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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
letter case (8401723)			
1. memo	from Matlock to Robert McFarlane re: Gromyko speech (1p) <i>R 5/23/03 MDZ-009 #1</i>	3/1/84	P-1 B1 P-5
2. memo	from Charles Hill to McFarlane re: Gromyko speech (2pp)	2/29/84	P-1 B1 P-5
letter case (8401701)			
3. memo	from Matlock to McFarlane re: Sen. Baker's comments (1p) <i>R 5/23/03 MDZ-009 #2</i>	3/1/84	P-1 B1 P-5
4. tracking worksheet	re: Howard Baker (1p, partial)	2/17/84	P-5 open
5. letter	from Howard Baker to the President re: Chernenko (1p)	2/17/84	P-5 open
letter case (8401578)			
6. memo	from Matlock to McFarlane re: visit of Soviet press officials (1p) <i>R 5/23/03 MDZ-009 #3</i>	3/1/84	P-1 B1 P-5
7. memo	from Robert Kimmitt to Charles Hill re: visit of Soviet press officials (1p)	n.d.	P-1 B1 CCT 12/4/00
COLLECTION: MATLOCK, JACK F.: Files			dlb
FILE FOLDER: Matlock Chron March 1984 [1 of 4] GA 90887 <i>box 3</i>			10/19/95

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
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- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
8. memo	from Hill to McFarlane re: visit of Soviet press officials (1p)	2/24/84	P-1 B1 P-5
9. memo	copy of item # 6 (1p) R MOZ-009 # 3 5/25/83 (DUPE)	3/1/84	P-1 B1 P-5
10. memo	copy of item # 7 (1p)	n.d.	P-1 B1
11. memo	copy of item # 8 (1p)	2/24/84	P-1 B1 P-5
letter case (8402505)			
12. memo	from Matlock to McFarlane re: Memcon President's meeting with Chancellor Kohl (1p) R 5/23/83 MOZ-009 # 4	3/27/84	P-1 B1
13. memcon	re: meeting with Chancellor Kohl (8pp, partial)	3/5/84	P-1 B1
14. memo	from Kimmitt to Hill re: mecon (1p) R - #5	n.d.	P-1 B1
15. memo (8401859)	from Matlock to McFarlane re: conference on Soviet strategy in Tokyo (1p) R - #7	3/5/84	P-1 B1
letter case (8490307)			
16. memo	from Matlock to McFarlane re: bilateral issues with Soviets (3pp) PART. 9/7/07 NLRRMOZ-009 #8	3/8/84	P-1 B1 P-5
COLLECTION: MATLOCK, JACK F.: Files			dlb
FILE FOLDER: Matlock Chron March 1984 [1 of 4] OA 90887 Box 3			10/19/95

RESTRICTION CODES

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
17. memo	from Matlock to William Clark re: strategy paper (3pp) <i>PART 9/7/07 NURMOZ-009 #9</i>	8/8/83	R-1 B1 P-5
18. memo	from Hill to Clark re: strategy paper (1p)	8/5/83	P-1 B1
19. strategy paper	(6pp) <i>PART 9/7/07 NURMOZ-009 #10</i>	n.d.	R-1 B1 P-5
20. briefing paper	(2pp) <i>PART. 5/23/03 MOZ-009 #11</i>	n.d.	P-1 B1 26
21. memo	from Kimmitt to Hill re: strategy paper (2pp)	8/8/83	R-1 B1 P-5
22. memo	from Kimmitt to Hill (1p)	n.d.	P-1 B1
23. memo	from Kimmitt to Hill (1p)	n.d.	P-1 B1
24. memo	from Kimmitt to Hill re: strategy paper	n.d.	P-1 B1
letter case (8401831)			
25. memo	from Matlock to McFarlane re: visit of Soviet TV commentator (2pp) <i>5/23/03 MOZ-009 #12</i>	3/12/84	P-1 B1 P-5
26. memo	from Kimmitt to Hill re: visit of Soviet TV commentator (1p)	n.d.	P-1 B1 P-5
27. draft memo reply	from Kimmitt to Hill re: visit of Soviet TV commentator (1p)	n.d.	P-1 B1 P-5
COLLECTION: MATLOCK, JACK F.: Files			dlb
FILE FOLDER: Matlock Chron March 1984 [1 of 4] GA 90887 <i>Box 3</i>			10/19/95

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
28. memo	from Hill to McFarlane re: visit of Soviet TV commentantor (1p)	3/3/84	R-1 P-5 <i>B1</i>
COLLECTION: MATLOCK, JACK F.: Files			dlb
FILE FOLDER: Matlock Chron March 1984 [1 of 4] QA 90887 <i>Box 3</i>			10/19/95

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PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O 13233

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer CAS

Box Number 3

FOIA M02-009

File Folder MATLOCK CHRON MARCH 1984 (1)

DATE 3/22/2007

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
1	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE GROMYKO SPEECH (#1)	1	3/1/1984	
			<i>MVH 3/17/08</i>		
3	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE SENATOR BAKER'S COMMENTS (#2)	1	3/1/1984	
			<i>MVH 3/17/08</i>		
6	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE VISIT OF SOVIET PRESS OFFICIALS (#3)	1	3/1/1984	
			<i>MVH 3/17/08</i>		
9	MEMO	DUPE OF ITEM 6	1	3/1/1984	
			<i>MVH 3/17/08</i>		
25	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE VISIT OF SOVIET COMMENTATOR (#12)	2	3/12/1984	
			<i>MVH 3/17/08</i>		

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

March 1, 1984

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*
SUBJECT: Gromyko Speech on Foreign Policy

State has sent a memorandum (TAB I) which analyzes Gromyko's February 27 speech on foreign policy.

According to State, Gromyko's condemnation of U.S. policy combined with expressions of interest in improving East-West relations suggests an effort to keep the U.S. on the defensive while the Soviets work through the problem internally of how and when to engage the U.S. in a serious dialogue. I concur with this analysis, and would note that it will be interesting to compare the tone on Chernenko's "election" speech -- scheduled for tomorrow -- with Gromyko's.

Attachment:

Tab I - Hill-McFarlane Memorandum of February 29, 1984

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
NLS MOZ-009#1
BY AK NARA, DATE 5/23/03

RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 1178² LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

March 1, 1984

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM:

JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT:

Senator Baker's Comments on Chernenko

You may be interested in Howard Baker's impressions of Chernenko, conveyed in a letter to the President (TAB I).

Baker feels that Chernenko enters office "without the burden of deeply seated personal animosity against the United States," and that he seems his own man and very much in charge.

I believe Baker's impressions veer to the optimistic on both points, but I find them interesting because they indicate that, in private, Chernenko comes across as more forceful and able than some of the press reports (and comments of Soviet intellectuals) would lead one to believe.

Oglesby's reply to Baker seems adequate, but you might wish to mention to Baker that the President appreciated his letter the next time you talk to him.

Attachment:

Tab I - Letter to President from Senator Baker

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLS M02-009 #2BY CH NARA, DATE 5/23/03

WHITE HOUSE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

O - OUTGOING

H - INTERNAL

I - INCOMING

Date Correspondence Received (YY/MM/DD) 84 102 17

Name of Correspondent: Howard Baker

MI Mail Report

User Codes: (A) PRES (B) _____ (C) _____

Subject: States ~~_____~~ it was an honor to serve with Vice President Bush as your representative to Yuri Andropov's funeral. Relates that "based on only a brief visit and my own political instincts...General Secretary Chernenko is a man with who we can deal, (and) his health is such that we will have him to deal with for some time to come. It is my own hope that you will take the earliest possible opportunity to get acquainted with him"

DISPOSITION

Office/Agency (Staff Name)	Action Code	Tracking Date YY/MM/DD	Type of Response	Code	Completion Date YY/MM/DD
<u>LA OGLE</u>	ORIGINATOR	<u>84 102 17</u> ^{MS}	<u>MS</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>84 102 24</u>
<u>MS atn Secretarial</u>	Referral Note: <u>A</u>	<u>84 102 27</u> ^{LD}			<u>1 1</u>
	Referral Note:				<u>1 1</u>
	Referral Note:				<u>1 1</u>
	Referral Note:				<u>1 1</u>

ACTION CODES:

- A - Appropriate Action
- C - Comment/Recommendation
- D - Draft Response
- F - Furnish Fact Sheet to be used as Enclosure

- I - Info Copy Only/No Action Necessary
- R - Direct Reply w/Copy
- S - For Signature
- X - Interim Reply

DISPOSITION CODES:


- A - Answered
- B - Non-Special Referral
- C - Completed
- S - Suspended

FOR OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE:

- Type of Response = Initials of Signer
- Code = "A"
- Completion Date = Date of Outgoing

Comments: _____

Keep this worksheet attached to the original incoming letter.
 Send all routing updates to Central Reference (Room 75, OEOB).
 Always return completed correspondence record to Central Files.
 Refer questions about the correspondence tracking system to Central Reference, ext. 2590.



