. I do not want to be viewed as using the Sakharov situation as way to make a profit. If the U.S. can react quickly, and allow me to use that quick reaction as a gesture that allows for progress on the Sakharov situation, then I will propose to the USSR that the deal be done with no profit or fee, or that the profit be used for some constructive purposes with regard to East-West problems.

My specific proposal is as follows. When I return to Moscow on the 7th, I would like to be able to obtain a piece of paper from the U.S. Embassy that enables me to report that there is an excellent chance that the U.S. may grant very rapid (within days or weeks) approval for the sale of the 100 sample systems. This information could come from you or some other appropriate person in Washington. This possibility should not be contingent on the immediate political situation. I will then emphasize that this rapid and positive step by the highest levels of the U.S. administration warrants giving me a serious

hearing with regard to the Sakharov situation. I believe that the result would be a meeting with the possibility that they may listen and react positively to the information that you gave to me.

My family and I will be in Bratislava starting this evening, until the 4th, then we will go to Budapest, returning to Moscow on the 7th. In Bratislava, I can be reached through the the Academy of Sciences, care of Prof. Ivan Plander. In Budapest, we will be staying at the Hyatt Atrium Hotel, and I will contact the U.S. Embassy there. In Budapest I will be visiting with Prof. Tibor Vamos, of the Academy of Sciences.

I realize that I am making an unusual request, and asking that something be done rapidly that would normally take time. Because of the July COCOM decision, it seems clear that the USSR will be able to buy such PC systems from various vendors in many different countries. They currently are taking deliveries of an even more sophisticated PC system that is made in Australia. Therefore the cost to the U.S. of a quick, positive reaction would be very small; the benefit could be large. I don't think it would be wise to haggle over the details of these 100 systems, we should either decide to do it now, or to not react and to let the order wend its way through the normal Department of Commerce procedures. I believe that the only favour they are asking is to accomplish the acquisition of these systems quickly and in a legitimate way, instead of slowly or in an illegitimate way. Why shouldn't we grant them this simple request, and see if that step leads to another?

Best Regards,

Edward Fredkin

31

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

UNCLASSIFIED

September 7, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT: Presidential Message to the Union of Councils for Soviet Jews

I have reviewed and concur with the attached State Department draft (Tab I) of a Presidential message to be delivered to the annual meeting, September 9-11, 1984, of the Union of Councils for Soviet Jews. A memo forwarding the draft to Anne Higgins is attached.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign and forward the memo to Anne Higgins with the draft Presidential message.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

- Tab I Memo to Anne Higgins with Draft Presidential Message
- Tab A Incoming Correspondence

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR ANNE HIGGINS

FROM: ROBERT M. KIMMITT

SUBJECT: Presidential Message to the Union of Councils for
Soviet Jews

We have reviewed and concur in the attached State Department draft of a Presidential message to be delivered at the annual meeting of the Union of Councils for Soviet Jews.

Attachment



S/S 8424506
United States Department of State

39

Washington, D.C. 20520

September 6, 1984

84 SEP 6 10:42

UNCLASSIFIED

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Presidential Message to the Union of Councils for Soviet Jews.

As requested by the office of Marshall Breger in the attached communication, enclosed is a suggested draft Presidential Message to the Union of Councils for Soviet Jews.

Charles Hill

Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:
As stated.

UNCLASSIFIED

40

Presidential Message to the Annual Meeting
of the Union of Councils for Soviet Jews

I want to extend my personal greetings to the members of the Union of Councils for Soviet Jews on the occasion of your annual meeting here in Washington and to reaffirm my Administration's deep commitment to the cause of Soviet Jewry.

As we are all too well aware, this is a tragic time for Jews in the Soviet Union. Thousands have been denied the right to emigrate and in many cases have been forcibly prevented from preserving their culture and practicing their beliefs. This is an intolerable situation and one which we will never accept.

We also deplore the Soviet campaign of harassment which has sought to prevent free and open communication between Soviet Jews and their concerned friends and relatives who live abroad.

I want to promise you that my Administration will continue to do everything possible to reopen these contacts, and to assist the emigration of Jews and others who wish to leave the Soviet Union. We will hold before the eyes of the world the Soviet government's continued refusal to grant its citizens the basic human rights to which men and women everywhere justly aspire.

The road ahead will not be an easy one, but I am convinced that with the help of genuinely caring organizations such as yours we will one day succeed. Your commitment to this great humanitarian cause and your support is crucial to our efforts. Please accept my thanks and good wishes.

