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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

**Withdrawer**

CAS 10/27/2009

**File Folder** MATLOCK CHRON DECEMBER 1983 (2)

**FOIA**

M08-244

**Box Number** 2

JONES

12

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
1.	78486 TALKING POINTS	RE OTHER ISSUES P.2	1	ND	<i>ps</i>
2.	78487 TALKING POINTS	PAGE OF ITEM 78486	1	ND	<i>ps</i>
3.	78488 MEMO	MATLOCK TO ROBERT MCFARLAN RE SUGGESTIONS <b>R 8/5/2010 M244/1</b>	2	12/16/1983	B1
4.	78489 MEMO	MATLOCK TO CHRISTOPHER LEHMAN RE SENATOR DANFORD VISIT	1	12/16/1983	B1
5.	78490 MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE DRAFT PRESIDENTIAL SPEECH	1	12/16/1983	B1
6.	78491 LETTER	THOMAS SIMONS TO MATLOCK RE VISA MATTER	1	12/15/1983	B6
7.	78492 MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE DRAFT PRESIDENTIAL LETTER TO ANDROPOV <b>R 10/27/2009 NLSM97-003 #5 (COPY)</b>	2	12/19/1983	B1
8.	78493 MEMO	MCFARLANE TO THE PRESIDENT RE LETTER TO ANDROPOV	2	12/19/1983	B1
9.	78494 DRAFT LETTER	REAGAN TO ANDROPOV	6	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

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12

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
10.	78495 DRAFT LETTER	REAGAN TO ANDROPOV (ANNOTATED)	6	ND	B1
11.	78496 CABLE	STATE 363464 <b>R 8/5/2010 M244/1</b>	5	12/23/1983	B1
12.	78499 MEMO	RON LEHMAN/MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE PROPOSAL FOR MEETINGS	2	12/20/1983	B1
13.	78500 MEMO	SAME TEXT AS 78499	2	12/20/1983	B1
14.	78501 MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE SPACE COOPERATION	2	12/22/1983	B1
	78502 MEMO	ROBERT KIMMITT TO GIL RYE RE SPACE COOPERATION	1	12/15/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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78488

C

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL/EYES ONLY~~

December 16, 1983

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JCM*

SUBJECT: Suzanne Massie's Suggestions

DECLASSIFIED  
NLRR 1108-244# 78488  
BY RW NARA DATE 8/5/10

I agree with several of Mrs. Massie's basic points, but have serious reservations about her specific suggestions as to how to handle them.

- I agree:
- (1) that cultural exchanges are in our interest;
  - (2) that there is widespread anxiety among Soviet intellectuals about U.S. intentions; and
  - (3) that the authorities would probably welcome resumption of negotiations on an exchange agreement if it is offered in the right way (though I doubt that the impact would be as great as Mrs. Massie assumes).

I see real problems with using Mrs. Massie as an official emissary, however:

--I believe we have adequate means to take an informal sounding of the Soviet attitude toward a proposal to resume exchange negotiations, if we wish to do so. Hartman can see Demichev or Arbatov as easily as Mrs. Massie can.

--If we want a "special emissary" to talk to Andropov or those close to him, Brent Scowcroft is much better qualified to deal with the central questions of the relationship. To name someone else in addition would be confusing, and almost certainly counterproductive.

--Designation by the President and conferral of diplomatic status and "authority" is a bad idea in principle and probably unworkable in practice.

--Regarding Mrs. Massie's second step, I doubt that we need another presidential commission to examine the content of a proposed exchanges agreement. We already have a Presidential Commission which deals with international cultural exchanges. Its members are not sufficiently specialized in their background or experience to vet this kind of detail, but naming another commission (aside from the general question of how much proliferation of this practice is desirable) would be seen as duplicative--and perhaps an insult to the existing commission.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

Having said this, I would see no great harm, and perhaps some limited benefit, if we could arrange for Mrs. Massie to go to Moscow strictly unofficially, but with a general message that she has discussed the questions of cultural and informational exchanges with senior officials of the Administration, has found that there is a willingness to consider ways to move ahead to expand them, and would be prepared to relay any ideas her Soviet interlocutors might have regarding desirable next steps in this area. In this context she might ask what the Soviet reaction would be if we should propose a resumption of negotiations on an agreement. She should, however, not ask to see anyone more senior than Minister of Culture Demichev.

On the "second step," I would see no objection to consulting Mrs. Massie unofficially (or even naming her officially as an NSC consultant) on the text of a proposed exchange agreement. She might well have something to contribute in this area.

The way you respond to Mrs. Massie will also depend importantly on your judgment as to whether we will in fact be prepared to resume negotiations on the cultural exchanges agreement in the near future. If you are sanguine on this score, and if you wish to be as responsive as possible to her suggestions, then I would recommend the following:

- (1) That we offer to name her a consultant to the NSC;
- (2) That we suggest travel to Moscow in that capacity, for general consultations as outlined above, in close coordination with the Embassy; and
- (3) That we give her a role in advising on the content of any draft agreement we might propose.

Before we proceed with such an offer, however, I should discuss with Bob Kimmitt the technicalities of naming her as a consultant and the ground rules for financing her travel. I suspect that the formalities (including security clearance) would take much too long to make travel toward the end of the year, as she suggests, feasible.

Alternatively, you could reply to her by thanking her for her ideas, assuring her that we will give priority consideration to resuming negotiations on cultural exchanges, and offering to stay in touch as plans move forward.

RECOMMENDATION:

- (1) That you authorize me to discuss with Bob Kimmitt the technicalities of naming Mrs. Massie a consultant and arranging for her to travel to Moscow, and if this seems feasible, to draft a letter proposing this.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

- (2) Alternatively, that I draft a letter welcoming her ideas but declining her offer to act as an emissary.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

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THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 4-5 LISTED ON THE  
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 14, 1983

Dear Dr. Pfaltzgraff:

Thank you for sending me a copy of World Energy Supplies and International Security. The report will be very useful to me and other members of the staff here.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Jack Matlock".

Jack F. Matlock

Dr. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr.  
IFPA  
Central Plaza Building, Tenth Floor  
675 Massachusetts Avenue  
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139

12/12

**Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc.**

In association with The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University



Central Plaza Bldg., Tenth Floor  
675 Massachusetts Avenue  
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139  
Telephone (617) 492-2116  
TELEX/TWX: 710-328-1128

Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr.  
President

November 28, 1983

Mr. Jack F. Matlock  
Senior Director, European  
and Soviet Affairs  
National Security Council  
Washington, DC 20506

Dear Mr. Matlock:

Please find enclosed a copy of the most recent  
Special Report of the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis  
entitled World Energy Supplies and International Security.

This publication is based upon expanded and updated  
versions of papers presented at the Second Conference on  
Nuclear Energy co-sponsored by the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung,  
the Industrial Research Institute of Japan, and the Institute  
for Foreign Policy Analysis.

A major theme of the Conference and the papers con-  
tained in this Special Report is the role of political fac-  
tors as catalysts to energy supply disruption and rapid price  
increases in the last decade. Because of the continuing  
importance of political factors and their potential for affect-  
ing energy supply disruption, I believe that the enclosed  
Special Report will be of interest to you.

With all good wishes,

Sincerely yours,

*Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr.*  
Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr.

