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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: MATLOCK, JACK: Files

Archivist: lov

File Folder: Matlock Chron August 1984 [8/1-8/10]

Date: July 29, 1999

Box 90887 5

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. Memo	Matlock and Lehman to Robert McFarlane, re revised statement on Vienna talks [90844], 1p <i>R 10/17/05 MO2-011 #37</i>	8/1/84	P1/F1 PS
2. Statement	draft, re Vienna talks, 2p <i>R " " #38</i>	8/1/84	P1/F1 PS
3. Statement	draft, re Vienna talks, 2p <i>R " " #39</i>	nd	P1/F1 RS
4. Statement	draft, re Vienna talks, 1p <i>R " " #40</i>	nd	P1/F1 PS
5. Memo	Matlock to Admiral Poindexter, re Soviet grain purchases [5941], 1p <i>R 6/22/2010 MO2-11 #41</i>	8/3/84	P1/F1 PS
6. Note	Poindexter to Matlock, written on print out of Router's article, 1p (partial) <i>R 9/13/00 NLSF 95-074/2 #57</i>	nd	P1/F1
7. Memo	Matlock to McFarlane, re Soviet attitude toward compromise [5942], 2p <i>R " " #58</i>	8/3/84	P1/F1
8. Memo	same text as #7, 2p <i>R " " #59</i>	8/3/84	P1/F1
9. Memo	Matlock to McFarlane, re Leningrad incident and travel advisory, 1p <i>D. 10/17/05 MO2-011 #42</i>	8/3/84	P1/F1 RS
10. Memo	Charles Hill to McFarlane, re travel advisory and Press Q's & A's, 1p <i>R 7/7/00 NLSF 95-074/2 #60</i>	8/3/84	P1/F1
11. Cable	020917Z AUG 84, 2p <i>R 7/7/00 NLSF 95-074/2 #61</i>	8/2/84	P1/F1
12. Memo	same text as #10 (without system #), 1p <i>R 7/7/00 NLSF 95-074/2 #62</i>	8/3/84	P1/F1
13. Cable	Same as #11, 2p <i>R 7/7/00 NLSF 95-074/2 #63</i>	8/2/84	P1/F1
14. Memo	Poindexter to Michael Armacost, re Soviet harassment, 1p <i>R 9/13/00 NLSF 95-074/2 #64</i>	9/6/84	P1/F1

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].
- C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: MATLOCK, JACK: Files

Archivist: lov

File Folder: Matlock Chron August 1984 [8/1-8/10]

Date: July 30, 1999

Box 5

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
15. Memo	Matlock to McFarlane, re Poland, 3p <i>PART. 10/17/05 moz-011 #43</i>	8/8/84	P1/F1 P6 PS
16. Memo	text same as #15 (with notations), 3p <i>PART. 10/17/05 " #44</i>	8/8/84	P1/F1 P6 PS
17. Memo	Matlock to Arthur Hartman, re Hungarians, 2p <i>R 9/13/00 NLSF95-074/2 #65</i>	8/8/84	P1/F1
18. Memo	Paula Dobriansky to Donald Fortier, re lack of coordination, 1p <i>R 9/23/99 NLSF95-074/2 #66</i>	8/7/84	P1/F1
19. Memo	Matlock to Robert Kimmitt, re State draft reports on S. Con. Res. 118 and S. 2743 (with notations) [6004], 1p	8/10/84	PS

RESTRICTION CODES

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- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
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- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
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- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O 13233

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer CAS

Box Number 5

FOIA M02-011

File Folder MATLOCK CHRON AUGUST 1984 (8/1-8/10)

DATE 3/22/2007

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
1	MEMO	MATLOCK AND LEHMAN TO MCFARLANE RE REVISED STATEMENT (#37)	1	8/1/1984	
15	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE POLAND (#3)	3	8/8/1984	
16	MEMO	SAME AS ITEM 15 WITH NOTATIONS (#44)	3	8/8/1984	

~~SECRET~~ *Matlock*

SYSTEM II
90844
follow-on

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

NLS MO2-011#37

*File
Chrom*

ACTION

BY WDT, NARA, DATE 10/17/05

August 1, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK and RON LEHMAN

SUBJECT: Revised Statement on Vienna Talks

Per your request, attached at Tab A is a revised draft of last night's NSC staff proposed White House statement. We have attempted both to strengthen the language and to explain the US position (and record on this issue) a bit more fully. As a consequence, it is a bit longer than the normal White House statement -- but we feel that this is necessary if we are going to make our point effectively.

Attached at Tab B is the latest version of the State Department's proposed draft on the same subject. If it should be used, we would recommend that the last two sentences be dropped and the last three paragraphs from the NSC draft be added in their place.

NSC staff believe that the US statement should explain the unreasonableness of the Soviet position and set the record straight on their inflexibility. It should also leave on the table a US offer to meet in Vienna under the conditions that we suggested on June 29 (i.e., we will discuss anything of mutual concern to both sides and we will have thoughts to share on (1) resuming negotiations on existing offensive nuclear systems and (2) limits on ASAT capability. The NSC staff proposed language at Tab A attempts to do the above.

Matlock would concur in either statement, but prefers Tab A. Lehman, Kraemer and Linhard feel strongly that the statement at Tab A is preferable.

Attached at Tab C are a set of Q&As drafted by State and annotated to reflect NSC suggested improvements.

Recommendation

That you approve the draft White House statement provided by NSC staff at Tab A.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Concurrence: Linhard, Kraemer
Attachments: as noted above

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
Declassify on: OADR

*Reached Bud after press
conference had begun --
too late to use NSC draft*

~~SECRET~~

SENSITIVE

0111 1.

DRAFT WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT

As you know, on June 29 the Soviet Union proposed that delegations from the United States and the Soviet Union meet in Vienna on September 18. The United States accepted that proposal on the same day that it was made, agreeing to discuss without preconditions any issues of mutual concern that the Soviets wished to raise. For the US part, the United States suggested that at that meeting that in Vienna it would like to:

- (1) discuss and define mutually agreeable arrangements under which we could resume negotiations on existing offensive nuclear systems; and
- (2) discuss and seek agreement on approaches to negotiating effective and verifiable limits on anti-satellite weapons.

Unfortunately, the Soviet response -- up to this point -- to the efforts of the US to arrange for a productive meeting in Vienna has not exhibited a desire to address the issues seriously. We deeply regret this. In addition, despite a clearly stated, positive stand on the US part, the Soviet Union has alleged that the United States has somehow rejected the Soviet proposal. In doing so, the Soviet Union has repeatedly misrepresented in its public statements the US position regarding the opening of arms control talks in Vienna. The United States has tried to keep this matter in private diplomatic channels where the possibility of a successful meeting is greatest. However, because of the Soviet stance, it is time to set the record straight.

The United States has made it clear to the Soviet Government in a series of high-level messages that it accepts the Soviet Union's June proposal to meet in Vienna on September 18, 1984, that the US views the proposal for a conference as an "excellent idea," and that the US is prepared to send a delegation. In those messages, the US made it equally clear that it is prepared for serious talks in Vienna on a number of important issues to include what the Soviets term the "militarization of space." However, the United States has expressed the view that the problem of weapons in space cannot be considered in isolation from the overall strategic relationship, but that the US holds no preconditions for the Vienna agenda.

The Soviet Union has rejected this US acceptance. In doing so, it charges that the US really has not accepted its proposal, but rather that the US has put preconditions on any talks by its desire to include discussion of reducing existing offensive nuclear systems. This Soviet charge best reveals that the Soviet position itself hinges upon two clear preconditions:

- (1) that the US agree in advance to limit the Vienna negotiations to only a part of the problem of the "militarization of space", and
- (2) that the US also agree, in advance, to a moratorium on anti-satellite tests from the outset of the talks.

DECLASSIFIED

NLS 102-011 #38

BY WJ, NARA, DATE 10/17/05

As the last in the series of diplomatic exchanges, the US presented a proposal for a possible, joint Soviet-American announcement on the content and objective of the Vienna talks. This proposal states explicitly that the US, in the interest of meeting Soviet concerns, would be willing to agree that the principal aim of the talks should be to work out and conclude agreements concerning what the Soviets have termed "the militarization of space," including anti-satellite systems and other aspects of this issue.

Going further, the US responded to the proposal of the Soviet Union, the only nation that now has a deployed anti-satellite capability, to establish a moratorium on anti-satellite tests from the outset of the talks. The United States could not agree to this as a precondition; but, once again responding to Soviet concerns, the US expressed a readiness to discuss what mutual restraints would be appropriate during the course of the negotiations. The latest Soviet stance, however, makes it absolutely clear that the Soviets have converted their initial suggestion for a moratorium into precondition to talks.

The US regrets the repeated misrepresentations by the Soviet Union of the US position regarding the opening of arms control talks between the two countries in Vienna. The US regrets even more that after the US has expended considerable effort and shown great flexibility in trying to meet Soviet concerns, the Soviets are now backing away from a meeting in Vienna.

For the US part, the United States stands ready to meet with the Soviets to discuss any item of concern to both sides at any time and at any place. The United States would welcome the opportunity to explore approaches which could lead to the negotiation of verifiable and effective limitations on anti-satellite weapons. The US would also like to discuss the resumption of negotiations on reducing existing offensive nuclear arms. And, the US remains prepared to discuss what the Soviets term the "militarization of space" and other areas of concern.

The United States seeks no advance commitments which would put the Soviet Union at a disadvantage, since we are serious about making progress in limiting and reducing arms. If the Soviet Union is also serious in its professed interest in arms control and reductions, it will not spurn the opportunity that that is yet available to it.

The United States reiterates its offer to meet with the Soviet Union without preconditions on September 18. We hope the Soviet Union will decide to join the US in addressing the important issues before both nations and in seeking avenues to successful negotiations.

DRAFT WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT

The United States has made clear to the Soviet Government in a series of high-level messages that it accepts the Soviet Union's June 29 proposal, and is prepared for serious talks in Vienna on outer space, including anti-satellite weapons. We have expressed our view that the problem of weapons in space cannot be considered in isolation from the overall strategic relationship, but that we have no preconditions for the Vienna agenda.

Despite this clearly-stated, positive stand on our part, the Soviet Union has alleged that the United States has rejected the Soviet proposal. The latest Moscow press briefing repeated these charges, despite the clear statement of the United States position in a series of high-level messages conveyed to the Soviet Government in diplomatic channels.

In our communications with the Soviets, we have stated our view that their proposal for a conference on the "militarization of outer space" is an "excellent idea," and that we are prepared to have a U.S. delegation in Vienna on September 18 to engage in such negotiations.

We recently presented a proposal for a possible joint Soviet-American announcement on the content and objective of the Vienna talks. This proposal states explicitly that the aim of the talks should be to work out and conclude agreements concerning the militarization of outer space, including anti-satellite systems and other aspects of this issue.

negotiators changed to "sides" //

In response to the Soviet proposal of a mutual moratorium on anti-satellite tests from the outset of the talks, the United States expressed a readiness to have our sides consider what mutual restraints would be appropriate during the course of negotiations. The latest Soviet statements have converted this proposal into a precondition, a transformation which suggests a disingenuous Soviet approach. We continue to believe that possible mutual restraints are an appropriate subject for the negotiation; the joint statement, however, should not prejudice the outcome of such negotiations.

2 sentences omitted //

The Soviet Union has repeatedly misrepresented the U.S. position regarding the opening of arms control talks between our two countries in Vienna. From this latest Soviet statement, it appears that the Soviets were not serious about their proposal. We regret this.

Addition: //

For its part, the United States stands ready to meet with the Soviets to discuss any item of concern to both sides at any time and at any place. We would welcome the opportunity to explore approaches which could lead to the negotiation of verifiable and effective limitations on anti-satellite weapons. We would also like to discuss the resumption of negotiations on reducing existing offensive nuclear arms. And, we remain prepared to discuss what the Soviets term the "militarization of space" and other areas of concern. We seek no

DECLASSIFIED

NLS MOZ-011 #39

Advison { advance commitments which would put the Soviet Union at a disadvantage, since we are serious about making progress in limiting and reducing arms. If the Soviet Union is also serious in its professed interest in arms control and reduction, it will not spurn the opportunity that is yet available to it.

We reiterate our offer to meet with the Soviet Union without preconditions on September 18. We hope the Soviet Union will decide to join us in addressing the critical issues before us and seeking avenues to successful negotiation.

VIENNA TALKS

Q: What is your assessment of the situation in light of the latest Soviet statement? Is this the end of the road for Vienna?

A: The Soviets' latest statements are certainly not encouraging. They have hardened their position, set forth preconditions, and sought to prejudge the outcome of the Vienna talks. Thus, it ^{IS} hard to avoid the conclusion that the Soviets were not serious about their proposal when they first presented it on June 29.

We hope, however, that this is not the end of the road. The Soviets claim that their proposal for talks in Vienna in September remains in force. For our part, we have repeatedly told them that we accept their proposal, that we are prepared to have a delegation in Vienna to engage in serious talks on outer space, including ^{AND OTHER ISSUES OF MUTUAL INTEREST} anti-satellite weapons, and that we approach the talks with no preconditions. If the Soviets are prepared to address the issue on the same basis, it should be possible to begin negotiations this fall.

