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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: MATLOCK, JACK: Files

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File Folder: Matlock Chron June 1984 [6/15-6/20]

Date: July 29, 1999

Box 90887 5

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. Memo	Jack Matlock to Robert McFarlane, re Soviet military [4826], 1p <i>R 9/13/00 NLSF95-074/2 #12</i>	6/15/84	P1/F1
2. Memo	Peter Rodman to the Secretary, re a reordering, 3p <i>R 7/7/00 NLSF95-074/2 #13</i>	6/11/84	P1/F1
3. Memo	Matlock to McFarlane, re Shultz meeting, 1p <i>R 10/17/05 MD2-011 #19</i>	6/19/84	P1/F1 P5
4. Talking Points	re summitry (with notations), 1p <i>R 9/13/00 NLSF95-074/2 #14</i>	nd	P1/F1
5. Memo	same text as #3, 1p <i>R 10/17/05 MD2-011 #19</i>	6/19/84	P1/F1 P5
6. Talking Points	same text as #4 (no notations), 1p <i>R 9/13/00 NLSF95-074/2 #15</i>	nd	P1/F1
7. Memo	McFarlane to the President, re Shultz meeting, 1p <i>R 9/13/00 NLSF95-074/2 #16</i>	nd	P1/F1
8. Talking Points	re summitry, 1p <i>R 9/13/00 NLSF95-074/2 #17</i>	nd	P1/F1
9. Memo	Matlock to McFarlane, re Dobrynin on summitry [90701], 1p <i>R 9/13/00 NLSF95-074/2 #18</i>	6/19/84	P1/F1
10. Memo	Same as #3 <i>R 10/17/05 MD2-011 #19</i>	6/19/84	P1/F1
11. Talking Points	re summitry, 1p <i>R 9/13/00 NLSF95-074/2 #19</i>	nd	P1/F1
12. Memo	McFarlane to the President, re summitry and next steps (with notations), 5 p <i>R 10/17/05 MD2-011 #20</i>	nd	P1/F1 P5
13. Memo	McFarlane to the President, re summitry and next steps, 3 p <i>R 10/17/05 MD2-011 #21</i>	nd	P1/F1 P5
14. Memo	same text as #9 (with notations) [90701], 1p <i>R 9/13/00 NLSF95-074/2 #20</i>	6/19/84	P1/F1

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
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- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
15. Memo	same text as item #9 (with different notations), 1p <i>R 9/13/00 NLSF95-074/2 #21</i>	6/19/84	P1/F1
16. Memo	Matlock and Cobb to John Poindexter, re Mitterrand 1982 Memecon [4936], 1p	6/20/84	P1/F1
17. Memo	<i>R 9/13/00 NLSF95-074/2 #22</i> James Rentschler to William Clark, re Mitterrand visit and the record [90158], 2p <i>D. 10/17/05 M02-011 # 22</i>	3/11/82	P1/F1 P5

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
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PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O 13233

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Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

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Box Number 5

FOIA M02-011

File Folder MATLOCK CHRON JUNE 1984 (6/15-6/20)

DATE 3/22/2007

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
3	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE SHULTZ MEETING (#19)	1	6/19/1984	
			<i>mvh 3/17/08</i>		
5	MEMO	SAME AS ITEM 3	1	6/19/1984	
			<i>mvh 3/17/08</i>		
10	MEMO	SAME AS ITEM 3	1	6/19/1984	
			<i>mvh 3/17/08</i>		
12	MEMO	MCFARLANE TO THE PRESIDENT RE SUMMITRY (#20)	5	ND	
			<i>mvh 3/17/08</i>		
13	MEMO	MCFARLANE TO THE PRESIDENT RE SUMMITRY (#21)	3	ND	
			<i>mvh 3/17/08</i>		

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 15, 1984

INFORMATION

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MC~~W~~ARLANENLS F95-074/2 #12FROM: JACK MATLOCK ~~KW~~BY LOT, NARA, DATE 10/24/00

SUBJECT: Soviet Military Priorities

Jeremy Azrael has called my attention to a most interesting interview which appeared in Red Star, May 9, by Marshal Ogarkov, Chief of the Soviet General Staff. He prepared a memorandum for Secretary Shultz, a copy of which is attached at Tab I, and I believe you will find his observations of interest.

First, Ogarkov's comments on nuclear war are entirely consistent with our conviction that the Soviet General Staff is not fearful of an imminent U.S. first strike. Although the interview is directed at a military audience, and therefore would be expected to convey an air of confidence, his categorical statements that nuclear war makes no sense comes very close to an explicit endorsement of MAD. It is particularly interesting in this regard that he does not dwell on the alleged threat of the Pershing II's and GLCM's in Europe.

A second striking feature is his treatment of ET. The emphasis he gives it implies that he sees developments along these lines as his greatest future worry.

It would be foolhardy to attach too much significance to a single statement. But this one is indeed food for thought. As Jeremy points out, one of the questions it raises is whether we may not have more leverage in vigorous pursuit of ET in the conventional area than in the strategic nuclear area. Going somewhat further afield with speculation, one can also read in Ogarkov's treatment a recognition that the Soviet economy cannot support competition across the board and may have to make some agonizing decisions on priorities. This could mean that the Soviet military may not be as rigid in opposing strategic arms reduction as many assume. Even if this should be the case, however, we should understand that the most likely reason will be a desire to have more resources available for ET.

I have asked the Agency to be alert for any further commentary in Soviet military literature which reiterates or supports Orgakov's themes.

Attachment:

Tab I Memorandum "A Reordering of Soviet Military Priorities?"

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~Declassify on: ~~OADR~~



United States Department of State

Washington, D. C. 20520

June 11, 1984

INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

S/S

CONFIDENTIAL

TO: The Secretary

FROM: S/P - Peter W. Rodman *PMR*

SUBJECT: A Reordering of Soviet Military Priorities?

On May 9 (Victory Day), the Soviet military newspaper, Red Star, published a lengthy and authoritative interview with Marshal N.V. Ogarkov, Chief of the Soviet General Staff (relevant section attached). U.S. commentary on this interview has focussed on the relative moderation of Ogarkov's anti-American rhetoric. A not unrelated, but much more distinctive and noteworthy feature of the interview is its questioning of long-established Soviet military priorities.

Unlike virtually all other recent Soviet commentaries on defense matters, the Ogarkov interview does not dwell on the threat posed by the deployment of Pershings and GLCM's and the modernization of U.S. strategic nuclear forces. On the contrary, Ogarkov describes our continuing nuclear buildup as "senseless," since the already existing "overkill" capacity on both sides has made it "impossible to destroy the enemy's systems with a single strike." No matter how destructive an initial attack, the victim will "inevitably" retain enough weapons for "a crushing retaliatory strike -- a strike inflicting unacceptable damage."

It would be unwarranted to conclude on this basis that Ogarkov has been converted from a proponent of nuclear war-fighting (the long-established Soviet military doctrine) to a proponent of mutual assured destruction. But he has gone out of his way to discount the military significance of the alleged U.S. quest for nuclear superiority. Although he refrains from saying so directly, it clearly follows from his argument that there is no compelling need either to cap the U.S. nuclear buildup through early arms-control agreements or to respond to that buildup through nuclear countermeasures. Despite new U.S. programs, a continuing nuclear standoff can be taken for granted.

Ogarkov's insouciance about a U.S. first-strike threat is accompanied by obvious concern about an adverse shift in the conventional balance. He argues at length that conventional

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BY LOJ NARA, DATE 7/18/00

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- 2 -

weaponry is on the threshold of a technological revolution that will radically transform current methods of waging war. Furthermore, he clearly implies that the U.S. has built a considerable lead in conventional modernization, thereby threatening to deprive the Soviets of a long-standing and potentially decisive competitive advantage. In Ogarkov's judgment, this is a threat that must be addressed "right now" -- with such urgency and concentration that other established priorities are bound to suffer.

Ogarkov concedes that certain risks inhere in such a reordering of priorities, but he insists that these risks are manageable and can and must be run. Without quite saying so explicitly, he clearly takes it as a given that the Soviet military does not and will not have the resources both for a crash program in conventional weaponry and for a significant buildup of its nuclear capabilities. If this is regrettable, it is nonetheless a fact of life, a reflection of what Ogarkov describes as "an objective law discovered in his time by Frederick Engels" -- to wit, that "nothing depends on economic conditions as much as the Army and Navy." Fortunately, however, the unattainable is unlikely to prove indispensable. While Ogarkov clearly does not view the existence of a stable nuclear balance as a guarantee against the outbreak of a conventional war (the gravamen of his entire argument is precisely the contrary), his case nonetheless rests on an assumption that the current period is a period of relative security.

Ogarkov has been a leading contributor to Soviet efforts to generate a war-scare (something he probably finds useful, among other things, in pressing his overall budgetary claims). But in this particularly authoritative statement to a professional audience, he suggests that it is possible to concentrate resources on the development and testing of necessarily uncertain emergent technologies and weapons systems because it is a time of peace -- and is likely to remain so for some time to come. In consequence, there is no justification for not reordering priorities. War is not a clear and present danger, and attempts to argue the contrary within military circles are nothing more than poorly disguised expressions of illegitimate inter-service rivalry. More generally, they reflect precisely the sort of "conservatism and inertia" that must be "resolutely overcome" by leaders who appreciate Engels' further "discovery" that innovations in military affairs often have to be imposed "almost forcibly and against the will of the military command."

If this reading of Ogarkov's interview is correct (and it is one in which Jeremy has considerable confidence), there are

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a number of implications that are worth bearing in mind and exploring further:

- The Soviet military is far from monolithic and may presently be divided by particularly intense inter-service rivalries.
- Soviet economic stringencies are such that the Soviet high command faces -- and is more-or-less resigned to facing -- hard choices among competing weapons systems and mission priorities.
- The Soviet high command does not believe that the risk of war (let alone of a U.S. first strike) is particularly high.
- The Soviet high command may not be as eager to cap the U.S. strategic buildup through a START agreement as we often suppose.
- The Soviet determination to match us nuclear missile for nuclear missile in a continuing cycle of deployments and counterdeployments may be shakier than we often assume.
- Within the Soviet high command support for nuclear arms control may be strongest among conventional force commanders who are eager to cap Soviet nuclear programs and increase spending on conventional modernization.
- Pressing ahead with our conventional arms modernization programs may be one of our most effective means for limiting the modernization of Soviet strategic and theatre nuclear forces.
- The Soviets may be on the verge of conventional force modernization programs that will tip the conventional balance even further in their favor unless we in fact justify their apprehension and exploit our technological advantages in the field of conventional weaponry.

Attachment:

As stated.

Drafted: S/P:JAzrael *JK*

Ogarkov Interview

PM081625 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 9 May 84 First Edition pp 2-3

[Interview with MSU N.V. Ogarkov, chief of General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces and USSR first deputy defense minister: "The Defense of Socialism: Experience of History and the Present Day" — first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[Text] The Soviet people's victory in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-45 is being celebrated widely and solemnly in our country today. On the eve of this great and resplendent holiday, the editorial office of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA asked Marshal of the Soviet Union N.V. Ogarkov, chief of General Staff of the Armed Forces and USSR first deputy defense minister, to answer a number of questions connected with the defense of socialism's gains.

Question: It is nearly 40 years since the Great Patriotic War. What changes have taken place in military matters in that time, and how are they taken into account in our military building, in the training of troops and fleets?

Answer: In his time, F. Engels discovered an objective law: "Nothing depends on economic conditions as much as the Army and Navy. Armaments, personnel, organization, tactics, and strategy depend, above all, on the level of production achieved at a given moment and on the means of communication," and "successes of technology, the moment they have become usable and have been applied in practice in military matters, have immediately -- almost forcibly, and often against the will of the military command -- caused changes and even revolutions in the methods of waging war."

In present-day conditions, this law is manifested with particular force. In the postwar years, several generations of weapons systems and combat hardware have already succeeded one another.

What do the basic changes in military matters consist of today?

First, the quantitative accumulation of nuclear weapons, which has continued over several decades, has led to radical qualitative changes in the conditions and potential for the use of these weapons. The stockpiles of nuclear ~~ammunition~~ and various means of delivery that the sides created have reached such a size and quality that they are sufficient to destroy all the important targets on enemy territory many times over in a short space of time.

For instance, in just one salvo (launch) of strategic (not counting battlefield) nuclear forces, the United States could today use about 12,000 nuclear charges with a total yield hundreds of times greater than the yield of all the explosives and ammunition used by all states throughout the 6 years of World War II. With the deployment of American medium-range missiles in Europe, this potential of U.S. strategic nuclear forces will further increase. You do not have to be a military man or a scientist to realize that a further buildup is becoming senseless. Nonetheless, this buildup is continuing, through the fault of the United States.