RLP:md  
Enclosure



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 19, 1983

Dear Dick:

Further on the Besançon matter, I have just received the attached report from Tom Simons in EUR/SOV. As I suspected, the "ii" notation is meant to facilitate, not impede his entry, and in any event seems to be required by the law.

As I mentioned in my previous letter, if he could be more specific about what difficulties he has encountered, we might be able to get at them by dealing directly with INS (or whoever is the source of the problem).

I hope your trip to Europe goes well, and look forward to seeing you here when you come in February.

With warmest regards,

Sincerely,



Jack Matlock

Enclosure: Simons-Matlock letter of December 15, 1983

Dr. Richard Pipes  
Harvard University  
Department of History  
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138


THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON  
December 14, 1983

Dear Mr. Hutchings:

Thank you for your letter of November 28 and the enclosed curriculum vitae.


I am not aware of any openings at the State Department at the moment, but if I should hear of any, I'll be glad to pass your curriculum vitae to the appropriate people.

Sincerely,



Jack F. Matlock

Mr. Robert L. Hutchings  
Deputy Director  
Radio Free Europe Division  
Oettingenstr. 67 Am  
Englischen Garten  
8000 Munich 22, West Germany



RADIO FREE EUROPE / RADIO LIBERTY  
OETTINGENSTR. 67 AM ENGLISCHEN GARTEN  
8000 MUNICH 22, WEST GERMANY  
TELEPHONE (089) 21020

12/14

28 November 1983

Ambassador Jack F. Matlock, Jr.  
National Security Council  
Old Executive Office Building  
Washington, D.C. 20506

Dear Ambassador Matlock:

You may remember me from your visits to Munich during your tenure as Ambassador in Prague.

I have decided to leave my position with Radio Free Europe in the coming year and am now looking for a suitable new position in the Washington area. Should there be an opening at the State Department (outside the FSO ranks) or should you know of some other position appropriate to my background and experience, I would be most grateful for your recommendation. I have enclosed a copy of my curriculum vitae for your consideration.

I would appreciate confidentiality in the interest of a smooth transition for the new RFE Director.

With apologies for intruding on your busy schedule,

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads 'Robert L. Hutchings'.

Robert L. Hutchings  
Deputy Director  
Radio Free Europe Division

Encl.

ROBERT L. HUTCHINGS

---

Curriculum Vitae

Business Address:

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Inc.  
Oettingenstrasse 67 am Englischen Garten  
8000 Munich 22, West Germany

Tel. 089-2102345

Home Address:

Orsinistrasse 8  
8000 Munich 81  
West Germany

Tel. 089-931196

Current Employment: Deputy Director, Radio Free Europe

Radio Free Europe. Deputy Director, 1981 to present (Acting Director, February-November 1983); Assistant Director, 1979-81

Responsibilities include:

- direction of the leading international broadcaster to five East European countries in six languages, totalling 80 hours of daily broadcasting;
- direction of the leading East European research organization in the Western world;
- leadership of a diverse, multinational staff of 400 employees;
- administration of an annual budget of \$25 million;
- maintenance and development of regular contacts with political, diplomatic, academic, and journalistic communities;
- representation of the Radios before outside organizations and visiting officials.

Past Employment:

1976-79: University of Virginia. Acting Assistant Professor of Government and Foreign Affairs, January-June 1979. Taught graduate seminars in Soviet politics and Soviet and East European foreign relations. Graduate Instructor, 1976-78. Assisted in courses in political philosophy and Soviet politics.

1969-74: United States Navy. Served as U.S. Naval officer aboard the aircraft carrier John F. Kennedy as division officer for 70 men and at the U.S. Naval training center, Dam Neck, Virginia, as instructor and coordinator for the training of U.S. and foreign naval officers. (Currently U.S. Naval Reserve intelligence officer with the rank of Lieutenant Commander.)

Higher Education:

Ph.D. University of Virginia, 1979 (Government)  
Certificate in Soviet and East European Studies

M.A. College of William and Mary, 1975 (Government)

B.S. United States Naval Academy, 1969 (Naval Science)

Summer language study: Charles University, Prague, 1977 (Czech)

Awards and Fellowships

Raven Society, University of Virginia, 1979 (academic honors)  
Foreign Language and Area Studies Fellowship, University of Virginia, 1978-79  
National Defense Foreign Language Fellowships, University of Virginia, 1976-77, 1977-78  
Graduate Instructorships, University of Virginia, 1976-77, 1977-78  
University Fellowship, College of William and Mary, 1974-75  
Graduate Research Assistantship, College of William and Mary, 1974-75

Foreign Languages

German (fair reading and speaking competence)  
Spanish (fair reading and speaking competence)  
Russian (fair reading, limited speaking competence)  
Czech (limited reading competence)

Personal Background

Born July 3, 1946, in Bainbridge, Maryland. Father was a career Naval officer; mother, a career school teacher. Extensive travel in the United States and Canada and in more than thirty countries in Europe and Latin America. Married with one son.

References

The Honorable James L. Buckley, President, Radio Free Europe/  
Radio Liberty, Inc., Oettingenstrasse 67, 8000 Munich 22,  
West Germany; tel. 0049-89-2102-300  
Dr. Glenn W. Ferguson, President, Lincoln Center for the  
Performing Arts, 140 West 65th St., New York, N.Y. 10023;  
tel. 212-877-1800 (formerly President, RFE/RL, Inc.)  
Mr. J.F. Brown, Consultant to the President, Radio Free Europe/  
Radio Liberty, Inc., Oettingenstrasse 67, 8000 Munich 22.  
West Germany; tel. 0049-89-989511 (formerly Director, Radio  
Free Europe)  
Mr. William A. Buell, Senior Vice President, Radio Free Europe/  
Radio Liberty, Inc., 1201 Connecticut Ave., NW, Washington,  
D.C. 20036; tel. 202-457-6900  
Prof. Inis L. Claude, Jr., Woodrow Wilson Department of  
Government and Foreign Affairs, University of Virginia,  
Charlottesville, Va. 22903; tel. 804-924-7875  
Prof. Paul Shoup, Woodrow Wilson Department of Government and  
Foreign Affairs, University of Virginia, Charlottesville,  
Va. 22903; tel. 804-924-4607

(Additional references furnished upon request.)

Publications:

Soviet-East European Relations: Consolidation and Conflict, 1968-1980 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1983)

"Anatomy of the Warsaw Pact," Le Temps strategique no. 6  
(Fall 1983): 37-43

Radio Free Europe Research:

"The Prague Summit and the Warsaw Pact's 'Grand Proposal,'" RAD Background Report/6 (Eastern Europe), 12 January 1983

"Andropov and the Allies," RAD Background Report/1 (Eastern Europe), 5 January 1983

"Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers Prepare for Madrid," RAD Background Report/225 (Eastern Europe), 25 October 1982

"Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers Second Brezhnev's Proposals," RAD Background Report/338 (East-West), 4 December 1981

"Poland's Allies Keep Up the Pressure," RAD Background Report/299 (Eastern Europe), 12 December 1980

"Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers' Communique: No Surprises," RAD Background Report/252 (Eastern Europe), 22 October 1980

"Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers to Meet in Warsaw," RAD Background Report/250 (Eastern Europe), 20 October 1980

"The 'Entangling' Alliance," RAD Background Report/108 (Eastern Europe), 8 May 1980

"Twenty-five Years of the Warsaw Pact," RAD Background Report/105 (Eastern Europe), 7 May 1980

"The GDR Since 1949," RAD Background Report/225 (Eastern Europe), 16 October 1979

12/19

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY  
CAMBRIDGE, MASS. 02138  
(617) 495-2556/2545

ROBINSON HALL

December 16, 1983

Amb. Jack Matlock  
National Security Council  
Old Executive Office Building  
Washington, D.C. 20506

Dear Jack:

Thank you for your letter of November 25th. I appreciate greatly your taking time to look into the Besançon matter and look forward to any information you may be able to impart to me.