Q: Don't the Soviets have a point that the talks should be on "prevention of" the militarization of outer space?

A: We believe the Soviet formulation is inappropriate for at least two reasons. First, it is illogical to speak of "preventing" the militarization of outer space when the Soviet Union has already tested and deployed an anti-satellite system ^{THE ONLY SUCH SYSTEM IN THE WORLD}. Second, space is already used for several other military purposes, ^{A NUMBER} many of which are recognized as contributing to ~~the~~ stability ~~[of the military balance]~~ -- for example, satellites which provide early warning of attack, or which assist in the verification of arms control agreements.

We believe this is essentially a semantic problem that could easily be worked out. Rather than having the ^{IMMEDIATE OBJECTIVE} goal of demilitarizing space, the Vienna talks should, in our view, be aimed at reaching agreement on ^{EFFECTIVE} appropriate restrictions on those systems and military activities in space that could diminish stability.

Q: What are the next steps? Is the U.S. planning to reply to the latest Soviet communication?

A: I won't comment on possible future discussions of this issue in diplomatic channels, where we would prefer that it be addressed. The Soviet Union is aware that we remain ready to work out a joint announcement on the Vienna talks acceptable to both sides. Moreover, we are prepared to begin talks in September, or at a later date, without any preconditions, with or without a joint announcement.

Q: What is the U.S. position on an ASAT moratorium? Is the U.S. considering accepting a moratorium while talks proceed?

WHO HAVE WORLD'S ONLY DEPLOYED ASAT SYSTEM HAVE

A: The Soviets, in their latest statements, have transformed their proposal for ^{AN ASAT TESTING} ~~a~~ moratorium into a precondition for beginning negotiations. They have also insisted that the outcome of the negotiations be determined in advance -- a complete ban on all space weapons systems.

We have told the Soviets that we are prepared to discuss at Vienna what mutual restraints would be appropriate ^{TO CONSIDER} during the course of negotiations. We have not foreclosed any options in this regard. But we are not prepared to agree to any specific restraints before the negotiations begin, or to prejudge the outcome of the talks in advance..

Q: What is the status of internal USG work on space arms control? Will you have specific proposals to put on the table by September?

A: Internal preparations for the proposed Vienna talks is *moving* ahead. A full range of options will shortly be forwarded to the President for his ^{CONSIDERATION} ~~decision~~. Thus we will have ~~some~~ concrete proposals to put on the table at Vienna.

Drafted: EUR/SOV: AVershbow
6/1/84 632-8040 1308M

Cleared: EUR/SOV: BLPascoe
EUR: MPalmer
EUR: JDobbins
PA: ARomberg

PM/SNP: JGordon
P: WHCourtney
D: JPTimble

~~SECRET~~

DRAFT WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT

[Contingent upon Soviet public rejection of latest U.S. proposal.]

The United States has made clear to the Soviet Government in a series of high-level messages that it accepts the Soviet Union's June 29 proposal, and is prepared for serious talks in Vienna on outer space, including anti-satellite weapons. We have expressed our view that the problem of weapons in space cannot be considered in isolation from the overall strategic relationship, but that we have no preconditions for the Vienna agenda.

Despite this clearly-stated, positive stand on our part, the Soviet Union has alleged that the United States has somehow rejected the Soviet proposal. The latest TASS statement repeats these charges, despite the clear statement of the United States position in a series of high-level messages conveyed to the Soviet Government in diplomatic channels.

In our communications with the Soviets, we have stated our view that the proposal for a conference is an "excellent idea," and that we are prepared to have a delegation in Vienna September 18.

We recently presented a proposal for a possible joint Soviet-American announcement on the content and objective of the Vienna talks. This proposal states explicitly that the aim of the talks should be to work out and conclude agreements concerning the militarization of outer space, including anti-satellite systems and other aspects of this issue.

Taking into account the Soviet proposal to establish a moratorium on anti-satellite tests from the outset of the talks, The United States rejected any precondition but expressed a readiness to consider language in the joint announcement stating that the negotiators would consider what mutual restraints would be appropriate during the course of the negotiations.

The United States regrets the repeated misrepresentations by the Soviet Union of the U.S. position regarding the opening of arms control talks between our two countries in Vienna on what the Soviets have called "the militarization of outer space." As we have indicated, we have accepted their proposal, we are prepared to begin such talks next month in Vienna, and we are prepared in the intervening weeks to work out an agreed formulation on the content and objective of this meeting.

DECLASSIFIED

NLS MO2 011 #40

~~SECRET~~

BY NOT, NARA, DATE 10/17/05

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

August 3, 1984

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL POINDEXTER

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT: Soviet Grain Purchases

I doubt very much that the increased Soviet grain purchases portend a cancellation of the Long-Term Agreement. These purchases are for shipment after October 1 -- that is, in the new crop year -- and the Soviets know that if they were to denounce the agreement we could (legally at least) embargo the shipments. I don't think they would risk this.

The explanation, I believe, lies in several factors:

1. The Soviet harvest looks to be poor, and my guess is that it will turn out to be significantly lower than the maximum 190 million tons Agriculture and CIA are now setting as a maximum yield.
2. Their crop this year may be of even poorer quality than is normal. Their harvest figures include chaff, poor quality grain and excessive moisture, which means that they look better (even when they are bad) than they are in reality. We routinely deflate Soviet figures by at least 11 percent to make them comparable to U.S. figures, and the signs are that the "deflator" might be even larger this year.
3. They have managed to expand livestock herds recently, and large quantities of imported feed grains will be necessary if distress slaughter is to be avoided this winter, particularly since the hay crop seems to have been under par (too much rain in some of the Western areas that grow a lot of the hay).
4. Finally, they may be replenishing their strategic grain reserve. The size of this reserve is their most closely guarded secret -- we know less about it than any of their military programs -- but maintaining it is clearly one of their highest priorities.

In sum, I believe the purchases are explainable in terms of their needs, and I doubt that the Soviets would risk their access to the US market (which, despite our rhetoric about their being able to cover their needs elsewhere, is essential to them) by cancelling the LTA.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

NLRR MD2-011 #41BY RW NARA DATE 6-22-10

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*make mistake,
could this mean
ready to change
the agreement?*

R928R A1111)LIYCBYLRYS
DC-GRAIN
LARGE SOVIET PURCHASES OF U.S. GRAIN PUZZLE OFFICIALS
BY JANIE GABBETT

WASHINGTON, AUG 2, REUTER - A SOVIET GRAIN-BUYING SPREE IN THE UNITED STATES HAS PUZZLED GOVERNMENT AND PRIVATE ANALYSTS AND SPURRED THEORIES THE SOVIET CROP MAY BE FALLING BELOW U.S. GOVERNMENT FORECASTS.

IN THE PAST MONTH, THE SOVIET UNION HAS BOUGHT NEARLY 2.3 MILLION TONS OF U.S. WHEAT, MOSTLY FOR SHIPMENT BY THE END OF SEPTEMBER, AND NEARLY 4.5 MILLION TONS OF CORN, LARGELY FOR SHIPMENT AFTER OCTOBER 1, 1984.

ONE GOVERNMENT ANALYST SAID IT WAS UNUSUALLY EARLY FOR THE SOVIET UNION TO BUY SO MUCH U.S. CORN, AS IT NORMALLY WAITS UNTIL IT HAS A GOOD IDEA OF THE SIZE OF ITS OWN CROP AND THE U.S. CROP.

SOME ANALYSTS SAY THE EARLY BUYING CONFIRMS THEIR BELIEF THAT THE 1984 SOVIET GRAIN CROP IS BELOW THE 190 MILLION TONS CURRENTLY FORECAST BY THE U.S. AGRICULTURAL DEPARTMENT.

AGRICULTURE DEPARTMENT AND PRIVATE ANALYSTS HAVE VARIED IN THEIR ASSESSMENTS OF SPORADIC HOT, DRY CONDITIONS IN SOME SOVIET GRAIN AREAS, COUPLED WITH DRENCHING RAINS IN OTHERS.

SOME PRIVATE ANALYSTS HAVE ADJUSTED THEIR FORECASTS AS LOW AS 170 TO 180 MILLION TONS, COMPARED TO THE SOVIET GOAL OF 240 MILLION TONS. THEY SAID THE RECENT BUYING BEARS THIS OUT.

AGRICULTURE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS, HOWEVER, ARE MORE CAUTIOUS ABOUT THE ACTUAL CROP SIZE AND RELATE THE RECENT BUYING TO RECORD LIVESTOCK NUMBERS, A POOR FORAGE CROP AND QUALITY PROBLEMS WITH THIS YEAR'S SOVIET WHEAT HARVEST.

BOTH GOVERNMENT AND PRIVATE ANALYSTS ALSO POINT TO POSSIBLE GRAIN STOCK REBUILDING IN THE USSR, FOLLOWING SEVERAL POOR HARVESTS IN RECENT YEARS.

ONE GOVERNMENT ANALYST SAID A MID-JULY RADIO MOSCOW REPORT PUT LAST YEAR'S SOVIET CROP AT 190 MILLION TONS, FIVE MILLION TONS BELOW THE U.S. ESTIMATE AND BELOW INDICATIONS IN A MARCH 2 SPEECH BY COMMUNIST PARTY CHIEF KONSTANTIN CHERNENKO.

ONE GOVERNMENT ANALYST SAID THE EARLY SOVIET GRAIN BUYING COULD BE REPLACING ARGENTINE GRAIN PURCHASES TYPICAL OF THIS TIME IN RECENT YEARS, AS A SLIGHTLY SHORT CROP THERE MAY HAVE DECREASED SUPPLIES FOR EXPORT.



DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F95-0742 #57

BY NOT, NARA, DATE 11/6/00

TO

MCFARLANE

FROM MATLOCK

DOCDATE 03 AUG 84

Ø 5942

KEYWORDS USSR

SUBJECT SOVIET ATTITUDE TOWARD COMPROMISE

ACTION.	FOR INFORMATION	DUE.	STATUS	IX	FILES	PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

~~KIMMITT~~

McFarlane

COMMENTS

REF#	LOG	NSCIFID	(CT)

ACTION OFFICLR (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
	CAUG 07 1984	Poundexter noted		JM
matlock	S 8/8	For further action	8/9	
NSC/S	C 23 Aug	AFAR per JM		

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE PA (C)

27.

National Security Council
The White House

NSC/S

System # _____

Package # _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Paul Thompson	_____	_____	_____
Bob Kimmitt	_____	_____	_____
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Tom Shull	_____	_____	_____
Wilma Hall	_____	_____	_____
Bud McFarlane	_____	_____	_____
Bob Kimmitt	_____	_____	_____
NSC Secretariat	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
<i>Matlock</i>	<i>1</i>		<i>P/N</i>

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

close-out if completed
done 8/24/84
per JM
rz

National Security Council
The White House

cu

System # I

Package # 5942

1284

3 = ?

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Paul Thompson	<u>1</u>	<u>J</u>	
Bob Kimmitt	<u>2</u>	<u>K</u>	
John Poindexter	<u>3</u>	<u>J</u>	
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall	<u>X</u>		
Bud McFarlane	<u>6</u>	<u>copy sent</u>	<u>I</u>
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat	<u>7</u>		<u>N</u>
Situation Room	<u>4</u>	<u>BKM</u>	<u>DACOM to Bud</u>

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

Jack,
This is very enlightening.
We should make certain that
Shultz sees it. Please prepare a
note for Bud to send. J

Confidential
CLASSIFICATION

CIRCLE ONE BELOW

IMMEDIATE

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

MODE

SECURE FAX # 244

NON-SECURE FAX # _____

TTY # _____

PAGES 11

RELEASER LUS

DTG 061910Z Aug 84

FROM/LOCATION/

1. THE SITUATION ROOM

TO/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. TOM SHULL FOR ROBERT MCFARLANE / SANTA BARBARA / SITTO #2071

062000Z

INFORMATION ADDRESSES/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

2. System #5942

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS: ATTACHED

TO: Mr. Kimmitt -

Bob -

State tells me that a copy of the article was sent to Secretary Shultz by Policy Planning (Azrael). Unless you want to send my comments, I believe we can assume he has already seen the Lefebvre piece - *[Signature]*

Soviet Attitude toward Compensation

Confidential
CLASSIFICATION

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

10V 1/100/199

USSR/General

Matlock

File

National Security Council
The White House

System # I
Package # 5942
1284

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Paul Thompson	<u>1</u>	<u>J</u>	
Bob Kimmitt	<u>2</u>	<u>K</u>	
John Poindexter	<u>3</u>	<u>J</u>	
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall	<u>5</u>		
Bud McFarlane	<u>6</u>	<u>Copy sent</u>	<u>I</u>
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat	<u>7</u>		<u>N</u>
Situation Room	<u>4</u>	<u>Blm</u>	<u>DACom to Bud</u>

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MODE

SECURE FAX #244

NON-SECURE FAX # _____

TTY # _____

PAGES

11

RELEASER

LUS

DTG

061910Z Aug 84

FROM/LOCATION/

1. THE SITUATION ROOM

TO/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. TOM SHULL FOR ROBERT MCFARLANE / SANTA BARBARA / SITTO #2071

2. 062000Z

INFORMATION ADDRESSES/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

2. System #5942

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS: ATTACHED:

Soviet Attitude toward Compromise

Confidential
CLASSIFICATION

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

ADV 7/20/99

DECLASSIFIED

NLS

F95-074/2#58

BY hjt, NARA, DATE 11/6/00

5942

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

CONFIDENTIAL

August 3, 1984

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM:

JACK MATLOCK *JM*

NOTED

SUBJECT:

Soviet Attitude toward Compromise

Vladimir Lefebvre, a Russian emigre now working in California, recently wrote an article comparing American and Soviet attitudes toward compromise which is highly relevant to our current dealings with the Soviets. It is short and I believe you should read it. Given the President's interest in Soviet psychology, you might want to send it to him as well.

