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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: MATLOCK, JACK: Files

Archivist: lov

File Folder: Matlock Chron October 1983 [10/11-10/24]

Date: July 29, 1999

Box ~~90888~~ 2

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
<del>1. Memo</del>	<del>Matlock and Sergei Vishnevsky meeting on October 11 1983 [91201], 3p</del>	<del>nd</del>	<del>P1/F1</del>
2. Memo	R 9/13/00 NLSF95-074/2 #93 Matlock to McFarlane, re urgent items: Europe, 1p	10/17/83	P1/F1
<del>3. Memo</del>	<del>Charles Hill to McFarlane, re meeting between the Embassy Pentecostals, 1p</del>	<del>10/19/83</del>	<del>P1/F1</del>
4. Memo	R 7/7/00 NLSF95-074/2 #94 Charles Hill to Clark, re travel of the last Embassy Pentecostals, 1p	7/29/83	P1/F1
<del>5. Memo</del>	<del>Hill to Clark, re recommended USG posture on the emigration of the Embassy Pentecostals, 1p</del>	<del>nd</del>	<del>P1/F1</del>
	R 7/7/00 NLSF95-074/2 #97		

### RESTRICTION CODES

**Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].
- C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

**Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

REFERRAL

DATE 21 SEP 83

MEMORANDUM FOR STATE

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION

TO PRESIDENT

SOURCE BYRD, ROBERT C

DATE 07 SEP 83

KEYWORDS USSR

KAL FLIGHT 007

CO

SUBJ LTR TO PRES FM SEN RE RESPONSE RE SOVIET ATTACK ON KAL

-----  
REQUIRED ACTION DRAFT REPLY FOR WH SIG

DUE DATE: 24 SEP 83

COMMENTS

*Jennifer*

FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

*rec'd S/S-T  
9/21/83 2300  
NHR*

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection:** MATLOCK, JACK: Files

**Archivist:** lov

**File Folder:** Matlock Chron October 1983 [10/25-10/31]  
Box 90888

**Date:** July 29, 1999

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
<del>1. Memo</del>	<del>Kenneth Tomlinson to McFarlane, re cultural program [7733], 1p</del> <i>R 11/5/99 NLSF 95-074/2 #98</i>	<del>10/26/83</del>	<del>P1/F1</del>
<del>2. Memo</del>	<del>Marlin Remick to Mr. Hedges, 3p</del> <i>R 11/5/99 NLSF 95-074/2 #99</i>	<del>10/16/83</del>	<del>P1/F1</del>
<del>3. Memo</del>	<del>Matlock to McFarlane, re Hartman meeting [91311], 1p</del> <i>R 9/13/00 NLSF 95-074/2 #100</i>	<del>10/28/83</del>	<del>P1/F1</del>
<del>4. Cable</del>	<del>191245Z OCT 83, 6p</del> <i>R 7/7/00 NLSF 95-074/2 #101</i>	<del>10/19/83</del>	<del>P1/F1</del>
<del>5. Memo</del>	<del>Matlock to Poindexter, re Eagleburger conversation [91320], 1p</del> <i>R 9/13/00 NLSF 95-074/2 #102</i>	<del>10/31/83</del>	<del>P1/F1</del>
<del>6. Cable</del>	<del>131518Z OCT 83, 5p</del> <i>R 7/7/00 NLSF 95-074/2 #103</i>	<del>10/13/83</del>	<del>P1/F1</del>

### RESTRICTION CODES

**Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
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- F-8 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

TRAVEL WORK SHEET

DATE: October 25, 1983

MAIL CHECK TO: NAME Jack F. Matlock  
 ADDRESS c/o Administrative Office, Room 397, Old Executive Office Bldg  
Washington, D.C. 20506

OFFICIAL DUTY DATES: October 20 - 24, 1983

ADVANCE RECEIVED: \$200.00 EXCHANGE RATE(S): £ 1.00 = \$1.56

FORM OF PAYMENT OF TRANSPORTATION (CASH OR GTR): \_\_\_\_\_

LODGING WAS PROVIDED/PAID FOR BY: Ditchley  
 (If paid by traveler, receipt must accompany claim.)

TRAVEL SCHEDULE

DATE/TIME	(PLACE) DEPARTED FROM	DATE/TIME	(PLACE) ARRIVED AT	TAXI/POV/ MISC EXPENSES	NO. MILES	AMOUNT
10/20 1915	Residence	10/20 2000	Dulles	Taxi		\$34.00
10/20 2115	Dulles	10/21 0930	London			
10/21 1030	London	10/21 1200	Ditchley			
10/23 1615	Ditchley Park	10/23 1745	London			
10/23 2115	London	10/23 2245	NY, NY			
10/23 2300	JFK	10/23 2345	Laguardia	Taxi		\$25.00

Sheraton Inn

EXPENSES

DATE	LODGING	MEALS			OTHER
		Breakfast	Lunch	Dinner	
10/21-23			(Ditchley expenses)		\$23.40
10/21-24			(Miscellaneous)		10.00
10/23-24	\$56.13				
10/21&23			(Baggage Handling)		3.12

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

1. Attach copy of GTR, ticket stubs, pullman stubs, etc. Return used tickets to Admin Office for refund from carrier when GTR is used.
2. All expenses incurred MUST be itemized. Receipts for hotels/motels must be submitted. Receipts must be submitted for all other expenses (i.e., taxis, meals, etc.) that are \$15.00 and over), or the claim will not be paid.

USE REVERSE SIDE FOR ADDITIONAL SPACE.



**EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT  
OFFICIAL TRAVEL AUTHORIZATION**  
(read the Privacy Act statement  
and instructions on back)

**1. TYPE OF AUTHORIZATION**

- TDY  Relocation  
 Blanket  Amendment  
(show item no(s) amended)  
 Invitational

2. Traveler (First name, middle initial, last name)

**Jack F. Matlock**

3. Title

**Staff Member**

4. Organization

**National Security Council**

5. Office Phone

**395-5112**

6. Official Duty Station

**Washington, D.C.**

7. Purpose of Travel

**Attend conference sponsored by the Ditchley Foundation.**

8. Itinerary (Point of origin and places to be visited)

**From Washington, D.C. to London, England and return to Washington, D.C.**

9(a) Travel begin on or about

**10/20/83**

9(b) Travel end on or about

**10/24/83**

10.  Per Diem

Actual Subsistence (High Rate Area)

Actual Subsistence (Unusual Circumstances)\*  
Rate(s):

**MODE OF TRAVEL**

11(a) Commercial Transportation 11(b) Privately owned vehicle

Rail		Air			Auto	Plane	Rate auth per mile	<input type="checkbox"/> Determined more advantageous to Government* <input type="checkbox"/> For convenience of traveler NTE common carrier cost
Coach	Extra Fare*	Coach/Tourist	First Class ‡	In lieu of train in N.E. corridor*				
		<b>x</b>						

‡ First Class must have approval of Agency Head or Deputy

11(c)  Gov't Owned  
Vehicle

11(d) Other (specify)

12. SPECIAL EXPENSES AUTHORIZED	13. ESTIMATED COST	AMOUNT
<input type="checkbox"/> Registration Fees (meetings, training, etc.)	Per Diem/Actual Subsistence	\$ <b>136.00</b>
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Taxi fares between lodging and/or place of business	Transportation	<b>895.00</b>
<input type="checkbox"/> Commercial Rental Car	Miscellaneous	
<input type="checkbox"/> Excess Baggage not to exceed _____		
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Other <b>taxi to/from residence/airport</b>		
14. ADVANCE REQUESTED \$ <b>200.00</b>	<b>TOTAL</b>	\$ <b>1,439.00</b>

\*15. Special Provisions/Remarks (Justification for first class travel, utilization of plane in N.E. corridor, actual subsistence, annual leave enroute, etc.)

