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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: Matlock, Jack F.: Files

Archivist: smf

File Folder: Matlock Chron May 1984 (2)

Date: 5/30/97

Box 4

| DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE | DATE | RESTRICTION |
|-------------------------------|---|--------------------|---------------|
| 1. memo (4073) | Jack Matlock to Robert McFarlane re Speech by Deputy Assistant Secretary Palmer (1 p.) | 5/22/84 | P1 |
| 2. memo (4073) | Robert Kimmitt to Charles Hill re Speech by DAS Palmer (1 p.) | n.d. | P1 |
| 3. memo (4073) | Charles Hill to Robert McFarlane re Draft Copy of Speech by DAS Palmer (1 p.) | 5/19/84 | P1 |
| 4. memo (4073) | duplicate of document #1 (1 p.) | 5/22/84 | P1 |
| 5. memo (4073) | duplicate of document #2 (1 p.) | n.d. | P1 |
| 6. memo (4073) | duplicate of document #3 (1 p.) | 5/19/84 | P1 |
| 7. memo (3447) | Jack Matlock to Robert McFarlane re US-USSR relationship (2 pp.) | 5/21/84 | P1 |
| 8. memo (3447) | Robert Kimmitt to Charles Hill re US-USSR relationship (1 p.) | n.d. | P1 |
| 9. memo (3447) | Charles Hill to Robert McFarlane re US-USSR relationship (3 pp.) | 4/28/84 | P1 |

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: Matlock, Jack F.: Files

Archivist: smf

File Folder: Matlock Chron May 1984 (2) *Box 90887 4*

Date: 5/30/97

| DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE | DATE | RESTRICTION |
|-------------------------------|---|--------------------|---------------|
| 1. memo (4073) | Jack Matlock to Robert McFarlane re Speech by Deputy Assistant Secretary Palmer (1 p.) | 5/22/84 | P1 |
| | <i>R 11/20/98 NLSF95-074 #83</i> | | |
| 2. memo (4073) | Robert Kimmitt to Charles Hill re Speech by DAS Palmer (1 p.) | n.d. | P1 |
| | <i>R 11/20/98 NLSF95-074 #84</i> | | |
| 3. memo (4073) | Charles Hill to Robert McFarlane re Draft Copy of Speech by DAS Palmer (1 p.) | 5/19/84 | P1 |
| | <i>R 11/20/98 NLSF95-074 #85</i> | | |
| 4. memo (4073) | duplicate of document #1 (1 p.) | 5/22/84 | P1 |
| | <i>R 11/20/98 NLSF95-074 #86</i> | | |
| 5. memo (4073) | duplicate of document #2 (1 p.) | n.d. | P1 |
| | <i>R 11/20/98 NLSF95-074 #87</i> | | |
| 6. memo (4073) | duplicate of document #3 (1 p.) | 5/19/84 | P1 |
| | <i>R 11/20/98 NLSF95-074 #88</i> | | |
| 7. memo (3447) | Jack Matlock to Robert McFarlane re US-USSR relationship (2 pp.) | 5/21/84 | P1 |
| | <i>R 11/22/99 NLSF95-074 #89</i> | | |
| 8. memo (3447) | Robert Kimmitt to Charles Hill re US-USSR relationship (1 p.) | n.d. | P1 |
| | <i>R 11/22/99 NLSF95-074 #90</i> | | |
| 9. memo (3447) | Charles Hill to Robert McFarlane re US-USSR relationship (3 pp.) | 4/28/84 | P1 |
| | <i>R 11/22/99 NLSF95-074 #91</i> | | |

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: Matlock, Jack F.: Files

Archivist: smf

File Folder: Matlock Chron May 1984 (2)

Date: 5/30/97

Box 4

| DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE | DATE | RESTRICTION |
|---------------------------------|--|--------------------|---------------|
| 10. memo (90605) | Jack Matlock to Robert McFarlane re Next Steps on Sakharov (1 p.) <i>R 11/22/99 NLSF95-074 #92</i> | 5/19/84 | P1 |
| 14. memo | Robert McFarlane to the President re Next Steps on Sakharov (1 p.) <i>R 11/22/99 NLSF95-074 #93</i> | n.d. | P1 |
| 12. memo (90605) | George Shultz to the President re Next Steps on Sakharov (3 pp.) <i>R 12/12/05 M1480 #9</i> | 5/18/84 | P1 |

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
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PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O. 13233

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

CAS 4/3/2007

File Folder MATLOCK CHRON MAY 1984 (2)

FOIA

M03-1480

Box Number 4

| ID | Doc Type | Document Description | No of Pages | Doc Date |
|---------------|-----------------|---|--------------|----------------------|
| 12 | MEMO | SHULTZ TO THE PRESIDENT RE NEXT STEPS ON SAKHAROV (#9) | 3 | 5/18/1984 |

mvh 5/19/08

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

May 22, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT: Response to Father Vytautas Bagdanavicius, MIC

Please sign and forward the memorandum at Tab I to Sally Kelley which forwards a response to a letter from Father Bagdanavicius to Linas Kojelis.

Walt Raymond concurs. *WR*RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachment:

Tab I Memorandum to Sally Kelley with attachments

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

MEMORANDUM FOR SALLY KELLEY

FROM: ROBERT M. KIMMITT

SUBJECT: Response to Father Vytautas Bagdanavicius, MIC

We have reviewed and concur in the response prepared by the Department of State to Father Bagdanavicius's letter of April 30, regarding the problems of bringing religious books, written in Lithuanian, into the Soviet Union.

Attachments

4078

UNCLASSIFIED

(Classification)

04 MAY 19 84 P 3: 50

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
TRANSMITTAL FORM

S/S 8413810

Date May 19, 1984

For: Mr. Robert C. McFarlane
National Security Council
The White House

Reference:

To: Linas Kojelis From: Father Vytautas Bagdanavicius, MIC
Date: 4/30/84 Subject: Writer questions Soviet regulation
of books written in Lithuanian or of religious nature, carried into
Lithuania by U.S. travelers and requests assistance in recommending
proper channel through which he may send books to R.C. Bishop in Lithuania.
WH Referral Dated: 5/9/84 NSC ID# 225650
(if any)

 The attached item was sent directly to the
Department of State.

Action Taken:

- XX A draft reply is attached.
- A draft reply will be forwarded.
- A translation is attached.
- An information copy of a direct reply is attached.
- We believe no response is necessary for the reason
cited below.
- The Department of State has no objection to the
proposed travel.
- Other.

Remarks:

for 
Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

UNCLASSIFIED
(Classification)

Dear Father Bagdanavicius:

Thank you for the letter describing the difficulties which travellers to Lithuania are having in bringing in religious books to that country.

We are aware of this reprehensible behavior by Soviet customs officials, and we believe that this kind of anti-religious activity is indicative of the fear which the Soviet Union has for any manifestations of personal belief that do not conform to its own rigid and atheistic ideology. Unfortunately, so long as the U.S.S.R. continues to exercise control over Lithuania, there is little that can be done to change Soviet customs procedures.

With regard to your request for a sure method to send books to Bishop Povilonis, it is not possible to facilitate this effort without putting the Lithuanian recipients at very substantial risk.

We have sought for many years to encourage the Soviets to allow better information and media exchanges. Your thoughtful letter describing the unjust customs procedures affecting Lithuania reminds us of how much remains to be done in this area.

Sincerely,

Father Vytautas Bagdanavicius MIC,
Lietuviskos Knygos Klubas,
4545 West 63rd Street,
Chicago, Illinois.

8413810

T H E W H I T E H O U S E O F F I C E

REFERRAL

MAY 9, 1984

TO: DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ACTION REQUESTED:

DRAFT REPLY FOR SIGNATURE OF WHITE HOUSE STAFF MEMBER

DESCRIPTION OF INCOMING:

ID: 225650

MEDIA: LETTER, DATED APRIL 30, 1984

TO: LINAS KOJELIS

FROM: FATHER VYTAUTAS BAGDANAVICIUS MIC
LIETUVISKOS KNYGOS KLUBAS
4545 WEST 63RD STREET
CHICAGO IL 60629

SUBJECT: WRITER QUESTIONS SOVIET REGULATIONS OF BOOKS
WRITTEN IN LITHUANIAN OR OF RELIGIOUS
NATURE, CARRIED INTO LITHUANIA BY U. S.
TRAVELERS AND REQUESTS ASSISTANCE IN
RECOMMENDING PROPER CHANNEL THROUGH WHICH
HE MAY SEND BOOKS TO R. C. BISHOP IN
LITHUANIA

PROMPT ACTION IS ESSENTIAL -- IF REQUIRED ACTION HAS NOT BEEN
TAKEN WITHIN 9 WORKING DAYS OF RECEIPT, PLEASE TELEPHONE THE
UNDERSIGNED AT 456-7486.

