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1. passport	Copies of, 2p	ND	P6/B6
2. letter	1p, partial <i>PART</i>	11/25/00	B3
3 letter	1p, partial <i>PART</i>	11/18/00	B3
4. article	Re: USSR, 2p <i>PART</i>	7/27/83	P1/B1 B3
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	<i>~ ~ #156</i>		
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
November 25, 1983

Dear Dave:

Thank you very much for sending a copy of your remarks at the "NATO at the Crossroads" conference in Hannover. I think you put your finger squarely on the key issues, and speeches such as this before European audiences are of great assistance in clarifying the real questions and separating them from the fluff and half-truths which mark so much of the European "security" debate.

I hope to see you soon in Washington, and am keeping my fingers crossed that we can get the appointments you desire.

With warm regards,

Sincerely,



Jack F. Matlock

The Honorable
David M. Abshire
United States Permanent Representative
on the North Atlantic Council
Brussels, Belgium

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11/17



UNITED STATES PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
ON THE
NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

Brussels

November 4, 1983

OFFICIAL-INFORMAL

Dear Jack:

I thought you might be interested in receiving a copy of my remarks at a recent conference on "NATO at the Crossroads" sponsored by the Evangelische Akademie outside Hannover. The meeting was attended by about 200 people of great diversity -- government officials, scholars, journalists, housewives, students, soldiers -- many of whom were sympathetic to or actively involved in the peace movement.

In addition to my presentation which keynoted the final day, the conference also had a debate between West German Defense Minister Manfred Woerner and SPD defense specialist Egon Bahr.

I hope you find some of my ideas of interest. They certainly sparked debate at the meeting.

With best wishes,

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Dave".

David M. Abshire
Ambassador

Enclosure:
"NATO at the Crossroads"

The Honorable
Jack F. Matlock, Jr.
National Security Council
Executive Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20506

UNCLASSIFIED

NATO AT THE MORAL CROSSROADS

BROADENING THE CONSENSUS

DAVID M. ABSHIRE

U.S. Permanent Representative to the
North Atlantic Council

October 9, 1983

I want to speak today on the moral choices confronting "NATO at the Crossroads." Some three months ago, when I appeared before the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee to be confirmed for my present position, I expressed my strong belief that the public consensus supporting the alliance must be broadened. Part of this broadening involves addressing the moral issues and choices related to NATO policies that are now being debated. I believe it is high time for NATO officials to address these moral issues, and here, in this appropriate setting of the Evangelical Academy, I would like to set out my personal views.

Some people -- fortunately not too many -- have questioned the moral legitimacy of the Alliance itself. A larger number -- churchmen, former government officials, theorists, philosophers -- have challenged the legitimacy of NATO's central strategy of deterrence. Ethics and nuclear war is the most vibrant public policy issue in the churches today. Even a former

US Secretary of Defense has spoken out against current NATO strategy which he helped formulate. If these numbers were to become too great, the NATO structure could be shaken to its foundation, for to be effective in our democracies, deterrence must be credible to our people as well as to our would-be adversary -- a reality too often overlooked by diplomats and generals.

Of course, the very fact of such a moral debate reflects the fundamental values of freedom and democracy to which NATO members are committed. We are different from the states of the eastern bloc where any demonstrating that is permitted is orchestrated by the regime. Dissent has an important role in our countries, and even when we disagree with the dissenters, we are often forced to reconsider our own positions.

NATO must respond to changing circumstances. In his novel The Leopard, Giuseppe di Lampedusa wrote. "If we want things to stay as they are, things will have to change." Military history is a tragic catalogue of failures to adapt realistically to change or to avoid stereotypes and immutable mindsets.

Thus, I applaud the reexamination of NATO's future that is now underway. But I am saying that all points of view must be considered, and those pro-alliance people like myself too often have left the moral debate to the critics of NATO and its strategy. What is truly important is to engage people in the process

of debate, exchange and the search for common ground. While there were things in the American Catholic Bishops' Pastoral letter with which I disagreed, I salute the fact that they went through a process of examination involving three drafts, scores of witnesses and considerable debate. Their first draft which I personally feel would have aborted our ability to defend Europe if it had become national policy, was far different from their third draft -- showing how we can benefit from the process of debate.

The Catholic Bishops' letter and the role of the Christian churches in general in the reexamination of our security needs has itself been the subject of considerable debate. I believe that it is quite appropriate for the churches to be active in addressing the dangers of nuclear war. The advent of nuclear weapons represents a quantum jump in mankind's ability to destroy itself. But the churches' examination of such awful dilemmas must be evenhanded and careful to look at the total problem, not paralyzed by the horrors that must be confronted. When the World Council of Churches, for example, talks about the dangers of nuclear war and criticizes Western policy while totally avoiding analysis of the Soviet Union, one can doubt the moral responsibility of their position. I say this despite the fact that I think the Council has contributed greatly to the cause of ecumenism where it has exercised the very kind of care and sensitivity it so often lacks on political questions.

In our debates, we have also heard considerable discussion about peace movements. Of course, honest opinion can differ on what constitutes the most effective movement for peace. In a recent speech to the Canadian Parliament, Margaret Thatcher called NATO the greatest peace movement in history. To my mind, peace movements, properly and reasonably constructed, can bolster stability and certainty in the turbulent 1980s. This would be especially true if they were allowed in the Soviet Union. Such movements could also point to the conditions that bring about a just peace, and remind people of the conditions that sparked two devastating wars in this century. If responsibly led, they can stimulate debate, not drown it out.

Peace movements, however, that are improperly constructed, emotional, and one-sided, or violent, could foster just that instability and miscalculation that served as the catalysts of wars past and could help create an uncertain climate that could ignite World War III. One can question, for example, whether those who resolved at Oxford in the 1930s not to fight for king and country contributed to peace and the deterrence of World War II, any more than those isolationists in the US Congress who blocked fortifications of certain key islands in the Pacific helped deter the attack on Pearl Harbor. In both cases, potential adversaries formed certain impressions that led them to miscalculate. The intention of supporting peace -- whether in

isolationist, neutralist, or anti-alliance movements-- must not be separated from the dynamics of what actually happens. Consequences as well as intentions must be weighed in our judgments about the morality of certain policies.

I am also saying that when we consider the moral dimension of today's critical issues, we are dealing with great ambiguities and seldom with absolutes. Neither the defenders nor the critics of NATO have absolute truth.

Moral judgments can often be expressed in terms of moral absolutes when dealing with the lives of individuals. Certainly, even such judgments can degenerate into the kind of hypocritical moralism that Jesus Himself criticized in the Pharisees. Nevertheless, there were the Ten Commandments, the Hammurabic Code, and there is today a body of law addressing the rights of man and defining the moral boundaries of individual conduct.

