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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

CAS 10/27/2009

File Folder MATLOCK CHRON 1983 (1)

FOIA

M08-244

Box Number 2

JONES

11

| ID | Doc Type | Document Description | No of Pages | Doc Date | Restrictions |
|-------|-------------------|--|-------------|------------|--------------|
| 78478 | MEMO | ROBERT KIMMITT TO FREDERICK RYAN RE ARMAND HAMMER'S REQUEST FOR MEETING WITH PRESIDENT | 1 | 12/9/1983 | |
| 78479 | MEMO | MATLOCK TO KIMMITT RE ARMAND HAMMER'S REQUEST R 10/27/2009 GUIDELINES | 1 | 12/9/1983 | B1 |
| 78480 | MEMO | MATLOCK/TYRUS COBB TO OLLIE NORTH RE EXERCISE R 2/18/2011 M244/1 | 1 | 2/12/1983 | B1 |
| 78481 | NSC PROFILE SHEET | COLIN POWELL TO POINDEXTER RE EXERCISE R 5/8/2000 NLSM97-003 #11 | 1 | 12/8/1983 | B1 |
| 78482 | MEMO | POWELL TO NSA RE EXERCISE R 5/8/2000 NLSM97-003 #12 | 1 | 12/8/1983 | B1 |
| 78483 | BRIEFING PAPER | RE EXERCISE R 5/8/2000 NLSM97-003 #13 | 9 | ND | B1 |
| 78484 | MEMO | MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE SOVIET POLICY R 12/12/2005 NLRRM03-1478 #1 | 1 | 12/13/1983 | B1 |

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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|-------|----------|--|-------------|------------|--------------|
| 78485 | CABLE | AMERICAN EMBASSY MOSCOW TO SECRETARY OF STATE RE SOVIET POLICY <i>R 12/12/2005 NLRRM03-1478 #2</i> | 8 | 12/10/1983 | B1 |

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| DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE | DATE | RESTRICTION |
|--|---|---------------------|------------------------|
| letter case (8308888) | | | |
| 1. memo | from Robert Kimmitt to Fredrick Ryan re: Armand Hammer's request for meeting with President (1p) | 12/9/83 | P-5 |
| 2. memo | from Matlock to Kimmitt re: Armand Hammer's request (1p) | 12/9/83 | P-1 P-5 |
| letter case (8308936) | | | |
| 3. memo | from Matlock/Tyrus Cobb to Ollie North re: exercise (1p) <i>R 2/18/11 MO8-244 # 78480</i> | 12/12/83 | P-1 P-5 |
| 4. NSC/S profile sheet | from C. Powell to Poindexter re: exercise (1p) <i>R 5/8/00 NLSM97-003 #11</i> | 12/8/83 | P-1 |
| 5. memo | from C. Powell to NSA re: exercise (1p) <i>R 5/8/00 NLSM97-003 #12</i> | 12/8/83 | P-1 |
| 6. briefing paper | re: exercise (9pp) <i>R 5/8/00 NLSM97-003 #13</i> | n.d. | P-1 |
| letter case (8309039) | | | |
| 7. memo | from Matlock to McFarlane re: Soviet policy (1p) <i>R 12/12/05 MO3-1478 #1</i> | 12/13/83 | P-1 P-5 |
| COLLECTION: MATLOCK, JAKC F.: Files | | | dlb |
| FILE FOLDER: Matlock Chron 1983 [1 of 2] DA 90888 <i>Box 2</i> | | | 10/17/95 |

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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| | R cable from Embassy Moscow to Sec. of State re: Soviet policy (8pp) <i>R 12/2/05 MOS-1478 #2</i> | 12/10/83 | P-1 P-5 |
| COLLECTION: MATLOCK, JAKC F.: Files | | | dlb |
| FILE FOLDER: Matlock Chron 1983 [1 of 2] GA-90888 <i>Box Z</i> | | | 10/17/95 |

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| COLLECTION: MATLOCK, JAKC F.: Files | | | dlb |
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PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O. 13233

Ronald Reagan Library

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CAS 4/3/2007

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FOIA

M03-1478

Box Number 2

| ID | Doc Type | Document Description | No of Pages | Doc Date | |
|--------------|------------------|--|--------------|-----------------------|------------------------|
| 7 | MEMO | MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE SOVIET POLICY (#1) | 1 | 12/13/1983 | MVH 5/19/08 |
| 8 | CABLE | AMERICAN EMBASSY IN MOSCOW TO SEC STATE RE SOVIET POLICY (#2) | 8 | 12/10/1983 | MVH 5/19/08 |

~~Mathoch~~

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

December 2, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR SALLY KELLEY

FROM:

RM ROBERT M. KIMMITT *RM*

SUBJECT:

Proposed Letter to Mr. Savi

We have reviewed and concur with the Department of State's proposed reply to Mr. Lembit Savi in response to his letter to the President re Baltic Freedom Day Proclamation.

Attachment

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

December 2, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR SALLY KELLEY

FROM: ROBERT M. KIMMITT
SUBJECT: Proposed Letter to Mr. Savi

We have reviewed and concur with the Department of State's proposed reply to Mr. Lembit Savi in response to his letter to the President re Baltic Freedom Day Proclamation.

8734

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

December 2, 1983

Attachment

FOR BOB KIMMITT

I recommend that you sign the attached memo to Sally Kelley.

Walt ^{WR}Raymond concurs.


JACK F. MATLOCK

DEC 1 1983



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
TRANSMITTAL FORM

S/S 8327561

Date 12/1/83

For: Mr. Robert C. McFarlane
National Security Council
The White House

Reference:

TO: President Reagan From: Mr. Lembit Savi

Date: August 25, 1983 Subject: Human Rights


WH Referral Dated: Sept. 12, 1983 NSC ID # 167394
(if any)

 The attached item was sent directly to the
Department of State.

Action Taken:

- XX A draft reply is attached.
- A draft reply will be forwarded.
- A translation is attached.
- An information copy of a direct reply is attached.
- We believe no response is necessary for the reason
cited below.
- The Department of State has no objection to the
proposed travel.
- Other.

Remarks.


for Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

Dear Mr. Savi:

The President has asked me to respond to your kind letter supporting his Baltic Freedom Day proclamation and his July 26 statement.

The President believes that the cause of freedom for the Baltic States is an important interest which deserves the continued full support of the United States. Our strong concern for the human rights and freedoms of the people in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania has been expressed publicly since the Soviet invasion of those countries in 1940, and we will continue to speak out until those peoples are allowed to determine their own national destiny.

Thank you again for your backing for the President's stand on U.S. Baltic policy and for his efforts to preserve peace and dignity everywhere.

Sincerely yours,

Mr. Lembit Savi,
President, Estonian World Council.

8327561

T H E W H I T E H O U S E O F F I C E

REFERRAL

SEPTEMBER 12, 1983

TO: DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ACTION REQUESTED:

DRAFT REPLY FOR SIGNATURE OF WHITE HOUSE STAFF MEMBER

DESCRIPTION OF INCOMING:

ID: 167394

MEDIA: LETTER, DATED AUGUST 25, 1983

TO: PRESIDENT REAGAN

FROM: MR. LEMBIT SAVI
PRESIDENT
ESTONIAN WORLD COUNCIL
ESTONIAN HOUSE
243 EAST 34TH STREET
NEW YORK NY 10016

SUBJECT: HUMAN RIGHTS

PROMPT ACTION IS ESSENTIAL -- IF REQUIRED ACTION HAS NOT BEEN
TAKEN WITHIN 9 WORKING DAYS OF RECEIPT, PLEASE TELEPHONE THE
UNDERSIGNED AT 456-7486.

RETURN CORRESPONDENCE, WORKSHEET AND COPY OF RESPONSE
(OR DRAFT) TO:
AGENCY LIAISON, ROOM 91, THE WHITE HOUSE

SALLY KELLEY
DIRECTOR OF AGENCY LIAISON
PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE

*need S/S-I
9/19/83 2045*

Siim Kojala

ESTONIAN WORLD COUNCIL

8327501

ESTONIAN HOUSE, 243 EAST 34th STREET
NEW YORK, N.Y. 10016, USA
TELEPHONES: (212) 685-0776, (212) 685-7467

Representing:

Association of Estonians in Great Britain
Council of Estonian Societies in Australia
Estonian Central Committee in the Federal Republic of Germany
Estonian Central Council in Canada
Estonian American National Council
Estonian National Congress in Sweden
Estonian Society in Belgium
Estonian Society in The Netherlands
Johannesburg Estonian Society in South Africa

167394

EXECUTIVE BOARD

Lembit Savi
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Aleks Kurgvel
Vice President

Harald Raudsepp
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Eduard Vallaste
Secretary General

Juta Ristsoo
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Paul Saar
Treasurer

Ylo Anson
Maido Kari
Peeter Kiik
Councilors

Ilmar Päär
Past President

August 25, 1983

The Honorable Ronald Reagan
President of the United States of America
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Mr. President:

On behalf of the Estonian World Council, it is my pleasant duty and honor to extend to you the thanks of the Estonian people and Estonian organizations on the occasion of your recent actions in the cause of human rights.