RETURN CORRESPONDENCE, WORKSHEET AND COPY OF RESPONSE
(OR DRAFT) TO:
AGENCY LIAISON, ROOM 91, THE WHITE HOUSE

SALLY KELLEY
DIRECTOR OF AGENCY LIAISON
PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE

C0165

WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

O - OUTGOING

H - INTERNAL

I - INCOMING

Date Correspondence Received (YY/MM/DD) 1 1

Name of Correspondent: Fr. Vytautas Bagdanavicius, MIC

MI Mail Report

User Codes: (A) (B) (C)

Writer
Subject: Questions Soviet regulations of books written in Lithuanian or of religious nature, carried into Lithuania by U.S. travelers and requests assistance in recommending proper channel through which he may send books to R.C. Bishop in Lithuania.

ROUTE TO:

ACTION

DISPOSITION

| Office/Agency (Staff Name) | Action Code | Tracking Date YY/MM/DD | Type of Response Code | Completion Date YY/MM/DD |
|----------------------------|-------------|------------------------|-----------------------|--------------------------|
| PL KOJE | ORIGINATOR | 84105107 | | 1 1 |
| ✓ 99 DOS | D | 84105107 | | 1 1 |
| | | 1 1 | | 1 1 |
| | | 1 1 | | 1 1 |
| | | 1 1 | | 1 1 |

ACTION CODES:

- A - Appropriate Action
- C - Comment/Recommendation
- D - Draft Response
- F - Furnish Fact Sheet to be used as Enclosure

- I - Info Copy Only/No Action Necessary
- R - Direct Reply w/Copy
- S - For Signature
- X - Interim Reply

DISPOSITION CODES:

- A - Answered
- B - Non-Special Referral
- C - Completed
- S - Suspended

FOR OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE:

- Type of Response = Initials of Signer
- Code = "A"
- Completion Date = Date of Outgoing

Comments:

Keep this worksheet attached to the original incoming letter.
Send all routing updates to Central Reference (Room 75, OEOb).
Always return completed correspondence record to Central Files.
Refer questions about the correspondence tracking system to Central Reference, ext. 2590.

8413810



LIETUVIŠKOS KNYGOS KLUBAS

4545 W. 63 STREET CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60629

225650

April 30, 1984

Mr. Linas Kojelis
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Kojelis:

My name is Father Vytautas Bagdanavičius and I am director of The Lithuanian Book Club, based in Chicago, which publishes books in the Lithuanian language by authors residing in the U.S. I was dismayed to learn that since about 1983 travelers to occupied Lithuania are being denied the right to keep among their personal possessions even a single book for their personal reading, if that book happens to be written in Lithuanian. The situation is especially embarrassing for travelers carrying books of a religious nature. Among the instructions issued to Soviet customs officials is that visitors are forbidden to have this type of book, in whatever language, in their possession when they enter the Soviet Union. I wonder if such a regulation is compatible with the Helsinki agreements?

I am requesting your assistance in two matters: 1/ in drawing the attention of responsible officials of the U.S. government to this fact and suggesting steps to prevent this violation of our citizens' rights by the Soviets, 2/ in recommending me to the proper channel in the State Department, which would be able to facilitate my sending a few books to The Most Reverend Liudvikas Povilonis, the Roman Catholic Bishop of Kaunas /233000 Kaunas, Vilnius 4, Lithuania/.

Respectfully,

Fr. Vt. Bagdanavičius, MIC
/Father/ Vytautas Bagdanavičius, MIC

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

May 22, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT: Proposed Response to Mr. Alex Balaban

Please sign and forward the memorandum at Tab I to Sally Kelley indicating our approval of the proposed response to Mr. Alex Balaban.

Walt Raymond concurs. *WR*RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the memorandum at Tab I to Sally Kelley.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment:

Tab I Memorandum to Sally Kelley with attachments

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

MEMORANDUM FOR SALLY KELLEY

FROM: ROBERT M. KIMMITT

SUBJECT: Proposed Response to Mr. Alex Balaban

We have reviewed and concur in the proposed response prepared by the Department of State to Mr. Balaban's letter of April 17, 1984, to President Reagan requesting that honorary citizenship be granted to Mr. Yuriy Shukhevych on humanitarian grounds.

Attachments

UNCLASSIFIED

(Classification)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
TRANSMITTAL FORM

S/S 8412715

Date May 19, 1984

For: Mr. Robert C. McFarlane
National Security Council
The White House

Reference:

To: President Reagan From: Mr. Alex Balaban
Date: April 17, 1984 Subject: Proposes that President grant
honorary U.S. citizenship to YURIY SHUKHEVYCH based on humanitarian
grounds
WH Referral Dated: April 27, 1984 NSC ID# 223673
(if any)

 The attached item was sent directly to the
Department of State.

Action Taken:

- A draft reply is attached.
 A draft reply will be forwarded.
 A translation is attached.
 An information copy of a direct reply is attached.
 We believe no response is necessary for the reason
cited below.
 The Department of State has no objection to the
proposed travel.
 Other.

Remarks:


Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

(Classification)

SUGGESTED REPLY

Dear Mr. Balaban:

I am writing in response to your letter of April 17 urging that the President grant honorary United States citizenship to Yuriy Shukhevych.

We recognize the motives which moved you to propose this singular honor. While we continue to be concerned about his plight, we believe that granting of honorary citizenship to Mr. Shukhevych would not be appropriate.

The granting of honorary citizenship calls for a Joint Resolution of the Congress authorizing and directing that the President issue a Proclamation to that effect. There have been only two occasions in our history where the United States has done so: Winston Churchill in 1963 and Raoul Wallenberg in 1981. The unique and exceptional circumstances present in those cases would not appear to be present in the case of Mr. Shukhevych.

Mr. Alex Balaban

1080 - 18th Avenue

Newark, New Jersey 07106

Under international law, honorary citizenship does not carry with it the rights and privileges of ordinary citizenship. Thus an honorary citizen of the United States would not be entitled to receive diplomatic or other protection of the United States, nor does such status confer any special immigration benefits upon the honoree or the honoree's relatives and descendents.

On the other hand, conferral of honorary United States citizenship does recognize an honoree's close ties with and commitment to the democratic principles of the United States. Mr. Shukhevych would not be likely to benefit by the close association with the United States implicit in the granting of this honor. On the contrary, such status might provide the Soviet authorities a pretext for further persecution of him.

Let me assure you that while we do not believe that the granting of honorary citizenship would be appropriate in this case, we remain committed to doing all we can to help Mr. Shukhevych and other Ukrainians imprisoned for practicing their culture or expressing their beliefs.

Sincerely,

DRAFTED BY:CA/PPT/C:WBWharton/CA/PPT:JDBlevins:st
5/8/84 (S/S #8412715) x20800

Clearances:

EUR/SOV:JBoris (by phone)

L/CA:JGHergen

HA/EUR:DMatthews

H:AMSchloss (by phone)

CA/PPT:JDBlevins

CA:ERowell

CA:JMClark

Alex Balaban
1080 - 18th Avenue
Newark, N.J. 07106
(201)648-2537 DAY

April 17, 1984

8412715

223673

Mr. Linas J. Kojelis, Associate Director
Office of Public Liaison
THE WHITE HOUSE
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. Kojelis:

As a Ukrainian-American, I would like to thank you for your support at a recent NYC demonstration in support of Yuriy Shukhevych.

Despite many pleas from the Ukrainian-American community to liberate Yuriy, and despite many petition drives and demonstrations; the KGB remains steadfast in its desire to make a mockery of Ukrainian nationalism through the continual torture of innocent Yuriy Shukhevych.

As a result, I and my family urge you to propose to President Reagan that he grant honorary U.S. citizenship to Yuriy Shukhevych based on humanitarian grounds. Nevertheless, the Ukrainian nationalists are far too many to be eliminated by the KGB today, and they stand a hundred percent behind President Reagan's offensive against Soviet expansionist global campaigns.

