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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
letter case (8490307)			
1. memo	from Matlock to McFarlane re: consular review talks (3pp) R 1/7/10 MO2-010 #1	3/28/84	P-1 P-5
2. memo	from Robert Kimmitt to Charles Hill re: consular review talks (1p) R 1/7/10 MO2-010 #2	n.d.	P-1 P-5
3. memo	from Hill to McFarlane re: consular review talks (1p) Part. 7/15/10 MO2-010 #3	3/19/84	P-1 P-5
4. briefing paper	re: consular review talks (2pp) Part. 9/27/10 MO2-010 #4	n.d.	P-1 P-5
5. memo	re: talks (1p) Part. 7/15/10 MO2-010 #5	n.d.	P-1 P-5
6. memo	from Diane Doran to Matlock re: comments on proposed terms (1p) R 7/15/10 MO2-015 #6	3/28/84	P-1
7. paper	re: consular review talks (3pp) D 10/11/05 MO2-010 #7	n.d.	P-1 P-5
8. note	from Matlock to McFarlane/Poindexter re: Hartman's lunch with Dobrynin (1p)	3/29/84	P-1
9. memo	from Richard Burt to the Secretary re: Hartman's lunch with Dobrynin (3pp) R 9/25/02 MO2-010 #9	n.d.	P-1
COLLECTION: MATLOCK, JACK F.: Files			dlb
FILE FOLDER: Matlock Chron March 1984 [4 of 4] 90887 Box 3			10/19/95

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
10. note	copy of item # 8 (1p)	3/29/84	P-1
11. memo	copy of item # 9 (3pp)	n.d.	P-1
12. paper	page 35 (1p) R 9/25/02 MOL-010 # 10	n.d.	P-1
COLLECTION: MATLOCK, JACK F.: Files			dlb
FILE FOLDER: Matlock Chron March 1984 [4 of 4] OA 90887 Box 3			10/19/95

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

March 26, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR KATHY JAFFKE

FROM: ROBERT M. KIMMITT

SUBJECT: Letter to President from Representative Rodino

We have reviewed and concur with the Department of State's draft letter in response to Representative Rodino's letter to the President regarding Soviet Jewry.

Attachment

2055

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

March 26, 1984

FOR BOB KIMMITT

I recommend that you forward the attached memo to Kathy Jaffke.

Jack
JACK MATLOCK



UNCLASSIFIED
(Classification)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
TRANSMITTAL FORM

S/S 8407717

Date March 23, 1984

For: Mr. Robert C. McFarlane
National Security Council
The White House

Reference:

To: PRESIDENT Reagan From: Peter W. Rodino

Date: 28 Feb 84 Subject: Letter to President regarding
Soviet Jewry

WH Referral Dated: 13 Mar -84 NSC ID# 8402955
(if any)

 The attached item was sent directly to the
Department of State.

Action Taken:

- x A draft reply is attached.
 A draft reply will be forwarded.
 A translation is attached.
 An information copy of a direct reply is attached.
 We believe no response is necessary for the reason
cited below.
 The Department of State has no objection to the
proposed travel.
 Other.

Remarks:

for Charles Hill
Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

UNCLASSIFIED
(Classification)

SUGGESTED RESPONSE

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for your recent letter to the President concerning the grim situation currently faced by Jews in the Soviet Union.

We share your concern over the plight of Soviet Jews and have long urged the Soviet authorities to adopt a more flexible policy on emigration and to live up to those basic international standards of human rights spelled out in the Helsinki Accords and other documents. We have strongly spoken out against the unwelcome developments you describe in your letter, such as increasing manifestations of officially sanctioned anti-Semitism, persecution of both prominent and less well-known refuseniks, and the continued downward trend in Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union. We have raised human rights issues with the Soviets at every level and in many fora; our concern has been conveyed to the new Soviet leadership as well. They can have no doubt that Soviet performance in the most important human rights categories is as central to the Soviet-American dialogue as any other theme.

The Honorable
Peter W. Rodino, Chairman,
Committee on the Judiciary,
House of Representatives.

The U.S. Government will not cease its efforts on behalf of Soviet Jews, or overlook any opportunity to make progress on this human rights question. As President Reagan said of those efforts in his statement for the March 15 International Day of Concern for Soviet Jews, we "...have no higher priority. Those who care about the fate of Soviet Jews should know that we are with them today, and will be with them tomorrow."

Thank you again for your support for our efforts on behalf of Soviet Jews and others whose basic human rights are violated in the USSR. Please do not hesitate to contact us if we can be of any further assistance in this or any other matter.

Sincerely,

REFERRAL

DATE: 13 MAR 84

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPT OF STATE

8407717

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION

TO PRESIDENT

SOURCE: RODINO, PETER W

DATE: 28 FEB 84

KEYWORDS: USSR

CO

ISRAEL

HUMAN RIGHTS

SUBJ: LTR TO PRES FM REP RODINO RE SOVIET JEWRY

REQUIRED ACTION: DRAFT REPLY FOR WH SIG

DUE DATE: 20 MAR 84

COMMENTS

Loretta Kayton
45830
FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

Rec'd s/s
2/13/84

PETER W. RODINO, JR. (N.J.), CHAIRMAN

STAFF DIRECTOR:
GARNER J. CLINEASSOCIATE COUNSEL:
ALAN F. COFFEY, JR.