**Authorize actual subsistence not to exceed: London-\$103.00 + \$33.00 = \$136.00.**

16(a) Requested by

**Jack Matlock**

17. Accounting data

**1142000**

16(b) I certify that the travel herein was reviewed and determined to be essential for the accomplishment of agency programs and missions  
Approval Official (Signature and title)

**Patricia Blauth  
Administrative Assistant**

18. Funds are available to defray travel costs specified above  
Funds Manager's Certification (Signature)  
*Thomas C. Shull*  
**Thomas C. Shull, Dep. Exec. Secy**

19. Date

**10/17/83**

20. Travel Authorization No.

**XS4E04**

**PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT** ..... The information requested is required to document the authorization and reimbursement of the individuals who travel at government expense on official business. Its routine use is restricted to officers and employees of Executive Office of the President agencies for performance of their official duties. Disclosure is voluntary, but failure to provide all or part of the information may delay or prevent authorization of travel. This information is collected under the authority of 31 U.S.C. 66a, 41 U.S.C. 3101, 3102, 3309; and General Accounting Office and General Services Administration policies and procedures.

### Instructions for Completing Travel Authorization

**ITEM 1—Check:**

- TDY block if travel is of routine nature by an employee of your agency
- Blanket block if authorization is for more than one trip.
- Invitational block if travel is to be performed by a person who is not employed by your agency.
- Relocation block if authorization is for a person being transferred from or to another geographical locality.
- Amendment block if making change to existing Travel Authorization.

**ITEMS 2 Through 9 are Self Explanatory.**

**ITEM 10 — Check appropriate box for the type of reimbursement authorized.  
List rate or rates applicable.**

**ITEM 11 — Check mode of travel authorized.**

**ITEM 12 — Check appropriate box for any special expenses authorized.**

**ITEM 13 — Compute cost of per diem or actual subsistence utilizing the information in **Item 10**.**

- Transportation is cost of airline ticket, privately owned vehicle mileage, or other transportation cost.
- Miscellaneous could include rental car, registration fees, taxi cabs, etc.

**ITEM 14 — Complete **only** if an advance of funds is requested.**

**ITEM 15 — Space provided for justifications and other miscellaneous information.**

**ITEM 16(a) — Signature of Traveler.**

**16(b) — Signature of Approving Official.**

**ITEMS 17 & 18 — Self Explanatory.**

**ITEMS 19 & 20 — To be completed by personnel assigning T/A numbers.**



**EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT  
OFFICIAL TRAVEL AUTHORIZATION**

(read the Privacy Act statement  
and instructions on back)

**1. TYPE OF AUTHORIZATION**

- TDY
- Relocation
- Blanket
- Amendment  
(show item no(s) amended)
- Invitational
- #13, 20**

**2. Traveler** (First name, middle initial, last name)

**JACK F. MATLOCK**

**3. Title**

**4. Organization**

**5. Office Phone**

**6. Official Duty Station**

**7. Purpose of Travel**

**8. Itinerary** (Point of origin and places to be visited)

**9(a) Travel begin on or about**

**9(b) Travel end on or about**

- 10.**  Per Diem  
 Actual Subsistence (High Rate Area)  
 Actual Subsistence (Unusual Circumstances)\*  
 Rate(s):

**MODE OF TRAVEL**

**11(a) Commercial Transportation**

**11(b) Privately owned vehicle**

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Coach	Extra Fare*	Coach/Tourist	First Class †	In lieu of train in N.E. corridor*				

† First Class must have approval of Agency Head or Deputy

**11(c)**  Gov't Owned  
Vehicle

**11(d)** Other (specify)

**12. SPECIAL EXPENSES AUTHORIZED**

- Registration Fees (meetings, training, etc.)
- Taxi fares between lodging and/or place of business
- Commercial Rental Car
- Excess Baggage not to exceed \_\_\_\_\_
- Other \_\_\_\_\_

**13. ESTIMATED COST**

**AMOUNT**

Per Diem/Actual Subsistence	\$	<b>544.00</b>
Transportation		<b>895.00</b>
Miscellaneous		
<b>14. ADVANCE REQUESTED</b>	\$	
	<b>TOTAL</b>	\$ <b>1,439.00</b>

**\*15. Special Provisions/Remarks** (Justification for first class travel, utilization of plane in N.E. corridor, actual subsistence, annual leave enroute, etc.)

**16(a) Requested by**

**17. Accounting data**

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Approval Official (Signature and title)

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Funds Manager's Certification (Signature)

*Thomas C. Shull, Dep. Exec. Secy*

**19. Date**

**20. Travel Authorization No.**

**XS4E04**

**Patricia Blauth**  
Administrative Assistant

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**ITEM 16(a) — Signature of Traveler.  
16(b) — Signature of Approving Official.**

**ITEMS 17 & 18 — Self Explanatory.**

**ITEMS 19 & 20 — To be completed by personnel assigning T/A numbers.**

10/26/83

CELEBRATION OF 65TH ANNIVERSARY  
OF THE INDEPENDENCE OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Remarks by Jack F. Matlock  
Washington, D.C., October 26, 1983

I appreciate the opportunity to mark the 65th anniversary of the independence of Czechoslovakia with you. Most of you trace your heritage to that beautiful land; the rest of us have ties of experience, interest and friendship. But whatever the precise nature of our tie, we all share a profound personal commitment to the freedom, welfare and prosperity of our relatives and friends in Czechoslovakia.

There is no need to recount the details of the historical experience of the Czechs and Slovaks in this century. We know them, not just in our minds, but in our hearts. But on this occasion I think it is proper--indeed necessary--to ponder the meaning of these events. What lessons can we draw, we friends of Czechoslovakia, we Americans, and, yes, we human beings dedicated to the proposition that mankind has an inalienable right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness?

First, the event itself--the establishment of a free and independent Czechoslovak state. When we think of this momentous event, we think first of all of two men, Tomas Masaryk and Milan Stefanik. To honor them is not to denigrate all the others who worked with them, but simply to say that they were both effective leaders of their peoples with the practical diplomatic skills to bring to fruition a difficult objective. With all the differences in their personalities and background, these two men shared a vision, a vision of an independent, democratic Czechoslovak state, and had the skill and leadership qualities to shape the national will to practical ends. The Pittsburg Declaration and the subsequent diplomatic efforts made the Czechoslovak Declaration of Independence possible. Nevertheless, a viable state could not have been created in 1918 if Masaryk and Stefanik had not been preceded by a national awakening. Their achievement was possible only as the result of the efforts of countless people in the nineteenth century who led the national awakening of their people. They stood directly on the shoulders of the Palackys, the Smetanas, the Sturs and the Hviezdoslavs.

10/26/83

OUTLINE

1. Importance of National tradition
2. Democratic basis
3. Association with U.S.
  - ties of blood and history
  - Masaryk in U.S. and WWII
  - Czechs and Slovaks in U.S.
4. Subsequent events: 1938, 1948, 1968
  - Chamberlain statement
  - postwar occupation zones
- 5 Lessons for us
  - maintain hope
  - maintain cultural identity
  - maintain personal ties
  - broader lesson: hazardous course to abandon friends--  
even when they seem far away
6. What we can do
7. Faith: immediate outlook gloomy, but we must persist. Must be confident that, in end, pravda vitezi.

MEMORANDUM

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

October 27, 1983

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Draft Speech by Deputy Secretary Dam

I have no problems with the draft speech (Tab I) prepared for delivery by Deputy Secretary Dam on October 31, except that the references to the Helsinki Final Act on page 12 should be consistent with the fact that the Final Act is not a treaty (i.e., is not legally binding).