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Lefebvre's observations on the Soviet (I would say Russian) mind-set are entirely congruent with my own experience in dealing with Russians. I think the phenomenon discussed in the article explains in part the persistent Soviet effort to do two things, when they are serious about dealing with others:

(1) To get agreement on a broad principle in advance of talking about particulars. Often, of course, their proposals for non-aggression pacts, no-first-use and the like contain serious hooks. We tend to view them either as eyewash or of pernicious intent -- and sometimes they can be. But sometimes they are designed to provide a framework for public presentation of subsequent deals which avoids the appearance of compromise.

(2) The persistent effort to establish "private channels," when they are serious about striking deals. These permit them to structure their compromises so that they do not seem to be compromises. The other side of this coin is that when they do not deal in this fashion, and play out their positions in the public arena (as they did during INF following their rejection of Walk in the Woods, and are doing now regarding Vienna), there is no intent to compromise, since they put themselves in a position where compromise is simply impossible, even if empirically attractive.

CONFIDENTIAL

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

Attachment:

Tab I - Article by Vladimir Lefebvre, "The Soviet Union and the Problem of Conflict Resolution"

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE SOVIET UNION AND THE PROBLEM OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION

Vladimir A. Lefebvre*

"Is the Soviet Union brave enough to extend a hand of friendship to President Reagan?" a friend of mine recently asked me. This is a critical question and, as a psychologist, I cannot answer it very briefly. The peculiarities of cognition in the common Soviet man and his American counterpart differ so deeply that even such seemingly general categories as "human dignity" and "sacrifice" have completely different meanings in Soviet and American culture. Schematically, the differences are as follows.

~~_____ himself and is respected by others when he is~~
~~_____ and respects himself~~
~~and is respected by others when he is uncompromising toward another~~

For example, a simple Soviet woman working as a librarian writes to a Soviet newspaper about a conflict she has with her supervisor, in which neither person has attempted to reach a compromise. This woman closes her letter by praising her co-workers for their support of her uncompromising behavior: "They are wonderful people! They weren't afraid to begin a fight!" Note that this conflict has nothing to do with class struggle, revolution, ideology, etc. This was a routine ^{Job} conflict ~~at a job~~, and the people involved were average people behaving in

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"normal" ways. However, the "norms" in the Soviet Union are different from those in America, i.e., ~~in the Soviet Union a good person is not supposed to compromise with his opponent.~~

The question which naturally arises is, how does one resolve such conflicts? The answer appears discouraging--in Soviet culture there is no procedure for conflict resolution. A conflict usually ends with the victory of one side over the other or is simply stopped by a higher authority.

Two more examples: in the early 1920's, my grandfather was in charge of ~~the~~ Moscow-Leningrad railroad traffic. At that time, every train was escorted by a military team headed by a "commander." It was not unusual for the commanders to threaten my grandfather with their pistols in order to receive scheduling priority. Sometimes the train commanders also confronted each other, brandished their weapons, and even shot in the air to establish their rights. Any attempts to compromise were considered disgraceful and unworthy of a person of the "proletarian state." The trains spent hours stuck on the tracks because their commanders refused to cooperate with each other.

During the Second World War, my father was a Soviet war correspondent. He told me that once on a narrow, snowy road ^{his} ~~the~~ car ~~he~~ ~~was in~~ encountered a jeep carrying Stalin's close associate Marshall George M. Zhukov. Although the road was narrow, it was still wide enough for two cars to pass each other. However, this did not happen. Zhukov did not allow his driver to move his jeep slightly aside, and my father's driver was forced to move in reverse for more than a mile. Nobody was

surprised at this. Zhukov just could not allow himself to compromise in any way in front of his subordinates.

Unfortunately, not all conflicts in Soviet history have such a "happy ending." During the 1920s and '30s, millions of people were killed because no decent procedure for conflict resolution existed in Soviet society. The absence of such a procedure is now the main obstacle to needed social and economic transformations; in order to begin these transformations, different groups of Soviet leaders must arrive at a certain compromise, but they cannot, since it would lead to the disgrace of one of the groups.

Analogous situations appear in international relationships. Let us imagine that the Geneva arms negotiations resulted in an agreement about significant Soviet-American arms reductions. The American representative would return home triumphantly; this is a victory: a compromise has been reached! Contrarily, the Soviet representative would be perceived by his compatriots as a person who made a disgraceful deal. Therefore, in order

The contrasting reactions of the Soviet and American media to the actual events in Geneva in early 1983 provide fertile ground for further comparisons of East-West perceptions. Every hint of a possible compromise or any step toward one was praised and exaggerated by the American media and diminished and denied by the Soviets. Here are two examples:

"The USSR declares that no progress has been made in the Geneva talks. Concerning the information about the fact that Washington may suggest some 'intermediate propositions' in the Geneva talks, Moscow asserts that in the discussions on this topic one cannot see any steps toward reality."

(Krasnaya Zvezda (the Red Star), February 26, 1983)

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The absence of a compromise is "good news" for the Soviets.

We have been aware of similar incidents for quite a long time, but only now have we been able to speak of them as representing a special regular peculiarity of Soviet cognition. It became possible to explain this peculiarity after constructing a formal model of human ethical cognition which predicted the existence of the two different ethical systems. In the first ethical system, a person increases his ethical status when he compromises with another person, and in the second ethical system a person increases his ethical status when he confronts another person. We have numerous empirical data indicating that in American culture the first ethical system is dominant, while in Soviet culture the second system prevails. For example, in a comparative survey which Victorina Lefebvre and I conducted among people brought up in the Soviet Union vs. those in the United States one of the questions was:

Two terrorists are hijacking a small plane. There is a possibility of killing them without injury to the passengers. Another possibility is to start negotiations first and try to

persuade them to surrender. The head of the rescue group made the decision not to negotiate with the criminals.

Did he act correctly?

Fifty nine percent of those with a Soviet background approved the commander's decision, while only twenty four percent of Americans did so. As with the examples of real conflict, this survey indicates that a good person in Soviet culture must behave uncompromisingly toward his adversary.

~~The differences in ethical systems create mutual misperceptions and misunderstandings during Soviet American negotiations. Very often Americans get the impression that their Soviet counterparts do not understand the advantages of a compromise. The Americans themselves often fail to explain to the Soviets all the advantages of compromise resolution.~~ Moral problems are not taken into consideration.

Americans believe that a compromise in relationships is universally evaluated as a meritorious act.

~~The Soviets know about the practical advantages of compromise very well. The idea of a compromise in relationships has an immoral connotation.~~ Therefore, a political leader making such a decision would

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~~adversaries and prevents them from concentrating on the purely pragmatic~~
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The difference in ethical systems alters the problem of conflict resolution. Western theories on this problem did not foresee the possibility of ethical asymmetry; it stood to reason that the Soviets would willingly compromise if it were advantageous for them to do so. But the core of the problem is that, for both ethical and psychological

reasons, the side of the second ethical system cannot accept compromises offered by the side of the first ethical system.

This dramatic situation is also partly understood in the Soviet Union, as is evidenced by numerous articles written by Fedor Burlatsky, a close associate of Andropov during the 1950's. ~~The solution offered by Burlatsky in an oblique form may be called "controlled confrontation"; the main task for the two superpowers is not to search for a compromise (which inevitably touches upon Soviet ideology and morality), but to try to stabilize international tension at a level which allows us to avoid armed confrontation.~~ These ideas seem useful. Compromise is inimical to the Soviet mentality; confrontation to the American mentality. ~~The solution is to "cheat" cultural stereotypes and to create a stable situation which can be interpreted as confrontation by the Soviets and as compromise by the Americans.~~ It could be a "silent" coordination of military development and activity toward stabilization, while political and ideological confrontation proceeds.

Sadly, our world has a very dramatic ethical asymmetry; and our future depends on how well we will be able to realize the differences and cope with them.

MEMORANDUM

BY LOJ NARA, DATE 11/6/00
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

August 3, 1984

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM:

JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT:

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

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AUG. 3, 1984

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THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 9 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.



Washington, D.C. 20520

August 3, 1984

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~


MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Travel Advisory and Press Q's and A's
on the Situation in Leningrad

This morning a Marine Security Guard at our Consulate General in Leningrad was lured away from the vicinity of the Consulate building and beaten up by militiamen and plain-clothesmen (see reporting cable at Tab C). The incident was an obvious set-up, and is one of the more egregious examples of official harassment in recent memory, although there have been a number of serious incidents of official harassment involving both American tourists and Consulate General officials in past months.

We have been considering whether to issue a travel advisory about the Leningrad situation for some time, and had warned the Soviets on a number of occasions that unless they took immediate steps to prevent the recurrence of such harassment incidents, there would be significant consequences. We now believe that, on the basis of this latest episode, we should go forward with a strong travel advisory on conditions in Leningrad. Our Embassy has been consulted and agrees.

Under Secretary Armacost met with Soviet Charge Oleg Sokolov at noon today to read him the riot act over this and other recent Leningrad incidents, as well as the problems we are having in Moscow. Armacost told Sokolov that we protested this act in the strongest terms and said we had warned them that if this harassment had to stop or serious consequences would follow. Our Embassy and Consulate General also plan to deliver strong protests. We intend to follow up by issuing the attached travel advisory (Tab A) tomorrow. Short Q's and A's are also attached (Tab B).


Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

Attachments:

1. Tab A - Travel Advisory
2. Tab B - Q's and A's
3. Tab C - Leningrad 2000

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
NLS F95-074/2 #60
BY LOT, NARA, DATE 7/18/00

Leningrad Travel Advisory

1. The Department of State advises that during the past few months, there has been a noticeable increase in the number of incidents of harassment involving Americans in the Soviet Union. The majority of serious incidents has occurred in the Leningrad area. There have been several cases of unlawful detention of tourists by the Soviet security organs following innocent contacts with Soviet citizens. During detention Americans have been denied their rights, under the US-USSR Consular Convention, to communicate with an American Consular officer and to be visited by him without delay. American tourists have also been subjected to arbitrary and in many cases unjustifiably embarrassing searches of their personal effects when arriving or departing from Leningrad's international airport. The Soviet authorities have not responded in a satisfactory manner to our urgent requests that they act immediately to correct this situation. Americans travelling to the Leningrad area should be aware that their rights as foreign tourists and the protections afforded them under the US-USSR Consular Convention are not being respected by the Soviet authorities.

2. Expiration date: indefinite.

LENINGRAD TRAVEL ADVISORY

(After issuing the attached Leningrad Travel Advisory)

Q: Is this connected with our disappointment over the Soviet position on outer space talks in Vienna?

A: No, it has no connection.

Q: Why then are you doing this now?

A: There have been several serious incidents in the Soviet Union over the past few months involving American tourists and officials that show a disturbing pattern of official involvement in a campaign to harass and isolate Americans in the Soviet Union. We have brought this matter up with the Soviets on numerous occasions, but have not received a satisfactory response.

Most recently, there was a serious incident in Leningrad involving one of our U.S. Marine Guards. The Marine in question, who was off duty, had left the Consulate building to investigate a suspicious vehicle that had been circling the Consulate. Two blocks from the Consulate, he was surrounded by militiamen and plainclothesmen, beaten, and taken to a police station. He has since been released by the authorities, and does not require hospitalization. The incident was a clear set-up, and was without any

provocation whatsoever. In effect, we now have a situation in Leningrad in which Soviet "goon squads" clearly sent by the security apparatus are cruising the neighborhood waiting to pick a fight with Americans who venture off Consulate grounds. This an intolerable situation.

Q: Could you provide us with any more details of this or other incidents which have occurred recently?

A: There have been a significant number of incidents of varying seriousness in recent months, many involving private citizens. It would be inappropriate for me to discuss these incidents in any more detail at this time.

Q: Why are you issuing a travel advisory for tourists if the most recent incident you refer to involved a member of the Consulate General staff?

A: The incident involving our Marine is symptomatic of a broader problem we face: a pattern of official harassment against all Americans in the Leningrad area. Therefore, we believe a travel advisory will be necessary until the overall situation improves.