JACK BROOKS, TEX.
ROBERT W. KASTENMEIER, WIS.
DON EDWARDS, CALIF.
JOHN CONYERS, JR., MICH.
JOHN F. SEIBERLING, OHIO
ROMANO L. MAZZOLI, KY.
WILLIAM J. HUGHES, N.J.
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PATRICIA SCHROEDER, COLO.
DAN GLICKMAN, KANS.
BARNEY FRANK, MASS.
GEO. W. CROCKETT, JR., MICH.
CHARLES E. SCHUMER, N.Y.
BRUCE A. MORRISON, CONN.
EDWARD F. FEIGHAN, OHIO
LAWRENCE J. SMITH, FLA.
HOWARD L. BERMAN, CALIF.
FREDERICK C. BOUCHER, VA.

HAMILTON FISH, JR., N.Y.
CARLOS J. MOORHEAD, CALIF.
HENRY J. HYDE, ILL.
THOMAS N. KINDNESS, OHIO
HAROLD S. SAWYER, MICH.
DAN LUNGREN, CALIF.
F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., WIS.
BILL MCCOLLUM, FLA.
E. CLAY SHAW, JR., FLA.
GEORGE W. GEKAS, PA.
MICHAEL DEWINE, OHIO

U.S. House of Representatives
Committee on the Judiciary
Washington, D.C. 20515
Telephone: 202-225-3951

8407717

February 28, 1984

Honorable Ronald Reagan
The President
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

I strongly believe that current developments in the Soviet Union have created a new sense of urgency to act on behalf of Jews in that country.

The situation confronting Soviet Jewry, in my judgment, has deteriorated in recent years to a point almost unparalleled in the history of the Soviet Union. For example, emigration has dramatically declined since 1979, government-sponsored anti-Semitic campaigns have been expanded and the incarceration and harrassment of refuseniks has increased at an alarming rate.

For this reason, I trust you share my view that the issue of Soviet Jewry must remain a top priority in our relations with the Soviet Union. I, therefore, respectfully request you to insure that the State Department raises this issue at every opportunity during bilateral discussions with representatives of that Government and that you will exercise your considerable influence and personal leadership to encourage the participation of our allies in this effort.

I hope that you will also agree that the recent change in leadership in the Soviet Union provides us with a timely opportunity to convey to that Government the depth of our commitment to alleviating the difficult plight of Soviet Jews.

Sincerely,

PETER W. RODINO, JR.
Chairman

PWR:sej

March 5, 1984

Dear Mr. Chairman:

On behalf of the President, I would like to thank you for your February 28 letter urging that we pursue additional efforts to ameliorate the plight of Soviet Jews. In your letter you indicated that there is a renewed sense of urgency to act and you cited the decline in the number of Jews who have emigrated since 1979 and the harassment of refuseniks as evidence of the importance of this situation.

We appreciate knowing of your serious concern on behalf of Soviet Jews, and we have conveyed your recommendations to the appropriate advisory staff members. In the interim, let me assure you that your comments are receiving close attention and careful consideration.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

M. B. Oglesby, Jr.
Assistant to the President

The Honorable Peter W. Rodino, Jr.
Chairman
Committee on the Judiciary
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

MBO:KRJ:tjr

cc: w/copy of inc to NSC Secretariat - for DRAFT response

5055

ID# 197398

THE WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

INCOMING

DATE RECEIVED: MARCH 02, 1984

NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: THE HONORABLE PETER W. RODINO JR.

SUBJECT WRITES CONCERNING DIFFICULTY OF SOVIET JEWS

ROUTE TO: OFFICE/AGENCY (STAFF NAME)	ACTION		DISPOSITION	
	ACT CODE	DATE YY/MM/DD	TYPE RESP	C COMPLETED D YY/MM/DD
M. B. OGLESBY <i>NSC</i>	ORG	84/03/02	MO	A 84/03/05 ^{TR}
REFERRAL NOTE:		D 84/03/07		1/1
REFERRAL NOTE:				1/1
REFERRAL NOTE:				1/1
REFERRAL NOTE:				1/1
REFERRAL NOTE:				1/1

COMMENTS: _____

ADDITIONAL CORRESPONDENTS: MEDIA:L INDIVIDUAL CODES 1230

MAIL USER CODES: (A) _____ (B) _____ (C) _____

- *****
- | | | | |
|--------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|---|
| *ACTION CODES: | *DISPOSITION CODES: | *OUTGOING | * |
| * | * | * CORRESPONDENCE | * |
| *A-APPROPRIATE ACTION | *A-ANSWERED | *TYPE RESP=INITIALS | * |
| *C-COMMENT/RECOM | *B-NON-SPEC-REFERRAL | * OF SIGNER | * |
| *D-DRAFT RESPONSE | *C-COMPLETED | * CODE = A | * |
| *F-FURNISH FACT SHEET | *S-SUSPENDED | *COMPLETED = DATE OF | * |
| *I-INFO COPY/NO ACT NEC* | | * OUTGOING | * |
| *R-DIRECT REPLY W/COPY * | | * | * |
| *S-FOR-SIGNATURE * | | * | * |
| *X-INTERIM REPLY * | | * | * |
- *****