I expect to be in Europe nearly all of January, but then in February, in connection with a project I am carrying out with PFIAB, I will probably spend a lot of time in Washington. Let us get together then.

Yours sincerely,



Richard Pipes

RP/nh

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.



DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLSM 97-003 #5

BY CKH NARA DATE 10/27/09

NON-LOG

78492

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

December 19, 1983

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK

SUBJECT: Draft Presidential Letter to Andropov

Secretary Shultz gave you a draft Presidential letter to Andropov a few days ago. It is at Tab A.

I believe that it would be useful for the President to send a letter at this time, particularly in connection with the speech. It would be best if the letter could be delivered in Moscow, with an advance text of the speech, before the speech is delivered. If this is impossible, however, it could be delivered the next day.

I have suggested several revisions in the letter. (Text with my suggestions is at TAB B.) My suggested revisions include the following:

- A beginning with a reference to the speech;
- New language on the Middle East, which includes an offer for specialist-to-specialist consultation;
- Omission of the reference to KAL (which would indicate to the Soviets that the letter is written for the record and is not serious) and to the situation in Korea (ditto).
- A reference to the proposal for a Shultz-Gromyko meeting in Stockholm, and expression of a desire to establish "a pattern of regular high-level consultations."

Otherwise, my suggestions are largely stylistic, with particular regard for how the language used translates into Russian. (They have no precise term for "trade-off" for example, and it is best to explain the concept in other ways.)

I have added, in red, a possible passage referring to a "special emissary." I would, however, recommend that it be used only if Hartman manages to deliver the letter directly to one of Andropov's aides. If he must deliver it to the Foreign Ministry, this paragraph should not be included. In any event, it might be better to convey it orally through other channels.

SECRET

Declassify on: OADR

Ron Lehman has reviewed the arms control aspects of the draft and has no problem with them. I shared my suggested revisions with Rick Burt over the weekend, and he concurs. As of late yesterday, however, Secretary Shultz had not seen them.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

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78496

~~SECRET~~

# Department of State

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PAGE 02 OF 06 STATE 363464 TOSEC 160014  
ORIGIN NODS-00

C05/05 005129 NOD286

INFO OCT-00 /000 R

*Letter Delivered to  
Gromyko 12/24 -  
no cable (printed  
by phone)*

DRAFTED BY S/S: CHILL: BDF  
APPROVED BY THE-ACTING SECRETARY  
S/S-O: TLRANDALL, JR.  
NSC: RCMCFARLANE  
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O O 232239Z DEC 83 ZFF6  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW NIACT IMMEDIATE  
INFO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 363464 TOSEC 160014

NODIS  
SPECIAL ENCRYPTION - NODIS/ALPHA AMB. HARTMAN ONLY

E. O. 12356: OADR  
TAGS: PEPR, US, USSR  
SUBJECT: LETTER TO ANDROPOV

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. YOU SHOULD ARRANGE TO DELIVER THE FOLLOWING LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT TO ANDROPOV. NOTE THAT THE BRACKETED PARAGRAPH ("IF YOU WOULD FIND IT HELPFUL... AND UNOFFICIAL BASIS") IS TO BE INCLUDED IN THE TEXT OF THE LETTER HANDED OVER ONLY RPT ONLY IF YOU ARE ABLE TO GIVE THE LETTER DIRECTLY TO ANDROPOV OR TO ONE OF HIS IMMEDIATE AIDES, SUCH AS ALEXANDROV. IF YOU ARE COMPELLED TO DELIVER THE LETTER VIA THE FOREIGN MINISTRY, THE BRACKETED LANGUAGE SHOULD NOT RPT NOT BE INCLUDED IN THE TEXT. PLEASE LET US KNOW IMMEDIATELY (BY NODIS ALPHA CABLE) TO

DECLASSIFIED  
NLRR 1008-244#78496  
BY RW NARA DATE 8/5/10

*Handwritten notes:*  
1008-244#78496  
8/5/10



~~SECRET~~

# Department of State

S/S-0  
OUTGOING

PAGE 03 OF 06 STATE 363464 TOSEC 160014

C05/05 005129 NOD286

WHOM THE LETTER WAS GIVEN AND WHETHER THE BRACKETED LANGUAGE WAS INCLUDED.

3. BEGIN TEXT: DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN:

ON HIS RECENT RETURN TO MOSCOW, AMBASSADOR HARTMAN CONVEYED TO FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO SOME OF MY THOUGHTS ON THE CURRENT DIRECTION OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES. I CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT DESPITE THE PROFOUND DIFFERENCES BETWEEN OUR TWO NATIONS, THERE ARE OPPORTUNITIES--INDEED A NECESSITY--FOR US TO WORK TOGETHER TO PREVENT CONFLICTS, TO EXPAND OUR DIALOGUE, AND TO PLACE OUR RELATIONSHIP ON A MORE STABLE AND CONSTRUCTIVE FOOTING. THOUGH WE WILL BE VIGOROUS IN PROTECTING OUR INTERESTS AND THOSE OF OUR FRIENDS AND ALLIES--WE DO NOT SEEK TO CHALLENGE THE SECURITY OF THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS PEOPLE. WE ARE READY TO DEAL SERIOUSLY AND POSITIVELY WITH YOU AND YOUR GOVERNMENT IN AN EFFORT TO REACH MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AND BENEFICIAL SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEMS IN OUR RELATIONSHIP. I WILL BE STRESSING THESE THEMES IN MY PUBLIC STATEMENTS OVER THE COMING WEEKS, AND HOPE THAT MY DESIRE TO BUILD A MORE STABLE RELATIONSHIP WILL BE RECIPROCATED ON YOUR PART.

IN CONSIDERING THE ISSUES NOW CONFRONTING OUR NATIONS, I ESPECIALLY REGRET THE DECISION OF THE SOVIET UNION NOT TO CONTINUE NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE REDUCTION AND ELIMINATION OF INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES. SINCE YOUR AUGUST 27 LETTER TO ME, BOTH OUR GOVERNMENTS MADE NEW PROPOSALS. FOR OUR PART, WE HAVE SOUGHT TO ADDRESS PARTICULAR SOVIET CONCERNS, BUT HAVE NOT YET SEEN A COMPARABLE READINESS ON THE SOVIET SIDE. THE NEGOTIATIONS HAVE REACHED A STAGE WHICH SUGGESTS THE POTENTIAL FOR FORWARD MOVEMENT IN SOME

AREAS; CLEARLY, HOWEVER, MUCH MORE NEEDS TO BE DONE. THUS, I SEE NO JUSTIFICATION FOR AN INTERRUPTION OF THESE TALKS.