CONFIDENTIAL
Department of State

INCOMING TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 OF 02 LENDING 02000 00 OF 03 020959Z 3535 EUR3498
ACTION EUR-00

LENING 02000 00 OF 03 020959Z 3535 EUR3498

ACTION OFFICE SOBI-03
INFO PMP-01 EUR-05 PMA-01 PMD-01 SOEC-01 EX-01 SOV-01 SOML-01
OCT-01 PA-01 PMS-01 PM-01 PF-01 PMO-02 FILE-01
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INFO OCT-00 COPY-01 ADS-00 INR-10 SS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00
NSAE-00 SSO-00 SY-06 PA-01 MCT-03 CPR-02 INRE-00
A-02 SYE-00 MOFM-03 /028 W

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TO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ Leningrad 02000

DEPT FOR EUR/SOV

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: ASEC, PREL, UR
SUBJECT: MARINE SECURITY GUARD ASSAULTED AND DETAINED

REFS: (A) Leningrad 1834, (B) Leningrad 1667

1. ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: CONSULATE GENERAL MARINE SECURITY GUARD (MSG), SGT. RONALD CAMPBELL, WAS ASSAULTED AT APPROXIMATELY 3:15 A.M. ON AUGUST 2 BY THREE SOVIET MEN IN PLAIN CLOTHES WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF FOUR SOVIET MILITIA OFFICERS. SGT. CAMPBELL HAD FOLLOWED ON FOOT A SUSPICIOUS AUTOMOBILE THAT HAD BEEN CIRCLING BY THE CONSULATE GENERAL. WHEN HE WAS ABOUT TWO BLOCKS FROM THE CONSULATE GENERAL, A MILITIA CAR APPROACHED FROM BEHIND WHILE THE MEN IN THE OTHER CAR RAN TOWARDS HIM. THE MILITIAMEN GRABBED SGT. CAMPBELL AND THE MEN IN PLAIN CLOTHES REPEATEDLY HIT AND KICKED HIM WHILE HE WAS BEING HELD. AFTER ABOUT ONE MINUTE, THE MILITIA PUT SGT. CAMPBELL IN THEIR VEHICLE AS HE WAS STILL BEING ASSAULTED BY THE OTHER MEN. THE ENTIRE TIME A PHOTOGRAPHER TOOK PICTURES OF THE INCIDENT. SGT. CAMPBELL DOES NOT REQUIRE HOSPITALIZATION.

3. AFTER THE ASSAULT THE MILITIA TOOK SGT. CAMPBELL TO A NEAR-BY MILITIA STATION. AT 5:30 A.M. ACTING DEPUTY PRINCIPAL OFFICER HARMS WAS CALLED BY THE ACTING CHIEF OF THE DIPLOMATIC AGENCY, M.A. VYBORNOV. VYBORNOV REQUESTED THAT HARMS COME TO THE MILITIA STATION TO PICK UP SGT. CAMPBELL, WHO, ALTHOUGH IDENTIFIED BY VYBORNOV, DID NOT HAVE HIS DIPLOMATIC IDENTIFICATION CARD. AT THE MILITIA STATION, VYBORNOV SAID THAT SGT. CAMPBELL WAS PICKED UP BY THE MILITIA BECAUSE HE WAS SEEN THROWING A ROCK AT A PASSING CAR ON LITEYNY PROSPEKT. VYBORNOV CLAIMED SGT. CAMPBELL WAS EXTREMELY DRUNK AND WAS YELLING INSULTING WORDS AT THE TIME. HAVING INTERVIEWED SGT. CAMPBELL AND OTHER MSG'S WHO WERE AWARE OF PARTS OF THE INCIDENT, THE CONSUL GENERAL INTENDS TO LODGE A STRONG PROTEST WITH THE DIPLOMATIC AGENCY AND REQUESTS THAT SIMILAR PROTESTS BE MADE IN MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON AT HIGH LEVELS. END SUMMARY.

4. ON AUGUST 2 AT APPROXIMATELY 0300, CONSULATE GENERAL MARINE SECURITY GUARD (MSG), SGT. RONALD CAMPBELL WAS ASSAULTED NEAR THE CONSULATE GENERAL BY THREE SOVIET MEN IN PLAIN CLOTHES WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF FOUR MILITIAMEN. PARAGRAPHS 5 THROUGH 8 BELOW CONTAIN THE FACTS OF THE INCIDENT AS RELATED BY SGT. CAMPBELL TO RSO JACKSON.

5. SGT CAMPBELL WORKED THE 1600-2400 SHIFT ON AUGUST 1ST.

HE WAS RELIEVED BY CPL. HOFFMAN AT 2400 HRS. AT APPROXIMATELY 0005 HE WENT TO HIS ROOM AND CHANGED HIS CLOTHES. AT 0015 HE WENT TO THE MARINE HOUSE BAR AREA TO RECORD SOME MUSIC (ALSO PRESENT WERE CPL. PITTMAN AND SGT. FRISINA). AT APPROXIMATELY 0115 HE WENT TO THE MARINE HOUSE TELEVISION ROOM TO WATCH TV. CPL. PITTMAN WAS ALSO PRESENT; SGT. FRISINA HAD GONE TO BED AT APPROXIMATELY 0100. AT APPROXIMATELY 0230 SGT. CAMPBELL WENT FOR A WALK IN THE LOCAL AREA FOR 20 MINUTES. UPON RETURNING TO THE CONSULATE GENERAL, HE STOPPED TO TALK WITH SGT. JONES AT THE TEMPORARY MSG POST IN FRONT OF THE BUILDING. SGT. JONES INFORMED HIM THAT A BEIGE VEHICLE HAD BEEN CIRCLING THE AREA AT LEAST THREE TIMES. SHORTLY THEREAFTER THE BEIGE VEHICLE APPEARED AGAIN AND STOPPED IN FRONT OF THE CONSULATE GENERAL. THE VEHICLE HAD THREE, POSSIBLY FOUR, MALE PASSENGERS DRESSED IN SUITS AND TIES. SGT. CAMPBELL APPROACHED THE VEHICLE AND ASKED THEM IF SOMETHING WAS WRONG AND IF HE COULD HELP THEM. HE DID THIS IN AN ATTEMPT TO DETERMINE IF THERE WAS A PROBLEM AS SUCH ACTIVITIES ARE NOT NORMAL. THE PERSONS INSIDE THE VEHICLE DID NOT SPEAK ENGLISH AND, UPON BEING ASKED WHAT WAS WRONG, STATED IN RUSSIAN THAT THEY DID NOT UNDERSTAND. THE VEHICLE THEN DROVE WEST APPROXIMATELY 100 YARDS AND SLOWED TO A STOP. SGT. CAMPBELL ATTEMPTED TO APPROACH THE VEHICLE IN AN EFFORT TO LET THEM KNOW HIS CONCERN ABOUT THEM STOPPING IN FRONT OF THE CONSULATE GENERAL. BEFORE HE REACHED THE VEHICLE THEY DROVE AN ADDITIONAL 400-500 YARDS DOWNTOWN TO THE CORNER OF LITEYNY PROSPEKT AND PETRA LAVROVA. AT THIS TIME THE PERSONS INSIDE THE VEHICLE MOTIONED TO SGT. CAMPBELL TO FOLLOW THEM BY WAVING THEIR ARMS OUT OF THE CAR WINDOWS (BOTH SIDES). SGT. CAMPBELL ATTEMPTED TO APPROACH THE VEHICLE, BUT WHEN HE WAS WITHIN 100 YARDS OF IT, THE VEHICLE DROVE AROUND THE CORNER AND DISAPPEARED FROM HIS SIGHT.

6. BECOMING CURIOUS, SGT. CAMPBELL RAN DOWN TO THE CORNER TO SEE WHAT WAS HAPPENING. UPON REACHING THE CORNER HE NOTICED THE CAR AGAIN APPROXIMATELY 100 YARDS FURTHER DOWN LITEYNY. THE PEOPLE INSIDE THE VEHICLE AGAIN MOTIONED FOR SGT. CAMPBELL TO FOLLOW THEM. AT THIS TIME HE OBSERVED A MILITIA VEHICLE APPROACHING FROM THE NORTH ON LITEYNY. THE MILITIA VEHICLE SLOWED DOWN UPON SEEING SGT. CAMPBELL; AT THE SAME TIME THE BEIGE VEHICLE BACKED UP ABOUT 5 FEET. WHILE SGT. CAMPBELL WAS WATCHING THE CAR BACK UP, THE MILITIA VEHICLE MADE A U-TURN AND CAME UP BEHIND HIM. BEFORE THE MILITIA VEHICLE CAME ALONG SIDE, THREE MEN GOT OUT OF THE BEIGE VEHICLE AND RAN TOWARD SGT. CAMPBELL YELLING SOMETHING. AT THE SAME TIME FOUR MILITIAMEN GOT OUT OF THEIR VEHICLE ALONG SIDE HIM. TWO OF THE MILITIAMEN GRABBED SGT. CAMPBELL, HOLDING HIS ARMS AT HIS SIDE. BY THIS TIME THE THREE MEN FROM THE BEIGE VEHICLE HAD ARRIVED ON THE SCENE. ALMOST IMMEDIATELY ONE OF THESE MEN HIT SGT. CAMPBELL IN THE LEFT EYE. AT THE SAME TIME THE MILITIAMEN FORCED HIS ARMS BEHIND HIS BACK AND BEGAN FORCING HIM TO THE BACK OF THE VEHICLE. ONE OF THE THREE MEN ALSO GRABBED HIS SHIRT, RIPPING IT WHILE FORCING HIM AGAINST THE VEHICLE. THE MILITIAMEN DID NOTHING TO ASSIST OTHER THAN TO HOLD HIM. HE WAS THROWN AGAINST THE BACK OF THE MILITIA VEHICLE WHERE HE WAS KICKED REPEATEDLY BY ALL THREE MEN IN SUITS. THE KICKS WERE DIRECTED MOSTLY AT HIS LEGS, GROIN AND BACK. THIS LASTED APPROXIMATELY 1 MINUTE. SGT. CAMPBELL RECALLS THAT A PHOTOGRAPHER WAS PRESENT AND TOOK FLASH PICTURES OF THE BEATING. HE WAS THEN FORCED INTO THE BACK OF THE MILITIA VEHICLE BY THE MILITIAMEN. THE OTHER THREE MEN WERE STILL HITTING AND KICKING AT HIM AT THIS TIME. WHILE SGT. CAMPBELL WAS SITTING IN THE BACK OF THE VEHICLE, THE MEN STILL ATTEMPTED TO HIT HIM, THROWING NUMEROUS BLOWS.

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NLS. F95-074/2#61

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BY LOJ NARA, DATE 7/18/00

Department of State

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7. SGT. CAMPBELL WAS ASSISTED BY THE MILITIAMEN IN SHUTTING THE DOOR. HE WAS TRANSPORTED TO A LOCAL JAIL APPROXIMATELY THREE MINUTES TRAVELING TIME. WHILE EXITING THE MILITIA VEHICLE, THE PHOTOGRAPHER WAS AGAIN PRESENT TAKING NUMEROUS PICTURES. SGT. CAMPBELL ATTEMPTED TO HIDE HIS FACE AT THIS TIME. HE WAS PUT INTO A JAIL CELL OCCUPIED BY SIX SLEEPING SOVIETS. WHEN THE JAIL DOOR WAS CLOSED, SGT. CAMPBELL INFORMED THE MILITIA OFFICERS PRESENT IN RUSSIAN THAT HE WAS AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT. HE ALSO GAVE THE CONGEN TELEPHONE NUMBER IN RUSSIAN. HE REPEATEDLY ASKED TO MAKE A TELEPHONE CALL AND WAS LAUGHED AT. THE ENTIRE TIME HE WAS HUMILIATED AND JEERED AT. THE PHOTOGRAPHER CONTINUALLY TOOK PICTURES WHILE HE WAS IN THE JAIL CELL. ALSO PRESENT AT THE JAIL WERE THE THREE MEN THAT BEAT HIM, WHO WERE LAUGHING AND POINTING AT HIM. AT SOME POINT, APPROXIMATELY TWO HOURS LATER, A MAN (PRESUMABLY M. A. VYBORNOV OF THE DIPLOMATIC AGENCY) APPEARED AT THE CELL AND ASKED IN ENGLISH IF HE WAS RON CAMPBELL. SGT. CAMPBELL HAD NOT PREVIOUSLY MENTIONED HIS NAME. THE MAN SAID "WE CALL MR. MAGEE" AND CAMPBELL RESPONDED "YES, PLEASE."

8. A SHORT TIME LATER HE WAS INFORMED THAT THEY COULD NOT REACH MR. MAGEE AND THAT MR. HARMS WAS ON HIS WAY. THE PHOTOGRAPHER AND THE MEN WHO BEAT SGT. CAMPBELL DISAPPEARED JUST PRIOR TO MR. HARMS' ARRIVAL. SGT. CAMPBELL WAS NEVER ASKED HIS NAME OR HIS DIPLOMATIC IDENTIFICATION DURING THE ENTIRE INCIDENT. BECAUSE HE HAD NOT INTENDED TO GO OUT ANYWHERE, SGT. CAMPBELL HAD LEFT HIS DIPLOMATIC KARTOCHKA IN HIS ROOM.

