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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: MATLOCK, JACK: Files

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File Folder: Matlock Chron June 1984 [6/1-6/7]

Date: July 29, 1999

Box 908875

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. Memo	Jack Matlock to Admiral Poindexter, re meeting with Alexei Semyonov [4433], 1 p <i>R 10/17/05 MOZ-011 #9</i>	6/1/84	P1/F1 P5
2. Memo	Matlock to Poindexter, re renewal of agreement [4280], 1p <i>R 9/13/00 NLSF95-074/2 #1</i>	6/4/84	P1/F1
3. Memo	Robert Kimmitt to Hill and Robbins, re renewal of agreement [4280], 1p <i>R " " #2</i>	nd	P1/F1
4. Letter	Secretary Baldrige to George Shultz, re renewal of agreement [4280], 1p	5/25/84	P1/F1
5. Memo	Matlock to Robert McFarlane, re meeting of the President with Russian emigres [2653], 2p <i>R 9/13/00 NLSF95-074/2 #4</i>	6/7/84	P1/F1
6. Schedule Proposal	Kimmitt to Frederick Ryan, re emigre meeting [2653], 1p <i>R 9/13/00 NLSF95-074/2 #5</i>	nd	P1/F1
7. Memo	Matlock to McFarlane, re meeting of President with Russian emigres [2653], 1p <i>R 10/17/05 MOZ-011 #11</i>	4/2/84	P1/F1 P5
8. Memo	Matlock to McFarlane, re Soviet restrictions [4440], 1p <i>R 9/13/00 NLSF95-074/2 #6</i>	6/7/84	P1/F1
9. Memo	Charles Hill to McFarlane, re new Soviet restrictions [4440], 1p <i>R 7/7/00 NLSF95-074/2 #7</i>	6/1/84	P1/F1
10. Memo	deGraffenreid to McFarlane, re Soviet restrictions, 1p <i>PART 10/17/05 MOZ-011 #12</i>	6/12/84	P1/F1 P5
11. Summary	USSR-East Germany: Permanent Restricted Areas (page 3), 1p <i>PART 10/29/02 F95-074/2 #8</i>	6/6/84	P1/F1 B3
12. Map	re new permanent restricted areas, 1p <i>PART " " #9</i>	6/5/84	P1/F1 B2

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].
- C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O 13233

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer CAS

Box Number 5

FOIA M02-011

File Folder MATLOCK CHRON JUNE 1984 (6/1-6/7)

DATE 3/22/2007

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
1	MEMO	MATLOCK TO POINDEXTER RE MEETING (#9)	1	6/1/1984	
		<i>mvh 3/17/08</i>			
7	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE MEETING (#11)	1	4/2/1984	
		<i>mvh 3/17/08</i>			
10	MEMO	KENNETH DEGRAFFENREID TO MCFARLANE RE SOVIET RESTRICTION (#12)	1	6/12/1984	
		<i>mvh 3/17/08</i>			

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 1, 1984

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL POINDEXTER

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JGM*

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Alexei Semyonov
3:00 P.M., June 1, 1984

Semyonov is a son-in-law of Mrs. Bonner (therefore step son-in-law of Sakharov) and lives in Boston. He has been pressing hard for actions to save Sakharov and has spoken to me on the telephone several times. He has also met with Mark Palmer and perhaps others at State.

Your meeting will be essentially a hand-holding operation, to assure him that we are doing all we wisely can, and trying to avoid actions which could make the situation worse.

Semyonov will probably float several ideas of steps we could take. One he has mentioned would be to offer to delay INF deployments if Bonner is allowed to travel. He probably has others, most of which will be things that we have already done or else are impractical, but I believe you should hear him out, let him know if some are totally impossible (such as involving deployments), but tell him we will give the most careful consideration to the others.

A list of suggested general talking points is attached.

Attachment:

Tab I Suggested Talking Points

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
NLS M02-011 #9
BY WDT, NARA, DATE 10/17/05

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 4, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL POINDEXTER

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*SUBJECT: Renewal of Agreement to Facilitate Economic,
Industrial and Technological Cooperation with USSR

Secretary Baldrige sent us a copy of a letter to Secretary Shultz on May 25, which reported on his conversation with Soviet Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade Sushkov and transmitted a draft letter which would notify the Soviets officially of our willingness to renew the Long Term Agreement to Facilitate Economic, Industrial, and Technical Cooperation and to convene a meeting of a working group to prepare for a session of the Joint Commercial Commission established by that agreement. Secretary Baldrige requested our approval of the draft letter.

State has now reviewed the draft letter and concurs. Bud saw an advance copy and noted that it looks OK to him. I have, therefore, prepared a memorandum from Kimmitt to Robbins and Hill approving the letter for transmittal.

Recommendation:

That you approve transmittal of the memorandum at TAB I.

Approve Disapprove

Attachments:

Tab I Memorandum to Robbins and Hill
Tab II Incoming Correspondence

cc: Fortier
Levine
Robinson

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F95-074/2 #1BY LOJ, NARA, DATE 10/24/00~~CONFIDENTIAL~~Declassify on: ~~OADR~~

SUGGESTED TALKING POINTS FOR SEMYONOV

-- The President, and all of us, are deeply concerned about the situation Academician Sakharov and Mrs. Bonner face.