In the lives of nations, as distinguished from the lives of men, however, clear moral choice is more difficult and ambiguous. This dilemma was identified by Reinhold Niebuhr in the very title of his classic book Moral Man and Immoral Society. Niebuhr wrote of the combination of "spiritual and brutal elements of human life," and made the following important point:

"The perennial tragedy of human history is that those who cultivate the spiritual elements usually do so by divorcing

themselves from or misunderstanding the problems of collective man, where the brutal elements are most obvious. The problems therefore remain unsolved, and force clashes with force, with nothing to mitigate the brutalities or eliminate the futilities of the social struggle."

The application of absolute moral standards becomes much more complicated when treating conflicts within societies, within nations, and particularly among nations. In foreign and security policy, only partial solutions are possible; one must constantly strike unsatisfactory balances -- between compromise and security, between order and progress.

Most leaders of the Church, I am happy to say, recognize this ambiguity in public policy judgments. John Roach, Catholic Bishop of St. Paul and Minneapolis and President of the US Bishops Conference since 1980, has made the point that "ambiguity is a legitimate and treasured part of our moral tradition." This ambiguity leads us to the problem of the nature and maintenance of peace.

II. The Nature of Peace: Pax or Shalom? Or Both?

The word "peace" means different things to different people. Part of the problem in the "peace" debate and the "peace" movement is that there is too little discussion of what peace is, how it has been manifested in history, and how we can attain it.

In April of this year, I participated in the Episcopal Church's National Conference on Peacemaking where Professor Allen Parrent identified two traditional concepts of the nature of peace, one reflected in the Latin word "pax" and the other in the Hebrew word "shalom."

The word "shalom" connotes a sense of peace that relates to wholeness and health, security and prosperity, righteousness and justice in their fullest sense. As Parrent says, "It is a relationship involving self, fellow creatures, the creation and God."

Peace in the sense of "pax" connotes the peace of the ordered political community that makes living together possible. It has to do with justice, compromise, prudence and the balance of power. Peace in this sense suggests an adequate, if perhaps only temporary balance between order and liberty in the human community.

While distinct, these two understandings of peace are inseparable. Our concept of peace -- an integration of both pax and shalom -- implies much more than the absence of war. Grounded in a profound regard for the sanctity of the individual and a deep sense of obligation to our neighbors and society, the pursuit of peace is a process. It involves growth, maturity, commitment and will. It is an on-going effort to create conditions

in which individuals and societies can flourish, in which there are recognized limitations on the use of force, and in which there is a strong sense of proportion between ends and means.

Our concept of peace also includes a strong sense of human justice, embodied in civic freedom and a political order that safeguards the individual against others and against the state. St. Augustine of Hippo described peace as "the tranquility of order." For true peace that order must be moral as well as physical. We must not be deluded that there is peace of any kind today in a country like Poland. In that unfortunate nation the moral dimension of public order has been destroyed, leaving only silence in the streets -- what William Stanmeyer calls "the counterfeit tranquility of immoral order." In a country where the free expression of working people is brutally repressed, where injustice is commonplace, there is no peace.

We must recognize that true peace -- a peace that entails strong elements of justice and freedom -- at times must be defended. St. Augustine was one of the first church leaders to struggle with this problem in his mammoth work, The City of God. The perfection of the city of God is not yet with us, he argues, and so the city of man -- in his case, Rome -- deserves protection despite its imperfections. And to return to my theme, Western civilization with all that it has provided to mankind and

despite its faults deserves to be protected. The preservation of our civilization has moral legitimacy.

III. The Evil of War in the Nuclear Age and the Available Choices.

NATO is dedicated to the preservation of peace because we know all too well the abomination of war in this century. The loss of 65 million lives in two catastrophic conflicts stands as a tragic testimonial to the horrors of war. The advent of nuclear weapons has only magnified the dread. They have created the prospect of death and suffering of such horrific proportions that the most fundamental task in the world today is to ensure that nuclear war does not occur.

How can we ensure peace, prevent nuclear war and at what cost? The answer does not rest in absolute pronouncements that are not likely to work, but in establishing a process of real deterrence of nuclear war. We will be judged as much by our results as our intentions.

Our problem -- and the basic moral ambiguity we must confront -- is that all of our options are unattractive; there is no good and pure choice. All of our options involve some element of moral risk and the possibility of pain and suffering for our peoples. What are some of those options?

One or more younger theologians have argued that, faced with the prospect of nuclear war, nothing is better than peace

at any price, under any circumstances, and that "preemptive" surrender is in order.

I have grave difficulties with this position. Advocates of this option speak as if our only choice is between surrender or nuclear war. That ignores process; it is a false choice. Clearly the answer to those who ask "better Red or dead" is "neither."

Another alternative offered is simply non-violent resistance, a policy championed by the heroic Martin Luther King and the historic Mahatma Gandhi. Both King and Gandhi were tremendously brave men whose unique form of courage left a lasting imprint on their nations' histories. But Martin Luther King's America and Gandhi's British-ruled India are far different from today's Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Poland or East Germany. Is it realistic to imagine that King or Gandhi would enjoy such success in a country that is neither democratic like the United States nor marked with decolonizing Britain's ultimate conscience of law and justice? Gandhi would be whisked away to a psychiatric ward. King would be shipped quietly to a gulag. Pravda would take note of neither event. Lack of cooperation by the peoples conquered by Hitler and Stalin may have made life more difficult for the conquerors, but it gave no real force or hope for turning back the newly imposed totalitarian rule. I believe there is an important lesson in that experience.

Another approach for avoiding the nuclear dilemma has been offered by Jonathan Schell in his moving book The Fate of the Earth. At the conclusion of his essay, Schell calls for a freeze in deploying nuclear weapons, a 50% cut in nuclear arms and, eventually, complete nuclear and conventional disarmament and the replacement of today's warring sovereign states with a new political system for resolving international disputes.

Schell joins many historical figures in conceiving a world that mankind has dreamed of and hoped for. But his examination of the ultimate problem is hardly as profound as that of earlier scholars and statesmen in search of peace. In his essay "Toward the Present and Future Peace of Europe," the Quaker William Penn envisioned a Parliament of Nations and an international police force to keep the peace. The philosopher Immanuel Kant in Perpetual Peace in 1795 appealed to reason and prudence to create a peaceful world order. The Kellogg-Briand treaties renounced war as an instrument of national policy only 12 years before this century's second violent cataclysm.

Schell's prescriptions for total disarmament, as earlier proposals for universal systems, would be marvelous if they could be achieved. But there is no way to disinvent nuclear weapons or the nation-state. Knowledge cannot be erased. Schell's naivete is far from unique. The great industrialist Andrew Carnegie ini-

tially felt he needed to fund his Endowment for Peace for only 4 years, in which time a lasting peace could surely be established. Meanwhile World War I came to its climax. If international conflict was complicated then, how much more complex is it in the nuclear age.