9. AT APPROXIMATELY 5:30 P.M. VYBORNOV, ACTING CHIEF OF THE DIPLOMATIC AGENCY, CALLED RONALD HARMS, ACTING DPO OF THE CONSULATE GENERAL. VYBORNOV SAID THAT SGT. CAMPBELL WAS AT THE MILITIA STATION ON CHEKOV STREET AND ASKED THAT HARMS COME GET HIM. VYBORNOV STATED THAT ALTHOUGH SGT. CAMPBELL DID NOT HAVE HIS DIPLOMATIC IDENTIFICATION CARD, HE WAS ABLE TO IDENTIFY HIM. HARMS REQUESTED THAT SGT. CAMPBELL BE RELEASED IMMEDIATELY, BUT VYBORNOV REFUSED INSISTING THAT HARMS COME TO THE STATION.

10. AT THE MILITIA STATION, VYBORNOV EXPLAINED THAT THEY HAD PICKED UP SGT. CAMPBELL AT 3:15 WHEN THEY SAW HIM THROW A ROCK AT A PASSING CAR ON LITEYNY PROSPEKT. THE MILITIA CLAIMED THAT SGT. CAMPBELL WAS EXTREMELY DRUNK, AND WAS LOUDLY SHOUTING OBSCENITIES. REFERRING TO THE PRIOR ALLEGATIONS AGAINST SGT. CAMPBELL (REF A), VYBORNOV SAID, "THIS IS ANOTHER SERIOUS HOOLIGAN ACT BY CAMPBELL. WE WILL DISCUSS THIS FURTHER." CAMPBELL WAS THEN RELEASED AND RETURNED WITH HARMS TO THE CONSULATE GENERAL.

11. SUBSEQUENT INTERVIEWS OF SGT. FRISINA, SGT. JONES, AND CPL. PITTMAN ALL INDICATE THAT SGT. CAMPBELL WAS NOT UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL. CPL. PITTMAN ADVISED THAT SGT. CAMPBELL HAD HAD TWO MIXED DRINKS PRIOR TO HIS LEAVING THE CONSULATE. SGT. JONES SAID THAT HE TALKED WITH SGT. CAMPBELL JUST PRIOR TO THE INCIDENT AND THAT SGT. CAMPBELL WAS NOT THE LEAST BIT INTOXICATED AND WAS IN "COMPLETE CONTROL". ADDITIONALLY, RSO JACKSON AND ACTING DPO HARMS OBSERVED THAT SGT. CAMPBELL WAS COMPLETELY SOBER AT 0600.

12. CG'S COMMENT: I RECOMMEND THAT THE DEPARTMENT AND EMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATELY PROTEST THIS INCIDENT IN STRONGEST TERMS AND AT VERY HIGH LEVELS. I WILL BE PROTESTING TO THE DIPLOMATIC AGENCY HERE AS SOON AS I CAN GET AN APPOINTMENT. THIS IS THE UGLIEST AND MOST SERIOUS INCIDENT TO OCCUR IN LENINGRAD DURING MY SIX MONTHS HERE, AND THERE WAS ABSOLUTELY NO JUSTIFICATION FOR IT. THE PHYSICAL BEATING AND PSYCHOLOGICAL HUMILIATION TO WHICH

SGT. CAMPBELL WAS SUBJECTED WAS APPALING BY ANY CIVILIZED STANDARD. THE LENINGRAD SECURITY ORGANS ARE THREATENING TO GET TOTALLY OUT OF HAND. WE ARE NOW TREATED TO THE SPECTACLE OF SOVIET "GOON" SQUADS CRUISING THE NEIGHBORHOOD OF THE CONSULATE GENERAL AT NIGHT, PRIMED TO PROVOKE FURTHER INCIDENTS AND PHYSICALLY HARM MEMBERS OF THE CONGEN STAFF WHO VENTURE OFF-COMPOUND. I AM SERIOUSLY WORRIED FOR THE SAFETY OF THE MARINE GUARD WHO WILL BE ON DUTY AT NIGHT OUTSIDE OUR BUILDING FOR THE NEXT SEVERAL WEEKS UNTIL THE FACADE AND ROOF REPAIR PROJECT IS COMPLETED.

13. THIS INCIDENT AND THE OTHER RECENT ALLEGATIONS AGAINST OUR MSG'S (REFS A AND B) INDICATE THAT THERE IS A CONCERTED CAMPAIGN TO HARASS AND DEMORALIZE THESE YOUNG MEN. SINCE THE SECOND ALLEGED INCIDENT (REF A), OUR MSG'S HAVE RECEIVED "LOCK-STEP" SURVEILLANCE EVERYWHERE THEY GO. ALL OF THIS HAS HAD A SERIOUS EFFECT ON THEIR MORALE. FOR THE PRESENT, WE HAVE DECIDED TO RESTRICT THE MARINES TO THE CONSULATE GENERAL COMPOUND TO PREVENT FURTHER HARASSMENT OR ASSAULTS, ALTHOUGH I DO NOT LIKE TO GIVE IN TO SOVIET PRESSURES IN THIS WAY. BUT IT IS NO LONGER SAFE FOR OUR MARINES TO LEAVE THE COMPOUND EVEN TO TAKE A SHORT WALK AROUND THE BLOCK. THE LENINGRAD AUTHORITIES HAVE GOT TO BE MADE TO RESPECT THE RIGHTS OF OUR DIPLOMATIC PERSONNEL, AND TO STOP THESE CRUDE SET-UPS WHICH HAVE SEVERAL TIMES RESULTED IN PHYSICAL INJURY.
MAGEE

CONFIDENTIAL



Washington, D.C. 20520

August 3, 1984

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Travel Advisory and Press Q's and A's
on the Situation in Leningrad

This morning a Marine Security Guard at our Consulate General in Leningrad was lured away from the vicinity of the Consulate building and beaten up by militiamen and plain-clothesmen (see reporting cable at Tab C). The incident was an obvious set-up, and is one of the more egregious examples of official harassment in recent memory, although there have been a number of serious incidents of official harassment involving both American tourists and Consulate General officials in past months.

We have been considering whether to issue a travel advisory about the Leningrad situation for some time, and had warned the Soviets on a number of occasions that unless they took immediate steps to prevent the recurrence of such harassment incidents, there would be significant consequences. We now believe that, on the basis of this latest episode, we should go forward with a strong travel advisory on conditions in Leningrad. Our Embassy has been consulted and agrees.

Under Secretary Armacost met with Soviet Charge Oleg Sokolov at noon today to read him the riot act over this and other recent Leningrad incidents, as well as the problems we are having in Moscow. Armacost told Sokolov that we protested this act in the strongest terms and said we had warned them that if this harassment had to stop or serious consequences would follow. Our Embassy and Consulate General also plan to deliver strong protests. We intend to follow up by issuing the attached travel advisory (Tab A) tomorrow. Short Q's and A's are also attached (Tab B).

Richard D. Kuzler
Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

Attachments:

1. Tab A - Travel Advisory
2. Tab B - Q's and A's
3. Tab C - Leningrad 2000

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DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
NLS F95-074/2 #62
BY LOI, NARA, DATE 7/18/00

Leningrad Travel Advisory

1. The Department of State advises that during the past few months, there has been a noticeable increase in the number of incidents of harassment involving Americans in the Soviet Union. The majority of serious incidents has occurred in the Leningrad area. There have been several cases of unlawful detention of tourists by the Soviet security organs following innocent contacts with Soviet citizens. During detention Americans have been denied their rights, under the US-USSR Consular Convention, to communicate with an American Consular officer and to be visited by him without delay. American tourists have also been subjected to arbitrary and in many cases unjustifiably embarrassing searches of their personal effects when arriving or departing from Leningrad's international airport. The Soviet authorities have not responded in a satisfactory manner to our urgent requests that they act immediately to correct this situation. Americans travelling to the Leningrad area should be aware that their rights as foreign tourists and the protections afforded them under the US-USSR Consular Convention are not being respected by the Soviet authorities.

2. Expiration date: indefinite.

LENINGRAD TRAVEL ADVISORY

(After issuing the attached Leningrad Travel Advisory)

Q: Is this connected with our disappointment over the Soviet position on outer space talks in Vienna?

A: No, it has no connection.

Q: Why then are you doing this now?

A: There have been several serious incidents in the Soviet Union over the past few months involving American tourists and officials that show a disturbing pattern of official involvement in a campaign to harass and isolate Americans in the Soviet Union. We have brought this matter up with the Soviets on numerous occasions, but have not received a satisfactory response.

Most recently, there was a serious incident in Leningrad involving one of our U.S. Marine Guards. The Marine in question, who was off duty, had left the Consulate building to investigate a suspicious vehicle that had been circling the Consulate. Two blocks from the Consulate, he was surrounded by militiamen and plainclothesmen, beaten, and taken to a police station. He has since been released by the authorities, and does not require hospitalization. The incident was a clear set-up, and was without any

provocation whatsoever. In effect, we now have a situation in Leningrad in which Soviet "goon squads" clearly sent by the security apparatus are cruising the neighborhood waiting to pick a fight with Americans who venture off Consulate grounds. This an intolerable situation.

Q: Could you provide us with any more details of this or other incidents which have occurred recently?

A: There have been a significant number of incidents of varying seriousness in recent months, many involving private citizens. It would be inappropriate for me to discuss these incidents in any more detail at this time.

Q: Why are you issuing a travel advisory for tourists if the most recent incident you refer to involved a member of the Consulate General staff?

A: The incident involving our Marine is symptomatic of a broader problem we face: a pattern of official harassment against all Americans in the Leningrad area. Therefore, we believe a travel advisory will be necessary until the overall situation improves.

Department of State

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ACTION EUR-00

ACTION OFFICE SOBI-03

INFO PMP-01 EUR-05 PMA-01 PMD-01 SOEC-01 EX-01 SOV-01 SOML-01
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INFO OCT-00 COPY-01 ADS-00 INR-10 SS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00
NSAE-00 SSO-00 SY-06 PA-01 MCT-03 CPR-02 INRE-00
A-02 SYE-00 MOFM-03 /028 W

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7. SGT. CAMPBELL WAS ASSISTED BY THE MILITIAMEN IN SHUTTING THE DOOR. HE WAS TRANSPORTED TO A LOCAL JAIL APPROXIMATELY THREE MINUTES TRAVELING TIME. WHILE EXITING THE MILITIA VEHICLE, THE PHOTOGRAPHER WAS AGAIN PRESENT TAKING NUMEROUS PICTURES. SGT. CAMPBELL ATTEMPTED TO HIDE HIS FACE AT THIS TIME. HE WAS PUT INTO A JAIL CELL OCCUPIED BY SIX SLEEPING SOVIETS. WHEN THE JAIL DOOR WAS CLOSED, SGT. CAMPBELL INFORMED THE MILITIA OFFICERS PRESENT IN RUSSIAN THAT HE WAS AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT. HE ALSO GAVE THE CONGEN TELEPHONE NUMBER IN RUSSIAN. HE REPEATEDLY ASKED TO MAKE A TELEPHONE CALL AND WAS LAUGHED AT. THE ENTIRE TIME HE WAS HUMILIATED AND JEERED AT. THE PHOTOGRAPHER CONTINUALLY TOOK PICTURES WHILE HE WAS IN THE JAIL CELL. ALSO PRESENT AT THE JAIL WERE THE THREE MEN THAT BEAT HIM, WHO WERE LAUGHING AND POINTING AT HIM. AT SOME POINT, APPROXIMATELY TWO HOURS LATER, A MAN (PRESUMABLY M. A. VYBORNOV OF THE DIPLOMATIC AGENCY) APPEARED AT THE CELL AND ASKED IN ENGLISH IF HE WAS RON CAMPBELL. SGT. CAMPBELL HAD NOT PREVIOUSLY MENTIONED HIS NAME. THE MAN SAID "WE CALL MR. MAGEE" AND CAMPBELL RESPONDED "YES, PLEASE."

8. A SHORT TIME LATER HE WAS INFORMED THAT THEY COULD NOT REACH MR. MAGEE AND THAT MR. HARMS WAS ON HIS WAY. THE PHOTOGRAPHER AND THE MEN WHO BEAT SGT. CAMPBELL DISAPPEARED JUST PRIOR TO MR. HARMS' ARRIVAL. SGT. CAMPBELL WAS NEVER ASKED HIS NAME OR HIS DIPLOMATIC IDENTIFICATION DURING THE ENTIRE INCIDENT. BECAUSE HE HAD NOT INTENDED TO GO OUT ANYWHERE, SGT. CAMPBELL HAD LEFT HIS DIPLOMATIC KARTOCHKA IN HIS ROOM.

9. AT APPROXIMATELY 5:30 M. A. VYBORNOV, ACTING CHIEF OF THE DIPLOMATIC AGENCY, CALLED RONALD HARMS, ACTING DPO OF THE CONSULATE GENERAL. VYBORNOV SAID THAT SGT. CAMPBELL WAS AT THE MILITIA STATION ON CHEKOV STREET AND ASKED THAT HARMS COME GET HIM. VYBORNOV STATED THAT ALTHOUGH SGT. CAMPBELL DID NOT HAVE HIS DIPLOMATIC IDENTIFICATION CARD, HE WAS ABLE TO IDENTIFY HIM. HARMS REQUESTED THAT SGT. CAMPBELL BE RELEASED IMMEDIATELY, BUT VYBORNOV REFUSED INSISTING THAT HARMS COME TO THE STATION.

