

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library  
Digital Library Collections

---

This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.

---

**Collection:** Matlock, Jack F.: Files  
**Folder Title:** Matlock CHRON November 1983 [1 of 4]  
**Box:** 2

---

To see more digitized collections visit:

<https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library>

To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:

<https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection>

Contact a reference archivist at: [reagan.library@nara.gov](mailto:reagan.library@nara.gov)

Citation Guidelines: <https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing>

National Archives Catalogue: <https://catalog.archives.gov/>

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

**Withdrawer**

CAS 10/23/2009

**File Folder** MATLOCK CHRON NOVEMBER 1983 (1)

**FOIA**

M08-244

**Box Number** 2

JONES

7

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
78419	MEMO	MCFARLANE TO RR RE SEC SHULTZ'S MEETING WITH DOBRYNIN 10/28	2	11/1/1983	B1
78420	MEMO	SHULTZ TO RR RE MY LUNCH TODAY WITH SOVIET AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN (ATTACHMENT TO 78419)	1	10/28/1983	B1
78421	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE SHULTZ'S LUNCH WITH DOBRYNIN 10/28	2	10/31/1983	B1
78422	MEMO	PETER SOMMER ET AL TO MCFARLANE RE THE MOOD IN EUROPE (ANNOTATED)	2	11/2/1983	B1
78423	MEMO	UNANNOTATED COPY OF 78422	2	11/2/1983	B1
78424	MEMO	CHARLES HILL TO MCFARLANE RE THE ALLIES AND GRENADA	2	11/2/1983	B1
78425	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE 50TH ANNIVERSARY <b>R 10/23/2009 GUIDELINES</b>	1	11/4/1983	B1
78426	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE 50TH ANNIVERSARY <b>R 10/23/2009 GUIDELINES</b>	1	11/14/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

**Withdrawer**

CAS 10/23/2009

**File Folder** MATLOCK CHRON NOVEMBER 1983 (1)

**FOIA**

M08-244

**Box Number** 2

JONES

7

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
78427	MEMO	HILL TO MCFARLANE RE 50TH ANNIVERSARY <b>R 10/23/2009 GUIDELINES</b>	1	11/14/1983	B1
78428	MESSAGE	IN RUSSIAN	1	ND	B1
78429	DRAFT MESSAGE	RR TO THE PRESIDUM OF THE USSR SUPREME SOVIET <b>R 10/23/2009 GUIDELINES</b>	1	ND	B1
78430	CABLE	STATE 323922 (122159Z NOV 83) <b>R 10/23/2009 GUIDELINES</b>	4	11/12/1983	B1
78431	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE POSSIBLE MEETING WITH MCGEORGE BUNDY	1	11/14/1983	B1
78432	MEMO	TYRUS COBB TO CONSTANTINE MENGES RE MCGEORGE BUNDY AND GRENADA PEACE-KEEPING	1	11/9/1983	B1
78433	DRAFT MESSAGE	COPY OF 78429 <b>R 10/24/2009 GUIDELINES</b>	1	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.



# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection:** MATLOCK, JACK: Files  
**OA/Box:** ~~OA90888~~ 2  
**File Folder:** Matlock Chron – November, 1983 [1 of 4]

**Archivist:** jas/jas  
**FOIA ID:** F95-074, Pfeiffer  
**Date:** 10/18/00

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. memo	McFarlane to RR re: Dobrynin, 2p	11/1/83	P1/B1
2. memo	Shultz to RR re: Dobrynin, 1p (attached to item #1)	10/28/83	P1/B1
3. memo	Matlock to McFarlane, 2p (attached to item #1)	10/31/83	P1/B1
<del>4. memo</del>	<del>Sommer to McFarlane re: Europe, annotated, 2p</del> R 8/5/2010 M244/1 #78422	<del>11/2/83</del>	<del>P1/B1</del>
<del>5. memo</del>	<del>Sommer to McFarlane re: Europe, 2p</del> R 8/5/2010 M244/1 #78423	<del>11/2/83</del>	<del>P1/B1</del>
6. memo	Hill to McFarlane re: Grenada, 2p	11/2/83	P1/B1
7. memo	Matlock to McFarlane, 1p	11/4/83	P1/B1
8. memo	Matlock to McFarlane, 1p	11/14/83	P1/B1
9. memo	Hill to McFarlane, 1p (attached to item #8)	11/14/83	P1/B1
10. letter	Supreme Soviet of USSR to RR (in Russian), 1p (attached to item #8)	11/16/83	P1/B1
11. message	RR to Supreme Soviet, 1p (attached to item # 8)	ND	P1/B1
12. cable	122159Z Nov 83, 4p	11/12/83	P1/B1
13. memo	Matlock to McFarlane re: McGeorge Bundy, 1p	11/14/83	P1/B1
14. Memo	Cobb to Menges re: Grenada, 1p (attached to item #13)	11/9/83	P1/B1
15. message	RR to Supreme Soviet, 1p	ND	P1/B1

### RESTRICTIONS

P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].  
P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].

P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].

P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].

P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].

P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].

B-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].



RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 1-3 LISTED ON THE  
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

MEMORANDUM  
~~SECRET~~  
ACTION

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

November 2, 1983

*File Chron* 7753 78422

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: PETER R. SOMMER  
JACK MATLOCK  
TYRUS W. COBB

SUBJECT: The Mood in Europe

*Let all reply to  
would prefer  
include our  
request at  
HMG's  
funding  
to support  
an ally  
Bud*

British Ambassador Wright has provided you Foreign Minister Howe's statement during the House of Commons October 26 emergency debate on Grenada (Tab II). While Howe did not condemn our actions, he did note HMG's view that military intervention was not required. The British public response is fairly indicative of Europe's reaction, which we would characterize as disappointing, but not unexpected. Indeed, a number of our European Allies, notably France, criticized us in considerably harsher terms than did the British.

European criticism has focused on the legality of our assistance; more pointedly, did the OECS really ask for our help or did we prod them into asking, and did Scoon formally appeal for U.S. intervention, or was this done after the fact? The one-page fact sheet that State sent to all diplomatic posts does not answer these questions with specific data, and in fact Scoon's role is not even addressed. Our vague reply, coupled with our less than precise and uniform public statements, have also hurt us domestically.

We have been working informally with Constantine and Walt to strengthen our public diplomacy presentation (particularly in Mrs. Kirkpatrick's statement at the UN today), and ask that you weigh in, perhaps with Eagleburger, on the need to give uniform and precise answers with regard to both the OECS and Scoon appeals. A chronological fact sheet for distribution in the field would help immensely, particularly if it could be augmented by intelligence information on threats to the students and the extent of Cuban/Soviet infiltrations.

On the positive side, Grenadians and the American students speaking out to the press on their fears and desire for freedom, plus the positive statements coming from the region are helping us in Europe, and should be further encouraged.

There are two immediate policy issues on which we ask you to consider European concerns. In our view, when and if we retaliate against the Beirut bomb attack, we should do so, to the

~~SECRET~~  
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
NLRR M08-244 #78422  
BY RW NARA DATE 8/5/10



extent feasible, in concert with the other MNF countries. At a minimum we should give them advance warning of our plans. On a separate but related matter, now, in our view, is not the time to declare Argentina eligible for arms sales. This would turn British public opinion, with a strong assist from HMG, completely sour. Should we decide we have to make a move, it should only be done following direct high level consultations with HMG.