A very different approach from that of Jonathan Schell is taken in the realistic new book entitled Living with Nuclear Weapons, prepared by some of America's best thinkers at Harvard University. Derek Bok, President of Harvard, asked these highly experienced and profoundly thoughtful men to "supply the public... with an objective account of the basic facts about nuclear arms control" and to provide "a credible body of knowledge and analysis with which to ... arrive at a thoughtful informed opinion." They have succeeded admirably. In this excellent analysis, the Harvard Nuclear Study Group argues:

"It is widely assumed that changes in the numbers of weapons in the superpower arsenals -- either upward or downward -- are the major determinants of the risks of war. Sheer numbers, however, matter far less than factors such as the vulnerability of weapons, the credibility of commitments to allies, and imbalances in conventional forces."

The total elimination of nuclear weapons would indeed make the world a safer place. But this, too, is an absolute solu-

tion in a world where absolutes rarely apply. As Bishop John O'Connor, a member of the committee that drafted the American Bishops' Pastoral Letter, has commented, "An individual in conscience can say, 'I will in no way involve myself with nuclear weapons.' A state cannot do this."

The answer to our nuclear dilemma does not lie in trying to banish all nuclear weapons, which is impossible. As St. Augustine taught, a Christian who wants to live in this world must seek to deal with power, not run away from it or surrender to it. For these reasons, he addressed the problems of a just defense. The solution to our problem rests in the process of controlling nuclear weapons, creating strategic and tactical stability, and reducing their numbers and the likelihood of their use through disarmament measures that are mutual, equitable and verifiable. It also includes ensuring that nobody has enough nuclear weapons of a given kind to think they can be used. All must agree that nuclear weapons must be controlled and that no one can win a nuclear war. If only we and not the Soviet Union believe this, we are left in a most perilous state.

Faced with a nuclear world, our best choice is to deter nuclear war while seeking genuine, mutual and verifiable disarmament. This leaves us with the moral problems of deterrence. The threat to take human life in order to preserve it has always

been a central dilemma. Moreover, the nature of nuclear weapons --their enormous destructive power -- threatens the principles of proportionality and discrimination, the essential moral elements of the Christian ethic of war. Of course, the aim of NATO is not to fight a nuclear war, but to prevent any war.

Despite these moral dilemmas, the American Catholic Bishops, taking their lead from Pope John Paul II, have accepted the concept of deterrence, not as an end in itself but as a temporary requirement. We must do the same. Where I would differ from the Bishops' final statement is that certain types of improvements in current weapons can refine capabilities and lead to greater confidence, stability and balance, and arms reduction.

The Soviet Problem

Many critics in the West have simplified our problem by criticizing US programs while ignoring the Soviet Union, its military build-up, form of government and international conduct. Thus it is easy to talk about unilateral disarmament when one averts one's gaze from the threat. The starting point for wise choice, however, must be a study of the harsh realities of the world and an understanding of what it is that the Western Alliance is faced with deterring.

In his remarkable book, The Terrible Secret, historian Walter Laqueur outlines the predicament of a world that ignored,

and in some cases denied, the enormous tragedy of the Holocaust in Nazi Germany at the very time it was happening. Information and evidence existed but was rejected by some Christian Church leaders, Jewish leaders, publishers, journalists and diplomats. They did not want to believe it, so they did not.

Laqueur's book is a chilling reminder to those who ignore the reality of today's Soviet Union. We must face the fact directly that huge power -- including an enormous nuclear arsenal -- is wielded by men unconstrained by Judeo-Christian values or the Western sense of moral or civil law. We cannot and must not overlook the asymmetry of values of the democratic West and the Soviet Union where those few in the Kremlin, unrestrained by the norms we obey, enjoy unlimited power over the lives of their people.

This does not mean that Soviet citizens are necessarily bad, or that there is a new "Communist man" not sharing our emotions, or that even the Soviet leadership aims at war. The Russians are a great people who have produced Tolstoy, Dostoyevsky and more recently Alexander Solzhenitsyn, and some of the world's great performing artists. A religious revival is taking place despite Soviet efforts to prevent it. But the current Soviet system is built on insecurity, totalitarian control and an expansionary complex, all of which are used to justify exaggerated notions of what its own security requires.

IV. Alternative Directions for the Future

In the immediate years ahead, I do not foresee the prospect of significant change within the Soviet Union. About the turn of the century, however, the Soviets' conflict between military spending, investment and domestic spending in the face of near zero economic growth will come to a head in a new "time of troubles." The non-Russian populations will have become a majority. The communications revolution will have continued making totalitarian control of information and the suppression of ideas more difficult.

What will be the role of Western Europe and America during this critical period? Much of the answer depends on the attitudes of you, the European members of the Alliance. Several alternatives are being presented.

One is neutralism. Some people in Europe argue that a Europe aligned with neither superpower and without significant military forces would be a safer haven, less likely to be drawn into a confrontation between the superpowers. Some think security can be found in their own countries going neutral, perhaps forgetting that Belgium was neutral in 1914 and Norway in 1940. Others contend that a neutral Europe could serve as a bridge between the two superpowers, alleviating the tension between them as an honest broker.

The United States and the Soviet Union are today sometimes mentioned casually in the same breath. Some Europeans are suggesting that they are both superpowers, and superpowers are a special breed, and that breed has more in common than do the Western allies. The situations in Afghanistan and El Salvador are often found in Europe to be roughly similar. Every time this happens, an important part of the turf supporting NATO is eroded. If young people who know little about either country have any genuine uncertainty as to which society is more attractive, that turf is crumbling.

In response to those who would opt for neutralism in Europe, then, I would recommend a recent report on the future of European community by the distinguished leaders of 5 of the best research institutes here in Europe. They argue:

"Those who today advocate Europe's establishing equidistance to the superpowers and opting out of the East-West struggle have lost sight of reality: the old antagonism between repressive systems that have no respect for individual liberties and Western democracy is as pronounced as ever. The events in Poland and the harshly repressive character of various regimes in Eastern Europe provide daily evidence of this. Whatever criticisms Europeans may address to American politics

and specific policies...the American superpower is a democracy whereas the Soviet Union is not. For Europe there can be no equidistance between the superpowers. Its place is in the democratic camp..."

A second option that has been offered for Europe is that of armed independence. Those who espouse this option argue for a strong, independent, western Europe capable of providing fully for its own security.

If this option ever took hold, many Americans would, in my judgment, forget the lessons of World Wars I and II and reembrace isolationism -- or general unilateralism. My own father could never understand why we should allow ourselves to be involved in "Europe's wars." His position was not far different from Tom Paine's in justifying revolt from Britain, and George Washington's when warning about "entangling alliances" as he retired from the Presidency of the new republic. One might argue that the nuclear age rules out such an option, but others can argue that the nuclear age makes the option a greater imperative for the United States. Let me hasten to note my disagreement with this belief, but I would not want to mislead my European friends that such a development could never come about. It could come also if too many West Europeans were to resent the US role or feel there was no threat from the East to Western Europe. Then

Americans would say, "Let us tend to our own business," as my father said.