February 24, 1984

Dear Senator Baker:

President Reagan very much appreciated talking with you about your meeting with General Secretary Konstantin Chernenko, and he asked me to reiterate his gratitude for your participation in the funeral services for Yuri Andropov.

The President welcomes your counsel on the issue of an early meeting with General Secretary Chernenko, and was pleased to have the additional observations in your February 17 letter. Let me assure you that your advice, as always, will be given most careful consideration.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

M. B. Oglesby, Jr.
Assistant to the President

The Honorable Howard H. Baker, Jr.
Majority Leader
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

MBO/KRJ/tjr

cc: w/copy of inc to NSC Secretariat - for
appropriate action

UNITED STATES SENATE

207434

OFFICE OF THE MAJORITY LEADER
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

February 17, 1984

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

It was both a pleasure and an honor to serve with Vice President Bush as your representative at the State funeral of Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Yuri Andropov. As I mentioned during our brief telephone conversation Wednesday, I came away from our 30 minute meeting with General Secretary Konstantin Chernenko with some definite impressions.

The first is that George Bush, as head of the delegation, was an excellent representative of the United States for this important and delicate mission. He was, in all respects, a skilled and able diplomat and I am grateful that I had the opportunity to serve with him.


The second is that I feel General Secretary Chernenko has entered his important office without the burden of deeply seated personal animosity against the United States. Although I did not meet with Chairman Andropov, I twice met with Chairman Brezhnev and anticipated that the new Soviet Leader would have the same personal dislike and mistrust for the United States that I sensed from Brezhnev. With Chernenko, that was not the case.

Third, Chernenko seemed very much his own man--very much in charge. He was sure of himself, perfectly willing to engage in spontaneous conversation, and not intimidated by the presence of Foreign Minister Gromyko. In fact, Gromyko's only words were in response to your letter to Chernenko and they were muttered as an aside and not so that Chernenko could hear them.

Finally, despite the various reports on his health, Chernenko seemed well and robust. He was quick, alert and animated in his conversation.

Mr. President, based on only a brief visit and my own political instincts, I have two basic conclusions. First, General Secretary Chernenko is a man with whom we can deal. Secondly, his health is such that we will have him to deal with for some time to come. It is my own hope that you will take the earliest possible opportunity to get acquainted with him.

Sincerely,



Howard H. Baker, Jr.

HHBJr:rdt

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

March 1, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT: Visit of Soviet Press Agency Officials

State reports that two Soviet press agency officials have applied for visas to tape an interview with the Cable News Network and to contact two American publishers regarding some translation agreements with Novosti Press Agency. Although State is disturbed by the lack of reciprocity in TV appearances, it recommends that we allow the visit to proceed. Otherwise, the U.S. media may create a stir, and the Department is already involved in lawsuits challenging past visa refusals.

I consider State's judgment correct in this instance, particularly since visa refusal would not prevent CNN from taping them in another country.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you authorize the attached Kimmitt-Hill Memorandum.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

- Tab I - Kimmitt-Hill Memorandum
- Tab II - Hill-McFarlane Memorandum

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
NLS 1402-009 #3
BY CRS NARA, DATE 5/23/03

RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER ⁷⁻⁸ 5A11 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

March 1, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

SIGNEDFROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT: Visit of Soviet Press Agency Officials

State reports that two Soviet press agency officials have applied for visas to tape an interview with the Cable News Network and to contact two American publishers regarding some translation agreements with Novosti Press Agency. Although State is disturbed by the lack of reciprocity in TV appearances, it recommends that we allow the visit to proceed. Otherwise, the U.S. media may create a stir, and the Department is already involved in lawsuits challenging past visa refusals.

I consider State's judgment correct in this instance, particularly since visa refusal would not prevent CNN from taping them in another country.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you authorize the attached Kimmitt-Hill Memorandum.

Approve *X* Disapprove

Attachments:

- Tab I - Kimmitt-Hill Memorandum
- Tab II - Hill-McFarlane Memorandum

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
NLS M02-009 #3
BY CU, NARA, DATE 5/23/03

RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

March 5, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR RONALD K. PETERSON
Office of Assistant Director for Legislative
Reference
Office of Management and Budget

FROM: ROBERT M. KIMMITT

SUBJECT: H.J. Res. 435, Resolving That the U.S. Should
formally Renounce the Yalta Agreement

We have reviewed and concur with the Department of State's
draft report on H.J. Resolution, resolving that the U.S.
should formally renounce the Yalta Agreement.

Attachment

1760

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

March 2, 1984

FOR BOB KIMMITT:

I recommend that you sign the
attached memorandum to Ronald K.
Peterson.

pps *pt* *oot*
Sommer, Thompson, Robinson and
C. Lennan concur.

Jack
JACK F. MATLOCK



EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

1760

February 28, 1984

LEGISLATIVE REFERRAL MEMORANDUM

TO: Legislative Liaison Officer-
✓ National Security Council

SUBJECT: State draft report on H.J.Res. 435, resolving that the U.S. should formally renounce the Yalta Agreement.

The Office of Management and Budget requests the views of your agency on the above subject before advising on its relationship to the program of the President, in accordance with OMB Circular A-19.

A response to this request for your views is needed no later than
THURSDAY, MARCH 22, 1984.

Questions should be referred to Tracey Lawler (395-4710)
the legislative analyst in this office.

Ronald K. Peterson
RONALD K. PETERSON FOR
Assistant Director for
Legislative Reference

Enclosures
cc: John Eisenhower



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Mr. Chairman:

The Secretary has asked me to respond to your request for Executive Branch comments on H. J. Res. 435, resolving that the United States should formally renounce the Yalta Agreement. The Department of State opposes this resolution.

The Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe clearly embodied the principle that each nation should be free to decide for itself the form of its own government. The problem of Soviet expansion springs not from the Yalta Declaration, but from the failure of the Soviet Union to implement the provisions of the Yalta Declaration. It is the policy of the United States to support the right of national self-determination, and it is our view that the action proposed by the resolution -- renunciation of the Yalta agreements -- would actually undercut, rather than further, this policy.

As Vice President Bush noted on September 21, 1983 in an address at Vienna: "In approaching the problems of the [Eastern and Central European] region, United States policy is guided by certain constants: First, we recognize no lawful division of Europe. There is much misunderstanding about the substance of the Yalta conference. Let me state as clearly as I can: there was no agreement at that time to divide Europe up into 'spheres of influence;' on the contrary, the powers agreed on the principle of the common responsibility of the three allies for all the liberated territories. The Soviet Union pledged itself to grant full independence to Poland and to all other states in Eastern Europe, and to hold free elections there. The Soviet violation of these obligations is the primary root of East-West tensions today..... Let me stress here that the United States does not seek to destabilize or undermine any government, but our attitude toward the region is informed by a sense of history--of European history. For this reason we support and will encourage all movement toward the social, humanitarian and democratic ideals which have characterized the historical development of Europe."

The Honorable
Dante B. Fascell,
Chairman,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
House of Representatives.

Secretary Shultz, speaking in Stockholm on January 17 at the opening of the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, also put forth clearly the American view on this subject. He noted that since 1945 "an artificial barrier has cruelly divided this continent -- and indeed heartlessly divided one of its great nations. This barrier was not placed there by the West. It is not maintained by the West. It is not the West that prevents its citizens free movement, or cuts them off from competing ideas. Let me be very clear: the United States does not recognize the legitimacy of the artificially imposed division of Europe."