Subsequent to our drafting of this memo, at our private suggestion State has forwarded you a short paper (Tab III) outlining their efforts to minimize fallout in Europe from our actions in Grenada. State's emphasis is on working constructively with our European Allies, especially the British, in restoring democracy to Grenada. State also is working hard via our Ambassadors to limit the spillover onto our other objectives in Europe, especially INF. In order to present our case directly to skeptical European governments, Secretary Shultz is sending Ken Dam to Europe next week for consultations in key capitals.

#### RECOMMENDATION

That you a) give a strong push to Grenada public diplomacy efforts and praise State's efforts to prop up our European Allies; b) keep our MFN partners in mind with regard to retaliation, and c) consider the impact on our relations with the UK in reviewing Argentine certification.

That you sign the polite reply to Ambassador Wright at Tab I.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Tab I Letter to British Amb.  
Tab II Letter from British Amb.  
Tab III State memo

cc: Constantine Menges  
Walt Raymond



National Security Council  
The White House

System # I  
Package # \_\_\_\_\_

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Executive Secretary	<u>1</u>	<u>LC</u>	
John Poindexter			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
John Poindexter			
Executive Secretary			
NSC Secretariat	<u>2</u>		<u>Staff</u>
Situation Room			
Executive Secretary			

I = Information    A = Action    R = Retain    D = Dispatch    N = No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP    Meese    Baker    Deaver    Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)

Action Items  
Cont Mings  
Prepare memo  
Kimmitt -> Whittlesey

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

November 4, 1983

NOTE FOR BOB KIMMITT

FROM: CONSTANTINE MENGES *CM*

SUBJECT: The Mood in Europe

Re request for comments to you--this office concurs with the proposed letter to Sir Oliver Wright as written.

**National Security Council  
The White House**

RECORDED

30 NOV 3 All: 34

System # I  
Package # 7753  
CT

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Executive Secretary	<u>1</u>	<u>K</u>	
John Poindexter	<u>2</u>	<u>J</u>	
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
John Poindexter			
Executive Secretary	<u>3</u>	<u>K</u>	
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room			
Executive Secretary			
<u>C. Menges</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>J</u>	<u>A</u>

I = Information    A = Action    R = Retain    D = Dispatch    N = No further Action

**DISTRIBUTION**

cc: VP    Meese    Baker    Deaver    Other \_\_\_\_\_

**COMMENTS**

Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)

Bob,  
I don't think Constantine  
would clear last paragraph of  
note to Sir Alvin. Please run  
by him.



78423

MEMORANDUM  
~~SECRET~~  
ACTION

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

November 2, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: PETER R. SOMMER *PR*  
 JACK MATLOCK *JM*  
 TYRUS W. COBB *TC*

SUBJECT: The Mood in Europe

British Ambassador Wright has provided you Foreign Minister Howe's statement during the House of Commons October 26 emergency debate on Grenada (Tab II). While Howe did not condemn our actions, he did note HMG's view that military intervention was not required. The British public response is fairly indicative of Europe's reaction, which we would characterize as disappointing, but not unexpected. Indeed, a number of our European Allies, notably France, criticized us in considerably harsher terms than did the British.

European criticism has focused on the legality of our assistance; more pointedly, did the OECS really ask for our help or did we prod them into asking, and did Scoon formally appeal for U.S. intervention, or was this done after the fact? The one-page fact sheet that State sent to all diplomatic posts does not answer these questions with specific data, and in fact Scoon's role is not even addressed. Our vague reply, coupled with our less than precise and uniform public statements, have also hurt us domestically.

We have been working informally with Constantine and Walt to strengthen our public diplomacy presentation (particularly in Mrs. Kirkpatrick's statement at the UN today), and ask that you weigh in, perhaps with Eagleburger, on the need to give uniform and precise answers with regard to both the OECS and Scoon appeals. A chronological fact sheet for distribution in the field would help immensely, particularly if it could be augmented by intelligence information on threats to the students and the extent of Cuban/Soviet infiltrations.

On the positive side, Grenadians and the American students speaking out to the press on their fears and desire for freedom, plus the positive statements coming from the region are helping us in Europe, and should be further encouraged.

There are two immediate policy issues on which we ask you to consider European concerns. In our view, when and if we retaliate against the Beirut bomb attack, we should do so, to the

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M08-244 #78423

RY 211 NADA DATE 2/1/84

~~SECRET~~

2

extent feasible, in concert with the other MNF countries. At a minimum we should give them advance warning of our plans. On a separate but related matter, now, in our view, is not the time to declare Argentina eligible for arms sales. This would turn British public opinion, with a strong assist from HMG, completely sour. Should we decide we have to make a move, it should only be done following direct high level consultations with HMG.

Subsequent to our drafting of this memo, at our private suggestion State has forwarded you a short paper (Tab III) outlining their efforts to minimize fallout in Europe from our actions in Grenada. State's emphasis is on working constructively with our European Allies, especially the British, in restoring democracy to Grenada. State also is working hard via our Ambassadors to limit the spillover onto our other objectives in Europe, especially INF. In order to present our case directly to skeptical European governments, Secretary Shultz is sending Ken Dam to Europe next week for consultations in key capitals.

RECOMMENDATION

That you a) give a strong push to Grenada public diplomacy efforts and praise State's efforts to prop up our European Allies; b) keep our MFN partners in mind with regard to retaliation, and c) consider the impact on our relations with the UK in reviewing Argentine certification.

That you sign the polite reply to Ambassador Wright at Tab I.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Tab I Letter to British Amb.  
Tab II Letter from British Amb.  
Tab III State memo

cc: Constantine Menges  
Walt Raymond

~~SECRET~~









7753  
BRITISH EMBASSY,  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20008  
TELEPHONE: (202) 462-1340

83 OCT 27 10  
FROM THE AMBASSADOR

27 October 1983

The Honorable  
Robert C McFarlane  
Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs  
The White House  
WASHINGTON DC

*Dear Bud,*

I enclose a copy of the statement which Sir Geoffrey Howe made in the House of Commons yesterday opening the emergency debate on Grenada.

As you will see, he declined to condemn the US intervention and he expressed the wish that the operation would have a speedy and successful outcome that would pave the way for genuine elections in Grenada for the first time in many years.

As the US Embassy in London has no doubt reported, HM Government had a pretty rough ride in the House of Commons yesterday. The important thing however is that nothing was said or done to prejudice the objectives we share - even if we disagree about the means - namely the restoration of constitutional government to Grenada. On this the independent position of the Governor General will be crucial.

*Yours,*

Oliver Wright

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Sir Oliver:

Thank you for sending me Geoffrey Howe's House of Commons statement on Grenada. As the President told the Prime Minister, we regret that we caused your government some embarrassment in Parliament. Absolute secrecy, as I am sure you will understand, was essential. The concern over leaks was on our end, not yours, but we needed to take all possible precautionary measures to protect the lives of our troops.

While the regional states will be taking the lead, we look forward to working closely with your government on the important task of restoring democracy in Grenada. Thank you again for bringing your government's views to my direct attention.

With best regards,

Sincerely,

Robert C. McFarlane

The Honorable Sir Oliver Wright  
Embassy of Great Britain  
3100 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20008



✓  
Minister

H of C

Chief of Staff BDS (3)

Mr Woodley

Mr French

Mr Green

Mr Pellew

Mr Anson

Mr Gray

Mr Ellacott

VERBATIM SERVICE 090/83

WEDNESDAY 26TH OCTOBER 1983

(PRODUCED BY THE CENTRAL OFFICE OF INFORMATION PRESS SERVICE)

GRENADA EMERGENCY DEBATE.  
SIR GEOFFREY HOWES OPENING SPEECH

FOLLOWING IS THE OPENING SPEECH BY THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY SIR GEOFFREY HOWE IN THE COMMONS EMERGENCY DEBATE ON GRENADA TODAY 26 OCTOBER 1983 A

MR SPEAKER WITH YOUR PERMISSION, I WILL TO BEGIN IF I MAY BY BRINGING THE HOUSE UP-TO-DATE WITH THE SITUATION IN GRENADA.

THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND

THE POSITION IS THAT THE AMERICANS HAVE NOW SECURED BOTH THE AIRPORTS ON THE ISLAND AT PEARLS AND SALINES, AS WELL AS THE RADIO STATION, AND FORT RUPERT. BUT FIGHTING IS APPARENTLY CONTINUING AT FORT FREDRICK AND ELSEWHERE. SEVERAL UNITED STATES SERVICEMEN HAVE BEEN KILLED, THERE ARE UNCONFIRMED REPORTS THAT TWELVE CUBANS HAVE BEEN KILLED DURING THE FIGHTING. THERE IS NO FIRM INFORMATION AT PRESENT OF ANY OTHER CASUALTIES. IN ADDITION, THERE ARE REPORTS THAT A NUMBER OF SOVIET NATIONALS MAY HAVE BEEN DETAINED., AND RUMOURS THAT MR BERNARD COARD ONE OF THE LEADERS OF LAST WEEKS COUP HAS SOUGHT SANCTUARY IN THE SOVIET EMBASSY. I AM NOT IN A POSITION TO CONFIRM THAT.

BRITISH CITIZENS

THE LATEST INFORMATION IS THAT THERE ARE NO REPORTS OF ANY BRITISH CASUALTIES. THE US ADMINISTRATION HAVE INFORMED US THAT THEY ARE WILLING TO EVACUATE UK CITIZENS TO BARBADOS AS SOON AS CONDITIONS ALLOW. HMS ANTRIM REMAINS READY TO BE CALLED UPON IN CASE OF NEED. AND WE ARE ALSO MAKING CONTINGENCY ARRANGEMENTS FOR EVACUATION BY AIR BY BRITISH AIRCRAFT. A CONSULAR MISSION FROM THE BRITISH HIGH COMMISSION IN BRIDGETOWN IS STANDING BY TO GO TO GRENADA AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE TO ESTABLISH HOW MANY BRITISH CITIZENS MAY WISH TO BE EVACUATED. THE MAJORITY OF THEM ARE LONG TERM RESIDENTS OF GRENADA.

THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL

I AM GLAD TO BE ABLE TO INFORM THE HOUSE THAT WE HAVE RECEIVED ASSURANCES THAT THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL, SIR PAUL SCOON, IS SAFE. (HON MEMBERS: WHERE?). IT WOULD NOT BE SENSIBLE OR HELPFUL FOR HIS SAFETY TO GIVE THAT INFORMATION IN THE PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES. HE MAY HAVE AN IMPORTANT ROLE TO PLAY IN THE RESTORATION OF DEMOCRACY IN GRENADA. HE REPRESENTS ONE OF THE FEW ELEMENTS OF CONSTITUTIONAL CONTINUITY IN GRENADA AT PRESENT. THE AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION ARE AWARE OF THIS CONSTITUTIONAL POSITION AND HAVE UNDERTAKEN TO RESPECT IT.

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

THE HOUSE MAY FIND IT USEFUL TO BE REMINDED OF THE EVENTS WHICH HAVE LED UP TO THE PRESENT SITUATION.

WHEN GRENADA ACHIEVED FULL INDEPENDENCE FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM ON 7 FEBRUARY 1974, IT WAS AS A PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY WITHIN THE COMMONWEALTH. THE PRIME MINISTER, SIR ERIC GAIRY, GOVERNED THE COUNTRY UNTIL MARCH 1979 WHEN HE WAS OVERTHROWN AS THE RESULT OF A COUP DETAT MOUNTED BY THE NEW JEWEL MOVEMENT. A PEOPLES REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT WAS SET UP, LED BY A MARXIST, MR MAURICE BISHOP, WHICH SUSPENDED THE CONSTITUTION AND GOVERNED BY PROMULGATING SO-CALLED PEOPLES LAWS.

THAT WAS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL REGIME AND IT LASTED UNTIL THE 13TH OF THIS MONTH, WHEN MR BISHOP WAS IN TURN OUSTED BY HIS DEPUTY, MR BERNARD COARD, A MORE RADICAL MARXIST. AFTER SEVERAL DAYS OF CONFUSION, A REVOLUTIONARY MILITARY COUNCIL WAS CONSTITUTED ON 18 OCTOBER, UNDER THE CHAIRMANSHIP OF GENERAL HUDSON AUSTIN.



ON THE EVENING OF 19 OCTOBER, MR BISHOP WAS KILLED, TOGETHER WITH SOME OF HIS CLOSE SUPPORTERS. THERE HAS BEEN NO SATISFACTORY EXPLANATION OF THESE KILLINGS, WHICH HAVE BEEN RIGHTLY AND VERY WIDELY CONDEMNED. AFTER THE KILLINGS, A TWENTY-FOUR HOUR CURFEW WAS DECLARED WHICH THE REVOLUTIONARY MILITARY COUNCIL ANNOUNCED WOULD LAST UNTIL 24 OCTOBER.

ON 20 OCTOBER, THE DAY AFTER MR BISHOP'S DEATH, GENERAL AUSTIN CALLED ON THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL, AND TOLD HIM THAT THE REVOLUTIONARY MILITARY COUNCIL WAS IN CONTROL, AND THAT HE INTENDED TO ANNOUNCE THE COMPOSITION OF A NEW CABINET THREE DAYS LATER. HE LATER EXTENDED THAT TO TWO WEEKS. ON THE SAME DAY, 20 OCTOBER, THE GRENADIAN HIGH COMMISSIONER IN LONDON WAS CALLED TO THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TO UNDERLINE OUR CONCERNS ABOUT THE SAFETY OF THE BRITISH COMMUNITY.

ON 21 OCTOBER, THE BRITISH HIGH COMMISSIONER IN BARBADOS LEARNED THAT SOME CARIBBEAN HEADS OF GOVERNMENT WERE PRESSING THEIR COLLEAGUES IN THE CARIBBEAN COMMUNITY TO ASK FOR MILITARY HELP IN RESTORING CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN GRENADA. WE PROMPTLY INSTRUCTED OUR EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON TO ASCERTAIN HOW THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT MIGHT RESPOND TO SUCH AN APPROACH.

ON THE FOLLOWING DAY, SATURDAY, 22 OCTOBER, THE UNITED STATES DIVERTED TOWARDS GRENADA A CARRIER GROUP, LED BY USS INDEPENDENCE. THEY STATED THAT THIS WAS A SIGNAL TO THE LOCAL AUTHORITIES OF CONCERN ABOUT THE SAFETY OF US CITIZENS ON THE ISLAND. WE WERE INFORMED ON THE SAME DAY, SATURDAY 22 OCTOBER, THAT THE SEVEN HEADS OF GOVERNMENT OF THE ORGANISATION OF EASTERN CARIBBEAN STATES HAD DECIDED TO PUT TOGETHER A MULTINATIONAL FORCE AND TO CALL UPON FRIENDLY GOVERNMENTS TO HELP RESTORE PEACE AND ORDER IN GRENADA.