Specifically, your declaration of the Baltic Freedom Day on June 13 in the White House in the presence of Americans of Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian descent is an unprecedented show of compassion and support for the cause of freedom for the Baltic people. Secondly, your statement on July 26, on the occasion of the sixty-first anniversary of the de jure recognition of Baltic States by the United States, is indeed a moving description of the Baltic holocaust.

Your actions stand out like a bright star in the present dark night which covers Eastern Europe. They will surely fortify and give hope to Estonians in their homeland, that there will be a brighter day for them in their future.

As for Estonian Americans as well as Estonians in the Free World I can state unequivocally that they stand firmly behind you in your efforts to preserve peace and human dignity everywhere.


Respectfully yours,

Lembit Savi


Lembit Savi
President
Estonian World Council

EUROPEAN BUREAU

Ants Luik
Director



L. Savi
ESTONIAN WORLD COUNCIL
ESTONIAN HOUSE
243 EAST 34TH STREET
NEW YORK, N.Y. 10018



The Honorable Ronald Reagan
President of the United States of America
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20025



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~8370~~

~~MATLOCK~~

December 3, 1983

Dear Dick:

It was very thoughtful of you to send me a copy of your testimony on November 16 before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. I appreciate your vigorous support of our approach to dealing with the Soviets. I believe that we are now dealing from sufficient strength that, when the Soviets have sorted out their leadership situation, we can hope to see some concrete results.

With warm regards,

*Merry Christmas
Best to Sab*

Sincerely,

Bud

Robert C. McFarlane

Mr. Richard V. Allen
905 16th Street, N.W.
Suite 303
Washington, D. C. 20006

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

November 21, 1983

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

SIGNED

FROM:

JACK MATLOCK *JEM*

SUBJECT:

Congressional Testimony by Richard V. Allen

Richard Allen has sent you a copy of his testimony on U.S.-Soviet relations, which he delivered before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on November 16 (Tab II). It is generally very supportive of our current policies.

I recommend that you send him a note of acknowledgement.

Chris *cm* and John *JL* Lenczowski concur.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you send the letter at Tab I to Richard Allen.

Approve Disapprove

Attachments:

Tab I Mr. Allen's Testimony
Tab II Letter to Mr. Allen

November 15, 1967

RICHARD V. ALLEN

WASHINGTON, D.C.

Dear Bud -

NOV 16 1983

You may find your hours of
this testimony interesting.

Best regards.

P.S. Percy called three witnesses:

Fulbright, Adm. Neil Gayler, and your brother.

Allen

8370
→

TESTIMONY BY RICHARD V. ALLEN

DISTINGUISHED FELLOW AND CHAIRMAN, ASIAN STUDIES CENTER,
THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION

AND

SENIOR COUNSELLOR FOR FOREIGN POLICY AND
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS,
THE REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE

BEFORE THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

NOVEMBER 16, 1983

"U.S.-Soviet Relations"

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee:

It is indeed a pleasure for me to appear once again before this Committee to discuss a subject central to our contemporary foreign policy concerns. United States-Soviet relations, as the former Chairman of this Committee had often said, have been subject to myths and realities. This is not to suggest that Chairman Fulbright and I agree on which are myths and which are realities, but I'm here to give you my views on what I consider to be the myths and realities currently affecting U.S.-Soviet relations, and my perception of the future course of those relations.

Just five months ago, Mr. Chairman, Secretary of State George Shultz appeared before this Committee to present a definitive statement of the Administration's policy toward the Soviet Union. In my opinion, his analysis remains the most lucid and important I have heard in many years, and I consider it to be a landmark document. It has received far too little attention,

especially in the media, and deserves the most serious study and reflection.

I am sure that you and your colleagues on this Committee, along with all Senators, can agree that the fate of the world depends in large measure on the outcome of the relationship between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. At the moment, that relationship is very delicate.

The purpose of this hearing is, clearly, to help shed some light on the relationship, to examine the performance of the Reagan-Bush Administration in its conduct toward the Soviet Union, and to assess the Soviet response to the Administration's policies and attitudes.

This is an important task, because the Senate plays an important role in our foreign and national security policies. Without the understanding and active support of the Congress, any policy will ultimately fail. Above all else, we urgently need a long-term policy toward the Soviet Union that is sustained by a broad bipartisan consensus on its fundamental tenets.

I think it is a myth to assume that U.S.-Soviet relations can be governed by a "personal chemistry" between whoever is in charge of the Soviet Presidium and the President of the United States. There are many who believe that summitry can resolve fundamental differences between our nations. In my view, it matters not so much who is in charge of the Soviet Union and what his particular musical or cultural tastes might be, but whether the Soviet leadership, which means essentially the leadership of the Party, will persist in a course of expansionism

-- or, better put, imperialism -- to exercise the use of force not to protect human freedoms, but to usurp and destroy them.

I believe the Soviet Union is committed to an essentially aggressive course in virtually every part of the world. Witness, for example, the military buildup in the Western Pacific; witness the activities of various communist parties throughout the Middle East and the Western Hemisphere which perpetrate terrorist activities to destabilize regimes friendly, or at least not openly hostile, to the West. They know full well that terrorism breeds a reaction that yields an ugly scene on American television, and that such spectacles can erode public support for strong and effective policies.

Too often we have concentrated on the symptoms of U.S.-Soviet relations without looking at the root causes of our differences. We have ignored the lessons of history and have made assumptions in dealing with the Soviet Union which have proven to be without foundation.

The policy of "detente" (as distinguished from the tactic of detente) theory, for example, appeared to be based on the assumption that we could build through economic, trade and credits a web of relationships with the Soviet Union which would somehow make them less aggressive, less dangerous, dependent upon and essentially respectful of our United States vital interests around the world.

For more than a decade successive Administrations declared that the policy of detente could not be "divisible;" that the Soviets could not expect to receive the benefits of that policy -- expanded trade credits, a more or less steady flow of

technology designed to bolster the efficiency and productivity of the stagnant and archaic Soviet economy -- and at the same time continue attempting to undermine and intimidate non-communist governments. This applied especially to the underdeveloped world, where the traces of direct Soviet involvement were less visible, and where subversion has typically been carried on by surrogates, often under the banner of "national liberation movements."

Instead of that moderating impact, detente was accompanied by: the largest buildup of arms in the history of the world on the part of the Soviet Union; the unbridled use of terrorism as a destabilizing force throughout the world; assassinations of Americans, including our Ambassador in Afghanistan preceding a brutal invasion of that country by Soviet military forces; massive genocidal military actions in Southeast Asia against the Cambodian and Laotian people as well as the Vietnamese; the buildup of Soviet missiles in Western Europe and in the Western Pacific. This harvest was precisely the opposite responses which our detente policies were supposed to achieve, and hence it is fair to say that, as a policy, detente was an abysmal failure.

It is ironic that a system that is such a blatant failure because it denies basic human freedoms, that cannot feed its own people, has succeeded, through the use of military force and violent terrorist acts, in destroying the freedoms of millions throughout the world.

These were the realities which led President Reagan to reverse the weakening of American forces. He is not, as some

political cartoonists would have us believe, a gunslinging Western cowboy; he is a thoughtful man who believes that the only thing the Soviet leadership respects is strength. I firmly believe that he is right and that historians will record this period, though dangerous to be sure, as one in which the Soviet Union's ability to impose its will on other nations has been ended.

Another myth in U.S.-Soviet relationships is that famous China Card policy which was played by Presidents Nixon and Carter. There are, to be sure, deep divisions between the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union. These divisions are much deeper even than differences over the purity of communist ideology; they extend to the very nature of the peoples and the historical attitudes of the Chinese towards foreigners by whom they had been dominated for centuries.

Although these divisions are real, the United States must be extremely careful in attempting to exploit them. Chinese leadership as well as Soviet leadership is composed of aged men, men who will not be around for many years.

In every totalitarian or authoritarian system there is always a succession problem. It often happens that the pendulum will swing from the "hardliners" to the "capitalists." The Chinese appeared to be headed in a "capitalist" direction at the moment. However, the Russians were in the same mold in the 1920s when they embarked on their New Economic Policy. That era was abruptly ended by the rise to power of Mr. Stalin and the subsequent massacre of millions of Russian people.

Who is to say the Chinese leadership after Deng Xiao Ping will not revert to the hardline policies pursued by Mao and the so-called Gang of Four? Who is to say that Chinese leadership will not attempt a rapprochement with the Soviet leadership in 1985? Does it make sense, therefore, to provide the People's Republic of China with military technologies which could be used in the future, not against the Soviet Union but against our friends in the Western Pacific?

Wouldn't it be ironic if American weapons were used against South Korea, for example, after we lost 55,000 American lives to defend South Korea against the North? Wouldn't it be a sad situation if this country, which prides itself on the defense of freedom at home and the exercise of an alliance system aimed at defending freedom abroad, were to sell out, for the sake of an ephemeral China card, the freedom of eighteen million people in the Republic of China on Taiwan?