-- We have been trying to do all we can to encourage a humanitarian resolution.

-- We feel that it could make the situation worse if we make the issue a test of strength between the U.S. and the Soviet leadership, since this could make it more difficult for them to make the right decision.

-- However, we have left no stone unturned to make sure the Soviet government knows how strongly we feel about the situation and the negative effects a tragedy would have for the US-Soviet relationship.

-- We believe other countries can be very helpful and have done all we can to encourage other governments to bring pressure to bear.

-- We will not give up our efforts, and are always ready to consider new ideas.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. CHARLES HILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MRS. HELEN ROBBINS
Executive Assistant to the Secretary
Department of Commerce

SUBJECT: Renewal of Agreement to Facilitate Economic,
Industrial and Technological Cooperation with USSR
(C)

Secretary Baldrige requested our review of a proposed letter to the Soviet Government which provides formal notification of our willingness to renew the Long Term Agreement to Facilitate Economic, Industrial, and Technical Cooperation, and proposes that a working group be convened to establish the groundwork for a session of the U.S.-USSR Joint Commercial Commission. The draft letter was forwarded to the Department of State under cover of a letter of May 25, 1984, from Secretary Baldrige to Secretary Shultz. (C)

We have reviewed the draft letter in question and concur in the text. (U)

Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary

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NLS F95-0742 #2

BY LOJ, NARA, DATE 10/24/00

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: ~~OADR~~

[4280]
JUNE 4, 1984

RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 34 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 7, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JSM*

SUBJECT: Meeting of President with Russian Emigres

You will recall that Mike Deaver suggested that it might be useful for the President to meet with some Russian emigre writers, and you authorized me to discuss the matter with persons knowledgeable of the Russian emigre scene and recommend about five who would be appropriate (TAB II).

Based on the advice of Walt Raymond, Steve Sestanovich and some specialists in State and the CIA, I would recommend the following five emigre intellectuals:

Vasily Aksyonov, a prominent writer living in Washington who left the USSR in the late 1970's and has continued to publish copiously in Russian and in English translation.

Georgy Vladimov, a writer and human rights activist who left the Soviet Union only last year and is now the editor of the emigre journal Grani. He lives in Frankfurt, West Germany.

Ernst Neizvestny, a well-known sculptor who was criticized by Khrushchev but later became a friend of the Khrushchev family and did Khrushchev's tombstone. He now lives in New York.

Yuri Lyubimov, the famous theater director who left the USSR last year and is now living in London.

Vladimir Lefebvre, a scholar who has been in the United States about ten years (he lives in California), and has done interesting work on the differences in American and Russian ethical systems.

As you can see, we have included some intellectuals who are not creative writers, since we feel it would be useful to have some of the other arts represented, and because the individuals involved have some unique insights which we believe would interest the President.

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

NLS F95-074/2#4
BY LOJ, NARA, DATE 10/24/00

I believe that at least an hour should be devoted to the meeting if it is to serve its purpose. An informal lunch would also be a possibility.

We should have at least two weeks notice to organize the meeting, since some of the invitees would have to travel from Western Europe.

Recommendation:

That you authorize sending the Schedule Proposal at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

by SES
Walt Raymond and Steve *OOT* Sestanovich concur.

Attachment:

- Tab I - Schedule Proposal
- Tab II - Matlock/McFarlane memo of April 2, 1984

UNCLASSIFIED

PROPOSED LETTER TO THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT

Dear _____:

At the May 25, 1984, meeting between Secretary of Commerce Malcolm Baldrige and Soviet Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade Vladimir Sushkov, Secretary Baldrige expressed the willingness of the United States Government to renew the Long Term Agreement to Facilitate Economic, Industrial, and Technical Cooperation. This agreement expires June 29, 1984, if not renewed. Secretary Baldrige and Deputy Minister Sushkov also discussed implementation.

Secretary Baldrige proposed that the first step be renewal of the Long Term Agreement without change for a ten-year period, by an exchange of diplomatic notes between the United States and the Soviet Union. Subsequent to renewal of the Agreement, we could convene a meeting of the Working Group of Experts provided for in the Long Term Agreement.

In response to the expressed interest of the Soviet side in convening a meeting of the Joint Commercial Commission, Secretary Baldrige indicated that if the Working Group is successful in establishing the groundwork for a meeting of the Joint Commercial Commission, a meeting of that Commission could be held when practical. The Joint Commercial Commission would discuss obstacles to trade and areas in which mutually beneficial trade could be expanded.

We await the response of the Soviet Union to these proposals.

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

UNCLASSIFIED

June 7, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM:

JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT:

Letter Recommending Mlýnař as Soviet Expert

Dr. Jiří J. Víték of the University of Alabama in Birmingham has written you recommending Zdenek Mlýnař as a person with a "deep theoretical and practical knowledge of the Soviet system" and suggesting that we seek his advice.