A third option has been labeled Alliance reconstruction. This option stresses reapportioning the burdens of the Alliance and the worthy objective of shifting the onus from nuclear deterrence to conventional defense. Those in Europe who stress this direction have several goals: to lessen their dependence on American nuclear force, to reduce the likelihood of nuclear war in Europe, and to secure greater flexibility to promote European interests around the world. Like former Secretary of Defense McNamara, there are some people in the United States who also favor restructuring the alliance although their reason to support this option is not the European reason. Sometimes it even means severing the US nuclear deterrent link to Western Europe.

I believe the proponents of the foregoing on both sides of the Atlantic state their argument in extreme forms that do not clarify our real choice. At the very least, while we do not want to make Europe safe for nuclear war, neither do we want to make it safe for conventional war. So-called conventional war has become increasingly lethal and can now include biological and chemical weapons. Moreover, radical schemes for reconstructing the alliance are probably not workable.

Reinforcing Extended Deterrence

There is a fourth option which I favor: I believe that it is necessary to revitalize alliance strategy and to reinforce deterrence. We have only ourselves to blame for our over-reliance on nuclear weapons. Throughout NATO's history, beginning with the failure to achieve the 1952 Lisbon force goals, alliance members have been unwilling to commit the economic resources necessary to achieve the conventional forces necessary to withstand -- and thereby deter -- a Soviet attack. Nuclear weapons were embraced partly because they provided defense on the cheap, and in NATO document MC 14/2 approved in 1957, a trip-wire strategy was adopted by the alliance.

This strategy did not pose major problems while the United States enjoyed nuclear superiority. In the 1960s, however, the Soviets began to whittle away at the American advantage -- undermining the credibility of the trip-wire strategy. This was not seen at the time as necessarily a deleterious development. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, for one, believed tensions between the superpowers would ease if the Soviet Union caught up. He proved wrong. As one of McNamara's successors, Harold Brown, observed: "When we build, the Soviet Union builds; when we don't build, the Soviet Union still builds."

In 1967 the trip-wire strategy described in MC 14/2 gave way to MC 14/3, the strategy of flexible response. The new

strategy provided for not just one alliance response to aggression -- a strategic nuclear one -- but three possible responses: direct conventional defense to defeat an attack, deliberate escalation within the theater, or a general strategic nuclear response. Conventional forces, theater nuclear forces and strategic forces became, and are today, the NATO triad on which deterrence rests.

Our problem is that we have never paid the price to implement flexible response completely. I believe that such implementation is not only a military but a deeply moral responsibility. We have not reached our full capabilities to execute flexible response at the conventional level. Weakness at one escalatory step propels one to the next step. The problem is not that the allies have stopped their common defense efforts but that the Warsaw Pact has so markedly stepped up its efforts in the last dozen years that serious gaps have developed.

Personally, I doubt if today's nuclear nervousness or the anti-nuclear movements would have developed so intensely if we had had a true flexible response strategy that had kept abreast of Soviet advances.

But flexible response remains a good strategy -- one of proportionality and legitimacy. It must be made to work. By making flexible response work we will achieve stability in

Europe. In its turn, stability will foster effective deterrence, NATO's ultimate goal. Stability and reinforced deterrence in Europe mean we can reduce our dependence on nuclear weapons and diminish our nuclear dilemma.

We can improve our capacity for flexible response in two ways:

-- First, by making all parts of the NATO triad more effective; and

--Second, through unflagging efforts to achieve verifiable and equitable arms reductions.

On all three levels of the NATO triad --conventional, theater, and strategic nuclear -- force modernization and arms control have never been more inter-related.

On the strategic nuclear level, the recommendations of the Presidential Commission on Strategic Forces -- the Scowcroft Panel -- outline a course for the modernization of US forces that emphasizes stability and verifiability. Introduction of smaller, single warhead missiles will help considerably to reduce the uncertainty and anxiety generated by current multiple-warhead systems.

Simultaneously, the United States is seeking stability on the strategic level through the START negotiations in Geneva.

During the last round, for example, we presented a draft treaty which responded to a number of concerns raised by the Soviet Union. Earlier this week President Reagan made a further proposal based on the so-called "build-down" concept which directly links arms modernization and arms reduction by eliminating more than one warhead for each new one that is introduced.

On the theater level, in 1979 NATO decided on a two-track approach. The first track is modernizing theater nuclear forces in the face of Soviet deployment of mobile, highly accurate SS-20 missiles which has continued unabated. The 351 SS-20s now deployed give Moscow an intimidating superiority that threatens the link between US strategic forces and the defense of Europe. Lacking our preferred option of a balanced, equitable and verifiable agreement, our deployment of cruise and Pershing missiles strengthens this link and helps insure that Western Europe will not become a battleground for limited nuclear war.

Finally, on the conventional level, the Soviet development of operational maneuver groups capable of rapid, offensive strikes deep into allied territory requires strong counter-measures. We now have an opportunity to improve significantly the performance of NATO's conventional forces, and thus shift the onerous nuclear decision to a much later point in conflict than is now the case. This is due to a convergence of new conceptual thinking about the battlefield of the future and creative stra-

tegy and tactics, the emergence of new technologies, and the prospects for greater allied armaments cooperation. These elements are all closely related. We can maximize the development and impact of new technology only if we foster better armaments cooperation. But new technology without new ideas about how to use it will be wasted.

The companions of these efforts are arms control and confidence-building measures. The MBFR negotiations in Vienna are important, as are crisis management measures and agreements on weapons limitations.

Sadly, there may be limits to what arms control can accomplish. It may not persuade the Soviet Union to eschew the role of force, eliminate the origins of conflict, or resolve the political problems between Moscow and Washington. Our ability to achieve arms control and disarmament surely will depend on allied unity and collective security. The basic Soviet strategy is to split the alliance and separate the United States from Europe. If the Soviets see that strategy failing, then there is a chance for genuine disarmament.

There are some in Western Europe as well as in America who simply want to opt out of this process and not be a part of this difficult effort. Some seek solace in their moral absolutes. Others will stay in the alliance but not share its risks and burdens.

Robert Runcie, Archbishop of Canterbury, identified the moral weakness in this stance when he asked: "Is there not a moral inconsistency in seeking to remain within an alliance which accepts the policy of nuclear deterrence while declining to take one's share in the means by which that policy is sustained?"

More than just morally questionable, however, the idea of alliance members choosing when to accept the fruits and duties of membership and when not to is dangerous. It creates the conditions for miscalculation and errors in judgment that could ignite conflict.

Neither World War I nor World War II was the product of a conscious decision to trigger general war. Even when Hitler invaded Poland, he thought he was setting off only a limited conflict. But prior to those wars, national commitments were unclear. The consequence of this ambiguity was misperception, miscalculation and mistaken judgments that transformed uneasy relations, destabilizing trends and intimidation into global war.