~~SECRET~~

# Department of State

S/S-0  
OUTGOING

PAGE 04 OF 06 STATE 363464 TOSEC 160014 C05/05 005129 N0D286  
PARTICULARLY SINCE FOR TWO YEARS WE WERE WILLING TO NEGOTIATE WHILE YOU DEPLOYED NEW MISSILES.

AS I HAVE PLEDGED, BOTH PUBLICLY AND PRIVATELY, THE UNITED STATES SEEKS AND WILL ACCEPT ANY EQUITABLE, VERIFIABLE AGREEMENT THAT STABILIZES FORCES AT EQUAL, BUT MUCH LOWER LEVELS THAN NOW EXIST. I STILL FEEL THAT ZERO ON BOTH SIDES IS THE BEST SOLUTION. WE ARE, OF COURSE, PREPARED TO CONTINUE THE SEARCH FOR AN AGREEMENT. IT IS ONLY THROUGH SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS THAT THE REDUCTION AND EVENTUAL ELIMINATION OF THE WEAPONS OVER WHICH THE SOVIET UNION HAS VOICED SUCH PUBLIC CONCERN CAN BE ACHIEVED.

THIS ALSO IS TRUE AS REGARDS REDUCTIONS IN OUR RESPECTIVE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR ARSENALS. AS YOU ARE AWARE, OVER RECENT MONTHS WE HAVE MADE SIGNIFICANT MODIFICATIONS TO OUR POSITION IN THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTIONS TALKS. WE WILL CONTINUE TO INSIST THAT ANY START AGREEMENT BE MEANINGFUL-- THAT IT LEAD TO REAL REDUCTIONS IN THE MOST DESTABILIZING CATEGORIES OF BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEMS, AS MEASURED BY THEIR WARHEADS, AND IN THE OVERALL DESTRUCTIVE POWER OF OUR TWO STRATEGIC FORCES. IN SEEKING A LOWER AND MORE STABLE STRATEGIC BALANCE, HOWEVER, WE DO NOT INSIST ON IDENTICAL FORCE STRUCTURES.

ANY SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATION MUST EVENTUALLY EMBODY A BALANCE BETWEEN THE INTERESTS AND ADVANTAGES OF BOTH SIDES. IF THE SOVIET UNION IS PREPARED TO AGREE TO MEANINGFUL REDUCTIONS IN BALLISTIC MISSILE WARHEADS-AND DESTRUCTIVE POWER, WHERE IT HOLDS THE ADVANTAGE, THE UNITED STATES IS PREPARED TO ACCEPT MORE STRINGENT LIMITS ON HEAVY BOMBERS AND AIR-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES, WHERE IT POSSESSES CERTAIN ADVANTAGES. IF WE COULD ACHIEVE A BALANCE OF CAPABILITIES IN THIS MANNER, WE WOULD BE ABLE TO DEVELOP A COMMON FRAMEWORK FOR CARRYING OUT -STRATEGIC

ARMS REDUCTIONS. THUS FAR, HOWEVER, OUR EFFORTS TO EXPLORE WHAT TYPES OF RECIPROCAL CONCESSIONS MIGHT BRING



~~SECRET~~

*Department of State*

S/S-0  
OUTGOING

PAGE 05 OF 06 STATE 363464 TOSEC 160014 C05/05 005129 NOD28E  
OUR INTERESTS INTO BALANCE HAVE BEEN REBUFFED. I URGE  
YOU TO RECONSIDER CAREFULLY OUR LATEST PROPOSALS. FOR I  
BELIEVE THEY OFFER AN APPROACH WHICH COULD BE FRUITFUL.  
I WOULD WELCOME YOUR OWN THOUGHTS IN THIS REGARD. WE ARE  
PREPARED FOR A SERIOUS AND CONFIDENTIAL DIALOGUE ON THIS  
ISSUE.

(IF YOU WOULD FIND IT HELPFUL, I AM PREPARED TO SEND TO  
MOSCOW A PERSONAL EMISSARY WHO IS THOROUGHLY FAMILIAR WITH  
MY THINKING ON THIS ISSUE TO DEAL WITH YOU OR YOUR DESIGNEE  
DIRECTLY. HE COULD EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITIES OF THIS AP-  
PROACH--OR OTHERS YOU MIGHT WISH TO SUGGEST--WITH YOU AND  
YOUR ADVISERS IN PRIVATE, ON A TOTALLY CONFIDENTIAL AND  
UNOFFICIAL BASIS.)

EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE BILATERAL ARMS CONTROL, HOWEVER,  
CONSTITUTE ONLY ONE PART OF OUR RELATIONSHIP, AND THEIR  
BENEFITS CAN BE UNDERCUT BY ACTIONS AND EVENTS IN OTHER  
AREAS. I MUST PARTICULARLY NOTE THE DANGERS POSED BY AN  
ESCALATION OF TENSIONS IN ANY OF THE WORLD'S TROUBLED  
REGIONS. THE MIDDLE EAST IS ONE OF THESE, AND I AM SURE  
YOU APPRECIATE THE DANGERS INHERENT IN THE TURMOIL IN  
LEBANON. THOUGH WE MAY NOT BE ABLE TO AGREE ON THE CAUSES  
OF THIS TRAGIC SITUATION, OR ON THE STEPS NECESSARY TO  
RESTORE PEACE TO THE REGION, I BELIEVE IT IS INCUMBENT ON  
BOTH OUR GOVERNMENTS TO USE OUR INFLUENCE TO URGE RESTRAINT  
ON ALL THE PARTIES AND TO CURB THE RESORT TO VIOLENCE.  
THIS, ALSO, IS ONE OF THE TOPICS WHICH MIGHT BENEFIT FROM  
AMORE DETAILED PRIVATE DISCUSSION.

THESE ARE ONLY A FEW OF THE ISSUES THAT DIVIDE US, BUT ALL  
OF THEM UNDERSCORE THE NEED FOR A MEANINGFUL DIALOGUE

BETWEEN US. EVENTS SEEM TO HAVE FORCED US BOTH TO  
COMMUNICATE LARGELY THROUGH THE PUBLIC MEDIA, WHICH  
OBVIOUSLY UNDERMINES OUR ABILITY TO REACH PRACTICAL  
SOLUTIONS. WHILE I AM UNDER NO ILLUSIONS AS TO THE  
DIFFICULTY OF THE PROBLEMS WE NOW FACE, I NONETHELESS



~~SECRET~~

*Department of State*

S/S-0  
OUTGOING

PAGE 06 OF 06 STATE 363464 TOSEC 160014 C05/05 005129 NOD286  
BELIEVE THAT SERIOUS AND FORTHRIGHT EXCHANGES COULD OPEN  
UP AVENUES TO MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL ARRANGEMENTS. IN THIS  
CONNECTION, I HOPE THAT FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO WILL BE  
ABLE TO MEET WITH SECRETARY SHULTZ IN STOCKHOLM IN  
JANUARY, AND THAT WE CAN ESTABLISH A PATTERN OF REGULAR  
HIGH-LEVEL CONSULTATIONS, ALONG WITH CONFIDENTIAL EXCHANGES  
OF VIEWS AT OTHER LEVELS.