As a result, a paradox arises: On the one hand, it would seem, a process of steadily increasing potential for the nuclear powers to destroy the enemy is taking place, while on the other there is an equally steady and, I would say, even steeper reduction in the potential for an aggressor to inflict a so-called "disarming strike" on his main enemy. The point is, with the quantity and diversity of nuclear missiles already achieved, it becomes impossible to destroy the enemy's systems with a single strike. A crushing retaliatory strike against the aggressor, even by the limited quantity of nuclear charges remaining to the defender -- a strike inflicting unacceptable damage -- becomes inevitable in present conditions. The calculation of the strategists across the ocean, based on the possibility of waging a so-called "limited" nuclear war, now has no foundation whatever. It is utopian: Any so-called limited use of nuclear facilities will inevitably lead to the immediate use of the whole of the sides' nuclear arsenal. That is the terrible logic of war. Their arguments about the possibility of a so-called "limited nuclear strike without retaliation" against the enemy's main centers and control points are even more groundless. Such arguments are pure fantasy. Put together, all this substantially changes both the conditions for the outbreak of modern warfare and the potential for waging it.

Second, rapid changes in the development of conventional means of destruction and the emergence in the developed countries of automated reconnaissance-and-strike complexes, long-range high-accuracy terminally guided combat systems, unmanned flying machines, and qualitatively new electronic control systems make many types of weapons global and make it possible to sharply increase (by at least an order of magnitude) the destructive potential of conventional weapons, bringing them closer, so to speak, to weapons of mass destruction in terms of effectiveness. The sharply increased range of conventional weapons makes it possible to immediately extend active combat operations not just to the border regions, but to the whole country's territory, which was not possible in past wars. This qualitative leap in the development of conventional means of destruction will inevitably entail a change in the nature of the preparation and conduct of operations, which will in turn predetermine the possibility of conducting military operations using conventional systems in qualitatively new, incomparably more destructive forms than before.

There is a sharp expansion in the zone of possible combat operations, and the role and significance of the initial period of the war and its initial operations become incomparably greater. A new war, should imperialism unleash it, will certainly be strikingly different in nature from the last war.

Third, the rapid development of science and technology in recent years creates real preconditions for the emergence in the very near future of even more destructive and previously unknown types of weapons based on new physical principles.

Work on these new types of weapons is already in progress in a number of countries, for example, in the United States. Their development is a reality of the very near future, and it would be a serious mistake not to consider it right now. This, in turn, cannot fail to change established notions of the methods and forms of armed struggle and even of the military might of the state.

This is a short list of only the basic changes currently taking place in the means of armed struggle. They are inevitably exerting their influence on the nature of war and the role and place of the branches of the Armed Forces in resolving operational and strategic tasks and on the further development and improvement of forms and methods of conducting military operations and military affairs as a whole.

All this must unconditionally be the subject of constant and in-depth analysis and must be generalized and taken into account in the practical building of our Armed Forces.

In consideration of this, the technical equipping, organizational building, and management of our Armed Forces are effected in such a way that they are always ready under any conditions to deal an immediate counterstrike against any aggressor. This capability must be guaranteed in all instances. The main component of the combat might of the Army and Navy and the basic factor in curbing the aggressor are our strategic nuclear forces, which are in a state of constant high combat readiness. All branches of the Armed Forces and categories of troops are developing harmoniously with them and are being equipped with the most modern weapons and combat hardware.

There is also a simultaneous process of honing and improving the system of operational, combat, and political training of troops and fleets; the procedure for mobilizing and provisioning them; troop and weapon control systems, and forms and methods of political-educational and party political work.

The Soviet Armed Forces' might is determined by not only the quantity but also the quality of their weapons and combat hardware. Our main strength is the Soviet people, who have an expert mastery of the awe-inspiring weapons entrusted to them by the motherland. Today, over 93 percent of our servicemen have secondary and higher education. Almost 90 percent of the servicemen are Communists and Komsomol members, who are transforming our Army and Navy into an invincible force.

The resolution of the tasks of military building and training of our Armed Forces is effected on the basis of comprehensive, in-depth analysis of the military-political situation and the development of the means of armed struggle. Therefore, our military cadres do not merely copy past experience, they use it creatively and enrich it. They must constantly improve the training and organizational structure of troops and naval forces and conduct scientific quests to this end, taking into account the continuous changes in military affairs and, if necessary, taking justified risks. It is better to test new forms in peacetime than to seek them in the course of a war. Furthermore, there would now be no time for this. We military men must, as Comrade K.U. Chernenko, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, points out, "resolutely overcome any conservatism and inertia"; for us in the military "the slogan of the day must be: From a correct idea, fully armed with experience, to bold actions!"

III. 9 May 84

R 21

USSR NATIONAL AFFAIRS
POLITICAL & SOCIAL DEVELOPMENTS

I would like to emphasize that the defense of the socialist motherland is the concern of every Soviet person, a concern of the entire people. In this connection, work to educate the Soviet people in accordance with revolutionary, combat, and labor traditions and train reliable and skillful defenders of the motherland, and the active participation in this work of our party, labor, war, and Army veterans, are of great importance.

The main source of the Soviet Armed Forces' strength and invincibility and an important condition of their further strengthening and development has always been and remains the leadership of the Communist Party and the unbreakable unity between the Army and the people. The CPSU, its Leninist Central Committee, and our government are doing everything necessary to ensure that the Soviet state's defense potential and its Armed Forces' combat might are abreast of present-day demands and that no eventuality can take us by surprise.

The grim years of the Great Patriotic War are receding further and further into the depths of history. A great deal has changed in the world in the almost 40 years since then. However, time cannot wipe out from the memory of grateful mankind the unparalleled feat of the Soviet people and their Armed Forces who, in an unprecedentedly fierce confrontation with a perfidious enemy, not only defended the socialist fatherland, but also saved the peoples of many countries from fascist enslavement. The memory of the millions of people who gave their lives for the great victory makes it imperative today to rally the forces of the world's peoples in the struggle against the perfidious designs of the forces of imperialism and reaction, against the instigators of a new war. The imperialist pretenders to world domination should not forget that history savagely punishes those who ignore its lessons.



June 15, 1984

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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Proposed Presidential Statement for the June 26-27
Smithsonian Meeting on US-Soviet Exchanges

Attached is a draft Presidential message outlining our efforts to improve our bilateral relationship with the Soviet Union for use at the June 26-27 meeting at the Smithsonian on US-Soviet exchanges.

for Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997

By R. V. Tate NARA, Date 6/21/99

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~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT TO SMITHSONIAN CONFERENCE

Gathered here today is an impressive group of Americans dedicated to the improvement of the range and quality of our contacts with the people of the Soviet Union. The Smithsonian Institution and its Woodrow Wilson Center are themselves outstanding examples of the American search for knowledge and communication with the world at large. ~~As you know, I am generally less impressed by what governments can do in resolving outstanding problems than~~ dedicated individuals giving free range to their energy and imagination. As I said on January 16, people don't make wars; on the contrary, their common interests cross all borders. ~~For this reason, I believe your efforts to improve meaningful people-to-people communication~~ *with the people in the Soviet Union* ~~is a matter of the greatest importance indeed.~~

The people of the Soviet Union have impressive energy, talent, and resources to contribute to the overall betterment of mankind. We all know that Russian writers, poets, and composers have made enormous contributions to the development of Western culture. What American does not think of Tchaikowsky as among his favorite classical composers, and what would our common literary heritage be like without Tolstoy, Dostoevsky, or Pasternak? Our recent commemoration of the Normandy landing reminds us once again of the incredible courage and sacrifice

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of the Russian people, and the contribution we each made to the other's efforts when confronted with a common enemy. In the years since World War II, the Soviet and American governments have often been on the opposite sides of major issues, but our people still retain fond memories of the past and understand clearly the value of communication for the future.

I want to emphasize to you, and to the people and leaders of the Soviet Union that: Increased communication among the world's peoples is the trend of the future, an essential ingredient for social progress and world peace. Genuine dialogue between the American people and the people of the Soviet Union is necessary for all of us. In an era of increased global interdependence, the trend towards Soviet self-isolation and restriction of contacts can only undermine the future of Soviet science, its economy, and its cultural development. The Kremlin's current approach is not healthy for Soviet society or for mankind as a whole. We hope it will change, and quickly.

All of us here today share a common goal in seeking to reverse this negative trend. You can -- and I trust you will -- make new efforts on the people-to-people side. We, for our part, have been working hard to make progress on a set of issues designed to facilitate communication between the United States and the Soviet Union. Those of you at this conference are well aware of some elements of our agenda and our effort to improve the overall atmosphere of the US-Soviet relationship.

-- We have encouraged the Soviets to return to the Geneva nuclear arms talks, put forth a new Chemical Weapons Treaty proposal, and advanced new ideas to break the impasse at the MBFR talks.

-- In Dublin, I noted our willingness to discuss the Soviet proposal on non-use-of-force in the CDE at Stockholm along with our proposals to make conflict in Europe less likely.

-- We have sought to engage the Soviets more deeply in discussions of regional trouble spots, most particularly in recent months, the Middle East, Iran-Iraq, and Southern Africa.

-- And, of course, we continue to make representations on human rights issues -- on the Sakharovs, on Shcharanskiy, on Orlov, on other persecuted individuals, on emigration issues, and on divided spouses. In these discussions, we regularly emphasize the importance of movement in the human rights area to an improvement in the overall relationship.

To give a fuller view of our efforts, I would like to take this opportunity today to provide for the first time a detailed accounting of the comprehensive program for cooperation and contacts between our peoples which we have proposed in recent months to the Soviet leadership.

First, we have completed all the necessary technical preparations for negotiations on a new exchanges agreement. This would open the way for official exchanges and encourage increased people-to-people contact. Our proposal contains

such features as a resumption of the highly popular exhibitions in the USSR and a proposal for reciprocal appearances on national television which would allow the leaders of the two countries to communicate directly with the people of the other.

Second, we are working with the Soviets on moving to open consulates in Kiev and New York. The details may yet take some time, but when completed, a Consulate in Kiev would give us greatly increased contact with the people of the Ukraine, the largest non-Russian nationality in the USSR.

Third, we have taken steps to reinvigorate agreements in force in the fields of environmental protection, housing, health, and agriculture.

-- Specifically, I have directed EPA Administrator Ruckelshaus to assume the position of U.S. Co-chairman of the US-USSR Committee on Environmental Protection. He is talking with his Soviet counterpart to begin arrangements for a Joint Committee meeting which would expand environmental cooperation.

-- Secretary Pierce at HUD has begun preparations for a meeting of the Joint Housing Committee, the first in over six years.

-- We are ready to move ahead with a full meeting of the Joint Agriculture Committee and rejuvenate cooperation in this vital area with, I hope, private sector participation.

-- In the health area, we have informed the Soviets of our willingness to broaden cooperation under both the health and artificial heart agreements as soon as the issue of Mrs. Bonner's need for medical treatment abroad is resolved.

Fourth, we are in the process of renewing several US-Soviet agreements that expire this year.

-- We have proposed that our bilateral fishing agreement be extended for eighteen months, rather than one year, and are looking at possibilities to increase cooperation under it.

-- Secretary Baldrige has formally proposed to Soviet Foreign Trade Minister Patolichev that we extend our Long-term Economic Cooperation Agreement for ten more years, hold a experts working group in the near future, and, if that meeting is successful, then convene a Cabinet-level Joint Commercial Commission to examine trade and economic issues.

-- A U.S. Naval delegation went to Moscow earlier this month to renew the Incidents at Sea agreement for another three years. This has been a highly successful agreement that demonstrates clearly the ability of our armed forces to ensure unnecessary frictions are not introduced into our military-to-military relationship.

-- And we are reviewing the World Oceans Agreement that

has been quite useful in ocean-going joint research. The agreement is due for renewal in December and we anticipate no problems continuing our cooperation in this area.

Finally, I should note that we are negotiating on or have proposed steps in several other areas that will improve our government-to-government dialogue with considerable benefits for the people of our two countries.

-- We recently concluded another round of Consular Review Talks in Moscow aimed at improving visa procedures and facilitating travel between our two countries.

-- We suggested a compromise formula to settle the exact depiction of the maritime boundary between us in the Bering Sea.

-- We proposed to the Soviets a joint simulated space rescue mission in which astronauts of the two countries would carry out a combined exercise in space to develop ways to rescue astronauts from malfunctioning space vehicles.