It is this kind of outcome that NATO was established to prevent. Article V of the NATO Treaty makes clear in advance that an attack on one member of the alliance will be considered an attack against all. It stands as an unambiguous commitment in peacetime to collective security in order to deter a potential conflict. If members of the alliance begin to determine their

obligations selectively, that clarity will disappear. Ambiguity and the potential for tragic miscalculation by our potential adversaries will increase.

NATO is a unique defensive alliance of democracies. Like the United Nations, it sprang from vision of a world in which conflict is no longer the last resort and final arbiter in the settlement of disputes among nations. NATO was created in the wake of the excesses of a world at war and gave hope that limitations on the use of force would be widely accepted. The NATO Treaty should be read with the UN Charter, which flatly prohibits any use of force except in self-defense. Today, the world is far different from the one in which NATO was created. But that vision remains.

CONCLUSION

In 1934 the English poet T.S. Eliot criticized his fellow human beings because they

"constantly try to escape
from the darkness outside and within
by dreaming of systems so perfect that no one
will need to be good."

We cannot escape, and a perfect system will not arrive to save us. We must be calm in crises, balanced in judgment, restrained in our differences with one another.

If will and collective commitment remain the spine of this great alliance of democracies -- NATO -- then it will remain the guarantor against intimidation, miscalculation and war.

The Alliance may not be perfect, but it is magnificent in its values and ideas, and in its dedication to peace. The ultimate strategy of NATO is a strategy for peace with freedom and justice. This surely will provide the best possible basis for broadening our consensus.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 25, 1983


Dear Dr. Fleischer:

Thank you very much for your letter of November 16 and for the photographs taken at the meeting October 24.

It was a great honor for me to address the meeting, and to receive the Masaryk Award. Thank you for your many efforts to keep knowledge of events in Czechoslovakia in the public eye, and friends of Czechoslovakia organized to help.

Rebecca joins me in sending our very best wishes to you and your associates.

Sincerely,



Jack F. Matlock

Dr. Vladimir Fleischer
5921 33rd Street, N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20015



Liberty
For All

Czechoslovak National Council

A Non-Profit Organization Founded in 1918
Devoted to Promote Co-operation of All Peoples for the
Preservation of Democratic Freedom

of America

November 16, 1983

Washington Chapter
President

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

On behalf of the Joint Organizing Committee I would like to express our gratitude for your participation in the anniversary of the founding of the Czechoslovak state 65 years ago.

Your speech was very well received and proved again your deep understanding of the Central European affairs. It also showed us your sincere feelings for the people of Czechoslovakia.

Enclosed are some pictures which were taken during the evening. Hope you will enjoy them.

With sincere regards to you and Mrs. Matlock,

I am yours,

Vladimir Fleischer

Dr. Vladimir Fleischer
5921-33 St. N.W.
Washington D.C. 20015

Encl. a/s

COMPUTER DISK TRANSFER SHEET

RONALD REAGAN LIBRARY

Collection: Jack Matlock

Series: _____

File Folder Title: Matlock Chron - November 1983 [3 of 4]

The following material was withdrawn from this segment of the collection and transferred to a separate parallel file for preservation purposes.

Description:

Snapshots, Jack Matlock w/ members of
Czechoslovak National Council, Jack Matlock
delivering speech

9 color, 3 B/W

Transferred by: JAS

Date: 10/19/00

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
November 25, 1983

Dear Dick:

Thanks for your letter of November 14 regarding Alain Besançon's visa difficulty. I am making inquiries at the State Department.

If my memory serves--from a couple of decades back when I worked on visas--the double "i" is a statutory requirement. It simply indicates that the person was once a member of a proscribed organization, but has since been officially granted "defector" status--which, in the case of the CP, requires at least five years in active opposition. "Defector status" is granted only with exhaustive documentation, and should involve no disability in the eyes of those officials who know what it means.

However, I will ask the State Department to look into the matter to see if something can be done. Also, if he can be more specific about the difficulties it has caused, we could take up the problem directly with INS.

I'm sorry to have missed you when you were in Washington recently. I learned you were here only after you had left. I hope we'll have better luck next time. (I enjoyed your comments in the "Crisis Game," by the way--very much to the point.)

With best regards,

Sincerely,



Jack F. Matlock

Dr. Richard Pipes
Harvard University
Department of History
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY

CAMBRIDGE, MASS. 02138

(617) 495-2556/2545

11/7

ROBINSON HALL

November 14, 1983

Ambassador Jack Matlock
National Security Council
Old Executive Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20506

Dear Jack:

I wonder if I can enlist your support in a minor but important matter that concerns my friend Alain Besançon. I am sure you know Besançon, if not personally, then from his work. I consider him to be an outstanding student of Soviet affairs-- he more or less predicted Andropov succeeding Brezhnev as long ago as 1976! As a young man, he had belonged for a short time to the Communist Party, and this apparently causes him continuous troubles with obtaining an American visa. He asks if the double 'i' which appears on his visas and causes him difficulties could be removed. Any assistance in this matter will be very much appreciated.

Yours sincerely,



Richard Pipes

RP/nh

ALAIN BESANÇON

27, RUE DE BOURGOGNE
75007 PARIS

Paris, October 19th, 1983

Professor Richard Pipes
Harvard University

Dear Richard,

You very kindly accepted to help me in my visa difficulties. The problem is : is it possible to remove from my visa the double i (ii) that apparently is considered as an infamous mark at any american consulate and prevents me from obtaining a quick and decent entry in your country.

Needless to say how I am grateful for anything you try, successfully or not.

With kindest regards

Alain Besançon

enclosed : - a curriculum vitae

-the file of my application for a "defector status"

- a reprography of my visas on my passport.

Alain Besançon . Curriculum vitae

Born in Paris, France, on April 25th , 1932

Married, 4 children

Degree from the Institut d'études politiques , Paris, 1952

M.A. (History), Sorbonne, 1954

"agregation d'histoire " , 1957

Docteur en histoire, (Sorbonne), 1967

Docteur ès lettres (doctorat d'Etat), 1977

Attaché de recherches au Centre National de la Recherche
Scientifique, 1959-63

Maître assistant, then Directeur d'études (=full professor)
at l'Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales. Paris,
1963-1983

Research Associate, Columbia University, New York, 1964

Visiting Professor, Rochester University, Rochester, N.Y. 1968

Visiting Scholar, Wilson Center, Kennan Institute, Washington
D.C., 1979

Visiting Scholar, Hoover Institution, Stanford, Ca, 1983.

He is the author of

Le Tsarévitch immolé, Paris, 1967

Histoire et expérience du moi, Paris, 1971 (translated into
Italian)

Education et société en Russie, Paris, 1974

Etre russe au XIXème siècle, Paris, 1974

Court traité de soviétologie à l'usage des autorités civiles,
militaires et religieuses , Paris, 1976, (translated into twelve
languages).