LATE THAT EVENING WE WERE INFORMED BY THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT THAT THEY HAD RECEIVED A FIRM REQUEST FROM THE HEADS OF GOVERNMENT OF THAT ORGANISATION TO HELP RESTORE PEACE AND ORDER IN GRENADA. THE US GOVERNMENT TOLD US ON THE EVENING OF 22 OCTOBER THAT NO DECISION HAD BEEN TAKEN ON HOW TO RESPOND, AND THEY HAD CONCLUDED THAT THEY SHOULD PROCEED VERY CAUTIOUSLY. THEY HAD NO REASON TO BELIEVE THAT WE WOULD ACCEDE TO SUCH A REQUEST IF ONE WERE MADE TO US.

ON 23 OCTOBER, THE BRITISH HIGH COMMISSIONER IN BARBADOS WAS INFORMED THAT A FORMAL REQUEST FOR BRITISH PARTICIPATION IN A MULTINATIONAL FORCE WOULD PROBABLY BE HANDED OVER LATER IN THE DAY. THIS DID NOT HAPPEN, BUT WE RECEIVED LATER THAT DAY THE CONCLUSIONS OF A MEETING HELD IN TRINIDAD OF ALL COMMONWEALTH CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES EXCEPT OF COURSE GRENADA DECIDED IN FAVOUR OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC MEASURES AGAINST GRENADA.

WE WERE IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT THROUGHOUT 23 OCTOBER AND TWO US CONSULAR OFFICIALS HAD ACCOMPANIED OUR DEPUTY HIGH COMMISSIONER TO GRENADA OVER THE WEEKEND THE PURPOSE OF THAT VISIT WAS TO FORM A FIRST-HAND ASSESSMENT OF THE RISKS TO BRITISH AND AMERICAN CITIZENS. WE WERE ASSURED BY THE US GOVERNMENT THAT WE WOULD BE CONSULTED IMMEDIATELY IF THE UNITED STATES DECIDED TO TAKE ANY ACTION, AND INFORMED THAT A UNITED STATES EMISSARY, AMBASSADOR MCNEIL, HAD BEEN SENT TO BARBADOS TO CONFER WITH CARIBBEAN LEADERS.

IT WAS ALSO ON 23 OCTOBER THAT HMS ANTRIM WAS INSTRUCTED TO SAIL FROM CARTAGENA IN COLOMBIA TO THE VICINITY OF GRENADA, IN CASE THE EVACUATION OF BRITISH NATIONALS PROVED NECESSARY. I WISH TO EMPHASISE THAT THAT WAS A PRECAUTIONARY MOVE, WHICH WAS ENTIRELY UNRELATED TO THE SUGGESTION OF SOME CARIBBEAN LEADERS THAT A MULTINATIONAL FORCE SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED.



FOR THE WEEK. HE THEN HAD AVAILABLE A REPORT ON HIS VISIT TO GRENADA TO WHICH I HAVE REFERRED. FROM THE BRITISH DEPUTY HIGH COMMISSIONER IN BRIDGETOWN. FOLLOWING THAT MEETING, OUR AMBASSADOR IN WASHINGTON WAS INSTRUCTED TO PUT TO THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT FACTORS WHICH WOULD HAD TO BE CAREFULLY WEIGHED BEFORE FIRM CONCLUSIONS WERE REACHED. I SHALL COME BACK TO THESE LATER.

(INTERVENTION): ON 23 OCTOBER THE BRITISH HIGH COMMISSIONER IN BRIDGETOWN WAS TOLD THAT THE FORMAL REQUEST BY THE ORGANISATION OF EASTERN CARIBBEAN STATES FOR BRITISH PARTICIPATION IN MILITARY ACTION AGAINST GRENADA WOULD BE HANDED OVER THAT NIGHT. THAT DID NOT HAPPEN.

ON MONDAY EVENING WE RECEIVED IN LONDON THE TEXT OF A STATEMENT BY THE ORGANISATION OF EASTERN CARIBBEAN STATES WHICH HAD BEEN HANDED TO THE BRITISH HIGH COMMISSION IN BARBADOS, INFORMING THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT, AMONG OTHERS, OF THE ORGANISATIONS INTENTION OF TAKING ACTION UNDER ARTICLE 8 OF THE 1981 TREATY OF THE ORGANISATION OF EASTERN CARIBBEAN STATES, FOR THE COLLECTIVE DEFENCE AND PRESERVATION OF PEACE AND SECURITY AGAINST EXTERNAL AGRESSION, AND REQUESTING ASSISTANCE FROM FRIENDLY GOVERNMENTS.

ALSO ON MONDAY EVENING PRESIDENT REAGAN INFORMED MY RIGHT HONOURABLE FRIEND, THE PRIME MINISTER, THAT HE WAS GIVING SERIOUS CONSIDERATION TO THE REQUEST FROM THE ORGANISATION OF EASTERN CARIBBEAN STATES AND WOULD WELCOME HER THOUGHTS. HE UNDERTOOK TO INFORM MY RIGHT HONOURABLE FRIEND IN ADVANCE OF ANY DECISION TAKEN BY THE UNITED STATES.

WHILE OUR RESPONSE TO THAT MESSAGE WAS BEING CONSIDERED, A SECOND MESSAGE ARRIVED FROM THE PRESIDENT SAYING THAT HE HAD DECIDED TO RESPOND POSITIVELY TO THE REQUEST THAT HAD BEEN MADE TO HIM. MINISTERS MET IMMEDIATELY TO DISCUSS THE SITUATION AND, SHORTLY AFTER MIDNIGHT ON MONDAY 25 OCTOBER, MY RIGHT HONOURABLE FRIEND SENT A REPLY TO THE PRESIDENT IN WHICH, AS SHE TOLD THIS HOUSE YESTERDAY, SHE REITERATED THE CONSIDERATIONS WHICH WE HAD ALREADY PUT TO THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT THE PREVIOUS DAY AND EXPRESSED OUR CONCERN AT THE COURSE OF ACTION WHICH HE WAS CONTEMPLATING.

SHE ALSO PHONED THE PRESIDENT - AND I AM NOT PREPARED TO DISCLOSE THE SUBSTANCE OF THE DISCUSSION - TO UNDERLINE THE IMPORTANCE SHE ATTACHED TO THE MATTER. EARLY ON TUESDAY MORNING MY RIGHT HONOURABLE FRIEND RECEIVED A MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN INFORMING HER THAT HE HAD WEIGHED THE ISSUES RAISED IN HER MESSAGE VERY CAREFULLY BUT HAD DECIDED THAT UNITED STATES PARTICIPATION IN THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE SHOULD, NEVERTHELESS, GO AHEAD.

THAT THEN IS THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS LEADING UP TO YESTERDAYS MILITARY INTERVENTION.

AS I HAVE EXPLAINED TO THE HOUSE, HER MAJESTYS GOVERNMENT DIRECTED THE ATTENTION OF THE UNITED STATES TO CERTAIN FACTORS THAT SHOULD BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT. SOME OF THESE INCLUDED THE SAFETY OF OUR OWN COMMUNITY., THE POSITION OF THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL., AND THE FACT THAT THE CARICOM COUNTRIES, ALTHOUGH AGREED ON THE NEED FOR POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC MEASURES, WERE DIVIDED ON THE ADVISABILITY OF MILITARY INTERVENTION.