REFER QUESTIONS AND ROUTING UPDATES TO CENTRAL REFERENCE
(ROOM 75, OEOB) EXT. 2590
KEEP THIS WORKSHEET ATTACHED TO THE ORIGINAL INCOMING

C

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

March 27, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Travel to Moscow by Mr. Kupperman

Mr. Robert H. Kupperman has written you (Tab II) to advise you of his trip to Moscow April 2-8 as a guest of the Soviet Academy of Sciences.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the letter at Tab I to Mr. Kupperman.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

- Tab I Letter to Mr. Kupperman
- Tab II Letter from Mr. Kupperman



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Bob:

Thanks for your letter of March 22 advising me of your upcoming trip to Moscow as a guest of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. I hope that it will be a successful trip and look forward to hearing about it upon your return.

With best regards,

Sincerely,

Mr. Robert Kupperman
CSIS, Georgetown University
1800 K Street, N.W., Suite 400
Washington, D. C. 20006



DTAU

Center for Strategic & International Studies
Georgetown University • Washington DC

MAR 22

March 22, 1984

Honorable Robert C. McFarlane
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Bud:

Following on our correspondence of December 14 and January 16, I have again received an official invitation from the Soviet Academy of Sciences to visit Moscow. My wife and I will be in the Soviet Union from April 2-8 as guests of the Academy, and we will return to Washington on April 10. The Soviets have not yet provided a schedule of my activities there, although I presume we will be discussing issues such as crisis management and "nuclear winter". Needless to say, I will report to you on the trip when I get back.

With warmest regards,

Sincerely,

Robert H. Kupperman
Robert H. Kupperman *by ecrs.*

REFERRAL

DATE: 23 MAR 84

MEMORANDUM FOR: STATE SECRETARIAT

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION:

TO: MCFARLANE

SOURCE: KUPPERMAN, ROBERT

DATE: 22 MAR 84

KEYWORDS. USSR

FOREIGN TRAVEL


KUPPERMAN, ROBERT

SUBJ: NOTIFICATION OF FOREIGN TRAVEL BY KUPPERMAN 2 - 10 APR

REQUIRED ACTION: FOR COMMENT

DUEDATE: 28 MAR 84

COMMENTS.


FOR ROBERT M. KIMMIDT
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

MEMORANDUM OF RECORD

FROM: Robert H. Kupperman
DATE: April 13, 1984
SUBJECT: Trip report of Robert H. Kupperman to the Soviet Union and to Helsinki, Finland (March 30 - April 9, 1984)

At the invitation of the USSR Academy of Sciences I was asked to address members of the Academy and other scientific groups on the mathematics of arms control and the technical aspects of crisis management. My wife and I traveled to the Soviet Union on behalf of the Center for Strategic and International Studies. In addition to our trip to the Soviet Union, Finland extended an invitation to us to discuss the possibility of my conducting an international congress on the subject of arms control and crisis management under the aegis of Georgetown University, the Institut de la Vie, and the Government of Finland.

At the outset I wish to make it clear that despite obvious strain between the United States and Soviet governments, my wife and I were treated cordially and the discussions held with the scientists in the USSR and Finland were largely substantive. There is no question that the Soviets are very worried over the lack of progress in arms control. They are especially concerned about our Star Wars initiatives. It is also clear that they agree that the future of meaningful arms control measures lies beyond the traditional impasses so painfully evident in the INF and START talks.

My first meeting was with Academician Moiseev, a member of the Academy and Director of the Computer Center of the Academy. Academician Moiseev led a large seminar (perhaps 50 or 60 people) on the mathematical models of conflict and compromise. In my view, he had given a lot of thought to their design. Following Professor Moiseev's presentation I was invited to lecture on the policy and mathematical implications of strategic force structure, deterrence and stabilization at times of stress. I lectured on the relevant technical and policy issues for some two hours. Afterwards, I answered questions as forthrightly as I could. From comments made afterwards, I believe my talk was well received.

Following the seminar, Academician Moiseev said that he and other Soviet technical and international relations experts would like to enter into a cooperative venture with the Center for Strategic and International Studies to explore the crisis management issues analytically. He agreed that the subject was of incalculable importance and that there was a chance to make great headway. (For one, unlike INF and START, no hardened political positions have been taken by either side about the crisis issues.)

That afternoon we were received by Academician E.P. Velikhov (my host and Vice President of the Academy). Velikhov and I conversed for nearly an hour. He said that the key to working together was to gather top-notch Soviet scientists who really wished to commit their efforts. Velikhov then stated his wish to enter into an agreement with the Center and establish a working relationship between the Academy and CSIS. I told him that we

look forward to a close relationship, but would have to explore carefully the terms of any formal arrangement. Finally, Velikhov said that he planned to be in the United States in May and would enter into a bilateral relationship with our National Academy of Sciences and would pursue some relationship with the Federation of American Scientists. (It was clear that the relationship with the Federation had all sorts of propaganda implications, such as "nuclear winter".)