Mr. Chairman, I believe the Chinese, like the Russians, respect strength. It was this committee which strengthened -- indeed, fundamentally changed -- the Taiwan Relations Act when it was submitted in draft form by President Carter. This country is now committed to providing Taiwan with defensive capability against the mainland. Did that rupture our relationship with the People's Republic? The answer is no. That relationship is based on mutual self-interest, not on capitulating to their demands.

Mr. Chairman, I believe there were a number of significant turning points in our relationship with the Soviet Union in the post-war era. Some of these were the result of agreements reached with the Soviet Union to divide Germany, Korea

and, in effect, to permit the Soviet Union to use the threat of force in Eastern Europe to subjugate the peoples of those nations. Many of these current day crises can be traced to the following events: (1) the Berlin blockade and airlift; (2) the takeover of the Suez Canal by Nasser and the subsequent rejection by the United States of British-French efforts to maintain control; (3) the introduction of Marxism into the Western Hemisphere by the Cuban revolution and the subsequent failure of the United States to invoke the Monroe Doctrine effectively when it became obvious that Cuba was a client state of the Soviet Union; (4) the prolonged war in Vietnam which lacked definition of purpose and eventually lost the support of the American people; (5) the recognition of the People's Republic of China as the sole representative of all China; (6) the failure of the United States to support its friend the Shah of Iran which led to the Khomeini regime; and finally (7) the hasty decision to get Israel out of Lebanon without getting Syria and the PLO out of Lebanon, which has contributed to the situation of near-chaos in that war-torn country.

Rather than discuss each of these turning points in detail, I would like to focus on two or three of them. First, Soviet ambitions in the Western Hemisphere: I believe the Soviet Union has two objectives in the Western Hemisphere.

The first is control of the Panama Canal, which is vital to United States security and that of Western Europe. The second is the neutralization and possibly the Marxist "liberation" of Mexico. A word about Panama: Americans tend to underestimate the strategic importance of the Panama Canal.

Few recognize that the Panama Canal has been the sea link between the United States and Western Europe and between the United States and Japan. More than half of the supplies the United States sent to Western Europe in World War II passed through the Canal. Our naval ships regularly use the Canal even from going from San Diego to the Gulf of Mexico. If the Canal is either put out of use by terrorist activity such as blowing up the locks or is taken over by unfriendly forces in Central America, the United States would face a very serious strategic problem. I don't believe the Soviet Union is interested in Nicaragua or El Salvador as an ultimate objective as much as I see their interest in the control of that vital gateway between the oceans.

Second, I see their interest in Mexico with its 80 million people contiguous to the United States. Mexico is a tinderbox, ripe for radical Marxist penetration. It is a one-party state with an incredible amount of poverty and a massive external debt of \$80 billion. Mexico's history of revolution should make us cautious about its ability to turn from a free nation, although not pluralistically democratic in our political standards, to a state dominated by radical revolutionary ideology, perhaps of the Marxist variety.

The intervention, invasion or rescue, however you want to designate it, in Grenada by the U.S. and Caribbean nations may have set back the plans of the Soviet Union in the Western Hemisphere. We would be naive if we assumed that these plans were dealt a body blow by the "liberation" of Grenada from the Marxist direction.

Therefore, viewing the continued struggle in Central America, I believe the Congress should support the President in providing assistance to those forces of freedom that are trying to restore the original aims of the Sandinista revolution. I think it is the height of folly to withdraw support from the so-called "Contra" groups in the region, those who are actively opposing Soviet and Cuban surrogates, while voting to spend billions of dollars on missiles that hopefully will never be used. The battle for freedom is not only in maintaining a strategic balance, but it's in supporting those forces of freedom who wish to see true democracy in their own homeland.

Now, let me turn to the Western Pacific. The buildup of Soviet forces on Sakhalin Island, including missile forces as well as air and naval bases, is very dangerous. The Soviet Union has made every effort to intimidate Japan from assuming a legitimate role for defending itself in its own sealanes. Moreover, the Soviet Union, which has pervasive influence over the tyrannical regime in North Korea, must have been aware of the effort by the North Koreans to assassinate the South Korean political leadership. We will not speculate on their motives in shooting down an unarmed Korean civilian airliner.

Communists leaders -- whether in Moscow, Peking, Pyong Yang or Hanoi -- are all quite familiar with the contrast between the stultifying impact of their own closed systems and the dynamic economies of free societies. These leaders are therefore committed to maintaining their insulation against outside forces of any nature and at the same time exploiting the very pluralism

and openness which characterizes the successful systems on our side.

Thus, the security of the Western Pacific has more than a strictly military dimension. Yet, given the circumstances of the region and the Soviet buildup of forces, there will be no substitute for collective security in the Western Pacific. That security should be in the form of a security community united by common perceptions of shared vital interests. Japan in particular must play a far greater strategic role, especially in maritime defense.

The only realistic way for this to be accomplished today, given Japanese domestic politics and the politics of the Pacific, is for Tokyo's role to evolve and be exercised within an informal concert of friendly, non-Communist countries in and near the region.

As with German rearmament in the 1950s, such defense growth must be disciplined by the constraints of a comprehensive, albeit informal, security system in which strategic planning is dedicated to the security of all members. Although today there is no prospect that Japan might again become a rogue elephant in the region, the Japanese people and the world both need assurance that Japan though strategically active is constrained by mutual obligations.

The community of the Western Pacific must include Australia, New Zealand, Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore, Malaysia, Taiwan, Japan and South Korea. Their chief mission and principal challenge would be to protect the tranquility of the Western Pacific and to cope with the spread of Soviet power and

the danger such power poses to the vital maritime lanes in the region. These kinds of security agreements must emerge organically rather than be proclaimed from Washington. The days when U.S. Secretaries of State could make momentous announcements and foreign embassies and ministers would respond are over.

Finally Mr. Chairman, a few words about an area which has dominated U.S. post-war policy: the Atlantic Alliance. Despite the so-called neutralist movement in Western Europe, which we see on the nightly news in the form of demonstrations against the deployment of missiles in Britain and the Federal Republic of Germany, the fact is that the elections which have taken place in Western Europe over the past several years have indicated a rejection of unilateral disarmament, peace at any price, and a neutralism of the region.

There's no question that a principal aim of Soviet policy is to split the Western alliance, to divide the United States from Western Europe. What the Soviet leadership must be brought to understand is that their efforts at intimidation will fail. If they are serious about disarmament, there is no greater will than that in this country for a verifiable, balanced reduction, indeed elimination, of strategic weapons in Western Europe. But as long as they continue their deployment of modernized missiles in Western Europe and expect the United States and its allies to refrain from seeking even parity in this strategic area, given the fact that in the conventional area, Western forces are badly outnumbered by Soviet controlled forces, their buildup will certainly continue.

While I would have preferred, obviously, as would you, to see the Soviet Union agree to dismantle its SS20s in return for no deployment of American Pershing or Cruise missiles, apparently this is not to be. There is not even the likely prospect that the Soviets would agree to essential parity at lower levels with the allied forces.

Thus, we are in the unhappy situation of having to implement the second track of the so-called two-track policy because the first track did not work. But I don't see any alternative. We should remember in this connection, however, that the two-track policy was not Ronald Reagan's creation, it was none other than Helmut Schmidt's, the leader of the Social Democratic Party in the Federal Republic.

I believe that once the Soviet Union is convinced that the demonstrations have not broken the will of the West, that the leadership of the Western Alliance is as firm as ever and trying to redress the imbalances that resulted from the Soviet buildup in the late '60s and throughout the '70s, it will come to the bargaining table and negotiate the kind of agreement which this committee will approve and recommend to the Senate for its approval.

The Reagan Administration has embarked on a long-term program of rearmament which, in my judgement, is correct, prudent and necessary. It has done so because of the clear determination of the Soviet Union to continue to fund, develop and deploy the most awesome arsenal of modern weapons of mass destruction known to history.

Unchallenged, this relentless buildup will continue to threaten world peace, and will certainly continue to exert psychological pressure upon our allies, especially those in Europe.

I take it that we are not here to argue the specific merits of the Reagan Administration's long-term defense program, although some will insist that it is this very defense program that represents a "destabilizing force" in the relationship between the two countries, and that if we would only show restraint on our side, the incentive for the Soviet Union to continue investing a disproportionate share of its very scarce resources in weapons would accordingly diminish. I do not share this point of view, since I think that Soviet planners make their resource allocation decisions based on their own perception of Soviet national interest. While they must certainly take into account our own actions, we have, at best, a highly limited capacity to influence these choices.

On the other hand, I believe that we can and do influence, in a direct and measurable way, Soviet policy choices.

The Reagan Administration came to office determined to put our relationship with the Soviet Union on a different footing, one that more accurately reflects the reality with which we must deal in the 1980s. Many consider view of the President and some of his advisors to be unnecessarily harsh, and some have characterized it as simplistic. One observer, himself a member of the preceding Administration, recently opined that "the public rhetoric of Mr. Reagan and his team and their private

conversations all point to a deeply held belief that the world is in a fight between the good guys and the bad guys. They do not seem to see the difference between compromising with an adversary and bargaining with the devil. All adversaries are devils. In their hearts, they simply do not want to make a deal with Communists and radicals, all of whom they believe cannot be trusted to keep a deal. The only way to deal with the devil is to keep your distance. The only recourse with a bad guy is to beat him to the draw."