The Office of Management and Budget advises that from the standpoint of the Administration's program there is no objection to the submission of this report.

Sincerely,

W. Tapley Bennett, Jr.
Assistant Secretary
Legislative and Intergovernmental Affairs

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

March 27, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation of the President's Meeting with Chancellor Kohl, March 5, 1984

Attached for your review and approval is the Memorandum of Conversation of the President's meeting with FRG Chancellor Helmut Kohl on March 5, 1984. (Tab I).

Attached at Tab II is a memorandum to Mr. Charles Hill, Department of State, forwarding a copy of the Memorandum of Conversation.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you approve forwarding the memorandum to Mr. Hill.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I Memorandum of Conversation

Tab II Memorandum to Mr. Hill

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
NLS 1402-009 #4
BY CA NARA, DATE 5/23/03

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Chancellor Helmut Kohl of the Federal Republic of Germany (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
The Vice President
Secretary Shultz
Robert C. McFarlane
Assistant Secretary Burt
Ambassador Burns
Jack Matlock, NSC
Harry Obst, Interpreter

Chancellor Helmut Kohl
MFA State Secretary Andreas Meyer-Landrut
Ambassador to the U.S., Peter Hermes
Dr. Horst Teltschik, Director General,
Foreign and Security Affairs, Federal
Chancellery
Heinz Weber, Interpreter
Dr. Juergen Sudhoff, Acting Chief, Federal
Press and Information Center (lunch only)
Dr. Edouard Ackermann, Director General,
Communications and Public Relations,
Federal Chancellery (lunch only)
Dr. Franz Pfeffer, MFA Director General for
Political Affairs (lunch only)
Ambassador Friedrich Ruth, FRG Commissioner
for Disarmament and Security Affairs (lunch
only)

DATE, TIME March 5, 1984
AND PLACE: 11:15 a.m. - 12:15 p.m., Oval Office, and
12:15 p.m. - 1:30 p.m., Working Lunch,
Family Dining Room

The President greeted Chancellor Kohl and they exchanged greetings to Mrs. Kohl and the First Lady. Kohl also mentioned that his eldest son was with him and was on his way to study at Harvard. (U)

The President then asked Kohl what was on his agenda. (U)

Kohl replied that he had in mind a tour d'horizon, and that the President should interrupt and comment as he went along. Kohl then began with a review of the domestic situation in the Federal Republic. (U)

Turning first to the economic situation, Kohl said that economic recovery was under way and that he felt that the recovery would

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By CU, NARA, Date 5/23/83

be stronger than the experts were predicting. Inflation was being controlled and would be in the 2.8-3% range. Unemployment continues to be a problem, with two million Germans out of work. Basically, the problem resulted from too little investment for too long. The FRG must put more investment in industries of the future. (C)

There is also, Kohl noted, a potential future problem with the trade unions. They are proposing a shorter work week -- 36 hours -- with the same pay.

Kohl also noted that the FRG has a problem with exports and protectionist pressures are growing, but that he will oppose them firmly. He feels that they must compete with the Japanese in efficiency, and he is not pessimistic regarding their ability to do so. But it is clear that protectionism hurts everyone in the long run. (C)

In this regard, he added that he was strongly opposed to the proposed Common Market tax on fats and oils, and that he could assure the President that it will not be adopted. He had discussed this issue with Prime Minister Thatcher and she is not willing to support it either. (C)

Kohl noted the European criticism of high U.S. interest rates, and said that they are indeed annoying. But, as he had told his colleagues, it would be even more annoying if the President is not reelected, and he realized that perhaps it is not the best policy to bring them down this year. He hoped, however, that the problem could be addressed next year. (C)


Secretary Shultz observed that the Chancellor's statement regarding his firm position against the special tax on fats and oils is very important to us. He was pleased that Kohl stated it so unequivocally. An agricultural trade war would be the worst thing that could happen to all of us. (C)

Kohl said that he would make this point when he meets with the Senate, but we should understand that the resistance to protectionism must be a two-way street. (C)


Secretary Shultz suggested that he make this point to the Senate as well. (U)

Turning to political topics, Kohl observed that the opposition to LRINF deployments had not disappeared,

Regarding conditions in the European Community, Kohl noted that the Community was going through a difficult period arranging its finances. All the members need to make sacrifices, but Thatcher has not reached the point of recognizing this fully. In the end he believed that an arrangement would be reached, but that care must be taken to make sure that the arrangement devised would not lead to a trade war. This question is also linked to Spain and Portugal; the other members must increase their contributions. They need another two billion on top of the four agreed to. (C)




So far as the EC is concerned, he hoped that the current problems would be solved, but noted that this would be a long process, since any agreements would have to be ratified by national parliaments, and this could take two years or so. With the elections to the European Parliament, however, a new and more informal phase of negotiations will begin. (U)




Kohl then turned to Henry Kissinger's recent analysis of the alliance, and noted that it contained some good proposals. He felt, however, that Kissinger was wrong on two points: that there should be a European supreme commander, and that the U.S. troop presence should be lowered. These steps would be interpreted in Europe as a diminishing U.S. commitment to the alliance and would lead to an unraveling of the alliance. He agreed, however, that the Europeans should do more for themselves. (C)

Regarding the GDR, Kohl said that "seismographic" developments are taking place. Pressures are building up, and it is clear that the ideological basis for communism has gone to pieces. The GDR is letting more people leave than before -- 4,000 were allowed out in January and February, more than in ten years. This is an attempt to reduce the pressures on the regime in the hope that an explosion can be prevented. It is not in our

interest, Kohl added, that an explosion occur. He has the feeling that Honecker is on better terms with Chernenko than he was with Andropov, and this may give him a little more elbow room. Basically, Kohl expressed optimism about the direction of current trends. ~~(S)~~

Regarding LRINF deployments, Kohl noted that the most important decisions have been made, 

 He suggested, however, that we could help by pursuing a policy of negotiation with the Soviets. ~~(C)~~

Turning to the Soviet Union, Kohl observed that it was stupid to ridicule Chernenko's age or health, as the media had done. He believed Chernenko could stay in office and that he should be treated with courtesy. His position is, however, not as strong as Andropov's, and his successor may already have been chosen. It would be a good idea to try to establish contacts with the successor, but this of course should not be done behind Chernenko's back, but by using normal channels. ~~(S)~~

Kohl added that he thought the President's decision not to go to the Andropov funeral was correct. The Soviet Union continues to have a collective leadership. They misread the situation in regard to NATO LRINF deployments, and it is important now for us to keep the initiative. ~~(S)~~

Kohl then reviewed some specific issues as follows:


~~(C)~~

Kohl then turned to Poland, where he felt the situation continues to be bad. The Soviets have not mastered the ideological situation. He felt the Catholic Church initiative to provide support for private agriculture has great promise, and noted that it is the Pope's idea. The Polish regime would have to make a

very difficult decision to allow it, but it deserves our support if it is approved. (S)

Kohl then apologized for talking so long. (U)

The President said that he had not at all talked too long, and noted that we seem to be very close on the issues. Regarding protectionism, he felt very strongly that it should be opposed. However, he has problems with Congress. He then suggested that the conversation be continued at lunch. (C)

* * * * *

Kohl initiated the conversation at lunch by saying that he was trying to do his part in supporting democratic forces in El Salvador. His ambassador is now there, and he was asking everyone to stand up for Duarte and assist him. (C)

The President said that these actions were most helpful. (U)

The topic then shifted to East-West relations, and Secretary Shultz referred to Kohl's earlier comments on the Polish Church initiative to assist private agriculture. (C)

Kohl reiterated the importance he attached to supporting this initiative, and observed that the President's personal support must be clear -- this will be very important for Catholics. (C)

The President noted that we have moved on some of our sanctions and will be prepared to move on others if the Polish government takes appropriate steps. As for the Soviets, he is making clear that we are ready to negotiate. (S)

