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# PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O 13233

## Ronald Reagan Library

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**File Folder** MATLOCK CHRON MARCH 1984 (3)

**DATE** 3/22/2007

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
<del>3</del>	<del>PAPER</del>	<del>STRATEGY PAPER RE CONSULATES (#25)</del>	<del>7</del>	<del>ND</del>	<del>ND</del>
			<i>MVH 3/17/08</i>		
<del>4</del>	<del>MEMO</del>	<del>MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE DENIAL OF SOVIET VISIT (#26)</del>	<del>1</del>	<del>3/20/1984</del>	
			<i>MVH 3/17/08</i>		
<del>5</del>	<del>MEMO</del>	<del>HILL TO MCFARLANE RE DENIAL OF SOVIET VISIT (#27)</del>	<del>1</del>	<del>3/17/1984</del>	
			<i>MVH 3/17/08</i>		
<del>6</del>	<del>MEMO</del>	<del>SAME AS ITEM 4</del>	<del>1</del>	<del>3/20/1984</del>	
			<i>MVH 3/17/08</i>		
<del>7</del>	<del>MEMO</del>	<del>SAME AS ITEM 5</del>	<del>1</del>	<del>3/17/1984</del>	
			<i>MVH 3/17/08</i>		
<del>10</del>	<del>MEMO</del>	<del>SHULTZ TO THE PRESIDENT RE VISITS TO MOSCOW (#29)</del>	<del>1</del>	<del>3/19/1984</del>	
			<i>MVH 3/17/08</i>		

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
letter case (8490307)			
1. memo	from Matlock to Robert McFarlane re: strategy paper (2pp) <i>PART. 12/10/07 NLRR MO2-09 # 23</i>	3/19/84	<b>B1</b> <b>BS</b>
<del>2. memo</del>	<del>from Charles Hill to McFarlane re: strategy paper (1p)</del> <i>R 10/17/05 MO2-009 #24</i>	<del>3/16/84</del>	<del>P-1</del>
3. strategy paper	(7pp) <i>PART. 10/17/05 MO2-009 #25</i>	n.d.	P-1 <del>P-5</del>
letter case (8402228)			
<del>4. memo</del>	<del>from Matlock to McFarlane re: denial of Soviet visit (1p)</del> <i>R 5/23/03 MO2-009 #26</i>	<del>3/20/84</del>	<del>P-1</del> <del>P-5</del>
5. memo	from Hill to McFarlane re: denial of Soviet visit (1p) <i>PART. 10/17/05 MO2-009 #27</i>	3/17/84	P-1 <del>P-5</del>
<del>6. memo</del>	<del>copy of item # 4 (1p)</del> <i>R 5/23/03 MO2-009 # 26</i>	<del>3/20/84</del>	<del>P-1</del> <del>P-5</del>
7. memo	copy of item # 5 (1p) <i>PART. 10/17/05 MO2-009 #27</i>	3/17/84	P-1 <del>P-5</del>
letter case (8402270)			
8. memo	from Matlock to McFarlane re: visits to Moscow (1p)	3/20/84	P-1
COLLECTION:  MATLOCK, JACK F.: Files			dlb
FILE FOLDER:  Matlock Chron March 1984 [3 of 4] <i>QA-90887 3</i>			10/19/95

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
<del>9. memo</del>	<del>from McFarlane to the President re: visits to Moscow (1p)</del> <i>L 5/23/03 M02-009 #28</i>	<del>n.d.</del>	<del>P-1</del>
<del>10. memo</del>	<del>from George Shultz to the President re: visits to Moscow (1p)</del> <i>R 10/17/05 M02-009 #29</i>	<del>3/19/84</del>	<del>P-1</del> <i>P-5</i>
COLLECTION:  MATLOCK, JACK F.: Files			dlb
FILE FOLDER:  Matlock Chron March 1984 [3 of 4] <del>OA-90887</del> <i>Box 3</i>			10/19/95

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- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
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DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLRR MD2-009 #23

SYSTEM II  
90307 ADD-ON

MEMORANDUM

BY CN NARA DATE 12/10/07

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Chon

~~SECRET~~

March 19, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM:

JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT:

Strategy Paper for Negotiation with Soviets  
on Consulates in Kiev and New York

State has submitted the attached strategy paper (Tab I) for the negotiation of the establishment of consulates in Kiev and New York. There is interagency agreement on all issues except one. (Although invited to participate in last week's interagency meeting, DOD/OSD did not do so; the meeting, therefore, reflects the views of State, USIA, [REDACTED] and the FBI.) The one issue still in dispute is whether to require the Soviets to staff their consulate in New York out of their overall quota for diplomats in the United States (the FBI position), or whether to establish the size of the U.S. consulate in Kiev on the basis of personnel required and impose the same limitation on Soviet staffing of their consulate in New York [REDACTED]

1.4c

When Secretary Shultz told Dobrynin on March 7 that we proposed movement to open the consulates, he promised that Rick Burt would get back in touch with Sokolov in a few days. Burt has an appointment with Sokolov the afternoon of March 20 and would like to broach the issue at that time.

Discussion

The next step in moving this matter forward is to inquire officially of the Soviets whether the building previously set aside for our consulate in Kiev is still available. This can be done without getting into the issue of personnel ceilings, and I therefore recommend that Burt be authorized to make this initial step with Sokolov at their next meeting.

As for the question of how to handle the staffing ceiling, it would be advantageous to us to require the Soviets to reduce their personnel from other installations in the U.S. in order to staff their consulate in New York. If we place such a requirement on the Soviets, however, we can be certain that they would refuse, since they have never accepted officially the ceiling we have placed on their personnel here (although they have no choice but to abide by it). Therefore, if we make this demand, the negotiations on opening the consulates are likely to be stalled from the outset.

SECRET

Our decision on this issue will be affected by two considerations: whether we want to negotiate the question so as to maximize prospects for an early agreement, and whether we consider a consulate in Kiev in exchange for New York to our net advantage.


In my view, it would be useful to move ahead as rapidly as possible on this issue, so long as the principle of reciprocity is maintained in this particular exchange. I also believe that a consulate in Kiev is inherently to our advantage, since the Soviets already have an enormous presence in New York, and we have none at all in Kiev. A consulate in the latter city would

1.4d



provide a base for observation of developments in the largest non-Russian ethnic area in the Soviet Union. For both of these reasons, I feel that it would be best to adopt a negotiating strategy which facilitates rapid agreement.

So far as the overall imbalance in Soviet official personnel in the U.S. and American personnel in the USSR is concerned, I believe that we can best solve this problem by replacing many Soviet local employees with Americans. State is planning to staff Kiev on this basis as a pilot project, and the practice could be extended to Moscow as we move into the new Embassy building there and free up housing elsewhere in the city.

In sum, I would recommend that the State  as regards staffing of the consulates be approved. As noted above, however, this question need not be resolved before we make our next move.

1.4d

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That you authorize State to inquire officially whether the building which had been set aside for our use as a consulate in Kiev is still available.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

2. That you approve staffing the Kiev consulate on the basis of need, and imposing a reciprocal ceiling on the Soviet consulate in New York.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

OR ALTERNATELY,

That you defer a decision on the staffing question for further study.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachment:





United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

SYSTEM II  
90307 add-on

March 16, 1984

~~SECRET~~MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MC FARLANE  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Strategy Paper for Negotiations with the Soviet Union on the Establishment of Consulates in Kiev and New York

In response to your March 12 request, the State Department reconvened an interagency working group meeting, chaired by Deputy Assistant Secretary Mark Palmer, to review the original Strategy Paper on the Establishment of Consulates, submitted to NSC on August 5, in light of subsequent developments. Agreement was reached on some previously divisive issues, with divergent agency positions remaining on only one question: staffing levels. The differing views, together with the minor modifications suggested, are set forth in the accompanying paper, which has been cleared in substance by all the participating agencies (DOD/OSD representatives were invited, but did not attend). We recommend concurrence in the State/NSA position on staffing.

*Tom McKinley*  
for Charles Hill  
Executive Secretary

Attachment:  
As stated.

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS MOZ-009 #24BY WJ, NARA, DATE 10/17/05~~SECRET~~  
DECL. OADR

~~SECRET~~


Strategy Paper  
Kiev and New York Consulates

Summary:

1. Initial Steps: There is agreement that we should inquire officially of the Soviets whether the previously designated office site will be available to us in Kiev. If available, all agencies agree that we should accept the old site, send an inspection team to check its current condition and assess further work needed on both apartments and office site; if unavailable, the consensus is that we should press the Soviets hard to provide a suitable alternative within a fixed time that would meet our needs. Should the Soviets prove unresponsive, strong counter-measures aimed at the Soviet building in New York would be in order.


2. Issue for Decision:

Staffing. While there is interagency accord on most questions associated with the establishment of new consulates, divergent views remain on the key issue of staffing levels. State and NSA believe we should set staffing limits according to needs and allow the Soviets to send only as many additional officials as we send to Kiev.