Ronald Reagan

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 31, 1984

⁴¹
Sept. 9-11

Assign to
NSC/Person

TO: CLAUDIA KORTE
FROM: ZEV LEWIS
OFFICE OF MARSHALL BREGER
RE: PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE REQUEST

Union of Councils for Soviet Jews
Annual Meeting September 9-11

I would be grateful if you could arrange to provide a Presidential message for the Union of Councils for Soviet Jews annual meeting, whose theme is " Crossroads for Soviet Jewry."

Marshall Breger will read the message
on September 10 at the Capital Hilton. Attached for your information is the message request and background information on the group.

Thank you very much for your assistance.



UNION OF COUNCILS FOR SOVIET JEWS

1411 K STREET, NW • SUITE 402 • WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005 • (202) 393-4117

42

OFFICERS

President
Lynn Singer
Vice-Presidents
Hinda Cantor
Pamela Cohen
Ruth Newman
Morey Schapiro
Secretary
Joan Dodek

August 30, 1984

BOARD OF DIRECTORS

Bailey Barron
Jeff Colvin
June Daniels
Shirley Goldstein
Lillian Hoffman
Judy Patkin
Sandra Spinner
Marilyn Tallman
David Waksberg

Dear Marshall,

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

Lawrence Y. Goldberg

ASSOCIATE DIRECTORS

Public Affairs
Judith E. Slovin
Communications
Claudia Zorn
National Programming
Marilyn Kalusin

I would like to take this opportunity to formally invite you to the Union of Councils for Soviet Jews annual meeting on September 9 - 11, at The Capital Hilton hotel, located at 16th and K Streets, N.W. The theme of this year's three-day gathering is "Crossroads for Soviet Jewry," and our goal is to evaluate the present situation and to plan our next move.

ADVISORY BOARD

Chairman
Robert G. Gordon
Honorable William Brodhead
Rep. Sala Burton
Prof. Alan Dershowitz
Prof. Alan Dowty
Father Robert F. Drinan
Dr. Paul Florey
Honorable Millicent Fenwick
Dr. Betsy Gidwitz
Sister Ann Gillen
Rabbi Irving Greenberg
Rev. Blahoslav Hruby
Rep. William Lehman
Dr. Alexander Lerner, Moscow
Dr. Harry J. Lipkin
Irene Manekofsky
Dr. Arno Penzias
Prof. Peter Reddaway
Dr. Andrei Sakharov, Gorky
Dimitri Simes
Prof. Andrei Sinyavsky
Prof. Jiri Valenta
Ben Wattenberg
Elie Wiesel
Gordon Zacks
Legal Counsel
Stuart Eizenstat
Israeli Representative
Yael Sofios

In particular, I hope you and your wife will join leaders from around the United States and other countries at our banquet on Monday, at 7:00 p.m. The evening will include our featured speaker, the Honorable Richard Perle, and the presentation of the Anatoly Shcharansky Freedom Award to Senator Charles Grassley. The banquet will be strictly kosher under the supervision of the Rabbinical Council of Greater Washington.

We would be most honored if President Reagan could provide a message to our leadership on Soviet Jewry to be read at the banquet. I am enclosing a booklet on the UCSJ for your information.

I hope that you are able to attend and look forward to hearing from your office by September 5th. We greatly appreciate all you are doing to further the cause of human rights and freedom of emigration for all Soviet Jews.

Sincerely,


Lynn Singer
President

LS:gps
enclosure

Mr. Marshall Breger
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

MEMBER COUNCILS

Alabama Council to Save Soviet Jews
Arizona Council on Soviet Jews
Baltimore Council for Soviet Jewry
Bay Area Council for Soviet Jewry
Boston Action for Soviet Jewry
Chicago Action for Soviet Jewry
Cincinnati Council for Soviet Jewry
Cleveland Council on Soviet Anti-Semitism
Colorado Committee of Concern
for Soviet Jewry
Connecticut Committee for Soviet Jews
Des Moines Action Committee for Soviet Jewry
Detroit Committee for Soviet Jewry
Greensboro Action for Soviet Jewry
Soviet Jewry Action of Harrisburg
Kansas City Council for Soviet Jewry
Knoxville-Oak Ridge Council
for Soviet Jews
Long Island Committee for Soviet Jewry
Los Alamos Committee on
Soviet Anti-Semitism
Minnesota-Dakotas Action Committee
for Soviet Jewry
Newport News Soviet Jewry Committee.
Jewish Federation
Oklahoma Commission for Soviet Jews
Soviet Jewry Committee of the Jewish
Federation of the North Shore
Oceanfront Council for Soviet Jews
Omaha Committee for Soviet Jewry
Soviet Jewry Council of the JRC. (Phila.)
Pittsfield Council for Soviet Jewry
Sarasota Conference on Soviet Jewry
Seattle Action for Soviet Jewry
Soviet Jewry Committee. Jewish Fed.
South Bend
South Florida Conference on Soviet Jewry
South California Council for Soviet Jews
Washington Committee for Soviet Jewry