Mlýnař was a leading Communist Party functionary during the "Prague Spring," and was taken by the Soviets to Moscow with the Czechoslovak Politburo when the Soviets invaded. He managed to leave Czechoslovakia shortly after the Soviet invasion and wrote a moving account of the events following the Soviet invasion and of his own disillusionment with the Soviet system. He now lives in Vienna and occasionally contributes to broadcasts by RFE. He is a controversial figure with the Czechoslovak emigration, however, because of his Communist past.

An appropriate letter of acknowledgement is attached at TAB I.

Recommendation:

That you sign the letter at TAB I.

Approve Disapprove

JL
John Lenczowski concurs.

Attachments:

Tab I -- Letter for signature

Tab II -- Dr. Vitek's letter of May 22, 1984

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Dr. Vitek:

Thank you for your letter of May 22, 1984,
concerning Mr. Zdeněk Mlýnař.

We are very familiar with Mr. Mlýnař's writings
and agree with you that they provide very
important insights regarding the Soviet system.
We shall continue to follow his comments with
great interest.

Sincerely,

Dr. Jiri J. Vitek
Director, Division of
Neuroradiology
University of Alabama
Birmingham, Alabama 35294



The University of Alabama in Birmingham
Department of Diagnostic Radiology
Division of Neuroradiology
Jiri J. Vitek, M.D., Ph.D., Director
Ernest R. Duvall, M.D.
B. Chandra-Sekar, M.D.
Kundan L. Gupta, M.D.
205/934-5131

7-11-84
Start for
RCM reply
MAY 29 1984

May 22, 1984

Mr. R. McFarland
National Security Advisor
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Sir:

As an immigrant to the United States and as a person who deeply cares for the success of the United States in international politics, I perceive some misconceptions in the political approach toward the Soviet Union. The basic problem I feel is the lack of knowledge of the Marxism-Leninism as interpreted in the Soviet Union, the lack of detailed understanding of the Soviet system, and the lack of comprehension of the Soviet way of thinking.

I would like to recommend to you a man, who in my opinion, is the foremost expert of the Soviet system and its politics, presently living in the West.

Mr. Z. Mlynar, originally from Czechoslovakia and presently living in Vienna, Austria, was the professor of the international law at Charles University in Prague. In the mid seventies, he was forcefully expelled from Czechoslovakia. Mr. Mlynar studied the Soviet system from inside, being not only the theoretician but also involved in practical politics as a member of the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party and later as a member of its politburo. Professor Mlynar headed a special group of advisors to the politburo of the Czechoslovak Communist Party on the future development of the s.c. Socialist systems. He is extremely familiar with all the nuances of Soviet life. He studied law in the Soviet Union. He knows personally almost all Soviet high political leaders and other communists leaders in all Soviet dominated countries. Some of the s.c. younger members of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party and its politburo were his personal friends from the times of his studies in Moscow. He was one of the Czech political leaders taken hostage in the summer of 1968.

In the last several years, he has written a large amount of articles about the present conditions in the Soviet Union and other East European countries. He has also written several essays on the future development of these systems not only from the political but also economical point of view. It is my understanding that his conclusions are slightly different to the ones published in the American news media and in American journals devoted to foreign affairs. All of his predictions,

Mr. R. McFarland
May 22, 1984
Page Two

as far as changes with the Soviet system, were always correct. In the United States, there is not one single man of science (even in between Soviet defectors) with such a deep theoretical and practical knowledge of the Soviet system as Mr. Z. Mlynar.

I think you should take advantage of his theoretical and practical knowledge of the Soviet system and ask him to evaluate certain problems related to the United States policies toward the Soviet Union and its allies.

Sincerely yours,



Jiri J. Vitek, M.D.
Director, Division of Neuroradiology

JJV/pjh

P.S. One of his last articles written for the public was published in Wiener Tagebuch, no. 4, in 1984 in Vienna, Austria.

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

June 4, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR KARNA SMALL

FROM:

JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT:

Action 4362 - Talking Points for
Administration Spokesmen

As requested in your memo dated May 31, attached are talking points for the state of U.S.-Soviet relations.

Attachment:

As stated.

STATE OF US-SOVIET RELATIONS

-- US-Soviet relations are not satisfactory, but the danger of direct conflict is not high.

-- We are repairing our deterrent capacity and this insures that we are not risking nuclear war.

-- Nevertheless, we would like to improve relations with the Soviet Union. The President set forth a comprehensive policy in his speech of January 16, 1984, a policy based on realism, strength and dialogue.

-- We have made concrete proposals to the Soviets in many areas: arms reduction, consultation on regional disputes and steps to improve the bilateral relationship. Our efforts in all these areas continue.

-- So far, the Soviet response has been disappointing. They are refusing to negotiate on strategic nuclear weapons and on intermediate-range nuclear weapons. They have shown little readiness to meet us half-way on the other issues, and have maintained a shrill anti-US propaganda campaign.

-- None of our proposals are on a take-it-or-leave-it basis; they are flexible and reasonable. We will be patient, and we believe it is as much in the Soviet interest as ours to solve some of the problems between us.

-- One thing we will not do is to reward Soviet intransigence by making concessions in advance of negotiations. To do so would make it impossible to achieve balanced agreements, since the Soviets would be led to believe that they can achieve their goals without modifying the policies which threaten us and our Allies.