-- We suggested discussions between the U.S. Coast Guard and the Soviet Ministry of Merchant Marine on search and rescue procedures that could be of major value to citizens of both countries lost at sea.

-- We have made progress in the talks on upgrading the Hotline, and we have made proposals dealing with nuclear terrorist incidents, establishing a Joint Military Communications Link, and upgrading embassy communications in both countries.

-- We have also put forward a specific set of steps the Soviets and we could take along the Pacific air routes to ensure that the KAL incident never recurs.

-- Finally, I want to mention that I suggested to General Secretary Chernenko that in addition to our other channels of communication, we institute regular, high-level contacts between military personnel of our two countries.

I have enumerated the steps above because I wanted you to know the scope of the efforts that we are making to improve the quality of our dialogue with the government and people of the Soviet Union. We are sufficiently realistic not to expect immediate results in all our endeavors and, given the current mood in the Kremlin, even small steps can be difficult. We are, however, looking to the long-term in our approach. If we cannot settle all of these issues today, we want nevertheless to lay the groundwork to convince this and future Soviet leaders of the need and value of better and more fruitful communications in the future.

All of us know that broadening genuine communication with a country as closed and suspicious as the Soviet Union is no easy

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

- 8 -

task. There is a natural conflict between the deeply ingrained American desire for free-wheeling discussions at all levels and the Soviet penchant for restricting contacts to a few hand-picked individuals on their side. At the present time, the atmosphere for contacts is at low ebb. Perhaps because of their own uncertainties, the Soviet leadership has recently boycotted the Olympics, reduced emigration abroad to a trickle, increased controls over mail allowed in, stepped up harassment of tourists, and even keep Soviets from our ambassador's cultural performances at his residence in Moscow.

One cloud over all our efforts to improve communications is the Soviet leadership's treatment of Academician Sakharov and Mrs. Bonner. As part of their generally defensive mood, they have gone to extraordinary lengths to cut them off from the outside world. The actions against the Sakharovs have earned the deserved condemnation of much of the world scientific community and forced the National Academy of Sciences to postpone its trip to the USSR. This is preeminently a people-to-people issue and it will inevitably affect what cooperation between our two peoples is possible. I call on the Soviet leadership to relax their pressures on the Sakharovs, allow them to communicate with the outside world, and provide them with their basic rights to seek medical care within or outside the country as necessary.

All of us here today understand only too well the difficulties before us. However, we cannot only dwell on the

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- 9 -

problems before us. We must must strive to reach the goal we are seeking and I am confident that those here at this meeting share my desire for improved communications with the peoples of the Soviet Union. I want to wish you well as you seek to formulate imaginative, but realistic, people-to-people programs that can increase the level of genuine and meaningful dialogue between our two peoples. Our task is hard, but I am sure that working together we can succeed.

Thank you.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

C

REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENTS

To: Officer-in-charge
Appointments Center
Room 060, OEOB

Please admit the following appointments on June 19, 19 84
for Jack F. Matlock, Jr. of NSC:
(NAME OF PERSON TO BE VISITED) (AGENCY)

BEECHER, William
CARTER, Barry
GARDNER, Richard
— GATTI, Tobi
KLEINMAN, Robert
MEYER, Steven
RESOR, Stanley
SCOWCROFT, Brent
SELIN, Ivan
SONNENFELDT, Helmut
LUCK, Edward C.

MEETING LOCATION

Building OEOb

Requested by Francesca Lapinski

Room No. 248

Room No. 368 Telephone 3912

Time of Meeting 1030

Date of request 6/18/84

Additions and/or changes made by telephone should be limited to three (3) names or less.

APPOINTMENTS CENTER: SIG/OEOB - 395-6046 or WHITE HOUSE - 456-6742

PRESERVATION COPY

Chen
June 84

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

June 19, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK

SUBJECT: Shultz Meeting with Dobrynin Today

State did not share with me their preparations for the Shultz meeting with Dobrynin, and I have not yet seen the Shultz memo to the President. However, I consider the following important for the meeting:

-- The basic thrust should be to put pressure on the Soviets to indicate where on our agenda there can be movement in response to the movement we have already made toward theirs and might make in the future. No concessions not already made should be signaled in the absence of some Soviet movement. This includes specifically the ASAT issue.

-- The summitry question must be covered, but this should be done preferably without notetakers, and from talking points approved by the President and in the President's name. To stress the latter, it would be best if Shultz actually read them off a piece of paper (which he could then give to Dobrynin). I have adapted the talking points in your Memorandum to the President for this purpose.

-- Shultz should stress the anomaly of the Soviet insistence that we take up new areas (however important) while refusing to negotiate on others, equally or more important. The tone should nevertheless be directed at problem-solving: how we might achieve a balance of benefits to both sides.

-- He should avoid any indication that we are seeking a summit for its own sake and should not mention the possibility of Dobrynin meeting with the President in the future.

Attachment:

Tab I - Talking Points on Summitry

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS MO2-011 #19

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

BY NOJ, NARA, DATE 10/17/05

NLS F95-074/2 #14TALKING POINTS ON SUMMITRYBY LOS, NARA, DATE 10/24/00

-- The President is concerned that there has been little progress in the relationship since his January speech, when he tried to set a course of improvement.

-- The exchange of correspondence has not yet produced an opening to get our relations on a more positive track.

-- The President is committed to progress in the relationship, but he senses that Chairman Chernenko, faced with the history of apparent paralysis in our relations, does not fully grasp the importance he attaches to improving the relationship.

-- A meeting could perhaps contribute to resolving this question.

-- The President had not intended to discuss this issue in public before consulting Chairman Chernenko, but Senator Baker's unexpected proposal made it necessary to explain his attitude. He trusts he made it clear that any decision must be a mutual one, and that he has no intention of ~~playing political games with the question~~ *issues extraneous to the US-Soviet relationship to impinge upon it.* *allowing*

-- The President proposes that he and Chairman Chernenko commit themselves to resolving the problems between us. Let us see how much progress we can make in narrowing our differences.

-- As we do so, issues may emerge which hold promise for a fruitful agenda at a personal meeting. As the President said at his recent press conference, he does not believe we have to have a treaty to sign to have a useful meeting. He understands that this is also Chairman Chernenko's position.

-- At the same time, the President recognises that both he and the Chairman must be confident that, if they meet, they can achieve something. People in both our countries would expect this.

-- If Chairman Chernenko agrees, the President would suggest that they both bear in mind the possibility of developing an agenda as we discuss the issues.

-- The President has no particular timetable in mind. The meeting could take place when discussion of the issues would benefit from a meeting. That could be this year or next year.

-- The President also believes that thought should be given to the utility of arranging regular, annual meetings of the Soviet and American political leaders. Such a practice could have the benefit of providing a mechanism of consultation which is not dependent on the state of relations or extraneous political factors. This question could be a subject for discussion at an initial meeting, or could be considered in advance of one.

-- The President would welcome Chairman Chernenko's thoughts on these questions.

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

June 19, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

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-- He should avoid any indication that we are seeking a summit for its own sake and should not mention the possibility of Dobrynin meeting with the President in the future.

Attachment:

Tab I - Talking Points on Summitry

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS MO2-011 #19

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

BY LOJ, NARA, DATE 10/17/05

NLS F95-074/2#15TALKING POINTS ON SUMMITRY

IV. LOJ, NARA, DATE ^{10/24/00} ~~The President~~ is concerned that there has been little progress in the relationship since his January speech, when he tried to set a course of improvement.

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-- A meeting could perhaps contribute to resolving this question.

-- The President had not intended to discuss this issue in public before consulting Chairman Chernenko, but Senator Baker's unexpected proposal made it necessary to explain his attitude. He trusts he made it clear that any decision must be a mutual one, and that he has no intention of playing political games with the question.

-- The President proposes that he and Chairman Chernenko commit themselves to resolving the problems between us. Let us see how much progress we can make in narrowing our differences.

-- As we do so, issues may emerge which hold promise for a fruitful agenda at a personal meeting. As the President said at his recent press conference, he does not believe we have to have a treaty to sign to have a useful meeting. He understands that this is also Chairman Chernenko's position.

-- At the same time, the President recognizes that both he and the Chairman must be confident that, if they meet, they can achieve something. People in both our countries would expect this.

-- If Chairman Chernenko agrees, the President would suggest that they both bear in mind the possibility of developing an agenda as we discuss the issues.

-- The President has no particular timetable in mind. The meeting could take place when discussion of the issues would benefit from a meeting. That could be this year or next year.

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-- The President would welcome Chairman Chernenko's thoughts on these questions.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

SUBJECT: Shultz Meeting with Dobrynin: Summitry

As you know, George Shultz will be meeting with Dobrynin at 2:00 this afternoon. I believe that it is essential for him to deal with the summit question, in view of the public attention it has gotten, and that he should do so in your name.

I would suggest, therefore, that you approve the talking points attached (adapted from the ones you saw earlier) for George to give Dobrynin in private on your behalf.

Recommendation

That you approve the talking points attached.

OK No
— —

Attachment:

Tab A -- Suggested Talking Points

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F95-074/2 #16

BY HJS, NARA, DATE 10/24/00

Prepared by:
Jack F. Matlock

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
Declassify on: ~~OADR~~

TALKING POINTS ON SUMMITRY

-- The President is concerned that there has been little progress in the relationship since his January speech, when he tried to set a course of improvement.

-- The exchange of correspondence has not yet produced an opening to get our relations on a more positive track.

-- The President is committed to progress in the relationship, but he senses that Chairman Chernenko, faced with the history of apparent paralysis in our relations, does not fully grasp the importance he attaches to improving the relationship.

-- A meeting could perhaps contribute to resolving this question.

-- The President had not intended to discuss this issue in public before consulting Chairman Chernenko, but Senator Baker's unexpected proposal made it necessary to explain his attitude to the American public. He trusts he made it clear that any decision must be a mutual one, and that he has no intention of allowing issues extraneous to the U.S.-Soviet relationship to impinge upon it.

-- The President proposes that he and Chairman Chernenko commit themselves to resolving the problems between us. Let us see how much progress we can make in narrowing our differences.

-- As we discuss ways to narrow our differences, issues may emerge which would benefit from discussion at a personal meeting. As the President said at his recent press conference, he does not believe we have to have a treaty to sign to have a useful meeting. He understands that this is also Chairman Chernenko's position.

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-- The President also believes that thought should be given to the utility of arranging regular, annual meetings of the Soviet and American political leaders. Such a practice could have the benefit of providing a mechanism of consultation which is not dependent on the state of relations or extraneous factors. This question could be a subject for discussion at an initial meeting, or could be considered in advance of one.

-- The President would welcome Chairman Chernenko's thoughts on these questions.

DECLASSIFIED/RELEASED
NLS F95-074/2#17
BY WOT, NARA, DATE 10/24/00

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 19, 1984

INFORMATION

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*
SUBJECT: Dobrynin on Summitry

NLS F95-074/2 #18
BY LOJ, NARA, DATE 10/24/00

John Wallach of Hearst Newspapers called this afternoon to say that he had just had a fascinating conversation with Dobrynin. (He went over to talk about his plans to visit the Soviet Union this summer.) He found Dobrynin, he said, surprisingly upbeat on summitry. While Dobrynin initially said he doubted a summit would be possible this year, as the conversation wore on most things he said were positive. For example, he disputed Wallach's remark that he supposed August was out because the Soviets take their vacations then. "Oh no," Dobrynin retorted, "Gromyko is taking is vacation early this year and will be working in August."

Dobrynin went on to remark that with all the talk of quiet diplomacy, he was surprised that the Administration had not discussed the summit question with him. But he added that he had an appointment with Shultz tomorrow, and maybe we were saving the discussion for then. Dobrynin added that he personally liked the Baker idea of regular summits, since this would lower expectations and make everything easier.

Regarding what could be usefully discussed at a summit, Dobrynin said that they would be interested in ASAT and CTB. When Wallach suggested that we would doubtless be interested in nuclear arms, Dobrynin said sure, each side could talk about what it wanted. When Wallach mentioned in another context the Democratic Convention, Dobrynin commented that they did not consider it very important and it was unlikely to get much coverage in the Soviet Union.

Wallach concluded from all of this that Dobrynin and Shultz would be discussing agenda tomorrow. I offered no comment other than to say it was an interesting conversation and thanked him for filling me in.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

June 19, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK

SUBJECT: Shultz Meeting with Dobrynin Today

State did not share with me their preparations for the Shultz meeting with Dobrynin, and I have not yet seen the Shultz memo to the President. However, I consider the following important for the meeting:

-- The basic thrust should be to put pressure on the Soviets to indicate where on our agenda there can be movement in response to the movement we have already made toward theirs and might make in the future. No concessions not already made should be signaled in the absence of some Soviet movement. This includes specifically the ASAT issue.