Kohl said that it would be useful if the President could arrange a meeting with Chernenko. Personal contact is important, and Gromyko is a problem. A way must be found to get around him and contact other policy makers directly. He had talked to Mrs. Thatcher, and she agrees that a summit meeting would be desirable. (S)

The President replied that he was interested in preparing for a meeting, but it was important that we not talk about this publicly, since the Soviets could use it for propaganda purposes. (S)

Kohl said that he had told the Soviets that the President was going to be reelected whatever they did. They should believe him, since he had told them last June that the missiles would be deployed, and he had been proven right. So he had told the Soviets that if they hesitated to deal with President Reagan because 1984 is an election year, they would lose again. (S)

Secretary Shultz asked if Chernenko could stand up to Gromyko. His speeches seem a bit milder, but Gromyko seems to act as the gatekeeper to the outside world. (S)

Kohl thought it would be possible to arrange a summit, and noted that a 30-minute meeting would not be enough. It should provide enough time to discuss subjects thoroughly. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] But he felt the President should probe, and it would surprise him if Chernenko did not react positively. The East Europeans, at any rate, want a meeting, and Chernenko himself may feel that he doesn't have a lot of time to lose. (S)

The President said he was reminded of the story of the man who had just had a physical, and who asked his doctor for a report. The doctor advised, "Just eat the best part of the chicken first." (U)

The Vice President asked how Kohl would view the development of U.S.-GDR ties. (S)

Kohl said that it depends. If greater prestige of the GDR regime helps the people, this is all right. But the question should be examined carefully to make sure that any moves do help the people. Honecker does seem to have an interest in improving his relations with the U.S. Kohl met with him at a Soviet guest house in Moscow during the Andropov funeral. Honecker said at that time that he had an invitation to speak in San Francisco, and asked some questions about Americans and the United States. So he may be interested, and Kohl himself would give a qualified yes to an improved U.S.-GDR relationship. (S)

The President asked if Kohl could estimate how many East Germans would choose the FRG over the Communist ideology. (C)

Kohl said 90 percent. Of course, he added, not all really want our system; they have grown up under a socialist system and may not want to give up some of the social benefits. But the influence of the Church is growing and there is no support at all for revolution. (C)

Secretary Shultz recalled that in Bonn they had spoken of the importance of military to military contacts with the Soviets. (C)

Kohl said yes, he thought they were potentially useful. At present, he observed, the Soviets have only two channels of information from the outside world, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the KGB. Soviet marshals know little of the personalities in the West, and direct contact could broaden their horizons. (C)

The President remarked that it is easy for us to see the Soviets as aggressive. He wondered whether they could possibly view us as aggressive. (C)

Kohl said that he thought they could, but not because they fear we will attack their borders, but because they feel they need a buffer zone. And then dictatorships always need an enemy. (C)

The President asked rhetorically how they could think that we would want to go to war. They have emphasized their determination to impose Communism, and should recognize that the rest of us are merely being defensive. (C)

Kohl observed that Communist ideology is becoming more flaccid. He noted at the Andropov funeral that the symbols and procedures were as if a pope or emperor or tsar were being buried. And he himself was witness to the fact that when Mrs. Andropov paid her final farewell to the corpse, she made the sign of the cross over the casket. (C)

The President observed that the Soviets seem to have created an aristocracy such as the one they overthrew. (C)

Kohl remarked that whereas Americans have found their place in the world and in history under the President's leadership, time is not working to the Soviet advantage. He noted that Mitterrand agrees with this, and he believes that it gives the United States an opportunity. The idea of Communism has lost much of its force. One can see this in the decline of the French and Italian Communist Parties. The idea of freedom is stronger everywhere. While the Soviet regime will not collapse overnight, it is brittle. (C)

The President said that he understood there was a turn to religion among the young. (C)

Kohl confirmed that he believed this was the case and noted that the Patriarch was allowed to read a public mass during the funeral period for Andropov. He wondered why the regime permitted it, and thought they might need it for insurance. He then asked Meyer-Landrut (until recently FRG Ambassador in Moscow) if he had any observations. (C)

Meyer-Landrut agreed that there is a growth of interest in religion, and noted that the Russians must cope with many problems for which the ideology gives them no help. They need better information regarding the West. (C)

Shultz wondered if Western tourists have an impact on the Soviet population. (U)

Meyer-Landrut thought that they definitely have an impact. Soviets are very interested in life in the West. They draw conclusions from the way Western tourists are dressed and act, and when they can, question the foreigners about their life. (U)

Kohl thought that we should not forget what it means to live in a country sealed from the outside. Distortions are great, and thirst for information is great. (C)

The lunch terminated with both the President and Chancellor Kohl agreeing on the usefulness of their conversation and on the importance of maintaining close consultations on the various issues that confront us. (U)

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE Attachment~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. CHARLES HILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation of FRG Chancellor Kohl's
Visit, March 5, 1984

Attached is the memorandum of conversation from the President's
meeting with FRG Chancellor Kohl on March 5, 1984.

Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary

Attachment

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE Attachment~~
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLS MOZ-009 #6

BY CS, NARA, DATE 5/23/13

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

March 5, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT: Conference on Soviet Strategy in Tokyo

Ray Cline of CSIS, Georgetown, has written me and Gaston Sigur regarding a conference on Soviet strategy in Asia which his organization, the World Strategy Network, is organizing in Tokyo March 13-14. The conference is funded by DOD.

Ray had hoped to have a participant from the NSC, but we were able to locate no one with an appropriate background who could get away next week. I managed to arrange, however, for Jack Scanlan of State, who is familiar with the issues, to go. Stillwell's deputy will go from Defense.

Ray's second request was for a letter from you endorsing the conference. Since I believe that this is a laudable effort, I attach a letter which I believe would be appropriate for the occasion.

Gaston Sigur concurs.

Recommendation:

That you sign the letter at TAB I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment:

- Tab I - Letter to Dr. Ray S. Cline
- Tab II - Cline-Matlock letter of Feb. 14, 1984

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLS 102-009 #7BY CH NARA, DATE 5/23/03

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Ray:

I am very pleased to learn of the plans for a conference in Tokyo on Soviet Strategy in Asia, sponsored by the World Strategy Network and the World Strategy Council of Japan.

The subject is obviously of great importance both for the United States and for our Japanese Allies. I commend the initiative taken by both your organizations to provide an opportunity for government officials and prominent specialists from both countries to meet and discuss the strategic questions which arise from increasing Soviet activity in Asia.

You have my best wishes for a successful conference and I look forward to seeing your report on the views expressed there.

Sincerely,

Dr. Ray S. Cline
World Strategy Network
1015 Eighteenth Street N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20036



World Strategy Network

1015 EIGHTEENTH STREET, N.W. • SUITE 805
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20036 • 202-775-3212

February 24, 1984

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Lt. Gen. Daniel O. Graham
U.S.A. (Ret.)

Science & Technology:

Dr. Edward Teller
Dr. Miles Costick

Ambassador Jack Matlock
Special Assistant to the President
National Security Council
Washington, D.C. 20506

Dear Jack:

Herewith is a brief description of the project in researching and conferring abroad with scholars and officials interested in Soviet strategy. This specific conference plan is for Japan.

We expect to hold a number of conferences this year but have scheduled only two: Tokyo, 13-14 March 1984 and Rome, 15-16 May 1984.

I am very anxious to have the NSC involved in and supportive of the whole project. Right now, however, it is urgent to demonstrate high-level enthusiasm for what we are doing in Tokyo. This means an NSC staff member should attend the Tokyo conference -- no paper necessary, just participation in discussions on Washington's view of Soviet strategy in Asia.

We also need a brief note of encouragement and endorsement from Bud McFarlane, or, if he thinks it appropriate, the President. Such a note would simply say White House officials concerned with strategic planning have been briefed on the Tokyo Conference on Soviet Strategy in Asia. This conference is sponsored by the World Strategy Network in Washington, whose Director Ray S. Cline will attend the Tokyo meetings. It is hosted by the World Strategy Council, Japan, an association of distinguished Japanese scholars and experts on Asian strategic issues.