For your information, I believe it will be useful for the President to make a major speech on U.S.-Soviet relations in a month or so, and would not want this speech to preempt some of the things the President might say. However, it seems sufficiently general and retrospective that there should be no potential conflict, and indeed, it could serve as a useful prelude to what the President might say, explaining some useful background points in greater detail than would be possible in a Presidential statement.

Therefore, I recommend clearance with the caveat that the language on page 12 be vetted by a lawyer familiar with our position regarding the legal status of the Helsinki Final Act. (Memorandum to State at Tab II.)

John Lenczowski and Bob Sims concur. *JL*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab II.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

## Attachments:

Tab I Draft Speech  
Tab II Kimmitt to Hill Memorandum

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

*JFM*  
7/28/99



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

October 26, 1983

URGENT

MEMORANDUM

*BM*

TO: S/S - Mr. Hill

FROM: D - James P. Timbie *JT*

SUBJECT: Draft Speech by the Deputy Secretary

Attached is a draft speech on US-Soviet relations for the Deputy Secretary to present to the International House at the University of Chicago on October 31. Please circulate this draft to the following distribution, requesting comments or concurrence to James Timbie (632-8930) by COB Thursday, October 27:

Outside State

Within State

- NSC ✓
- OSD
- CIA
- ACDA

- S
- P
- T
- C
- H
- PA
- PM
- S/P
- EA
- AF
- ARA
- HA
- NEA

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

*JT*  
*1/28/99*

International House Speech  
DRAFT - EUR #3- 10/25/83  
Challenges of U.S.-Soviet Relations

At the Fifty Year Mark

I

The commemoration today of International House's five decades appropriately coincides with the eve of another 50th anniversary -- that of the establishment of formal diplomatic relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. It was, of course, in November of 1933 that the Roosevelt-Litvinov Agreement was concluded, giving us one of our first opportunities to undergo the rigors of the classic Soviet negotiating style.

In the following years, every American administration since FDR's has had to wrestle with the increasingly complex problems posed by this evolving relationship: How does the United States deal with the reality of a country that is both assertive and insecure in its dealings with the rest of the world? How do we build a constructive relationship with the Soviet Union, whose interests and values are so different from ours? How do we sustain a coherent policy in the face of wide swings in American popular opinion from euphoria to <sup>a</sup> [bitter].

hostility? In one way or another, U.S.-Soviet relations have been the central issue in postwar American foreign policy and, not surprisingly, have been the source of much political debate. Honest men and women can have different views about that relationship both because the Soviet Union is far more complex than it was 50 years ago and because we still know far too little about it.

It is especially fitting, then, that we have come together at International House to take a fresh look at the issues involved in U.S.-Soviet relations of the 1980's -- examining some problems that are familiar after fifty years and others that are quite new.

As the keynote speaker to a conference entitled "The Search for Solutions," I should not pre-empt the rest of the field by providing all of the definitive answers this early in the morning. Do not fear. If this Administration or those that recently preceded it had the final answers, you would not be having this conference. I can, however, aspire to setting the stage for the discussions to follow by reviewing with you those aspects of Soviet policy of the past decade that directly affect American interests. They are the facts of life, if you will, that any U.S. decision-maker will have to face in considering the future course of Soviet-American relations.



II

Let me begin by reviewing the steady increase in Soviet military strength during the past two decades, extending through periods of both tension and détente. I do so because it is the Soviet military establishment that provides the basis for the Soviet Union's super-power status in the world of the 1980's. It is this dramatic expansion of Soviet military power, both nuclear and conventional, that gives an obvious immediacy to our need to manage Soviet-American frictions carefully .

The allocation of Soviet resources for military purposes has been persistent and substantial. The burden of defense within the Soviet Union -- the share of the GNP devoted to the military -- remained at 13 - 14 percent through the past decade. By contrast, defense spending within the United States during this period averaged only 5.9 percent. Even with our planned increases, U.S. defense spending in 1984 will increase just one percent more -- to 6.8 percent of our GNP in 1984. According to our estimates, the real growth in Soviet military spending has averaged 4 percent a year since 1970, though this may have declined somewhat in recent years. The high level already achieved, however, is being maintained.

The Soviet military sector continues to be accorded the number one priority in resource allocation -- including capital, people and bureaucratic precedence. More than one-third of all Soviet machinery output now goes to the military. Substantial amounts of metallurgical products, electrical power, coal, gas, and chemicals are either directly sent to the military or embodied in the goods it receives. Almost one-half of all research and development expenditures goes for military applications.

In human terms, the Soviet military sector takes about one-seventh of total manpower and a substantially higher proportion of the best qualified scientific and technical personnel. The military sector is truly the fast-track of a bifurcated economy, absorbing the best talents and the greatest energy while demanding a high degree of efficiency. In its administration, large parts of military production are separated from the civilian sector by not only secrecy, but different organizational rules and procedures as well. The resulting burdens of this separate military economy weigh heavily on the quality of life for the average citizen.

In view of the pervasive secrecy in the Soviet Union and the formidable intellectual issues involved, debates recur both within and outside the U.S. government regarding our ruble and dollar estimates of Soviet defense spending. The concrete results of such spending programs, however, are clear. There is nothing hypothetical about the overall size and growth of the Soviet military establishment.

Over the past decade, for instance, the Soviets have manufactured approximately 2000 new ICBMs; by comparison, the United States built approximately 350 during the same time. The Soviets built 54,000 new tanks and armored vehicles; U.S. production was 11,000. The Soviet Union turned out 6000 tactical combat aircraft; the U.S., 3000. The Soviets launched 61 attack submarines; the United States, 27.

It is not just a question of numbers. Qualitatively, much of this growing Soviet arsenal is comparable to U.S. systems. Within the last two years, we have seen:

-- The first tests of two new Soviet land-based ICBMs -- the MIRVed SS-X-24 and the single warhead SS-X-25 -- and the continued improvement of their already deployed force consisting of over 800 SS-17, SS-18, and SS-19 modern ICBMs.

-- Flight-tests of a new generation of strategic heavy bomber, which we call the BLACKJACK, and of an entirely new generation of Soviet cruise missiles.

-- The launching of the 25,000 ton TYPHOON class strategic ballistic missile submarine and of two new KIEV-class aircraft carriers to join the two Soviet carriers already in operation.

-- Deployment of some 100 new SS-20's carrying three nuclear warheads each, for a total of more than 350 of these mobile intermediate-range missiles targeted on Europe and East Asia.

-- In space, an increase in the Soviet Union's military-related programs -- involving manned missions, reconnaissance/ surveillance/ targetting satellites, and the world's only operational anti-satellite system.

Inevitably, in any such overview our attention is drawn to the new weapons systems. Yet, the steady pursuit of long-standing programs, combined with the Soviet practice of keeping older but capable models in inventory much longer than in the West, has resulted over the years in a tremendous military inventory for the Soviet Union. The results are

readily apparent from NATO/Warsaw Pact force comparisons: the East now fields some 42,500 main battle tanks as compared to 13,000 by the West, and over 31,000 artillery pieces and heavy mortars to less than 11,000 comparable Western weapons.

This inventory has also provided a reservoir for the ready supply of Soviet weaponry at concessional rates to an increasing number of countries. Since 1969, Soviet military aid to the Third World has increased tenfold. As a result, the Soviet Union has become the largest arms exporter to the Third World and the principal supplier of over 34 states, twice as many a decade ago.

The Soviet military machine is not without flaws. In addition to the disadvantages posed by a highly-centralized command structure, Soviet strategists in the 1980's will be have to consider the military implications of the Soviet Union's longer-term economic and demographic problems. The West, moreover, can bring to bear powerful advantages of its own in maintaining a common defense. In recent years, we have done much to redress past inadequacies in this area.