La Confusion des langues, Paris, 1978, (translated into italian
and spanish)

Les Origines intellectuelles du léninisme, Paris, 1977, (trans-
lated into english, spanish, italian and greek languages)

Présent soviétique et passé russe, Paris, 1980.

Anatomie d'un spectre, Paris, 1981 (translated into japanese,
portuguese and italian languages)

His more than 100 scholarly papers have been published in France,
Italy, Germany, Poland (samizdat), Great Britain and United
States, notably in Daedalus, Journal of Contemporary History,
Encounter, Survey, Commentary, Policy review.

ÉCOLE PRATIQUE DES HAUTES ÉTUDES

VI^e SECTION - SCIENCES ÉCONOMIQUES ET SOCIALES

SORBONNE

PARIS. LE


June 11

19 75

Visa Unit
American Consulate
PARIS
and to whom it may concern

I, Alain Besançon, residing at 27 rue de Bourgogne, Paris, 75007, France, since 1954, born on April 25, 1932 at Paris, France, a citizen of France, state and declare the following :

- 1) I have been a member of the french communist party from 1951 to 1956. Still beeing a student I defected at the age of 24. During my membership I never occupied any responsible position. I never wrote nor published anything in a communist paper of journal, nor anything that supports the policy of this party.
- 2) Since 1956 I have not been associated with any political party nor with any communist-controlled union.
- 3) As a historian of Russia I published several books and papers that establish a clear opposition to the doctrine, program, principles of ideology of such party and of the soviet regime.
- 5) Humanly and intellectually I am in debt to the United States where I studied, lectured and taught several times, with pleasure and profit. I intend to do so in the future.
- 6) Therefore I apply to have my visa inegibility removed under Section 212(a)(28)(I)(ii) of the Immigration Nationality Act.



Alain Besançon
sous-directeur d'Etudes.



EMBASSY
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Office of Visa Services
2, rue Saint-Florentin
75042 Paris Cedex 01


December 1, 1975

Mr. Alain Jules Besancon
27, rue de Bourgogne
Paris 7, France

Dear Mr. Besancon:

The Department of State has arrived at a favorable decision on your application for Defector Status. You may apply for a regular visa at anytime for travel to the United States. At the time of your next visa application, please bring your passport to my office (room 34, Visa Section).

Sincerely,



James F. Myrick
American Consul

COLLÈGE

DE

FRANCE

CHAIRE

DE SOCIOLOGIE

DE LA CIVILISATION MODERNE

Paris, le

16 MAI 1975

To whom it may concern

I have known Alain BESANCON for twenty years. He has been in the past a member of the communiste party, but for the last twenty years after his stay in Moscow, He has been among the french intellectuals one of the most outspoken fighter against any form of totalitarianism, one of the most eloquents defenders of freedom.

Very few of my colleagues of the University are so clearly aware of the fundamental issues of the politics of our time and more devoted to the values of the West.

He is a very intimate friend of mine and I have a total confidence in his honesty and reliability.

Ray

Raymond ARON
Professor at the Collège de France



DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY

BERKELEY, CALIFORNIA 94720

May 27, 1975

AFFIDAVIT

Visa Unit
American Consulate
Paris, France

Dear Sir:

I am writing with reference to the application of Mr. Alain Besançon, of 27 rue de Bourgogne, Paris 7^e, to have his visa ineligibility removed under Section 212 (a) (28) (I) (ii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

My name is Martin E. Malia and my permanent address is 2668 Shasta Rd., Berkeley, Calif., 94708. I was born on March 14, 1924, at Springfield, Mass., USA. For the past five years---and more---I have resided at the above address, with two temporary exceptions: From Aug., 1970 to Aug., 1971, I lived at 83 Av. Denfert-Rochereau, Paris 14^e, and from Jan. 1974 to Sept. 1974, at 4 rue de Chevreuse, Paris, 6^e. I have a permanent appointment as a full Professor of History at the University of California, Berkeley, and at regular intervals I teach as a Directeur d'Etudes Associé (visiting professor) at the Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes (6e section), Paris, which explains the two Parisian stays noted above.

I have known Mr. Alain Besançon for some twelve or more years. I first became acquainted with him through mutual friends in Paris; then I got to know him better, both personally and through his works, as a co-worker in the field of Russian history; and, finally, in the course of three year-long stays in Paris, at the Ecole Pratique, where we often taught together in the same course, I have come to be a close personal friend.

As a matter of record, Mr. Besançon was a member of the French Communist Party from 1951 to 1956 (i.e., until Khrushchev's destalinization and the Hungarian revolt). This is now almost twenty years ago. Moreover, Mr. Besançon was only nineteen when he joined the CP and twenty-four when he left. In other words, his involvement with Communism was of the order of a youthful indiscretion rather than of a mature and enduring commitment.

Since Mr. Besançon left the CP he has been a consistent and outspoken defender of the Western European and American tradition of constitutional democracy. At the same time, he has developed into an increasingly perceptive,

Visa Unit
American Consulate
May 27, 1975
Page 2

eloquent, and active critic of Marxist-Leninist totalitarianism and, after May '68, of the Marxist New Left (gauchisme) as well. In other words, he did not simply leave the CP; he has made it a part of his professional work in Russian history and of his activity as an intellectual and writer to point out both the ideological errors and the disasterous practical consequences of the Marxist-Leninist tradition. This is apparent in his teaching at the Ecole Pratique---and I have often heard him speak there. This is apparent also in his scholarly work on Russian history, for instance in his recently published book on the Russian radical intelligentsia of the 1860s. And it is apparent, above all, in his more journalistic endeavors---as, for example, a review of Solzhenitsyn in Le Figaro for April 18, 1975, and especially a whole series of articles, book reviews, etc. on Russia and Communism, in the magazine Contrepoint, which is presently the most prominent and the best anti-Marxist periodical in France (roughly comparable to the English-language Encounter).

In short, it would be difficult to find in the field of Russian history, in any country, a more penetrating, effective, and tireless critic of Communism than Mr. Besançon. Indeed, I would not hesitate to say that he is far more unequivocal and forceful on this subject than a fair number of my American colleagues in the same field.

Sincerely,

Martin E. Malia

Martin E. Malia
Professor of History

kec

State of California

County of Alameda


} SS.

On this the 28th day of May 1975, before me,

Craig R. Long
the undersigned Notary Public, personally appeared
Martin E. Malia

known to me to be the person(s) whose name(s) is subscribed to the within instrument and acknowledged that he executed the same for the purposes therein contained.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I hereunto set my hand and official seal.