Recommendation:

NSC concurrence with the interagency proposal to inquire officially of the Soviets as to the availability of the previous site and to retain it, if possible;



E. O. 12958  
As Amended  
Sec. 1.5c

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLS MD2-009 #25

By LOS, NARA, Date 10/17/05

~~SECRET~~  
DECL: ~~OADR~~



BACKGROUND

Secretary Shultz informed Ambassador Dobrynin on June 18, 1983 that the President had approved in principle the establishment of new Consulates in Kiev and New York. Judge Clark subsequently requested that State convene an interagency meeting to draft the terms of reference and develop a negotiating strategy. At the July 1 meeting called by State, [REDACTED] accepted the attached terms of reference (Tab A) and agreed to reconvene with the objective of forwarding an agreed negotiating strategy to the NSC. The group, augmented by USIA representatives, met on July 26, but it did not prove possible fully to reconcile agency views. A version of this paper, reflecting the divergent positions, was presented to the NSC on August 5, but the issue was placed on hold following the KAL incident. The NSC on March 12 requested a review of the original paper in light of subsequent developments. On March 13 State reconvened the interagency working group, which resolved several differences, creating a greater degree of consensus and leaving only one issue still outstanding.

POLICY OBJECTIVES

In noting that the USG should seek to reach agreements which "protect and enhance US interests and are consistent with the principle of strict reciprocity", NSDD-75 provides the fundamental policy framework for establishing the new Consulates. A Consulate in Kiev will provide [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] a major new US penetration in a key geographical area, which contains the second largest Soviet nationality group and significant numbers of religious minorities. In addition, it will give us a unique vantage point for economic and political reporting, a base in the Soviet agricultural heartland for crop monitoring, a facility to provide on-the-spot consular protection and assistance to American visitors in the area, and the opportunity to initiate new cultural, informational, and educational exchanges, thereby heightening awareness of US values and goals in the region.

MODALITIES OF NEGOTIATIONS

On July 15, 1983 Secretary Shultz received a positive Soviet response on the Consulates from Ambassador Dobrynin. Both sides reiterated their interest in moving forward at the January 1984 Stockholm Shultz-Gromyko meeting. As soon as possible Assistant Secretary Burt will work out with Chargé Sokolov the modalities of the negotiations. The State Department will handle the actual negotiations using normal diplomatic channels, in coordination with interested agencies.

E.O. 12958  
As Amended  
Sec. 1.5c



The Department anticipates opening the talks in Washington as soon as is mutually convenient. Technical discussions may subsequently take place in Moscow. Since our logistical problems in Kiev may well prove greater than those of the Soviets in New York, it might be advantageous to hold such talks at closer range.

SPECIFIC GOALS

1. Early Establishment of U.S. Presence: Our first agenda item in negotiating with the Soviets will be to obtain agreement on the terms under which we will send advance parties to the two consular sites. The fact that we and the Soviets have both had previous advance teams in Kiev and New York, respectively, under mutually agreed arrangements, should ease our negotiations with them on this matter, but it would be unrealistic not to expect problems. Nevertheless, our retention of three apartments in Kiev from the time of the original Advance Party should enable us to put an advance team into place rather quickly (within several months). Having personnel on the spot will be a key to gaining movement from the Soviets on housing and office facilities, as well as support from the home front on logistics and funding.

2. Acquisition of Suitable Housing and Office Facilities: Concurrently, we must ascertain whether the Soviets are still holding for our use the previously designated office building and Consul General residence.

The prevailing view is that if the original building is unavailable, the Soviets must provide us with a suitable alternative within a reasonable period of time or else face tough counter-measures. In any case, they will not be permitted to occupy their Consulate site until we have obtained satisfaction on our requirements in Kiev.

The preferred option, which all could accept, remains the original building. We have already invested \$1.5 million in renovation, which would be lost if we refused the building. Moreover, the negotiations for a more desirable site would be long and the end result would not necessarily be a site preferable to the one we now have. If the current site remains available, we believe that a team should be sent to Kiev as soon as possible for an inspection and evaluation of the work and time required to put it into suitable condition.

E. O. 12958  
As Amended  
Sec. 1.2C



Finally, with regard to terms of occupancy, we should note that the previous agreement on establishing Consulates permitted the Soviets to purchase property in New York in return for short-term leasing rights in Kiev. This situation was clearly not reciprocal and cannot be allowed to recur. Further negotiations on the reopening of our respective Consulates will include insistence on much greater reciprocity vis-a-vis our housing and office space requirements. Although we could theoretically insist that the Soviets divest themselves of their property and require a lease arrangement comparable to what we obtain in Kiev, such an approach would be quite problematical. The Office of Foreign Missions has indicated that a forced divestiture of this type could be legally contested and if so could involve legal proceedings.

We should instead concentrate on obtaining what is possible -- long-term leases at reasonable prices. The Soviets will have a strong incentive to move on our requirements. We fully expect them to seek immediate occupancy of the building that they previously purchased in New York for their Consulate. Consequently, State believes that we should not permit the Soviets to occupy their building until we have obtained satisfaction on our basic requirements in Kiev, which, at a minimum, include adequate temporary offices for the Consulate, an official agreement on our permanent facilities, and approved construction plans for necessary renovations.

3. Reciprocal Staffing Patterns: As soon as we have decided on the number of persons we wish to send to Kiev both as a TDY-Advance Team and as a permanent staff (recommendations on these issues follow below), we will inform the Soviets that there will be reciprocal staffing levels for the two consulates.

[REDACTED] State believes there will be a flat rejection by the Soviets to such a proposal; that this would mean no consulates. Having frequently decried the existence of the current ceilings, the Soviets will refuse an attempt to reduce staffing levels at existing posts as a precondition to an agreement on opening Kiev and New York. [REDACTED] we should proceed on the basis of our requirements [REDACTED] in Kiev and insist on reciprocity in any final decision on staffing patterns.

4. Resolution of Long-Range Issues and General Problems: Although Kiev's location is ideal in certain respects, its isolation, coupled with the absence of a large diplomatic community, may produce a difficult work environment for consular personnel, as well as create numerous logistical problems. In our negotiations we shall also address these general issues and attempt to arrive at mutually agreed solutions to both existing

E. O. 12958  
As Amended  
Sec. 1.5c



and potential problems. Specifically, we shall strive to obtain clearly defined privileges and immunities for American personnel; an expansion of exit/entry points to facilitate shipment of requisite materials to put our facilities into shape for the final opening (we are currently limited to entry at Moscow, Leningrad, and Vyborg near Leningrad); a relaxation of travel controls in the area; and a commitment to provide a suitable recreational facility for the permanent staff.

5. Implementation of USG Scenario: An interagency group will have to make some immediate decisions with regard to timing, personnel, and funding. It will also have to address questions of logistical support and the acquisition of financial and other resources. For preliminary planning purposes, we propose the following timetable and base our discussion of estimated costs and resource requirements on this opening scenario, which assumes that we will obtain the previously designated office building and be able formally to open the Kiev Consulate in two years. An alternate scenario, involving the acquisition of a new site, would probably require at least five years.

1. Fall 1984 - Initial TDY Advance Team takes up residence in Kiev;
2. Summer 1985 or earlier - Permanent Advance Staff arrives in Kiev;
3. Summer 1986 - Consulate is officially opened.

A. Funding:

State has already presented to Congress its FY-85 budget submission, which does not include a request for funds or positions for the opening of Kiev. Therefore, the estimated \$200,000 operating costs needed to support the initial TDY presence in Kiev would have to be secured either by amendment to the FY-85 budget, or reprogrammed from within State's existing budget.

State anticipates an additional outlay of \$2.5 million annually (for two years) to prepare for the opening of the Consulate (total estimated cost of \$5.2 million). Not included in this estimate is the cost of a suitable recreational facility for the permanent staff assigned to Kiev, which would contribute substantially to improving morale and the quality of life at an extremely isolated post (roughly another \$1.0 million).

Ultimately, any decision to move ahead on establishing a Consulate in Kiev is conditioned on our ability to secure supplemental funding from Congress. In view of budgetary stringencies, we should anticipate questions from Congress as to why we are taking this step at the present time. We should be prepared to brief key members whose support will be necessary in order to obtain the requisite funds.



B. Personnel:

In selecting an Advance Team, we will try to identify personnel for permanent assignment, but may initially have to use personnel from Embassy Moscow and appropriate Washington offices on a 1-3 month TDY basis. The initial Advance Team should include a Team Leader, an Administrative Officer, and a Political/Consular Officer with reporting responsibilities.

In tandem with these arrangements, we need a prompt decision on the size of our permanent advance team. Language training and the vagaries of the assignment process will make it difficult to assign people to Kiev for regular tours prior to the summer of 1985. Even meeting that deadline will require speedy action to obtain positions, identify individuals for particular slots, and secure funding. We believe that with the addition to the advance team of a General Services Officer and a secretary we will have the personnel necessary to prepare for the official opening of the Consulates.