YOU HAVE PLEDGED TO ME YOUR COMMITMENT TO PEACE AND I HAVE  
MADE A SIMILAR AND HEARTFELT PLEDGE TO YOU. IN YOUR LETTER  
OF AUGUST 27, YOU WROTE OF "THE NEED FOR A BROAD,  
CONSIDERED APPROACH AND FOR TAKING BOLD POLITICAL  
DECISIONS LOOKING TO THE FUTURE." IF YOU ARE INDEED  
PREPARED TO TAKE SUCH AN APPROACH AND TO MAKE FAR-REACHING  
DECISIONS AND, BY DOING SO, TO ADDRESS IN A TANGIBLE WAY  
SOME OF THE BASIC CAUSES FOR DIVISIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO  
NATIONS, THEN YOU WILL NOT FIND THE UNITED STATES LACKING  
FOR A POSITIVE RESPONSE COMPARABLE IN SCOPE.

I AWAIT YOUR THOUGHTS ON THESE MATTERS, AND ON ANY OTHERS  
WHICH YOU FEEL WE SHOULD ADDRESS IN A JOINT SEARCH FOR-  
WAYS TO MOVE RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR COUNTRIES IN A MORE  
POSITIVE DIRECTION.

SINCERELY, RONALD REAGAN  
END TEXT.  
DAM



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THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 12-14 LISTED ON THE  
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

MEMORANDUM

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

December 13, 1983

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*SUBJECT: President's Interview with Time Magazine

Attached are papers prepared for the President's interview on U.S.-Soviet relations with Time Magazine, including the following:

- Tab A: Objectives and Main Points
- Tab B: Opening Questions
- Tab C: Talking Points on Other Issues
- Tab D: Arms Control Agenda

*ans*  
Bob Sims concurs. Ron Lehman has reviewed and concurs in the wording of the arms control material and Dave Laux in the questions regarding China.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you forward the attached material to Larry Speakes for inclusion in his memo to the President.

Approve  Disapprove

## Attachments:

- Tab A Objectives and Main Points
- Tab B Opening Questions
- Tab C Talking Points on Other Issues
- Tab D Arms Control Agenda

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
BY *RA*, NARA, Date 10/16/85

## President's Interview with Time Magazine

### OBJECTIVES

The interview will provide an opportunity to increase pressure on the Soviets to negotiate seriously and to strengthen the consensus at home and among our Allies behind our policies by:

--making clear that the basic problem is the Soviet military build-up and their use of force to expand their influence;

--pointing out that the trend toward U.S. decline, which made Soviet aggressiveness possible, has been reversed;

--emphasizing our commitment to peace and to arms reduction on a fair and verifiable basis;

--calming fears that we are on a "collision course" (which only feeds the pacifist movement); and

--challenging the Soviets to join us in a search for solutions (thus placing the onus on them if they refuse).

### MAIN POINTS

A. Present tensions are the direct result of Soviet policies over the past decade or more: their steady military build-up--which has gone far beyond conceivable defensive needs--and their increased use of their military power to expand their influence by threatening other countries and exporting revolution.

B. We have reversed the deterioration of U.S. and Western strength. We are now in a better position to deter Soviet expansionism and to demonstrate that more restrained behavior is in their own interest.

C. While we are convinced that the only way to preserve peace is to maintain an adequate deterrence, we are deeply concerned with the high levels of arms, particularly nuclear ones, and want to get them greatly reduced. Our proposals in START and INF are directed to that goal.

D. We are serious about negotiations. But we must insist that they be directed at real causes of tension and not atmospherics. And we must insist that any agreements reached be fair and verifiable. If the Soviets are willing to negotiate on that basis, they will find us eager to join in a search for practical solutions.

E. The world is not on the brink of war. Actually, the real danger of superpower conflict has been reduced. When we demonstrate our strength and steadfastness, the Soviets are less likely to take dangerous chances. And we both know that we must, above all, avoid a nuclear war, which could destroy our civilization.

~~Attachment~~

File -  
Chen

Notes -

12/14

No folder 9056

Orig attachment to

K. Spokes via Bob

Sims

RMS

## OPENING QUESTIONS

Q. -- "Now that you've had three years experience dealing with the Soviets, has anything surprised you about the way they act and think?"

A. -- No, not really. Of course, none of us can predict precisely what they will do at a given moment, but I have not been surprised by the way they act and think. We have a lot of basic differences, but they do respect strength. You see, when I entered office, the U.S. had gone through a period of growing weakness--weakness in the economy, in our defenses and in our political will. Under such conditions, we could not expect the Soviets to take much account of our interests. We have started rebuilding our strength and this gives us the means to deal with the Soviets on a fair and effective basis.

Q. -- "You and your advisers spend a great deal of your time thinking about the Soviets--their plans and policies. You've also had personal correspondence with both Brezhnev and Andropov. Have you formed any image in your mind of your counterparts over there, as people worrying about what you're going to do next? Does it help to try and think of them as individuals, with human strengths and failings?"

A. -- Certainly they are individuals, but the system and the way it operates imposes real constraints on individuality. Often I get the feeling that we are dealing with a committee. But I hope that, whatever our differences in outlook and methods of operation, the Soviet leaders are human beings who take their responsibility seriously to help avoid nuclear war and who will join us in finding ways to bring about a safer world for everyone.

Q. -- "Some people who work with you say that, since becoming President, you've been surprised at how difficult it is to turn things around in the balance between the U.S. and the Soviets. They say you've been frustrated by the lack of funds available, by the long lead time in weapons development, and by the tremendous number of different claims on our resources. Is this accurate? How difficult have you found it to change America's military posture."

A. -- Well, it has taken a lot of work, and a lot of the things we must do are not easy, but I think the important thing is that we have in fact reversed the trend of decline in U.S. strength, and that we have good bipartisan support for keeping America strong. And I believe we will continue to have support for policies necessary to keep the peace and preserve our freedoms.

Q. -- "You've based your nuclear negotiating strategy on the conviction that the Soviets would bargain seriously when they recognized two realities: that you were succeeding in modernizing the American strategic nuclear arsenal and that NATO had the determination to proceed with actual deployment of the Pershing II and cruise missiles. These two conditions have been met. But instead of negotiating seriously, Moscow is threatening to match us in a new lap of the arms race. How do you propose to deal with that?"

A. -- It is true that I feel history shows us that the Soviets do not give up something without getting something in return. So if we are not strong--if we disarm unilaterally--they will have no incentive to reduce the immense arsenal they hold. And in addition, they might calculate that they could get advantages by using their arms, and this would greatly increase the danger of war. So I think that rebuilding our strength is absolutely essential for both peace and arms reduction.

Now I don't believe that any of us can predict precisely what the Soviets will do in regard to negotiations at any particular time. They seem to be using the threat to break off negotiations as a propaganda weapon, to frighten the West and obtain unilateral concessions. And if there is an arms race, it is not on our side. We have reduced the number of our weapons, even while they were increasing theirs, and even without an INF agreement we will be taking more nuclear weapons out of Europe than we put in.