-- In dealing with the Soviet Union, we must bear in mind the nature of the Soviet system and the threat to world peace and to U.S. security that some of its actions and policies represent. We cannot wish these away, but must deal with them realistically.

-- Over more than a decade we have faced a steady and massive buildup of Soviet military might and a policy of using it to intervene in regional disputes and threaten neighbors. We have also witnessed a refusal by the Soviet leaders to abide by their commitments in the Helsinki Final Act to respect the human rights of their citizens and those of other countries under their control. Obviously, we cannot have the sort of relationship with the Soviet Union we desire so long as these policies and practices persist.

-- The only way we can persuade the Soviet Government to curb those practices which threaten the peace, and to deal with us on an equitable basis, is to make it clear that the Soviet Union cannot cow us into submitting to their threats. That is why it is important to continue our Defense Modernization Program until the Soviets are willing to negotiate agreements which will permit lower arms levels.

-- History has shown repeatedly that the Soviets do not respond to unilateral gestures. Some of their most threatening behavior occurred in the 1970's under the cover of "detente." When they negotiate, they expect to get something in return for concessions they make. Our Defense Modernization Program gives us something to offer while it also keeps our deterrent force adequate to prevent war.

-- The President has stated many times that "a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought." Our policies are designed both to avoid such a catastrophe, and to lay a foundation for improving U.S.-Soviet relations whenever the Soviet Government is prepared to meet us half way in looking for solutions to concrete problems.

MEMORANDUM

4362

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

May 31, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: JACK MATLOCK
FROM: KARNA SMALLIS
SUBJECT: Action 4362 -- Talking Points for
Administration Spokesmen

Mike Baroody's office has asked for talking points for Administration spokesmen (Baroody's memo attached) on a variety of national security subjects. My office is coordinating the action, and I would appreciate receiving a one-page paper on the topic listed below, no later than COB, tomorrow, Friday, June 1.

- State of US-Soviet relations

Format examples are attached.

Many thanks.

Attachments

As stated

May 30, 1984

Memorandum for Bob Kimmit

From:

Mike Baroody *MB*

Subject:

Preparation of Talking Points for Spokesmen

We are preparing a set of talking points on a variety of issues. They will be published in booklet form and also included in a computerized White House "guidance" system. In both cases, the guidance will be made available widely, as in the past, to all Reagan spokesmen.

Some samples of domestic guidance are attached. You will see it is not the purpose to exhaust the issue or even to competely detail the complexities of any specific policy.

Rather, they are designed to provide highlights or key points of the Reagan Administration record and policies that any spokesman, no matter what his specific duties may entail, might be expected to know and be questioned about by a general audience.

We would like to include one-pagers on at least the following issues in the initial set of talking points and would appreciate your assistance in their preparation. Of course, there may be other issues that should be included in such an initial set, and your additions to this list would be welcome.

- 2- -- Defense spending
- Safer world now than before
- Military morale, recruitment record
- Objectives and accomplishments in Central America
- Objectives and accomplishments in Mideast
- State of U.S. defense readiness
- Combatting waste in Pentagon spending
- State of U.S. - Soviet relations
- Arms reductions proposals -- general
- START
- Nuclear freeze proposals
- MX, other weapons systems

DEFENSE AND SOCIAL SPENDING COMPARISON

- o Real spending on defense had been steadily declining in 8 of the 10 years during the 1970s. President Reagan promised to change that dangerous situation, and he did -- but not at the expense of social programs.
- o This year, about 28 percent of the total federal budget goes for defense. The defense share of the budget was significantly larger -- about 49 percent -- in 1962.
- o Even after five full years of President Reagan's needed defense build-up (in FY 1987), defense spending will take less than 35 percent of the total budget -- still way below the pre-Vietnam budget shares of the early 1960s.
- o Spending for the Pentagon this fiscal year is \$57 billion less than the budget for the Department of Health and Human Services.
- o Critics of the President's defense build-up are fond of citing the figure \$1.7 trillion as his National defense spending plan for the next five years.
- o But that is \$115 billion less than his five year budget just for the Department of Health and Human Services.
- o Overall, total human needs spending of \$2.6 trillion is in the Reagan budget for the next five years -- when you add up payments for "people programs" like Social Security, Medicare, food assistance, education, housing etc. -- without including other items like interest on the debt.
- o Forty-four percent of defense spending goes for personnel costs -- pay and support for active duty personnel, civilian employees and retired pay.
- o The so-called big ticket defense items like the MX missile, the B-1 bomber -- in fact all major weapons procurement added together -- only accounts for 20 percent of total defense budget authority.

INFLATION

- o We've gone from two years of double-digit inflation in 1979 and 1980, to more than two years under 5 percent.
- o Actually, the CPI rose less than 4% a year in 1982 and 1983; in 1984 it's running at 5 percent.

Hits poor the hardest

- o Inflation hurts everybody, especially low-income families. When it's bad enough, it can push them into poverty.
- o A family on a fixed income of \$8000 started 1979 about \$500 above the poverty line. By the end of 1980, double-digit inflation had forced it into poverty -- and put that family almost \$500 below the line.