We suggest that the consular staff consist of approximately 30 employees. In the past, this was considered the right size to advance our interests in Kiev and it still appears to meet our needs. We intend, however, to schedule interagency meetings as soon as feasible to determine whether their personnel requirements for the Consulate warrant a larger or smaller staff. We will also solicit Embassy Moscow's views on both the question of timing and its ability to provide personnel and logistical support.

We believe that the Kiev Consulate should serve as a pilot project in shifting to a greater reliance on American personnel overall in our missions in the Soviet Union. Ultimately, Kiev may provide an opportunity for Americans to carry out all the functions normally performed by local employees. It may not, however, prove practical or feasible to begin with a completely all-American staff. Initially, we may wish to rely on some local support and gradually shift to a greater preponderance of American personnel. Thus we need to retain as much flexibility as possible in setting our own staffing levels, while insisting on strict reciprocity in terms of the size of the Soviet Consulate staff in New York.

~~SECRET~~

-7-

*nt*  
Drafted:EUR/SOV:NTongour:jh  
3/15/84 Ext. 22137 #6105B

Clear:EUR/SOV:RFSmith *nt for*

EUR:TWSimons, Jr. *nt for*

EUR:MPalmer

[REDACTED]  
USIA:ALeMaistre *nt for - subst.*

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
P:LSEAGLEBURGER *nt for*

E. O. 12958  
As Amended  
Sec. 1.5c

~~SECRET~~

## MEMORANDUM

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

March 20, 1984

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT: Denial of Soviet Visit to Alaska Pipeline

The attached memorandum from State reports the denial of permission for a group of Soviet engineers to tour the Alaska pipeline in June.

I believe the denial was appropriate under the circumstances.

## Attachment:

Tab I - Hill-McFarlane Memorandum of March 17, 1984

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
NLS 102-009 #26  
BY OH, NARA, DATE 5/23/05



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

March 17, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. McFARLANE  
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Denial of Soviet Visit to Alaska Pipeline

The Department of State is denying a request from General Electric that they host a group of Soviet engineers, headed by an unspecified deputy minister of the gas industry and the operational manager of the export gas pipeline, on a tour of the Alaska pipeline in June. We will inform GE of our decision.

The Soviets wanted to review the Alaska pipeline consortium's experience in maintaining GE Frame V turbines in the tundra. All equipment which the visitors would have seen is licensable for export to the USSR under current standards. The Soviet delegation also planned to tour Canadian pipelines equipped with aircraft-engine derivative compressors. The Soviet quid pro quo would have been a visit by GE engineers to the new Soviet export gas pipeline to Western Europe.

While we perceived commercial utility for GE from the exchange of visits, [REDACTED]

E. O. 12958  
As Amended  
Sec. 1.5c [REDACTED] there was a strong possibility that the visit would have been interpreted as evidence that we now view our pipeline sanctions as a mistake, and that we are relaxing our oil and gas equipment export controls. Therefore, we decided to deny the visit.

*BMCKmley*  
for Charles Hill  
Executive Secretary

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
NLS MO2-009 #27  
By WJ, NARA, Date 10/17/05

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECL: OADR



Matlock:

File

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

CONFIDENTIAL

March 20, 1984

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT: Denial of Soviet Visit to Alaska Pipeline

INTEL

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Tab I - Hill-McFarlane Memorandum of March 17, 1984

CONFIDENTIAL  
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
NLS M02-009 #26  
BY CK, NARA, DATE 5/23/03

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520



March 17, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. McFARLANE  
THE WHITE HOUSE

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E. O. 12958  
As Amended  
Sec. 1.5c

*BMCKmley*  
for Charles Hill  
Executive Secretary

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
NLS MOZ-009 #27 (DUPLICATE)  
By LDS, NARA, Date 10/17/05

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECL. OADR

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE  
SUBJECT: Forthcoming Visits to Moscow

George Shultz has sent you the memorandum at Tab A, calling your attention to plans of a number of Allied Foreign Ministers and several prominent private Americans to visit Moscow during the spring and early summer.

As George points out, we can expect the Soviets to try to use these visits to bring pressure to bear on us to make unilateral concessions.

Attachment:

Tab A - Memorandum from Secretary Shultz of March 19, 1984

Prepared by:  
Jack Matlock

cc: Vice President

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
NLS MUZ-009/ #28  
BY CIS, NARA, DATE 5/23/03



8407979

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

March 19, 1984

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

84 MAR 20 A 3: 37

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT  
FROM: George P. Shultz  
SUBJECT: Forthcoming Visits to Moscow

WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM

We are now entering a period of more active East-West diplomacy. With Chernenko, the Soviets once again have a leader who can meet with foreign visitors. We are already witnessing an increase in prospective visits by Allied Foreign Ministers to the USSR:

- German Foreign Minister Genscher has accepted an invitation from Gromyko to visit Moscow May 21-22;
- Portuguese Foreign Minister Gama also plans to be in Moscow in May; and
- British Foreign Secretary Howe is scheduled to visit Moscow July 2-3.

In addition to talks at the Foreign Minister level, the Soviets may fête each visitor with a session with the new General Secretary.

These may just be the beginning of an upsurge in pilgrimages to the Kremlin, as our Allies try to demonstrate that they are doing their part to explore the possibilities of improving the West's relations with the new Soviet leadership. As they did with SPD leader Vogel, the Soviets will try to use the Allied visits as a means of putting pressure on us to make unilateral concessions toward Moscow.

As government-to-government contacts increase, we can also expect an increase in visits to Moscow by American political figures, academics and private "peace" groups, along with reciprocal visits to the U.S. by their Soviet counterparts. Much of this will be critical of the Administration's policies. For example, the Co-Chairperson of Gary Hart's National Campaign, Pat Schroeder, is leading a delegation of Congresswomen to Moscow for talks on arms control in mid-April. The U.S. and Soviet scientists who last year publicized the "nuclear winter" concept are continuing to cooperate, and Senator Kennedy may attend one of their sessions in Moscow this spring.

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
DECL: OADR

NLS MOZ-009 #29  
BY hjt, NARA, DATE 10/17/05

MEMORANDUM

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

March 21, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR SALLY KELLY

FROM: ROBERT M. KIMMITT

SUBJECT: Draft Response to Mr. C. C. Richelieu

We have reviewed and concur with the Department of State's proposed draft response to Mr. C. C. Richelieu in answer to his letter to the President.

2245

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

March 21, 1984

Attachment

FOR BOB KIMMITT

I recommend that you forward the attached memorandum to Sally Kelley.

  
JACK MATLOCK

UNCLASSIFIED  
(Classification)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT  
TRANSMITTAL FORM

S/S 8407188

Date March 17, 1984

For: Mr. Robert C. McFarlane  
National Security Council  
The White House

Reference:


To: President Reagan From: Mr. C.C. Richelieu  
Date: Feb. 21, 1984 Subject: Wants to present Chernenko  
with specially made Ne Plus Ultra Plus Banjo to help with  
US/Soviet relationship  
WH Referral Dated: Mar. 9, 1984 NSC ID# 210426  
(if any)

           The attached item was sent directly to the  
Department of State.

Action Taken:

- X   A draft reply is attached.  
       A draft reply will be forwarded.  
       A translation is attached.  
       An information copy of a direct reply is attached.  
       We believe no response is necessary for the reason  
cited below.  
       The Department of State has no objection to the  
proposed travel.  
       Other.

Remarks:

  
Charles Hill  
Executive Secretary

UNCLASSIFIED  
(Classification)



DRAFT REPLY

Dear Mr. Richelieu:

I have been asked to reply to your letter of February 21 to the President offering to make one of your fine banjos for presentation to Mr. Chernenko, the Soviet leader.

Your thought is greatly appreciated, although I should tell you quite frankly that we cannot confirm that Mr. Chernenko plays the banjo. Information that is often highly imaginative tends to circulate about new Soviet leaders, whose private lives are carefully screened from the outside world. We will, nevertheless, keep your kind offer in mind in case the President should decide that a meeting with Mr. Chernenko would be appropriate.

Let me assure you that the President appreciates your support and your activity as a member of the Re-election Task Force.

Sincerely yours,

Mr. C. C. Richelieu,  
Banjos by Richelieu,  
Box 101,  
786 N. Main Street,  
Oregon, Wisconsin.