I urge you once again to propose the citizenship idea to President Reagan.

I understand the many demands on your time, and I thank you for any help you can render in this crucial situation.

4219
JOHN BOROWIS

Sincerely,
Alex Balaban
Alex Balaban
Gloria Balaban
Gloria Balaban
Maria Balaban
Maria Balaban
Walter Balaban
Walter Balaban

ID # 223673

WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

HU

- O - OUTGOING
 - H - INTERNAL
 - I - INCOMING
- Date Correspondence Received (YY/MM/DD)

1 1
Nov 2, 1984

8412715

T H E W H I T E H O U S E O F F I C E

REFERRAL

APRIL 27, 1984

TO: DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ACTION REQUESTED:

DRAFT REPLY FOR SIGNATURE OF WHITE HOUSE STAFF MEMBER

DESCRIPTION OF INCOMING:

ID: 223673

MEDIA: LETTER, DATED APRIL 17, 1984

TO: PRESIDENT REAGAN

FROM: MR. ALEX BALABAN
1080 18TH AVENUE
NEWARK NJ 07106

SUBJECT: PROPOSES THAT THE PRESIDENT GRANT HONORARY
U. S. MEMBERSHIP TO YURIY SHUKHEVYCH BASED
ON HUMANITARIAN GROUNDS

PROMPT ACTION IS ESSENTIAL -- IF REQUIRED ACTION HAS NOT BEEN
TAKEN WITHIN 9 WORKING DAYS OF RECEIPT, PLEASE TELEPHONE THE
UNDERSIGNED AT 456-7486.

RETURN CORRESPONDENCE, WORKSHEET AND COPY OF RESPONSE
(OR DRAFT) TO:
AGENCY LIAISON, ROOM 91, THE WHITE HOUSE

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

May 22, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT: Speech by Deputy Assistant Secretary Palmer

Attached at Tab II is a draft copy of the remarks to be given by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs R. Mark Palmer before the plenary session of the U.S.-USSR Trade and Economic Council in New York, May 23. I have no objection to the speech and have received none. A memorandum to Charles Hill for signature by Bob Kimmitt is attached at Tab I.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve forwarding the memorandum at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I Kimmitt to Hill memorandum
 Tab II State's memorandum, May 19

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 23, 1997

By smf NARA, Date 11/20/98

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4073

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. CHARLES HILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Speech by DAS Palmer (U)

We have reviewed and have no objection to the draft speech to be given by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs R. Mark Palmer before the plenary session of the U.S.-USSR Trade and Economic Council in New York on May 23. *ler*

Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By *smj* NARA, Date *11/20/98*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



8414872

7013

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

May 19, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Draft Copy of Speech by DAS Palmer

Attached is a draft copy of remarks to be given by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs R. Mark Palmer before the plenary session of the US-USSR Trade and Economic Council in New York May 23.

Covey

Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997

smf NARA, Date 11/20/98

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Decl: OADR

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

May 22, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT: Speech by Deputy Assistant Secretary Palmer

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RECOMMENDATION

That you approve forwarding the memorandum at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I Kimmitt to Hill memorandum
 Tab II State's memorandum, May 19

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997

By *smf* NARA, Date 11/20/98

Remarks to the
U.S.-USSR Trade
and Economic Council Meeting,
May 23, 1984

By
Deputy Assistant Secretary
for European Affairs
Mark Palmer

USTEC is meeting today at a time when U.S.-Soviet relations are "normal". Unfortunately since the Second World War the norm has been that we were not doing much constructive business together. With only very brief periods of limited cooperation, practically every year has found us focussed more on our differences than on the fact that the two most powerful nations in the world should work together.

The past decade has witnessed several sustained efforts at cooperation by the United States. Speaking frankly, we believe that each of them has been cut-short because of Soviet actions. Not because we want to engage in an academic exercise in history, but because we believe greater understanding is essential as we strive to open a new and more durable period in our relations, I would like to review our understanding of the two most recent, ultimately stillborn efforts by this country.

During the first half of 1983 we were beginning to make some tangible progress. Both sides emerged from the round of START talks which concluded last summer with the view that progress was being made. We had each taken steps to meet the other's concerns. While there was still a long way to go, at least the direction was positive. Similarly we were able to conclude a new long-term grains agreement which raised the levels for both sides. And in the United States the release of the Pentecostalists was interpreted as a gesture of goodwill.

We are all aware of the tragedy of the Korean airliner. Some 69 Americans were killed. Nevertheless in the course of the fall, President Reagan proposed further steps in both the strategic and intermediate-range nuclear arms talks in Geneva. He recognized, as has every American President since Harry Truman, that in the nuclear era there is no sane alternative to efforts at nuclear arms control between the two nations with the capacity to destroy civilization as we know it.

Despite these sincere efforts, and despite the fact that the United States had agreed to sit down at the negotiating table and to stay there for two years while the Soviet Union deployed ever-larger numbers of SS-20 missiles, when NATO began its deployments the Soviet Union walked out of the talks.

Again, despite this negative Soviet action the President determined early this year to once more attempt to move in a positive direction.

Our policy of dealing with the Soviet Union on the basis of strength, realism and negotiation was authoritatively expressed by the President in his January 16th address. At that time, he stated his personal commitment to seeking ways to bridge the very real differences between our two countries.

The President subsequently reaffirmed and expanded on the substance of his January 16th speech in a series of personal letters that he despatched to General Secretary Chernenko.

We have followed up the President's statements in diplomatic channels. We made clear to the Soviet leadership that we are prepared to engage in substantive dialogue on problems now before the two countries, including many of those issues identified by the Soviet side as well as by the United States. In recent months Secretary Shultz has met a number of

times with Ambassador Dobrynin in Washington. Ambassador Hartman, who has returned several times to Washington for special consultations and meetings with the President on this subject, has had similar sessions with First Deputy Chairman Gromyko.

In the course of both this correspondence and these meetings, we have put forward concrete proposals.

In the field of arms control, we have, of course, urged the resumption of formal START and INF negotiations in Geneva, but have also stressed our readiness to explore the substance of these issues in private channels away from any publicity and without preconditions. In doing so, we have underscored our readiness to pursue a give-and-take process in which the concerns of both sides and the differing force structures of the two sides are to be taken into account.

As you are aware, during this period we also tabled a new draft chemical weapons treaty at the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva. We have introduced a new initiative at the conventional force talks in Vienna, which attempts to build upon constructive elements of the East's latest proposals, and to find a creative way around the long-standing dispute over data.

Regarding the Conference on Disarmament in Europe, we invited the Soviet Delegation head to Washington during this past recess. Because he was unable to come, U.S. delegation chief James Goodby went instead to Moscow late last month to explore the possibilities for moving forward and particularly to permit full discussion of eastern and western proposals.

At our initiative, a team of U.S. communications experts went to Moscow as well in late April to discuss our proposals

to improve the "Hotline" linking our two capitals. Considerable progress was made on most technical aspects, yet the Soviet side seems to be raising issues to prevent the early conclusion of the draft agreement we have tabled.

In its public statements, the Soviet Union has expressed concern over the dangers posed by "militarization of outer space." We have offered to conduct a private, high-level exchange of views on space arms control. Moreover last year, in response to Soviet concerns, we proposed discussions on the President's Strategic Defense Initiative and its implications among our government's experts in START and the Standing Consultative Commission. While the Soviets turned aside this offer, we have in the latest session of the SCC proposed a special working group on strategic defense issues.

We have proposed to the Soviet Union consultations on a number of regional issues, including southern Africa and the Middle East. We stand ready to proceed with such exchanges.

We have proposed a series of steps to improve bilateral relations, which I will not detail here.

It was logical to assume that this long list of constructive initiatives would have been greeted positively by the Soviet side, at least with a recognition that we were moving in the right direction. But quite the opposite has occurred.

Indeed, it appears that the Soviet Union made a deliberate decision in late April to chill bilateral relations with us. The Olympic boycott is but the most visible action. In addition, the Soviet side has turned down our invitation to Academy of Sciences Vice President Velikhov to meet to discuss space arms control; and introduced obstacles to progress on a range of bilateral issues.