Nonetheless, the scope and persistence of the Soviet Union's efforts to create an instrument of military power

beyond reasonable estimates of their defense requirements is troubling. This quest for military superiority has been made in the face of mounting domestic economic difficulties. Our concerns over this Soviet preoccupation with power have been heightened by their increasingly disruptive international behaviour over the past decade.

That record of increased Soviet activism and influence, particularly in the Third World, is already familiar to you. The wide range and diversity in the Soviet Union's ties with various client states of the Third World defies any simple categorization. The methods and degree of Soviet involvement vary from country to country. In addition to the Soviet Union's expanded role as an arms supplier, we have also seen in recent years:

-- the Soviet Union's direct military intervention into Afghanistan;

-- its strengthened economic and military involvement with such regional powers as Cuba and Viet Nam;

-- its deployment of over 20,000 of their own or East Bloc military personnel located in more than 30 Third World countries, including sophisticated Soviet air-defense missiles and their crews in Syria; and

-- its innovative and extensive use of surrogate forces -- some 40,000 Cuban military personnel in Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Central America.

However, Soviet-Third World relations are not without friction. At times, the conflicting interests of the Soviet Union and a Third World nation or group have resulted in twists and turns for Soviet diplomacy. The PLO's Arafat has recently discovered this to his misfortune, now that he is opposed by Syria and has as a result become a non-person in Moscow's eyes. Nor is it a game without risks for the Soviets. Their failures in Egypt and Somalia in the 1970's are well-known.

Nonetheless, it is possible for us to identify two broad benefits that the Soviet Union has gained through its Third World relationships over this past decade. First of all, these relationships have permitted the Soviet Union to project power into regions not immediately on their borders. Looking at today's geopolitical map, we can see -- for the first time --

Soviet military bases on or adjoining strategically sensitive points throughout the world: Cam Ranh on the South China Sea approaches to the Straits of Malacca; Asmara, Aden and the Dahlak Islands at the access to the Red Sea and Suez Canal; Luanda in Southern Africa; and a variety of installations in Cuba on the Caribbean approaches to the Panama Canal and American Gulf Coast.

Secondly, these Third World relationships have now enabled the Soviet Union to involve itself in regional politics to a much greater degree than before. The origin and basic causes of instability in the Third World are predominantly local in origin. But all too often, the Soviets have used the opportunities provided by local instability to expand their power and influence. To that end, their policies have frequently hindered efforts to resolve existing tensions. The difficulties, for instance, of securing peace in Lebanon in the face of Soviet efforts to encourage Syrian obstruction are obvious and immediate.

Ironically, at the same time that the Soviets are playing this increasingly active, if unconstructive role throughout the world, their basic behavior continues to be rooted in an excessive insularity. Recent events illustrate three different aspects of this problem.



If nothing else, the Soviet Union's destruction of KAL 007, its subsequent attempts to deny any wrong-doing on its part in this tragedy, and its assertion that it is prepared to act again in a similar matter as their interests require underscore the Soviet search for absolute security. The Soviet conduct in the KAL 007 incident does not stand in isolation. Rather, it is consistent with a concept of security under which the Soviet Union has claimed the right to intervene in neighboring states (which was demonstrated in Afghanistan) and to maintain levels of weaponry greater than those of many other states combined (which we now see in the INF talks).

In the name of absolute security the Soviet leadership continues to be unwilling to countenance either meaningful national autonomy for Eastern bloc countries or free expression and initiative for its own peoples. In recent years, a general internal crackdown has occurred within the Soviet Union. Jewish, German, Armenian and other emigration are at the lowest level since the 1960's and officially-sponsored anti-Semitism is on the rise. The oppression of such prominent dissidents as Sakharov and Shcharanskiy continues unabated. Unfortunately, just in the past month a series of new trials has been held, resulting in the convictions of:

Iosif Begun [Yo-siff Bay-goon], a noted Jewish activist;

Oleg Radzinskiy [Ah-lyeg Rad-zeen-ski], a leader in the unofficial Soviet peace movement; and

Father Sigitas Tamkevicius [Seeg-it-tass Tom-kay-veech-us], a prominent Lithuanian Catholic leader;

-- all for the crime of disseminating anti-Soviet material.

Soviet infringements of the rights <sup>promised</sup> guaranteed under the Helsinki Final Act are representative of the Soviet Union's persistent violations of both the spirit and the letter of international obligations. In recent years, apparent Soviet infractions of various agreements have increased with troubling frequency -- the suppression of human rights that I just mentioned; evidence of "yellow rain" and employment of lethal biological warfare in Afghanistan and Indochina; and most recently, a series of Soviet activities involving ICBM testing and radar construction that has raised serious questions about Soviet compliance with the <sup>Strategic offensive</sup> ~~SALT II~~ and ABM agreements. These Soviet efforts to stretch treaties and obligations to their very brink and sometimes beyond have disturbing implications for the future of the arms control process.

*Agents  
this  
there?*

*Point: SALT II not signed*

III

Occasionally, we hear the argument that the patterns of Soviet behavior that I have described are at least in part a response to recent U.S. policies. It is asserted that Soviet actions, however disproportionate in final result, have arisen out of deep-seated fears exacerbated by a perceived U.S. hostility. While this circular action-reaction model of U.S.-Soviet relations has a simplicity and symmetry that may appeal to those so inclined, the evidence available does not support it.

In considering Soviet actions over the past decade -- whether in terms of military spending, expanded Third World involvement, or tightened domestic suppression -- I am struck as much by the sense of continuity as of change. Obvious shifts in tempo and tactical emphasis have occurred, but the basic direction of the Soviet Union has remained much the same throughout its dealings with the Nixon, Ford, Carter and now Reagan Administrations. The Soviets themselves say that their policies have not changed.

Scholars, for example, differ over the degree to which particular American policies have affected Soviet emigration rates in the 1970's. The sustained crack-down on dissidents over the past years, however, has clearly been driven by Soviet leadership decisions based primarily on internal considerations. Similarly, Soviet activism in various Third World areas during this same period appears to be far more opportunistic than defensive in the face of any supposed American provocation.

The Soviet military build-up occurred well before the United States began devoting increased attention to defense in the last three to four years. The large, MIRVed ICBMs that form the core of the Soviet strategic forces, for instance, have no counterpart in U.S. forces, and certainly cannot be considered a response to any U.S. program. Soviet SS-20 deployments in Europe and Asia since the mid-1970's cannot be seen as a counter to U.S. actions. The number of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe has in fact declined during this period.

*Since the U.S. has no theater nuclear weapons in Europe.*

Similarly, it is questionable that U.S. statements about the advantages of democracy over the Soviet system are themselves responsible for Soviet-American frictions. I recall that on one of his visits to Moscow, Giscard D'Estaing proposed

to then-Soviet leader Brezhnev that détente in the diplomatic and economic sphere should be accompanied by a relaxation of ideological competition. Giscard was firmly rebuffed with the Soviet rejoinder that ideological coexistence was totally impossible. The Soviet reaction to our efforts to assist and support those who seek to build democracy within the Third World shows that this policy has not changed.

#### IV

This is not to say that we cannot influence the Soviets. On the contrary, U.S. policy can be a major factor in shaping the degree, if not the direction, of Soviet policies. We should be wary, however, of any illusion about the possibility of quick or dramatic breakthroughs in our relations with the Soviet Union, no matter how earnestly we might desire such an easy solution.

In considering how we might respond to the Soviet actions that I outlined earlier, this Administration concluded that we should strive to create an international environment in which the Soviet Union is faced

-- first, with tangible evidence of a renewed determination by the United States and its allies to strengthen both our common defenses and Western political and economic cohesion, and

-- secondly, with drastically reduced opportunities and incentives for adventurism and intimidation.