U.S. AFFILIATES

Student Struggle for Soviet Jewry
(New York)
Soviet Jewry Legal Advocacy Center
Medical Mobilization for Soviet Jewry

INTERNATIONAL AFFILIATES

London 35 s (Women s Campaign
for Soviet Jewry)
Canadian 35 s
Comite Des Quinze

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

UNCLASSIFIED

September 7, 1984

MEMORANDUM TO ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM:

JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT:

Study of Pakistan/USSR Relations

Dr. Lawrence E. Grinter, Professor of National Security at the Air Force Air Command and Staff College, has sent you a study investigating Soviet power projections in Northeast Asia (Tab A). A short note of thanks to him is attached.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign and forward the note to Dr. Grinter at Tab I.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I Note to Dr. Grinter

Tab A Incoming Letter

44

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Buck:

Thanks for taking the time to send on the interesting study of potential Soviet power in Northeast Asia by Maj. Charles Hillebrand.

I have passed it to Jack Matlock, Director of Eastern European and Soviet affairs, to share with his staff and am sure they will find it useful.

With best wishes.

Sincerely,

Robert C. McFarlane

Dr. Lawrence E. Grinter
Professor of National Security Affairs
Department of the Air Force
Air Command and Staff College
Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE (AU)
MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, AL 36112

6651
45

SEP 4 1984

Kemp for ack pls
29 August 1984

Honorable Robert C. McFarlane
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington DC 20500

Dear Bud

As promised in May, when we forwarded Major Mike McConnell's study of Pakistan-US relations, more of our national security policy studies are now back from the printer.

Enclosed is a meticulously researched, and compelling, analysis of Soviet power projection in Northeast Asia by Major Charles Hillebrand, USAF. After presenting Mackinder's and Spykman's concepts of geopolitical dominance of the Eurasian heartland and rimlands, Major Hillebrand investigates Soviet power projection in Northeast Asia to determine if there is a pattern to Soviet activity. His conclusion, that Soviet behavior indeed correlates closely to Spykman's dictum, will be of interest to your staff I am sure. Having recently rotated from an assignment with the Combined Forces Command in Seoul, Korea, Major Hillebrand has joined our ACSC faculty.

More studies will be forwarded.

With best wishes, I am

Sincerely yours

Buck

LAWRENCE E. GRINTER
Professor of National Security Affairs

Enclosure

MEMORANDUM

6399
add-on 2

C
40

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

UNCLASSIFIED

September 7, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCKS *JM*

SUBJECT: Thank-You Note to Nina Tumarkin

Since the President found Professor Tumarkin's article of interest, it might be appropriate for him to send her a note of acknowledgement.

Recommendation:

That you approve the letter from the President at Tab I.

Approve ___ Disapprove ___

Attachment:

Tab I - Letter from President to Professor Tumarkin

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Professor Tumarkin:

I want you to know that I read with great interest your article "Does the Soviet Union Fear the United States?", which you sent to me through Jack Matlock.

The points you made seem to me entirely persuasive, and I want you to know how much I appreciate the effort you took to describe Soviet attitudes and your thoughtfulness in conveying your insights to us. I will see to it that your observations come to the attention of others in the Government who deal with our policy toward the Soviet Union.

One of my highest priorities is developing a better working relationship with the Soviet Union and achieving significant arms reduction. Your observations will help us as we continue our efforts to bring this about. Despite all the frustrations of the past, I am absolutely convinced that we must persist.

With warm regards and best wishes,

Sincerely,

Professor Nina Tumarkin
Russian Research Center
1737 Cambridge Street
Harvard University
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

September 7, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MC FARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT: FBI Report on Soviet Plan to Cancel Long-Term Grain Agreement

Judge Webster has forwarded to you a report regarding alleged Soviet plans to cancel the Long-Term Grain Agreement in late September or October.