THE UNITED KINGDOM AND A NUMBER OF COMMONWEALTH CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES TOOK THE VIEW THAT NO ACTION OF THIS KIND WAS REQUIRED. THE UNITED STATES AND SOME COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES IN THE CARIBBEAN TOOK THE OTHER VIEW OF THE RISK TO WHICH THE CITIZENS WERE EXPOSED AND OF THE ACTION WHICH WAS CALLED FOR.



THE DECISION TO INTERVENE IN GRENADA MAY BE A MATTER OF REGRET, BUT IT SHOULD NOT BE A MATTER FOR SURPRISE. WE DO NOT AGREE WITH THE AMERICANS ON EVERY ISSUE, ANY MORE THAN THEY ALWAYS AGREE WITH US. NOR WOULD WE EXPECT TO. ON SOME ISSUES OUR PERCEPTIONS AND THOSE OF THE AMERICANS ARE BOUND TO BE DIFFERENT.

IN THIS CASE THE UNITED STATES HAD PARTICULAR REASON TO CONSULT MOST CLOSELY WITH THOSE CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES WHICH HAD CALLED ON IT TO HELP RESOLVE THE CRISIS. NEVERTHELESS THE EXTENT OF THE CONSULTATION WITH US WAS, REGRETTABLY, LESS THAN WE WOULD HAVE WISHED. BUT, IN THE COURSE OF THEM, MY RIGHT HONOURABLE FRIEND THE PRIME MINISTER MADE PERFECTLY PLAIN THE VIEW WHICH WE TOOK.

AN HONOURABLE MEMBER: DO YOU CONDEMN THE ACTION?

THE US TOOK ONE VIEW, THE UK ANOTHER. IT IS NO MORE FOR ME TO CONDEMN THEM THAN IT IS FOR THEM TO CONDEMN US.

INTERRUPTION ...

IN AFGHANISTAN, FOREIGN TROOPS HAVE OCCUPIED THE COUNTRY AND REMAINED THERE. IN GRENADA, THE AIM IS A WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY AND FREE ELECTIONS.

AN HONOURABLE MEMBER: I CAN UNDERSTAND THE FOREIGN SECRETARY'S RELUCTANCE TO DAMAGE ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS. I CAN UNDERSTAND HIS RELUCTANCE TO USE THE WORD CONDEMN BUT HE HAS A DUTY TO THE HOUSE TO SAY, AS HE WILL HAVE TO IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL, WHETHER HE THINKS THIS ACTION WAS JUSTIFIED UNDER ARTICLE 8 OF THE OEC'S TREATY).

ON A MATTER OF THIS KIND IT IS POSSIBLE FOR MORE THAN ONE VIEW TO BE HELD BUT WHEN MILITARY OPERATIONS ARE UNDERWAY, NOTHING COULD BE MORE UNHELPFUL THAN TO CONDEMN THE UNITED STATES.

TO RETURN TO THE CARIBBEAN. IT MUST NOT BE OVERLOOKED THAT SEVEN INDEPENDENT CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES HAVE JOINED WITH THE UNITED STATES IN THIS INTERVENTION, INDEED THEY HAVE URGED IT ON THE UNITED STATES. IT IS NOT PERHAPS SUFFICIENTLY RECOGNISED THAT, ALTHOUGH THESE ISLANDS ENJOY FULL INDEPENDENCE, THE ISLANDS OF THE CARIBBEAN HAVE A HIGH DEGREE OF MUTUAL INTERDEPENDENCE. THERE HAVE BEEN DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS IN MOST OF THESE ISLANDS VERY RECENTLY. THEY ATTACH GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THE CONSOLIDATION OF DEMOCRATIC PROCESSES WITHIN THE REGION.

THIS IS WHY THE ORIGINAL COUP OF 1979 IN GRENADA WAS SO DISTURBING, AND WHY THE BLOODY EVENTS OF LAST WEEK SO DEEPLY AFFRONTED THEM. THE BREAKDOWN OF CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT, THE RULE OF LAW AND PUBLIC SAFETY IN ONE OF THEIR MEMBERS, WAS PERCEIVED AS A DANGEROUS DISRUPTION BY THE COUNTRIES IN THE IMMEDIATE VICINITY.

NOT ONLY WAS THAT THE CASE, BUT WE MUST REMEMBER THAT JUST AS THE UNITED STATES HAD SOME 1000 CITIZENS IN GRENADA, SO THE OTHER CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES WHO HAVE INTERVENED HAVE NATIONALS OF THEIR OWN ON GRENADA AND HAVE GRENADANS IN THEIR OWN ISLANDS. THIS IS A VERY CLOSE FAMILY OF STATES.

JUST AS THAT FACT EXPLAINS MUCH OF WHAT HAS HAPPENED, SO ALSO IT PERHAPS PROVIDES THE KEY TO THE WAY AHEAD. COUNTRIES WHICH HAVE PARTICIPATED IN THE PRESENT OPERATION WILL BE WELL PLACED TO ASSIST THE GRENADANS TO RESTORE AND SET UP THE NECESSARY MACHINERY TO ENSURE AN EARLY RETURN TO CONSTITUTIONALITY AND DEMOCRACY.



WAS KEPT WITHOUT CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT. PRINCE BOP DECLINED TO HOLD ELECTIONS AND WAS HIMSELF THE VICTIM OF VIOLENT OVERTHROW.


THE COUNTRIES WHICH HAVE INTERVENED ARE DEMOCRATIC COUNTRIES. THEIR STATED OBJECTIVE IS TO RESTORE DEMOCRATIC AND CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT TO THE ISLAND. THAT IS AN OBJECTIVE WE FULLY SHARE. IT MAY BE NECESSARY AND DESIRABLE FOR OTHER COMMONWEALTH STATES TO PLAY A PART IN THAT PROCESS. WE SHALL BE IN TOUCH WITH OUR COMMONWEALTH PARTNERS ABOUT THAT AND WE WELCOME THE WILLINGNESS OF THE COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY-GENERAL TO HELP TOWARDS THAT END. THE AMERICANS, AS THE HOUSE CLEARLY UNDERSTANDS, HAVE MADE PLAIN THEIR WISH TO WITHDRAW FROM THE GRENADAN SCENE AT THE EARLIEST REASONABLE OPPORTUNITY.

MEANTIME, THEIR FORCES AND THOSE OF COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES INVOLVED ARE EXPOSED TO GREAT DANGER. WE SHALL DO NOTHING TO MAKE THEIR TASK MORE DIFFICULT. WE MUST ALL WISH FOR A SPEEDY AND SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME. ONE THAT WILL QUICKLY PAVE THE WAY FOR GENUINE ELECTIONS IN GRENADA, FOR THE FIRST TIME IN MANY YEARS.

THE WHOLE HOUSE WILL HOPE THAT GRENADA WILL ONCE AGAIN BE ABLE TO MOVE FORWARD ALONG THE PATH OF DEMOCRACY. THAT WILL IMPROVE THE PROSPECTS FOR PEACE THROUGHOUT THE CARIBBEAN. SOMETHING OF REAL VALUE WILL THUS HAVE BEEN ACHIEVED.

ENDS VERBATIM SERVICE VS090/83

COI LONDON





RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 6 LISTED ON THE  
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

MEMORANDUM

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

November 4, 1983

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM:

JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT:

Invitation to Speak in Brazil in December

I have received an invitation to speak on U.S.-Soviet relations at a conference in Brazil December 4-7. The conference is sponsored by the Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies with funding from USIA. It includes a conference in Sao Paulo December 4-6, followed by a day's consultation in Brasilia with senior Brazilian Government officials.