At Velikhov's request, I visited Dr. A. Jakoolev, who was Director of the Institute of World Economy. That meeting, while largely cordial, reflected Soviet intransigence. No matter what I said about the crisis management issue, Jakoolev replied with a statement about the evil intent of the Reagan administration. Finally, I asked him if he preferred the risk of nuclear carnage to that of cooperative ventures which might prevent it. He was left somewhat speechless.

Jakoolev's deputy, whose name I do not recall, said that the U.S. does not understand the "psychology" of the Soviet people but that the Soviet Union understands the American psychology all too well. (He accused us of being a violent people, noting that 20,000 murders per year are committed on U.S. television.) He made a most incredible statement -- if the U.S. and Soviet Union were to play a war game, the Soviet Union could do a better job in playing the U.S. role than could the United States. I responded that I was not certain that the Soviet Union fully understood us as well as they thought.

My next meeting was with Vitaly Zhurkin, Deputy Director, Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies. Zhurkin expressed the party line about the strained relationship between the U.S. and USSR but said he was prepared to work with the Center. (At lunch with Moiseev the prior day, he said that Zhurkin would be working with him. Moiseev also joined the Jakoolev meeting unexpectedly. A few minutes after he sat down at the Jakoolev meeting, the tone of the meeting became more productive.) Zhurkin asked if the Center's study would also include issues about the first-use of nuclear weapons, and I stated that we would consider all of the relevant issues including his concerns.

A curious thing about the meeting was that Georgi Arbatov refused to step in and say hello. (I had the feeling that Arbatov resented Velikhov having taken the lead in the crisis management matter.)

The next meeting was at their space and research institute. Their computer simulations of the Heley's Comet mission were demonstrated. The real reason for that institute having wished to see me was their admission they have been given the job of analyzing U.S. efforts in Star Wars. Obviously, I could discuss nothing with them.

When I first came to the Soviet Union, and shortly before I left, I visited with Mr. Warren Zimmermann, the Deputy Chief of Mission to our embassy. I told Zimmermann about everything that had transpired. It turns out that he leads our delegation on

the crisis management negotiations with the Soviets. He said that the Soviet Union has been quite uncooperative with him and have only sent low level technicians to discuss hot line matters. He also complained that few of Ambassador Hartman's or his calls are returned by the Soviets.

At each meeting with the Soviets, I made it clear that neither the Center nor I represented the U.S. government. Moreover, I told my hosts that it was imperative that they maintain the arms control dialogue with the United States government.

On Friday evening we took the night train to Leningrad and Saturday morning we were met at the train and were taken to meet with Dr. V. V. Ivanischev who is Chief of the System Analysis Lab in Leningrad. (He works for Moiseev.) The only thing I was able to learn from Dr. Ivanischev was that the USSR planned to go beyond the nuclear winter propaganda efforts by building models of the ecological effects of nuclear warfare.

On Sunday, April 8, we left Leningrad via Aeroflot to Helsinki. (The Aeroflot trip, though one-half hour long, was in itself a memorable experience.) The following morning we attended a luncheon in our honor given by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The senior official was the Under Secretary for Political Affairs. It was clear that they were in touch with the Soviets. In addition to the Soviet Union's interest in a bilateral relationship with CSIS, Finland wanted to pursue the multi-lateral aspects of crisis management. In particular, they proposed I lead an international congress on crisis management. In addition to the

Ministry officials, there were quite a number of others present including the head of Finland's National Academy of Science and several other leading academicians.

A joint organizing meeting was broached, with the hope of holding an international congress about a year later.

cc: Robert C. McFarlane
Amos Jordan
William Taylor

C

SYSTEM II
90307

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

File

~~SECRET~~

March 28, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JEM*

SUBJECT: Consular Review Talks with the USSR

State has submitted, in the memorandum at Tab II, a report with recommendations for next steps in the Consular Review Talks with the USSR. The one point in dispute is the refusal of the FBI to agree to an offer to expand entry/exit points allowed on visas for our respective officials to include Baltimore and San Francisco in return for Brest and Nakhodka. State considers such expansion in the U.S. interest, and the provision for reciprocal expansion of entry/exit points integral to our negotiating package. Without this provision, State sees no merit in continuing the Consular Review Talks.

Discussion

The Consular Review Talks under discussion actually began in the mid-seventies and have been carried on sporadically over the years without conclusion. From the outset, the principal U.S. objective was to secure an expansion of entry/exit points available to U.S. diplomats and officials in the Soviet Union. This is important to us both to facilitate travel relevant to intelligence gathering, and also to provide more efficient access by highway and rail to Western Europe. The Soviets have been in a position, by denying a visa amendment to enter or exit the Soviet Union at points such as Brest and Nakhodka, to prevent important travel without risking retaliation for a travel denial as such. (In 1981, for example, the Soviets routinely refused the Brest entry/exit point to our military attaches, at a time when observation of possible Soviet mobilization on the Polish border was a high-priority objective.) The Soviets hardly ever apply for an additional entry/exit point for their personnel, since they routinely use New York as the port of entry, even for their personnel in San Francisco. Therefore, we have had no means of forcing a more forthcoming policy in this area by retaliation in kind.