Without more information about the source and the rank and position of his Soviet subsources, it is difficult to evaluate the report. Its substance, however, seems highly improbable, for the following reasons:

-- The Soviets have a large stake in keeping their trade agreements as insulated from political ups and downs as possible. To cancel a government-to-government agreement for essentially political reasons would do them great damage in other areas. (They of course often have political motivations in negotiating, concluding and renewing trade agreements, but once entered into, they are normally scrupulous in carrying them out.)

-- The Soviet grain harvest this year is so bad that they could not be sure to cover all their needs elsewhere. The current wave of purchases is for delivery, for the most part, after October. Cancellation of the LTA would, in effect, represent a gamble that the President would not be able to embargo shipments of grain contracted under the agreement. Although this is a gamble they might win, it is unlikely the Soviets would wish to run any risk at all on this score.

-- I cannot dismiss the suspicion that the Soviet subsources were engaged in a calculated disinformation effort. After all, if the Soviets are able to make us jittery on this score, they might reason that it would affect policy decisions in other areas. This possibility requires more analysis than the incoming report provides.

Despite these observations, the prospect is a sufficiently serious event that we should make further efforts to determine

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR FD6-114/1 #6060

DV 011

the reliability of the report. Therefore, I recommend that you request the FBI to supply, through System IV controls, more information on the nature of the sources and subsources, and an assessment of the possibility that the ultimate Soviet sources may have been engaged in deliberate disinformation. Judge Webster might also be requested to provide the report to the CIA for its analysis.

Roger Robinson, Doug McMinn and Ken deGraffenreid concur; Lenczowski and Sestanovich are unavailable.

Recommendation:

That you sign the attached memorandum to Judge Webster.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I - Letter to Judge Webster

Tab II - Letter from Judge Webster of August 29, 1984, with enclosed report

50

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/ORCON/WNINTEL~~ →

Dear Bill:

Thank you for your letter of August 29, 1984, which forwarded a follow-up report on Soviet consideration of a plan to cancel the U.S.-USSR Long Term Grain Agreement.

Such a step by the Soviet Union would be a major event requiring extensive contingency planning on our part to deal with it. Therefore, it seems essential that we give the report as serious and thorough consideration as possible. It would be helpful, therefore, if the Bureau could provide the report to the CIA for consideration by its specialists.

Additionally, it would be helpful to me if the Bureau could provide more information about the nature of its source and of the Soviet subsources. I do not need names, of course, but a more precise description of the manner the information was obtained and the position of the Soviet subsources would be most helpful.

Finally, I would appreciate the Bureau's assessment of the possibility that the Soviet subsources were engaged in deliberate disinformation. One can conjecture that the Soviet authorities might see some advantage in convincing us that they are considering such a step, even if in fact they are not. Is this possible in this case?

Sincerely,

Robert C. McFarlane

The Honorable William H. Webster
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20535

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET/ORCON/WNINTEL~~

Declassify on: OADR

NLRR F06-114/1 #6007

BY C/1 NARA DATE 8/20/07



U.S. Department of Justice

6676

Federal Bureau of Investigation

~~SECRET-WNINTEL~~

Office of the Director

Washington, D.C. 20535

August 29, 1984

BY LIAISON

Honorable Robert C. McFarlane
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Bud:

Enclosed is a follow-up report on the current status of Soviet consideration of an attempt to influence the presidential election through cancellation of the U.S./USSR grain agreement. We are continuing to follow this matter, and we will keep you informed should we receive additional information. This information is also being furnished under separate cover to the Director of Central Intelligence, William J. Casey.

Sincerely,

William H. Webster
Director

Enclosure

~~SECRET-WNINTEL~~

Classified by: 859
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLRR F06-114/1, #6068

BY AS NARA DATE 8/20/07

52



U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

~~SECRET-ORCON-WNINTEL~~

Office of the Director

Washington, D.C. 20535

August 29, 1984

BY LIAISON

Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted

~~SECRET-ORCON-WNINTEL~~

Classified by: 859
Declassify on: OADR



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

chron
OUTGOING
54

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 THE WHITE HOUSE 6966 DTG: 082109Z SEP 84 PSN: 075845
SIT046 AN004465 TOR: 252/2036Z

DISTRIBUTION: RLPH MATL SHAN /003

DECLASSIFIED

PRIORITY
DE RUEADWW #6966 2522036
P 082109Z SEP 84 ZFF-1 ZFF-4
FM THE WHITE HOUSE

NLRR FOI-114/1 #6069

TO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

BY Cy NARA DATE 11/27/07

INFO SECSTATE

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ WH06966

TO CHARGE KAMMAN FROM AMBASSADOR JACK MATLOCK

PLEASE CONVEY FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO EDWARD FREDKIN FROM ME:

QUOTE

DEAR EDWARD:

THANK YOU FOR THE MESSAGE REGARDING YOUR TALKS IN MOSCOW.