There has been a sudden, sharp increase in attacks on the United States. Senior Soviet officials had for years said that our rhetoric was the chief obstacle to improving relations. Now they dismiss as of no importance the constructive statements of the Administration. The Soviet side called on us to discuss a variety of subjects, from anti-satellite weapons to the Middle East. We have agreed and now the Soviet Union is unwilling to sit down to talk.

Whatever the specific motives behind these negative actions, the pattern seems to be that whenever the Soviet leadership comes up against hard decisions, it chooses a path that results in no serious discussion and no practical cooperation. This is obviously not the Soviet role we would prefer. Rather we seek a Soviet Union ready to be a serious partner in negotiations on a full range of issues as the means of building a more constructive relationship.

We will neither be discouraged nor intimidated by the current Soviet approach. We will neither reward nor imitate Soviet tactics. As Secretary Shultz has said: "We will continue to be realistic...and we will continue to be reasonable and ready to sit down (the Soviet Union) whenever they are of a like mind."

One area where our two countries have shown they can work together to mutual benefit is the one you are meeting to discuss -- trade. Our economic relationship with the USSR has been the subject of much debate and study in recent years. Unfortunately, much of this discussion has taken place based on a misunderstanding of what the Administration's policies towards economic relations with the Soviet Union actually are. I hope to clear up some of that confusion today.

Our policy towards trade with the USSR is clear. Trade can go forward as long as it is mutually beneficial, does not subsidize the Soviet economy, and does not contribute to the Soviet strategic or military capability. Let me stress this -- our policy is not one of economic warfare. We have been able to take a number of small positive steps of benefit to both sides in the field of trade. This was in accord with our efforts to preserve the structure of our economic relationship with the Soviets. We want that structure in place to build upon if future conditions permit.

- We signed a new long-term grain agreement providing for a 50 percent increase in the minimum Soviet purchase requirement last August.
- Our Fisheries Agreement with the Soviets, which permits the joint fisheries venture to operate in Seattle and Nakhodka, has been renewed three times, most recently for an 18-month term.
- We are currently considering the renewal of our 10-year Long-Term Economic, Industrial and Technical Cooperation Agreement. We are hopeful this agreement can be extended.
- Last October, the US-USSR Trade and Economic Council co-sponsored an agribusiness trade show in Moscow. We think this is a good example of the kind of trade between our two countries for which our policy calls. We endorsed that exhibition, as we are supporting this plenary session with our presence. We will continue to support Council activities appropriate to our policy on trade with the Soviet Union.

Additional steps forward in the trade relationship are possible. However, the prospects for such steps will

necessarily be influenced by the Soviet approach to our concerns across the broad range of our relationship -- arms control, regional issues, human rights, as well as trade.

Trade is not a "golden bridge" that by itself will lead to better relations between our two countries. But it can be an important part in a process of slow expansion and improvement of relations in many fields. That is our hope; that is our objective.

I cannot appear before an audience which includes a number of influential officials from the Soviet Union without mentioning a case which weighs heavily on the minds of the American people today. There is great warmth in this country for the peoples of the Soviet Union. When we are together as human beings, there is a natural affinity, a spontaneous closeness and respect. When we think about you, we remember most of all your incredible courage during the war and the great intellectual contributions and courage of individual Russian writers, scientists and others throughout history. Among your many extraordinary peoples, there are two who are particularly close to our hearts -- a woman who was wounded three times in the war, and a man who was honored with every possible Soviet award and the Nobel Prize for Peace. We earnestly hope that you will be true to the best of your traditions and respond to their appeal. They are following the path of non-violence which Tolstoy and Gandhi trod. They deserve your respect and support.

#0194A

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4073

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. CHARLES HILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Speech by DAS Palmer (U)

We have reviewed and have no objection to the draft speech to be given by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs R. Mark Palmer before the plenary session of the U.S.-USSR Trade and Economic Council in New York on May 23. (C)

Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997

By smf NARA, Date 11/20/98

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



8414872

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

May 19, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Draft Copy of Speech by DAS Palmer

Attached is a draft copy of remarks to be given by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs R. Mark Palmer before the plenary session of the US-USSR Trade and Economic Council in New York May 23.

Covey

Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997

By smf NARA, Date 11/20/98

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Decl: OADR

Remarks to the
U.S.-USSR Trade
and Economic Council Meeting,
May 23, 1984

By
Deputy Assistant Secretary
for European Affairs
Mark Palmer

USTEC is meeting today at a time when U.S.-Soviet relations are "normal". Unfortunately since the Second World War the norm has been that we were not doing much constructive business together. With only very brief periods of limited cooperation, practically every year has found us focussed more on our differences than on the fact that the two most powerful nations in the world should work together.

The past decade has witnessed several sustained efforts at cooperation by the United States. Speaking frankly, we believe that each of them has been cut-short because of Soviet actions. Not because we want to engage in an academic exercise in history, but because we believe greater understanding is essential as we strive to open a new and more durable period in our relations, I would like to review our understanding of the two most recent, ultimately stillborn efforts by this country.

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- We signed a new long-term grain agreement providing for a 50 percent increase in the minimum Soviet purchase requirement last August.
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#0194A

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

May 21, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MC FARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT: Review of U.S.-USSR Fishing Relationship

The interagency review of measures proposed last year by Congressman Breaux regarding the fisheries relationship with the USSR has been completed. You will recall that Breaux had proposed removing the Afghanistan sanction and restoring our bilateral fisheries relationship with the Soviets. Recently, we agreed with the Soviets to extend the existing fisheries agreement to December 31, 1985, but no allocation of fish was made to the USSR.

Following the interagency review, State and Commerce recommend that two steps be taken:

- restore a directed allocation of 50,000 metric tons, conditioned on a Soviet commitment to increase the existing joint venture with an American firm commensurately; and
- permit further joint ventures providing there are no overriding security problems.

The IG considered a third step -- to seek renegotiation of the bilateral fisheries agreement at this time -- but concluded that this step should not be taken now, but should be kept under review with regard to the future development of political conditions.

Discussion:

The reasons given by the IG for restoring a small fisheries allocation to the Soviets (50,000 metric tons would be one tenth of the allocation they had before Afghanistan) and allowing further joint ventures are based on a judgment that these moves would be of benefit to the American fishing industry, which is currently depressed.

Given the strong Congressional interest (from the Pacific Northwest and Alaska) in restoring the bilateral fisheries relationship and the desirability of maintaining a minimal framework for non-strategic economic interaction with the Soviets, I believe that the IG's recommendations should be approved eventually.

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Declassify on: OADR

BY smk NARA, DATE 11/22/97

However, I believe that at the moment the timing is bad. The Soviets are still engaged in a major offensive in Afghanistan, and we face a possible tragedy in the Soviet handling of the Sakharov's hunger strike. I recommend, therefore, that State be requested to review its recommendation in light of the present political situation, and provide its views on whether a decision on this issue should be made now, or should be deferred in light of current additional strains in the U.S.-Soviet relationship.

Lenczowski, Levine and Sestanovich concur. ^{SRS}

Recommendation:

That you authorize transmittal of the attached Kimmitt-Hill memorandum, which requests State to review its recommendation in respect to timing.

Approve

Disapprove

Attachments:

- Tab I Proposed Kimmitt to Hill memorandum
- Tab II Hill to McFarlane memorandum, April 28, 1984

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3447

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. CHARLES HILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Review of U.S.-USSR Fishing Relationship (e)

Since your memorandum of April 28, 1984, on this subject was sent, a number of additional strains have developed in the U.S.-Soviet relationship. These include the Soviet boycott of the Olympics, the intensification of the war in Afghanistan, and the steps taken against Mrs. Bonner and Academician Sakharov. (e)

In view of the above, the Department's views are requested on the question of timing the President's decision on the fisheries matter. Specifically, should such a step be taken now, and if so, how should we explain a favorable decision on this matter in light of present circumstances? (e)

Upon receipt of the Department's views on the timing question, the matter will be forwarded to the President for decision. (e)

Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary

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Declassify on: OADR

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NLS F95-074 #90

BY smj NARA, DATE 11/22/99

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



Washington, D.C. 20520

April 28, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. McFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Review of US - USSR Fishing Relationship

The NSC on March 21, 1983, requested an interagency review of measures proposed by Congressman Breaux regarding the fisheries relationship with the USSR. Breaux's proposals would remove an Afghanistan sanction and restore our bilateral fisheries relationship. They are strongly supported by the fishing industry and other Senators and Congressmen from the Pacific Northwest and Alaska. We and the Soviets just agreed to extend the existing fisheries agreement for eighteen months, through December 31, 1985.