Craig R. Long

May 20th, 1975

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

I, Marc Raeff, residing at 479 Knickerbocker Road, Tenafly, New Jersey, C7670, since 1962, born on 28 July 1923, Moscow (Russia a citizen of the United States since 1943 (US District Court of Massachusetts, 9 August 1943, Certif. No. 5871593), state and declare the following:


I have known Professor Alain Besançon since the Spring of 1961, first as a graduate student at the Sorbonne, then as a visiting research associate of Columbia University in 1964 where he participated in my seminar on Russian intellectual history, and since then as a close personal friend and professional colleague. The personal friendship is of such nature as to have our older children stay at each other's houses throughout the summer of 1973.

Throughout the period of our association I have known Mr. A. Besançon as a determined opponent of communism under all forms - and because of his former brief party membership, a well informed, sophisticated, and effective opponent at that. In both his teaching and writings he has always strongly emphasized and defended the essential values of democracy: individual freedoms economic free choice, the primacy of human dignity and of spiritual values, high regard for the rule of law and the political processes of democracy. In recent years he has been actively engaged in his nation's political process as an articulate spokesman against communism and for the democratic and liberal parties (especially during last year's electoral campaign and in his voting residence in the South of France). He is also a combative and effective anti-communist writer for periodicals and newspapers of wide circulation.

In his professional activities Alain Besançon has consistently aimed at sharing with students and colleagues his profound understanding of the dynamics of Russian history and the threat of Soviet communism to the heritage of Western civilization. His several books (Être russe au XIXe siècle, 1974; Education et société en Russie dans le second tiers du XIXe siècle, 1974; Le tsarévitch immolé, 1967; editing and introducing A. Amalrik's L'Union soviétique survivra-t-elle en 1984?, 1970) and numerous articles, are most persuasive and significant contributions to our knowledge of the origins and nature of the Soviet system's threat to the Western community. I can hardly think of anyone who has provided more compelling arguments and evidence against Soviet communism both as an ideology and as a political program.

Alain Besançon's scholarly work is internationally respected, so that his critical analysis and condemnation of Soviet communism reach a significant segment of opinion makers in his own country as well as the scholarly communities of Western Europe and the U.S. Enabling him to come regularly and easily to the United States would immeasurably increase the range and effectiveness of his

valuable anti-communist activities and writings.



Marc Raeff
Bakhmeteff Professor of
Russian Studies



PHILIP A. PAVONE
NOTARY PUBLIC OF NEW JERSEY
My Commission Expires April 7, 1979

CENTRE D'ÉTUDES RUSSES
DE MEUDON

15, Rue de Porto-Riche
92190 MEUDON

Tél. 626-13-38

C. C. P. Foyer St-Georges PARIS 12839-34

Affidavit

Visa Unit
American Consulate
PARIS

Dear Sir:

I am writing in support of Monsieur Alain Besançon's application for a visa.

My name is François Rouleau. I was born 28/9/1919, at Périgueux (Dordogne). My permanent address is 15 rue Porto-Riche, 92190 Meudon. In 1942 I joined the Society of Jesus and in 1952 was ordained priest of that order. In 1954, I entered the Foyer St Georges - a religious center of russian studies - and became its director during the years 62-68. My particular field of activity in the Center is history of Russian Ideas in XIX^e.

I have been acquainted with Mr Alain Besançon for some 10 years now & have known that in his youth (from the age of 19-24) he was a member of the C.P., but without ever having held a position of note, nor having ever written anything in favour of the C.P.

For several years now my particular speciality in Russian Ideas has hallowed me to regognise very thoroughly Mr Besançon position with regard of Marxism. In my opinion he is one of the few people amongst the French intellectual Catholics who has remained completely free & untouched by Marxism. His many articles in newspapers and magazines clearly emphasise his position. They are based on his penetrating studies of the C.P. and not less by his firm Christian convictions.

I may add that for me he his a friend in whom I have the greatest confidence and whose ideas inspire only the greatest admiration in that they incompact nothing but good sense into an area of intellectual confusion.

Sincerely,

François Rouleau
François Rouleau s.j.

Meudon, le 10 juin 1975.

RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 511 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
November 25, 1983

Dear Doug:

Thanks for your note of November 18 and the FBIS piece of July 27. I must have missed it last summer when I was out of town. So much for the "signal" theory!

With best regards,

Sincerely,



Jack F. Matlock



FOIA(b) (3)

Deputy Chief,
FBIS
P. O. Box 2604
Washington, D. C. 20013

DECLASSIFIED IN PART 1/22/03
NLS #155
By CVS NARA, Date 1/22/03

18 November 1983

NOTE FOR: Ambassador Matlock

SUBJECT: Soviet Greetings Messages

Your remark at Wednesday evening's panel about the Soviet letter received here commemorating the 50th anniversary of diplomatic ties reminded me of a short piece we did some months ago on Soviet greetings messages (attached). It was written to put in perspective the 4 July message Moscow sent to us this year, which as you know did not bear Andropov's name, and I thought you might find it of interest.

I enjoyed the panel and was delighted to meet your wife. Some time soon I would like to visit your office with [REDACTED] and I believe a member of the State Senior Seminar when you were at FSI, to talk for a few minutes about how you think our media analyses could be made more useful to policymakers (please don't suggest Latin rubrics—[REDACTED] might agree!).

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
Deputy Chief, [REDACTED] FBIS

DECLASSIFIED IN PART 102709502
NLS F95 014/3 #156
By CAS, NARA, Date 1/22/03

U S S R

GREETINGS MESSAGES SUGGEST EFFORT TO DEPERSONALIZE LEADERSHIP

- The Andropov leadership appears to be moving away from the past Soviet tendency to build a personality cult around the party leader. Since Andropov became general secretary official top-level greetings messages have no longer been signed by individual leaders, but instead have been issued over the names of the leading party and state organizations. This apparent bow to the principle of collectivity notwithstanding, Andropov appears to be building his personal authority much more quickly than Brezhnev did after becoming party leader.

The first message using the new protocol was issued hours after Brezhnev died on 10 November. On that day a congratulations message was sent to the president of Angola on his country's national day over the names of the CPSU Central Committee and the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet. Brezhnev had signed the previous year's message. The new protocol continued to be observed after Andropov had become general secretary on 12 November and president on 16 June. The only exception to this pattern was an 8 July message to an international film festival in Moscow that bore Andropov's signature. Andropov has also sent messages to world leaders on substantive issues and in answer to personal messages of congratulations that have not appeared in the Soviet press.

Some other Soviet leaders have also stopped personally signing messages in recent months, but the practice has not been adopted across the board and may be controversial. The change in protocol for sending messages has included Premier Tikhonov and Foreign Minister Gromyko since April. Until then both had been signing messages in their own name; now these messages are signed by the Council of Ministers or by the Foreign Ministry. Gromyko, for example, had regularly signed greetings messages to countries observing quinquennial anniversaries of their relations with the USSR. The last such message from him--sent to Burma--was reported in the 13 March IZVESTIYA. However, on the next such occasion, the anniversary of Ethiopia's establishment of relations with the USSR, the 22 April IZVESTIYA reported that the message had been sent in the name of the Foreign Ministry. Defense Minister Ustinov has continued to send messages in his own name to other defense ministers, most recently on the 26 July Cuban National Day.