In pursuing this general strategy, we have sought to be prudent and realistic. In such an environment we expect that over time the Soviet leadership will see greater restraint on their part as the most attractive option -- not out of any sudden conversion to our values, but out of sober calculation of how best to serve Soviet interests.

To that end, we have pursued policies intended to restore the military balance. Our preference is to do so through verifiable agreements that will reduce arms on both sides. But, if necessary, we will restore the balance through our own and allied defense programs. Because of our concern about the Soviet readiness to use force and promote instability, that we will resist any encroachments on our vital interests and those of our allies. At the same time, however, we have stated that

we will respect legitimate Soviet security interests and are ready to negotiate equitable solutions to outstanding problems.

Such a strategy, of course, is more than just a question of solely U.S. policy towards the Soviet Union. Rather, it touches upon the much larger issue of how the West as a whole manages its dealings with the Communist East. This is a subject beyond the scope of my speech today. This morning, I would only note one important point. There is some validity to the view that a lack of both firmness on the part of the United States and of cohesion within the Western Alliance has encouraged the Soviet Union in its lack of restraint. The Administration believes that the converse is also true -- that strengthened consultation and cooperation with our various allies and friends can serve to discourage unconstructive Soviet actions.

By last spring, we were beginning to see signs that the Administration's efforts in the economic, defense, and diplomatic fields were paying off. Domestically, economic recovery was underway. Various defense programs were already showing results.

Diplomatically, along with the successful Williamsburg

Summit, a series of productive meetings in NATO and other international organizations provided a useful benchmark by which to measure our progress in strengthening the Western Alliance in terms of our common trade and security policies. Through this process, the United States reached agreement with our allies at the Williamsburg Summit and later at the June meeting of the NATO North Atlantic Council in Paris that economic relations with the Soviet Union should be conducted on a strict balance of mutual advantage and should not directly contribute to Soviet military strength. At the same time, the Western governments reaffirmed their support of the 1979 "Dual Track" decision relating to the restoration of a balance in land-based intermediate nuclear missile forces -- either through negotiations or Western deployments.

Earlier this year, the United States began to step up the pace of our dialogue with the Soviets in a variety of channels and levels -- in both Washington and Moscow as well as in Geneva, Vienna and Madrid. Our contacts included extensive sessions on the part of the Secretary and myself with Ambassador Dobrynin. We pressed a comprehensive agenda in these exchanges -- covering arms control, regional issues, human rights, and bilateral questions involving trade and exchanges. We were expecting no breakthroughs. Rather, we



sought to discover where some progress might be made in resolving particular problems with the Soviets.

A number of modest, but nonetheless encouraging developments occurred. In the summer rounds of the START and MBFR negotiations, the Soviets showed tentative willingness to contribute to making progress. In Moscow, the Soviet authorities allowed the emigration of the Pentecostalist families that had been living at our Embassy for so many years. After rapid negotiations, a Long Term Grains Agreement was signed. In response to our proposal, there was a meeting of U.S. and Soviet experts in Moscow to discuss upgrading the Hotline and other crisis communications improvements. We were beginning to discuss the possibility of both a new cultural exchanges agreement and the opening of new consulates in both countries.

I do not want to make too much of these modest steps. Contrary to some press speculation, they did not constitute a sudden warming in the relationship nor were they necessarily a prelude to an early Summit. Nonetheless, by late August we were viewing the Secretary's scheduled meeting with Foreign Minister Gromyko at the concluding session of the Madrid CSCE meeting as an opportunity to see whether Soviets were willing

to follow up these first steps. The Soviets had already indicated that they were prepared to take actions which would cool U.S.-Soviet relations should an INF agreement not be reached before U.S. deployments of INF missiles in Europe were scheduled to begin late this year. We were interested in testing these suggestions that cautious progress with the Soviets might nevertheless be possible late this year and into the next.

Then, on September 1, the Soviet air-defense forces shot down KAL 007 and its 269 passengers just as the Korean airliner was leaving Soviet airspace over Sakhalin. The manner in which the Soviets mishandled the KAL tragedy throughout and how these events inevitably set back any hopes for early progress in our relations with the Soviets are well-known.

The necessity of a firm American response to these Soviet actions was clearcut. We promptly took a number of steps on our own and in concert with other nations. We pressed for the international condemnation of the Soviet actions. We were active in supporting the aviation boycott of the Soviet Union. Foreign Minister Gromyko's performance in Madrid -- before the assembled CSCE participants and in his private meeting with Secretary Shultz -- made clear that the Soviet Union was

determined to persist in its stonewalling on this issue. The Soviet Union was not interested in finding a way to limit the damage this tragedy would cause on the state of East-West relations.

The domestic calls for a harsh and across-the-board reaction on our part were understandably strong and came from both a liberal and conservative direction. However, the Administration believed that our basic approach in dealing with the Soviet Union was still valid. We were shocked, but not surprised. This use of Soviet force merely confirmed what we had been saying all along about the Soviet Union and reaffirmed the need for realism and strength on our part.

Similarly, we concluded that however justifiably strained our relations with the Soviets might become over the KAL shootdown, we should not be the ones to foreclose serious dialogue -- particularly on those important issues where a meaningful resolution would be as much in our interests as in the Soviets'.

This balance of firm resistance to unacceptable Soviet actions with a readiness to pursue a meaningful dialogue was a central theme of the President's address before the United

Nations General Assembly on September 26. The President gave substance to that message by announcing a threefold initiative in the INF talks in Geneva. Within a week of his UN address, he followed this with a major new initiative in the START negotiations.

I urge you to look closely at what we are proposing in those negotiations. In both cases, we are making a serious effort to address Soviet concerns and achieve equitable and mutually-acceptable agreements. In INF, for example, we are moving on an issue -- that of the so-called U.S. "forward-based" systems aircraft -- that the Soviets have been raising back to the beginning of the SALT I process. Similarly, in START, we have now explicitly committed ourselves to tradeoffs between our bombers and their missiles.

For their part, the Soviets have not yet responded in any way as to reduce tensions. They have sought to maintain a pose of apparent moderation and reason toward the Europeans, while adopting an increasingly shrill tone toward the United States. Indeed, the intemperate language of Mr. Andropov's statement of September 28 was designed to suggest that they have given up altogether on dealing with the Reagan Administration. This is, of course, not born out by daily realities. Our channels to

the Soviets are open and working. We continue to talk; they continue to talk. In some instances, it is tough talk on both sides. It is not yet clear, however, how the Soviets will proceed from here.

We are now in a period of uncertainty as to the immediate future of U.S.-Soviet relations. The Soviets are facing a major foreign policy embarrassment. Should we not reach agreement this fall in Geneva on an effective and equitable INF solution, U.S. deployments will go forward -- an event the Soviet Union has invested considerable political capital to block. Earlier this week, the Soviet Ministry of Defense announced intentions to emplace modern, short-range missiles in both East Germany and Czechoslovakia as a counter-measure to the potential U.S. deployments. It is clear, however, that these are improvements to Soviet military capabilities in Eastern Europe that already had been planned to be underway in this time period.

It remains much less certain how long and how widely they are prepared to chill East-West relations over INF. We do know, as the Soviets have said to us and others in private, that they do not want a confrontation leading to war. We are therefore dealing with one of the many crises in our relations

with the Soviets -- with all the attendant uncertainties -- but it is not one which either side will push too far.

v

These uncertainties and as yet unanswerable questions return me to my beginning point -- that despite fifty years of intense preoccupation with our Soviet relationship, we still know and understand far too little about the Soviet Union.

In the Administration and the State Department in particular, we are acutely aware of the need to rebuild and to strengthen Soviet and East European studies within the United States. That is a resource we cannot afford to neglect any longer.