-- The summitry question must be covered, but this should be done preferably without notetakers, and from talking points approved by the President and in the President's name. To stress the latter, it would be best if Shultz actually read them off a piece of paper (which he could then give to Dobrynin). I have adapted the talking points in your Memorandum to the President for this purpose.

-- Shultz should stress the anomaly of the Soviet insistence that we take up new areas (however important) while refusing to negotiate on others, equally or more important. The tone should nevertheless be directed at problem-solving: how we might achieve a balance of benefits to both sides.

-- He should avoid any indication that we are seeking a summit for its own sake and should not mention the possibility of Dobrynin meeting with the President in the future.

Attachment:

Tab I - Talking Points on Summitry

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS MO2-011 #19

BY LOJ, NARA, DATE 10/17/05

TALKING POINTS ON SUMMITRY

-- The President is concerned that there has been little progress in the relationship since his January speech, when he tried to set a course of improvement.

-- The exchange of correspondence has not yet produced an opening to get our relations on a more positive track.

-- The President is committed to progress in the relationship, but he senses that Chairman Chernenko, faced with the history of apparent paralysis in our relations, does not fully grasp the importance he attaches to improving the relationship.

-- A meeting could perhaps contribute to resolving this question.

-- The President had not intended to discuss this issue in public before consulting Chairman Chernenko, but Senator Baker's unexpected proposal made it necessary to explain his attitude to the American public. He trusts he made it clear that any decision must be a mutual one, and that he has no intention of allowing issues extraneous to the U.S.-Soviet relationship to impinge upon it.

-- The President proposes that he and Chairman Chernenko commit themselves to resolving the problems between us. Let us see how much progress we can make in narrowing our differences.

-- As we discuss ways to narrow our differences, issues may emerge which would benefit from discussion at a personal meeting. As the President said at his recent press conference, he does not believe we have to have a treaty to sign to have a useful meeting. He understands that this is also Chairman Chernenko's position.

-- At the same time, the President recognizes that both he and the Chairman must be confident that, if they meet, they can achieve something. People in both our countries would expect this.

-- If Chairman Chernenko agrees, the President would suggest that they both bear in mind the possibility of developing an agenda as we discuss the issues.

-- The President has no particular timetable in mind. The meeting could take place whenever it appears that it would be useful. That could be this year or next year.

-- The President also believes that thought should be given to the utility of arranging regular, annual meetings of the Soviet and American political leaders. Such a practice could have the benefit of providing a mechanism of consultation which is not dependent on the state of relations or extraneous factors. This question could be a subject for discussion at an initial meeting, or could be considered in advance of one.

-- The President would welcome Chairman Chernenko's thoughts on these questions.

DECLASSIFIED/RELEASED
NLS F95-0742#19
BY 605 NARA DATE 10/24/00

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS M02-011#70

BY LOI, NARA, DATE 10/17/05

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

SUBJECT: Summitry and Next Steps in U.S.-Soviet Relations

Your masterful handling of the summit issue in your press conference last week not only clarified your position for the American public, but may have created an opportunity to put life into our dialogue with the Soviets. As you think through our strategy over the next few months and, specifically, your meeting with Dobrynin tomorrow, the following thoughts may be helpful.

Summitry

Your position on the desirability of a summit meeting if certain minimal conditions are met is now clear. Our immediate task is to explore with the Soviets in confidence whether and how these conditions can be created -- and in what time frame. As for the meetings tomorrow with Dobrynin, I would suggest that George review the issues and leave it to you to deal with the summit question.

If we are to arrange a successful summit, we must approach the question with some potential dangers in mind. First, we cannot totally dismiss the possibility that the Soviets could use a meeting which is not properly prepared in an effort to embarrass you, for example by using it to hector and bully, and then announce that your unreasonableness prevented progress. We should, therefore, have sufficient guarantee in their prior behavior that they are serious in attempting to narrow differences before we commit ourselves to a meeting. This might take little more than their willingness to agree on a potentially productive agenda and some moderation of the verbal attacks on you, but this should be considered the bare minimum.

Second, we must recognize that Chernenko's own political influence may still be limited. We have little evidence that he has consolidated his authority in any meaningful way, and unless he is able to do so, any impact that you could make on him would have limited affect on Soviet policy. So long as he is politically and physically weak, his colleagues may balk at allowing him to run the risk of exposing himself to a meeting

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with you, where you would clearly have the upper hand in mental and physical vigor, not to speak of political stature. The other side of this particular coin is that a meeting could conceivably be used by Chernenko to enhance his stature at home, and if so, he and his immediate staff may be attracted by the idea for this reason alone.

Finally, we must carefully avoid any actions which lead the Soviets to believe that you need a summit for your reelection. The political pressures on you are of course evident to them, but this is all the more reason to avoid seeming to have fixed a mental deadline or to be particularly anxious over the timing. If the Soviets conclude that your motivation is largely political, they either will refuse to play, or will ask an exorbitant price and be attracted by strategems to embarrass you.

In sum, with this issue, how you go about it will be as important as what you do.

The Soviet Position

The Soviets have not yet reacted publicly to your press conference. We should hold our cheers and keep the champagne corked, but this is not a bad sign. We may be seeing the outward indications that they are reviewing their apparent earlier decision not to deal with you this year. At a minimum, they must be asking whether their public posture of intransigence is still tenable.

Besides the ^uunusual public silence (following many months of automatically and systematically condemning everything you propose), there have been two events which might be straws in the wind revealing a growing interest on their part:

-- Robert O. Anderson of ARCO, who was in Moscow last week, reported that his Soviet interlocutors (Arbatov and Vekikhov of the Academy of Sciences -- both members of the Communist Party Central Committee), commented on your press conference in a favorable light and even indicated that a summit before November might be possible. Just three weeks ago both were travelling around the U.S. telling all and sundry not only that the Soviets would not deal with you this year, but that they were likely to stay in hibernation for another four years if you were reelected.

-- A Soviet Embassy officer in Belgrade, who has often been used to pass accurate information about the Soviet leadership in the past, asked for a meeting with his American diplomatic contact and said that in his "personal view" the idea of regular summits was a good one, and that it might be possible to announce this year that they would start next year. We have every reason to believe that he was acting under instructions.

Your and George's meetings with Dobrynin tomorrow should shed additional light on the Soviet attitude. Dobrynin, however, may not provide conclusive evidence, since he will presumably be acting under Gromyko's instructions, and we do not know whether

~~Dobrynin's~~ ^{Gromyko's} and Chernenko's views on the subject are identical. It would be surprising if they were, since we can presume that Gromyko will attempt to circumscribe Chernenko's freedom of maneuver in foreign affairs, while Chernenko may well see his interest served by establishing his own authority. Given the bureaucratic nature of the Soviet government, these attitudes probably extend to the two men's personal staffs. When Gromyko is ascendant, this affects the position of officials in the Central Committee Secretariat, whose authority and influence derive from the General Secretary's.

We have some indirect evidence that senior officials on Chernenko's staff have been chafing over what they perceive as their boss's weakness. Some have spoken disdainfully of Gromyko to American visitors, calling him "our super hawk." While we should not base policy on speculations of this sort, we should be alert to the possibility that Chernenko's men will use the summit issue to get their man back into the action -- and simultaneously restore their own influence. In any case, we should continue our efforts to establish direct contact with Chernenko's people. At worst, this can do no harm. At best -- if we succeed -- we might find that their interests and ours coincide on some points.

Chernenko's Letter

It is very negative, and the best that can be said of it is that it is not at all personal. It was clearly staff written in Gromyko's shop. While it should of course be answered, our experience thus far in the correspondence shows that you are not getting through to Chernenko on the personal level, and perhaps this cannot be done with letters. They seem to be circulated through the Soviet bureaucracy, which drafts replies calculated not to yield an inch, lest the formal record open someone to the charge of weakness in standing up to the Americans.

I would suggest that your reply to Chernenko's letter be relatively brief, and that it make clear your disappointment that Chernenko seems not yet able to approach the issues in the constructive spirit which has motivated you, but reiterate your desire to find a way to make progress on the issues before us. Details on the issues could be left to oral discussion with Dobrynin -- or subsequently by Hartman to Gromyko.

If such an approach is what you want, we could probably have a reply ready for you to give Dobrynin tomorrow, since it would not require extensive staff work.

Your Meeting with Dobrynin

George Shultz will have met with Dobrynin for three hours before he brings him by to see you. You might initiate the meeting by asking for a report on their discussion. This would set the stage for a discussion of the summit question.

I would suggest that you make the following points:

-- There has been little progress in the relationship since your January speech, when you tried to set a course of improvement.

-- Your exchange of correspondence has not yet produced an opening to get our relations on a more positive track.

-- You are committed to progress in the relationship, but you sense that Mr. Chernenko, faced with the history of apparent paralysis in our relations, does not fully grasp the importance you attach to improving the relationship.

-- A meeting could perhaps contribute to resolving this question.

-- You had not intended to discuss this issue in public before consulting Mr. Chernenko, but Senator Baker's unexpected proposal made it necessary to explain your attitude. You trust you made it clear that any decision must be a mutual one, and that you have no intention of playing political games with the question.

-- You would propose that you and Mr. Chernenko commit yourselves to resolving some problems. Let us see how much progress we can make in narrowing our differences.

-- As we do so, issues may emerge which hold promise for a fruitful agenda. As you said at your press conference, you don't believe we have to have a treaty to sign to have a useful meeting. You understand that is also Mr. Chernenko's position.

-- At the same time, we both must be confident that, if we meet, we can achieve something. We both would need to explain to our people what progress had been made.

-- So, if Mr. Chernenko agrees, you would suggest that we bear in mind the possibility of developing an agenda as we discuss the issues.

-- You have no particular timetable in mind. The meeting could take place when the issues are ripe for the two of you to deal with personally. That could be this year or next year. And maybe then, there could be agreement to make these things automatic, every year. That could be an advantage over the long run.

* * * * *

Besides discussing the possibility of a summit, you might also consider making two proposals which, if accepted, could provide some direct access to Chernenko and his staff. For example, you could suggest that, if progress continues to be slow in official channels, consideration be given to some informal and exploratory discussions. For example, someone from each side who is familiar with the views of each chief of state could meet and discuss the

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issues broadly, confidentially and without commitment. Maybe they could come up with some ideas which we could check out, and if they seemed promising, take up officially. You could point out that we need to find some way to break the stalemate we are in, and if we feel that we will be committed to every word we say, this inhibits creative thinking.

The second suggestion with the same objective would be to say that you are prepared to meet periodically with Dobrynin, if that is considered useful. You could add, however, that this will be possible only if your Ambassador in Moscow is granted comparable access to your counterpart.

If you are comfortable with an approach along these lines, I will provide more detailed suggested talking points before the meeting.

Prepared by:
Jack F. Matlock

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTONNLS MOJ-011#21BY LOJ, NARA, DATE 10/17/05~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

SUBJECT: Summitry and Next Steps in U.S.-Soviet Relations

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Summitry

Your position on the desirability of a summit meeting if certain minimal conditions are met is now clear. Our immediate task is to explore with the Soviets in confidence whether and how these conditions can be created -- and in what time frame. As for the meetings tomorrow with Dobrynin, I would suggest that George review the issues and leave it to you to deal with the summit question.

If we are to arrange a successful summit, we must approach the question with some potential dangers in mind. First, we cannot totally dismiss the possibility that the Soviets could use a meeting which is not properly prepared in an effort to embarrass you, for example by using it to hector and bully, and then announce that your unreasonableness prevented progress. We should, therefore, have sufficient guarantee in their prior behavior that they are serious in attempting to narrow differences before we commit ourselves to a meeting. This might take little more than their willingness to agree on a potentially productive agenda and some moderation of the verbal attacks on you, but this should be considered the bare minimum.

Second, we must recognize that Chernenko's own political influence may still be limited. We have little evidence that he has consolidated his authority in any meaningful way, and unless he is able to do so, any impact that you could make on him would have limited affect on Soviet policy. So long as he is politically and physically weak, his colleagues may balk at allowing him to run the risk of exposing himself to a meeting with you,

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

where you would clearly have the upper hand in mental and physical vigor, not to speak of political stature. The other side of this particular coin is that a meeting could conceivably be used by Chernenko to enhance his stature at home, and if so, he and his immediate staff may be attracted by the idea for this reason alone.