Please help us get a name promptly for an NSC representative participating (unofficially and informally) at the Tokyo scholars' conference and also clear a letter endorsing the concept of the conference prior to 10 March 1984. Both the Defense Department and the State Department have approved the Tokyo project and are supporting it. Two officers from General Stilwell's staff will attend. Speedy action on a letter should be easy.

SPONSORING INSTITUTIONS

Center for Strategic & International
Studies,
Georgetown University


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Ambassador Jack Matlock
February 24, 1984
Page Two

Sorry to trouble you, but we want these discussions to be successful in improving understanding of the American view of the Soviet threat to world security.

Cordially

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Ray S. Cline".

Ray S. Cline
Director

Encs.

cc: Dr. Gaston Sigur, NSC



SOVIET GLOBAL STRATEGY AGAINST ASIA

POSSIBLE PARTICIPANTS

CONFERENCE IN TOKYO, JAPAN, MARCH 14, 1984

The Japan host for the conference effort will be the Japan World Strategy Council (JWSC) whose leaders include:

Gen. Ichiji Sugita (Ret.) (JWSC Chairman)
Honorary President, Japan Veterans Association

Amb. Shinsaku Hogen (JWSC Co-Chairman)
Former Vice Foreign Minister

Prof. Osamu Miyoshi (JWSC Executive Director)

Prof. Kenzo Kiga
Keio University, and President of the Association for
Soviet-East European Studies

Adm. Kenichi Kitamura (Ret.)
Former Commander, Self-Defense Fleet

Dr. Koh Maruyama
Former Vice Minister of State for Defense

Gen. Shigeto Nagano (Ret.)
Former Chief of Staff, Ground Self-Defense Force

Prof. Haraki Niwa
Kyoto Sangyo University

The JWSC tentatively plans to invite to the March 14, 1984, conference in Tokyo the following persons, all of whom were met by Drs. Cline and Miller at various meetings during a planning trip to Tokyo, December 11-16, 1983:

Adm. Hirosato Asonuma (Ret.)
Former Deputy Commander in Chief, Self-Defense Fleet

Amb. Ryuichi Ando
Former Ambassador to Athens

Mr. Yukiyasu Harano
Secretary, Kangaku-in Foundation

Gen. Iiichi Hirose (Ret.)
President, Japan Veterans Association

Mr. Hajime Iki
Executive Director, Japan Veterans Association

Mr. Toyokazu Isaka
Monthly Magazine "JIYU"

Mr. Hideaki Kase
Chairman, Japan Center for the Study of Security Issues (JCSSI)

Mr. Hiroshi Kimura
Critic

Mr. Nobutane Kiuchi
Chairman, Institute of the World Economy

Mr. Yoshihisa Komori
Senior Correspondent, Mainichi Newspapers

Mr. Hiroshi Komoto
Director, RF-RADIO NIPPON Inc.

Gen. Hiroomi Kurisu (Ret.)
Former Chairman, JSC

Gen. Hisatomo Matsukane (Ret.)
Former North-Eastern Army Commander

Dr. Akishige Matsumoto
Vice President, Defense Association

Mr. Masahiro Miyazaki
Secretary General, JCSSI

Mr. Masahiko Motoki
Deputy Chief, Monthly Magazine "GENDAI"

Prof. Yatsuhiko Nakagawa
Tsukuba University

Mr. Toshio Nakajima
Director, U.S. Affairs, Cabinet Research Office

Ms. Kaoru Nakamaru
Director, International Affairs Institute

Mr. Toyoo Nobori
Director, Sogo Security Service Corporation

Adm. Ryohei Ohga (Ret.)
Former Chief of Staff, Self-Defense Fleet

Mr. Hisahiko Okazaki
Director General, Research and Planning Division,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Mr. Tomoya Okumura
President, Ohsaka Riki-Knives Mfg. Co., Ltd.

Amb. Shizuo Saitoh
Former Ambassador to the United Nations;
Chairman, The Foreign Press Center

Mr. Tomohisa Sakanaka
Senior Correspondent, Asahi Newspapers

Mr. Norimitsu Sasagawa
President, The Nippon Times

Prof. Yoshiaki Sasaki
Lecturer, Takusyoku University

Dr. Hideo Sekino
Director, Historical Research Institute

Prof. Yasunobu Somura
Tokyo Scientific University

Mr. Yasutoh Takada
The Star & Stripe Association

Mr. Minoru Tamba
Director, Soviet Union Affairs Division, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs

Dr. Jun Tsunoda
Executive Director, Japanese Center for Strategic Studies

Mr. Takehiko Ueda
Director, Office of Total Produce, News Track Japan, Inc.

Mr. Sanji Ueki
Secretary, Kangaku-in Foundation

Prof. Kazuro Umezu
Ohsaka Foreign Policy University

Prof. Tetsuji Yasuhira
Soka University

Prof. Yasuhiko Yoshida
Aoyama Gakuin University

Mr. Joji Yoshihara
Senior Staff, Cabinet Research Office

Other Japanese, not met by Drs. Cline and Miller, yet perhaps suitable for invitation include:

Mr. Masamichi Inoki
President, Research Institute for Peace and Security

Prof. Hiroshi Kimura
Hokkaido University

Prof. Masataka Kosaka
Kyoto University

Prof. Masamori Sasse
Japan Defense College

Prof. Seizaburo Sato
University of Tokyo

Prof. Hayao Shimizu
Tokyo Gaiko University

Most of these are believed to be Soviet specialists, or at least specialists on foreign policy and defense matters.



SOVIET GLOBAL STRATEGY AGAINST ASIA

FACT SHEET

The nature, objectives, intensity, and modus operandi of Soviet global strategy against Asia are being treated in a major research effort being undertaken by Interaction Systems Incorporated (ISI) of McLean, Virginia. Located near Washington, D.C., ISI is a research firm which concentrates on international political, military, and economic issues. As part of its Soviet Global Strategy Project, ISI is preparing a study entitled Soviet Global Strategy Against Asia.

Global strategy can be viewed as a systematic process involving the employment of the political, economic, technological, military, diplomatic, psychological, ideological, and moral elements of national power to promote national goals and objectives. Many analysts in the free world believe that the Soviet Union has a multi-faceted global strategy which consciously and, with the exception of occasional, relatively minor setbacks, effectively promotes Moscow's long-term expansionistic aims. Full understanding of the essence of Soviet global strategy is essential to policymakers in the free world.

Contributing to the project will be dozens of recognized Asian and American specialists on Soviet affairs. Relying whenever possible on primary Soviet sources of information, these Soviet specialists are being asked to document the existence of and the Asia-oriented manifestations of Soviet global strategy. A major element of the research process is extensive interviewing, panel discussions, and library-type research in the United States.

But in order to obtain the essential Asian perspective on Soviet global strategy, Soviet Global Strategy Against Asia will also be based heavily on the results of several conferences to be held in Japan. These conferences in Japan will be hosted by the Japan World Strategy Council and assisted by three American organizations based in the Washington, D.C. area: the World Strategy Network, the Center for Strategic and International Studies of Georgetown University, and Interaction Systems Incorporated. At these meetings, Asian and American specialists on the Soviet Union will meet and, in a structured manner, exchange facts and insights on Soviet global strategy as applied to Asia. In addition, a select audience of Asians, who are not necessarily Soviet specialists

but who have concerns and expertise about international affairs, will be invited to participate in each meeting so that their perceptions of Soviet global strategy against Asia might be noted. Each conference will also include keynote and other special presentations by distinguished guests.

As Director of ISI's Soviet Global Strategy Project and Chairman of the firm's Advisory Council, Dr. Ray S. Cline serves as the Senior Editor for Soviet Global Strategy Against Asia. Dr. Cline is the former Deputy Director for Intelligence of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. He is also Director of the World Strategy Network, Washington, D.C., and Senior Associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies of Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. A prolific commentator and writer on strategic matters, Dr. Cline is the author of World Power Trends and U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1980s (1980). His most recent book, written with Dr. Yonah Alexander, is Terrorism: The Soviet Connection (1984), which reports on the increasing use by the Soviets of terrorism and other forms of low-intensity conflict to implement their global strategy.