8407188

T H E   W H I T E   H O U S E   O F F I C E

REFERRAL

MARCH 9, 1984

TO: DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ACTION REQUESTED:

DRAFT REPLY FOR SIGNATURE OF WHITE HOUSE STAFF MEMBER

DESCRIPTION OF INCOMING:

ID: 210426

MEDIA: LETTER, DATED FEBRUARY 21, 1984

TO: PRESIDENT REAGAN

FROM: C. C. RICHELIEU  
BANJOS BY RICHELIEU  
786 NORTH MAIN STREET  
OREGON WI 53575

SUBJECT: WANTS TO PRESENT CHERNENKO WITH SPECIALLY  
MADE NE PLUS ULTRA PLUS BANJO TO HELP WITH  
U.S./SOVIET RELATIONSHIP

PROMPT ACTION IS ESSENTIAL -- IF REQUIRED ACTION HAS NOT BEEN  
TAKEN WITHIN 9 WORKING DAYS OF RECEIPT, PLEASE TELEPHONE THE  
UNDERSIGNED AT 456-7486.

RETURN CORRESPONDENCE, WORKSHEET AND COPY OF RESPONSE  
(OR DRAFT) TO:  
AGENCY LIAISON, ROOM 91, THE WHITE HOUSE

SALLY KELLEY  
DIRECTOR OF AGENCY LIAISON  
PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE

**WHITE HOUSE  
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET**

- O - OUTGOING
- H - INTERNAL
- I - INCOMING

Date Correspondence Received (YY/MM/DD) 84 10 26

Name of Correspondent: C. C. Richelieu

MI Mail Report      User Codes: (A) \_\_\_\_\_ (B) \_\_\_\_\_ (C) \_\_\_\_\_

Subject: wants to present Chernenko with specially made Plus Ultra plus banjo to keep with US/Soviet relationship

ROUTE TO:		ACTION		DISPOSITION	
Office/Agency	(Staff Name)	Action Code	Tracking Date YY/MM/DD	Type of Response	Completion Date YY/MM/DD
	<u>Co Higg</u>	<u>CS</u> ORIGINATOR	<u>84 10 26</u>		<u>  /  /</u>
	<u>DOS</u>	<u>CS</u> Referral Note:	<u>84 10 29</u>		<u>  /  /</u>
		Referral Note:			<u>  /  /</u>
		Referral Note:			<u>  /  /</u>
		Referral Note:			<u>  /  /</u>
		Referral Note:			<u>  /  /</u>

- |  |                           |
|--|---------------------------|
| <b>ACTION CODES:</b>                           | <b>DISPOSITION CODES:</b> |
| A - Appropriate Action                         | A - Answered              |
| C - Comment/Recommendation                     | B - Non-Special Referral  |
| D - Draft Response                             | C - Completed             |
| F - Furnish Fact Sheet to be used as Enclosure | S - Suspended             |
| I - Info Copy Only/No Action Necessary         |                           |
| R - Direct Reply w/Copy                        |                           |
| S - For Signature                              |                           |
| X - Interim Reply                              |                           |
- FOR OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE:**  
 Type of Response = Initials of Signer  
 Code = "A"  
 Completion Date = Date of Outgoing

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

Keep this worksheet attached to the original incoming letter.  
 Send all routing updates to Central Reference (Room 75, OEOB).  
 Always return completed correspondence record to Central Files.  
 Refer questions about the correspondence tracking system to Central Reference, ext. 2590.



50



# Banjos By RICHELIEU

8407188

Box 101 786 N. Main St. Oregon, Wisconsin 53575

Tel: (608) 835-5500

210426

February 21, 1984

Manufacturers of:

Richelieu "Golden Eagle"®

"Lyte Laydie"

"Golden Bell"

& "Ne Plus Ultra" Banjos

"Akoostik" Bridges

"Tensionator" Tailpieces

"Master-Mute" &

Tone Clarifier

"Pick-Ahoy" Pickholders

"Rich-Tone" Strings

Custom Restoration to  
Original Factory Standards

Gold & Nickel Plating

Pearl Inlays - Carving -

Engraving

Refinishing

"Where Banjos Are Treated

Like A Stradivari"

CAD

The President of the United States  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. President:

As a staunch supporter of your Presidency, and a member of your Re-election Task Force - I respectfully ask your consideration of the following proposal.

The banjo is generally acclaimed as our only truly native American musical instrument. I am a builder and player of this instrument for over sixty years. You can then well understand my interest in reading in today Associated Press release the news that Konstantin U. Chernenko plays the banjo.

This poses an ideal opening - a common interest olive branch - at a very personal level - to the new Russian leader. It is my proposal that we build one of our Ne Plus Ultra series banjos as a gift for Mr. Chernenko - to be presented by you at your time and pleasure.

I realize that this may require time and thought - however, I want you to know, Mr. President - that the gesture is one of sincere interest in furthering world peace - and above all - your successful re-election.

If there is anything further I can do - I stand ready and willing to help. The enclosed brochure sheets will indicate the extreme quality of our hand built instruments.

Respectfully yours



*C. C. Richelieu*  
C. C. Richelieu



C. C. 'Rich' RICHELIEU, Owner  
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*Note the beautiful Brazilian rosewood and Gabon ebony format of the 6000 series Tenor Banjo as played by such eminent artists as Johnny Baier, Frank Vignola and Tim Allan. The intertwining floral pattern of abalone and Tahitian pearl, with silver vine, is framed in ebony and ivory. The richness of the hand-carved neck and the hand-engraved 24-carat gold plated metal work is enhanced by the American golden eagle wood-inlay set into the resonator back. Truly a product of individual craftsman pride and integrity, a 'sound' investment for your banjo future.*

**R**

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

March 21, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR SALLY KELLY

FROM: ROBERT M. KIMMITT

SUBJECT: Draft Response to Mr. C. C. Richelieu

We have reviewed and concur with the Department of State's proposed draft response to Mr. C. C. Richelieu in answer to his letter to the President.

2245

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

March 21, 1984

Attachment

FOR BOB KIMMITT

I recommend that you forward the attached memorandum to Sally Kelley.

  
JACK MATLOCK





UNCLASSIFIED  
(Classification)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT  
TRANSMITTAL FORM

s/s 8407188

Date March 17, 1984

For: Mr. Robert C. McFarlane  
National Security Council  
The White House

Reference:


To: President Reagan From: Mr. C.C. Richelieu  
Date: Feb. 21, 1984 Subject: Wants to present Chernenko  
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Executive Secretary

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Your thought is greatly appreciated, although I should tell you quite frankly that we cannot confirm that Mr. Chernenko plays the banjo. Information that is often highly imaginative tends to circulate about new Soviet leaders, whose private lives are carefully screened from the outside world. We will, nevertheless, keep your kind offer in mind in case the President should decide that a meeting with Mr. Chernenko would be appropriate.

Let me assure you that the President appreciates your support and your activity as a member of the Re-election Task Force.

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MARCH 9, 1984

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DISPOSITION

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
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Respectfully yours



*C. C. Richelieu*  
C. C. Richelieu



C. C. 'Rich' RICHELIEU, Owner  
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**R**



MEMORANDUM

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

March 21, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR KATHY JAFFKE

FROM: ROBERT M. KIMMITT

SUBJECT: Letter to President from 99 Senators re Soviet  
Jewry

We have reviewed and concur with the Department of State's draft response to a letter signed by 99 Senators to the President on Soviet Jewry.

2289

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

March 21, 1984

Attachment

FOR BOB KIMMITT

I recommend that you forward the attached memorandum to Kathy Jaffke.

Raymond and C. Lehman concur.

  
JACK MATLOCK

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

March 19, 1984

2289

TO: B

FROM: KATHY RATTÉ JAFFKE  
Office of Legislative Affairs

The attached letter was received on Friday, March 16. Since the letter is signed by 99 Senators, I worked up a draft and would like you to approve it before we start having a response typed.

The language is based on the attached press release and a previous NSC draft to Senator Percy re: Anatoly Shcharansky.

*OK this  
OK with  
NSC  
OK with  
me*

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

March 20, 1984

TO: LORETTA BRAXTON

FROM: KATHY RATTÉ JAFFKE  
Office of Legislative Affairs

Per our conversation, please obtain NSC approval/comments on the attached draft.

I have kept the original file in my office.

Please let me know as soon as possible.

Thanks.

March 19, 1984

Dear Senator //////////////:

Thank you for your February 29 letter to the President, cosigned by 98 of your Senate colleagues, urging that the case of Anatoly Shcharansky be raised with the new Soviet leadership at every appropriate opportunity.

You may be certain that the White House and the Department of State share your commitment to the prompt release of Mr. Shcharansky, and we appreciate your support in this matter. On the occasion of International Day of Concern for Soviet Jews, the White House issued a Statement by the President which reflects our strong commitment to the right of Soviet Jews to practice their cultural traditions freely and to emigrate from the U.S.S.R. if they so choose. As was mentioned in the President's statement, this point has been emphasized to the Soviet authorities in many fora and at all levels, and has been conveyed to the new Soviet leadership. This issue is a most important concern of ours and will continue to be of the highest priority.

For your information, I have enclosed a copy of the March 15, 1984, press release concerning International Day of Concern for Soviet Jews.