Participation would require my departure the evening of December 2 and I would return the morning of December 8. Since the office will be adequately staffed during this period and the sponsors pay all travel costs, I recommend that I accept.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you approve my participation in the conference in Brazil, December 4-7.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

MEMORANDUM

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

November 4, 1983

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM:

JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT:

Fiftieth Anniversary of Establishment of  
Diplomatic Relations with the USSR

State informs me that their current thinking is that we should issue a statement through the State press spokesman on November 15 which takes note of the anniversary. This could also be a vehicle for making some observations regarding our current policy toward the USSR.

They have considered other possible steps, including having Secretary Shultz invite Dobrynin over for a glass of champagne, but have dropped the idea in view of the current state of our relations.

There will be special attention devoted to the anniversary in the issue of America Illustrated distributed in the USSR this month, which includes a special Presidential message, which we cleared last summer.

I believe State's current thinking is along the right lines, and if you concur, will work with EUR to develop an appropriate text for the press spokesman.

RECOMMENDATION:

That State be authorized to issue a press statement on November 15 marking the 50th anniversary of diplomatic relations with the USSR.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

Sec. 3.4(b), E.O. 12958, as amended  
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2006  
BY NARA *CA* DATE *10/23/09*



*File Chron*

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

CONFIDENTIAL

November 14, 1983

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *Rec'd for JIM*

SUBJECT: 50th Anniversary of Relations with USSR

The Soviet Embassy has delivered a message to the President from the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet marking the 50th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the U.S. and the USSR (Tab III). It is dated November 16, the date of the anniversary. Before the receipt of this message, State had prepared a proposed statement for the State (or White House) press spokesman to issue on the anniversary (Tab I).

Comment: It is interesting that the message from the Soviets is signed, not by Andropov, the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Presidium, but by the collective body itself. This may be a hint that Andropov is still ill, or may be meant to stress the collectivity of the message. The Soviets apparently plan to publish the message on November 16.

I consider the State draft for the press spokesman a good one (Tab I), and recommend that it be issued, either by Larry Speakes, or by the State spokesman.

Since the Soviets apparently intend to publish the message to the President from the Supreme Soviet Presidium, I believe it also would be useful for him to send a message, worded so as to provide reassurance to the Soviet people regarding our intentions. If they receive it in time, the Soviets might well publish it themselves, along with their message (Tab II).

RECOMMENDATION

1. That you approve the statement to be issued by the press spokesman at Tab I.

OK        *modified* NO       

To be issued by:        White House        State       

2. That you approve the draft message from the President to the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium at Tab II.

OK        NO       

Attachments: Tab I Proposed statement from State, 11/12/83  
Tab II Proposed statement from President  
Tab III Soviet message

CONFIDENTIAL

## MEMORANDUM

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

MEMORANDUM FOR RONALD K. PETERSON

FROM: ROBERT M. KIMMITT

SUBJECT: H.R. 3500 re Exchange for Understanding Act

We have reviewed and concur in the proposed report prepared by the Department of the Treasury to Clement J. Zablocki, Chairman, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, on H.R. 3500, a bill entitled the "Exchange for Understanding Act."

Attachments


8031

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

November 8, 1983

TO: ROBERT M. KIMMITT

I have reviewed the attached report prepared by Treasury and recommend that you forward the memorandum to Mr. Peterson.

  
Jack F. Matlock

 Dobriansky, C. Lehman and Robinson concur.



EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT  
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

8031

November 3, 1983

LEGISLATIVE REFERRAL MEMORANDUM

TO: Legislative Liaison Officer-  
Department of State  
National Security Council  
U.S. Information Agency

SUBJECT: Treasury draft report on H.R. 3500, a bill  
entitled the "Exchange for Understanding Act."

The Office of Management and Budget requests the views of your agency on the above subject before advising on its relationship to the program of the President, in accordance with OMB Circular A-19.

A response to this request for your views is needed no later than TUESDAY, 29 NOVEMBER 1983.

Questions should be referred to Tracey Lawler (395-4710) the legislative analyst in this office or to Dave Spevacek (395-4580).

*Ronald K. Peterson*  
RONALD K. PETERSON FOR  
Assistant Director for  
Legislative Reference

Enclosures





DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY  
OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20220

Dear Mr. Chairman:

This is to submit to your committee the views of this Department on H.R. 3500, a bill entitled the "Exchange for Understanding Act."

The purpose of the bill is to provide additional financial support for exchange programs among the United States, the Soviet Union, and Eastern European countries. The bill would create a "Soviet Union and Eastern Europe Exchange Commission" composed of five members to administer the program.

Section 3 of H.R. 3500 would establish a "Soviet Union and Eastern Europe Exchange Fund" to provide financial support for exchange programs. This fund would consist of an appropriation of \$80 million (plus the interest on, and the proceeds from the sale or redemption of, any obligation held in the Fund). Section 6 of the bill authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to invest excess monies in the Fund in special par-value obligations at a coupon rate of interest.

The Department strongly opposes enactment of the bill for the following reasons:

Trust funds are established to account for particular receipts from the public and expenditures by the Government to carry out specific programs in accordance with the terms of a statute or trust agreement. However, H.R. 3500 does not provide for any receipts from the public or trust agreement and consequently, the creation of a trust fund would be inappropriate in this instance.

In addition, the bill reflects a misunderstanding of Federal budget concepts. An appropriation is not a sum of cash which is available for investment. Rather, an appropriation is simply obligational authority with a limit on the amount an agency may spend under its authorized programs. Thus, the investment authority proposed in the bill would not be appropriate.

In view of the foregoing, the Department does not support the bill as it is currently drafted.

The Office of Management and Budget has advised that there is no objection from the standpoint of the Administration's program to the submission of this report to your Committee.

Sincerely yours,

Deputy General Counsel

The Honorable  
Clement J. Zablocki, Chairman  
Committee on Foreign Affairs  
House of Representatives  
Washington, D.C. 20515

## MEMORANDUM

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

MEMORANDUM FOR RONALD K. PETERSON

FROM: ROBERT M. KIMMITT

SUBJECT: SR-70 re Ukranian Famine 1932-1933

We have reviewed and concur in the proposed report prepared by the Department of State on S.Con.Res. 70 to the Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, expressing the sense of the Congress regarding actions the President should take to commemorate the anniversary of the Ukranian famine of 1932-33.

Attachments

8032

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

November 8, 1983

TO: ROBERT M. KIMMITT

I have reviewed the attached report and recommend that you forward the attached memorandum to Ron Peterson.

*Jack Matlock*  
Jack Matlock

<sup>PD</sup>  
Dobriansky, C. Lehman,  
Raymond and Robinson concur.  
*out of town*





EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT  
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET

8032

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

November 3, 1983

LEGISLATIVE REFERRAL MEMORANDUM


TO: Legislative Liaison Officer-  
National Security Council

SUBJECT: State draft report on S.Con.Res. 70, expressing the sense of the Congress regarding actions the President should take to commemorate the anniversary of the Ukranian famine of 1932-33.

The Office of Management and Budget requests the views of your agency on the above subject before advising on its relationship to the program of the President, in accordance with OMB Circular A-19.

A response to this request for your views is needed no later than MONDAY, NOVEMBER 28, 1983.

Questions should be referred to Tracey Lawler (395-4710) the legislative analyst in this office.