Took 20 cents out of every dollar in 1979-80

- o In terms of purchasing power, that family was even worse off. Its fixed income could buy less than \$6500 worth of goods and services by the end of 1980 as inflation stole over \$1500 in just two years.
- o In fact, every fixed income family -- no matter what their income amount -- lost 20 percent of its purchasing power in those 2 years.
- o When inflation's in double-digits, upper-income people may have to think twice whether to take another summer cruise. The poor have to think twice about buying meat or milk or bread for the kids.

Some typical prices

- o If inflation had stayed at 1980 rates, then from December 1980 to December of 1983:
 - bread would have gone up 16 cents a loaf. Instead, it went up 3 cents;
 - bacon would have cost \$1.23 more a pound. Instead, it cost a nickel more;
 - chicken would have gone up 49 cents a pound. It didn't; it went up a nickel.

INTEREST RATES

- o The prime peaked at 21.5 percent just before the inauguration. That was a post-Civil War record.
- o Now in the 12 percent range, it's been cut about in half -- and other interest rates are down substantially too.

Home ownership not just a dream anymore

- o At current lower mortgage rates (13½-14 percent, down from 17-18 percent in 1981), it costs a family \$160 a month less to take out a \$50,000 mortgage. That puts home ownership in reach for an estimated 3 million Americans who couldn't afford it 3 years ago.
- o Lower loan rates made cars more affordable too.
- o The surge in car and home sales in late 1983, early 1984 shows how lower rates have helped.

Record rates hurt working Americans

- o While the well-to-do could protect themselves with high yields on safe investments like CDs, -- many prospered with record interest rates -- working Americans who wanted to buy homes and cars suffered the most from the high interest rates we faced when President Reagan took office.

NLS F95-074/2#5BY LOJ, NARA, DATE 10/24/06THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTONSCHEDULE PROPOSAL

TO: FREDERICK J. RYAN, Director
Presidential Appointments and Scheduling

FROM: ROBERT M. KIMMITT

REQUEST: Private Meeting or Informal Luncheon

PURPOSE: To meet with five Russian emigre intellectuals and hear their views on conditions in Soviet Union.

BACKGROUND: Mike Deaver requested our views on the desirability of the President meeting with some Russian emigre writers. We think it a good idea, which could serve two purposes: to provide the President with some unique insights into Soviet society, and to indicate his regard for Russian culture, which is being maintained by persons who have left the Soviet Union.

PREVIOUS PARTICIPATION: None (with these individuals)

DATE & TIME: Late June or early July

LOCATION: Oval Office or Family Dining Room

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Vasily Aksyonov, novelist
Georgy Vladimov, editor of Grani, Frankfurt
Ernst Neizvestny, sculptor
Yuri Lyubimov, theater director
Vasily Lefebvre, scholar
Mr. McFarlane
Jack F. Matlock, NSC
Meese, Baker and Deaver at their discretion

OUTLINE OF EVENTS: President invites the guests to comment on the present situation in the Soviet Union, and discusses their views.

REMARKS REQUIRED: None

MEDIA COVERAGE: Staff Photographer only

RECOMMENDED BY: Robert C. McFarlane

OPPOSED BY: None

PROJECT OFFICER: Robert M. Kimmitt/Jack F. Matlock

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

April 2, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT: Meeting of President with Russian Emigre Writers

Mike Deaver has requested your opinion regarding the possibility of the President meeting with three Russian emigre writers living in the United States, Vasili Aksyonov, Sergei Dovlatov and Yuz Aleshkovsky.

I believe that the President would find it very interesting to hear the views of these writers on some of the questions he has been discussing with other recent visitors, particularly those relating to Russian and Soviet psychology and the role of Communist ideology in regime thinking.

If he has a meeting with emigre writers, however, I believe it should include some from genres other than the novel (Josef Brodsky, for example, is one of the finest Russian poets writing today). We should also give some thought to the orientation of members of the group as regards other Russian emigres. It would be unfortunate to be seen favoring one faction over another. Of the three writers mentioned in the Times article, I know only Aksyonov personally. He is a brilliant writer who is an excellent conversationalist.

In sum, if you think the President would be interested, I would recommend that we draw up a list of not more than five Russian emigre writers and invite them to a meeting or a private lunch. Some of them do not speak English well, so an interpreter will probably be necessary.

Recommendation:

That I discreetly consult some persons knowledgeable about the Russian emigre cultural scene (including Suzanne Massie), and develop a list of about five emigre writers to be invited to a meeting or lunch with the President.