This caricature of the policy inclinations and the basic beliefs of the President and his advisors offers little in the way of serious analysis, let alone guidance for an understanding of the way in which fundamental policy choices are presently made.

The Administration came to office with a mandate to rebuild our military forces, and with the conviction that to retain the credibility of our deterrent capability we would necessarily have to proceed with the development and deployment of weapons systems that had been deferred or scrapped by previous Administrations. To delay any longer the recovery program for our armed forces, the President reasoned, would be to jeopardize our safety and to cause further erosion of our alliances.

A point of contention in the Reagan program was its rejection of the SALT II Treaty as negotiated by the Carter Administration. During the campaign of 1980, Mr. Reagan had decisively rejected that instrument because he had concluded -- along with the majority of the then Democratic-controlled Senate Armed Services Committee -- that the treaty did not serve the

national security interests of the United States.

He repeatedly pledged to negotiate arms reduction agreements with the Soviet Union, but promised to seek agreements that would be balanced, equitable and, most important, verifiable. In the meantime, the Administration agreed to observe the terms of SALT II.

The Administration has done all this, although it has been forced to face a barrage of criticism from the press and from other quarters, much of it alleging that the Administration's negotiating position is unnecessarily lopsided and unrealistic, and does not take into account legitimate Soviet interests.

Still another variant of criticism is the one I heard just a few days ago in Taipei, where former British Prime Minister Edward Heath declared that "It is perfectly obvious that President Reagan does not want an Arms agreement with the Russians."

The fact of the matter is that President Reagan does want an agreement, and believes that he can get one on terms that are both acceptable to the Senate and which will truly serve the security interests of the United States. Such an agreement would necessarily take into consideration the basic security requirements of the Soviet Union, else why would there be an incentive to the Soviets to conclude such an agreement in the first place?

On both the intermediate and strategic fronts, continued negotiations with the Soviet Union are both necessary and

desirable. Effective, safe, verifiable arms reduction agreements are a prerequisite for safety in the nuclear age. Yet, to grasp for an agreement that does not meet the criteria set down by the President would be a profoundly dangerous mistake.

~~Matlock~~

National Security Council
The White House

System # 1
Package # 8888 RG

| | SEQUENCE TO | HAS SEEN | DISPOSITION |
|---------------------|-------------|----------|-------------|
| Executive Secretary | <u>1</u> | <u>K</u> | |
| John Poindexter | | | |
| Wilma Hall | | | |
| Bud McFarlane | | | |
| John Poindexter | | | |
| Executive Secretary | | | |
| NSC Secretariat | <u>2</u> | | <u>D</u> |
| Situation Room | | | |

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

December 9, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR FREDERICK J. RYAN, JR.

FROM:

ROBERT M. KIMMITT *Bob*

SUBJECT:

Armand Hammer's Request for Meeting with
President

I recommend that Hammer be informed that the President's
schedule unfortunately does not permit a meeting.

78479

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

December 9, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT KIMMITT

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JSM*

SUBJECT: Armand Hammer's Request for Meeting with President

Armand Hammer, President of Occidental Petroleum, wrote the President December 2 requesting an appointment before his trip to Moscow December 17, when he has been informed that he will see Andropov.

Although Hammer requests the meeting formally to report to the President on his work as Chairman of the Cancer Panel, it is clear that his real motivation is to see the President before he sees Andropov, and thus appear to be a quasi-official emissary. Given Hammer's propensity for freewheeling, and indeed ingratiating himself with the Soviet authorities in ways that are frequently distasteful (to say the least), I believe it would be unwise to give him any peg on which to pretend that he is speaking for the President in his conversations with the Soviets. Therefore, I recommend that he be informed that the President's schedule unfortunately does not permit a meeting.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
Sec. 3.4(b), E.O. 12958, as amended
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2006
BY NARA *CS* DATE *10/27/09*

8838

ID: 178061 CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET
INCOMING CORRESPONDENCE DATE 831202 RECEIVED DATE 831206
(PREFIX) (FIRST) (LAST)

(SUFFIX)

MR. ARMAND HAMMER

TITLE: CHAIRMAN AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER

ORGANIZATION: OCCIDENTAL PETROLEUM CORPORATION

STREET: SUITE 1600
10889 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD

CITY: LOS ANGELES STATE: CA ZIP: 90024

COUNTRY:

SUBJECT: WRITES CONCERNING AN INVITATION HE HAS RECEIVED TO FLY TO MOSCOW FOR A MEETING WITH MR. ANDROPOV ON DEC 17 83

AGY/OFF ACTION CODE TRACKING DATE
NSMCFA ORG 831206

STAFF NAME: PRESIDENT REAGAN MEDIA: L OPID: GF TYPE: IBA

COMMENTS: ALSO WRITES REGARDING SURVIVAL STATISTICS FOR CANCER VICTIMS IN THE U. S.

CODES: REPORT MI INDIV: USER:

178061

OCCIDENTAL PETROLEUM CORPORATION

10889 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD • SUITE 1600

LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90024

(213) 879-1700 • (213) 208-8800

ARMAND HAMMER
CHAIRMAN AND
CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER

December 2, 1983

The President
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

I have just returned from an interesting half-hour conversation with Under Secretary Eagleburger, which I hope he will report to you and Secretary Shultz, since it relates to the invitation I have received to fly to Moscow on December 17 where I was told I will have an appointment to see Mr. Andropov.

You have bestowed the greatest honor of my life by selecting me as Chairman of your Cancer Panel, and in the past two years I have devoted a great deal of time to it, working closely with the National Cancer Institute and other scientists throughout the country.

Thursday morning I chaired a meeting of the President's Cancer Panel during which we received reports that the relative survival statistics for cancer victims in the United States have now reached 50%. This is a great advance over previous years.

I have reported to Dr. George Keyworth, with whom I am periodically in contact, and I enjoy working with him. However, as Chairman of the Panel I hope I can report to you personally, though briefly, on these major developments.

You can take great pride that it is under your Administration that great advances are being made with a disease which strikes one out of every four Americans and adds almost a million new cases every year.

I am certain that our people would be glad to hear more from you personally about what is being done to seek a significant cure and the efforts of your Administration. After all, it is under your Administration that the budget of the Cancer Institute first reached one billion dollars a year - a great achievement.

It is my hope that while personally reporting to you about our achievements in cancer, I can, at the same time, provide some insights on my promised meeting with Andropov and share with you some ideas I have which may be helpful to our troubled world.

Please convey the warmest regards of Frances and myself to Nancy. I thought she looked joyously beautiful at the Shilo Church ceremony last night, and we were happy to see her looking so well.

Respectfully,



AH:ec

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

December 12, 1983

Comments

MEMORANDUM FOR OLLIE NORTH

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *Jaw*
TYRUS COBB *twc*

SUBJECT: Exercise Night Train 84

We are concerned with the political implications of this exercise, and believe that they should be carefully weighed before approval is given.

In particular, the scenario itself -- if it should leak (and we must assume that it will) -- will be used by critics of the Administration both here and elsewhere in the world as evidence that we are planning for a nuclear war. This could seriously undercut the President's image as a peacemaker and increase apprehension in Europe, where we still face a rocky road to keep to the INF deployment schedule on track.

If the exercise is essential, could the purposes be served with a scenario which culminates, not in a nuclear exchange, but in a peaceful solution following an alert?

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Declassify on: OADR

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NLRR MD8-244/1 #78480
BY RW NARA DATE 2/18/11

JACIK - You may wish to look over before of

NSC/S PROFILE

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TO POINDEXTER FROM POWELL, C

DOCDATE 08 DEC 83

DECLASSIFIED

NLS M 97-003 #11

BY amf, NARA, DATE 5/8/00

KEYWORDS MILITARY EXERCISES CANADA

SUBJECT: SIGNIFICANT MILITARY EXERCISE / NIGHT TRAIN 84

ACTION: MEMO POINDEXTER TO POWELL DUE: 15 DEC 83 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

NORTH

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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301



8 DEC 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPUTY ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: Significant Military Exercise NIGHT TRAIN 84

(U) The attached brief on the subject exercise is forwarded. This exercise has been coordinated with the Department of State.

~~Let~~ Please note that the critical cancellation date is 9 March 1984.