10. AT THE MILITIA STATION, VYBORNOV EXPLAINED THAT THEY HAD PICKED UP SGT. CAMPBELL AT 3:15 WHEN THEY SAW HIM THROW A ROCK AT A PASSING CAR ON LITEYNY PROSPEKT. THE MILITIA CLAIMED THAT SGT. CAMPBELL WAS EXTREMELY DRUNK, AND WAS LOUDLY SHOUTING OBSCENITIES. REFERRING TO THE PRIOR ALLEGATIONS AGAINST SGT. CAMPBELL (REF A), VYBORNOV SAID, "THIS IS ANOTHER SERIOUS HOOLIGAN ACT BY CAMPBELL. WE WILL DISCUSS THIS FURTHER." CAMPBELL WAS THEN RELEASED AND RETURNED WITH HARMS TO THE CONSULATE GENERAL.

11. SUBSEQUENT INTERVIEWS OF SGT. FRISINA, SGT. JONES, AND CPL. PITTMAN ALL INDICATE THAT SGT. CAMPBELL WAS NOT UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL. CPL. PITTMAN ADVISED THAT SGT. CAMPBELL HAD HAD TWO MIXED DRINKS PRIOR TO HIS LEAVING THE CONSULATE. SGT. JONES SAID THAT HE TALKED WITH SGT. CAMPBELL JUST PRIOR TO THE INCIDENT AND THAT SGT. CAMPBELL WAS NOT THE LEAST BIT INTOXICATED AND WAS IN "COMPLETE CONTROL". ADDITIONALLY, RSD JACKSON AND ACTING DPO HARMS OBSERVED THAT SGT. CAMPBELL WAS COMPLETELY SOBER AT 0600.

12. CG'S COMMENT: I RECOMMEND THAT THE DEPARTMENT AND EMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATELY PROTEST THIS INCIDENT IN STRONGEST TERMS AND AT VERY HIGH LEVELS. I WILL BE PROTESTING TO THE DIPLOMATIC AGENCY HERE AS SOON AS I CAN GET AN APPOINTMENT. THIS IS THE UGLIEST AND MOST SERIOUS INCIDENT TO OCCUR IN LENINGRAD DURING MY SIX MONTHS HERE, AND THERE WAS ABSOLUTELY NO JUSTIFICATION FOR IT. THE PHYSICAL BEATING AND PSYCHOLOGICAL HUMILIATION TO WHICH

SGT. CAMPBELL WAS SUBJECTED WAS APPALING BY ANY CIVILIZED STANDARD. THE LENINGRAD SECURITY ORGANS ARE THREATENING TO GET TOTALLY OUT OF HAND. WE ARE NOW TREATED TO THE SPECTACLE OF SOVIET "GOON" SQUADS CRUISING THE NEIGHBORHOOD OF THE CONSULATE GENERAL AT NIGHT, PRIMED TO PROVOKE FURTHER INCIDENTS AND PHYSICALLY HARM MEMBERS OF THE CONGEN STAFF WHO VENTURE OFF-COMPOUND. I AM SERIOUSLY WORRIED FOR THE SAFETY OF THE MARINE GUARD WHO WILL BE ON DUTY AT NIGHT OUTSIDE OUR BUILDING FOR THE NEXT SEVERAL WEEKS UNTIL THE FACADE AND ROOF REPAIR PROJECT IS COMPLETED.

13. THIS INCIDENT AND THE OTHER RECENT ALLEGATIONS AGAINST OUR MSG'S (REFS A AND B) INDICATE THAT THERE IS A CONCERTED CAMPAIGN TO HARASS AND DEMORALIZE THESE YOUNG MEN. SINCE THE SECOND ALLEGED INCIDENT (REF A), OUR MSG'S HAVE RECEIVED "LOCK-STEP" SURVEILLANCE EVERYWHERE THEY GO. ALL OF THIS HAS HAD A SERIOUS EFFECT ON THEIR MORALE. FOR THE PRESENT, WE HAVE DECIDED TO RESTRICT THE MARINES TO THE CONSULATE GENERAL COMPOUND TO PREVENT FURTHER HARASSMENT OR ASSAULTS, ALTHOUGH I DO NOT LIKE TO GIVE IN TO SOVIET PRESSURES IN THIS WAY. BUT IT IS NO LONGER SAFE FOR OUR MARINES TO LEAVE THE COMPOUND EVEN TO TAKE A SHORT WALK AROUND THE BLOCK. THE LENINGRAD AUTHORITIES HAVE GOT TO BE MADE TO RESPECT THE RIGHTS OF OUR DIPLOMATIC PERSONNEL, AND TO STOP THESE CRUDE SET-UPS WHICH HAVE SEVERAL TIMES RESULTED IN PHYSICAL INJURY.

MAGEE

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NLS F95-074/2#64

→ ~~MATOK~~ Chron

BY LOS, NARA, DATE 11/6/00

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

5944

September 6, 1984

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE MICHAEL H. ARMACOST
The Under Secretary of State
for Political Affairs

SUBJECT: Policy on Soviet Harassment on U.S. Citizens (S)

We remain concerned over Soviet harassment of U.S. citizens in the USSR, particularly in Leningrad. In case our protests and travel advisory should not prove a lasting deterrent to the repetition of such incidents, we believe that we should examine, on a priority basis, what sort of retaliatory mechanism may be needed to provide for prompt retaliation for such incidents. (S)

For obvious reasons, we must not employ physical violence against individuals as a retaliatory tool. However, there would seem to be measures which do not require physical harm to individuals to bring home more effectively to the Soviet authorities the dangers to them of violating the diplomatic immunity of our personnel. Steps which merit examination include the following:

1. Detaining a Soviet intelligence official (without physical violence), and holding him in a police station until identified by other Soviet diplomatic personnel.
2. Notifying the Soviets that should there be another staged incident, the personnel quota for one of their installations in the U.S. will be decreased and that any retaliation for this will be met by proportionately greater retaliation on our part until our respective personnel are equal in numbers.

There may well be other devices which should be examined. (S)


It is recognized that it is impossible to foresee all future contingencies, and that it is undesirable to respond to incidents without consideration of all the circumstances at the time. Nevertheless, it is clear that we need an agreed mechanism which can be utilized promptly if needed in the future. (S)

It would be appreciated if the Department would convene interested agencies -- including the FBI, CIA and DIA -- to examine this question and provide recommendations for implementation. (S)

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~


J. M. Poindexter
Deputy Assistant to the
President for National
Security Affairs

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

August 8, 1984

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JSM*
SUBJECT: Poland: Private Message

(b)(6)

[REDACTED] came in today to pass on to me a conversation he had with Polish press spokesman Jerzy Urban in Warsaw in July. Urban had sought [REDACTED] out while the latter was in Warsaw since, as he explained, "very few Americans come through Warsaw these days" and the Polish Government was looking for a way to get a message through to the Reagan Administration, where he understood [REDACTED] had good contacts. (Note: [REDACTED])

[REDACTED] Urban claimed that Jaruzelski was apprised of his intent to meet [REDACTED] and wished him to pass on his comments.

The principal thrust of Urban's comments was that Poland is close to total disaster and is facing bankruptcy -- if not immediately, then certainly within 18 months. Formal bankruptcy, in his opinion, would not displease the Soviets, who are beating the drums in Eastern Europe against entangling economic ties with the West. Jaruzelski, he said, decided upon the amnesty despite strong pressure against it from the Soviets, since he felt that he has some elbow room (he does not believe the Soviets can replace him in the immediate future) and that the step was necessary to improve Poland's image in the West. Jaruzelski's main aim, he said, is "to save Poland from total Soviet dominance," but that the current economic situation is hopeless in the sense that there is no way interest on foreign debts can be covered over the next two years. In Urban's words, "without MFN and IMF, Poland is 'finished'." Something must be devised soon if the West wants any kind of influence in Poland in future years.

During the conversation, Urban also made the following specific observations:

Solidarity: Solidarity had "won" by late 1980, but didn't realize it and blew its opportunity by "going too far." There is no way it can be resurrected without triggering Soviet intervention. The Pope understands this, which is why he is not pushing for a

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
Declassify on: OADRDECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLS MOJ-011 #43
By ADJ, NARA, Date 10/17/05

reinstatement. (At one point, Urban even spoke of a "deal" with the Pope.) The Polish Government also knows that among the Solidarity/KOR are some agents in the pay of the Soviets who play a provocatory role on instructions.

The Polish Economy: The foreign currency situation is so desperate that the authorities have tasked the secret police with buying up dollars and marks from foreign tourists on the street. They are paying 700 zloty a dollar, but are scraping up very little this way, since there are so few tourists. The \$25 million Church project to aid private farmers will be approved, despite Soviet opposition, because they need the help, but this is a drop in the bucket of what is needed. It was a relief not to have to go to the Olympics, since they literally would have had trouble buying the fuel for the three planes to transport their athletes. Meanwhile, the farmers are hoarding the food they produce; markets are bare despite what looks like a good year on the farm.

Soviet attitudes: Pressure not to proceed with the amnesty was great, and even at the last minute, Tikhonov came to Warsaw with a strong message not to grant the amnesty. The Soviets are attempting to exert pressure in other ways: at that time they were conducting maneuvers with Soviet forces alone (i.e., without other Warsaw Pact forces) in both Czechoslovakia and on the Soviet side of the Polish border. The Poles interpreted this as a signal that the Soviets would not require the cooperation of others to intervene if they chose to. In general, the Soviets complain about everything the Poles do, and offer no help themselves. In this connection, Urban asserted that the U.S. should understand that many of the official statements the Poles made were tailored for Soviet ears and should not be taken seriously in the West.

Soviet leadership situation: At this time the Soviets are totally disorganized. Different, often conflicting, "advice" comes from various elements of the Soviet Party and Government, with no evidence of close coordination. So far as foreign affairs is concerned, Gromyko is running the show, and that is bad news for everyone, since his attitude is basically Stalinist. The Soviets are very worried about trends in Eastern Europe; GDR and Czechoslovak resistance to the deployment of missiles shocked them. They are unhappy about Hungary and fear further movement in a Yugoslav direction, but are unable to do much about it. But their principal concern relates to Poland, the GDR and Czechoslovakia. If the GDR continues its "Westpolitik" and Poland stabilizes with significant Western ties, the Czechs will come under enormous internal pressure to move in the same direction. Both the Soviets and the current Czechoslovak regime realize this, which is the reason the Czechs keep appealing to the Russians to put a stop to some of the trends evident in the GDR. But Russia is now "without a leader," and has never been able to assert itself effectively when in that condition.

(b)(6) [REDACTED] felt that the Poles are really on the ropes, and are ripe for a deal, but that this will require direct communication with Jaruzelski. He, therefore, feels that we should consider sending an emissary to Warsaw quietly to discuss concrete possibilities. Urban made no concrete suggestions, other than his general appeal that "something must be done" if the West is to retain any influence on future events. But [REDACTED] came away with the feeling that Jaruzelski will consider almost anything short of a step that would trigger Soviet military intervention, if incentives are offered.

Comment: Urban's arguments are obviously self-serving in many respects. Still, the conditions he describes are consistent with what I have been hearing from other academic specialists who have visited Poland recently (John Mroz and Charles Gati, for example), and also consistent with much of our intelligence reporting.

I am inclined to agree that conditions in Eastern Europe in general, and in Poland in particular, may present us with an opportunity to make some modest headway in increasing our influence in the area. And even modest headway would serve to increase psychological pressures on the Soviets. The fact is that the Soviets are facing growing problems in the area which both psychologically and geopolitically is the most important of all to them, and they are facing these problems when they are in a relatively poor position to cope with them -- in part because of their intransigence on East-West issues in general. We may well have opportunities which we should explore -- but it should be done quietly, cautiously and tactfully.

As regards Poland in particular, it may well be that the time has come (say, when and if we in fact drop our political objection to IMF membership) to consider sending someone of stature to Warsaw to talk turkey with Jaruzelski. Eagleburger or Stoessel (who was once Ambassador to Poland) come to mind as possibilities. Whether we decide to take this step or not, I believe we should take particular care in our public statements not to foreclose options for the future and to avoid gratuitous offense to the Polish regime. Now that they are in the bind we helped place them in, we should give them some opportunity to demonstrate whether in fact they are Poles or merely Soviet puppets. If we assume the latter, it is likely to be a self-fulfilling prophesy. But if we probe to test the former, we might find something there we can work on.

I will provide further thoughts on steps we might take when I return August 21 from leave and a speaking engagement.

cc: Paula Dobriansky

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

August 8, 1984

INFORMATION

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NLS MOJ-011 #44
By MOJ, NARA, Date 10/17/05

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cc: Paula Dobriansky

~~OFFICIAL/INFORMAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

August 8, 1984

Dear Art:

John Mroz, President of the Institute for East-West Security Studies in New York, has told me of a recent incident involving the Hungarians, Arbatov and Korniyenko which you and your colleagues may find of interest.