Co-Editors of Soviet Global Strategy Against Asia will be Dr. Roger E. Kanet and Dr. James Arnold Miller. Dr. Kanet is Professor of Political Science at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. A distinguished authority on Soviet foreign and military policies, Dr. Kanet has written hundreds of articles and written and edited a number of major books. Dr. Miller has written widely on such topics as terrorism and insurgency, geopolitics, raw materials availability, and Soviet global strategy in general. He is the Executive Secretary of the World Strategy Network, Washington, D.C. And in his capacity as Chairman of Interaction Systems Incorporated, Dr. Miller is responsible for the administrative aspects of the Soviet Global Strategy Project and the preparation of Soviet Global Strategy Against Asia.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

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March 8, 1984

NLRR MD2009 #8

ACTION

BY CK NARA DATE 9/7/07

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM:

JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT:

Bilateral Issues with Soviets: Bureaucratic Handling

During his meeting with Dobrynin March 7, Secretary Shultz proposed the resumption of negotiations on several bilateral issues. We now must decide how we handle the bureaucratic preparations, since some have very short time fuses. The most urgent questions involve the following:

Consulates: Shultz told Dobrynin that Burt would be in touch with Sokolov on this question next week. This presumably does not require us to have a negotiating position by then, but we should be prepared to discuss the concrete issues involved as soon as possible.

Interagency work on the question was completed last August, without agreement on several points, which were forwarded to the NSC for resolution. Attached at TAB I is a copy of a memorandum I forwarded to Judge Clark at the time, which explains the agency differences and my own view of them. You should also know that when the question was considered on an interagency basis, DOD was not included, since the matter was considered "close hold," and Defense [redacted] does not have a direct interest in the matter. Subsequently, however, Richard Perle complained that he was cut out, and requested, if the matter comes alive again, that OSD be included in the staffing. *1.4d*

We therefore face two questions: (1) should the interagency group be reconvened? and (2) if so, should OSD be included? Although I doubt that Agency positions will change on the issues, I would recommend that we request State to convene one more meeting and to include OSD, but that a short deadline be set for a report.

Exchange Agreement: Shultz suggested to Dobrynin that we negotiate this one in Moscow, and indicated that we would be ready to talk about it again in a couple of weeks.

The interagency work on our negotiating position had not been concluded when the question was put into suspense by KAL. We had asked State to convene a close-hold meeting and State had

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delegation of USIA to do the initial draft. USIA has completed a draft and Embassy Moscow has reviewed it and made informal comments. State has the draft, but has not yet commented on it. Since work is well advanced on the drafting, I believe that State should be directed to complete work on a draft within two weeks.

Consular Review Talks: Shultz urged that these be concluded expeditiously, but did not mention a date.

Most of the issues discussed with the Soviets are not contested by other agencies. One, however, has been a stumbling block: the FBI has been unwilling to agree to add Baltimore to a list of ports of entry where Soviet diplomats can enter the U.S. (This is in the context of trying to increase the number of entry and exit points available to us in the Soviet Union; we would get Brest and Nakhodka in return for Baltimore and San Francisco.)

In this case I would recommend that State be instructed to hold one more meeting with the interested agencies and to refer any remaining disagreement to us for resolution.

Maritime Boundary: The time pressure on this one comes primarily from Interior's desire to put up some of the disputed territory for leasing. Richard Levine has been working these complex issues and has recommended a high-level meeting soon. Judge Clark has a direct interest in the outcome, and Shultz has delegated Ken Dam to coordinate State's position. I believe that a meeting of you with the other senior officials involved will be necessary soon if we are to bring a clear U.S. position out of the welter of conflicting interests which are involved.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. Consulates: That you approve the Kimmit to Hill Memorandum at TAB II, directing State to convene an interagency meeting on a close hold basis to review our negotiating position, and to include OSD in the process.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

OR, alternatively, that you approve a memorandum which directs State to conduct the interagency review, without naming OSD as one of the participants.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

2. Exchanges Agreement: That you approve the Kimmitt to Hill Memorandum at TAB III instructing State to convene an interagency meeting on a close hold basis to finish work on the USG negotiating position on a cultural exchange agreement, with a report to the NSC due March 21.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

3. Consular Review Talks: That you approve the Kimmitt to Hill Memorandum at TAB IV which directs State to consult the FBI and other interested agencies regarding outstanding issues in the consular review talks, and to refer any outstanding areas of disagreement to the NSC for resolution.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

4. Maritime Boundary: Covered in Richard Levine's memorandum.

Attachments:

Tab I - Copy of Matlock-Clark Memorandum of August 8, 1983
Tab II - Kimmitt to Hill Memo on Consulates
Tab III - Kimmitt to Hill Memo on Exchanges Agreement
Tab IV - Kimmitt to Hill Memo on Consular Review Talks

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

August 8, 1983

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ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JEM*

SUBJECT: Strategy Paper for Consulates in Kiev and New York

State's memorandum outlining recommended strategy for negotiating an opening of consulates in Kiev and New York is attached at TAB A.

Background: Following agreement at the 1974 Nixon-Brezhnev summit, steps were taken to open consulates general in Kiev and New York. The Soviets had long resisted an American office in Kiev, offering instead less advantageous locations, but finally agreed to Kiev under the pressure of reaching agreements for the 1974 summit. Subsequently, the Soviets were allowed to purchase a building in New York

1.4d

[redacted] for their consulate general and we were offered the choice of several properties in Kiev for rental (no sale of real estate is permitted by Soviet law). We selected a large building, [redacted] had American architects design the reconfiguration for our use, and both sides sent small "advance parties" to oversee preparations for formal openings, which we insisted be simultaneous, so that the Soviets could not open in New York before our building was ready in Kiev.

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We had invested \$1.5 million in the renovation of the building when we ordered the withdrawal of both advance parties in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The Soviets still have title to their building in New York, while we have continued to pay rent on three apartments (previously occupied by our advance party) in Kiev. We have not paid rent on the building we had selected for the office and a number of staff apartments, and our understanding is that, after holding it for us for more than a year, the Soviets are now using it. Its status, therefore, is not entirely clear.

This complicated background is relevant to some of the questions raised in the strategy paper. Broadly speaking, our options are to aim for an opening as quickly as possible, and thus establish our presence in the capital of the largest non-Russian republic, or to attempt to improve on the arrangements already negotiated, which could entail considerable delay with little prospect of significant improvement.

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NLRR MD2009 #9

BY *CV* NARA DATE *9/7/02*

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Issues: There is general interagency agreement on the negotiating plan except for the following three points:

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A. Office Site: State [redacted] believe that we should accept the old building if it is available. The FBI believes that we should press for a new one.

B. Staffing: State [redacted] believe that the staffing level should be set according to need; the FBI, [redacted] believe that we should insist that the Soviets staff their consulate from the current personnel allowed them in Washington, or from their mission to the UN.

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C. Status of Property: State [redacted] believe that we should seek more advantageous rental arrangements (i.e., a long-term lease with guarantees on the rent), while the FBI wants us to demand either the right to purchase the building in Kiev, or divestiture of the building owned by the Soviets in New York, followed by a rental arrangement.

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Analysis: My judgment on the three issues above is as follows:

A. Since the building already selected and partially reconfigured for our use is acceptable, and we already have a substantial sum invested in it, no useful purpose would be served by demanding another one. The State [redacted] seems sound.

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B. If we insisted that the Soviets staff their consulate from their current quota in Washington and New York, we would have to staff Kiev from our Embassy in Moscow. The sixteen persons necessary for Kiev could not be spared from Moscow without seriously impairing the Embassy's ability to perform its functions. Therefore, it seems preferable to set our staff at the level we need, and then impose an identical quota on the Soviets in New York. This would preserve reciprocity, and while the FBI's task in New York would be increased, its additional problems would be no greater than those faced by the KGB in Kiev.

C. Although it is unfortunate that the Soviets were allowed to purchase their consulate building in New York, it will be most difficult to turn the clock back on this arrangement. In the interest of moving as rapidly as possible to establish our presence in Kiev (a net gain for us, since we have no one there now) in return for a small incremental gain for the Soviets (they already have hundreds of officials in New York), I would recommend using the Soviet ownership of their building in New York as leverage to insist upon favorable long-term rental arrangements in Kiev.