For those reasons, the Administration fully supports the goals expressed in the "Soviet-East European Research and Training Act of 1983," a bill now before the Congress sponsored by Senator Richard Lugar and Representative Lee Hamilton. This legislation would help to provide a stable base for the improvement of our professional Soviet and East European research. The State Department has taken the lead in the Administration's efforts to obtain a separate annual

appropriation to administer the programs envisioned in this bill. This financial and administrative mechanism would give us the means to achieve the objectives which all parties -- the Congress, the Executive, and the academic community -- agree are essential to strengthening our understanding of the Soviet Union.

We still have far to go in both furthering that understanding of the Soviet Union and in the development of a more stable and constructive relationship with that country. I believe we have laid the groundwork for important and meaningful progress in both regards.

I fear that I have already talked far too long and regret that I will not be able to remain with you for all of your discussions. I look forward, however, to hearing of your deliberations and would welcome the constructive suggestions you might wish to send on to me in Washington. Thank you again for inviting me.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 27, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. CHARLES HILL  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

SUBJECT: Draft Speech by Deputy Secretary Dam

We have reviewed the attached draft speech to be given by Deputy Secretary Dam and recommend that the language on page 12 be vetted by a lawyer familiar with our position regarding the legal status of the Helsinki Final Act.

Robert M. Kimmitt  
Executive Secretary

Attachment



~~SECRET~~

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

TO: BOB KIMMITT  
FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*  
SUBJECT: Brubeck at SPASO

I attach a memo along the lines of our discussion earlier today.

*JM*  
Bob Sims concurs.

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997  
By R. V. Ott NARA, Date 7/28/99

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET~~

October 27, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR TERESA COLLINS  
Chief, Secretariat Staff  
Executive Secretariat  
U.S. Information Agency

SUBJECT: Cultural Presentations at Ambassador's Residence  
Moscow

In reference to the memorandum of October 26 from Mr. Tomlinson to Mr. McFarlane, the NSC staff endorses the recommendation of the Department of State.

Robert M. Kimmitt  
Executive Secretary

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997  
By L. V. H. NARA, Date 7/25/99

**United States  
Information  
Agency**

Washington, D.C. 20547

Office of the Director

7733

~~SECRET~~



03 OCT 26 1983 08:07

October 26, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable  
Robert C. McFarlane  
Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs  
The White House

FROM: Kenneth Y. Tomlinson  
Acting Director

Director Wick would appreciate your guidance regarding a cultural program planned by Ambassador Hartman for his residence in Moscow next month.

As the attached memorandum indicates (Remick-Hedges, 10/16/83) the program featuring the Dave Brubeck Quartet would be the first such event since the KAL incident. Other previously scheduled events have been postponed or cancelled.

Mr. Leslie Lenkowsky, who will be nominated shortly to be USIA Deputy Director, last week concluded, after consultation with Robert Sims and Dave Gergen, that this event should be postponed until after the end of 1983 due to domestic and other considerations.

I understand that Ambassador Hartman and the State Department wish to proceed with the Brubeck event. Since Mr. Lenkowsky is new here, we want to ensure that all proper procedures for deciding the issue are followed. Director Wick, in a phone call from Paris today, directed me to seek your guidance urgently on this matter. Please let me know the NSC decision at your earliest convenience. Thank you.


~~SECRET~~

Classified by:  
Kenneth Y. Tomlinson  
Acting Director  
GDS: OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
NLS F95-074/2 #98  
BY LoJ, NARA, DATE 7/18/00

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

October 16, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: C - Mr. Hedges  
FROM: EU - Marlin W. Remick   
SUBJECT: Dave Brubeck and Ambassador Hartman's  
Spaso House Cultural Program

Over the course of several months before the Soviets shot down the KAL 007 airliner (August 31), Ambassador Hartman, our PAO and CAO in Moscow and EU have been working jointly on arranging a number of cultural programs to take place in the Ambassador's residence in Moscow and in the Consul General's residence in Leningrad. Several artists had been lined up to participate in this program, beginning this past September and continuing into 1984. (Ambassador Hartman started doing similar cultural programming at Spaso House for especially invited Soviet elites from the time of his presentation of credentials as Ambassador.) The Dave Brubeck Quartet was one of the programs that have been under negotiation for several months, which, along with Pearl Bailey and Ben Vereen, were planned to take place in November, the 50th anniversary of diplomatic relations between the US and the USSR.

The schedule, as it was shaping up before the KAL tragedy, was as follows:

1983      September - Major film showings  
              October - Johnny Cash  
              October - Actors Theater of Louisville group

Each of the above events was cancelled as inappropriate after the KAL airliner was shot down.

November - Dave Brubeck Quartet  
November - Pearl Bailey (postponed until March 1984)  
November - Ben Vereen group (postponed into 1984)

1984      January - Ware/McKenzie Duo  
              February - Opera singer Phyllis Curtin  
              March - New York Arts Ensemble  
              April - Muir String Quartet (possibly June)  
              April - Ruff-Mitchell Jazz Duo  
              May - Composer and Pianist Leo Smit  
              Indefinite - Weekley/Arganbright (4-hand piano duo)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CLASSIFIED BY: Charles E. Courtney  
OFFICE SYMBOL: EU  
DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
NLS F95-074/2 #99  
BY hct, NARA, DATE 7/18/00

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

[2]

The Soviets may refuse to issue Guest-of-the-Ambassador visas to Brubeck and the other groups. The Soviet Embassy here had told us that they would not issue such visas to the Actors Theatre of Louisville group and that they would have to go to the Soviet Union under Intourist auspices.

In our negotiations with Mr. Gloyd, Dave Brubeck's manager, our understanding was that Brubeck was more than willing to forego performance fees for his group. Mr. and Mrs. Brubeck must fly first class, the rest of the group, including two other spouses would fly economy fare. The estimated total cost is on the order of \$30,000. Costs attributable to the spouses were to be covered by Ambassador Hartman's special private fund (from private sector contributions).

The following is also noted for your information, with no implications intended in respect to any decision being made on the Brubeck program. Mr. Gloyd is fully aware of the possible, ultimate visa problem; he has been informed of the negative decision to date; and he has indicated that the group has not made other commitments in the meantime and would still be willing to go if requested. Mr. Gloyd also clearly indicated, as he had earlier, that they would be willing to consider another date sometime in 1984, but that the mid-November beginning of tour had worked out nicely for them.

When the Ambassador met with the Director on September 1, in the immediate aftermath of the KAL tragedy neither the Ambassador nor we focused on the question of the cultural programs being arranged for Spaso (Memcon attached). Subsequently, however, the Ambassador cancelled the film showing planned for September and he also cancelled the planned October visit of the Actors Theatre of Louisville. In the meantime Johnny Cash also cancelled in the wake of KAL.

While Sam was travelling in Europe, I telephoned PAO Benson, who was in Helsinki at the time hoping to rendezvous with Sam at that point. I told Ray that I thought that none of us, including the Mission in Moscow, in the immediate rush of events after KAL, had re-addressed ourselves to what it was appropriate to continue to plan for Spaso cultural programming in November and December. I asked Ray to sit down with the Ambassador and the DCM in Moscow to address that situation in terms of the domestic considerations here, and most particularly that Brubeck, Pearl Bailey and Ben Vereen had all been scheduled months earlier to coalesce in November for programs at Spaso in Moscow and with the Consul General in Leningrad. The Embassy subsequently indicated that the Ambassador and the Mission wanted to go ahead with scheduling Brubeck for mid-November. When Sam returned from his European travel he pointed out that the question of Brubeck should be

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

[3]

raised with Mr. Lenkowsky and that the White House also should be asked to make a decision. Sam then raised the question with Mr. Lenkowsky.

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

October 31, 1983

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL POINDEXTER

FROM:

JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT:

Eagleburger-Dobrynin Conversation

Following my request last week, State finally sent over today the copy of a cable reporting on the Eagleburger-Dobrynin conversation which had been mentioned earlier in a night reading item.