Finally, we must carefully avoid any actions which lead the Soviets to believe that you need a summit for your reelection. The political pressures on you are of course evident to them, but this is all the more reason to avoid seeming to have fixed a mental deadline or to be particularly anxious over the timing. If the Soviets conclude that your motivation is largely political, they either will refuse to play, or will ask an exorbitant price and be attracted by strategems to embarrass you.

The Soviet Position

The Soviets have not yet reacted publicly to your press conference. We should hold our cheers and keep the champagne corked, but this is not a bad sign. We may be seeing the outward indications that they are reviewing their apparent earlier decision not to deal with you this year. At a minimum, they must be asking whether their public posture of intransigence is still tenable.

Besides the unusual public silence (following many months of automatically and systematically condemning everything you propose), there have been two events which might be straws in the wind revealing a growing interest on their part:

-- Robert O. Anderson of ARCO, who was in Moscow last week, reported that his Soviet interlocutors (Arbatov and Vekikhov of the Academy of Sciences -- both members of the Communist Party Central Committee), commented on your press conference in a favorable light and even indicated that a summit before November might be possible. Just three weeks ago both were travelling around the U.S. telling all and sundry not only that the Soviets would not deal with you this year, but that they were likely to stay in hibernation for another four years if you were reelected.

-- A Soviet Embassy officer in Belgrade, who has often been used to pass accurate information about the Soviet leadership in the past, asked for a meeting with his American diplomatic contact and said that in his "personal view" the idea of regular summits was a good one, and that it might be possible to announce this year that they would start next year. We have every reason to believe that he was acting under instructions.

Your and George's meetings with Dobrynin tomorrow should shed additional light on the Soviet attitude. Dobrynin, however, may not provide conclusive evidence, since he will presumably be acting under Gromyko's instructions, and we do not know whether

Dobrynin's and Chernenko's views on the subject are identical. It would be surprising if they were, since we can presume that Gromyko will attempt to circumscribe Chernenko's freedom of maneuver in foreign affairs, while Chernenko may well see his interest served by establishing his own authority. Given the bureaucratic nature of the Soviet government, these attitudes probably extend to the two men's personal staffs. When Gromyko is ascendant, this affects the position of officials in the Central Committee Secretariat, whose authority and influence derive from the General Secretary's.

We have some indirect evidence that senior officials on Chernenko's staff have been chafing over what they perceive as their boss's weakness. Some have spoken disdainfully of Gromyko to American visitors, calling him "our super hawk." While we should not base policy on speculations of this sort, we should be alert to the possibility that Chernenko's men will use the summit issue to get their man back into the action -- and simultaneously restore their own influence. In any case, we should continue our efforts to establish direct contact with Chernenko's people. At worst, this can do no harm. At best -- if we succeed -- we might find that their interests and ours coincide on some points.

Chernenko's Letter

It is very negative, and the best that can be said of it is that it is not at all personal. It was clearly staff written in Gromyko's shop. While it should of course be answered, our experience thus far in the correspondence shows that you are not getting through to Chernenko on the personal level, and perhaps this cannot be done with letters. They seem to be circulated through the Soviet bureaucracy, which drafts replies calculated not to yield an inch, lest the formal record open someone to the charge of weakness in standing up to the Americans.

I would suggest that your reply to Chernenko's letter be relatively brief, and that it make clear your disappointment that Chernenko seems not yet able to approach the issues in the constructive spirit which has motivated you, but reiterate your desire to find a way to make progress on the issues before us. Details on the issues could be left to oral discussion with Dobrynin -- or subsequently by Hartman to Gromyko.

If such an approach is what you want, we could probably have a reply ready for you to give Dobrynin tomorrow, since it would not require extensive staff work.

Your Meeting with Dobrynin

George Shultz will have met with Dobrynin for three hours before he brings him by to see you. You might initiate the meeting by asking for a report on their discussion. This would set the stage for a discussion of the summit question.

Chron

SYSTEM II
90701

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 19, 1984

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*
SUBJECT: Dobrynin on Summitry

John Wallach of Hearst Newspapers called this afternoon to say that he had just had a fascinating conversation with Dobrynin. (He went over to talk about his plans to visit the Soviet Union this summer.) He found Dobrynin, he said, surprisingly upbeat on summitry. While Dobrynin initially said he doubted a summit would be possible this year, as the conversation wore on most things he said were positive. For example, he disputed Wallach's remark that he supposed August was out because the Soviets take their vacations then. "Oh no," Dobrynin retorted, "Gromyko is taking is vacation early this year and will be working in August."

Dobrynin went on to remark that with all the talk of quiet diplomacy, he was surprised that the Administration had not discussed the summit question with him. But he added that he had an appointment with Shultz tomorrow, and maybe we were saving the discussion for then. Dobrynin added that he personally liked the Baker idea of regular summits, since this would lower expectations and make everything easier.

Regarding what could be usefully discussed at a summit, Dobrynin said that they would be interested in ASAT and CTB. When Wallach suggested that we would doubtless be interested in nuclear arms, Dobrynin said sure, each side could talk about what it wanted. When Wallach mentioned in another context the Democratic Convention, Dobrynin commented that they did not consider it very important and it was unlikely to get much coverage in the Soviet Union.

Wallach concluded from all of this that Dobrynin and Shultz would be discussing agenda tomorrow. I offered no comment other than to say it was an interesting conversation and thanked him for filling me in.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F95-074/2 #20

BY LDS, NARA, DATE 10/24/08

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 19, 1984

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

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DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

NLS F95-074/2 #21
BY WJS, NARA, DATE 10/24/00

TO: Walt Raymond

c
Comments

June 20, 1984

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

TO: JACK MATLOCK

FR: WALT RAYMOND *WR*

SUBJ: Vladimov

I have been asked by Langley whether we have completed the Vladimov's "interview" with Bud McFarlane. Could you advise me of the status and expected time for transmission.

6/22
Attached is Steve Sestamovich's draft replies to the questions Brunot submitted. They are good, but I think it would be helpful to devise a few "follow up" questions and get some hard figures on Sov. mil strength as compared with ours. (Sov. citizens rarely get this, and it illustrates what the problem is from our point of view.)

I have not yet discussed with Bud. He might want to make sure publication occurs in the fall, not inmediately. In short, we still need more work on the problem.

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as such.

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doubt about what the
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of the interests and the
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doubt.

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and repressive policies
uation of former Russian
Russian history, tradition,
Reagan has called the
this mean that Russia
THE enemy?

2. The US is spending enormous sums to acquire more missiles, more warheads, more weapons of every kind. Why? Does the US feel threatened, and if yes, by whom? Does the US really intend to use all those missiles against our cities, our homes and families?

3. Is it true that only the introduction of Soviet troops in Afghanistan has prevented an American takeover there? Why do the Americans ^{support} the Afghan Mudjaheddeen, who kill Soviet soldiers, but ~~is~~ ^{are} so excited when the USSR arms the Salvadoran ^wgerillas, who do not - or not specifically - shoot at Americans?

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

UNCLASSIFIED

June 20, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT: Reply to Richard Allen

In his letter of June 19 (Tab III), Richard Allen requested a letter from the President to the EDU/IDU meeting in Oslo, your comments on his East-West paper which will be discussed at the meeting, and also your assistance in including Frank Fahrenkopf in Brian Mulroney's meeting with the President tomorrow.

A letter to Dick dealing with these points is at TAB I. The letter for the President's signature is at TAB II and has been cleared with Speechwriters. Regarding Fahrenkopf, we are checking on the possibility of having him attend the meeting. I see no problem in principle.

Recommendation:

That you sign the letter at TAB I and authorize the President's signature on the letter at TAB II.

Approve ___ Disapprove ___

Attachments:

Tab I	Proposed response to Richard V. Allen
Tab II	Proposed letter to Alois Mock for the President's signature
Tab III	Richard Allen's letter to you, June 19, 1984

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Dick:

I am pleased to send along the President's letter to Mock, for your EDU/IDU meeting in Oslo. And thanks for the assist with the drafting -- such thoughtfulness makes our life much easier.

Your East-West paper is right on the mark. I think it does an outstanding job of explaining Soviet policy and highlighting those areas which we must get across to public opinion in the West. I have just a couple of suggestions regarding details:

- Your reference to the "hotline" talks on page 7 may not be totally accurate in saying that the Soviets "refused to sign." There was one technical issue unresolved at our last session, and we had not agreed on the precise form of the document. So there was not a finished piece of paper to sign. Perhaps a better example would be the Soviet failure up to now to negotiate seriously on the Western proposals for confidence-building measures in Stockholm, despite NATO's agreement to consider the Soviet non-use-of-force proposal if they would.
- On page 17, lumping Mozambique with Angola and Ethiopia may be slightly misleading, given recent developments in the former which have reduced Soviet influence.
- The reference to a recent decline in the growth rate of Soviet military hardware production (p. 21) might need some qualification, since recent reports indicate that it may have begun to rise again in 1983.
- Finally, in your references to the "Cold War" on page 31, it might be useful to note that the Soviet definition of "peaceful coexistence" sounds very much like what we call the "Cold War," which is one of a number of reasons we should avoid the term.

These are, of course, the tiniest of nit-picks; I consider the paper outstanding.

I am looking into the possibility of including Frank Fahrenkopf in the President's meeting with Brian Mulroney tomorrow. As you know, it is sometimes hard to alter the list of attendees, but we'll do our best.

Warm regards -- and best wishes for your efforts to mobilize world opinion on the basic East-West issues.

Sincerely,

Robert C. McFarlane

The Honorable Richard V. Allen
Senior Counsellor for Foreign Policy
and National Security
Republican National Committee
905 Sixteenth Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. Mock:

I am pleased to send my best wishes and personal greetings to the distinguished party leaders of the European Democrat Union. I hope that your meetings will be productive and interesting.

Last year at this time, Vice President Bush traveled to London to be with you for the founding of the International Democrat Union. IDU has made major contributions to the cohesion of democratic nations everywhere, and your work and that of EDU will become increasingly valuable in the years ahead.

I am happy to note that the work of IDU, the EDU and their counterpart for Asia, the Pacific Democrat Union, have decided to work extensively in the substantive areas of foreign and domestic policies. The institutions of democracy will benefit from your contributions, and the example you set will serve as a beacon for others who wish to follow the democratic path. The challenges that face us require our collective experience as democracies and as defenders of liberty.

May your work be rewarded with unbridled success, and may the IDU, EDU and PDU prosper and grow. And considering the dedicated men and women who have assembled in Oslo for the EDU meeting, I am sure you will.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Alois Mock
President
International Democrat Union
Oslo, Norway



Republican
National
Committee

Richard V. Allen
Senior Counsellor for
Foreign Policy and National Security

June 19, 1982

4403
Please Respond to:
905 Sixteenth St., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006

Telephone: 202/737-2824
Telex: 710-822-1143

Dear Bud:

Herewith the draft text of the proposed letter from the President to the EDU/IDU meeting at Oslo. If convenient, I will carry it with me to Oslo (I leave Thursday evening by way of Manila).

Also enclosed is a copy of my East-West paper which will be discussed by IDU in Oslo and, shortly, released as a statement of all twenty-one member parties representing more than 150 million members. As it is a private draft for the moment, I'd appreciate having your comments and suggestions.

Finally, as a matter of some urgency, and which I mentioned in one of our previous conversations: when Brian Mulroney meets with the President on Thursday afternoon, I suggest that Frank Fahrenkopf be included in the meeting. The Progressive Conservative Party is a member of IDU and PDU with us, and the gesture will not be missed.

With best regards,

Sincerely,

Richard V. Allen

RVA:ajk

Enclosures

The Honorable
Robert C. McFarlane
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20506

IDU

**INTERNATIONAL
DEMOCRAT
UNION**

JUNE 1, 1984

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE STANDING COMMITTEE
ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS**

Secretariat:

32 Smith Square
GB-LONDON SW1P 3HH

FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN

Telephone:

44 (01) 222-0847

SUBJECT: DRAFT OF PAPER ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS

Telex:

8955242 IDU G

Herewith the draft of the paper on East-West relations,
scheduled for discussion in Oslo on July 1, 1984.