I believe that two other points should be covered specifically in the NSC response:

(1) State should be instructed that any staffing arrangement provide for strict reciprocity of numbers at the two consulates. This need not be the subject of negotiation, but simply a statement of U.S. policy, comparable to that used in imposing personnel ceilings on the Soviet Consulate General in San Francisco.

(2) Before proceeding to plan for 12 local employees, a close study should be made of the feasibility of staffing Kiev entirely with American citizens.



The foregoing recommendations are incorporated in a memorandum to State at TAB B.

^{RV}
Paul Dobriansky and John Lenczowski concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the memorandum at TAB B.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

- Tab A State's Memo
- Tab B Memo to State

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Strategy Paper
Kiev and New York Consulates

Summary:

1. Initial Step: There is agreement that we should inquire officially of the Soviets whether the previously designated office site will be available to us in Kiev.

2. Issues for Decision:

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A. Office Site. If the Soviets say the building is not available, all agencies agree that we should press for a new and better site. If the Soviets tell us the old site is available, State ██████ believe we should accept it, and send an inspection team to determine its adequacy and assess further work needed on both apartments and office site. FBI believes we should press for a new site, whether or not the old site is available.

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B. Staffing. State ██████ believe we should set staffing patterns according to need, without imposing demands that the Soviets would counter with unacceptable reciprocal requirements. FBI, ██████ believes we should initially insist that the Soviets staff New York under the present 320 ceiling in order to maintain existing levels of coverage, recognizing that if the Soviets refuse we will have to revert to the State ██████

1.4d
C. Purchase vs. Lease. State ██████ believe we should seek more advantageous long-term rent arrangements without insisting on purchase in Kiev, and hence on full reciprocity, which Soviets certainly would turn down. (The legality of requiring Soviets to sell their present building and lease it instead is questionable. Legal action in any case would result in prolonged delays if we adopted this course.) FBI believes we should make the demand despite the probability that the Soviets would turn it down, forcing us to fall back on a demand for long-term leasing arrangements.

Recommendation:

1.4d
NSC concurrence with the interagency proposal to inquire officially of the Soviets as to the availability of the previous site; and NSC concurrence with the State ██████ on office site, staffing and purchase vs. lease.

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DECL: OADR

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NLRR M02-009 #10

BY CIS NARA DATE 9/7/07

BACKGROUND

1.4d Secretary Shultz informed Ambassador Dobrynin on June 18 that the President had approved in principle the establishment of new Consulates in Kiev and New York. Judge Clark subsequently requested the State Department to convene an interagency meeting to draft the terms of reference and develop a negotiating strategy. At the July 1 meeting called by the State Department, representatives of [REDACTED] accepted the attached terms of reference (Tab A) and agreed to reconvene with the objective of forwarding an agreed negotiating strategy to the NSC. The group, augmented by USIA representatives, met on July 26, and it did not prove possible fully to reconcile agency views. Divergent views are set forth, where appropriate, in this paper.

POLICY OBJECTIVES

1.4d In noting that the USG should seek to reach agreements which "protect and enhance US interests and are consistent with the principle of strict reciprocity", NSDD-75 provides the fundamental policy framework for establishing the new Consulates. A Consulate in Kiev will provide [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] a major new US penetration in a key geographical area, which contains the second largest Soviet nationality group and significant numbers of religious minorities. In addition, it will give us a unique vantage point for economic and political reporting, a base in the Soviet agricultural heartland for crop monitoring, a facility to provide on-the-spot consular protection and assistance to American visitors in the area, and the opportunity to initiate new cultural, informational, and educational exchanges, thereby heightening awareness of US values and goals in the region.

MODALITIES OF NEGOTIATIONS

On July 15, Secretary Shultz received a positive Soviet response on the Consulates from Ambassador Dobrynin. Assistant Secretary Burt will work out with Chargé Sokolov the modalities of the negotiations. The State Department will handle the actual negotiations using normal diplomatic channels, in coordination with interested agencies.

The Department anticipates opening the talks in Washington as soon as is mutually convenient. Technical discussions may subsequently take place in Moscow. Since our logistical problems in Kiev may well prove greater than those of the Soviets in New York, it might be advantageous to hold such talks at closer range.

SPECIFIC GOALS

1. Early Establishment of U.S. Presence: Our first agenda item in negotiating with the Soviets will be to obtain agreement on the terms under which we will send advance parties to the two

consular sites. The fact that we and the Soviets have both had previous advance teams in Kiev and New York, respectively, under mutually agreed arrangements, should ease our negotiations with them on this matter, but it would be unrealistic not to expect problems. Nevertheless, our retention of three apartments in Kiev from the time of the original Advance Party should enable us to put an advance team into place rather quickly (within three months). Having personnel on the spot will be a key to gaining movement from the Soviets on housing and office facilities, as well as support from the home front on logistics and funding.

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[REDACTED]

2. Acquisition of Suitable Housing and Office Facilities:
Concurrently, we must ascertain whether the Soviets are still holding for our use the previously designated office building and Consul General residence.

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[REDACTED] State concurs in this approach.

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State [REDACTED] agree that if the Soviets tell us they have kept the building available, we should accept it. We have already invested \$1.5 million in renovation, which would be lost if we refused the building. Moreover, the negotiations for a more desirable site would be long and the end result would not necessarily be a site preferable to the one we now have. If the current site remains available, State [REDACTED] should send a team to Kiev as soon as possible for an inspection and evaluation of the work and time that will be required to put it into suitable condition. The FBI, on the other hand, would prefer that we seek new facilities whether or not the Soviets are willing to make the previously designated office site available, in order not to set our sights too low at the outset.

Finally, with regard to terms of occupancy we should note that the previous agreement on establishing Consulates permitted the Soviets to purchase property in New York in return for short-term leasing rights in Kiev. This situation was clearly not reciprocal and cannot be allowed to recur. Further negotiations on the reopening of our respective Consulates will include insistence on greater reciprocity vis-a-vis our housing and office space requirements. The FBI has suggested that we try to purchase property in Kiev. Since, to the best of our knowledge, the

Soviets have never permitted a foreign mission to own property and there is no chance that they would reverse this long-standing policy in this instance, State's view is that no purpose is served by making such a demand. Although we could theoretically insist that the Soviets divest themselves of their property and require a lease arrangement, such an approach would be quite problematical. The Office of Foreign Missions has indicated that a forced divestiture of this type could be legally contested and if so could involve legal proceedings.

We should instead concentrate on obtaining what is possible -- long-term leases at reasonable prices. The Soviets will have a strong incentive to move on our requirements. We fully expect them to seek immediate occupancy of the building that they previously purchased in New York for their Consulate. Consequently, State believes our approach should be to insist on an agreement to the effect that the Soviets may only occupy their building when we have obtained the following in Kiev: adequate temporary offices for the Consulate, an official agreement on our permanent facilities, and approved construction plans for necessary renovations.

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3. Reciprocal Agreement on Staffing Patterns: As soon as we have decided on the number of persons we wish to send to Kiev both as a TDY-Advance Team and as a permanent staff (recommendations on these issues follow below), we will raise the issue of a reciprocal staffing arrangement with the Soviets. We will need to proceed cautiously on this point, with strict reciprocity as a goal. The FBI, concerned about increases in the size of the Soviet diplomatic establishment in New York, prefers that the Consulate there be staffed by personnel transferred from the Embassy or SMUN. State anticipates strong Soviet resistance to such a proposal. Having frequently decried the existence of the current ceilings, the Soviets will balk at a perceived attempt to reduce staffing levels at existing posts as a precondition to an agreement on opening Kiev and New York. If pressed, they would probably demand a similar arrangement in Kiev, which would prove extremely costly in terms of staffing at our Moscow Embassy. The Department [redacted] that we should negotiate on the basis of our requirements [redacted] in Kiev and insist on reciprocity in any final decision on staffing patterns.