The short report in the night reading covered the highlights. Perhaps the most interesting items are Dobrynin's harping on the need to re-establish communications (including his broad hint that he would like to see the President again), and his comments regarding the need to notify the Soviets of proposals privately in advance of going public, if we want the proposals to be taken seriously (paragraph 6). This is, in fact, the Soviet attitude, since they do not expect us to take seriously Soviet proposals which have not been discussed with us in advance.

A copy of the cable/memcon is attached at Tab I.

Attachment:

Tab I State cable/memcon

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F95-074/2 #102

BY LOT, NARA, DATE 11/16/00

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~  
Declassify on: ~~OADR~~

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL/EYES ONLY~~

October 28, 1983

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Hartman-Gromyko Meeting

You may want to take a look at the report (Tab I) of Hartman's meeting with Gromyko on October 19. The major thrust of Gromyko's comment was that the Soviet leaders are convinced that the Reagan Administration does not accept their legitimacy, and that therefore it is not prepared to negotiate seriously with the USSR, but is actually dedicated to bringing down the system.

There is a large self-serving element in such argumentation, but I believe that it is an argument used in policy debates among the Soviet leadership. Given the present signs of uncertainty in the Soviet leadership, and the indirect evidence of debate, it probably serves our interest to do what we can (without changing our policies) to undercut the force of this argument.

Attachment:

Tab I Report of Hartman/Gromyko Meeting

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F95-074/2 #100

BY WJ, NARA, DATE 11/6/00

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
Declassify on: OADR



Department of State

INCOMING



PAGE 02 OF 05 MOSCOW 13169 01 OF 02 191856Z CB1/01  
ACTION NODS-00

NOD489

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 13169

NODIS

FOR THE SECRETARY

PLEASE PASS TO UNDER SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER AND ASSISTANT  
SECRETARY BURT

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PREL  
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S CALL ON GROMYKO OCTOBER 19

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: I CALLED ON GROMYKO TODAY TO GET A READING OF HIS VIEWS OF THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP PRIOR TO MY DEPARTURE TOMORROW. THE DISCUSSION VERY QUICKLY BECAME A PHILOSOPHICAL ONE; IN FACT, HE HAD NOTHING NEW TO SAY ON THE ONE SPECIFIC ISSUE -- INF -- THAT WE TOUCHED ON. BUT HE DID GO TO GREAT LENGTHS IN ARGUING THAT THE MAJOR PROBLEM THE SOVIETS HAVE WITH THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION IS THAT THEY BELIEVE WE ARE NOT PREPARED TO ACCEPT THEIR LEGITIMACY AND THEREFORE THAT WE CONSTANTLY INTRUDE IDEOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS INTO ISSUES OF WAR AND PEACE. EVEN ALLOWING FOR HIS WELL-KNOWN THESPIAN QUALITIES, GROMYKO WAS PASSIONATE ON THE SUBJECT, FREQUENTLY CORRECTING HIS INTERPRETER TO MAKE SURE THAT EXACT NUANCES WERE BEING CONVEYED AND EVEN KEEPING ME

DECLASSIFIED  
NLS 95-074/2#101  
BY LOJ, NARA, DATE 7/18/00

ALERT COPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



PAGE 03 OF 05 MOSCOW 13169 01 OF 02 191856Z CB1/01

NOD489

FIFTEEN MINUTES BEYOND OUR ALLOTTED HOUR TO EMPHASIZE HIS POINTS. WHILE A LOT OF THIS IS OBVIOUSLY SELF-SERVING, AT LEAST IT'S A PROBLEM WE SHOULD TALK ABOUT IN-HOUSE; I HOPE WE CAN DISCUSS THE ISSUE WHEN I SEE YOU NEXT WEEK. END SUMMARY.

3. GROMYKO RECEIVED ME IN HIS MFA OFFICE. HE LOOKED NONE THE WORST FOR WEAR FOLLOWING HIS RIGOROUS TRAVELS AND CONVERSATIONS. GROMYKO WAS ACCOMPANIED BY USA DEPARTMENT CHIEF BESSMERTNYKH; I BROUGHT WITH ME MY DCM, ZIMMERMANN. WHILE GROMYKO HAD SOME HARD THINGS TO SAY, HIS TONE WAS MORE REFLECTIVE THAN POLEMICAL--A STRIKING CONTRAST FROM THE PYROTECHNICS AT MADRID.

4. I BEGAN BY SAYING THAT I HAD COME PRIMARILY TO LISTEN, AND WANTED TO GET HIS SENSE OF THE STATE OF RELATIONS BEFORE MY CONSULTATIONS IN WASHINGTON. BEGINNING WITH INF, I WONDERED WHAT THE SOVIET OBJECTIVE HAS BEEN. IF IT HAS BEEN TO STOP DEPLOYMENT, IT WON'T SUCCEED. IF IT HAS BEEN TO LIMIT OUR DEPLOYMENTS, OUR NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BE MORE SERIOUS. I TOLD GROMYKO I WAS PUZZLED.

5. GROMYKO RESPONDED BY NOTING THE LOW DEPTH TO WHICH OUR RELATIONS HAVE SUNK AND SAYING THAT THIS WAS THE PRODUCT OF THE POLICY OF THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION. HE CLAIMED THAT IN INF THE ADMINISTRATION'S NEGOTIATING POSITION WAS NOT SERIOUS AND THAT WE WERE JUST KILLING TIME IN ORDER TO MISLEAD PEOPLE AND USE THE NEGOTIATIONS AS A SORT OF SMOKE SCREEN FOR DEPLOYMENT. HE SAID THE SOVIET UNION DOES NOT SEEK DOMINANCE, BUT WILL TAKE MEASURES TO ASSURE THAT ITS POSITION IS NOT WEAKENED. THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT IS IN FAVOR OF PARITY AND EQUALITY. IT HAS MADE PROPOSALS BASED ON PARITY. BUT PARITY CAN

BE ON VARIOUS LEVELS; IT IS ONE THING TO HAVE PARITY AT A LOWER LEVEL BUT ANOTHER THING TO HAVE PARITY AT



PAGE 04 OF 05 MOSCOW 13169 01 OF 02 191856Z C01/01  
A HIGHER LEVEL LEADING TO MAJOR NUCLEAR ARSENALS.

NOD439

6. AN UNPRODUCTIVE DISCUSSION ENSUED REGARDING THE BRITISH AND FRENCH FORCES. GROMYKO CALLED OUR ASSERTIONS THAT THEY ARE NOT PART OF NATO SYSTEMS A "FAIRYTALE". IF WE WANTED SOMEONE TO BELIEVE SUCH A FAIRYTALE, THEN WE'LL HAVE TO LOOK FOR SOMEONE OTHER THAN THE SOVIET UNION. I TRIED TO PULL GROMYKO BACK TO THE SITUATION HE ENVISAGES FOLLOWING OUR DEPLOYMENTS. HE REFUSED TO BE DRAWN ASSERTING SIMPLY THAT OUR ACTION WOULD LEAD TO NEW TWISTS IN THE ARMS SPIRAL. I STRESSED THE PRESIDENT'S WILLINGNESS TO CONTINUE NEGOTIATIONS, BUT ADDED THAT IN DOING SO WE HAD TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE INTERESTS OF SUCH NON-NUCLEAR POWERS AS THE FRG. GROMYKO SAID THAT OUR LATEST PROPOSAL WAS A MOCKERY OF COMMON SENSE AND THAT NEITHER IN INF NOR IN START HAD OUR RECENT PROPOSALS MOVED EVEN ONE SMALL STEP IN THE DIRECTION OF AGREEMENTS.