With best wishes,

/s/

M. B. Oglesby, Jr.  
Assistant to the President

The Honorable ////  
United States Senate  
Washington, D.C. 20510

Enclosure : March 15, 1984 Stmt by the President

cc: w/copy of inc to W. Tapley Bennett, Congressional Rela., State - FYI

MBO:KRJ:



March 6, 1984

Previous draft re  
same subject.

Dear Senator Percy:

Thank you again for your February 10 letter requesting that the President meet with Avital Shcharansky, who has devoted considerable time and energy to the release of her husband, Anatoliy, from prison camp.

As Nancy Kennedy indicated to you, we regret that we are unable to schedule a meeting with the President, but let me assure you that we admire Mrs. Shcharansky for her efforts and will continue to work with her to expedite her husband's release. Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and Canadian Affairs Mark Palmer and other State Department officers have met regularly with her, and have kept her apprised of the U.S. Government's efforts on Mr. Shcharansky's behalf. As you know, we have long believed that U.S. Government efforts should focus on private channels in attempting to secure Mr. Shcharansky's release. A meeting at this time between Mrs. Shcharansky and the President could decrease the credibility of our private efforts. For that reason, we would prefer that Mrs. Shcharansky meet with Deputy Assistant Secretary Palmer, who would be pleased to see her at a mutually convenient time to discuss the next steps in her husband's case.

You may be certain that the White House and the Department of State share your commitment to a prompt release of Mr. Shcharansky, and appreciate your support in this issue.

lifted &  
incorporat  
ed in new  
draft

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

M. B. Oglesby, Jr.  
Assistant to the President

The Honorable Charles H. Percy  
United States Senate  
Washington, D.C. 20510

MBO:NSC:KRJ:tjr

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

---

For Immediate Release

March 15, 1984

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

Today is the International Day of Concern for Soviet Jews. It marks the seventh anniversary of the arrest of Anatoliy Shcharanskiy for his activities on behalf of human rights in the Soviet Union. His courage and determination to stand up for those rights have earned him the respect and admiration of countless people worldwide. But he would not want this day to be dedicated solely to him. Rather it is a day when men and women of good will reflect on all the aspects of the situation of Jewry in the U.S.S.R. That situation has deteriorated over the past year. Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union has fallen to its lowest levels since the late 1960s; officially-tolerated anti-Semitism manifesting itself in broadcasts, articles, and the widely-publicized formation of an "Anti-Zionist Committee of the Soviet Public", has increased; and individual refuseniks continue to be subjected to harassment.

All in all, this is a grim picture. But we will not be disheartened. Soviet Jews value the support of concerned individuals and organizations all over the world. In our country this support reflects the broad, grassroots concern which abuse of human rights elicits in the American public. Outrage where human rights are violated is one of the best American traditions. I endorse the International Day of Concern, and the goals for which it stands.

The United States Government shares these goals. It has actively supported the right of Soviet Jews to practice their cultural traditions freely and to emigrate from the U.S.S.R. if they so choose. This point has been emphasized to the Soviet authorities in many fora and at all levels; it has been conveyed to the new Soviet leadership. It is our sincere hope that the Soviets will ease their repressive human rights policies and fulfill the solemn international obligations they have undertaken, including their commitment under the Helsinki accords. In our dialogue with the Soviet authorities, we have no higher priority. Those who care about the fate of Soviet Jews should know that we are with them today, and will be with them tomorrow.

# # #



# United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

STROM THURMOND, S.C., CHAIRMAN

CHARLES McC. MATHIAS, JR., MD.  
PAUL LAXALT, NEV.  
ORRIN G. HATCH, UTAH  
ROBERT DOLE, KANS.  
ALAN K. SIMPSON, WYO.  
JOHN P. EAST, N.C.  
CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, IOWA  
JEREMIAH DENTON, ALA.  
ARLEN SPECTER, PA.

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., DEL.  
EDWARD M. KENNEDY, MASS.  
ROBERT C. BYRD, W. VA.  
HOWARD M. METZENBAUM, OHIO  
DENNIS DeCONCINI, ARIZ.  
PATRICK J. LEAHY, VT.  
MAX BAUCUS, MONT.  
HOWELL HEFLIN, ALA.

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE  
AND PROCEDURE

CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, IOWA, CHAIRMAN

PAUL LAXALT, NEV.      HOWELL HEFLIN, ALA.  
ARLEN SPECTER, PA.      MAX BAUCUS, MONT.  
LYNDA L. NERSESIAN, CHIEF COUNSEL AND STAFF DIRECTOR  
ALICE R. MILDER, GENERAL COUNSEL

VINTON DeVANE LIDE, CHIEF COUNSEL AND STAFF DIRECTOR  
DEBORAH K. OWEN, GENERAL COUNSEL  
SHIRLEY J. FANNING, CHIEF CLERK  
MARK H. GITENSTEIN, MINORITY CHIEF COUNSEL

February 29, 1984

212318

The Honorable Ronald Reagan  
The President  
The White House  
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

On March 15, 1977, Soviet Jewry and Human Rights activist Anatoly Shcharansky, was arrested by the KGB and charged with anti-Soviet activity. Though he attempted to defend himself, he was not allowed to call defense witnesses and was interrupted when he tried to question prosecution witnesses. The result of this KGB effort to silence Shcharansky was the imposition of a 13-year prison sentence. Anatoly's own words at the close of his trial accurately reflect his feelings and those of us who shared his ordeal.

Five years ago, I applied for a visa to Israel, but now I am further than ever away from the attainment of my dream. It might appear that I must have regrets about what has happened. But this is not so. I am happy. I am happy that I have lived honestly, in peace with my conscience, and have never betrayed my soul, even when I was threatened with death. I am happy that I have helped people. I am proud to have known and to have worked with such honorable, brave people as Sakharov, Orlov, Ginzburg--they who are continuing the finest traditions of the Russian intellectuals. I am happy that I can be a witness to the redemption of the Jews in the USSR. These absurd accusations against me and against the whole Jewish emigration movement will not hinder the liberation of my people. My dear ones and friends know how I wanted to exchange activity in the emigration movement for a life with my wife, Avital, in Israel.

For more than 2000 years the Jewish people, my people, have been dispersed. But wherever they are, wherever Jews are found, each year they have repeated: 'Next year in Jerusalem.' Now, when I am further than ever from my people, from Avital, facing many arduous years of imprisonment, I say, turning to my people, my Avital: NEXT YEAR IN JERUSALEM!.



Honorable Ronald Reagan  
February 29, 1984  
Page Two

Mr. Shcharansky's release would be a positive step in the easing of U.S.-Soviet tensions and we urge that you raise this issue with the new Soviet leadership at every appropriate opportunity.


Sincerely,



Dennis DeConcini




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
Lawton Chiles



Daniel K. Inouye



Larry Pressler




Alfonse D'Amato



Carl Levin



William Proxmire




Lloyd Bentsen



Richard G. Lugar




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
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
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
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
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Bob Dole



Arlen Specter




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
Steve Symms



James Exon



James Abdnor



Gordon Humphrey




Paul Trible



Slade Gorton



Max Baucus




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
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
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
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J. Bennett Johnston




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
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
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
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
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Gary Hart





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



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



  
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
  
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Patrick J. Leahy


  
Edward Zorinsky


  
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
  
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
  
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
  
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
  
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
  
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
  
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
  
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
  
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





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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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Chic Hecht



Frank H. Murkowski




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
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
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
Robert T. Stafford



William V. Roth Jr.



Jennings Randolph



Warren B. Rudman

*Ed Kennedy*

Edward M. Kennedy

*John Heinz*

John Heinz

*Joe Biden*

Joseph R. Biden Jr.

*Nancy Landon Kassebaum*

Nancy Landon Kassebaum

*Malcolm Wallop*

Malcolm Wallop

*Alan Cranston*

Alan Cranston

*Howell Heflin*

Howell Heflin

*Wendell Ford*

Wendell H. Ford

*John C. Stennis*

John C. Stennis

*John Melcher*

John Melcher

*Ted Stevens*

Ted Stevens

*Mark Andrews*

Mark Andrews

*Claiborne Pell*

Claiborne Pell

*Thad Cochran*

Thad Cochran

*Charles McC. Mathias Jr.*

Charles McC. Mathias Jr.

*Howard H. Baker Jr.*

Howard H. Baker Jr.

*Robert C. Byrd*

Robert C. Byrd



Washington on improving communications, including the hotline.

Now these bilateral proposals will be broadened at the conference in Stockholm. We're working with our allies to develop practical, meaningful ways to reduce the uncertainty and potential for misinterpretation surrounding military activities and to diminish the risk of surprise attack.

Arms control has long been the most visible area of U.S.-Soviet dialog. But a durable peace also requires ways for both of us to diffuse tensions and regional conflicts.

Take the Middle East as an example. Everyone's interest would be served by stability in the region, and our efforts are directed toward that goal. The Soviets could help reduce tensions there instead of introducing sophisticated weapons into the area. This would certainly help us to deal more positively with other aspects of our relationship.