COLIN L. POWELL
Major General, USA
Military Assistant to the
Secretary of Defense

Attachment 1
a/s (3 copies)

Classified by DIRECTOR, J-3
Declassify on 18 AUG 1989

REGRADED CONFIDENTIAL UPON
REMOVAL OF ENCLOSURES

DECLASSIFIED

NLS M 97-003 #12

BY amf NARA, DATE 5/8/00

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SEC DEF CONTR No. X28353

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

BRIEF OF A SIGNIFICANT MILITARY EXERCISE

1. (U) Exercise Name. NIGHT TRAIN 84.
2. (U) Geographic Area. United States and Canada.
3. (S) Dates. 5-13 April 1984.
4. (S) Type. Worldwide procedural nuclear war command post exercise (CPX).
5. (U) Aims
 - a. (S) Exercise and evaluate selected procedures for controlling, implementing, and processing nuclear actions.
 - b. (S) Evaluate effectiveness of installed and deployed command and control equipment during a post nuclear exchange environment.
 - c. (S) Evaluate military capability to reconstitute and redirect the military forces of the nation after a nuclear attack.
 - d. (S) Exercise tactical warning/attack assessment.
 - e. (S) Evaluate the capability of surviving command nodes to provide a residual capability assessment.
 - f. (S) Evaluate degraded strategic communications connectivity in a non-HEMP environment to include the capability to perform force management and receipt of force report back/strike assessments.
 - g. (S) Evaluate the National Military Command System (NMCS), including the National Emergency Airborne Command Post (NEACP) and other surviving elements of the NMCS.
 - h. (S) Exercise and evaluate space assets and warning capabilities.
 - i. (S) Evaluate residual threat assessment and national reconnaissance capabilities.

DECLASSIFIED

NLS M 97-003 #13

CLASSIFIED BY NINCIOR, 5-3
DECLASSIFY ON 18 AUGUST 1989

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BY AML NARA DATE 5/8/00

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- j. (S) Evaluate logistic and personnel plans, policies and procedures to support military/civil requirements immediately prior to, during, and following a nuclear attack on CONUS.
 - k. (S) Evaluate DOD procedures in resource claimancy and emergency management of resources.
 - l. (S) Evaluate telecommunications reconstitution, frequency management, economy, policy, and communication security practices.
 - m. (S) Evaluate operations security posture of the exercise to include operational and administrative procedures and practices.
 - n. (S) Evaluate the WIN in support of NCA, NMCS, commanders of unified and specified commands, and the Services, during pre-, trans-, and the post-nuclear attack periods.
 - o. (S) Evaluate military assistance to civilian authorities and military support of civil defense during the pre-, trans-, and post-nuclear attack periods.
 - p. (S) Evaluate the capabilities of alternate NMCS Command Centers to direct military forces worldwide and maintain necessary coordination with state and Federal agencies involved in national recovery and reconstitution activities.
 - q. (S) Exercise portions of appropriate OPLANS.
6. (S) Critical Cancellation Date. 9 March 1984.
7. (U) Critical Approval Date. Not required.
8. (S) Political Implications. Conduct of a worldwide nuclear exercise could show strength of purpose. On the other hand, it could be perceived as showing an intent for use of nuclear weapons. It could have the potential to affect US/USSR strategic arms reduction negotiations or bilateral US/USSR summit preparations should either of these be in progress.
9. (S) Politico-Military Scenario Summary. The scenario will be based upon a simulated crisis situation in which the Soviet Union invades Central Europe and Turkish Thrace. This scenario also depicts threats of conflict in Korea, Iran, and the Caribbean Basin. Execution of non-SIOP options will be required, as well as consideration and possible employment of chemical weapons. A subsequent strategic nuclear strike against selected targets in

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North America will result in US SIOP execution. Integral to this will be the live fly portion of SAC's Exercise GLOBAL SHIELD, live launch of a Navy C3 Poseidon missile, and the live fire portion of NORAD'S Exercise AMALGAM CHIEF all specifically scheduled to coincide with Exercise NIGHT TRAIN 84 (see para 15). Following a 24-hour administrative break, the exercise will continue at a time 16 days into the postattack period. This portion of the exercise assumes that a cease-fire exists and will concentrate on reconstitution and redirection of military forces and civil government, military support to the civil population after a nuclear attack, and FEMA's continuity of government activities.

10. (S) Directing Headquarters. This exercise is being conducted by the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with a major contribution by FEMA and its Exercise REX 84 A during the post-attack period.

11. (U) Participating Commands, Headquarters, and Forces

a. (S) United States

Office of the Secretary of Defense
Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
United States Army
United States Navy
United States Air Force
United States Marine Corps
United States Coast Guard
Aerospace Defense Command
North American Air Defense Command
Atlantic Command
US European Command
Military Airlift Command
Pacific Command
US Central Command
US Readiness Command
US Southern Command
Strategic Air Command
Military Traffic Management Command
Military Sealift Command
Joint Task Force Alaska
Defense Logistics Agency
Defense Intelligence Agency
Defense Communications Agency
National Security Agency
Defense Mapping Agency
Defense Nuclear Agency

b. (S) Allied. Canada National Defence Headquarters (NORAD)

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c. (U) Total approximate number of US personnel participating cannot be determined at this time.

12. (U) Scope of Anticipated Participation

- a. (U) Other Unified and Specified Commands. N/A.
- b. (U) Unassigned Forces of the US Military Services. N/A.
- c. (U) US Federal Agencies or Departments (affiliated with REX 84 A)

Federal Emergency Management Agency
Department of State
Department of Commerce
Department of Interior
Department of Justice
Department of Health and Human Services
Department of Agriculture
Department of Energy
Department of Housing and Urban Development
Department of Labor
Department of Transportation
Department of Treasury
Federal Reserve System
Veteran's Administration
General Services Administration
National Communications Systems

13. (S) Simulated use of Nuclear Weapons. Escalatory exchanges of thermonuclear weapons are programmed only in the initial phase of the exercise and will culminate in a major strategic nuclear exchange between the USSR and the United States. The second phase of the exercise deals with the aftermath of the nuclear attack and will assume a cease fire condition between the two superpowers.

14. (U) Coordination Effected With Other Unified, Specified, or Service Commands, Government Departments, Agencies, or Representatives thereof. Full coordination has been and will continue to be effected with FEMA effecting coordination with anticipated participating civil agencies (REX 84 A), and JCS effecting coordination with participating military commands and headquarters as well as overall coordination between OJCS, FEMA, and Department of State.

15. (U) Recommended Public Affairs Policy

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a. (S) A passive public information policy is recommended for Exercise NIGHT TRAIN 84 with an initial exercise news release date of 2 April 1984. SAC's Exercise GLOBAL SHIELD will have an active public information policy for its exercise as will NORAD's Exercise AMALGAM CHIEF. The public information policy for these exercises will be promulgated in their significant military exercise briefs. Although GLOBAL SHIELD and AMALGAM CHIEF will be conducted in the same time-frame as NIGHT TRAIN 84, they are separate and distinct exercises conducted and controlled by the respective commands.

b. (C) It is requested that OASD(PA) post the following Memorandum for Correspondents regarding Exercise NIGHT TRAIN 84 three days prior to commencement of the Exercise:

"Exercise NIGHT TRAIN 84, a routine worldwide command post exercise (CPX) will be conducted by the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff between 5 and 13 April 1984. The exercise is part of the JCS-sponsored CPX program which is routinely conducted locally and worldwide to test command and control procedures. The scenario for "NIGHT TRAIN 84" is a fictitious series of worldwide events leading to increased tension and conflict. This provides headquarters staffs of the unified and specified commands with the opportunity to test planning and procedures in that fictitious environment.

A part of the exercise activities will include movement of some exercise participants from their normal headquarters, including the Pentagon, to alternate command posts for a short period. "NIGHT TRAIN 84" does not involve movement of forces.

The overall objective for the exercise is to test command and control procedures. Another key objective is to view the interaction of civil and military plans in the simulated crisis environment."

c. (U) The following list of questions and answers is provided in anticipation of media queries:

(1) (U) Q. Is this exercise being conducted in response to Soviet provocations?

(U) A. No, the exercise is part of the JCS-sponsored command post exercise program which is routinely conducted locally and worldwide to test command and control procedures.

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(2) (U) Q. When was this exercise scheduled?

(U) A. This exercise was officially scheduled by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1979 as a result of the exercise scheduling conference held that year.

(3) (U) Q. Was this exercise approved by the President?

(U) A. Interagency approval was obtained, as is routinely done for these exercises.

(4) (U) Q. Will there be any worldwide movement of aircraft or other forces as a result of this exercise?

(U) A. There will be no force movement in NIGHT TRAIN 84.

(5) (U) Q. When will the movement to the Alternate Command Post take place, and how long will the personnel be there?

(U) A. Movement to Alternate Command Posts will take place in reaction to the exercise scenario. Personnel will be at these locations for approximately three days.

(6) (U) Q. How will the movement to Alternate Command Posts be accomplished?

(U) A. The movement will be accomplished by air and ground transport.

(7) (U) Q. Will any field training take place as a result of the exercise?

(U) A. No. The movement of staffs to alternate headquarters is not considered "field training."

(8) (U) Q. What level of participation will the exercise include? Can you provide any names?

(U) A. General and flag officers, and senior department and agency officials may participate, although their identities have not yet been determined.

(9) (U) Q. What do you mean by worldwide participation in the exercises?

(U) A. Headquarters of the unified and specified commands will participate.

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(10) (U) Q. Will nuclear command and control procedures be exercised?

(U) A. Details of the exercise are not discussed for security reasons. A broad range of command and control procedures will be exercised.

(11) (U) Q. Will any weapons of any kind be fired or launched? What kind?

(U) A. I can confirm that training firings will be part of the exercise. Due to security considerations, no details are available.