- 9 -

Under Brezhnev, the pattern of signing messages appeared to reflect changes in personal political power. From the time of Khrushchev's ouster (October 1964) until the early 1970's greetings messages were signed by the triumvirate of top leaders: the General Secretary (Brezhnev), the Premier (Kosygin), and the President (Mikoyan until 1965 and thereafter Podgorny). Although these three leaders continued to send joint messages to their counterparts abroad, in 1973 Brezhnev also began to send personal messages on a regular basis, particularly within the Soviet Union. This new pattern emerged at the same time as Brezhnev began to be referred to as "head" of the Politburo and seemed in other ways to be building a personality cult.

Currently, Andropov appears to be well ahead of Brezhnev in accumulating the trappings of political power, suggesting that the collective signing of messages does not reflect any significant limitation of his authority. He has already been recognized as "head" of the Politburo by his colleagues, acquired the presidency and chairmanship of the Defense Council, and emerged as principal regime spokesman on foreign policy issues. Brezhnev did not emerge as principal spokesman on foreign policy until the early 1970's, was not identified publicly as chairman of the Defense Council until 1976, and was made president only in 1977.

FOIA(b) (3)

For Official Use Only

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
November 25, 1983

Dear George:

Please excuse my long delay in acknowledging your kind letter of September 20. I've been trying to dig out of a mass of correspondence which came during my hectic summer and fall of transatlantic commuting, but have fallen seriously behind.

You are most kind to invite me to Nashville again. Needless to say, I'm always eager to come when I can. Unfortunately, the next couple of months look quite impossible, but maybe things will ease up a little after January, and I'll certainly let you know if I see a clearing on the horizon.

My warmest personal regards to you and to your associates on the Nashville Committee.

Sincerely,



Jack F. Matlock

Mr. George C. Paine, II
United States Bankruptcy Court
Customs House
701 Broadway
Nashville, Tennessee 37203

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

GEORGE C. PAINE, II
U.S. BANKRUPTCY JUDGE
615 - 251 - 5587

September 20, 1983

CUSTOMS HOUSE
701 BROADWAY
NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE 37203

The Honorable Jack F. Matlock
The National Security Council
Old Executive Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20506


Dear Jack:

Please excuse my belated congratulations on your new job assignment. I am particularly pleased because it gives us another excuse to invite you to return again to address the Nashville Committee on Foreign Relations.

Accordingly, I would like to issue what is apparently becoming an annual invitation to speak to the Committee. While I realize your schedule must be hectic at this time, if you could fit us in, we would love to have you.

If this possibility exists, please drop me a line and I will make all the arrangements for a date convenient to you. Congratulations again. I will look forward to hearing from you. With best personal wishes, I am

Yours very truly,


George C. Paine, II
For the Nashville Committee
on Foreign Relations

GCP/clh

cc: Mr. Rolland Bushner

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 25, 1983

Dear Bill:

Thank you so much for your letter of September 24 and for the copy of the Russian translations of your poetry. It was indeed thoughtful of you to send them--and inexcusable of me to wait so long to convey my delight. (I'm still so busy unpacking and getting hold of my new job, that my correspondence is in shambles.)

We are hoping that Andrei will be able to reschedule next year. I understand that the postponement was his own decision.

Rebecca and I send our very best regards to you and Sonja. Do let us know when you come to Washington so we can get together.

Sincerely,



Jack F. Matlock

Mr. William Jay Smith
1675 York Avenue, Apt. 20K
New York, New York 10128

1675 York Avenue - Apt. 20K
New York, N. Y. 10128

24 September 1983

Dear Jack,

I was delighted to learn last summer of your appointment at the White House. It is good to know during this difficult time that you are there to offer sound advice.

I have often thought of the reading with Andrei Voznesensky at Spasso House. It occurred to me that you might be interested, in that connection, in having a copy of this selection of my poems which was published recently in Moscow. Most of the translations were completed while I was there. I think that you will agree that the result is an unusually handsome book. But now it has probably been withdrawn from circulation.

Andrei was scheduled to come here for readings in October and November but I can't believe now that he will come.

Sonja joins me in sending you all best wishes for your work and very best regards to your wife. I realize how very busy you must be but when you are in New York we'd like very much to see you both again.

Yours sincerely,

Bill

William Jay Smith

Mr. Jack F. Matlock
The White House
Pennsylvania Avenue, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20500

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
November 25, 1983

Dear Gordon:

Thank you very much for your letter of October 28. I very much regret that we didn't make connection when you were last in Washington. You had already left before I managed to track you down!

Your books and articles were immensely helpful to me when I was preparing for Prague, and while I was there. David Peel and I mentioned you frequently, and I had hoped that you would visit while we were there. But I am encouraged that you will be back to Washington for work on the Masaryk project, and I hope that we will have better luck in getting together the next time you are here.

My office telephone is (202) 395-5112. Be sure to let me know when you are next in the vicinity.

With warm regards,

Sincerely,



Jack F. Matlock

Professor H. Gordon Skilling
Department of Political Science
University of Toronto
100 St. George Street
Toronto, Canada M5S 1A1



UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
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October 28, 1983

Jack Matlock,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

Dear Jack :

Here is a voice from the distant past, at least as far as personal contacts are concerned. Our paths crossed at Dartmouth College, and hardly at all since then.

I have several times thought of writing to you while you were in Prague as Ambassador. I was really very pleased that you visited the TGM grave in Lany and that you had the Masaryk plaque placed in the Embassy and wanted to congratulate ^{you} on this.


I am coming to Washington on the 7th of November, (another auspicious date- like this one !) for a briefing of the new Ambassador to Prague on the 8th. With several others I shall be taking part in an all-day seminar at the State Department. It would be nice to think you would have time to drop in but I have some doubts that you will be able to do so in your new assignment. I shall be giving a brief report on human rights and dissent in Czechoslovakia - the subject of a recent book of mine on Charter 77 which you may have seen or heard of.

I shall also be visiting the CSCE to talk about Madrid with some of my friends there. We are preparing a book on the entire Helsinki process at Toronto, and I have been following the Belgrade and Madrid stages for that reason and have written chapters on each of the two review conferences.

I shall also be visiting ⁱ the Library of Congress for some work on Masaryk. I have turned back to history as an escape from Communist studies.

If I do not see you this time in Washington, may I wish you the best in your new post and express the hope that we may meet sometime in the future. I was rather hoping to get to Prague during your ambassadorship, but after an encounter with the security police during my latest visit in 1978 I have not visited Czechoslovakia. I am thinking of trying to get there in the spring of next year and have been encouraged by our Ambassador, David Peel, whom you must know, I think, to try for a visa.

Cordially yours,


H. Gordon Skilling