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR MD2-018#1
BY RW NARA DATE 1/7/11

During past negotiations, the Soviets showed no interest in expanding the number of entry/exit points, but were eager to obtain diplomatic visas for members of the Supreme Soviet and certain other senior Soviet officials not normally eligible for such visas. Since this is a purely symbolic issue (diplomatic visas not conferring diplomatic immunities under U.S. law), it was decided to tie this issue to the expansion of entry/exit points to provide a Soviet incentive for settlement. Prior to April, 1983, the FBI had approved this arrangement, but withdrew its approval at that time, and its position on the matter is unchanged now.

The FBI rests its objection primarily on the problem of handling Soviet ship visits to Baltimore. This, however, is not relevant to the entry/exit visa question, since issuing visas valid for entry and exit in Baltimore does not constitute permission for Soviet ships to use the port. The latter is an entirely separate issue, and permission for each visit is decided on its own merits, without regard to the visa question. I asked Ken de Graffenreid to point this out to the FBI and request them to provide, if they wished, a more relevant explanation of their position. The FBI reply to this request is at TAB III. While it raises a number of issues, it still seems to be written under the impression that issuance of entry/exit visas valid for Baltimore would somehow result in Soviet ship visits. Since this is not the case, I do not find in the FBI memo a persuasive case that this step would add importantly to their burdens. Other arguments advanced in that paper seem to be based on a misunderstanding of actual practices and an exaggeration of what authorizing entry and exit points really means.

Inasmuch as the Consular Review Talks represent one of the very few areas where it appears that a quick agreement would be possible, and the addition of Brest and Nakhodka would be of substantial benefit to U.S. installations in the Soviet Union, I believe that State should be authorized to renew negotiations on the basis it proposes. However, I believe that your approval should make clear that it does not imply approval of Soviet ship calls, that any arrangements must meet the test of reciprocity, and that implementation should be conducted in close coordination with the FBI and other appropriate counterintelligence organizations.

Recommendation:

That you authorize transmission of the Kimmitt-Hill Memorandum at Tab I, which authorizes State to proceed with the Consular Review Talks on the basis it recommends, but with the caveats noted above.

Approve ____

Disapprove ____

Attachments:

- Tab I - Kimmitt-Hill Memorandum
- Tab II - Hill-McFarlane Memorandum of March 19, 1984
- Tab III - FBI Memorandum of March 28, 1984

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. CHARLES HILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Consular Review Talks with the USSR (S)

The report transmitted with your memorandum to Mr. McFarlane of March 19, 1984, containing recommendations for next steps on the Consular Review Talks with the Soviet Union, has been reviewed. (S)

The Department is authorized to renew the Consular Review Talks with the USSR on the basis it recommends. It should be noted, however, that this approval does not constitute approval for Soviet ship visits to the Port of Baltimore, which should be treated as a separate issue. Any future recommendations in regard to such requests should be submitted following coordination with the FBI and other interested U.S. agencies. (S)

If the Soviets should accept the expansion of entry/exit points as a part of the package of U.S. proposals, the Department should insure that any arrangements made pursuant to the agreement meet the test of strict reciprocity, and that close coordination be maintained with the FBI and other counterintelligence agencies so that appropriate measures can be taken to minimize any potential intelligence benefits to the Soviet Union. (S)

Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR MD2-010#2
BY RW NARA DATE 11/2/04



Washington, D.C. 20520

March 19, 1984

84 MAR 20 A 7: 28

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Consular Review Talks with the USSR

In response to your March 12 request, we are attaching a report with recommendations for next steps on the Consular Review Talks with the Soviet Union. The Department would like to proceed with the Consular Review Talks using the agenda to which the FBI agreed prior to the April, 1983 meeting with the Soviets. The FBI subsequently withdrew its concurrence to one item of the package -- an increase of entry/exit points -- an item which we feel is central to a balanced package. The entry/exit issue was placed on the agenda to counterbalance the Soviet request for diplomatic visas for high-level Soviet officials and to address Embassy Moscow's request for improved travel [redacted] a long-standing goal of the U.S. Government.

Bo McKelvey
for Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

Enclosures:
As stated.

~~SECRET~~

DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLRR MD2-DID #3
BY RW NARA DATE 7/15/10

E.O. 12958
As Amended
888-3.3 (b)(1)

~~SECRET~~

U.S.-Soviet Consular Review Talks

The Consular Review Talks (CRT) are part of our effort to find areas in the bilateral relationship in which we can make progress in solving specific problems. We are having particular problems now on a series of consular and visa matters that the talks could help resolve. Successful talks could also provide a demonstration that realistic negotiations can produce agreements that serve the interests of both countries. A round of talks in Washington last spring came close to producing an agreement that we thought was attractive, but the FBI withdrew its consent on one important element. As a result, we had to stall and the Soviets eventually went home. The shutdown of the KAL aircraft delayed a resumption of the talks.

We believe now is the time to resume the talks. The USG must decide, however, whether or not we can agree to a reciprocal increase in the number of entry/exit points in each country from three to five. This is the issue that caused us the problem last spring, when the FBI withdrew its concurrence. Increasing the number of Soviet exit/entry points has long been a U.S. goal. It would greatly increase our ability to enter and depart the country, particularly by the overland routes

[REDACTED]

We would obtain entry/exit at Brest, on the Polish border, and Nakhodka, on the Soviet Pacific coast near Vladivostok. The Soviets would obtain entry/exit at San Francisco, where they have a consulate, and at Baltimore (by sea only, to parallel our entry/exit possibilities at Nakhodka).