(12) (U) Q. What is the general scenario of the exercise?

(U) A. The scenario is a fictitious series of worldwide events leading to increased tension and conflicts, thus providing staffs with the opportunity to test planning and procedures in the fictitious crisis environment.

(13) (U) Q. What are the specific objectives of the exercise?

(U) A. The overall objective of the exercise is to test command and control procedures. Another objective is to view the interaction of civil and military plans and policies in the simulated crisis environment.

(14) (U) Q. Approximately how many people and aircraft will participate in the exercise?

(U) A. The role of each activity is different, and real-world requirements vary, but we expect that a few people from every unified and specified command, as well as from several government agencies and departments, will participate.

(15) (U) Q. Are any allies or friendly nations participating in the exercises?

(U) A. Yes, Canada.

(16) (U) Q. Can you provide a list of the participating commands, headquarters, and forces? If not, why?

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(U) A. The headquarters elements of the unified and specified commands and Services, as well as that of the OJCS, will participate.

(17) (U) Q. Are any agencies other than military participating in the exercise?

(U) A. Yes.

(18) (U) Q. Can you provide a list of them?

(U) A. Several Government departments and agencies, such as the Departments of State and Defense and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), will participate. FEMA can provide the complete list.

(19) (U) Q. When was the last time this exercise or a similar one conducted, which involved worldwide participation?

(U) A. March 1982 was the last exercise in this series.

c. (U) Media queries beyond the scope of the announcement and Q's and A's in subparagraph b and c above will be accepted and forwarded to OASD(PA) for resolution on a case-by-case basis. No media interviews will be granted and photography of CPX activities will not be permitted.

d. (U) No final report of the success (degree thereof) or problem areas will be made available to the public.

16. (U) General policy concerning:

a. (U) Diplomatic information. Not applicable.

c. (U) Security restrictions. Information concerning the continuity of government exercise is sensitive and will be treated accordingly. Requests for information on this portion of the exercise will be routed to FEMA for final determination.

c. (U) Psychological elements. Not applicable.

17. (U) Assessment of Perception of US and Allied Strategy and Military Capability. The exercise will demonstrate a resolve to test and confirm both military and nonmilitary procedures to be used prior to and after a catastrophic event. Military

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capabilities and strategy assessments derived from the exercise will remain in classified channels.

18. (U) Additional Remarks. None.

Prepared by: Colonel G. M. Houser, USA
Joint Exercise Division
J-3, OJCS
Extension 53089

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

December 13, 1983

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM:

JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT:

American Academic on Soviet Policy

The telegram from Moscow I mentioned this morning is attached at Tab I. It reports on the observations of an experienced American academic who spent about ten days in discussions with senior Soviet officials, including Boris Ponomarev, candidate member of the Politburo and head of the Central Committee's International Department, and several other Party and Institute officials not often seen by Americans.

Among the source's conclusions were:

--Fear of war seemed to affect the elite as well as the man on the street.

--A degree of paranoia seemed rampant among high officials, and the danger of irrational elements in Soviet decision making seems higher.

--The election next year seems to have become a key determinant in Soviet foreign policy making, with the aim not to permit the President to assume the role of peacemaker.

--There seems to be a growing climate of neo-Stalinism and outright chauvinism on the lower levels of the bureaucracy.

The scholar also was told that Andropov had directed a more activist role in the Middle East, and that Andropov is increasingly seeking to take control over foreign policy and to undermine Gromyko.

Paragraphs 2-11 are the most relevant ones in the long cable.

Attachment:

Tab I Moscow telegram 15409 of December 10, 1983.

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EXDIS
E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, ECON, PINR, UR
SUBJECT: AMERICAN ACADEMIC ON SOVIET FOREIGN AND
DOMESTIC POLICY

1. ~~(C - ENTIRE TEXT)~~

2. SUMMARY: AN AMERICAN ACADEMIC WITH EXCELLENT ENTREE TO THE SOVIET POLITICAL ELITE BRIEFED EMBASSY ON HIS DISCUSSIONS HERE NOVEMBER 28-DECEMBER 8. HE BELIEVES, BASED ON THESE DISCUSSIONS, THAT A SIGNIFICANT SHIFT HAS TAKEN PLACE IN SOVIET THINKING AND ATTITUDES, ESPECIALLY TOWARDS THE U. S., OVER THE PAST SIX MONTHS. WHERE EARLIER SOVIET DECISION-MAKING WAS FOUNDED ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY ON PRAGMATISM AND REASONED CALCULATION OF SOVIET INTERESTS, EMOTIONALISM AND EVEN IRRATIONALITY ARE NOW ENTERING INTO PLAY. THE ACADEMIC PERCEIVES A GROWING PARANOIA AMONG SOVIET OFFICIALS, AND SEES THEM LITERALLY OBSESSED BY FEAR OF WAR. HE BELIEVES THAT THE U. S. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS HAVE BECOME THE CENTRAL DETERMINING FACTOR IN SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY.

3. THE ACADEMIC HAS NOTED, FURTHER, A CERTAIN SENSE OF LEADERLESSNESS AND A LACK OF AN INTEGRATED FOREIGN POLICY, WHICH HE ATTRIBUTES TO ANDROPOV'S LENGTHY ABSENCE FROM THE SCENE AND THE UNCERTAINTY THIS HAS GENERATED. HE FEELS THAT THERE ARE SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES WITHIN THE LEADERSHIP--PARTICULARLY ON DOMESTIC POLICY--AND PINPOINTS THE LOWER PARTY ORGANS (AT THE DISTRICT LEVEL) AND THE ECONOMIC BUREAUCRACIES AS THE MAJOR SOURCES OF OPPOSITION TO ANDROPOV'S DOMESTIC PROGRAMS, AND ANTICIPATES THAT ANDROPOV WILL SHORTLY ATTEMPT TO OVERCOME THIS OPPOSITION THROUGH WIDESPREAD PERSONNEL CHANGES IN THE ECONOMIC MINISTRIES AND AT LOWER PARTY LEVELS. ALTHOUGH THE ACADEMIC SENSED THE SAME WIDESPREAD RECOGNITION AMONG HIS INTERLOCUTORS AS HE HAD DURING A PREVIOUS VISIT IN MAY OF THE NECESSITY FOR ECONOMIC CHANGE, HE DETECTED MUCH LESS OPTIMISM THAT THE KIND OF CHANGES REQUIRED TO BREAK OUT OF THE CURRENT IMPASSE COULD BE REALIZED. HIS OWN BELIEF IS THAT THE LEADERSHIP IS EITHER UNWILLING OR UNABLE TO PURSUE OTHER THAN A GRADUAL, INCREMENTAL APPROACH TO ECONOMIC CHANGE, AND THAT EACH SMALL STEP WILL BE ABSORBED BY THE SYSTEM RATHER THAN REFORM IT.

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4. THE ACADEMIC'S INTERLOCUTORS ACKNOWLEDGED THAT ANDROPOV HAD UNDERGONE AN OPERATION BUT CLAIMED THAT HE WAS NOW BACK AT WORK ALBEIT ON A SOMEWHAT LIMITED SCHEDULE. THE ACADEMIC GAINED THE IMPRESSION THAT USTINOV HAD STOOD IN FOR THE GENERAL SECRETARY DURING THE LATTER'S ABSENCE; CHERNENKO HAD BEEN COMPLETELY BYPASSED. END SUMMARY.

5. THE ACADEMIC IDENTIFIED THREE MAJOR CURRENTS IN SOVIET THINKING THAT HAD EMERGED SINCE HIS VISIT HERE IN MAY:

-- A GENUINE SENSE OF CONCERN OVER TRENDS ON THE INTERNATIONAL STAGE AND A FEAR OF WAR THAT SEEMED TO BE SHARED BY SOVIET CITIZENS GENERALLY. THE OFFICIAL LINE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS IS GENERALLY BELIEVED BY THE POPULACE.

-- A GROWING CLIMATE OF NEO-STALINISM, PARTICULARLY EVIDENT AT THE RAION (DISTRICT) LEVEL AND AMONGST THE YOUNGER GENERATION, FED BY STRONG FEELINGS OF PATRIOTISM AND EVEN CHAUVINISM. THERE IS A GROWING SENSE THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS BEING PUSHED AROUND BY THE U.S., AND THAT RESOURCES MUST BE MOBILIZED TO COUNTERACT THIS THREAT, UTILIZING THE ADVANTAGES WHICH A CENTRALIZED ECONOMY POSSESSES IN THIS REGARD. THE COROLLARY TO THIS IS THAT DOMESTIC ECONOMIC CHANGES CANNOT BE AFFORDED AT THIS TIME.