The interagency review, interrupted by the KAL incident, has been completed. The concerned agencies (State and Commerce; NSC unable to attend) considered the following three steps:

--granting the Soviets a directed fish allocation of approximately 50,000 metric tons to permit expansion of the existing joint venture based in Seattle. Prior to the Afghanistan invasion, the Soviets had a 500,000-ton allocation. A directed allocation would permit Soviet vessels to remain on station fishing when weather conditions require the smaller U.S. fishing boats to seek shelter. This would permit an expanded Soviet processing capability to remain in place for longer periods of time, which would benefit the joint venture. At present, Soviet vessels can only process U.S.-caught fish;

--allow further joint ventures in other areas of the U.S. fishing zone as they are proposed, assuming there are no overriding security problems;

--inform the Soviets we are prepared to renegotiate the US-Soviet fisheries agreement, with the possibility of negotiating an agreement to allow US fishermen access to Soviet fisheries. This would almost certainly require a large directed allocation to the Soviets in return.

The IG determined that there are strong economic reasons to restore the fisheries relationship and that the current sanctions are imposing economic hardships on the U.S. fishing industry:

-- The US firm currently involved in the existing joint

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DECL: OADR

BY Smf, NARA, DATE 11/22/99

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

venture has stated that it expects to increase the joint venture operations by the amount of the direct allocation given to the USSR. The joint venture currently processes about 160,000 MT of US-caught fish annually, valued at \$30 million, and involving 40 US vessels which otherwise would not be employed. An additional 50,000 MT caught by the joint venture would result in an estimated \$8 million increase in proceeds to participating US fishermen.

-- Establishment of new joint ventures with the Soviets in US waters would increase our leverage with other countries now fishing off the US coast (Japan and Korea) to expand cooperation with the US fishing industry.

-- The US fishing industry is depressed and the impact from the joint ventures is substantial; the multiplier effect on local fish-related industries from each dollar earned by the present joint venture is estimated at four to one.

-- There has been a significant reverse flow of technology and expertise to the US fishing industry from the Soviets as the result of the joint venture and our cooperative fisheries research programs. Restoration of Soviet fishing privileges would enhance our opportunities to take greater advantage of these benefits.

The IG also concluded that forward movement would be consistent with the President's January 16 speech calling for a constructive dialogue with the Soviets. The fishing sanction on Poland has been removed and the restoration of Soviet privileges would underscore our commitment to review sanctions to ensure that US business interests are not unfairly penalized. Finally this action parallels negotiation of the the new LTA.

The Departments of State and Commerce have concluded that we should now take the first two steps: restoring a directed allocation of 50,000 MT, conditioned on a Soviet commitment to increase the existing joint venture commensurately; and, permitting further joint ventures providing there are no overriding security problems. We would not publicly encourage new joint ventures, however. The allocation would be granted in at least two stages to permit observation of Soviet performance.

It was deemed inappropriate to seek renegotiation of the bilateral fisheries agreement at this time. We will keep this step under review should political conditions permit our moving in that direction in the future.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

We now request NSC concurrence with the recommendations of the interagency review and that the matter be forwarded to the President for his review of all the options and decision.

Charles Hill
for Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

UNCLASSIFIED

May 21, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT: Brown's Speech to US-USSR Trade and Economic Council

I concur with the draft text of Clarence J. Brown's speech to the US-USSR Trade and Economic Council, provided the suggestions by State incorporated in the Wishard-Kimmitt Memorandum of May 18 are incorporated, and a further change is made in the sentence at the end of paragraph 1, page 2 to read:

"These talks are especially needed at times when relations between our countries need improvement."

Since we have not yet seen a full revised and coordinated text, I would suggest that we convey our agreement in principle with a text incorporating these changes, but request a revised text before formal clearance is given.

Recommendation:

That you authorize a telephone call to Commerce to convey the above, that is, agreement in principle with a text with the suggested changes, but a request for the revised text before formal clearance is granted.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment:

Tab I -- Brown-McFarlane letter of May 16 and Wishard-Kimmitt Memo of May 18, with attachments

National Security Council
The White House

1169 cu

May 18

1200

System # I
Package # 3989

When action package 3989 comes back from Matlock. Please put this note with it.

Van Wishard with Clarence Brown is waiting for approval or comments on the speech. They want the comments today. If RCM approves, please call Wishard on 377 5151 and let him know what comments we have.

Kay

| | SEQUENCE TO | HAS SEEN | DISPOSITION |
|------------------|-------------|----------|-------------|
| Dep. Exec. Sec'y | <u>1</u> | <u>✓</u> | |
| Bob Kimmitt | <u>2</u> | <u>K</u> | |
| John Poindexter | <u>X</u> | | <u>X</u> |
| Tom Shull | | | |
| Wilma Hall | | | |
| Bud McFarlane | | | |
| Bob Kimmitt | <u>X</u> | | |
| NSC Secretariat | | | |
| Situation Room | | | |
| <u>Matlock</u> | <u>3</u> | | <u>A</u> |

I = Information **A = Action** R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

I've already called Commerce. Please resubmit comments on new draft.

Attached



84 MAY 18 P 5: 13

May 18, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT KIMMETT
Deputy Assistant to the
President for National
Security Affairs

FROM: Wm. Van Dusen Wishard
Special Assistant

Van Wishard

SUBJECT: Clarence J. Brown's Speech to US-USSR
Trade and Economic Council

Attached is the paragraph the State Department has asked to be inserted in Deputy Secretary Brown's speech. They suggest it be inserted on page 7 between the last two paragraphs.

Other changes recommended by State;

- Page 3, line 8: delete "computer"
Line 10: delete "the latest"
- Page 4, second paragraph: delete the second sentence about Japan becoming world's second largest economy.
- Page 2: strike last line
- Page 8, second paragraph, second sentence should read "for national security and foreign policy reasons"
- Page 10, line 3: change "encourage" to "support"
Line 7: change "encourages" to "supports"
Second paragraph, strike the third sentence
Second paragraph, line 7 should read "Agreement, currently under consideration for renewal, could provide us with a solid basis for improving."

-- Page 14, second sentence should read "The economic cooperation bred by trade is integral to this progress."
Strike what was the remainder of that sentence.

Attachment

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

May 18, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: U.S.-USSR Trade and Economic Council's Speech

I have a number of problems with Brown's draft speech, but Mark Palmer tells me that State was sent the same draft you were and is working on suggested changes.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Bob Kimmitt or me to ask Commerce to send us a draft as coordinated with State before we review the text in detail.

Approve RMK

Disapprove _____

Attachment:

Tab I Mr. Brown's letter and draft speech

cc: Mr. Lenczowski
Mr. McMinn
Ms. Small
Mr. Sestanovich
Mr. Robinson
Mr. Fortier

THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20230

May 16, 1984

Honorable Robert McFarlane
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Bud,

Enclosed is a draft of my forthcoming speech to the US-USSR Trade and Economic Council. As I mentioned yesterday, I would value any guidance and suggestions you might have both for the speech and for any broader contribution I might make while I am at the Council's meeting in New York.

With best wishes.

Sincerely,



Clarence J. Brown

Enclosure

CJB/VW/bs

1001 2 115623

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

UNCLASSIFIED

May 21, 1984

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT: Baldrige-Sushkov Meeting

Secretary Baldrige has sent you a letter outlining his plans for a meeting with Bill Verity and Soviet Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade Sushkov. The meeting is scheduled for May 25, a few hours before you have a scheduled meeting with Verity and Sushkov.

Baldrige's plans for the meeting seem consistent with our earlier consultations and I perceive no problems with them.

JL
Lenczowski, *JM* McMillan, *DR* Robinson and *SRS* Sestanovich concur.

Attachment:

TAB I - Letter from Secretary Baldrige of May 15, 1984

THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20230

May 15, 1984

84 MAY 17 12:02

MAY 17 1984

Honorable Robert C. McFarlane
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Bud,

On May 25 I will be meeting with Soviet Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade, Vladimir Sushkov, who is coming to the United States to cochair the meeting of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Trade and Economic Council in New York.