The FBI opposes this expansion of entry/exit points. The attached statement of its position (Tab A) lists the following objections: "The agreed upon proposals approved by the SIG-I addressing limiting the presence and travel of hostile foreign officials and nonofficials in the U.S., proposed in part '...limiting Soviet officials and tourists to specific entry/exit points; ...' had as its thrust the reduction of entry/exit points available for utilization by Soviet officials"; and, "The presence of Soviet passenger ships for extended periods of time in this port facility (of Baltimore) would afford the Soviets a prolonged period of time to accomplish disembarkment...."

[REDACTED]

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DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLRR MD2-010 #4

RV 211) NARA DATE 1/27/11

E.O. 12958
As Amended
Sec. 1.4 (D)

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- 2 -

The Department does not share the FBI's view that the SIG-I agreed to reduce the number of entry/exit points; rather, it merely agreed to add exit controls to the previously existing entry controls. Earlier, the Soviets had been restricted to specific entry points, but could exit from any open city. The SIG/I decision restricted the Soviets to the same exit points as entry points.

[REDACTED] The Soviets cannot bring any more ships into Baltimore than we authorize. Making Baltimore an exit/entry point will not change that. In some past years, they already have been permitted to have one ship visit. In 1983 and again this year the Department turned down their yearly ship-visit request because the Soviets were not sufficiently forthcoming on our needs in Moscow.

Given the convenience of Brest as an entry point (particularly if we open a consulate in Kiev)

[REDACTED] the United States will get considerably more out of this expansion of exit/entry points than the Soviets and our interests are served by going ahead with it on its own merits. In addition, this was a key element in the draft "package" that we worked on with the Soviets last spring. To withdraw it would unbalance the package in the Soviets' favor, leaving us several unpalatable alternatives: 1) reach an agreement in which we will give more than we get; 2) withdraw a bargaining item of major interest to the Soviets, i.e. diplomatic visas for high-level U.S. and Soviet officials, leaving a package of rather minor visa concessions which they would probably reject; or, 3) decline to resume the talks, thus giving up the opportunity for progress that they represent and possibly stimulating a worsened tit-for-tat situation on these irritating visa and consular issues.

The State Department recommends that the entry/exit points be included in the next round of talks and we will then inform the Soviets that the U.S. proposes to reconvene the talks in May.


~~SECRET~~

SECRET/WNINTEL

RE: SOVIET SECTION INTD'S POSITION ON BALTIMORE
AS THE ENTRY/EXIT POINT FOR SOVIET OFFICIALS

The agreed upon proposals approved by the SIG-I addressing limiting the presence and travel of hostile foreign officials and nonofficials in the U.S., proposed in part "... limiting Soviet officials and tourists to specific entry/exit points; ..." had as its thrust the reduction of entry/exit points available for utilization by Soviet officials.

Therefore, the FBI opposes the Port of Baltimore being designated as an entry/exit point for the convenience of Soviet travelers. The presence of Soviet passenger ships for extended periods of time in this port facility would afford the Soviets a prolonged period of time to accomplish disembarkment and boarding of passengers and large cargo items. In addition, members of the crew would also be afforded the opportunity to disembark.



While opposing opening the Port of Baltimore, the FBI would not oppose the resumption of weekly Aeroflot flights into JFK Airport, New York, if such an offer would afford adequate negotiating leverage to gain the additional entry/exit points desired by State in the USSR. Such resumption of flights would be permitted and contingent upon simultaneous access to the desired entry/exit points in the USSR and their continued availability to U.S. officials and tourists.

SECRET/WNINTEL

Classified by: 4193
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLRR M82-010 #5
BY RW NARA DATE 7/15/18

E. O. 12958
As Amended
Sec. 3.3(b)(1)

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

March 28, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR JACK MATLOCK

FROM: DIANE DORNAN *DD*

SUBJECT: FBI Comments on Proposed Terms of Reference
for Negotiations with the USSR

At your request I contacted FBI and asked that they revise their initial comments on opening the port of Baltimore to the Soviets, in order to make them more relevant to the issues being discussed.

The initial problem arose because the Bureau was not fully informed on the terms of reference and was not asked for a formal opinion even on the port issue. They were informally approached by a State official and asked to put on paper the gist of the objections they had raised last spring to terms of reference then being considered, which involved access through the port of Baltimore. They were astounded to discover that the real issue apparently related to visas, that San Francisco was also being considered as an additional entry/exit point and that the brief, informal paper they had quickly prepared was to be attached to a decision package as their formal and complete comment.

I suggested that FBI call the Soviet desk at the State Department to ensure that they had an accurate and complete account of the issues upon which they were to comment. Lynn Pascoe insisted that FBI was not to be concerned with other issues in the negotiating package, including visa issues, but was to confine their comments merely to the entry/exit points issue. They have framed their comments accordingly, although trying to tailor them to address indirectly visa issues which may be under consideration.