-- A HIGH DEGREE OF PARANOIA AMONG HIGH OFFICIALS WITH WHOM THE ACADEMIC SPOKE, NOT UNLIKE THE ATMOSPHERE OF THIRTY YEARS AGO. SINCE HIS MAY VISIT, THE ACADEMIC HAS NOTICED THAT ATTITUDES HAVE BECOME MORE PERSONAL AND EMOTIONAL, ESPECIALLY WITH RESPECT TO THE U.S., AND HE DID NOT DISCOUNT THE POSSIBILITY OF IRRATIONAL ELEMENTS IN SOVIET DECISION-MAKING. HE CITED THE STRAIGHTFACED CLAIM MADE TO HIM BY ONE OFFICIAL THAT THE KAL FLIGHT HAD BEEN DELIBERATELY STAGED BY THE U.S.--NOT AS AN INTELLIGENCE FLIGHT--BUT TO PROVOKE THE USSR AND ANTI-SOVIET FEELINGS IN THE WORLD.

6. THE ACADEMIC DECLARED THAT THE STATEMENT RECENTLY MADE BY BRZEZINSKI THAT THE SOVIETS "WOULD CRAWL BACK TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE" WAS COMPLETELY INCONSISTENT
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 04 MOSCOW 15409

EXDIS
E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, ECON, PINR, UR
SUBJECT: AMERICAN ACADEMIC ON SOVIET FOREIGN AND
 -- DOMESTIC POLICY
WITH THE POSITIONS TAKEN BY HIS SOVIET CONTACTS HERE.
ALL OF HIS SOVIET INTERLOCUTORS HAD UNEQUIVOCALLY
STATED THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD NOT RETURN TO SEPARATE
INF TALKS. MOREOVER, ALL HAD EXPECTED THAT THE SOVIET
UNION WOULD NOT CONTINUE WITH START NEGOTIATIONS EITHER,
BUT THIS HAD BEEN EXPRESSED AS PERSONAL OPINION RATHER
THAN AS A CATEGORICAL STATEMENT.

7. THE ACADEMIC FELT THAT THE U. S. PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTIONS HAVE BECOME THE KEY DETERMINANT OF SOVIET
FOREIGN POLICY MAKING. IN THEIR EFFORTS TO PREVENT
THE PRESIDENT'S RE-ELECTION, THE SOVIETS ARE DETERMINED
NOT TO ALLOW HIM TO ASSUME THE MANTLE OF PEACEMAKER.
SOVIET INTERLOCUTORS CLAIMED THAT THE SOVIET SIDE HAD
CONSISTENTLY SHOWED RESTRAINT VIS-A-VIS THE U. S. BUT
HAD MET WITH NO RESPONSE FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN. THEY
CLAIMED TO SEE NO INCENTIVE WHATEVER FOR A POLICY OF
RESTRAINT IN THE FUTURE. (IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION
FROM THE AMBASSADOR, THE ACADEMIC ACKNOWLEDGED THAT
NONE OF HIS SOVIET CONTACTS HAD CITED ANY SPECIFIC
EXAMPLES OF PAST SOVIET RESTRAINT.)

8. ON THE SOVIET SIDE, HE FELT THAT THE PARAMETERS
OF ASSESSING RISK HAD SHIFTED AWAY FROM THE BASICALLY
PRAGMATIC APPROACH WHICH HAD IN THE PAST CHARACTERIZED
SOVIET BEHAVIOR ABROAD. THE ACADEMIC SENSED, MOREOVER,
THAT THE SOVIETS DO NOT, AT THIS TIME, HAVE AN INTEGRATED
FOREIGN POLICY. THIS WAS PARTIALLY A FUNCTION OF THE
SERIOUSNESS AND COMPLEXITY OF THE PROBLEMS FACING THEM.
A MORE IMPORTANT FACTOR, HE FELT, WAS THE UNSETTLED
STATE OF THE LEADERSHIP.

THE MIDDLE EAST

9. THE ACADEMIC CITED THE MIDDLE EAST AS AN EXAMPLE
OF AN AREA WHERE THE LACK OF A COHERENT SOVIET POLICY
IS EVIDENT, WHILE SOVIET OFFICIALS HAD WARNED
THAT "YOU CAN BE SURE WE WILL REACT" TO ANY U. S. ACTION
AGAINST SYRIA, THE SCHOLAR FELT THAT IN FACT HIS INTER-
LOCUTORS HAD NO CLEAR IDEA WHAT FORM THIS REACTION WOULD

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TAKE. THERE SEEMED, MOREOVER, TO BE CERTAIN BASIC CONTRADICTIONS IN SOVIET ASSESSMENTS OF THE CURRENT SITUATION IN LEBANON. ON THE ONE HAND, THE ACADEMIC HEARD REPEATED EXPRESSIONS OF CONCERN OVER THE POSSIBILITY OF A U. S. -SOVIET CLASH OVER LEBANON; ON THE OTHER, THE SOVIETS SEEMED TO DERIVE "SATISFACTION" FROM THE PRESENCE OF U. S. MARINE "HOSTAGES" IN LEBANON, WHICH WAS PERCEIVED AS GENERATING ARAB ENMITY WITH THE U. S. AND, ULTIMATELY, CREATING DOMESTIC POLITICAL PROBLEMS FOR THE PRESIDENT.

10. THE SCHOLAR WAS TOLD THAT ANDROPOV HAD RECENTLY WRITTEN A MEMORANDUM ADDRESSED TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE INTERNATIONAL DEPARTMENT IN WHICH HE REPORTEDLY ASSERTED THAT SOVIET POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST WAS TOO PASSIVE AND REACTIVE AND DIRECTED THAT THE SOVIET UNION TAKE THE INITIATIVE. WHETHER ANDROPOV HAD IN MIND DIPLOMATIC OR MILITARY ACTIONS WAS UNCLEAR. THE SCHOLAR MAINTAINED THAT, ON A MORE GENERAL PLANE, THE GENERAL SECRETARY WAS INCREASINGLY SEEKING TO TAKE CONTROL OVER FOREIGN POLICY AND TO UNDERMINE GROMYKO.

11. THE AMBASSADOR SUGGESTED THREE FACTORS WHICH HE THOUGHT COULD ACCOUNT FOR THE CHANGE IN THE ATMOSPHERE AND ATTITUDES WHICH THE ACADEMIC HAD ENCOUNTERED HERE: THE TURN FOR THE WORSE IN ANDROPOV'S HEALTH, THE KAL INCIDENT, AND THE REALITY OF THE INF DEPLOYMENTS. THE ACADEMIC AGREED WITH THIS ASSESSMENT, LAYING PARTICULAR STRESS ON THE FIRST FACTOR. THERE HAD BEEN A GREAT SENSE OF CONFIDENCE AMONGST HIS INTERLOCUTORS HALF A YEAR AGO, HE SAID, A SENSE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF POSITIVE CHANGE BECAUSE OF THE UNITY FORGED BY A STRONG LEADER. ANDROPOV'S ABSENCE FROM THE SCENE FOR THE

LAST FEW MONTHS HAD PERMITTED DIFFERENCES TO EMERGE AND HAD GENERATED A SENSE OF LEADERLESSNESS. WHETHER ANDROPOV COULD AGAIN ASSERT HIMSELF AS THE STRONG LEADER WHOM ALL BELIEVED WAS NECESSARY AND BEHIND WHOM ALL COULD UNITE WAS FOR THE MOMENT PROBLEMATICAL.

ANDROPOV'S HEALTH

12. THE SCHOLAR'S CONTACTS INDICATED THAT THE GENERAL SECRETARY HAD UNDERGONE AN OPERATION (THE DATE AND NATURE OF WHICH WERE NOT SPECIFIED) AND HAD BEEN
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 03 OF 04 MOSCOW 15409

EXDIS

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, ECON, PINR, UR
SUBJECT: AMERICAN ACADEMIC ON SOVIET FOREIGN AND
-- DOMESTIC POLICY

ORDERED TO REST FOR AT LEAST FOUR OR FIVE WEEKS. WHILE
RECUPERATING AT HIS DACHA, HOWEVER, MAJOR DECISIONS
HAD BEEN SUBMITTED TO HIM AND RESOLUTIONS HAD BEEN
WRITTEN UNDER HIS DIRECTION. DURING THIS RECUPERATIVE
PERIOD, USTINOV HAD SERVED AS ANDROPOV'S STAND-IN;
CHERNENKO HAD BEEN COMPLETELY BYPASSED. ANDROPOV
HAD CONTINUED TO MEET WITH SENIOR FIGURES INDIVIDUALLY
WHEN HE HAD BEEN UNABLE TO ATTEND POLITBURO MEETINGS.
(THE PERIOD OF TIME DURING WHICH ANDROPOV HAD NOT
ATTENDED THESE MEETINGS WAS UNCLEAR.)

13. AT ANY RATE, ACCORDING TO THE ACADEMIC, ANDROPOV
WAS NOW BACK AT WORK ALTHOUGH UNDER STRICT ORDERS TO
LIMIT HIS SCHEDULE. THE SCHOLAR HAD BEEN TOLD THAT THE
GENERAL SECRETARY WORKS CURRENTLY EIGHT HOURS A DAY WITH
A BREAK FOR A MID-DAY REST. (COMMENT: THIS SCHEDULE
WOULD ACCORD WITH THE PATTERN OF ANDROPOV'S MOTORCADE
MOVEMENTS.) WEEKENDS WERE TO BE RESERVED FOR REST.