Approve Disapprove

Attachment:

Tab I - Memo from Deaver's office and New York Times article~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

NLS MO2-011 #11BY LOT, NARA, DATE 10/17/05

219578

ID #

WHITE HOUSE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

O - OUTGOING

H - INTERNAL

I - INCOMING

Date Correspondence received (YY/MM/DD)

84 103 128

NAME OF CORRESPONDENT:

Sittman (Deane)

DC Mail Report

User Codes: (A) _____

(B) _____

(C) _____

SUBJECT:

request for President Reagan to meet w/ three Sittman writers who have immigrated to the US

ROUTE TO:

ACTION

DISPOSITION

Office/Agency (Staff Name)

Action Code

Tracking Date YY/MM/DD

Type of Response Code

Completion Date YY/MM/DD

DC Sittman

C

84 103 128 PX

S 8410312

ORIGINATOR

Referral Note:

C

84 103 128 PX

S 84103130

Referral Note:

Referral Note:

Referral Note:

ACTION CODES:

- A - Appropriate Action
- C - Comment/Recommendation
- D - Draft Response
- F - Furnish Fact Sheet to be
- I - Info Copy Only/No Action Necessary
- R - Direct Reply w/Copy
- S - For Signature
- X - Interim Reply

DISPOSITION CODES:

- A - Answered
- B - Non-Special Referral
- C - Completed
- S - Suspended

FOR OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE:

- Type of Response = Initials of Signer
- Code = A
- Completion Date = Date of Outgoing

COMMENTS:

21957

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
March 29, 1984

Bob Kimmitt

TO:

FROM: **BILL SITTMANN**
Special Assistant to the President
and Special Assistant to the
Deputy Chief of Staff

Subject: Attached

Mike Deaver would like your
thoughts about a possible
meeting with these people and R

Information

Action

Emigré Novelists Look at U.S.

Concern Over Softness On Russians

By WALTER GOODMAN

THE scores of Soviet writers who have found their way to the West in the last decade were evidently accompanied by their Slavic muse, for they continue to write in Russian about Russia, to associate with other emigrés, to lament what they believe is a lack of understanding among Americans about the nature of the Soviet regime.

That concern came through sharply in recent interviews with three novelists now living on the East Coast, whose work has made an impact here and abroad in the last few months. They are Vasily Aksyonov, author of "The Island of Citizens," published by Random House, a political fantasy about an independent Russian Empire; Sergei Dovlatov, author of "The Compromises," a satirical novel published by Farrar, Straus & Giroux; and Yuz Alekshyev, whose novel "Kangaroo," a satirical nature about the Soviet secret police, appeared in France last year, to favorable reviews and is due to be published in this country in July by Farrar, Straus & Giroux.

The three are stars assigned to Russian émigrés like those who have joined together for mutual support in a Russian Writers' Club that meets once a month at the Russian Institute at Columbia University. Last month, the group of about 30, almost entirely Jewish, celebrated its fifth anniversary with a party at the Rauspign restaurant, not chosen for literary reasons. "We have a big problem making a living," says Yevgeny Labin, the club president. "Some of us write for Russian newspapers. Some of us have wives or husbands who have jobs. Nobody's work has been translated. When somebody makes a success, they don't come to our meetings any more."

Mr. Alekshyev is one of those who hasn't been to a meeting lately. Now 54 years old, he was a writer of children's books and stories as well as television and film scripts in the Soviet Union — "one of the most successful writers in Russia," he says. In 1971, he ran afoul of the authorities when he joined an attempt to persuade them to permit publication of "Metropol," a volume of conserved words. He came to the United States in 1969 with his wife and 7-year-old son.

Now settled in a rambling old frame house in Middlesex, Conn., close to Wesleyan University, Mr. Alekshyev has moved away from children's stories, which he writes because "the world of childhood wasn't yet perverted by the cruelty of the political games," to fiction for adults. But his plot continues to reflect the imagination of a children's writer — with a difference. He is working on a novel about a group of Russians who save themselves during the Nazi invasion in 1941 by acting like monkeys. The Germans make a film about them, as a scientific phenomenon, which leads after liberation to the group's arrest by the Soviet army for collaborating with the enemy.

Despite separations — his working outfit includes jogging shoes and a pair of corduroys — Mr. Alekshyev is far from Americanized. He confesses that even after four years in

this country, his English is "prevalent." ("I haven't finished solving the problems of the Russian language," he notes wryly, adding that the "soul" of his work remains in Russian.) He relies for help in interviews on the wife, Irina, who learned her very serviceable English in Soviet schools and who now teaches Russian at Wesleyan, and a friend from Wesleyan's department of Russian literature.

Although America has had little impact on Mr. Alekshyev's work so far, his politics are much on his mind. He says he is sure that he speaks for most Soviet émigrés in maintaining that "the best of America's exterior" is more important than any of its faults.

"In Russia," as he sees it, "the people have their leaders, who are trying to hurt them; in America, the people dislike their leaders, who are trying to help them. It's auto-ostichism or masochism." Although he favors a nuclear freeze — "and to hell with the army" — he believes that the political demonstrations against nuclear weapons should be taking place in Red Square. "I agree with Khrushchev," he says. "If the Soviet Union wants peace, there will be peace."

Mr. Alekshyev's interview for a panel for improving international relations — offered with a straight face — is for Washington to illustrate "the lack of the human rights of Soviet leaders." He explains: "Those people at the top are terrified that if they fall a little bit, there will be a complete collapse. That makes them dangerous to everybody. The number one problem in the Soviet Union is that its leaders are absolutely without culture, without spiritual values. They are not even truly pragmatic. There is no air up there. They have no autonomy. For the sake of the world, they must be saved."