YOUR REPORT ON YOUR CONVERSATIONS WITH THE ACADEMY OF SCIENCES WAS MOST INTERESTING, AND I THINK YOUR COMMENTS ON THE FUTURE IMPLICATIONS OF THE INTRODUCTION OF LARGE NUMBERS OF MICROCOMPUTERS INTO SOVIET SOCIETY ARE QUITE PERSUASIVE. THE QUESTION OF EXPORT LICENSING OF MANUFACTURING FACILITIES, SHOULD IT ARISE IN THE FUTURE, WOULD OF COURSE REQUIRE DETAILED EXAMINATION IN THE U.S. GOVERNMENT. HOWEVER, ULTIMATE APPROVAL IS CERTAINLY NOT BEYOND THE REALM OF THE POSSIBLE. OBVIOUSLY, ANY DECISION ON A MAJOR QUESTION OF THIS SORT WOULD BE INFLUENCED BY THE OVERALL POLITICAL RELATIONSHIP AT THE TIME. WHILE I DO NOT WISH TO IMPLY ANY SORT OF DIRECT LINKAGE, IT IS CLEAR THAT THE SAKHAROV SITUATION DOES HAVE A BEARING ON THE POLITICAL CLIMATE, AND A HUMANITARIAN RESOLUTION OF THAT TRAGIC SITUATION WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO ITS IMPROVEMENT. I WOULD HOPE THAT THIS POINT IS UNDERSTOOD BY YOUR SOVIET INTERLOCUTORS.

AS FOR YOUR SPECIFIC REQUEST, WE WOULD LIKE TO BE HELPFUL IF WE COULD, GIVEN OUR SHARED INTEREST IN RESOLVING THE SAKHAROV TRAGEDY. HOWEVER, IT SEEMS CLEAR THAT ANY EXPLICIT OR IMPLICIT COMMITMENT TO GIVE SPECIAL TREATMENT TO AN EXPORT LICENSE APPLICATION WOULD RAISE SERIOUS LEGAL QUESTIONS. WHETHER OR NOT A PROFIT IS INVOLVED IN THE TRANSACTION, IT COULD BE DEEMED IMPROPER FOR ANY USG OFFICIAL TO GIVE ASSURANCES OF PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT, AND FOR THIS REASON NEITHER I NOR ANYONE ELSE CAN DO SO.

MY UNDERSTANDING OF THE STATUS OF REVISION OF EXPORT LICENSE REGULATIONS IS AS FOLLOWS. THE JULY DECISION OF COCOM STILL MUST BE FORMULATED IN REGULATIONS, AND THERE WILL BE A MEETING OF COCOM COUNTRY REPRESENTATIVES SHORTLY TO COORDINATE DRAFTING LANGUAGE. SUBSEQUENTLY, IT WILL BE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF EACH COUNTRY TO REVISE ITS OWN REGULATIONS. THIS ENTIRE PROCESS IS EXPECTED TO BE COMPLETE BEFORE THE END OF THE YEAR. THE SPECIALISTS WORKING ON THE MATTER ANTICIPATE THAT, WHEN THE REGULATIONS ARE REVISED, LICENSES FOR EXPORT OF THE IBM PC-XT TO THE SOVIET UNION WOULD BE AVAILABLE TO VENDORS BY PROMPT AND ROUTINE APPROVAL.

WE APPRECIATE YOUR EFFORTS TO MAKE REPRESENTATIONS ON BEHALF OF SAKHAROV AND TRUST YOU WILL UNDERSTAND THE CONSTRAINTS WHICH MAKE IT IMPOSSIBLE TO GIVE THE SORT OF SPECIFIC ASSURANCE YOU HAVE REQUESTED. NEVERTHELESS, THE PROGNOSIS IS THAT THE TRANSACTION YOU CONTEMPLATE SHOULD BE POSSIBLE WITHOUT UNDUE DELAY IF NORMAL PROCEDURES ARE FOLLOWED.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5
OUTGOING

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02

THE WHITE HOUSE 6966

DTG: 082109Z SEP 84

PSN: 075845

SINCERELY,

JACK

END QUOTE
DECL. OADR

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~