Chairman:

Alois Mock

Vice-Chairmen:

Ulf Adelsohn
Richard Allen
John Atwill
Jacques Chirac
John Selwyn Gummer
Susumu Nikaido
Franz-Josef Strauss

Treasurer:

Allan Lawrence

Executive Secretary:

Scott Hamilton

Private Draft

PEACE AND SECURITY:

The International Democrat Union Assesses East-West Relations

International Democrat Union

The Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs

Oslo, Norway

June 30 - July 1, 1984

PEACE AND SECURITY:
The International Democrat Union Assesses East-West Relations

Contents

1. EAST-WEST RELATIONS: AN OVERVIEW	1
A. The Balance Sheet	2
B. Relations Today	5
2. SOVIET OBJECTIVES	7
A. Western Europe and the Peace Issue	7
B. Problems in Eastern Europe	8
C. Other Regions	11
D. Southwest Asia	11
E. Southeast Asia	12
F. The People's Republic of China	13
G. The Middle East	14
H. Iran	15
I. Central and Latin America	16
J. Africa	17
3. SOVIET VULNERABILITIES	18
A. Endemic Problems	18
B. Consumer Unrest	20
C. Defense Spending	20
4. THE WESTERN RESPONSE: TAKING THE INITIATIVE	22
A. Principles and Objectives	22
B. Arms Limitations and Reductions	23
C. Relations with Eastern Europe	24
D. Relations with The Third World	25
5. STRENGTHENING DEMOCRACY: THE ROLE OF THE IDU	27
A. Shaping Perceptions Abroad	28
B. Education At Home	32

1. EAST-WEST RELATIONS: AN OVERVIEW

The member parties of the International Democrat Union meet in the Summer of 1984 to assess the status of relations between East and West, a task that for decades has preoccupied their leaders and the broad publics they represent.

Some believe the East-West relationship is now in a poor and undesirable condition, and as a consequence, the world has edged closer to confrontation and conflict than at any time since the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962.

The dialogue between East and West has become obstructed; arms control negotiations have been interrupted; military spending on both sides continues in an upward spiral; and flashpoints on the periphery of the superpowers threaten to engulf whole regions in open warfare, while presenting the possibility of West and East colliding in the process of assisting allies or client states.

As members of an international organization of committed democrats, as proponents of the democratic way of life and the freedoms it guarantees, our understanding of this complex relationship will have a direct influence on the shape and context of our policies to affect it. Nothing less than world peace depends upon the actions we take to influence the policy process in East-West relations.

A. The Balance Sheet

As we survey the last twenty-five years of the relationship between East and West, we find a record that is ambivalent and mixed. Although the dangers seem more complex and more numerous than before, it is an undeniable fact that we have, through collective action and dedicated unity, avoided serious and direct confrontation and conflict with the East.

The decade of the 1970s represents for some the zenith of good relations between East and West, when the dialogue was so intense and the hopes for the policy of detente were so high. But even then, when from 1970 to 1976 summit meetings between East and West were so commonplace and arms control negotiations were in full blossom, the Soviet Union and its allies gave their complete backing to North Vietnam in its quest to subjugate South Vietnam, and ultimately supported the victorious North Vietnamese in the subjugation of adjacent states. And even then, during the days of detente, as trade and credits flowed from West to East,* the Soviet Union probed at the margins of the West,

* East-West trade increased by 300 per cent in the 1970s; Eastern debt, which financed this trade, expanded from \$8 billion in 1971 to \$82 billion in 1980.

concentrating on the Third World, and simultaneously increasing its already enormous military budget to produce still more weapons of mass destruction.

As the decade drew to a close, the brutal invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 rounded out a succession of Soviet or Soviet-backed conquests: South Vietnam in 1975, Angola in 1975-76, Ethiopia in 1977, Cambodia in 1978. With this tragic record of systematic conquest, hopes for genuine detente vanished, and Western leaders reappraised the East-West relationship to make the necessary adjustments in their policies.

Beginning in 1980, the Soviet Union encountered resistance across a broad front. This has been the inevitable product of Soviet actions, and has given the West the impetus to restore strength, leadership and seriousness of purpose in its dealings with the Soviet Union. The active diplomacy of recent years has worked, and while there have been strains among the Western countries, such international difficulties have been less important than the goal of unity in the face of a mounting threat from the Soviet Union.

Yet the decade of the 1970s, despite the disappointments and shocks, also produced a series of agreements between East and West: the successes of Germany's Ostpolitik; the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin; SALT I; the U.S.-Soviet "Code of Conduct," a statement of basic principles; numerous agreements between individual nations

and the Soviet Union promoting trade, cultural exchange, scientific and technological exchanges; the beginning of the talks on Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR); and many others of importance.

When the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) was signed at mid-decade, the West believed that it had succeeded in codifying an era of detente in which negotiation has replaced confrontation as a means of resolving differences between East and West.

By and large, tensions in Europe had been significantly eased, and a new sense of stability, hope and cooperation replaced the suspicion and mistrust of earlier years. Indeed, it was said that the "Iron Curtain" had begun to disappear, and that once it had vanished, it could never again be restored.

The increase in economic, cultural and scientific contacts with Warsaw Pact countries had encouraged evolutionary trends, in varying degrees, throughout Eastern Europe. Western concerns for human rights and fundamental freedoms had been made a legitimate part of the international agenda. New avenues for the reduction and limitation of nuclear and conventional arms appeared to have been opened.

Paralleling these hopeful developments, however, were a series of ominous Soviet undertakings in the military sphere. In the early 1970s, the USSR achieved parity with the United States in the area of continent-spanning strategic nuclear weapons, began an accelerated buildup of its

conventional and continental-range nuclear capability in Europe, and acquired a capacity for the projection of power and military intervention on a global scale. The relentless pressure that Moscow later exerted on the Polish government to suppress the legitimate aspirations of its people to determine their own affairs only sealed the downturn.

The West, it should be acknowledged, was not without complicity in these events. At times, it exhibited a peculiar determination to deny that the USSR did not understand "detente" in the same way as the West understood the term. For the Soviets, as Marxist-Leninist ideology makes explicit, "detente" was but a phase in a larger policy of "peaceful coexistence." As understood in Moscow, it was a phase during which the USSR, profiting from a "relaxation" of tensions, could achieve strategic parity with the West, attract the technology, credits and grain needed to infuse new life into a stagnant economy, and make "peaceful coexistence" irreversible by extending Soviet power and influence throughout the world.

B. RELATIONS TODAY

In the first half of 1983, despite an unprecedented Soviet propaganda campaign to portray East-West and especially U.S.-Soviet relations as more dangerous than at any time since the 1962 Cuban crisis, Moscow and Washington were cautiously exploring the possibility of a gradual renewal of

more normal East-West contacts. This movement came to an abrupt halt in September, however, when an unarmed Korean civilian airliner was shot down over Kamchatka by Soviet air defense forces. The USSR's initial silence regarding the action, and its subsequent attempt to shift the blame for the tragedy onto the United States, further poisoned the general East-West atmosphere. Soviet actions since then--perhaps by design--have not improved the climate:

- In November, as NATO proceeded to execute its 1979 dual-track decision to deploy intermediate range nuclear forces in Europe, the USSR withdrew from the intermediate-range missile talks in Geneva, suspended strategic arms reduction talks, and refused to set a date for the resumption of MBFR negotiations.

- In early 1983, in response to Western INF deployment, Moscow began to deploy extended-range missiles in the DDR and Czechoslovakia, and later moved additional submarines closer to the shores of the United States.

- In April 1983, the Soviet Northern Fleet conducted unprecedentedly large naval maneuvers in the North Atlantic and in the vicinity of Norway in a show of force designed in retaliation for the INF decision; almost simultaneously, additional Soviet submarines probed the Swedish naval base at Karlskrona.

- The Soviet Union spoke in blunt language to Italy, suggesting that Italy would suffer the fate of

Pompeii, and that Japan would burn in nuclear fires; and said that the President of the United States was pursuing Hitler-like policies.

- More recently, the Soviet Union announced that it would boycott the Olympiad in the United States; increased its harassment of Andrei Sakharov, the dissident Soviet physicist; rejected a Western proposal for the reduction of conventional forces in Europe; and refused to sign an agreement to improve the "hotline" between Washington and Moscow.

Some in the West appear to have concluded from recent Soviet behavior that the USSR has turned inward upon itself, and is now feeding on resentments which could have long-term implications for East-West relations. This is probably what Moscow wishes us to conclude.

2. SOVIET OBJECTIVES

A. Western Europe and the Peace Issue

In our view, current Soviet behavior reflects a tactical decision to persist in a policy which seeks to reinvigorate the "peace" movement and influence parliaments in Western Europe, drive wedges between NATO, Europe and the United States, and seek to influence the outcome of the election process in key Western countries, including Canada and the United States.

Although the trends that Moscow has set in motion will not be easy to reverse, Soviet actions do not appear to be genuine reflections of a wider policy of retrenchment. The Soviet reaction to the initial INF deployment in Europe did not precipitate the crisis which some in the West had feared, and which Moscow frequently threatened. It was, moreover, a carefully controlled reaction which played to Western media interests, but stopped well short of completely alienating Western public opinion and the "peace" movement.

And, although Soviet negotiators walked out of the major US-Soviet arms fora of greatest public concern, Moscow has kept open a range of multilateral channels of negotiation, especially those in which West Europeans have a particular interest. The USSR is playing a full part in the Stockholm Conference on Disarmament in Europe and the MBFR talks in Vienna, and is participating as usual in the UN-sponsored Committee on Disarmament in Geneva. It appears that the Soviet leadership has carefully kept open certain channels that could ultimately provide the circuits to reopen discussions on a broader scale.

B. Problems in Eastern Europe

In Eastern Europe, economic difficulties, declining standards of living, and pervasive nationalist sentiment have led to tensions between the regimes and the USSR in the political, economic and military spheres.

Politically, the East European countries no longer look to the Soviet Union for guidance or show it unquestioning obedience. Their independence and freedom of action continue to be constrained by the Brezhnev Doctrine, and they must express official support for Soviet positions. East European leaders, however, increasingly resent interference from Moscow in their internal affairs and are inclined to see their primary political challenge to be one of steering a delicate course between Soviet pressures for "socialist unity" and, in varying degrees, popular pressures for political and economic change.

The challenge posed by Solidarity in 1980-81 to the supremacy of Communist Party rule in Poland, in particular, shook the foundations of the East besides exposing the hollowness of the Communist Party's claim to the "leading role" in society, the events symbolized the failure of Marxism-Leninism to inspire loyalty in the mass of East European populations.

In the economic sphere, Soviet supplies of energy, raw materials and hard currency goods are only partly offset by East European supplies of machinery and agricultural produce. In consequence, Moscow persists in pushing for closer integration within CMEA, both to tighten the economic cohesion of the Warsaw Pact and to redress the balance of trade. As was evident at the recent CMEA summit meeting, however, East European leaders are adept at finding ways of

resisting being bound more closely to a Soviet economy they regard as second-rate and simply inferior. In the future, Soviet inability to subsidize East European economies to the extent required will increase pressures within those countries for credits to import technology from the West.

Finally, East European regimes, in varying degrees, are resisting Soviet pressure for increased levels of military spending. Activists from church, peace, and human rights groups in the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia -- most of them young people -- publicly opposed the arrival earlier this year of new Soviet nuclear missiles on their territories. Even the Communist leaders in those countries hinted at misgivings. Romania openly called for the withdrawal from Europe of both NATO and Soviet nuclear forces.

Soviet leaders, understandably, will not publicly acknowledge the degree of their concern about the direction events are taking in Eastern Europe. But the "lessons of Poland" have become a subject of quasi-official debate in the Soviet Union. Although unlikely to have immediate or perhaps significant effect, some Soviet party officials do not disguise their view that the Polish experience should serve as a crucially important lesson for the USSR, given its own serious internal economic difficulties and societal strains.

C. Other Regions

The Soviet Union views the Third World as the main area of competition with the West. Since the mid-1970s, Moscow has relied on its recently acquired ability to project military power over large distances as the main instrument of a policy to tip the scale in regional contests in favor of "socialist oriented" states. Diplomatically, it has sought to convince the neutral and nonaligned that the USSR is their "natural" ally. More recently, however, Soviet leaders have spoken as if the economic burden of supporting client states is forcing them to be more selective in their commitments and therefore to set some limits to their appetite.

D. Southwest Asia

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 was a watershed for East-West and US-Soviet relations. Subsequent Soviet efforts to crush the proud and determined Afghan freedom fighters have also severely damaged the USSR's standing in the Third World. Islamic states, in particular, sympathize with the insurgent Mujaheddin and their war of attrition against the more numerous and better-equipped Soviet troops. The parties of the IDU express their strong support for, and solidarity with, those Afghans who combine their struggle for freedom against a brutal and relentless occupying force from the Soviet Union.

As frequently demonstrated since the death of

President Brezhnev, the Soviets are masters of encouraging Western speculation that they are exploring a political solution to the war in Afghanistan. Thus far, however, Moscow appears to be sticking to preconditions for a political settlement that are unacceptable to neighboring states directly affected, and to a majority of UN-member states.