As Mr. Alekshyev was leaving for Paris a few weeks ago, for the publication in French of a new novel, Vasily Aksyonov was returning after the opening in Paris of his play "The Hero," which he describes as a "hard comedy" modeled on "The Sea Gull" by Chekhov.

The 31-year-old writer, among the best-known in his homeland, arrived in this country in 1960, after reading from the Soviet Writers' Union in protest against the expulsion of two younger writers for their part in the "Metropol" affair. His books, more than a dozen novels, were taken off the library shelves, his telephone was tapped, his mail blocked, the tires of his car slashed. His citizenship was revoked soon after his departure from the Soviet Union. He now lives in Washington, with his wife and a daughter and grandson by her first marriage, and teaches short-story writing at Goucher College in Maryland.

His novel "The Sun," written before "The Island of Citizens," will be published here in September. It takes place during what Mr. Aksyonov calls the Soviet Union's "soul period," the



Three Soviet writers who have immigrated to the West, and continue to write in Russian about Russia, are Vasily Aksyonov, below at left, Sergei Dovlatov, left, and Yuz Alekshyev.

From top, left to right: Vasily Aksyonov, Sergei Dovlatov, Yuz Alekshyev.

relatively permissive late 1960's and early 1970's, and centers on the intellectuals limited together by their experiences of the Siberian gulag.

The gulag has figured intimately in Mr. Aksyonov's own life. His mother was Eugenia Ginzburg, whose books, "Journey into the Whirlwind" and "Within the Whirlwind," recounted memorably her 10 years in Stalin's camps.

Mr. Aksyonov, whose English is more than passable, says that he is beginning "to feel some influence of my own country in my writing." He plans to start next year on a novel that will be set partly in the United States.

It seems to Mr. Aksyonov that Americans have been growing somewhat more realistic about the Soviet Union. "Before, the media tried to make an image of Russia as an American model," he says. "They tried to interpret all events from an American perception. But the Soviet Union is very different from America. It is an ideological empire." He adds tentatively, "I'm afraid to sound a little bit conservative — but in spite of a sometimes top-heavy rhetoric, Reagan understands."

Like Mr. Aksyonov, Sergei Dovlatov, too, is working on a novel set in America; when he arrived early in 1970, at the age of 27, with his mother and a few letters from Glaston, he

was preceded here by the wife, Elena, who contributes to the family upkeep with a job as a phototype machine operator, and their daughter, 17-year-old Katerina, a senior at Forest Hills High School, who serves as interpreter for interviews, generally conducted in the small kitchen of their apartment in a large building near Queens Boulevard. "Russians do all their business in the kitchen," says Katerina. A son, Nicholas, was born in 1961.

Mr. Dovlatov's new novel, entitled "The Invisible Paper," which he hopes to complete this spring, reflects his experiences in trying to write for some Russian periodicals in this country. He complains that they are controlled by right-wing editors who refuse to print liberal opinions about subjects like racial prejudices in the United States.

"To such Russians," he says, "Reagan seems to be on the left. Although they hate the Soviet Union, they don't understand the American idea of freedom of speech. They would tell my friends — about me: 'This writer must not be published. They are products of the Soviet system.'"

He tells a joke about a violin player who auditioned for a job. The conductor listens approvingly, and when the audition is done says, "That's fine — but of course you have to play while walking on a tightrope." So the violinist plays while walking the tightrope. And the conductor says, "I'm sorry, I can't hire you. You're not doing sonatas."

Mr. Dovlatov works part time for Radio Liberty, which broadcasts to audiences across the Iron Curtain. He sees no prospect of change in the Soviet regime no matter what is on top. "Why should they change?" he asks. "The people in charge are in a privileged position. If you're speaking in Leningrad, cross the street carefully because if a car drives by a member of the elite hits you, it won't even stop. The Soviet Union is a nation of winners and losers. That's what Americans can't understand."

He comments, in his self-deprecating style, "That was the high point of my journalistic career." Although Mr. Dovlatov did not consider himself a dissident, he says that he left the Soviet Union because the

subjects he wanted to write about were deemed unsuitable. "You can't write about crime or slums or drunkenness or the emptiness, boredom, dullness of big-city youth today. You can criticize some aspects of the system, like the failure of a grain plan — but you can't criticize the system."

Mr. Dovlatov, who is given to telling little stories to make his point, tells one about the prevailing attitude on central issues: "Suppose my brother is living with my brother in California, and she's sick. So I call my brother and ask how she's feeling. He tells me that the weather is bad, transportation is bad, and there's prejudice in California — but please our mother, nothing."

Soviet writers, he says, "must master the art of knowing what you can write and what you can't write. They know the line where you have to stop."

C

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 7, 1984

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT: Soviet Restriction of Military Liaison Missions

State has sent you a memorandum reporting on the Soviet action May 16 to redefine the Permanent Restricted Areas which apply to Allied Military Liaison Missions in East Germany. State is currently consulting with our Allies concerning an appropriate reaction and will keep us informed.