Another major problem in our relationship with the Soviet Union is human rights. Soviet practices in this area, as much as any other issue, have created the mistrust and ill will that hangs over our relationship. Moral considerations alone compel us to express our deep concern over prisoners of conscience in the Soviet Union and over the virtual halt in the emigration of Jews, Armenians, and others who wish to join their families abroad.

Our request is simple and straightforward: that the Soviet Union live up to its obligations. It has freely assumed those obligations under international covenants, in particular its commitments under the Helsinki accords.

Experience has shown that greater respect for human rights can contribute to progress in other areas of the Soviet-American relationship. Conflicts of interest between the United States and the Soviet Union are real, but we can and must keep the peace between our two nations and make it a better and more peaceful world for all mankind.

Our policy toward the Soviet Union—a policy of credible deterrence, peaceful competition, and constructive cooperation—will serve our two nations and people everywhere. It is a policy not just for this year, but for the long term. It's a challenge for Americans; it is also a challenge for the Soviets. If they cannot meet us halfway, we

will be prepared to protect our interests and those of our friends and allies.

But we want more than deterrence. We seek genuine cooperation. We seek progress for peace. Cooperation begins with communication. And, as I've said, we'll stay at the negotiating tables in Geneva and Vienna. Furthermore, Secretary Shultz will be meeting this week with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in Stockholm. This meeting should be followed by others, so that high-level consultations become a regular and normal component of U.S.-Soviet relations.

Our challenge is peaceful. It will bring out the best in us. It also calls for the best in the Soviet Union. We do not threaten the Soviet Union. Freedom poses no threat. It is the language of progress. We proved this 35 years ago when we had a monopoly on nuclear weapons and could have tried to dominate the world, but we didn't. Instead, we used our power to write a new chapter in the history of mankind. We helped rebuild war-ravaged economies in Europe and the Far East, including those of nations who had been our enemies. Indeed, those former enemies are now among our staunchest friends.

We can't predict how the Soviet leaders will respond to our challenge. But the people of our two countries share with all mankind the dream of eliminating the risk of nuclear war. It's not an impossible dream, because eliminating these risks are so clearly a vital interest for all of us. Our two countries have never fought each other. There's no reason why we ever should. Indeed, we fought common enemies in World War II. Today our common enemies are poverty, disease, and above all, war.

More than 20 years ago, President Kennedy defined an approach that is as valid today as when he announced it. "So let us not be blind to our differences," he said, "but let us also direct attention to our common interests and to the means by which those differences can be resolved."

Well, those differences are differences in governmental structure and philosophy. The common interests have to do with the things of everyday life for people everywhere. Just suppose with me for a moment that an Ivan and an Anya could find them-

selves, oh, say a shelter from Jim and Sally barrier to keep ed. Would the between their would they notes about t other did for a

Before they probably hav hobbies and children and meet. And a ways, maybe "Wasn't she r Or Jim would or didn't like even have de get together t Above all, th people don't r

People war world without want to have and above h worth living craft, trade, satisfaction i common inte

If the Sov then there v strengthen p and know ir fulfill the h represent a where. Let

Thank yo

*Note: The E East Room*

**President's Cost Cont Governme**

*Remarks on Report. J*

You kn and certai too much




NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

March 22, 1984

FOR BOB KIMMITT

BOB:

Attached is Schedule Proposal proposed for Hartman as you requested. Please enter date and time after consultation with Bud.



JACK MATLOCK

## MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTONSCHEDULE PROPOSAL

March 22, 1984

TO: FREDERICK J. RYAN, Director  
Presidential Appointments and Scheduling

FROM: Robert M. Kimmitt

REQUEST: Meeting with Ambassador Hartman

PURPOSE: To review recent developments in U.S.-Soviet  
Relations

BACKGROUND: Ambassador Hartman will be in Washington May  
27 and 28, and this will provide an  
opportunity for the President to hear his  
views on current developments in Moscow and  
provide any instructions he may have for  
contacts with Soviet officials.

PREVIOUS  
PARTICIPATION: Ambassador Hartman met with the President  
during his earlier visits to Washington.

DATE & TIME:

LOCATION: Oval Office

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
The Vice President  
Mr. McFarlane  
Ambassador Hartman  
Jack F. Matlock  
Meese, Baker, Deaver at their discretion

OUTLINE OF EVENTS: The President greets Ambassador Hartman,  
solicits his views on the current situation  
in Moscow, and discusses the issues as  
appropriate.

REMARKS REQUIRED: None

MEDIA COVERAGE: None; White House Staff Photographer

RECOMMENDED BY: Robert C. McFarlane

OPPOSED BY:

PROJECT OFFICER: Robert M. Kimmitt/Jack F. Matlock

National Security Council  
The White House

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March 22, 1984

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
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Bob Kimmitt	<u>2</u>	<u>K</u>	_____
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Wilma Hall	_____	_____	_____
Bud McFarlane	_____	_____	_____
Bob Kimmitt	_____	_____	_____
NSC Secretariat	<u>3</u>	_____	<u>N</u>
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
Tom Shull	_____	_____	_____

23 to May 1,  
President's trip to  
my area at this  
handle the normal

April 23 - May 1,

I = Information    A = Action    R = Retain    D = Dispatch    N = No further Action

cc: VP    Meese    Baker    Deaver    Other    Admin / Exec Sec

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)

MAR 23 1984

done S/ES  
KJ



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MEMORANDUM

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

March 26, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR SALLY KELLEY

FROM: ROBERT M. KIMMITT

SUBJECT: Letter to President from Ukrainian Students Association

We have reviewed and concur with the Department of State's draft letter to Ms. Stephanie Hryckowian, Ukrainian Students Association, in response to her letter to the President concerning "Yuriy Shukhevych Defense Week."

Attachment

2452

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

March 26, 1984

FOR BOB KIMMITT

I recommend that you forward the attached memo to Sally Kelley.

*WR*  
Raymond concurs.

*Jack*  
JACK MATLOCK



2452

UNCLASSIFIED  
(Classification)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT  
TRANSMITTAL FORM

S/S 8407181  
84 MAR 23 PIO: 52  
Date 3/23/84

For: Mr. Robert C. McFarlane  
National Security Council  
The White House

WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM

Reference:

To: PRESIDENT Reagan From: Ms. Stephanie Hryckowian  
Date: 20 Feb 84 Subject: Participation by President in  
observance of "Yuriy Shukhevych Defense Week".  
WH Referral Dated: March 9, 1984 NSC ID# 210547  
(if any)

       The attached item was sent directly to the  
Department of State.

Action Taken:

- x   A draft reply is attached.  
       A draft reply will be forwarded.  
       A translation is attached.  
       An information copy of a direct reply is attached.  
       We believe no response is necessary for the reason  
cited below.  
       The Department of State has no objection to the  
proposed travel.  
       Other.

Remarks:

*for Kristine A. Kenney*  
Charles Hill  
Executive Secretary

UNCLASSIFIED  
(Classification)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
SUGGESTED RESPONSE

Dear Ms. Hryckowian:

I am writing in response to your recent letter to the President concerning the upcoming "Yuriy Shukhevych Defense Week" planned by the Ukrainian Students Association of Mykola Michnowsky (TUSM). In your letter you request White House participation in a March 31 rally for Mr. Shukhevych in New York.

Thank you for that invitation. Unfortunately, the President's schedule does not permit his participation in that rally. Nevertheless, we endorse your organization's goal of freedom for Mr. Shukhevych, who, as you note, has spent most of his adult life in prison or other confinement in the Soviet Union.

The United States Government has attempted to follow closely the situation of Mr. Shukhevych. His most recent period of imprisonment, from 1972 until the present, stems primarily from his human rights activities. In March 1972, Mr. Shukhevych was arrested in Nal'chik, Kabardin-Balkar ASSR, and charged under Article 62 of the Ukrainian SSR legal code, "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda." This is a well-known catch-all charge which the Soviets employ when they cannot detain human

Ms. Stephanie Hryckowian  
Director of Public Relations  
Ukrainian Students Association of Michnowsky (TUSM)  
Executive Board  
136 Second Avenue  
New York, New York 10003



rights activists for more specific "criminal" offenses. In September 1972 Mr. Shukhevych was sentenced to ten years' imprisonment, to be followed by five years' internal exile. While in prison he joined the Helsinki Monitoring Group established in Kiev to check Soviet compliance with the Helsinki Final Act.

Mr. Shukhevych's prison term was scheduled to end in March 1982. He has since reportedly been transferred to his place of exile. Mr. Shukhevych reportedly suffers from several medical ailments, and we are concerned that he is not receiving adequate medical care. Some reports indicate that Mr. Shukhevych may now be totally blind as a result of unsuccessful eye surgery performed in a Leningrad hospital, and that his internal exile therefore includes confinement in a facility for invalids.