4. Resolution of Long-Range Issues and General Problems: Although Kiev's location is ideal in certain respects, its isolation, coupled with the absence of a large diplomatic community, may produce a difficult work environment for consular personnel, as well as create numerous logistical problems. In our negotiations we shall also address these general issues and attempt to arrive at mutually agreed solutions to both existing and potential problems. Specifically, we shall strive to obtain clearly defined privileges and immunities for American personnel;

an expansion of exit/entry points to facilitate shipment of requisite materials to put our facilities into shape for the final opening (we are currently limited to entry at Moscow, Leningrad, and Vyborg near Leningrad); a relaxation of travel controls in the area; and a commitment to provide a suitable recreational facility for the permanent staff.

5. Implementation of USG Scenario: An interagency group will have to make some immediate decisions with regard to timing, personnel, and funding. It will also have to address questions of logistical support and the acquisition of financial and other resources. For preliminary planning purposes, we propose the following timetable and base our discussion of estimated costs and resource requirements on this opening scenario, which assumes that we will obtain the previously designated office building.

1. Fall 1983 - Initial TDY Advance Team takes up residence in Kiev;
2. Summer 1984 or earlier - Permanent Advance Staff arrives in Kiev;
3. Summer 1985 - Consulate is officially opened.

A. Funding:

State has already presented to Congress its FY-84 budget submission, which does not include a request for funds or positions for the opening of Kiev. Therefore, the estimated \$200,000 operating costs needed to support the initial TDY presence in Kiev would have to be secured either by amendment to the FY-84 budget, or reprogrammed from within State's existing budget.

State anticipates an additional outlay of \$2.5 million annually (for two years) to prepare for the opening of the Consulate (total estimated cost of \$5.2 million). Not included in this estimate is the cost of a suitable recreational facility for the permanent staff assigned to Kiev, which would contribute substantially to improving morale and the quality of life at an extremely isolated post (roughly another \$1.0 million).

Ultimately, any decision to move ahead on establishing a Consulate in Kiev is conditioned on our ability to secure supplemental funding from Congress. In view of budgetary stringencies, we should anticipate questions from Congress as to why we are taking this step at the present time. We should be prepared to brief key members whose support will be necessary in order to obtain the requisite funds.

B. Personnel:

In selecting an Advance Team, we will try to identify personnel for permanent assignment, but may initially have to use

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personnel from Embassy Moscow and appropriate Washington offices on a 1-3 month TDY basis. The initial Advance Team should include a Team Leader, an Administrative Officer, and a Political/Consular Officer with reporting responsibilities.

In tandem with these arrangements, we need a prompt decision on the size of our permanent advance team. Language training and the vagaries of the assignment process will make it difficult to assign people to Kiev for regular tours prior to the summer of 1984. Even meeting that deadline will require speedy action to obtain positions, identify individuals for particular slots, and secure funding. We believe that with the addition to the advance team of a General Services Officer and a secretary we will have the personnel necessary to prepare for the official opening of the Consulates.

We suggest that the consular staff consist of 16 Americans plus 12 Soviet National employees. In the past, this was considered the right size to advance our interests in Kiev and it still appears to meet our needs. We intend, however, to schedule interagency meetings as soon as feasible to determine whether their personnel requirements for the Consulate warrant a larger or smaller staff. We will also solicit Embassy Moscow's views on both the question of timing and its ability to provide personnel and logistical support. The following are the proposed permanent positions for Kiev:


Principal Officer
Deputy Principal Officer
Consular Officer
Administrative Officer
Agricultural Officer
Press and Culture Officer
Communications Program Officers (2)
Secretaries (2)
Marine Security Guards (6)

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Basic Policy Considerations

- The President has approved in principle the desirability of establishing new Consulates in Kiev and New York, and Secretary Shultz informed Ambassador Dobrynin of this on June 18.

- NSDD 75 provides the policy framework for this move, noting in particular that the USG should seek "to reach agreements which protect and enhance U.S. interests and are consistent with the principle of strict reciprocity and mutual interest." Also relevant is the original Consulates Agreement (Aide-Memoire of July 3, 1974) and the subsequent exchange of notes between the US and USSR of September 1976.

- At the time of the suspension in January 1980, we were approximately six months away from completion of the work on the Consulate office building and officially opening our Consulate in Kiev. The absence of a Consulate has deprived us  of continuing contacts with important nationality and religious groups in the area. Establishing the Consulate will mark a major new U.S. penetration into this geographically key area which contains the second largest Soviet nationality group.

-- An interagency group, chaired by State [REDACTED] [REDACTED] has been formed to develop our negotiating strategy. State has undertaken to produce by July 20 the first draft of a strategy paper, incorporating the positions of other interested parties, which will form the basis of our negotiations with the Soviets.

-- The paper will include both long-term issues requiring resolution and the following immediate problems associated with sending an Advance Team to Kiev:

- Personnel - number and source of positions required.
- Timing - target date and time needed for training and other preparation;
- Funding - estimation of costs, acquisition of funds, and congressional involvement;
- Technical considerations - housing and office space, logistical support, security factors, and coordination of interagency requirements.

Negotiating Modalities

-- State Department will handle the negotiations through diplomatic channels backstopped by the interagency group.

Next Steps

--State will forward to the NSC an interagency-cleared strategy

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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March 12, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT: Visit of Soviet TV Commentator Pozner

The memorandum from State at TAB III describes plans developed by Jim Dabakis, a TV talk show announcer from Salt Lake City, to invite Moscow TV commentator Vladimir Pozner to the U.S. for at least seven national TV programs, in return for which Pozner would arrange for Dabakis and a Brigham Young University professor to appear on four national TV programs in the Soviet Union, and to tour the fifteen Soviet republics. Dabakis and the professor would go to the Soviet Union in August and September, and Dabakis has agreed to spend a week in Washington before his departure to be briefed on U.S. positions on the issues. Senator Orrin Hatch has expressed support for the project, and State recommends that a visa for Pozner be approved.

Although it can be argued that a Soviet commitment to arrange for TV appearances in the Soviet Union by Americans is a step forward in achieving more reciprocity in the area of information exchange, in fact this proposal falls far short of real reciprocity. First, the Soviets would be sending an experienced propagandist, while the Americans (even with extensive briefing) are likely to be much less well prepared to defend U.S. positions than he is to present Soviet views. Second, by arranging Pozner's appearances here first, we have no assurance that the promised programs in the USSR will in fact materialize, and if they do, that they will not be "doctored" after taping.

For these reasons, my preference would be to deny the visa unless and until one of two conditions are met: (1) the exchange is pursuant to an exchange agreement in force which guarantees effective reciprocity; or (2) the exchange is arranged so that the Americans go first, that a USG official familiar with the issues accompany Dabakis, and that Pozner be granted reciprocity for the treatment actually offered the Americans.

If we follow this course, we can expect a certain degree of public criticism, including -- perhaps -- by Senator Hatch. We also cannot prevent Pozner from appearing on U.S. television in feeds from Moscow, and the visa denial could be legally

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challenged by the American sponsors -- as some past refusals have been. If the visa denial should become a public issue, we would doubtless be charged with acting contrary to our current policy of dialogue, and rejecting an arrangement which provides more potential reciprocity than we have obtained in the past.

Our decision, therefore, is essentially whether 1) to accept an arrangement which offers some, but inadequate, reciprocity in order to avoid a public controversy at this time and to provide some possibility of U.S. citizens appearing on Soviet TV, or 2) to hold firm on the principle of full reciprocity, while recognizing that we cannot prevent U.S. networks from using Soviet spokesmen by feeds outside the U.S.

I have prepared alternate Kimmitt to Hill memos for you to choose.

John Lenczowski concurs. ^{JL} *I concur only with the first recommendation. "Dialogue" requires reciprocity. Otherwise it is "monologue." - John L.*

RECOMMENDATION

1. That you authorize the memorandum at TAB I which directs State to refuse a visa to Pozner unless and until one of the conditions set forth above is filled (in which case State or I would call Senator Hatch to explain in advance).

Approve ___ Disapprove ___

OR, ALTERNATELY,

2. That you authorize the memorandum at TAB II, which concurs in issuance of the visa, if you feel that it is unwise at this time to stimulate public controversy on the issue.

Approve ___ Disapprove ___

Attachments:

Tab I Kimmitt to Hill
Tab II Kimmitt to Hill
Tab III Incoming Memo from State

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