The April 1984 campaign in the Panshjr for the first time featured large-scale bombing by TU-16 Badgers and SU-24 fighter-bombers in a massive application of force designed to sweep the valley of insurgents. Like the half dozen previous Soviet attempts to control the valley, however, it appears to have been largely unsuccessful. In consequence, Moscow presumably must either return to small scale engagements, or combine large-scale operations with the introduction of the massive numbers of additional troops that would be necessary to control the insurgency.

E. Southeast Asia

Soviet support for Vietnam in its occupation of Cambodia and its border conflict with the People's Republic of China is likely to continue. In return, Moscow gains a means of containing China and the use of strategic assets, including a naval base at Cam Ranh Bay that sits astride one of the world's major sea lanes.

Moscow seeks to separate and intimidate Japan from

strengthening its close ties with the United States on security issues, and to press Japanese leaders to abandon their stand on territorial issues, specifically rejecting Japan's demand for the return of the Kurile Islands seized by the Soviet Union at the end of World War II. Japanese public opinion was deeply shocked by the shooting down of the unarmed Korean Air Lines jetliner, and Soviet behavior toward rescue and salvage efforts were thought by Japan to be very distasteful.

Nonetheless, the Soviet Union's need for massive amounts of capital and construction equipment to support large-scale projects in the Far Eastern USSR means that the Soviet leadership will continue its efforts to attract Japanese investment and technology.

F. People's Republic of China

In dealings with China, Moscow seeks to prevent any recurrence of tension or hostilities on its eastern borders, and to frustrate development of any strategy perceived as designed to encircle the Soviet Union.

The USSR has proposed a declaration of key principles for Soviet-Chinese relations and a joint draft of confidence measures. It is unlikely, however, to make concessions on security issues, as demanded by the Chinese, or to jeopardize relations with Vietnam and Mongolia by making a deal with China at their expense.

In the future, Moscow will focus on "atmospherics" and seek additional positive changes in the area of trade and cultural ties. In large measure, the publicity it will accord the process of normalizing relations with the PRC will continue to be a function of the state of US-Soviet relations. Soviet leaders doubtless expect the diplomatic progress to be slow. But -- with an eye to its effect in the West, and particularly Washington -- they will seek to foster the impression that it is proceeding better, and more swiftly, than is actually the case.

G. Middle East

Since its ouster from Egypt in the early 1970s, Moscow's aim in the Middle East has been to overcome its isolation in a strategic area and regain a voice in the region's diplomacy. Thus far it has combined support for the Arab cause against Israel with persistent efforts to undermine Western peace efforts. At the same time, however, it seeks to avoid being dragged into a Mideast confrontation at a time, or on a scale, not of its own choosing.

The USSR was publicly humiliated during the 1982 Lebanon War when huge amounts of Soviet armament in the hands of the Syrians were destroyed by Israeli forces. Since then, it has rapidly regained and steadily improved its position, largely through a major military resupply program for Syria that has included air defense missiles, sophisticated command

and control equipment, and some 7,000 military experts and advisers. Under the cloak of the military might of a resurgent Syrian client, the Soviet Union seeks to displace Western influence and to gain hegemony in a region already threatened with conflict and political instability across a wide geographic front.

Intermittent Soviet statements of support for Syria pointedly avoid the kind of unambiguous or open-ended military commitment likely to encourage a final showdown. Nonetheless, in case of a direct Israeli threat to Syria -- as opposed to Syrian forces in Lebanon -- Moscow may be persuaded to give its active support in a Syrian counterthrust. The implications of such a move are ominous.

Although Soviet influence in the area is likely to remain limited, recent American setbacks in Lebanon, and general Arab disillusionment with Western efforts to redress their grievances may provide the Soviet Union an opening for a challenge to Western influence of the Mideast scene.

H. Iran

Soviet relations with Iran are poor and not likely to improve even after the Ayatollah Khomeini's death. Several months ago, Moscow's protestations proved powerless to save Tudeh Party members from execution. More recently, some Soviet technical and economic advisers and their families returned to the USSR. The situation of those

remaining appears precarious.

Arms deliveries to Iraq have increased, belying Moscow's public profession of even-handedness on the Iran-Iraq War. Soviet and Iranian Foreign Ministers recently conferred in Moscow, apparently on ways to impede the United States from using the hostilities to increase its military presence in the region. An Iranian victory giving further stimulus to Shiite fundamentalism in the area could undermine conservative Arab regimes in the Persian Gulf. This would clearly improve Moscow's geopolitical position by severely weakening that of the United States.

I. Central and Latin America

In Central and Latin America, the USSR seeks low-risk opportunities to challenge the United States in its own hemisphere and to divert its attention from areas of more strategic interest to Moscow. Specific Soviet aims include backing Cuba militarily and economically, to consolidating influence in Nicaragua, and forming closer ties with local Communist Parties and left-wing movements in the area beyond. The recent US action in Grenada, which the member parties of IDU have endorsed in their December 1983 meeting at Canberra, and the memory of the 1962 showdown off Cuba, will make Soviet leaders especially sensitive to involvements that might escalate into a direct confrontation with the United States.

J. Africa

Recent statements and actions by Soviet leaders indicate that the USSR remains committed to the regimes in Angola, Mozambique and Ethiopia and is determined to provide them the military assistance they need to stay in power. Soviet inability to compete with the West in providing those countries trade, development aid, and technology on a scale approaching their needs, will constitute a significant long-term liability.

In southern Africa, the Soviet Union thus far has been unable to obstruct the American-sponsored drive for a diplomatic solution to many of the region's most pressing problems. Other events, too, suggest the limits of Moscow's leverage in the area. In mid-February, South Africa and Angola signed an agreement obliging the Angolans to curb the activities of South-West African insurgents, in return for the withdrawal of South African invasion forces. In mid-March, South Africa signed a non-aggression pact with Mozambique which, like Angola, is a Marxist former Portuguese colony with close ties to Cuba.

It is not clear whether the Soviet Union will go along with recent peace moves, or if Cuba will remove its troops in Angola to end South African incursion and support for UNITA and pave the way for independence for Namibia. If Moscow continues a policy of seeking to undermine relations between governments in power and the Western world, it risks

demonstrating to regional leaders that, despite its frequent claims to play a diplomatic role in the area, the USSR offers neither positive goals nor the prospect of a more stable, prosperous future.

3. SOVIET VULNERABILITIES

The Soviet economy is the second largest in the world; it is cumbersome, archaic and irrational in Western and free market terms, but it is also resilient and is by no means approaching a collapse. Many of the problems that have been constraining economic growth in the USSR since the late 1970s, however, are now just reaching the peak of severity. Inevitably, this will have some impact on Soviet defense and foreign policies. Whether it will contribute to more moderate Soviet behavior abroad, or whether it will stimulate a sense of desperation at the prospect of falling behind the West in the military competition, remains to be seen. Therefore, whether we can influence the Soviet leadership in its basic choices will remain a central task of the non-Communist world's diplomacy and strategy; we must constantly probe the closed Soviet system and leadership, making our own intentions clear while trying to determine theirs.

A. Endemic Problems

The USSR has an enormous endowment of natural resources and a huge industrial plant. Much of its fuel and raw materials lie in nearly inaccessible regions, however,

and are enormously costly to extract and refine. In recent years "bottlenecks," such as an inadequate transportation system for both raw materials and finished products, have contributed to a falloff in industrial growth.

Agricultural production is an intractable, permanent problem in the USSR. It is hostage to weather conditions in the Soviet Union to a far greater degree than in most developed countries, and the constraints on individual freedom and productivity have been costly to the nation as a whole. Of the many enigmas surrounding the Soviet Union, the leadership's inability to feed the population and to harness the latent riches of the land remains one of the most striking.

Labor productivity is low throughout the USSR and, since the mid-1970s, the country has also been plagued by declining increments to the working-age population. Despite reform of the educational system to stress vocational training, the Soviet Union is likely to suffer from a shortage of skilled labor throughout the decade. Yet another factor in population growth is the rapid and disproportionate increase among ethnic minorities throughout the Soviet Union, leading to eventual problems of cultural and linguistic tension as these minorities assume numerical importance in the total population of the Soviet Union.

To these important difficulties must be added the well-known systemic problems rooted in the USSR's system of

planning and managing the economy. Externally, the Soviet Union is also providing support to the stagnating economies of Eastern Europe; to clients further afield, such as Cuba; and is fighting a costly war in Afghanistan.

B. Consumer Unrest

Not surprisingly, Soviet economic growth rates in recent years have been well below the rate achieved during most of the 1970s. Last year's slight recovery, facilitated in part by some slight productivity gains from the "discipline campaign," did not invalidate the general trend. Total per capita consumption appears to have leveled off, and the availability of quality foods and nonfood consumer goods has declined generally. Although Soviet leaders promise "additional production" of consumer goods, they must also admit that any improvement in the standard of living will be slow, and that significant improvement in the lot of the average Soviet citizen is to be expected only in the distant future.

C. Defense Spending

Despite the many problems, reliable analyses estimate that military expenditures in the USSR continue to rise. The burden of defense--the share of GNP devoted to defense--remains roughly constant at 13-14%, far in excess of the legitimate defensive needs of the nation.

In at least one major area, however, procurement of

military hardware, expenditure appear to have levelled off since 1976. This suggests that Soviet leaders have already begun to find resource allocation decisions between civilian and military needs especially difficult. Any major effort to accelerate sharply the level of military procurement would require lower civilian investment and slower economic growth, or even a fall in per capita consumption. These are highly undesirable consequences for the Soviet leadership.

An accelerated arms race to develop military technology across the board would also render the underlying problems of the Soviet economy particularly acute. This is especially true now that the Western states have agreed that in their bilateral economic relations with the East they must avoid dependence on the USSR for strategic materials, and must not contribute to the growth of Soviet military capabilities.

In past decades, Soviet leaders have at times responded to serious economic difficulties by lowering the nation's profile abroad and seeking a brief respite from international tensions; this is the classic Soviet strategy of "Peredyshka," or "pause," a "breathing space."

The West, however, obviously cannot gamble on the internal economic problems or temporary distractions of its adversaries. It must seize the initiative, both in providing for its defense and in creating the conditions for the possibility of a more constructive East-West dialogue. Only

in this way can an active diplomacy, based on clear-cut perceptions of the future and implemented in accordance with a long-range strategy, have a significant chance of influencing Soviet behavior and encouraging a future Soviet leadership to take steps toward ensuring peace.

4. THE WESTERN RESPONSE: TAKING THE INITIATIVE

A. Principles and Objectives

The Member Parties of the IDU, like the nations they represent, are committed to the principles of individual liberty and the rule of law, the peaceful settlement of disputes, and the renunciation of the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state. Their objectives are to maintain their freedoms and way of life, to deter aggression and war, and to create the conditions for a lasting peace among the countries of East and West.

The essential condition for achieving these aims is the maintenance of effective defenses and political cohesion through cooperation in NATO, with allies and friends in the Middle East and Asia, and through individual national efforts. The maintenance of the integrity of Third World nations, who wish to remain apart from what they perceive to be the "superpower conflict," is also of primary importance in maintaining the peace.

B. Arms Limitations and Reductions

The West must neither cede the "peace" and "disarmament" issues to the East, nor join in a contest that manipulates the hopes and fears of millions for propaganda and narrow purposes of gaining unilateral advantage. Western publics are justified in their demands that governments be as tireless in the pursuit of equitable, verifiable arms agreements, as they are in maintaining military security and defense.

At the same time, however, the West must resist the temptation to view arms control as an end in itself, a self-contained whole, or as the "centerpiece and barometer" of East-West relations. As Afghanistan has shown, the arms control process cannot in practice be insulated from what happens in the larger international sphere. So long as nations seek to pursue both arms agreements and foreign conquests, arms control will be a cause of disillusionment and the erosion of political trust.

The Member Parties of the IDU welcome proposals from the Soviet Union and the East that offer realistic and constructive ways of overcoming the obstacles and the problems now affecting the arms reduction process. Western states, without exception, are prepared to join with them, at a time and place of their choosing, to discuss arms agreements that will reduce the risks of aggression and war and result in significant reductions of weapons and forces.

On specific issues, the IDU supports proposals leading to

- deep reductions in strategic ballistic missiles and warheads belonging to the United States and USSR, and limitations on other strategic systems to enhance strategic stability.
- radical reductions in intermediate-range nuclear forces, with the ultimate objective of their complete elimination.
- reductions in NATO and Warsaw Pact conventional forces manpower in Central Europe to a common ceiling.
- militarily significant, politically binding and verifiable confidence and security building measures designed to increase the transparency of military activity in Europe, and thereby guard against the possibility of surprise attack.
- a global, verifiable ban on chemical weapons.