  
RONALD K. PETERSON FOR  
Assistant Director for  
Legislative Reference

Enclosures



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Mr. Chairman:

The Secretary has asked me to respond to your request for Executive Branch comments on S. Con. Res. 70, expressing the sense of the Congress regarding actions the President should take to commemorate the anniversary of the Ukrainian famine of 1932-33.

S. Con. Res. 70 accords fully with our understanding of the tragic and barbaric events which occurred in the Ukraine during the early nineteen-thirties. The Great Famine of 1932-33 is, unfortunately, a little-known event in the early history of the Soviet Union. It is generally recognized now that the famine was artificially created by Stalin to subdue resistance by the peasantry to collectivization and to establish firmly his unquestioned rule. In terms of total victims, the famine rivals Hitler's extermination campaigns against European Jewry during World War II. Groups throughout the United States and Canada are observing the fiftieth anniversary of this famine, in which as many as eleven million Ukrainians and non-Ukrainians may have died, and are rightfully demanding that more attention be paid to this atrocity.

Thus, it is our view that S. Con. Res. 70 is fully consistent with the aims and practice of U.S. foreign policy.

The Office of Management and Budget advises that from the standpoint of the Administration's program there is no objection to the submission of this report.

Sincerely,

Alvin Paul Drischler  
Acting Assistant Secretary  
Legislative and Intergovernmental Affairs

The Honorable  
Charles H. Percy,  
Chairman,  
Committee on Foreign Relations,  
United States Senate.



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

8215

78427

November 14, 1983

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE  
THE WHITE HOUSESUBJECT: Soviet Message to the President on Fiftieth Anniversary  
of U.S.-Soviet Relations

Attached is an informal Department translation of a message from the Supreme Soviet of the USSR to President Reagan. It was delivered to the Department by Soviet Embassy Counselor Kuznetsov November 12, under cover of a letter from Ambassador Dobrynin to Secretary Shultz. We are transmitting both texts by cable to the Secretary. The message is dated November 16; Kuznetsov explained this is because the Soviets plan to publish it either that day or the next. We will be considering the question of whether a reply is warranted (and to whom) and making our recommendation. For the day itself, we believe the Department press statement whose text was transmitted to you earlier today should suffice.

Charles Hill  
Executive SecretaryEnclosure:  
As stated~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECL: OADR

RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 9-11 LISTED ON THE  
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.



DRAFT MESSAGE

78429

TO: The Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet

Fifty years have passed since diplomatic relations were established between our countries. As we note this anniversary, I hope that we can recommit ourselves to working constructively on the problems before us.

The United States has no higher aim nor more urgent goal than achieving and preserving world peace and security.

Let us seek ways, despite the differences in our governments, philosophies and values, to cooperate in reducing international tensions and creating a safer world.

If we can work together to this end, we shall be fulfilling the promise of November 16, 1933, when formal ties between our countries began.

Ronald Reagan

DECLASSIFIED (R/1052)  
Dept. of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997  
BY CV NARA DATE 10/23/09

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

**LIMITED OFFICIAL USE** November 12, 1983MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE  
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Fiftieth Anniversary of U.S.-Soviet Relations

Enclosed is the text of a press statement the Department plans to make on November 16, the fiftieth anniversary of U.S.-Soviet relations. We plan to send the statement to all diplomatic posts with the following caveat: "In the wake of the KAL tragedy we plan to do very little to mark the fiftieth anniversary of U.S.-Soviet relations and assume that the Soviets will take much the same tack. In general, we want to discourage participation in any public celebration of the November 16 event. Where special circumstances dictate otherwise, or attendance at a private (U.S.-Soviet) event seems appropriate, posts should seek guidance from the Department. Posts should not, however, take the initiative to mark the anniversary."

*for*   
Charles Hill  
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:  
As stated -**LIMITED OFFICIAL USE**

JAS, 10/18/00

STATEMENT ON THE FIFTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS

Today marks the fiftieth anniversary of the recognition of the Soviet Union by the United States. In a letter to the Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs written on this date in 1933, President Franklin Roosevelt expressed his hopes for the future: "I trust that the relations now established between our peoples may forever remain normal and friendly, and that our nations henceforth may cooperate for their mutual benefit and for the preservation of the peace of the world."

President Roosevelt had only these hopes to guide him. They continue to guide us, five decades later, in the conduct of relations with the Soviet Union. But we also have the record of the past fifty years before us. Unfortunately, that record falls short of what it should be.

The nuclear era has presented new challenges to all nations which seek peace, as we do. Soviet expansionism throughout that era has been a challenge in its own right. It has raised the honest question of whether the Soviet Union is as committed to peace as we are. Through strength, through realism, through responsible deterrence, and through dialogue, the peace has been preserved, but the challenge remains. For our part, we will continue in our efforts to build a constructive relationship with the Soviet Union on that basis. In this nuclear age our two countries inhabit a small and precious planet together. ~~Our responsibilities are enormous.~~ *Through mutual cooperation we have a unique opportunity to reduce nuclear weapons in the world.*

Our nations today have significantly different interests and values, as they did fifty years ago. But we are prepared to work with the Soviets to solve the problems that confront us. There is a need on both sides for responsible, predictable behavior, behavior that can lead to reduced tensions and equitable solutions that respect the interests of each. That is our approach. We will do our part to maintain the peace: that objective has guided us in relations with the Soviet Union for fifty years, and that is our objective today.



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR CHARLES HILL  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

SUBJECT: Presidential Message to USSR Supreme Soviet

Attached is a message from the President to the USSR Supreme Soviet. Please arrange for its immediate transmission to Embassy Moscow for delivery.

  
Robert M. Kimmitt  
Executive Secretary

Attachment:  
Presidential message

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

8215  
(S/S 8334680)  
Via LDX

*Matlock*

November 15, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR CHARLES HILL  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

SUBJECT: Statement on the 50th Anniversary of U.S.-Soviet  
Relations

Attached is a slightly modified version of the "Statement on the  
Fiftieth Anniversary of U.S.-Soviet Relations." Please proceed  
to utilize it as recommended in your memorandum of November 12.

*Robert M. Kimmitt*  
Robert M. Kimmitt  
Executive Secretary

Attachment

8215 add-on

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

November 15, 1983

TO: ROBERT M. KIMMITT

Please sign and forward the memoranda to Charles Hill at Tabs I and II. They have both been approved for forwarding.

  
Jack Matlock

cc: Bob Sims





502

### National Security Council The White House

00114 201-1

System # I  
Package # 9115

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Executive Secretary	<u>1</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	
John Poindexter	<u>2</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	
Wilma Hall	<u>3</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	
Bud McFarlane	<u>4</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	<u>A</u>
John Poindexter			
Executive Secretary	<u>5</u>		<u>A</u>
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room	<u>URGENT</u>		
Executive Secretary			

I = Information	A = Action	R = Retain	D = Dispatch	N = No further Action
-----------------	------------	------------	--------------	-----------------------

#### DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other \_\_\_\_\_

#### COMMENTS

Should be seen by: ASAP  
(Date/Time)

President briefed at 1030, 11/15/83.