As you may know, Mroz has set up a number of study groups which involve East Europeans and Americans in the extended study (several months) of specific issues. Up to now, the Romanians, Yugoslavs, Hungarians and East Germans have sent participants, and the Bulgarians and Czechoslovaks have expressed some interest and may provide researchers during the coming academic year. Although the Soviets have been invited repeatedly to participate, they have not yet done so. (Normally the East European researchers come to New York for six months or more to participate in the projects.)

In addition, the Institute is planning a major conference next year, and Hungarian Foreign Minister Varkonyi offered to host it. When Mroz had dinner with Varkonyi recently in Budapest, the latter recounted the following in that connection.

When news reached Moscow that the Hungarians would host the conference next year, Arbatov came to Budapest and made strong and indeed vitriolic comments about the Hungarian agreement to host the conference and, in particular, Varkonyi's personal involvement. This caused some worry in Budapest, but Varkonyi said that he decided to handle it "my own way." Shortly after Arbatov's strong protests, Varkonyi had a meeting with Korniyenko, at which time he mentioned Arbatov's comments and said that he was perplexed by them, since he saw no reason for the Soviets to take this position; they themselves had been invited and were certainly welcome. According to Varkonyi, Korniyenko replied that the conference seemed a good idea to him, that he thought the Hungarians had acted entirely properly, and that Arbatov's comments should be ignored. Varkonyi added that an "official memorandum" was drawn up for the files with Korniyenko's comments, for possible use later in case some Soviet should raise the question again.

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F95-074/2#65

BY LOS, NARA, DATE 11/6/00

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Declassify: OADR

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
2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Since Varkonyi conveyed this story privately to Mroz, it would be best to make sure it does not get on the gossip circuit, but I thought you might want to add it to the Embassy's repertoire of Arbatov-MFA anecdotes.

With warm regards and best wishes for a restful vacation.

Sincerely,



Jack F. Matlock
Special Assistant to the President

cc: Assistant Secretary Burt

The Honorable Arthur A. Hartman
American Embassy
Moscow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM


NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

August 8, 1984

NOTE FOR JACK MATLOCK

Jack:

Isn't the attached a little excessive? We kept Paula fully informed on our thinking and the recommendation we advanced was completely congruent with all of our earlier discussions with her. I apologized to Paula personally for the oversight and asked that she not send the note forward. Apparently she sent copies to Steve and Bob Kimmitt anyway, a step that was -- in my view -- unusually harsh and formal, particularly with respect to a new staff member trying to learn the ropes. Steve assumed, understandably enough, that given Paula's unavailability at the moment the memo had to move forward, you -- as Senior Director -- had authority to clear on her behalf. In clearing off on Paula's formal protest, are you in fact saying that this assumption is incorrect?



Don Fortier

Attachment

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

August 7, 1984

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR DONALD FORTIER

FROM: PAULA DOBRIANSKY ⁷⁷

SUBJECT: Lack of Coordination

At the end of July, your office forwarded a memorandum on LANDSAT sales to Romania. Although the trigger list called for my concurrence, no attempt was made by your office to coordinate this important decision memorandum with me. This has resulted in considerable embarrassment as I was asked by both the State and Commerce Departments about the status of the LANDSAT issue and was unaware that an NSC decision memorandum had been drafted and forwarded. As you well know, I am the primary action officer for all East European countries. Therefore, I should be consulted on all issues that affect Eastern Europe which are considered by your office. I hope that this oversight will not be repeated in the future.

Jm
Jack Matlock concurs.

Attachment

cc: Robert M. Kimmitt
Stephen Rosen~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F95-074/2 #66BY LoJ, NARA, DATE 7/18/00

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

MEMORANDUM FOR MARSHALL BREGER

FROM: ROBERT M. KIMMITT

SUBJECT: Presidential Statement Re Soviet
Dissident

While we do not believe that the Yakir case is appropriate for a statement by the President, we would have no objection to a statement by a White House staffer along the lines of the attached.

Attachment
Tab A - Draft Statement

PROPOSED STATEMENT ON YAKIR TRIAL

We are disturbed by the report that the Soviet authorities plan to put Aleksander Yakir, a Soviet Jewish refusenik, on trial in Moscow tomorrow. We have been following his case closely and are concerned that his trial may really be intended as a warning to refuseniks to stay away from dissidents and foreigners.

We all know that the Yakir family has encountered much hardship and harrassment since it first applied to emigrate 11 years ago. This new development could further endanger their chances of leaving.

We see this trial as part of a Soviet campaign of increased harrassment of both foreigners and citizens of the USSR. These additional violations of human rights will not pass unnoticed. You may be assured that the United States Government has intervened with the Soviet authorities to permit the prompt immigration of the Yakir family, and to acquit Aleksander of the draft evasion charges against him. In the Yakir case, the Soviet authorities have the opportunity to demonstrate in actuality the respect for human rights and due process which they frequently profess. We and many other throughout the world will be watching the Soviet decision on August 9 with concern.

C

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Presidential Statement Re Soviet Dissident

Attached is a suggested reply to Marshall Breger regarding a proposed Presidential statement on Alexander Yakir.

Walt Raymond concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached memo.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab A - Draft Statement

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

August 9, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT

FROM:

JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT:

State-drafted Replies to Viyvaldis Klive and
Olgerts R. PavlovskisRECOMMENDATION

That you sign the self-explanatory memo to Sally Kelley at Tab I.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I - Memo to Sally Kelley

Tab A - State-drafted Letters to Klive and
Pavlovskis

Tab B - Incoming Correspondence

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

MEMORANDUM FOR SALLY KELLEY

FROM: ROBERT M. KIMMITT

SUBJECT: State-drafted Replies to Visvaldis Klive and
Olgerts R. Pavlovskis

NSC has reviewed and concurs with the State-drafted replies to Mr. Visvaldis V. Klive, President of the American Latvian Association, and Mr. Olgerts R. Pavlovskis, President of the World Federation of Free Latvians.

Attachments

- Tab A - State Draft
- Tab B - Incoming Correspondence

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
SUGGESTED RESPONSE

Dear Mr. Klive:

Thank you for your letter to the President regarding the plight of Lidija Doronina, a Latvian Baptist who was sentenced last year to five years' strict-regime labor camp and three years of internal exile for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda".

We have consistently condemned Soviet persecution of Christians and other religious believers. Such measures are contrary to the human rights provisions of the Helsinki Final Act, and we have strongly called for Soviet compliance with their own undertakings in that agreement. In bilateral exchanges with the Soviets, we have made it unequivocally clear that their abuses of individual rights have a serious detrimental effect on US-USSR relations.

Unfortunately, the Soviet Government has not been responsive to our efforts or to those of other concerned Western governments and independent human rights organizations.

Mr. Visvaldis V. Klive
President,
American Latvian Association,
In The United States Inc.,
Post Office Box 4578,
Rockville, Maryland.

The Soviets persist in maintaining that incarceration of "criminals" on essentially religious grounds is an exclusively internal policy matter. While we condemn such arbitrary and inhumane behavior, and have often made this known to Soviet officials, we lack the ability to alleviate the circumstances of prisoners or psychiatric hospital detainees in any direct fashion.

Nevertheless, we intend to persist in our attempts to exercise what influence we have. As Secretary of State Shultz said in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, "Human rights cannot be relegated to the margins of international politics.... The need for steady improvement of Soviet performance in the most important human rights categories is as central to the Soviet-American dialogue as any other theme."

You may be assured that we will continue to follow the case of Lidija Doronina and to do whatever is possible to promote her cause and the cause of human rights in the Soviet Union.

Sincerely,

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
SUGGESTED RESPONSE

Dear Mr. Pavlovskis:

Thank you for your letter to the President regarding the plight of Lidiya Doronina, a Latvian Baptist who was sentenced last year to five years' strict-regime labor camp and three years of internal exile for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda".

We have consistently condemned Soviet persecution of Christians and other religious believers. Such measures are contrary to the human rights provisions of the Helsinki Final Act, and we have strongly called for Soviet compliance with their own undertakings in that agreement. In bilateral exchanges with the Soviets, we have made it unequivocally clear that their abuses of individual rights have a serious detrimental effect on US-USSR relations.

Unfortunately, the Soviet Government has not been responsive to our efforts or to those of other concerned Western governments and independent human rights organizations.

Mr. Olgerts R. Pavlovskis
President,
World Federation of Free Latvians,
Post Office Box 16,
Rockville, Maryland.

The Soviets persist in maintaining that incarceration of "criminals" on essentially religious grounds is an exclusively internal policy matter. While we condemn such arbitrary and inhumane behavior, and have often made this known to Soviet officials, we lack the ability to alleviate the circumstances of prisoners or psychiatric hospital detainees in any direct fashion.

Nevertheless, we intend to persist in our attempts to exercise what influence we have. As Secretary of State Shultz said in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, "Human rights cannot be relegated to the margins of international politics.... The need for steady improvement of Soviet performance in the most important human rights categories is as central to the Soviet-American dialogue as any other theme."

You may be assured that we will continue to follow the case of Lidija Doronina and to do whatever is possible to promote her cause and the cause of human rights in the Soviet Union.

Sincerely,



AMERIKAS LATVIEŠU APVIENĪBA
American Latvian Association in the United States, Inc.
400 HURLEY AVENUE
P. O. BOX 4578, ROCKVILLE, MARYLAND 20850-0432
TEL.: (301) 340-1914

8420709

July 16, 1984

242241

The President
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President,

On behalf of the American Latvian Association in the United States, Inc., we ask that you personally intercede at the highest levels of Soviet authorities on behalf of Mrs. LidiĶa Doronina-Lasmane.

On August 12, 1983, Mrs. Doronina, a Latvian baptist, was sentenced by the High Court of Riga in Soviet-occupied Latvia, to 5 years in a labor camp and 3 years in internal exile for anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda. We need your help, Mr. President, because Mrs. Doronina is seriously ill with uncured lung tuberculosis and a kidney ailment. She is not receiving medical treatment, and will perish soon under present conditions.

Her family lives in Riga and is seeking her entry to Sweden. The Swedish government has already issued Mrs. Doronina a visa for immigration.

To this date all efforts by her family, various Latvian organizations, Amnesty International and other human rights organizations have failed to gain freedom for her.

If our efforts fail, she will certainly die. Time is of the essence. Please help, Mr. President!

Respectfully yours,

Visvaldis V. Klive
President

Enclosures

**WORLD FEDERATION
OF FREE LATVIANS**

*AMERICAN LATVIAN ASSOCIATION
LATVIAN FEDERATION OF AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND
EUROPEAN COMMITTEE FOR LATVIAN FREEDOM
LATVIAN NATIONAL FEDERATION IN CANADA
LATIN AMERICAN LATVIAN ASSOCIATION*

8420708



242239

July 13, 1984

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:


On behalf of the World Federation of Free Latvians, I respectfully ask for your help in persuading the Soviet Government to reverse their inhumane policies regarding the Latvian woman Lidija Doronina, who was sentenced by the High Court of Riga in Soviet occupied Latvia, to five years in a labor camp and three years of internal exile for anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda. Ms. Doronina's only crime was to assert her basic human rights and help others who did the same.

Amnesty International and other human rights groups as well as numerous Latvian organizations have appealed to the Soviet Government on her behalf. The Swedish government has offered her a visa for immigration, but all these efforts have failed to secure her freedom.

Any assistance that you could provide in this matter would therefore, be greatly appreciated. Doronina is very ill with lung tuberculosis and in addition is suffering from a kidney ailment. She surely will not survive without medical help in her present deplorable situation.

Thank you, Mr. President!

Respectfully yours,


Olgerts R. Pavlovskis
President

JM/Reformal

6004



MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

August 10, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT: State Draft Reports on S.Con.Res. 118 and S. 2743: Legislation Dealing with Naming Part of 16th Street, Washington, D.C. as "Andrei Sakharov Avenue"

I have reviewed and concur with State's draft reports on the subject legislation.

JL does not concur Lenczowski, *WR* Raymond, *SRS* Sestanovich and *on leave* C. Lehman concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the memorandum at Tab I to Ronald K. Peterson.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment:

Tab I Memorandum to Ron Peterson

State's arguments are weak and will be seen as such by many on the Hill. Perhaps changing the name of the street would not be a good idea - but a better case should be made if the Administration is to get involved in this.

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

MEMORANDUM FOR RONALD K. PETERSON

FROM: ROBERT M. KIMMITT

SUBJECT: State Draft Reports on S.Con.Res. 118 and S. 2743:
Legislation Dealing with the Naming of Part of
16th Street, Washington, D.C. as "Andrei Sakharov
Avenue"

We have reviewed and concur with the draft reports prepared by
the Department of State on S.Con.Res 118 and S.2743.