The Member Parties of the IDU express their satisfaction with the May 1984 statement of Foreign Ministers of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization at Washington that acknowledges: "dialogue can only be fruitful if each party is confident of its security and is prepared to respect the legitimate interests of others: military strength alone cannot guarantee a peaceful future."

C. Relations With Eastern Europe

The Members of the IDU will continue to encourage the nations of Eastern Europe to assert the individual national characters reflecting their great cultural and historical traditions. It is both in our interests and a part of our human concern for these nations that they evolve

gradually into more tolerant societies in which basic human rights are protected and actually advanced. High-level visits, on political and economic levels, cultural, scientific and technological exchanges, the free flow of information and ideas are all appropriate ways in which the West can respond to evidence that individual regimes in Eastern Europe are modifying their internal and foreign policies in ways that will improve relations.*

Trade, too, should be encouraged, with due regard for commercial and financial prudence and the requirements of Western security. The issue of trade, inevitably linked with the transfer of technology and the extension of long-term financial credits, must at all costs, be a symbol of unity among the IDU countries, and not a contentious issue reflecting permanent quarrels.

D. Relations with the Third World

We do not wish the East-West competition to be extended to other regions of the world, such as Africa and Central America. We acknowledge that the roots of many Third

*Editorial Footnote:

Recent information concerning the vote of Bulgaria on the recent attempted assassination of Pope John Paul II should be weighed in this discussion; there is evidence of growing support for strong measures to be taken vis-a-vis Bulgaria if this information is verified by the Italian tribunal.

World crises are indigenous, and therefore not the product of East-West confrontation. For large segments of the populations in the Third World, conditions of life are intolerable, or nearly so. But we cannot and will not accept the exploitation of these conditions by hostile outside forces--specifically, by Cuba, backed by the Soviet Union, frequently operating in concert with or through other satellite states and terrorist organizations.

The activities and ambitions of the Soviet Union make it impossible to divorce completely our concern for the Third World's need for stability and development from challenges created by Soviet expansionism--whether direct or indirect.

We do not consider social changes, indigenous reform, or even indigenous revolution a security threat to the West. More often than not, such reforms or revolutions embody ideas and aspirations we can share and appreciate, and which are deeply rooted in our own respective traditions and cultures.

But we do condemn the intrusion of aggressive outside powers--seeking to exploit local grievances in various regions of the world in order to expand their own political influence and military control--as a serious threat to the balance of power, which has for so long kept the peace. History and bitter experience teach that piecemeal advances by aggressors, unchecked and unchallenged, can

ultimately lead to wider conflict and even to war. We will not acquiesce in Soviet or surrogate advances or threats to stability and legitimate Western interests.

In relations with the Third World, the IDU encourages the creation and strengthening of moderate regional groupings, and will work bilaterally and through multilateral institutions to promote political, economic, and social development. We are prepared to recommend and encourage military assistance to key states in regions of vital interest that appear vulnerable, and the use of military means to deter or repulse aggression where no other remedy appears feasible.

5. STRENGTHENING DEMOCRACY: THE ROLE OF THE IDU

The sudden proliferation of modern means of communication now offers masses of ordinary people in East and West, North and South, unprecedented access to information and ideas. Regrettably, this means that ideologies incorporating a more or less elaborate system of opinions are not "dead." We may disagree about the importance of ideology in shaping the perspective of a nation. No one, however, can examine the political landscape of our world today without concluding that ideologies continue to play a major role in forming the political understanding or, at least, the reflex actions of much of contemporary humanity.

To some extent, we owe our renewed appreciation of the central role of public opinion in the development and implementation of foreign policy to Soviet and other communist efforts to exploit the freedom of discussion and independent news media of Western societies for the purpose of grossly distorting democratic values, principles and objectives.

This imposes upon the member parties of the IDU a double challenge. We must insist on our right to influence Soviet and East European public opinion, and insure that Western determination to maintain its principles and objectives is effectively communicated to the leaders of those countries. At the same time, we must see to it that our domestic publics, and especially our youth, receive a continuing education in the basic values of democracy, and in the political and military measures being taken to defend and preserve them.

A. Shaping Perceptions Abroad

The new Soviet leadership has pledged continuity with the policies of its predecessors, meaning that its underlying approach to the West will continue to be that of a determined adversary. They, not we, have chosen to define the relationship in these strident terms. We should be mistaken, therefore, if we were to anticipate sudden shifts in Soviet policy toward us.

At the same time, however, in recent months there have been occasional signs of uncertainty among Soviet leaders about how best to manage East-West relations. We would also be mistaken were we to draw premature conclusions on the basis of such indications.

Soviet leaders, as in the past, will be reluctant to adopt positions which might appear to have been forced upon them by outside pressure. We must keep in mind, however, that their opinions are not as uniform as their public statements and propaganda would suggest. This should be of especial concern to the West now that a younger generation of Politburo leaders ** stands poised to take over from aging leadership.

The perspective of the future generation of Soviet leaders is of fundamental importance to us, and the debate that takes place within its ranks is one in which we will continue to have an important stake. Attempts to shape that perspective must become an urgent priority of leaders in the West, and to that end we must intensify our own internal process of consultation and coordination.

As the Western alliance continues the process of consolidation in political and deterrent military terms, some

**Mikhail Gorbachev (53), Grigory Romanov (61) and Vitality Vorotnikov (58), among them.

Soviet leaders may advance the notion that the West, led by the United States, is taking steps to alter the military balance in a way that is both highly dangerous and which may not be reversed in the future. From this, they may conclude that the Soviet Union will soon enter a period of great danger, and that "hardline" policies toward the West, based on implicit threats and great pressure, should be the motivating principle of Soviet policy.

The member parties of the IDU have a fundamental interest in assuring that such a perception does not come to dominate the thinking of the Soviet leadership. By the same token, our attempts to convey to the leadership a spirit of willingness to engage in constructive dialogue need not imply the surrender of basic principles and positions merely for the purpose of engaging it in serious discussion of the long agenda before East and West.

A firm, principled defense of Western positions, duly taking into account the overriding interests of preserving peace and safeguarding the interest of other nations, such as those of the Third World, is the only reasonable basis on which to engage Soviet leadership.

The experience of recent years has demonstrated to us that division among the partners of the West can encourage the Soviet Union to exploit differences within our ranks to sow seeds of discord and contention. Cohesion and steadfast determination is more likely to yield positive results,

although to the extent that the West succeeds in maintaining this desirable approach, to that same extent the Soviet leadership may appear displeased and hostile.

Somber warnings of a "new Cold War" emanating from West and East are, we believe, both inaccurate and inadequate to describe the state of relations between East and West. Individually and collectively, the member parties of the IDU earnestly seek to avoid both the form and the content of Cold War in the context of policy toward the Soviet Union. We will do well to keep this clearly in mind as we determine the future course of our relations with the emerging Soviet leadership.

Because we stand for democratic principles and the freedoms that only democracy can give and sustain, and because we have maintained the essential unity of our partnership for so many years, we have succeeded in demonstrating the superiority of the democratic way. We have nothing at all to apologize for as we continue along this path.

Above all, we recognize clearly that this very success, reflected in the relative well-being of the Western countries today, may contribute to current Soviet attitudes toward the West, and may continue to shape the perspective of the leadership of the future. In this special sense, the enormous asset of our democratic success stands in stark contrast to the totalitarian shortcomings of the Soviet Union

and its client states, and will therefore remain as an irritant in the East-West relationship. As democrats, we must be mindful of this innate strength, and be careful to assure that it is never compromised or bargained away.

B. Education at Home

Our most critical task as member parties of the IDU, however, lies not in shaping perceptions of future Soviet leaders or even the Third World. Important as these tasks are, they pale in comparison with the challenge that lies in the West itself.

The IDU must play a major role in convincing Western publics--especially the young--that the Western deterrence and defense posture, which is the guarantee of international peace and stability, is being achieved on the basis of a military balance set at the lowest possible level. We must also not weary of the persistent search for common ground between East and West, and for verifiable arms control and arms reduction. For only this will demonstrate to Western publics that their governments do not pursue deterrence and military security as ends in themselves, but as the necessary and legitimate means for the continued enjoyment of our liberties, our spiritual aspirations, and our chosen way of life.

In the months and years ahead, the IDU must take the lead in creating a domestic consensus in its member countries

for the "grand strategy" that emerges naturally from our traditions and our common achievements, and is firmly anchored in our highest aspirations. We must reaffirm and revitalize Western belief in liberal democracy as a political system and a way of life that is as morally superior to the Communist alternative--as it so clearly is in providing for our present and future material wellbeing.

Suggested letter from the
President to EDU and IDU
Oslo, Norway June 1984

The Honorable
Alois Mock
President
International Democrat Union
Oslo, Norway

Dear Dr. Mock:

I am pleased to send my very best wishes and personal greetings to the distinguished party leaders of the European Democrat Union. I hope that your meetings will be productive and interesting.

Last year at this time Vice President George Bush traveled to London to be with you for the founding of the International Democrat Union. This important step has been a major contribution to the cohesion of democratic nations everywhere, and the work of the IDU and EDU organizations will become increasingly valuable in the years ahead.

I am particularly happy to note that the work of the IDU, the EDU and their counterpart for Asia, the Pacific Democrat Union, have decided to work extensively in the substantive areas of foreign and domestic policies. The institutions of democracy will benefit from your important contributions, and the example you set will serve as a beacon for others who wish to follow the democratic path. The

contrast between democratic societies and totalitarian systems is stark, and the challenges that face us in the future require that we rely on our collective experience as democracies and as defenders of liberty.

May your work be rewarded with success, and may the IDU, EDU and PDU prosper and grow through the efforts of dedicated men and women such as those who have assembled for these meetings in Oslo.

National Security Council
The White House

System # I
Package # 4903

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Dep. Exec. Sec'y	_____	_____	_____
Bob Kimmitt	_____	_____	_____
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>J</u>	_____
Tom Shull	_____	_____	_____
Wilma Hall	_____	_____	_____
Bud McFarlane	_____	_____	_____
Bob Kimmitt	<u>2</u>	_____	_____
NSC Secretariat	<u>3</u>	_____	<u>A</u>
Situation Room	_____	_____	<u>Staff to Matlock for action ASAP. Need letter for President</u>

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other by COB 6/20.

COMMENTS Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

Bob,
Bud sent Jack Matlock a
PROFS note giving him a heads
up on this package. J

MSG FROM: NSPBT --CPUA TO: NSGVE --CPUA
To: NSGVE --CPUA

06/18/84 19:55:27

NOTE FROM: PAUL THOMPSON

Subject: Forwarding Note 06/18/84 18:30 Note to Jack Matlock

* * * F O R W A R D E D N O T E * * *

To: NSPBT --CPUA

EXPEDITE

~~SECRET~~

NOTE FROM: ROBERT MCFARLANE
SUBJECT: Note to Jack Matlock

Dick Allen called. As I mentioned earlier he will leave soon to attend the meeting in Oslo of the IDU/EDU. He would like to carry a letter from the President to the group. That seems ok to me. He will drop off the draft tomorrow and a draft of his remarks at the conference on E-W relations. Please prepare the letter and send it over unless you see a problem. Also let me know of any problems in his remarks if any. Many thanks.

cc: NSJMP --CPUA

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997

By A. Vitt NARA, Date 6/21/99

~~SECRET~~

4936 c

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

INFORMATION

June 20, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: JACK MATLOCK/TYRUS COBB *Law OTC*

SUBJECT: Mitterrand 1982 Memcon

We have searched the files (as has the Secretariat) and there is no record of a memcon from the Mitterrand-Reagan working visit in March of 1982 here or at State. Interestingly, Jim Rentschler apparently foresaw a problem developing in this area and sent the attached memo to Clark regarding the advisability of having a notetaker there.

On the specific issue of the French pledge on terminating arms deliveries to Nicaragua, you may have some record in the West Wing files. However, in the exchange with the French in April over Cheysson's reputed offer of French assistance to Managua in Mine-clearing operations, the French tacitly endorsed the non-transfer of arms commitment by underlining that the Cheysson proposal did not violate the Mitterrand pledge.

Attachment

cc: Oliver North
Constantine Menges

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F95-074/2#22

BY h0J, NARA, DATE 10/24/00

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
Declassify on: OADR

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JUNE 20, 1984

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