[Signature]

---

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Incoming letter to  
President on pages 3-4.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

70430

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 04 SECSTATE WASHDC 3922  
SIT784 AN000815

DTG: 122159Z NOV 83 PSN: 025977  
TOR: 316/2304Z

-----  
DISTRIBUTION: MCF JP VP SIT MATL /009  
WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLIST  
-----

DECLASSIFIED  
Dept. of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997  
BY CU NARA, DATE 10/23/09

OP IMMED  
DE RUEHC #3922 3162247  
O 122159Z NOV 83 ZFF4  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE 0070

INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 1938  
AMCONSUL LENINGRAD PRIORITY 7038

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ STATE 323922 TOSEC 130177

E. O. 12356: DECL: 11/12/84  
TAGS: PREL, OPDC, UR, US  
SUBJECT: LETTER TO PRESIDENT FROM PRESIDUM OF SUPREME  
SOVIET ON OCCASION OF 50TH ANNIVERSARY OF  
DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN U. S. AND USSR

1. ~~C~~ - ENTIRE TEXT

2. ON NOVEMBER 12, SOVIET EMBASSY COUNSELOR KUZNETSOV  
DELIVERED TO EUR/SOV A LETTER TO YOU FROM SOVIET  
AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN ENCLOSING A LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT  
FROM THE PRESIDUM OF THE USSR SUPREME SOVIET ON THE  
OCCASION OF THE 50TH ANNTVERSARY OF THE ESA3LTSHMENT OF  
DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS 9ETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE  
SOVIET UNION (TEXTS FOLLOW IN PARA 4). THE LETTER TO THE  
PRESIDENT IS DATED NOVEMBER 16, THE ACTUAL DATE OF THE



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 04    SECSTATE WASHDC 3922    DTG: 122159Z NOV 83    PSN: 025977

ANNIVERSARY, AND THE EMBASSY EXPLAINED THIS WAS BECAUSE THE SOVIETS INTEND TO PUBLISH IT.

3. WE TRANSMITTED THE TEXT OF A DEPARTMENT PRESS STATEMENT MARKING THE ANNIVERSARY TO THE NSC THIS MORNING. WE ARE ALSO TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF THE SOVIET MESSAGE TO THE NSC, NOTING THAT WE ARE SENDING IT TO YOU AND WILL BE CONSIDERING WHETHER A REPLY IS WARRANTED AND MAKING A RECOMMENDATION; FOR THE TIME BEING, WE BELIEVE

THE PRESS STATEMENT SHOULD SUFFICE FOR NOVEMBER 16 ITSELF.

4. BEGIN TEXTS

LETTER TO THE SECRETARY  
-----

THE HONORABLE  
GEORGE P. SHULTZ  
SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

NOVEMBER 12, 1983

DEAR MR. SECRETARY,

I WOULD LIKE TO ASK YOU TO FORWARD TO PRESIDENT REAGAN THE ENCLOSED MESSAGE OF THE PRESIDUM OF THE USSR SUPREME SOVIET ON THE OCCASION OF THE 50TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES.

WITH BEST WISHES,

SINCERELY,

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 04 SECSTATE WASHDC 3922

DTG: 122159Z NOV 83 PSN: 025977

ANATOLIY F. DOBRYNIN,  
AMBASSADOR

LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT  
-----  
(UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION)

RONALD W. REAGAN  
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

MR. PRESIDENT:

NOVEMBER 16TH WILL MARK 50 YEARS FROM THE MOMENT OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. THIS IS A MAJOR LANDMARK IN RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO STATES.

IN ESTABLISHING DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS, BOTH SIDES PROCEEDED FROM A RECOGNITION OF THE FUNDAMENTAL

DIFFERENCE IN THEIR SOCIO-ECONOMIC SYSTEMS, BUT AT THE SAME TIME FROM A RECOGNITION THAT THIS DIFFERENCE IS NOT AN OBSTACLE TO NORMAL INTERSTATE RELATIONS.

THIS PRINCIPLE IS OF LASTING SIGNIFICANCE. THE SOVIET STATE, UNFAILINGLY DEVOTED TO THE CAUSE OF PEACE AMONG PEOPLES AND TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF EQUITABLE, MUTUALLY ADVANTAGEOUS RELATIONS, IS TO THIS DAY FIRMLY GUIDED BY THIS PRINCIPLE IN ITS RELATIONS WITH THE USA.

WE ASSUME THAT THERE IS A BASIS IN OUR COUNTRIES FOR PROPER APPRECIATION OF THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SUCH A DATE AS THE 50TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

~~PAGE 04 OF 04 SECSTATE WASHDC 3922 DTG: 122159Z NOV 83 PSN: 025977~~

RELATIONS.

PRESIDIUM OF THE SUPREME SOVIET OF THE USSR  
MOSCOW  
NOVEM4ER 16, 1983

D.AM  
BT



RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 13-14 LISTED ON THE  
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.


8215 add-on

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

November 15, 1983

TO: ROBERT M. KIMMITT

Please sign and forward the memoranda to Charles Hill at Tabs I and II. They have both been approved for forwarding.

  
Jack Matlock

cc: Bob Sims



I



8215  
(S/S 8334680)

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

November 15, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR CHARLES HILL  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

SUBJECT: Statement on the 50th Anniversary of U.S.-Soviet  
Relations

Attached is a slightly modified version of the "Statement on the Fiftieth Anniversary of U.S.-Soviet Relations." Please proceed to utilize it as recommended in your memorandum of November 12.

Robert M. Kimmitt  
Executive Secretary

Attachment

## STATEMENT ON THE FIFTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS

Today marks the fiftieth anniversary of the recognition of the Soviet Union by the United States. In a letter to the Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs written on this date in 1933, President Franklin Roosevelt expressed his hopes for the future: "I trust that the relations now established between our peoples may forever remain normal and friendly, and that our nations henceforth may cooperate for their mutual benefit and for the preservation of the peace of the world."

President Roosevelt had only these hopes to guide him. They continue to guide us, five decades later, in the conduct of relations with the Soviet Union. But we also have the record of the past fifty years before us. Unfortunately, that record falls short of what it should be.

The nuclear era has presented new challenges to all nations which seek peace, as we do. Soviet expansionism throughout that era has been a challenge in its own right. It has raised the honest question of whether the Soviet Union is as committed to peace as we are. Through strength, through realism, through responsible deterrence, and through dialogue, the peace has been preserved, but the challenge remains. For our part, we will continue in our efforts to build a constructive relationship with the Soviet Union on that basis. In this nuclear age our two countries inhabit a small and precious planet together. Through mutual cooperation we have a unique opportunity to reduce nuclear weapons in the world.

Our nations today have significantly different interests and values, as they did fifty years ago. But we are prepared to work with the Soviets to solve the problems that confront us. There is a need on both sides for responsible, predictable behavior, behavior that can lead to reduced tensions and equitable solutions that respect the interests of each. That is our approach. We will do our part to maintain the peace: that objective has guided us in relations with the Soviet Union for fifty years, and that is our objective today.

II



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR CHARLES HILL  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

SUBJECT: Presidential Message to USSR Supreme Soviet

Attached is a message from the President to the USSR Supreme Soviet. Please arrange for its immediate transmission to Embassy Moscow for delivery.

Robert M. Kimmitt  
Executive Secretary

Attachment:  
Presidential message

DRAFT MESSAGE

78433

TO: The Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet

Fifty years have passed since diplomatic relations were established between our countries. As we note this anniversary, I hope that we can recommit ourselves to working constructively on the problems before us.

The United States has no higher aim nor more urgent goal than achieving and preserving world peace and security.

Let us seek ways, despite the differences in our governments, philosophies and values, to cooperate in reducing international tensions and creating a safer world.

If we can work together to this end, we shall be fulfilling the promise of November 16, 1933, when formal ties between our countries began.

Ronald Reagan

DECLASSIFIED (RE/CASE)  
Dept. of State Guidelines, July 21, 1987  
CW 10/23/09