A few days ago I discussed with Ambassador Hartman my meeting with Sushkov and the President's recent approval for extending the U.S.-Soviet Economic, Industrial and Technical Cooperation Agreement (EITCA) and for exploring the possibility of a meeting of a Working Group of Experts under the Agreement.

In the course of our conversation the Ambassador noted that news of the President's decision would be conveyed to the Soviets at the working level of the State Department. He agreed that it would be a good idea for me to follow up on this by raising the subject of the EITCA Working Group with Sushkov. The Joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. Commercial Commission (JCC) is specifically charged with convening the Working Group of Experts under the terms of the EITCA.

The Working Group is headed on the Soviet side by an official of the Ministry of Foreign Trade, and for the U.S. side it should be headed by the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for International Economic Policy.

The Working Group would be responsible for exchanging information and forecasts on economic industrial and commercial trends to assist enterprises and trading organizations in both countries in identifying fields for "mutually beneficial contracts."

The level and character of this exchange would be entirely within current policy guidelines and should contribute to the objective the President enunciated in his January 16 speech of finding areas for U.S. Soviet cooperation in order to move toward a more constructive relationship. Observers from other departments, and certainly from the NSC staff, will be invited to participate.

Sincerely,



Secretary of Commerce

Chron

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

May 19, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MOFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT: Next Steps on Sakharov

Secretary Shultz has submitted a Memorandum to the President reporting on past actions and plans for additional steps to encourage the resolution of the Sakharov problem.

It is a useful run-down of our efforts, and I recommend that you send it to the President for his information.

Walt Raymond ^{*unavailable*} concurs.

Recommendation:

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I to the President.

Approve ___ Disapprove ___

Attachments:

- Tab I - Memorandum to the President
- Tab A - Shultz-President Memorandum of May 18, 1984

~~SECRET~~

Declassify: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F95-074 #92

BY *inf* NARA, DATE 11/22/99

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
SUBJECT: Next Steps on Sakharov

George Shultz has sent you the attached memorandum reviewing the steps we have taken to encourage the Soviet leadership to resolve the Sakharov situation favorably, and also some steps which are now underway.

George agrees that it would be unwise for you to make a public statement on the issue, to avoid further polarization, but is moving -- in full consultation with us -- to activate other statesmen and prominent private individuals to convey their interest to the Soviet leaders.

Attachment:

Tab A -- Memorandum from Secretary Shultz of May 18, 1984

Prepared by:
Jack Matlock

cc: Vice President

~~SECRET~~

DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F95-074 #93

BY AMJ NARA, DATE 11/22/79

~~SECRET~~

SYSTEM II
90605

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

May 18, 1984 10:58

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
From: George P. Shultz *GPS*
Subject: Next Steps on Sakharov

Dr. Andrei Sakharov's hunger strike is now in its fifteenth day. In view of his fragile health, time is already running out for U.S. and Western efforts to persuade the Soviet authorities to allow Mrs. Bonner to go abroad for medical treatment, and thereby allow Dr. Sakharov to terminate his hunger strike. According to relatives, Mrs. Bonner was scheduled to join Dr. Sakharov in his hunger strike on May 12. Soviet efforts to prevent news about the Sakharovs from reaching the West have thus far been successful, and we do not know what is happening to the Sakharovs or what their condition is.

The U.S. Government has already undertaken several steps to encourage the Soviet authorities to relax their pressure on the Sakharovs:

-- We have brought up the Sakharov situation with the Soviets at a number of levels (including my May 10 meeting with Dobrynin).

-- The Department has released two public statements condemning Soviet behavior toward the Sakharovs.

-- We have instructed our Embassies in 21 Western and Third World capitals to request the help of host governments and international political organizations in convincing the Soviets to cease their pressure on the Sakharovs. Some governments have already responded, and there is a possibility that Mitterand may precondition his June trip to Moscow on resolution of Sakharov's case.

-- We have initiated special discussions of the Sakharov case with visiting foreign leaders or during the travels of our own leadership overseas. For example, during his visit to New Delhi, Vice President Bush raised Sakharov with Indian officials.

-- We have consulted with National Academy of Sciences President Frank Press, who has in turn informed sister Academies of other nations of his concern about the Sakharov situation and caused the Soviets to worry that his mid-June trip to Moscow will not take place as planned.

-- USIA is putting together a public affairs strategy for dealing with the Sakharov situation, and has already advised

DECLASSIFIED

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NLS M1480 #9

DECL: OADR

BY AM, NARA, DATE 12/12/05

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

posts to give their support to Sakharov Day observances (May 21) and to distribute as widely as practicable key public documents on the situation.

-- We are continuing our close contact with Sakharov family members in this country, and are advising posts where they can be of assistance to Sakharov relatives during their travels to other countries.

-- Finally, we are consulting with prominent Americans not in government who might have some influence with the Soviets to use on the Sakharovs' behalf. George Kennan has already undertaken to discuss Sakharov with Dobrynin in the context of an upcoming trip to the USSR.

Action Plan for Additional Efforts

In the coming days we will be taking steps designed to place increasing pressure on the Soviet authorities. Our objective is to provide them additional avenues for resolving the situation favorably should they so choose and make clear that this is an issue of worldwide humanitarian concern, rather than a U.S.-Soviet political confrontation.

-- At this time we do not recommend that you make either a private or a public statement on behalf of the Sakharovs, since this could have the effect of further polarizing the issue. As you know, we made a private approach to the Soviets on your behalf to try to avert the present crisis. The Soviet response, both in private and then in public, was to accuse us of having conspired with the Sakharovs to create the present situation. The same response is likely to any new Presidential statement on Sakharov.

-- We will, however, encourage other U.S. officials to raise the issue when appropriate, stressing the international nature of concern about the Sakharovs.

-- We are making a discreet approach to East German lawyer Vogel, who has brokered some past spy and dissident trades, to determine whether there is any Soviet interest in principle in trading for the Sakharovs. There is little chance that the Soviets will trade for Sakharov. But despite the limited prospects for success, this avenue should be tried to provide the Soviets with another option to resolve the present situation short of tragedy.

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~~SECRET~~

- 3 -

-- We will also be going privately to other governments who have persons the Soviets want (such the West Germans and the Norwegians) to determine if there is any willingness on their part to trade for Sakharov.

-- We will be following up our 21-country demarche of last week with additional demarches, at the Ambassadorial level where appropriate, to encourage wider international private and public efforts on behalf of the Sakharovs.

-- I am asking Foreign Minister Genscher to raise the Sakharov matter during his May 20-22 trip to Moscow.

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SYSTEM II
90605

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

May 18, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
From: George P. Shultz *GPS*
Subject: Next Steps on Sakharov

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-- USIA is putting together a public affairs strategy for dealing with the Sakharov situation, and has already advised

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DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLS F95-074 P94

By smf, NARA, Date 11/22/99

posts to give their support to Sakharov Day observances (May 21) and to distribute as widely as practicable key public documents on the situation.

-- We are continuing our close contact with Sakharov family members in this country, and are advising posts where they can be of assistance to Sakharov relatives during their travels to other countries.

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- 3 -



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-- I am asking Foreign Minister Genscher to raise the Sakharov matter during his May 20-22 trip to Moscow.

~~SECRET~~

C

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

May 18, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: U.S.-USSR Trade and Economic Council's Speech

I have a number of problems with Brown's draft speech, but Mark Palmer tells me that State was sent the same draft you were and is working on suggested changes.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Bob Kimmitt or me to ask Commerce to send us a draft as coordinated with State before we review the text in detail.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment:

Tab I Mr. Brown's letter and draft speech

cc: Mr. Lenczowski
Mr. McMinn
Ms. Small
Mr. Sestanovich
Mr. Robinson
Mr. Fortier

THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20230

May 16, 1984

Honorable Robert McFarlane
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Bud,

Enclosed is a draft of my forthcoming speech to the US-USSR Trade and Economic Council. As I mentioned yesterday, I would value any guidance and suggestions you might have both for the speech and for any broader contribution I might make while I am at the Council's meeting in New York.

With best wishes.