RECEIVED 07 AUG 84 18

TO KIMMITT

FROM PETERSON, R

DOCDATE 06 AUG 84

PETERSON, R

06 AUG 84

KEYWORDS: USSR

HUMAN RIGHTS

LEGISLATIVE REFERRAL

SUBJECT STATE DRAFT RPT ON SCR & SR-2743 RE NAMING PART OF 16TH STREET
WASH DC AS ANDREI SAKHAROV AVENUE

ACTION: MEMO KIMMITT TO PETERSON

DUE: 30 AUG 84 STATUS S FILES WH

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MATLOCK

LENCZOWSKI

SESTANOVICH

ROBINSON

RAYMOND

LEHMAN, C

STEINER

THOMPSON

SABLE

COMMENTS

F# LOG NSCIFID (LF)

ON OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

Matlock - 8/9 Recd Revised OMB memo Same

H _____ W/ATTCH FILE _____ (C)



EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

August 6, 1984

Revised

LEGISLATIVE REFERRAL MEMORANDUM

TO: Legislative Liaison Officer-
National Security Council
District of Columbia

SUBJECT: State draft reports on S.Con.Res.¹ and S. 2743,
legislation dealing with the naming of part of
16th Street, Washington, D.C. as "Andrei Sakharov
Avenue." 118

The Office of Management and Budget requests the views of your agency on the above subject before advising on its relationship to the program of the President, in accordance with OMB Circular A-19.

A response to this request for your views is needed no later than
FRIDAY, AUGUST 31, 1984.

Questions should be referred to Tracey Lawler (395-4710)
the legislative analyst in this office.

Ronald K. Peterson
RONALD K. PETERSON FOR
Assistant Director for
Legislative Reference

Enclosures
cc: Jim Barie
Jennifer Andrews



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Mr. Chairman:

The Secretary has asked me to respond to your request for Executive Branch comments on S.2743 which would name 16th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. "Andrei Sakharov Avenue".

We share your outrage and concern over the plight of Andrei Sakharov and Yelena Bonner. We have been following their cases closely and have made clear to the Soviets the importance of a successful outcome for U.S.-Soviet relations. As you know, the Soviets persist in refusing to grant outsiders the right to verify their assertions that Sakharov and Bonner are in good health and they have not allowed Bonner to go abroad for medical treatment. We are continuing to make every possible effort to help the Sakharovs.

We are thus completely in accord with the spirit behind this measure in looking for ways to honor the Sakharovs, to show our support for their plight, and to focus attention on them until their case is satisfactorily resolved. There are, however, several difficulties which we believe make it inappropriate and probably counterproductive. As you may know, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs, Robie M.H. Palmer, discussed these issues at length in his testimony before the Subcommittee on the District of Columbia of the Senate Appropriations Committee on July 25th. We enclose a copy of his testimony for your convenience (See Tab A).

The Office of Management and Budget advises that from the standpoint of the Administration's program there is no objection to the submission of this report.

Sincerely,

W. Tapley Bennett, Jr.
Assistant Secretary
Legislative and Intergovernmental Affairs

Enclosure:

Testimony on "Andrei Sakharov Avenue"

The Honorable
William V. Roth, Jr.,
Chairman,
Committee on Governmental Affairs,
United States Senate.

98TH CONGRESS
2D SESSION

S. 2743

To designate a portion of 16th Street, Northwest, Washington, District of Columbia, on which the Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is located, as "Andrei Sakharov Avenue".

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

JUNE 8 (legislative day, JUNE 6), 1984

Mr. GRASSLEY introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Governmental Affairs

A BILL

To designate a portion of 16th Street, Northwest, Washington, District of Columbia, on which the Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is located, as "Andrei Sakharov Avenue".

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*
3 That the portion of 16th Street, Northwest, Washington,
4 District of Columbia, between L and M Streets shall hereaf-
5 ter be known and designated as "Andrei Sakharov Avenue".
6 Any law, regulation, map, document, or other record of the
7 United States in which such a portion of such street is re-

- 1 ferred to shall be deemed to refer to such portion as "Andrei
- 2 Sakharov Avenue".

○



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Mr. Chairman:

The Secretary has asked me to respond to your request for Executive Branch comments on S.Con.Res. 118 which would name 16th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. "Andrei Sakharov Avenue" and urge similar actions to be taken in other U.S. cities with a Soviet Consulate or Mission.

We share your outrage and concern over the plight of Andrei Sakharov and Yelena Bonner. We have been following their cases closely and have made clear to the Soviets the importance of a successful outcome for U.S.-Soviet relations. As you know, the Soviets persist in refusing to grant outsiders the right to verify their assertions that Sakharov and Bonner are in good health and they have not allowed Bonner to go abroad for medical treatment. We are continuing to make every possible effort to help the Sakharovs.

We are thus completely in accord with the spirit behind this measure in looking for ways to honor the Sakharovs, to show our support for their plight, and to focus attention on them until their case is satisfactorily resolved. There are, however, several difficulties which we believe make it inappropriate and probably counterproductive. As you may know, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs, Robie M.H. Palmer, discussed these issues at length in his testimony before the Subcommittee on the District of Columbia of the Senate Appropriations Committee on July 25th. We enclose a copy of his testimony for your convenience (See Tab A).

The Office of Management and Budget advises that from the standpoint of the Administration's program there is no objection to the submission of this report.

Sincerely,

W. Tapley Bennett, Jr.
Assistant Secretary
Legislative and Intergovernmental Affairs

Enclosure:

Testimony on "Andrei Sakharov Avenue"

The Honorable
William V. Roth, Jr.,
Chairman,
Committee on Governmental Affairs,
United States Senate.

TESTIMONY BY
ROBIE M.H. PALMER
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR EUROPEAN AND CANADIAN AFFAIRS
BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
OF THE SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE
JULY 25, 1984

I am pleased to have the opportunity to testify today before this subcommittee regarding the proposal to rename a portion of 16th Street in Washington "Andrei Sakharov Avenue."

For the last several months, international attention has been focused on the plight of Dr. Andrei Sakharov, who has been held incommunicado in the closed city of Gor'kiy since May 2. As you know, this eminent and courageous Soviet scientist announced that he would begin a hunger strike to protest the Soviet authorities' refusal to allow his wife, Yelena Bonner, to seek necessary medical treatment abroad. Since the Soviet authorities have persistently refused to permit any independent observers to confirm Sakharov's current status, there is great cause for concern over his health and well-being. Recent reports that Sakharov is now being subjected to psychotropic drugs in an isolated ward in a Gor'kiy hospital are particularly disturbing.

Unfortunately, Dr. Sakharov is not alone in having his human rights violated. The Department of State follows hundreds of cases of human rights abuses in the USSR, all deserving of attention. Sakharov's case is particularly noteworthy, however, because it poignantly illustrates the Soviet Union's intolerance of an independent spirit in the hearts and minds of its people, even one of its most prominent citizens.

Sakharov's stature as a scientist is well-known. To quote Harrison Salisbury: "It is obvious that in speaking of Sakharov we are speaking of one of the great intellects of our age--a man whose name flows easily and naturally into the rhythm of the list of those like Rutherford, Einstein, Bohr, Heisenberg, Kapitsa, and Oppenheimer, whose minds have changed the world."

Sakharov's brilliance was recognized early on by the Soviet authorities, and, after the war, Sakharov soon became the rising star in theoretical physics. He joined forces with Dr. Igor Tamm, who would later win a Nobel Prize in Physics, and his work was published extensively both in the Soviet Union and abroad. In the 1950s, Sakharov and Tamm began to work on a highly classified project involving thermonuclear reaction and the creation of an H-bomb. By age forty, Sakharov's achievements in physics had earned him considerable official recognition and privileges.

By the late 1950s, however, Sakharov began to reflect on the implications of his work for the Soviet Union and the world and to look at world problems from "a broader, more human perspective." Sakharov's first attempts to speak out for the greater good dealt with issues in the realm of his own experience as a scientist. He lobbied against the rehabilitation of Stalin's crackpot cronies who had polluted scientific research in biology and genetics for years, most notably Trofim D. Lysenko. He also argued for nuclear arms control.

Sakharov's training as a nuclear physicist has given him a special insight into human rights problems in the Soviet Union, and particularly into their relationship to global security. Sakharov began to address a wide range of issues pertaining to human rights, foreign policy and domestic concerns beginning with the publication of his first manifesto in 1968, "Thoughts on Progress, Peaceful Coexistence and Intellectual Freedom." He has since sent several appeals to Soviet and American leaders, and written articles for publication in samizdat and abroad.

Sakharov has most recently written an article on "The Danger of Thermonuclear War," published in Foreign Affairs in July 1983, in which he asserts that the convergence of the socialist and capitalist systems is a precondition for the preservation of world peace. Sakharov states in this article that:

Genuine security is possible only when based on a stabilization of international relations, a repudiation of expansionist policies, the strengthening of international trust, openness and pluralization in the socialist societies, the observance of human rights throughout the world, the rapprochement--convergence--of the socialist and capitalist systems, and worldwide coordinated efforts to solve global problems.

Sakharov claims that true East-West cooperation can only be achieved when all people enjoy freedom of information, freedom of movement, freedom of religion, and an independent press. As he wrote in Alarm and Hope, "It is impossible to trust a government on an international level that violates the rights of its own citizens, rights that are guaranteed by international agreements that the government has signed and is obliged to respect."

Outspoken comments such as these, however, have not gone unanswered by the Soviet authorities. Ever since the publication of "Thoughts on Progress, Peaceful Coexistence and Intellectual Freedom" in 1968, Sakharov has been publically criticized. Soon after its publication, he was discharged from the nuclear weapons program, his security clearance was withdrawn and he was given a position as a senior researcher, the lowest position a member of the Academy of Science is

allowed to hold. In 1975 when he won the Nobel Peace Prize, he was forbidden to leave the Soviet Union to accept it because of his knowledge of "state secrets." His wife, Yelena Bonner, accepted the award in his place. While these measures were taken by the Soviet authorities to dissuade Sakharov from continuing to publish his writings abroad and participating in the human rights movement, they had the unanticipated effect of decreasing the stakes for his activism.

In the last several years, Sakharov and his family have been the target of increased Soviet official harrassment. First Tatiana Yankelovich, Bonner's daughter, was expelled from Moscow University and her husband, Yefrem, was fired from his job as an engineer. The two were then permitted to emigrate to Israel. In 1980, Soviet authorities stripped Sakharov of his state honors and sent him into internal exile in the city of Gor'kiy. During that time, Liza Alekseyevna, the fiancée of Bonner's son, Aleksei Semyonov, was denied permission to join him in the United States. In November 1981, Sakharov and Bonner went on a hunger strike to protest the authorities' refusal to allow Liza Alekseyevna to emigrate. On the 13th day of their hunger strike, Sakharov and Bonner were placed in a hospital and forced to end their hunger strike. Alekseyevna was allowed to emigrate in December.

This May, Soviet authorities again stepped in to end the Sakharovs' determination to carry out a hunger strike, but without acceding to their demands to allow Bonner to go abroad for the medical treatment she desperately needs. Both Sakharov and Bonner have serious heart conditions, which their two hunger strikes undoubtedly have aggravated. While all of us hope that they are receiving adequate medical care, there is no possibility of confirming Soviet assurances to this effect since Moscow has steadfastly refused to allow any independent observers to assess their condition.

We have repeatedly stressed to the Soviets the importance of a successful outcome of the Sakharov case for U.S.-Soviet relations and will continue to make every possible effort to help the Sakharovs. Working behind the scenes, the U.S. government has sought to encourage a more forthcoming Soviet response. Publically, President Reagan has referred to the case on several occasions, most recently on July 17th, when he called attention to the tragic fate of Sakharov and Bonner and stated that "The world demands to know the fate of these two good and courageous people."

All of us are outraged at the plight of the Sakharovs. You asked me to come today to give the Administration's views on a proposal to rename a portion of 16th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C., where the Soviet Embassy is located, "Andrei Sakharov Avenue." As I noted, we are certainly in accord with the spirit behind this proposal in looking for ways to honor Sakharov and Bonner, to show our support for them in their ordeal, and to focus attention on them until their case is

satisfactorily resolved. There are, however, several difficulties with this particular action which we believe make it inappropriate.

There are certain legal and procedural issues involved. I obviously do not want to address in any great detail before this committee aspects of D.C. home rule. However, we have certainly noted that under District of Columbia law, with a few specific exceptions, public places in Washington can be named after persons only if they have been dead for at least two years. Renaming a portion of 16th Street "Andrei Sakharov Avenue," might be interpreted as a statement by the U.S. that we believe that Sakharov has died and might also set a precedent that could cause us problems later.

In addition, this action might well violate our responsibility under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations to "prevent the impairment of the dignity" of foreign missions here in Washington. Certainly the Soviets can be expected to make such a charge and we suspect many others would agree with their position since the gesture is clearly directed specifically at the Soviet Embassy. Finally, it is not clear that the Soviet response would be to free the Sakharovs -- in fact, it might increase the authorities' determination to keep them isolated from the world.

In addition, let me once again stress the deep and lasting commitment of the President, Secretary Shultz, and, I am confident, the American people, to the Sakharovs and their freedom. We believe this hearing itself is making an important contribution. We all must persevere.

Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today on this issue. If you have any questions, I would be pleased to answer them.