Nevertheless, we are determined to do all we can to negotiate fair, verifiable agreements to lower the high levels of arms. If the Soviets refuse to join us in this effort, then the world will draw its own conclusions as to who is interested in a more peaceful world and who is pushing an arms race. But I believe the Soviets will ultimately find that it is in their interest to negotiate realistically, since we both have much to gain from arms reduction.

## TALKING POINTS ON OTHER ISSUES

A. Our Agenda: We want to engage the Soviets in discussing the whole range of problems confronting us. Most of them can be grouped in three broad categories:

(1) Reducing the use and threat of force in international disputes, which is what actually causes armed conflict;

(2) Lowering the high levels of armaments by equitable and verifiable agreements; and

(3) Establishing more confidence in the relationship, by insuring compliance with past agreements, improving regard for human rights, and developing bilateral ties on a fair and reciprocal basis.

--While we know it is unrealistic to try to solve everything at once, we believe there must be progress in all three areas if we are to achieve very much in any of them. They are interconnected. For example, if the Soviets continue to use their arms to impose their will on others, that makes arms reduction agreements very difficult. And if they violate past agreements, that of course makes it much harder to reach new agreements.

### B. Dialogue

--We are conducting an extensive dialogue with the Soviets and are willing to intensify it to the degree the Soviets are willing.

--The problem is not lack of communication, but the fact that the Soviets remain intransigent in dealing seriously with our concerns.

### C. Summitry

--As I have said many times, I'd be delighted to meet with Mr. Andropov if preparations indicated that it could produce positive, beneficial results.

--At this time, these conditions do not prevail. It would be a mistake for us to raise hopes and then dash them if we can't make some progress.

--As I understand the Soviet view on this point, it is the same as ours.



--In general, I think it important to look at summit meetings as one instrument in the negotiating process, to be used when appropriate, but not as an ends in themselves.

NOTE: It would be best not to refer to Andropov's health as a possibly limiting factor.

D. Soviet Walk-Out in INF

--Deplorable, since it is without genuine reason. We are ready to return to the table at any time and are eager for an agreement.

--Soviets must understand, however, that their insistence on a monopoly of this type of weapon is totally unacceptable. Obviously, any agreement must be fair, and if they insist on their SS-20's, they must agree to a balance.

--Don't know whether they will return to negotiating table or not, but if they don't it will tell us whether they are really interested in arms reduction or not. We negotiated when they were deploying their missiles.

E. Current Tensions

--We don't say the Soviets have caused all the problems in the world, but what has raised tensions in many areas and intensified conflicts has been the Soviet habit of introducing arms where there are local problems in an effort to exploit these problems to their advantage.

--It is this Soviet pattern of behavior that must change if they are to achieve better relations with the rest of the world.

--The best way to deter this dangerous behavior is to see to it that it does not succeed.

--Military force is of course not the only answer. But when the Soviets and their surrogates threaten other countries with the force of arms, we cannot ignore the military aspect.

--In some cases, the Soviets artificially raise tensions--as they have done over the NATO deployments. But this is a transparent effort to intimidate the free world and to stimulate fear, which they know causes some people to advise capitulation.

F. Soviet Compliance

--Soviet failure to live up fully to some past agreements is a matter of serious concern. I will be reporting the facts to Congress when it convenes next year.

--At this point I would just say that, at a minimum, our experience with past agreements underscores how vital it is to make sure that any agreements we conclude are really verifiable.

G. "Rhetoric"

--I think it is important for us to assert our values clearly and to tell the truth about communism and the Soviet system. Our people must understand the real world we live in and the nature of the Soviet threat.

--The Soviets themselves have said for decades that the "ideological struggle" will continue, whether or not relations are good with other countries. So we are just taking them at their word.

--I don't think telling the truth as we see it makes negotiation impossible. We don't refuse to negotiate with the Soviets because they call us imperialist aggressors--and even worse. And I think when they complain about "rhetoric," they're just looking for a pretext to avoid serious negotiations themselves.

--I've made it clear that, however much I may disapprove of communism and the Soviet system, I recognize that we must deal realistically and on a fair and equal basis with the Soviet Union to reduce the danger of confrontation.

H. Andropov and Soviet Leadership

NOTE: It would be advisable to avoid any comment on the Soviet leadership situation or Andropov's health. If asked, the reply might be along the following lines:

--Of course we hear a lot of rumors, but--frankly--the Soviets are so secretive about these things that we don't really have many facts.

--In any case, what goes on in the Soviet leadership is their affair, not ours. What we should do is make our own policy clear and not be overly concerned by rumors and unsubstantiated reports about what is going on in their internal politics.

I. The "China Card"

--We don't think of our relationship with the People's Republic of China as a "card" to play in our relations with the Soviet Union--nor, for that matter, our relations with the Soviet Union as a "card" in our relations with China. This is not a card game.

--We approach our relations with China on their own merits, and our relations with the Soviet Union on their own merits. If you look at our relations with both countries historically, you will see that at times our relations with both have improved at the same time; on other occasions relations with one have improved while relations with the other have not.

--As you know, the Chinese and the Soviets have had several meetings over the past year or so, designed to reduce tensions between them. If Sino-Soviet contacts serve to reduce the dangers of war in areas such as Kampuchea or Afghanistan, and lead to a general improvement in Soviet behavior, we would regard that as a positive development.

--For our part, we will continue to focus on the proper management of our separate relations with Beijing and Moscow on their own merits.

## PRESIDENT REAGAN'S ARMS REDUCTION AGENDA

- Embarked on the most ambitious arms reduction agenda ever developed by any Administration.
- Negotiating directly with the Soviet Union about deep reductions in strategic and intermediate-range nuclear weapons.
- We and NATO Allies are negotiating with the Soviets and their Warsaw Pact allies about cutting conventional forces in Europe.
- Negotiating with the Soviet Union and other interested nations about an effective and verifiable ban on chemical weapons.
- Have also asked the Soviet Union to join us in efforts to ensure that nuclear testing limits can be effectively verified.
- Have asked the Soviet Union and others to join with us in the search for confidence-building agreements that can help reduce the risk of accidental war.

## CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS

Strategic Arms Negotiations

- The U.S. approach is to secure an equitable, verifiable agreement which will reduce the number of ballistic missile warheads by one-third, gain substantial reductions in the most destabilizing systems, by as much as one-half, reduce the destructive capacity of nuclear missiles, and establish limits on bombers and cruise missiles.

- In order to facilitate an agreement, the President has made substantial adjustments to our initial position. The adjustments made over the last few months have been taken in close consultations with the Scowcroft Commission and the Congress and take expressed Soviet concerns into account. And they include a guaranteed mutual build-down as recommended by many in the Congress. Strong, bipartisan support of the Congress and the American people is essential to success in the negotiations.

- The President has expressed a willingness to agree to trade-offs between areas of U.S. interest or advantage and areas of Soviet interest and advantage. Everything is on the table, and our negotiators have great flexibility.

- While the Soviet Union has not yet demonstrated a similar flexibility toward reaching agreement, either by responding positively to our recent initiatives or by tabling new, more forthcoming proposals of its own, there is reason for some hope. Already, the Soviet Union has agreed to the importance of reductions and has shown some limited flexibility on secondary issues.

- Increased Congressional support for our defense program and a new bipartisan spirit in arms control will enhance the likelihood that the Soviets will increasingly realize that it is time to begin to negotiate seriously on the central issues.

### Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Negotiations

- In November 1981, President Reagan announced the zero-zero option of U.S. and Soviet longer-range, land-based INF missiles. The President thereby offered to cancel the planned deployment of 572 Pershing II and Ground-Launched Cruise Missiles in return for Soviet elimination of its 600 SS-20, SS-4 and SS-5 missiles with far more warheads, which it had been unilaterally deploying for a number of years. This proposal would eliminate an entire class of nuclear weapons. The President made clear that the U.S. would also carefully consider any serious Soviet proposal.

- By March 1983, it was clear that the Soviets were not ready to accept the U.S. proposal. In an effort to move negotiations forward, the President announced a proposal for an interim agreement: the U.S. would reduce the planned deployment of Pershing IIs and GLCMs, provided the Soviets reduced the number of their warheads to an equal level on a global basis. At the same time, the U.S. made clear that the zero-zero proposal remained on the table. But no meaningful Soviet counter-proposal was offered.

- Notwithstanding Soviet inflexibility, the President on September 26 and on November 14, 1983, announced further initiatives designed to move the negotiations forward and responding to expressed Soviet concerns. First, we agreed explicitly to include aircraft in the negotiations and to consider foregoing deploying in Europe the full complement of missiles we would be allowed within a global limit. Second, we proposed a specific interim global limit of 420 warheads on each side, although we would prefer zero.

Unfortunately, the Soviet Union has not yet demonstrated comparable flexibility. Each Soviet proposal tabled since the negotiations began in 1981 would have the same basic outcome: prohibiting any NATO deployments while the Soviets retained their substantial monopoly in LRINF missiles, which now have some 1,400 warheads in our zero.

### Conventional Force Reductions in Europe

- The goal of the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) negotiations is the reduction of each side's military manpower in Central Europe to parity at a level of 700,000 ground force personnel and a maximum of 900,000 air and ground force personnel combined.

- In MBFR's 10-year existence, both East and West have made a variety of proposals. On both sides, however, there has been a strong continuity in negotiating objectives. The West has consistently sought parity of forces at a reduced level. The East, with equal consistency, has resisted effective acceptance of parity. Initially, it rejected equality explicitly; later, it did so implicitly, accepting parity as a goal but refusing to admit to the size of its current forces and, consequently, to the size of reductions that would be needed to arrive at parity. It has refused to provide sufficient detail on how it would go about ensuring compliance.

- In July 1982, the West tabled a new draft treaty, marking a further effort to address expressed Warsaw Pact/Soviet concerns while preserving the Western requirement for parity and effective verification. The major innovation of the Western draft is that it would bind all direct participants in one agreement to undertake the reductions required to reach the reduced ceiling. This provision seeks to address the frequently expressed Soviet concern that initial Soviet reductions might not be followed by reductions in the forces of the United States' NATO Allies. The East has yet to respond constructively.

### Confidence-Building Measures

- U.S.-Soviet confidence-building measures include the "Hotline" Agreement and the "Accidents Measures" to reduce the risk of accidental outbreak of nuclear war. Multilateral measures in force are also contained in the Final Act of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), signed in Helsinki in 1975. The principal feature of the CSCE measures is the agreement of both East and West to prior notification of large military maneuvers. This concept has also been incorporated into the Western proposals at the MBFR negotiations.

- In 1982, President Reagan proposed a new set of bilateral confidence-building measures, including prior notification of ballistic missile launches, prior notification of major military exercises, and expanded exchange of forces data. These proposals have been tabled at the START and INF negotiations.

- In addition, the U.S. has proposed and begun bilateral discussions with the Soviet Union to improve the hotline, establish a U.S.-U.S.S.R. Joint Military Communications Link and improve embassy-capital communications. We have also proposed a multilateral agreement on consultations concerning unexplained nuclear incidents. When the Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE) begins in Stockholm in January 1984, we will seek agreement on additional measures which would inhibit opportunities for surprise attack in Europe.

- The United States is seeking to improve compliance with existing international agreements. In the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva, the United States and its allies are seeking a complete and verifiable ban on chemical weapons production, stockpiling possession, transfer, and use. Whether we can achieve this objective will depend largely on whether the Soviet Union is willing to accept effective provisions for verification and compliance.

- The U.S. maintains a limited stock of chemical weapons as a deterrent against the use of such weapons against the U.S. and our Allies, and as an incentive to the Soviet Union to negotiate a verifiable, worldwide chemical weapons ban. Our program to begin modernization of this deterrent stockpile after 14 years of unilateral restraint is intended to increase the prospects for achieving such a comprehensive ban.

### Nuclear Testing

While achievement of a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing remains the ultimate U.S. objective, progress toward that goal is a step-by-step process. In the 1970s, the U.S. and the USSR took steps in that direction when they signed the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty, which limit the size of underground nuclear tests. However, serious questions have been raised about Soviet compliance with the limits of these unratified Treaties and about the adequacy of the Treaties' verification measures. To help resolve these questions, the United States in 1982 proposed to the Soviet Union that we discuss means to enhance the verification provisions of the Treaties. Unfortunately, the Soviets have been unwilling to date to enter into such discussions with us.

### Nonproliferation

The United States is committed to a vigorous program to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. This includes strengthening the 1968 treaty against the spread of nuclear weapons and our efforts

to strengthen international safeguards on nuclear material and more tightly to control access to technology relating to the production of nuclear weapons. Under the Reagan Administration, regular bilateral talks have been initiated with the Soviet Union to focus on problems of nuclear proliferation.

#### Outer Space Arms Control

The Administration is in the process of assessing the merits of a number of outer space arms control proposals, but there are a number of serious problems related to this area. These include the difficulty of assuring effective verification, and the question of the threat posed by the existing Soviet anti-satellite interceptors and by present and prospective Soviet satellites which, while not weapons themselves, are designed to provide direct support to the Soviet Union's terrestrial forces in the event of a conflict. The U.S. has been actively involved in establishing a Working Group to discuss outer space issues at the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva, with a view to determining what if any new arrangements might be needed or desirable to further the peaceful uses of space.

#### The Shifting Military Balance

- Some 3/4 of nuclear warheads on US strategic weapons are on systems which are more than 15 years old. But 3/4 of the warheads on Soviet strategic weapons are on systems which are less than 5 years old.
- The US deployed no new strategic bomber since the last B-52 was deployed in 1962, while the Soviet Union has deployed more than 230 intercontinental-range Backfire bombers and is expected to deploy the Blackjack bomber as well.
- The US, until last year, had deployed no new strategic submarine (SSBN) for some 13 years, while the Soviet Union deployed 6 new classes involving 62 new strategic submarines during the same period.
- The US deployed only one new strategic submarine missile (SLBM) during the past 12 years, while the Soviets deployed 5 new types, involving hundreds of new missiles during the same period.
- The US deployed no new land-based strategic missile (ICBM) since 1969, undertaking only a warhead improvement for a proportion of its Minuteman force, while the Soviets



deployed at least 3 new types of systems involving over 800 new missiles and are already testing 2 more new types.