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NLRR MD2-D10#10
BY RW NARA DATE 7/15/10

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR ARTHUR HARTMAN

DATE: March 28, 1984
 LOCATION: Oval Office
 TIME: 2:00 - 2:30 P.M.
 FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

I. PURPOSE:

To review U.S.-Soviet relations with Ambassador Hartman.

II. BACKGROUND:

The meeting will give the President the opportunity to discuss the current state of U.S.-Soviet relations and to provide guidance to Amb. Hartman for his future contacts with Soviet officials. Hartman plans to return to Moscow this coming weekend.

III. PARTICIPANTS:

The President
 The Vice President
 Secretary Shultz
 Robert C. McFarlane
 Ambassador Hartman
 Jack F. Matlock

IV. PRESS PLAN:

Release White House staff photo.

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS:

The President greets Amb. Hartman and initiates a discussion of the current state of U.S.-Soviet relations.

Attachment:

Tab A Talking Points/card

Prepared by:
 Jack F. Matlock

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Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
 E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
 White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
 BY RB, NARA, Date 10/10/85

TALKING POINTS

-- I'm glad we have a chance to meet while you are in town. Why do you think the Russians still seem to be giving us a cold shoulder?

-- What sort of tactics should we be following over the coming months? Have they really decided finally that they will not deal this year, as some are saying?

-- Do you think the Soviet leaders really fear us, or is all the huffing and puffing just part of their propaganda?

-- Is there anything we can do to give you more ammunition in your dealings with Gromyko and the other Soviet leaders?

-- I know you have a tough job in Moscow, and I get nothing but good reports on the Embassy's fine performance. Please let your staff know that we really appreciate what you are doing for us there.

MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR HARTMAN

- GLAD WE HAVE CHANCE TO MEET WHILE YOU ARE IN TOWN. WHY DO YOU THINK RUSSIANS STILL SEEM TO BE GIVING US COLD SHOULDER?
- WHAT SORT OF TACTICS SHOULD WE BE FOLLOWING OVER COMING MONTHS? HAVE THEY REALLY DECIDED FINALLY THEY WILL NOT DEAL THIS YEAR, AS SOME ARE SAYING?
- DO YOU THINK SOVIET LEADERS REALLY FEAR US, OR IS ALL THE HUFFING AND PUFFING JUST PART OF THEIR PROPAGANDA?

2.

- IS THERE ANYTHING WE CAN DO TO GIVE YOU MORE AMMUNITION IN YOUR DEALINGS WITH GROMYKO AND THE OTHER SOVIET LEADERS?
- I KNOW YOU HAVE TOUGH JOB IN MOSCOW, AND I GET NOTHING BUT GOOD REPORTS ON EMBASSY'S FINE PERFORMANCE. PLEASE LET YOUR STAFF KNOW WE REALLY APPRECIATE WHAT YOU ARE DOING FOR US THERE.

REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENTS

To: Officer-in-charge
Appointments Center
Room 060, OEOB

Please admit the following appointments on March 28, 19 84

for The President of White House:
(NAME OF PERSON TO BE VISITED) (AGENCY)

The Vice President
Secretary of State George Shultz
Robert McFarlane
Ambassador Arthur A. Hartman, American Ambassador to Soviet Union
Jack F. Matlock, NSC

MEETING LOCATION

Building West Wing

Requested by Rachel C. Ashley

Room No. Oval Office

Room No. 368 Telephone 5112

Time of Meeting 2:00 p.m.

Date of request March 27, 1984

Additions and/or changes made by telephone should be limited to three (3) names or less.

APPOINTMENTS CENTER: SIG/OEOB - 395-6046 or WHITE HOUSE - 456-6742

TALKING POINTS FOR BACKGROUNDER

File

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-- The meeting yesterday focused on broad strategic and philosophical questions. The Presidents exchanged views in depth on the background of and prospects for East-West relations. There was full agreement on fundamentals.

-- So far as the future is concerned, both agreed on the need for an intensified East-West dialogue and on the importance of maintaining NATO's deterrent strength.

-- For our part, we are committed both to an adequate deterrence and to negotiations to diminish world tensions. The President made this clear in his address of January 16, and the approach to U.S.-Soviet relations he outlined at that time remains his policy.

-- In that context, the United States continues to deplore the Soviet refusal to resume negotiations on strategic and intermediate-range nuclear weapons. It would appear that the Soviet leadership is going through a period of introspection, and is attempting to divert attention from its unwillingness or inability to engage us in negotiations for real nuclear arms reduction by trying to shift attention to secondary issues, which it of course presents in one-sided and self-serving fashion.

-- The United States is prepared for a dialogue across the board, and insists only that our talks focus on ways to solve real problems. But we also believe that the Soviets should not

be allowed to escape responsibility for intransigence in the effort to achieve substantially lower levels of nuclear weapons by a smokescreen of propagandistic "proposals." We are serious in our intent and will engage them seriously when they are ready. But there should be no doubt where the responsibility lies if there are delays in this process.

-- We consider the meetings extremely useful and productive. They have demonstrated that Franco-American ties are deep, and that we share a fundamental and unshakeable commitment to freedom and democracy.