We remain committed to drawing world attention to the plight of persons in the Soviet Union who suffer for their defense of individual human rights. At the Madrid Review Meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), we conducted a thorough and candid discussion of Soviet treatment of human rights activists in the Ukraine. We have voiced our special concern for Mr. Shukhevych and other individuals deprived of their liberty for expressing their cultural rights or their national heritage. Vice President Bush called specific attention to the plight of Yuriy Shukhevych at the 30th convention of the Ukrainian National Association in Rochester, New York.

Let me assure you we will continue to do all we can to help Mr. Shukhevych and other Ukrainians imprisoned for practicing their culture or expressing their beliefs. We value your commitment to this cause, and would be interested in your views on how we might best work toward this common goal. You may wish to contact the Department of State to arrange to discuss this subject with you at a mutually convenient time.

Again, thank you for your invitation. We wish you success in your efforts on behalf of Yuriy Shukhevych.

Sincerely,

8407181

T H E W H I T E H O U S E O F F I C E

REFERRAL

MARCH 9, 1984

TO: DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ACTION REQUESTED:

DRAFT REPLY FOR SIGNATURE OF WHITE HOUSE STAFF MEMBER

DESCRIPTION OF INCOMING:

ID: 210547

MEDIA: LETTER, DATED FEBRUARY 20, 1984

TO: PRESIDENT REAGAN

FROM: MS. STEPHANIE HRYCKOWIAN  
DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC RELATIONS  
UKRAINIAN STUDENTS ASS'N OF  
MICHNOWSKY (TUSM)  
EXECUTIVE BOARD  
136 SECOND AVENUE  
NEW YORK NY 10003

SUBJECT: ASKS FOR PRESIDENT'S PARTICIPATION IN  
OBSERVANCE OF "YURIY SHUKHEVYCH DEFENSE WEEK"  
TO BROADEN PUBLIC AWARENESS OF AND BRING  
MORAL PRESSURE UPON SOVIET UNION TO RELEASE  
POLITICAL PRISONER, YURIY SHUKHEVYCH

PROMPT ACTION IS ESSENTIAL -- IF REQUIRED ACTION HAS NOT BEEN  
TAKEN WITHIN 9 WORKING DAYS OF RECEIPT, PLEASE TELEPHONE THE  
UNDERSIGNED AT 456-7486.

RETURN CORRESPONDENCE, WORKSHEET AND COPY OF RESPONSE  
(OR DRAFT) TO:  
AGENCY LIAISON, ROOM 91, THE WHITE HOUSE

SALLY KELLEY  
DIRECTOR OF AGENCY LIAISON  
PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE





UKRAINIAN STUDENTS ASS'N  
of MICHNOWSKY (TUSM)  
EXECUTIVE BOARD  
136 Second Avenue  
New York, N. Y. 10003

President Ronald Reagen  
The White House  
Washington, D. C. 20500

Feb. 20th, 1984.

8407181

210547

Dear Mr. President,

As in previous years, the National Executive Board of the Ukrainian Students Association of Mykola Michnowsky (TUSM) will be observing the week of March 26-31, 1984 as "YURIY SHUKHEVYCH DEFENSE WEEK." The activities surrounding this year's observance are designed to broaden public awareness and bring moral pressure on the Soviet Union to release Mr. Shukhevych from his now over 32 year incarceration in Soviet Russian prisons, concentration camps and exile. We sincerely hope that you will be able to participate in this year's observance.

While our efforts to date have not gained Mr. Shukhevych's release, your contribution and that of your colleagues in Congress has undoubtedly had impact on mitigating the treatment of Mr. Shukhevych by the Russian authorities. It is by no means erroneous to state that he is alive today because his fate has become a matter of concern in the West. We are therefore, anxious that his case not become a moot issue in our Government's relations with the U.S.S.R.

Although Mr. Shukhevych's case is unique, it is symptomatic of Moscow's fears of open resistance to its policy denying the most elementary human and national rights. Furthermore, it is indicative of the plight of the thousands of Ukrainian political prisoners who are today languishing in the Soviet Russian concentration camps because of their resistance to the occupation and colonization of Ukraine by Soviet Russia.

As you know, Yuriy Shukhevych was arrested in 1948 at the age of 15. His sole "crime" is having been born the son of Roman Shukhevych, the commander-in-chief of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) which fought on two fronts against Hitler's Germany and Stalin's Russia during World War II and continued the struggle for national liberation well into the '50's. The only thing that stands between Yuriy Shukhevych and freedom is the odious demand by the authorities, that they first put to him in 1948, to renounce his father and the Ukrainian National Liberation Struggle. For his continued refusal to comply, he has been subjected to the most repulsive physical and psychological torture that the K.G.B. has devised and that only our nightmares can comprehend.

Excerpts from a letter, written by Yuriy's mother, dated March 25, 1982. "....I visited my son together with my daughter,....Following the operation, (involuntary human experimentation by the K.G.B.) he became totally blind. He is a virtual invalid.....How more incapacitated can one be? An inhuman fate befell him and us....They brought him to us.....I hugged him; his chest reminded me of a ladder - bones covered with skin; it was painful to look at him and even more painful to speak. I never cried during these past thirty years - till now. The Soviet system has completed its task."

(continued)

Mr. Shukhevych's case has not gained the notoriety that it deserves. We hope that public meetings, teach-ins at major universities and the rally at the United Nations during the week of March 26-31, 1984 will in some way, help bring the tragedy of Yuriy Shukhevych to the attention of the Reagan Administration and more importantly, impress upon the Soviet Russian authorities that the American people and Government continue to view his plight with the utmost concern.

The week long program will conclude with a rally at the United Nations' Dag Hammarskjold Plaza in New York on Saturday, March 31st, 1984 at 2:00 p.m. We hope that the White House will be able to participate in the rally. One of the aims of our Executive is to strengthen our contact and dialogue with the Reagan Administration and the United States Congress, thereby allowing us to discuss ways in which to assist in the furthering of the realization of human rights and national freedom in Ukraine.

We would like to meet with the Reagan Administration and further discuss our program and consult with you on the most effective way in which to bring the case of Yuriy Shukhevych to the attention of the American public.

SH/sh

Sincerely yours,



Stephanie Hryckowian  
Director of Public Relations



**WHITE HOUSE  
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET**

- O - OUTGOING
- H - INTERNAL
- I - INCOMING  
Date Correspondence Received (YY/MM/DD) 1 1

Name of Correspondent: Stephanie Hryckowian

MI Mail Report User Codes: (A) \_\_\_\_\_ (B) \_\_\_\_\_ (C) \_\_\_\_\_

Subject: ASKs for President's participation in observance of "Yuriy Shukhenych Defense Week," to broaden public awareness of & bring moral pressure upon Soviet Union to release political prisoner, Yuriy Shukhenych.

ROUTE TO:		ACTION	DISPOSITION		
Office/Agency	(Staff Name)	Action Code	Tracking Date YY/MM/DD	Type of Response	Completion Date YY/MM/DD
<u>PLKOSE</u>		ORIGINATOR	<u>840310</u>		<u>1 1</u>
<u>99 DOS</u>		D	<u>841030</u>		<u>1 1</u>
			<u>1 1</u>		<u>1 1</u>
			<u>1 1</u>		<u>1 1</u>
			<u>1 1</u>		<u>1 1</u>

- ACTION CODES:**  
 A - Appropriate Action  
 C - Comment/Recommendation  
 D - Draft Response  
 F - Furnish Fact Sheet to be used as Enclosure  
 I - Info Copy Only/No Action Necessary  
 R - Direct Reply w/Copy  
 S - For Signature  
 X - Interim Reply
- DISPOSITION CODES:**  
 A - Answered  
 B - Non-Special Referral  
 C - Completed  
 S - Suspended
- FOR OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE:**  
 Type of Response = Initials of Signer  
 Code = "A"  
 Completion Date = Date of Outgoing

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_

Keep this worksheet attached to the original incoming letter.  
 Send all routing updates to Central Reference (Room 75, OEOP).  
 Always return completed correspondence record to Central Files.  
 Refer questions about the correspondence tracking system to Central Reference, ext. 2590.



MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

March 26, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR KATHY JAFFKE

FROM: ROBERT M. KIMMITT

SUBJECT: Letter to President from Representative Lent

We have reviewed and concur with the Department of State's draft letter to Representative Lent in response to his letter to the President on Soviet Jewry.

Attachment

1866

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

March 26, 1984

FOR BOB KIMMITT

I recommend that you sign the attached memo to Kathy Jaffke.

  
JACK MATLOCK



UNCLASSIFIED

(Classification)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT  
TRANSMITTAL FORM

S/S 8406970

Date 84 MAR 22 P 11:41  
March 22, 1984

For: Mr. Robert C. McFarlane  
National Security Council  
The White House

WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM

Reference:

To: PRESIDENT Reagan From: Rep. Lent  
Date: 24 Feb 84 Subject: Letter to President  
regarding Soviet Jewry


WH Referral Dated: 06 March 84 NSC ID# 8401866  
(if any)

\_\_\_\_\_ The attached item was sent directly to the  
Department of State.