Sincerely,



Clarence J. Brown

Enclosure

CJB/VW/bs

DRAFT
5/16/84

US-USSR TRADE AND ECONOMIC COUNCIL

MAY 24, 1984

MR. VERITY, MR. SUSHKOV, AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN, DISTINGUISHED MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL. IT IS A PRIVILEGE FOR ME TO BE WITH YOU TODAY; TO REPRESENT THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AT THIS OCCASION; AND TO TAKE PART IN AN EVENT THAT HOLDS THE GERM OF PROMISE AND POSSIBILITY FOR OUR TWO COUNTRIES.

YOU HAVE BEEN MEETING HERE TO DEVELOP WIDE-RANGING MUTUAL ADVANTAGES FOR OUR NATIONS . . . ADVANTAGES THAT CAN MEAN PROGRESS AND PEACE FOR THE PEOPLES WE REPRESENT.

THIS MEETING . . . THE TRADE AND ECONOMIC COUNCIL'S FIRST FULL MEMBERSHIP MEETING IN THE UNITED STATES IN SEVEN YEARS . . . IS A SINGULAR EVENT. THE COUNCIL PLAYS A UNIQUE ROLE BETWEEN OUR TWO NATIONS . . . INDEED, IN THE WORLD.

THROUGH FAIR AND STORMY WEATHER, THE COUNCIL HAS CARRIED THE BANNER OF AMERICAN-SOVIET ECONOMIC COOPERATION. IN THE ABSENCE OF OFFICIAL GOVERNMENTAL MEETINGS ON NON-AGRICULTURAL TRADE, THE COUNCIL HAS SERVED AS A FORUM FOR COMMERCIAL DISCUSSIONS ON MANY LEVELS. THESE TALKS ARE ESPECIALLY NEEDED AT TIMES WHEN OUR DIFFERENT ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL SYSTEMS PRODUCE UNCERTAINTY AND TENSION.

WE MEET TODAY AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF DRAMATIC CHANGE SWEEPING ACROSS THE EARTH. PROPELLING THIS CHANGE IS THE DOUBLING EVERY DECADE OF THE WORLD'S BODY OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE. THE TORRENT OF TECHNOLOGY THIS KNOWLEDGE CREATES IS ALTERING RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN NATIONS, AND IT HOLDS BROAD IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE US-SOVIET RELATIONS.

THESE NEW TECHNOLOGIES ARE BRINGING OUR NATIONS TO THE VERGE OF THE GREATEST ECONOMIC EXPANSION SINCE ELECTRICITY, CHEMICALS AND AUTOMOBILES CHANGED POWER SOURCES, MATERIALS AND THE TRANSPORTATION OF INDUSTRY A CENTURY AGO. THEY ARE RESTRUCTURING THE PATTERN OF WORLD ECONOMIC PRODUCTION AS SURELY AND FUNDAMENTALLY AS THE CHANGES MADE DURING THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION A CENTURY EARLIER.

WITH THE COMING OF LOW COST COMPUTER-TELECOMMUNICATIONS NETWORKS, ENGINEERS AND SCIENTISTS IN EVERY PART OF THE GLOBE NOW HAVE INSTANT ACCESS TO THE LATEST TECHNOLOGY AND PRODUCTION TECHNIQUES. THE ABILITY OF PEOPLE TO ADAPT TO THESE INFORMATION-BASED ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES IS PLAYING AN INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT ROLE IN NATIONAL ECONOMIES. THE VERY CONCEPT OF AN INDEPENDENT NATIONAL ECONOMY IS CRUMBLING AND TAKING WITH IT OUTDATED ECONOMIC THEORIES.

KNOWLEDGE HAS REPLACED LABOR AND RAW MATERIALS AS THE PRIMARY SOURCE OF WEALTH, THUS ALLOWING NATIONS TO CREATE THEIR OWN COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE EVEN WHEN NOT GIFTED WITH RAW MATERIALS.

IN THIS VERY WAY JAPAN HAS DISPLACED AMERICA AS THE WORLD'S LEADING AUTOMOBILE MANUFACTURER; THEY HAVE DISPLACED GERMANY AS THE WORLD'S MAJOR CAMERA MAKER; AND THEY HAVE DISPLACED SWITZERLAND AS THE WORLD'S PREMIER WATCH PRODUCER. ON THE BASIS OF SUCH DYNAMISM, JAPAN COULD BECOME THE WORLD'S SECOND LARGEST ECONOMY. NEED I MENTION THAT JAPAN IS LIMITED IN ITS NATURAL RESOURCE BY COMPARISON TO THE U.S. OR THE USSR, AND IT HAS ACCOMPLISHED ITS POSITION IN ONLY ONE GENERATION SINCE ITS ABJECT DEFEAT IN WORLD WAR II.

BUT IT'S NOT JUST JAPAN.

GERMANY IS THE WORLD'S LARGEST EXPORTER OF MANUFACTURED GOODS. HONG KONG IS THE WORLD'S THIRD LARGEST FINANCIAL SUPERMARKET. KOREA BOASTS THE WORLD'S LARGEST SHIPBUILDING YARDS. BRAZIL HAS MOVED INTO THE FRONT RANK OF COMMODITY STEEL PRODUCTION. SINGAPORE IS THE WORLD'S SECOND-LARGEST PRODUCER OF OIL DRILLING RIGS. SOME 15 THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES ALONE HAVE OVER 1,300 FOREIGN MANUFACTURING AND TRADING SUBSIDIARIES.

WHAT THIS MEANS IS THAT THE PROCESS OF ECONOMIC PRODUCTION IS BECOMING GLOBAL. ANY NATION -- EVEN LESSER DEVELOPED COUNTRIES WITH LIMITED RESOURCES -- CAN OVERLEAP MORE DEVELOPED WORLD LEADERS IF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC RESOURCES ARE WISELY ORGANIZED. NATIONS ARE INCREASINGLY PART OF A WORLDWIDE SYSTEM OF RESEARCH, INVENTION, FINANCING, PRODUCTION, MARKETING AND CONSUMPTION. THUS THE WORLD BANK REPORTS THAT 25 PERCENT OF EVERYTHING PRODUCED IN THE WORLD IS SOLD ACROSS NATIONAL BORDERS.

EACH NATION IS STRUGGLING TO ADJUST TO THIS NEW SITUATION.

IN MY OWN COUNTRY, FOR EXAMPLE, 70 PERCENT OF EVERYTHING SOLD TO CONSUMERS COMPETES AGAINST PRODUCTS FROM OTHER NATIONS. THE SHARE OF OUR GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT DERIVED FROM TRADE HAS DOUBLED IN THE PAST DECADE. WE EXPORT 20 PERCENT OF OUR INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION AND MORE THAN 40 PERCENT OF OUR FARM PRODUCE. EXPORTS ACCOUNT FOR THE JOBS OF APPROXIMATELY 5 MILLION AMERICANS.

IT IS IN THIS CONTEXT WE VIEW THE REQUIREMENTS OF U.S. TRADE. TRADE IS NO LONGER A SECONDARY ECONOMIC ACTIVITY. IT IS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE PRODUCTION PROCESS.

AND SO WE SEEK TO EXPAND OUR TRADE RELATIONSHIP WITH ALL NATIONS, INCLUDING WITH THE SOVIET UNION.

THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT HAS LONG RECOGNIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF TRADE BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES. TRADE OFFERS OPPORTUNITIES FOR BENEFICIAL COOPERATION. PRESIDENT REAGAN NOTED RECENTLY THAT PEACEFUL TRADE HELPS IN THE EFFORT TO DEVELOP CONSTRUCTIVE AMERICAN-SOVIET RELATIONS.

YET TRADE IS ONLY ONE FACET OF THE TOTAL AMERICAN-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP . . . A RELATIONSHIP WHICH TOUCHES VIRTUALLY EVERY AREA OF U.S. INTERNATIONAL CONCERNS.

IN SUCH A COMPLEX RELATIONSHIP, TRADE CANNOT BE SEPARATED FROM EVERYTHING ELSE.

THIS IS A POINT SOVIET LEADERS HAVE ALSO MADE OVER THE YEARS. EVEN WHEN EXPECTATIONS FOR TRADE BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES WERE GREATEST, WE EACH RECOGNIZED, IN WRITING, THE RIGHT OF EITHER GOVERNMENT TO TAKE ANY ACTION IT DEEMED NECESSARY FOR THE PROTECTION OF ITS SECURITY INTERESTS.