The new restrictions do not expand the overall area declared off bounds to travel by Military Liaison Missions, but seem to have been redefined to impede our intelligence collection. If retaliation is deemed appropriate, we presumably have the means, with Allied concurrence, to redefine areas in the FRG from which the Soviet military missions are excluded.

deGraffenreid, ^{*unavailable*} Lenczowski, ^{*OOT*} Dobriansky and ^{*unavailable*} Robinson concur.
(See Memo)

Attachment:

- Tab I Hill/McFarlane Memorandum
- Tab II deGraffenreid Memo

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F95-074/2#6

BY LOS, NARA, DATE 10/24/00

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR



United States Department of State

4440

Washington, D.C. 20520

June 1, 1984

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: New Soviet Restrictions on Military Liaison Missions
in the German Democratic Republic

On May 16, the Soviets informed Allied Military Liaison Missions (MLM) in Potsdam of newly redefined Permanent Restricted Areas (PRA) which, in the US MLM's view, severely restrict their intelligence gathering capability, although the overall area covered by the PRA's has not increased. Originally set up in 1947 to perform liaison functions between the respective Allied CINCs and the Soviet CINC in the eastern zone of occupation, the three Allied MLMs currently are useful primarily for intelligence collection. (The Soviets have three missions in the FRG.) The last PRA changes were made by both the Allies and the Soviets in 1978.

We are currently examining more closely the new Soviet restrictions with our Allies and assessing their impact on MLM intelligence collection. We are also considering possible courses of action, including formal protests, with our Allies. While the Soviets do not appear to have abandoned their desire to maintain calm in and around Berlin during the present period of East-West tensions, Soviet and GDR actions regarding Berlin will need to be observed especially carefully.

Factors affecting the Soviet sense of timing in issuing the new PRAs are unclear. The precise delineation of the redrawn PRAs indicates that they must have been under preparation for quite some time, and are intended to prevent Allied MLM intelligence collection as much as possible. In April, there was an exchange of letters of protest regarding Soviet actions toward US MLM officers, while during the same period, an article appeared in the International Herald Tribune which called attention to the MLMs' intelligence capability. At a time when overall relations are poor, these events may have precipitated the Soviet decision to restrict further the MLMs.

We discussed these matters at an Inter-Agency meeting May 24, and have tasked agencies to gather more information for a subsequent meeting to recommend next steps. The US, UK, French and FRG Berlin experts discussed possible coordinated reactions at the NATO Ministerial meeting May 28. We will keep you informed.

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F95-074/2 #7

BY LOJ, NARA, DATE 7/18/00

Richard D. Kazal
Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

CONFIDENTIAL

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~WITH SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

June 12, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: KENNETH deGRAFFENREID *kd*

SUBJECT: Soviet Restriction of Military Liaison Missions

The Soviet action seriously limits the effectiveness of MLM activities in East Germany. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] I don't believe that we can afford to ignore it or to chalk it up as another manifestation of strained relations. Combined with other unilateral Soviet moves to restrict Berlin air travel, it demonstrates, among other things, that the Soviets are able to deal quickly and effectively to limit [REDACTED] threats to themselves.

I recommend that you talk to Secretary Shultz about possible actions which can be taken to counter the Soviet MLM move and, germane to the hostile pressure issue here, invite his attention to the firmness with which the Soviets deal with [REDACTED] threats.

Recommendation

That you call Secretary Shultz on this issue.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab A [REDACTED] Summary Topic - USSR-East Germany: Permanent Restricted Areas, June 6, 1984

E. O. 12958
As Amended
Sec. 1.4(c)

~~CONFIDENTIAL WITH SECRET ATTACHMENT~~
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLS MO2-011#12
By NOT, NARA, Date 10/17/05


~~SECRET~~

USSR-EAST GERMANY: Permanent Restricted Areas. (S)

(C) Recent changes to the permanent restricted areas (PRAs) in East Germany will impose significant constraints on the operations of the Allied Military Liaison Mission.

(C) All boundaries of the new PRAs, which were effective 15 May (DIADIN 139-14A, 18 May), are formed by recognizable geographic or man-made features to eliminate past ambiguities. The new PRAs roughly coincide in both location and combined area with those previously in effect but have been skillfully adjusted to enhance Soviet operations security. In addition, the Soviets also simultaneously imposed new restrictions that prohibit stopping on autobahns when traveling through a PRA and deny access to all nonautobahn roads forming the boundaries of a PRA.

(C) In general, the interior PRAs have been expanded or combined, and those in the border areas have been reduced. This closed a number of gaps between PRAs that were previously exploited to monitor units moving between training areas. In the most striking examples, a number of former PRAs have been combined to form two unbroken bands of denied area 150 km or more long. A few minor interior PRAs associated with East German installations or training areas have been eliminated.



FOIA(b) (1)


(S) This is the 10th PRA adjustment imposed since their inception in 1951 and the 1st extensive revision in the past 10 years. The Soviets offered no explanation for the changes; however, it is clear they were carefully crafted to address longstanding Soviet security concerns. In addition, the announcement of the changes may be intended to further demonstrate to the West the consequences of continued strained relations with Moscow. (DECH OADR)



FOIA(b) (3)

~~SECRET~~

NEW PERMANENT RESTRICTED AREAS



FOIA(b) (2-)

DECLASSIFIED IN PART (RELEASER)

NLS #95-074/2 49

By CS, NARA, Date 10/29/02

~~SECRET~~