Action Taken:

- A draft reply is attached.  
 A draft reply will be forwarded.  
 A translation is attached.  
 An information copy of a direct reply is attached.  
 We believe no response is necessary for the reason  
cited below.  
 The Department of State has no objection to the  
proposed travel.  
 Other.

Remarks:

  
Charles Hill  
Executive Secretary

UNCLASSIFIED

(Classification)

The U.S. Government will not cease its efforts on behalf of Soviet Jews, nor overlook any possible opportunity to make progress on this human rights question. As President Reagan said of those efforts in his statement for the March 15 International Day of Concern for Soviet Jews, "we have no higher priority. Those who care about the fate of Soviet Jews should know that we are with them today, and will be with them tomorrow."

Thank you again for your support of our efforts on behalf of Soviet Jews and others whose basic human rights are violated in the USSR.

Sincerely,



REFERRAL

DATE: 06 MAR 84

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPT OF STATE

DESCRIPTION

TO: PRESIDENT

**8406970**

SOURCE: LENT, NORMAN F

DATE. 24 FEB 84

KEYWORDS: USSR

HUMAN RIGHTS

CO

SUBJ: LTR TO PRES FM REP LENT RE OVIET JEWRY

-----  
REQUIRED ACTION. DRAFT REPLY FOR WH SIG

DUE DATE: 13 MAR 84

COMMENTS.

*Loretta Y. Brewster*  
25830  
FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

415-1 rec'd MB  
211. 2250

February 29, 1984

Dear Norm:

On behalf of the President, I would like to thank you for your February 24 letter urging that we pursue additional efforts to ameliorate the plight of Soviet Jews. In your letter you indicated that there is a renewed sense of urgency to act and you cited the number of Jews who have emigrated from 1979 to 1982 as evidence of the importance of this situation.

We appreciate knowing of your support for past efforts of the Administration on behalf of Soviet Jews, and we have conveyed your recommendations for additional actions to the appropriate advisory staff members. In the interim, let me assure you that your comments are receiving close attention and careful consideration.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

M. B. Oglesby, Jr.  
Assistant to the President

The Honorable Norman F. Lent  
House of Representatives  
Washington, D.C. 20515

MBO:KRJ:tjr

cc: w/copy of inc to NSC Secretariat - for DRAFT response

WALTER LENT  
NEW YORK

COMMITTEE ON ENERGY  
AND COMMERCE

SUBCOMMITTEE:  
SPACE, TRANSPORTATION,  
AND TOURISM

COMMITTEE ON  
COAST GUARD AND FISHERIES

SUBCOMMITTEE:  
CANAL AND OUTER  
CONTINENTAL SHELF

COAST GUARD AND NAVIGATION

Congress of the United States  
House of Representatives  
Washington, D.C. 20515

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BALDWIN, NEW YORK 11510  
TELEPHONE: (516) 223-1616

MASSAQUA PARK VILLAGE HALL  
151 FRONT STREET  
MASSAQUA PARK, NEW YORK 11762  
(516) 795-4454

February 24, 1984

8406970

The President  
The White House  
Washington, D.C. 20050

Dear Mr. President:

We believe there is a renewed sense of urgency to act on behalf of Jews in the Soviet Union. As you know, Soviet Jewish emigration plummeted from a peak of 51,320 in 1979 to 2,688 in 1982. A new nadir was reached in 1983 when only 1,315 Jews were allowed to join their families outside the Soviet Union.

There is a new and frightening wave of anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union. The Soviet state-sponsored anti-Zionist committee is attacking Jewish cultural efforts with a new vengeance. Yosef Begun has recently been sentenced to seven years at hard labor and five years internal exile for the "crime" of teaching Hebrew. Mail, which is the lifeline to the free world for Soviet Jews, is not being delivered. The harsh treatment of Prisoners of Conscience and the increased harassment of long-term refuseniks further illustrate that the Soviet regime seeks to eliminate any vestige of Jewish culture within its borders.

We applaud your address of January 16, in which you expressed your concern regarding the Soviet Prisoners of Conscience and the virtual halt in emigration. We also commend Secretary of State Shultz's efforts in bilateral and multilateral meetings to speak on behalf of Soviet Jews. The issues of emigration and human rights should remain high on the agenda in all relevant forums, including the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe's follow-up meetings and the United Nations Commission on Human Rights. The rapidly deteriorating situation, however, indicates that new avenues must be explored to ameliorate the plight of Jews in the Soviet Union. We must encourage further participation of our Western allies and neutral and non-aligned nations in this effort.




The President  
February 24, 1984

Page two

America has long been a symbol of freedom for the oppressed peoples of the world. It is important that we reaffirm our commitment to this basic principle at this critical time for Soviet Jews. With the recent change in power in the Soviet Union, now would be a timely opportunity to renew our efforts.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Norman F. Lent". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large, prominent initial "N".

NORMAN F. LENT  
Member of Congress

NFL/jm

1866

ID# 197155

THE WHITE HOUSE  
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

INCOMING

DATE RECEIVED: FEBRUARY 27, 1984

NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: THE HONORABLE NORMAN F. LENT

SUBJECT: URGES ACTION ON BEHALF OF JEWS IN THE SOVIET UNION

ROUTE TO: OFFICE/AGENCY (STAFF NAME)	ACTION ACT CODE	DATE YY/MM/DD	TYPE RESP	C D	COMPLETED YY/MM/DD
M. B. OGLESBY	ORG	84/02/27	<i>MS</i>		<i>AS 10/22/90</i>
<i>W. S. O. Secretary D</i>		<i>84/03/01</i>			<i>1/1</i>
REFERRAL NOTE:					
REFERRAL NOTE:					
REFERRAL NOTE:					
REFERRAL NOTE:					
REFERRAL NOTE:					

COMMENTS:

ADDITIONAL CORRESPONDENTS: MEDIA:L INDIVIDUAL CODES: 1240  
MAIL USER CODES: (A) (B) (C)

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*ACTION CODES:          *DISPOSITION CODES:      *OUTGOING          *
*                       *                       * CORRESPONDENCE:  *
*A-APPROPRIATE ACTION  *A-ANSWERED              *TYPE RESP=INITIALS *
*C-COMMENT/RECOM       *B-NON-SPEC-REFERRAL    *           OF SIGNER *
*D-DRAFT RESPONSE      *C-COMPLETED           *           CODE = A   *
*F-FURNISH FACT SHEET  *S-SUSPENDED           *COMPLETED = DATE OF *
*I-INFO COPY/NO ACT NEC*                       *           OUTGOING *
*R-DIRECT REPLY W/COPY *                       *                       *
*S-FOR-SIGNATURE       *                       *                       *
*X-INTERIM REPLY       *                       *                       *
*****

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REFER QUESTIONS AND ROUTING UPDATES TO CENTRAL REFERENCE  
(ROOM 75, OEOB) EXT. 2590  
KEEP THIS WORKSHEET ATTACHED TO THE ORIGINAL INCOMING  
LETTER AT ALL TIMES AND SEND COMPLETED RECORD TO RECORDS  
MANAGEMENT.

February 29, 1984

Dear Norm:

On behalf of the President, I would like to thank you for your February 24 letter urging that we pursue additional efforts to ameliorate the plight of Soviet Jews. In your letter you indicated that there is a renewed sense of urgency to act and you cited the number of Jews who have emigrated from 1979 to 1982 as evidence of the importance of this situation.

We appreciate knowing of your support for past efforts of the Administration on behalf of Soviet Jews, and we have conveyed your recommendations for additional actions to the appropriate advisory staff members. In the interim, let me assure you that your comments are receiving close attention and careful consideration.

With best wishes,

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M. B. Oglesby, Jr.  
Assistant to the President

The Honorable Norman F. Lent  
House of Representatives  
Washington, D.C. 20515

MBO:KRJ:tjr

cc: w/copy of inc to NSC Secretariat - for DRAFT response



IRMAN F. LENT  
DISTRICT NEW YORK

COMMITTEE ON ENERGY  
AND COMMERCE

SUBCOMMITTEE:  
ENERGY, TRANSPORTATION,  
AND TOURISM

COMMITTEE ON  
MERCHANT MARINE AND  
FISHERIES

SUBCOMMITTEES:  
PANAMA CANAL AND OUTER  
CONTINENTAL SHELF

COAST GUARD AND NAVIGATION

Congress of the United States  
House of Representatives  
Washington, D.C. 20515

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MASSAPEQUA PARK VILLAGE HALL  
151 FRONT STREET  
MASSAPEQUA PARK, NEW YORK 11762  
(516) 795-4454

February 24, 1984

The President  
The White House  
Washington, D.C. 20050

Dear Mr. President:

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
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The President  
February 24, 1984

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NORMAN F. LENT  
Member of Congress

NFL/jm