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BY CJ NARA, DATE 9/25/82

United States Department of State

Washington, D. C. 20520

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INFORMATION MEMORANDUM
S/S

TO: The Secretary
FROM: EUR - Richard Burt
SUBJECT: Ambassador Hartman's Lunch with Dobrynin

Art Hartman gave us a quick readout of his lunch today with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin before returning to Moscow. The conversation covered a wide range of topics. Dobrynin took a positive line on our dialogue, encouraging movement forward on the agenda.

Dobrynin's Health: Dobrynin told Art that he has a badly swollen foot, aggravated by the gout, that makes it difficult to move around. The doctors have told him the pain should be gone in a couple of days. Because of the discomfort, he felt he had no choice but to put off the meeting with you until next week.

Treatment of Scowcroft: Dobrynin said that Moscow had thought that the Scowcroft effort was a U.S. trick. The people there (presumably Gromyko) are "very sensitive" about these things, he said, and we should have taken time to better prepare the way. Art responded that we had taken the time, that he had discussed the trip with Dobrynin and had gone over it in detail with Gromyko. He added that the Soviets had missed an important opportunity to talk with Scowcroft. We had already decided that if Chernenko were not available, Scowcroft could talk with the General Secretary's assistant or with Gromyko. Dobrynin merely repeated that Moscow had thought it was a trick and confirmed that the offer of Komplektov was a deliberate step based on this assumption.

Content of Our Dialogue: Dobrynin asked what he should say to you in your next meeting. Art noted that we had put a full agenda on the table to discuss, but that the Soviet side had not been very responsive. He noted in particular that we had advanced some ideas on START in September that had considerable promise, but the Soviet side had shown no interest. Dobrynin said that they did not find them all that interesting. Art responded that they had not given them careful enough study. He added that we found the present Soviet position on INF hopeless and are waiting for them to come forward with a more reasonable position.

When Dobrynin mentioned Moscow was very concerned about outer space (the Cosmos), Art said they should read the President's last letter. He noted that he himself had been advocating another look at the TTBT. Dobrynin said if we could do something in this regard (even if the President makes an effort on the Hill and it

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fails), it would make an important impression on Moscow. He noted that movement on the CTB would be even better, but Art told him there was no chance on that issue. Dobrynin asked if we could at least discuss it, and Art responded "of course". Art added that we know Sokolov plans to talk with me on TTBT tomorrow and we hoped he had some useful ideas.

Dobrynin asked about Non-Use-Of-Force, adding that they know we object to No-First-Use. Art said we were aware they were pushing this in Stockholm and reminded Dobrynin that we also have some things on the table there that we want. When Art noted that we will put forward our CW treaty soon, Dobrynin laughed and said, "Let's be frank, we both know this effort will not go anywhere." But, he added, it would be good to make a try nevertheless and to get this issue out of our laps into Geneva.

Dobrynin returned to ASAT, saying the Soviets are worried about our efforts. They know their technology is poor and assume ours is great. This issue should be discussed now, he continued, to see if it can be kept under control, because if it is not, the Soviet side will certainly do all it can to catch up. Art and Dobrynin agreed that the Hotline issue is going well and that we should be able to get an agreement in the next round.

On the maritime boundary negotiations, Dobrynin advised us to pick a place for the next meeting. He was optimistic that we should be able to wind up this issue in the near future. He confirmed that the Soviets are ready to move ahead on an exchanges agreement "as soon as you are". He said they were also interested in moving on the Consulates. In this connection, Dobrynin commented that they know full well we want these agreements to get deeper into Soviet society, but they need the foreign exchange from cultural groups and he needs a Consulate in New York because "Trojanovskiy won't touch my consular problems there."

Art complained about the message the Soviets are passing out in Moscow, noting that while Dobrynin says they want to move ahead, his people in Moscow are telling everyone there is no hope in dealing with the Administration. Dobrynin said this had not come from official Soviets, "only Arbatov, who has non-governmental duties". Art noted that Arbatov, Falin, and others had turned off an important group of Americans. If we can only talk sensibly in governmental channels, he added, perhaps we should not even encourage such groups to go. Dobrynin said there was no substitute for government-to-government discussions, but that outside groups could also be useful. He promised to report Art's complaints about the treatment of the Dartmouth group to Moscow.

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- 3 -

On regional issues, Dobrynin said the two sides had a lot to talk about, citing in particular the Mid East and southern Africa. He laughed that we would please Gromyko if we agreed to an international conference on the Mid East. Art agreed we had a lot to discuss, but countered that the Soviets could surely do better than that twenty-year old proposal.

Finally, Art probed into Soviet calculations in the months ahead, commenting in particular that he was surprised that so many Soviets seemed to pass off our efforts as election-year politics. Dobrynin said that "maybe this was so, but why wait?" He added that the Soviets have learned over the years that no matter what promises may be made during the Presidential campaigns, American politicians in office keep coming back to essentially the same foreign policy approach.

Given the fact that you will not see Dobrynin until next week, you may want to send this conversation to the President. If you do, we will change this into a memorandum to him from you.

Drafted:EUR/SOV:BLPasco *AW*
3/28/84 #1276b
Cleared:EUR:MPalmer

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BY CWJ, NARA, DATE 9/25/02

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- 35 -

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