OPPOSITION TO ANDROPOV

14. THE SCHOLAR IS CONVINCED THAT THERE ARE SIGNIFICANT
DIFFERENCES WITHIN THE LEADERSHIP (HE DID NOT PROVIDE
ANY ELABORATION) AND THAT OPPOSITION TO ANDROPOV'S
EFFORTS AT ECONOMIC REVIVAL IS CENTERED IN THE ECONOMIC
BUREAUCRACY AND IN MID-LEVEL PARTY ORGANS AT THE RAIION
(DISTRICT) LEVEL. THE SCHOLAR CHARACTERIZED THE RAIKOM
SECRETARIES, TYPICALLY MEN IN THEIR 30'S AND 40'S, AS
INTENSE PATRIOTS--EVEN CHAUVINISTS--WHO BELIEVED THAT
THE COUNTRY SHOULD BE MOBILIZED TO MEET THE CHALLENGE
FROM THE U. S. THEY WERE NOT ACTIVE SUPPORTERS OF
ECONOMIC CHANGE. "IT WAS ANYBODY'S GUESS" WHETHER
ANDROPOV'S RETURN TO A MORE ACTIVE ROLE WOULD RESULT
IN THE ELIMINATION OR ISOLATION OF THIS OPPOSITION TO
CHANGE, BUT THE SCHOLAR FELT SURE THAT ONE OF HIS
GENERAL SECRETARY'S GOALS WILL BE TO UNDERTAKE A
"CLEANING-OUT." HE BELIEVED THAT THERE WOULD SOON BE
MAJOR PERSONNEL CHANGES IN THE MINISTRIES AND AT LOWER
PARTY LEVELS, AND SAID THAT PROMOTIONS INTO THE POLITBURO
MIGHT BE ANNOUNCED AT THE UPCOMING PLENUM. (COMMENT:
PRESS COVERAGE OF THE ONGOING PARTY-ELECTION CAMPAIGN

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HAS INDEED BEEN SHARPLY CRITICAL OF THE PERFORMANCE OF NUMEROUS DISTRICT LEVEL ORGANIZATIONS. WHILE THE CAMPAIGN HAS NOW REACHED THE OBLAST LEVEL, DISTRICT LEVEL OFFICIALS ARE STILL BEING SINGLED OUT FOR SHORTCOMINGS.)

15. THE SCHOLAR SAID THAT HE HAD HEARD FROM TWO SOURCES THAT ANDROPOV HAD SENT A HARD-HITTING LETTER TO ALL PARTY ORGANIZATIONS IN OCTOBER THAT DECLARED IN NO UNCERTAIN TERMS THAT THE FATHERLAND WAS IN DANGER AND UNDERScoreD THE NECESSITY OF REVIVING AND REINVIGORATING THE SOVIET ECONOMY. REPORTEDLY ANDROPOV STRESSED THAT HE WAS NOT EXAGGERATING THE EXTERNAL DANGER TO THE NATION, AND HE WARNED THAT THE TIME HAD PASSED WHEN A "FORMALISTIC" APPROACH TOWARD CHANGES MANDATED BY THE CENTER WOULD BE TOLERATED AND THAT THOSE WHO DID NOT SUPPORT THESE CHANGES ASSIDUOUSLY WOULD BE DEALT WITH RUTHLESSLY. (COMMENT: WE HAVE RECENTLY HEARD A SIMILAR REPORT FROM A CHINESE DIPLOMAT, WHO SPECULATED THAT THE INTENT OF THE LETTER HAD BEEN TO PREPARE THE COUNTRY FOR AN INCREASED DEFENSE BURDEN.)

ECONOMIC REFORM

16. WHILE SOVIET CONTACTS EVINced A CONTINUED RECOGNITION THAT MAJOR ECONOMIC CHANGES WERE ESSENTIAL, THE SCHOLAR DETECTED A MARKEDLY DECREASED CONVICTION THAT SUCH CHANGES COULD BE SUCCESSFULLY IMPLEMENTED. THE SCHOLAR HIMSELF WAS PESSIMISTIC THAT CURRENT EFFORTS WOULD MAKE AN APPRECIABLE DENT IN A SYSTEM STILL GOVERNED BY AN UNREAL PRICING MECHANISM AND A LACK OF MEANINGFUL MATERIAL INCENTIVES. THERE SEEMED TO BE NO WAY, HE ASSERTED, OF BREAKING THE VICIOUS PRODUCTIVITY/INCENTIVES CIRCLE. WHILE THE SOON-TO-BE INTRODUCED EXPERIMENT IN INCREASED ENTERPRISE AUTONOMY DID INDEED REPRESENT THE MOST MEANINGFUL STEP TAKEN IN THE SPHERE OF ECONOMIC CHANGE SINCE THE LATE 60'S, IT WAS ULTIMATELY DOOMED TO FAILURE. IT WAS TYPICAL OF PREVIOUS EFFORTS AT ECONOMIC CHANGE IN THAT IT WAS LIMITED IN APPLICATION AND INCREMENTAL IN APPROACH. AS IT STOOD, IT WAS LIKELY TO BE ABSORBED AND THUS SMOTHERED WITHIN THE SYSTEM EVEN IF THE EXPERIMENT PRODUCED POSITIVE RESULTS WITHIN THE FIVE MINISTRIES WHERE IT IS TO GET UNDERWAY NEXT JANUARY. THE SCHOLAR
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 04 OF 04 MOSCOW 15409

EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, ECON, PINR, UR
SUBJECT: AMERICAN ACADEMIC ON SOVIET FOREIGN AND
-- DOMESTIC POLICY
CITED ONE ECONOMIC OFFICIAL WHO CONCURRED WITH HIS OWN
PESSIMISTIC ASSESSMENT OF THE EXPERIMENT'S LIKELIHOOD
OF HAVING A MEASURABLE IMPACT ON THE ECONOMY AS A WHOLE.

17. THE ACADEMIC COMMENTED THAT THE MILITARY APPEARS TO HAVE SOMETHING OF AN AMBIVALENT ATTITUDE TOWARDS ECONOMIC CHANGE. ON THE ONE HAND, THEY ARE WORRIED ABOUT THE WEAKNESS OF THE CIVILIAN ECONOMY AND ARE ESPECIALLY CONCERNED ABOUT SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS. THIS IMPELS THEM TO SUPPORT CHANGE ON A FAIRLY MAJOR SCALE. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE MILITARY RECOGNIZE THAT THE PROCESS OF CHANGE WILL YIELD LITTLE IMMEDIATE BENEFITS FOR THEM AND MAY EVEN CONSTRICT THEIR SHARE OF THE RESOURCES PIE. ONE THING IS CERTAIN-- THE MILITARY STRONGLY BACK THE ANDROPOV DRIVE FOR GREATER WORK DISCIPLINE.

18. IN RESPONSE TO A QUERY ON RYZHKOV (WHOM THE SCHOLAR DID NOT SEE ON THIS TRIP), THE SCHOLAR SAID THAT HE REMAINED ACTIVE AS HEAD OF THE CC'S ECONOMICS DEPARTMENT, WHICH WAS CONCENTRATING ON THE STRATEGIC ECONOMIC ISSUES AS DISTINCT FROM DAY-TO-DAY OPERATIONAL ISSUES. THE ACADEMIC REFERRED TO HIS EARLIER UNDERSTANDING THAT THIS NEW DEPARTMENT WOULD SUPERSEDE THE OTHER CC ECONOMIC DEPARTMENTS (REF MOSCOW 5473) AS NO LONGER CURRENT. WHILE THERE WOULD BE NO ACROSS-THE-BOARD ABOLITION OF THE OTHER ECONOMIC DEPARTMENTS OF THE CC AS HE REPORTED IN MAY, SEVERAL OF THEM MAY BE FUSED. IN ANY EVENT, THE ECONOMICS DEPARTMENT HEADED BY RYZHKOV IS CLEARLY IN CHARGE OF LONG-TERM STRATEGIC THINKING ON THE ECONOMY.

19. THE SCHOLAR HAD HEARD LAST MAY THAT A NEW STAFF WOULD BE CREATED FOR THE DEFENSE COUNCIL - IT WOULD BE PART OF AN NSC STAFF COMPOSED OF MILITARY OFFICERS IN MUFTI AND CIVILIANS. THE IDEA WOULD BE TO GIVE ANDROPOV A STRONGER STAFF. ON THIS TRIP THE ACADEMIC HAS HEARD THAT THIS STAFF EXISTS BUT IS NOT PLAYING A MAJOR ROLE - PERHAPS ANOTHER CASUALTY OF ANDROPOV'S ILLNESS. THE SCHOLAR EXPECTS ITS ROLE TO INCREASE, HOWEVER.

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20. THE ACADEMIC'S INTERLOCUTORS HAVE INCLUDED POLITBURO
CANDIDATE MEMBER PONOMAREV, CC INTERNATIONAL DEPARTMENT
DEPUTY CHIEF ZAGLADIN, IMEMO DIRECTOR YAKOVLEV, IUSAC
DIRECTOR ARBATOV, IEWSS DIRECTOR BOGOMOLOV AND OTHER
OFFICIALS IN ECONOMIC ORGANS AND INSTITUTES.
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