AS YOU WELL KNOW, WE HAVE EXPORT CONTROLS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY, FOREIGN POLICY, AND SHORT SUPPLY REASONS. BUT OUTSIDE OF EXPORTS PROHIBITED FOR NATIONAL SECURITY REASONS, A LARGE RANGE OF PRODUCTS EXISTS WHICH CAN FREELY BE EXPORTED FROM THE U.S. TO THE SOVIET UNION. WE HAVE JUST ISSUED A BOOKLET WHICH DETAILS SOME OF THE AREAS OF TRADE ACCEPTABLE UNDER OUR REGULATIONS.

EXPORTS AND IMPORTS PROVIDING BENEFITS TO BOTH COUNTRIES COVER A WIDE RANGE OF PRODUCTS. BULLDOZERS AND SUPER DUMP TRUCKS, SOFT DRINK AND BABY FOOD PLANTS, PLATINUM GROUP METALS, FERTILIZERS AND FUELS ARE EXAMPLES WHICH COME TO MIND.

AS TO FUTURE POSSIBILITIES, I COULD THINK OF SALES TO THE USSR OF AGRICULTURAL EQUIPMENT AND PLANT TO MANUFACTURE SUCH EQUIPMENT. THE COMMERCE DEPARTMENT HAS ENCOURAGED THIS TYPE OF TRADE IN SEVERAL WAYS, INCLUDING SUPPORT FOR THE COUNCIL'S "AGRIBUSINESS-USA" AS WELL AS ASSURANCE OF EXTENSION OF EXPORT LICENSES. I AM SURE THAT DURING THIS MEETING YOU HAVE BEEN DISCUSSING MANY NEW IDEAS FOR COOPERATION IN THE FUTURE. WE HOPE THAT THESE WILL TRANSLATE INTO INCREASED TRADE.

PERHAPS IT HAS NOT BEEN AS CLEAR TO AMERICAN AND SOVIET BUSINESS REPRESENTATIVES AS IT MIGHT HAVE BEEN THAT WE ENCOURAGE U.S. FIRMS TO DEVELOP NON-STRATEGIC TRADE WITH THE SOVIET UNION. OUR NEGOTIATION OF AN EXPANDED GRAIN AGREEMENT LAST YEAR MAKES CLEAR OUR POLICY ON AGRICULTURAL TRADE. I HOPE MY PRESENCE HERE PROVIDES REASSURANCE THAT THE U.S. ALSO ENCOURAGES NON-STRATEGIC TRADE IN OTHER AREAS.

WE HAVE ENSURED THE PRESERVATION OF KEY ELEMENTS IN THE BILATERAL ECONOMIC FRAMEWORK. THERE IS A GRAIN AGREEMENT, AN AGRICULTURAL COOPERATION AGREEMENT AND A FISHERIES AGREEMENT. THE JOINT COMMERCIAL COMMISSION REMAINS TO OVERSEE TRADE RELATIONS. RENEWAL OF THE LONG-TERM ECONOMIC, INDUSTRIAL AND TECHNICAL COOPERATION AGREEMENT WILL PROVIDE US WITH A SOLID BASIS FOR IMPROVING THE COMMUNICATION BETWEEN OUR GOVERNMENTS IN THE ECONOMIC SPHERE.

OUR MISSION AT THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE IS BOTH TO PROMOTE EXPORTS AND, AT THE SAME TIME, TO ADMINISTER EXPORT CONTROLS WHERE NECESSARY. THIS IS A DIFFICULT AND, AT TIMES, CONTRADICTORY TASK. SUCH A JOB IMPRESSES UPON US THE NEED FOR AS STABLE A WORLD TRADING ENVIRONMENT AS POSSIBLE. THIS IS THE REASON THAT, WHILE WE SEEK AUTHORITY TO ADMINISTER CONTROLS EFFECTIVELY, WE ALSO SUPPORT MEASURES TO PROVIDE A REASONABLE DEGREE OF CONTRACT SANCTITY.

OUR GOVERNMENT IS CURRENTLY CONSIDERING RENEWAL OF THE EXPORT ADMINISTRATION ACT. PRESIDENT REAGAN SUPPORTS INCLUSION IN THE NEW ACT OF A PROVISION ON CONTRACT SANCTITY. THIS PROVISION ACKNOWLEDGES THAT BUSINESS CONTRACTS SHOULD NOT, AS A GENERAL RULE, BE BROKEN FOR REASONS OF FOREIGN POLICY, YET IT PROVIDES THE PRESIDENT WITH THE FLEXIBILITY TO BREAK CONTRACTS UNDER EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES.

THIS WOULD COMPLEMENT THE CONTRACT SANCTITY FOR AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS ALREADY PROVIDED BY THE COMMODITY FUTURES ACT. IT WOULD HELP MANIFEST PRESIDENT REAGAN'S INSISTENCE THAT THE UNITED STATES BE A RELIABLE TRADING PARTNER. OF COURSE, THE CONGRESS IS STILL DELIBERATING THE EXPORT ADMINISTRATION ACT, AND WE HAVE NO WAY OF PREDICTING THE OUTCOME.

LET ME STRESS THAT, IN LOOKING AT THE BROADER SCOPE OF US-SOVIET RELATIONS, NO ONE IS HAPPY ABOUT THEIR CURRENT STATE. THE FUTURE OF MANKIND OBLIGES OUR TWO NATIONS TO PEACEFULLY RESOLVE OUR DIFFERENCES. PRESIDENT REAGAN RECOGNIZED THIS IN HIS SPEECH ON JANUARY 16. "NEITHER WE NOR THE SOVIET UNION," HE SAID, "CAN WISH AWAY THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN OUR TWO SOCIETIES AND OUR PHILOSOPHIES. BUT WE SHOULD ALWAYS REMEMBER THAT WE DO HAVE COMMON INTERESTS.

AND THE FOREMOST AMONG THEM," THE PRESIDENT CONTINUED,
"IS TO AVOID WAR AND REDUCE THE LEVEL OF ARMS. THERE IS NO
RATIONAL ALTERNATIVE BUT TO STEER A COURSE WHICH I WOULD
CALL CREDIBLE DETERENCE AND PEACEFUL COMPETITION; AND IF WE
DO SO," HE CONCLUDED, "WE MIGHT FIND AREAS IN WHICH WE COULD
ENGAGE IN CONSTRUCTIVE COOPERATION."

THE UNITED STATES IS DETERMINED TO DEAL WITH OUR DIFFERENCES
WITH THE SOVIET UNION PEACEFULLY, THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS.
WE'RE PREPARED TO DISCUSS THE PROBLEMS THAT DIVIDE US AND TO
WORK FOR PRACTICAL, FAIR SOLUTIONS ON A BASIS OF MUTUAL
COMPROMISE. THE UNITED STATES WILL NEVER RETREAT FROM
NEGOTIATIONS. BUT WE INSIST THAT NEGOTIATIONS DEAL WITH
REAL PROBLEMS AND SEEK GENUINE SOLUTIONS. THE TIME FOR
POSTURING BEFORE WORLD AUDIENCES HAS LONG PASSED.

IN CLOSING, I WANT TO EMPHASIZE THAT NEVER HAVE THE PEOPLE OF OUR TWO COUNTRIES SO HOPED FOR PROGRESS TOWARD PEACE AS THEY DO TODAY. THE INTERDEPENDENCE BRED BY TRADE IS INTEGRAL TO THIS PROGRESS, AS PEOPLE ARE LESS LIKELY TO SHOOT AT SOMEONE ELSE IF THEY KNOW THEY WILL HIT THEMSELVES IN THEIR OWN POCKETBOOK. TECHNOLOGY AND TRADE HAVE GIVEN US THE TOOLS LITERALLY TO SHAPE A NEW ERA. AN ERA WHICH CAN FEED, CLOTHE AND HOUSE EVERY MEMBER OF THE HUMAN FAMILY. AN ERA WHERE FEAR OF ANNIHILATION IS A RELIC OF BYGONE TIMES. AN ERA THAT COULD TAKE NATIONS BEYOND HISTORIC RIVALRIES. AN ERA OF FULFILLMENT FOR ALL PEOPLES.

THAT IS THE HEART OF THE TASK FACING OUR TWO COUNTRIES, AND THIS COUNCIL, AS WE SEEK TO EXPAND OUR COMMERCE AND TRADE.

THANK YOU.