- While the US destroyed its biological warfare stocks in 1969 and produced no new chemical weapons for 14 years the Soviet Union greatly expanded its CBW efforts, and with its proxies is employing chemicals and toxins against tribesmen in three countries of Asia.
- In addition to major asymmetries in the production and deployment of weapons, the Soviet Union and its proxies have aggressively expanded their military pressure throughout the world.

### The U.S. Nuclear Stockpile

- The total numbers of nuclear weapons in the US stockpile has declined significantly since its peak in the mid-sixties. Today, the US has one-third fewer weapons than it had at that time. Since then many thousands of US weapons have been disassembled and destroyed, and today the US stockpile is at its lowest level in 20 years.

- The destructive power as measured in total yield, or megatonnage, of the US nuclear weapons stockpile has declined even more sharply since its peak in the early 1960s. Today, the total yield of our stockpile is only one-fourth as large as it was then. Today, the total yield of the US stockpile is at its lowest level in 25 years. The total yield of the stockpile will not change in the years ahead.

- The same reductions trend has taken place in Europe. In December, 1979, NATO reached a decision to reduce immediately the number of shorter-range nuclear weapons stationed in Europe. In 1980, we carried out that decision by removing 1,000 of these weapons. The same decision also committed the Alliance to a further review of the remaining systems of this category.

- That review has now been completed, and a decision was made in October, 1983, that the overall size of the NATO nuclear stockpile will now be reduced by an additional 1,400 weapons, not counting those to be withdrawn on a one-for-one basis as new INF systems are deployed. When these 2,400 weapons have been withdrawn, the US will have reduced its nuclear weapons in Europe by over one-third from 1979 levels and NATO will have the lowest number of nuclear weapons in 20 years.

file JM-c

For Amb Matlock

To: Mr. Stevens -  
Stevens  
look good  
Can't find you  
memo on  
orchestra  
could you  
send me  
another  
copy.

The Press Secretary  
(Los Angeles, California)

Jack,

Here is the final version of  
statement on Afghanistan.  
I reworked it with State  
take your concerns into account.

December 27, 1983

I also signalled your concerns  
in my memo to Bud -- assure  
system gave you a copy of that.

BY THE PRESIDENT

On another subject, can I have  
your green light on trying to arrange  
for Soviet "Emigré" Orchestra to  
play here at WH, incl. Shostakovich.

for the blessing of peace at home  
do not forget that the tragic war in  
four long years the Soviet Union has  
But for four long years the brave  
might of a Soviet occupation force at  
in a faraway land have given new  
determination and strength. They  
those who value freedom and  
the world.



Steve

(per my earlier memo to you)

...rs -- the resistance or mujahidin --  
...ment that swept through their  
... a foreign military power  
... threatening their religion and their very way of life. With  
... little in the way of arms or organization, the vast majority of  
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While we will continue to do our part to maintain and improve the  
U.S.-Soviet dialogue, we cannot remain silent on the tragedy of  
Afghanistan. There should be no misunderstanding that the Soviet  
occupation of Afghanistan has created serious international  
tensions. It is not only the Afghan themselves who oppose the  
Soviet occupation of their country, but virtually the entire  
world community. This has been demonstrated time and again in  
five consecutive votes of the United Nations General Assembly,  
when resounding majorities of the world's nations called upon the  
Soviet Union to end its occupation and restore the independence  
and nonaligned status of Afghanistan. In fact the most recent  
U.N. Resolution was adopted on November 23 by the largest vote  
yet: 116 to 20.

Early this year, I had the privilege of receiving in my office a  
group of six Afghan Freedom Fighters. I was moved by their  
simple dignity and pride and their determination to continue  
their struggle for independence. These brave individuals have  
returned to the fight.

The struggle for a free Afghanistan continues. This is not  
because of any outside manipulation, but because of the Afghan  
people's own desire to be free. And their struggle will continue  
until a negotiated political settlement can be found to allow the  
Afghan people to determine their own destiny.

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary  
(Los Angeles, California)

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For Immediate Release

December 27, 1983

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

While Americans are thankful for the blessing of peace at home this holiday season, we do not forget that the tragic war in Afghanistan continues. For four long years the Soviet Union has occupied that unhappy land. But for four long years the brave Afghan people have held the might of a Soviet occupation force at bay. These Islamic fighters in a faraway land have given new meaning to the words courage, determination and strength. They have set the standard for those who value freedom and independence everywhere in the world.

Afghanistan's freedom fighters -- the resistance or mujahidin -- represent an indigenous movement that swept through their mountainous land to challenge a foreign military power threatening their religion and their very way of life. With little in the way of arms or organization, the vast majority of the Afghan people have demonstrated that they will not be dominated, and that they are prepared to give their lives for independence and freedom. The price they have so willingly paid is incalculable.

While we will continue to do our part to maintain and improve the U.S.-Soviet dialogue, we cannot remain silent on the tragedy of Afghanistan. There should be no misunderstanding that the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan has created serious international tensions. It is not only the Afghan themselves who oppose the Soviet occupation of their country, but virtually the entire world community. This has been demonstrated time and again in five consecutive votes of the United Nations General Assembly, when resounding majorities of the world's nations called upon the Soviet Union to end its occupation and restore the independence and nonaligned status of Afghanistan. In fact the most recent U.N. Resolution was adopted on November 23 by the largest vote yet: 116 to 20.

Early this year, I had the privilege of receiving in my office a group of six Afghan Freedom Fighters. I was moved by their simple dignity and pride and their determination to continue their struggle for independence. These brave individuals have returned to the fight.

The struggle for a free Afghanistan continues. This is not because of any outside manipulation, but because of the Afghan people's own desire to be free. And their struggle will continue until a negotiated political settlement can be found to allow the Afghan people to determine their own destiny.

Our goal is to do everything we can to help bring about a peaceful solution which removes the Soviet forces from Afghanistan, ends the agony and destruction of the Afghan nation, and restores that country's independence and nonalignment. Clearly, a neutral and nonaligned Afghanistan would not be a threat to its huge Soviet neighbor.

Thus, we mark the fourth anniversary of the Soviet invasion with sadness and continued indignation. But we are convinced that a settlement is possible, and we are glad that consultations in the U.N. process of indirect talks will go on. We call upon the Soviet Union to reach a settlement of the crisis which restores the freedom, independence and nonalignment of Afghanistan.

Let all of us who live in lands of freedom, along with those who dream of doing so, take inspiration from the spirit and courage of the Afghan patriots. Let us resolve that their quest for freedom will prevail, and that Afghanistan will become, once again, an independent member of the family of nations.

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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

*File*

December 28, 1983

Honorable Jack F. Matlock  
Room 368  
Old Executive Office Building  
White House  
Washington, D.C. 20506

Dear Ambassador Matlock:

The preparation of perceptive and objective evaluation reports is an important element in judging managerial and supervisory effectiveness. The Selection Boards are therefore directed to identify those officers who merit commendation for the high quality of reports prepared on subordinates.

I am pleased to inform you that the 1983 Selection Board identified for special commendation the report you prepared on Martin Wenick for the most recent rating period. A list of officers commended by the 1983 Selection Boards for preparation of evaluation reports will be published in State magazine.

In accordance with 3 FAM 522.1, a copy of this letter is being placed in your performance file.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "SMB", written over a horizontal line.

Stephen M. Block  
Director, Office of  
Performance Evaluation