7. GROMYKO THEN MOVED ON TO HIS PRIMARY MESSAGE. HE SAID THAT U.S. POLICIES AND STATEMENTS ARE BASED ON DECEPTION AND ARE UNWORTHY OF TRUST. OUR WAYS OF DEALING WITH THE SOVIET UNION SHOWED NO VESTIGE OF ELEMENTARY PROPRIETY. IDEOLOGY WAS BEING MIXED INTO POLICIES INVOLVING WORLD SECURITY AND ISSUES OF WAR AND PEACE.

8. I ARGUED THAT SOVIETS, OF ALL PEOPLE, SHOULD NOT BE SURPRISED AT IDEOLOGICAL COMBAT. I MYSELF HAD HEARD BREZHNEV, AT THE HEIGHT OF DETENTE, SAY THAT THE IDEOLOGICAL COMPETITION WOULD CONTINUE. AND I HEARD ANDROPOV LESS THAN A YEAR AGO -- IN A SPEECH IN THE KREMLIN -- DEVOTE THE FIRST HALF TO IDEOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND THE SECOND HALF TO A DISCUSSION OF ARMS CONTROL. THE SOVIET UNION HAS A PARTY APARATUS AND NEWSPAPERS THAT CAN MAKE THE IDEOLOGICAL CASE WHILE THE GOVERNMENT

LEADERS CAN CONCENTRATE ON STATE POLICY; THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES DOES NOT HAVE SUCH POSSIBILITIES.



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PRESIDENT REAGAN HAS STRONG IDEOLOGICAL BELIEFS; THE  
FACT THAT HE HOLDS THEM DOES NOT MEAN THAT HE DOES NOT  
DESIRE TO PURSUE ARMS CONTROL OR TO DISCUSS REGIONAL  
PROBLEMS SERIOUSLY WITH THE SOVIET UNION.

NOD489

9. GROMYKO CLAIMED THAT IN NEGOTIATING WITH THREE U.S.  
PRESIDENTS, BREZHNEV HAD NEVER PUT IDEOLOGY ON THE  
NEGOTIATING TABLE. HE SAID IT WOULD BE ONE THING IF  
PRESIDENT REAGAN WENT TO A CLUB AND GAVE A LECTURE ON  
THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN SOCIALIST AND CAPITALIST  
IDEOLOGY. HE COULD OUTLINE THE ADVANTAGES OF CAPITALIST  
IDEOLOGY; HE COULD ARGUE THE VIRTUES OF IDEALIST PHILOSOPHY  
OVER MATERIAL PHILOSOPHY. AND, IN THE FIELD OF POLITICAL  
ECONOMY, HE COULD NOTE HIS PREFERENCE FOR ADAM SMITH  
OVER KARL MARX. BUT IT'S SOMETHING ELSE WHEN HE ATTACKS  
THE LEGITIMACY OF OUR SOCIAL SYSTEM, OUR CONSTITUTION  
OUR PARTY AND GOVERNMENT, AND OUR LEADERSHIP. WITH SUCH  
RHETORIC BEING USED, GROMYKO CONTINUED, IT IS DIFFICULT  
TO DISCUSS POLITICAL ISSUES, INDEED TO DISCUSS ANYTHING  
AT ALL



Department of State

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PAGE 02 OF 03 MOSCOW 13169 02 OF 02 191904Z C01/B1  
ACTION NODS-00

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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 MOSCOW 13169

NODIS

FOR THE SECRETARY

PLEASE PASS TO UNDER SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER AND ASSISTANT  
SECRETARY BURT

10. I COUNTERED THAT THERE WAS NO WAY TO DEFINE OUR  
COMPETITION PURELY IN TERMS OF PHILOSOPHICAL DEBATES.  
THE COMPETITION GOES ON IN MANY AREAS, IN PART BECAUSE  
BOTH OF US ARE FREE TO PROMOTE OUR COMPETING IDEOLOGIES  
AND THIS IS BOUND TO BRING US INTO CONFLICT. WE HAVE TO  
MAINTAIN A STATE-TO-STATE RELATIONSHIP, EXERCISE RESTRAINT,  
AND TALK MORE. I DENIED THAT OUR MAJOR PROBLEM WITH THE  
SOVIETS WAS THE EXISTENCE OF THEIR SYSTEM; OUR MAJOR  
PROBLEM WAS THAT OUR SECURITY INTERESTS AND THOSE OF OUR  
FRIENDS WERE AFFECTED BY SOVIET ACTIVITIES. I RECALLED  
FOR GROMYKO THAT OUR CURRENT PROBLEMS WITH THE SOVIET  
UNION TOOK ROOT AT THE TIME OF A DEMOCRATIC PRESIDENT  
AND A DEMOCRATIC CONGRESS.

11. GROMYKO THEN LAUNCHED INTO A LONG PLEA FOR THE  
SEPARATION OF IDEOLOGICAL AND SECURITY PROBLEMS, ARGUING  
THAT IDEOLOGY SHOULD NOT BE A FACTOR WHEN ISSUES OF  
WAR AND PEACE ARE BEING DISCUSSED. SAYING IN SPEECHES  
ON NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS AND SECURITY THAT SOCIALIST  
REPRESENTATIVES DON'T BELIEVE IN GOD OR IN LIFE

ALERT COPY

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~



AGE 03 OF 03 MOSCOW 13169 02 OF 02 191904Z C01/01

NOD490

AFTER DEATH AND HAVE DIFFERENT MORAL VALUES IS NOT A CORRECT APPROACH TO SECURITY PROBLEMS. WHETHER THIS IS A CONSCIOUS APPROACH ON YOUR PART OR A CARELESS APPROACH, IT'S EQUALLY BAD IN EITHER CASE. GROMYKO CITED THREE EXAMPLES OF THE "CORRECT" APPROACH: THE OVERCOMING OF EDIOLOGICAL DIFFERNCES TO ESTABLISH DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS 50 YEARS AGO; THE COLLABORATION IN WORLD WAR II; AND THE SALT I AND II AGREEMENTS.

12. I TOLD GROMYKO THAT THE IDE~~A~~OLOGICAL APPROACH OF WHICH HE COMPLAINED HAD NOT BEEN PRESENT ON OUR SIDE IN THE HIGH-LEVEL EXCHANGES WE HAVE HAD WITH THE SOVIT LEADERSHIP. GROMYKO, SOMEWHAT ODDLY, SAID HE FOUND THIS REMARK VERY INTERESTING. I FOLLOWED UP BY TELLING HIM TO TAKE THESE PRIVATE EXCHANGES EXTREMELY SERIOUSLY BECAUSE THEY SHOW WHAT THE PRESIDENT HOPES TO ACCOMPLISH 'N THE RELATIONSHIP. HARTMAN

## MEMORANDUM

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

October 31, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM:

JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT:

Letter from Congressman Lowry Regarding Elbert Family

Congressman Lowry has written you (Tab II) to inform you of a petition he and a large number of other Members of Congress sent to USSR Procurator General Rekunkov, urging that charges of drug possession (apparently trumped-up) be dropped against Lev Elbert of Kiev, and that he and his family be allowed to emigrate to Israel, as they have sought to do for nine years.

A reply to Lowry's letter is attached for your signature at Tab I.

Chris *CM* Lehman and John *JL* Lenczowski concur.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the attached letter to Congressman Lowry.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

## Attachments:

Tab I Proposed Letter to Congressman Lowry  
 Tab II Letter from Congressman Lowry

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Dear Congressman Lowry:

Thank you for your letter of October 28, 1983, calling my attention to the petition you and your colleagues sent to Soviet Procurator General Rekunkov regarding Lev Elbert and his family.

I hope that Soviet authorities will drop the charges against Mr. Elbert and allow him and his family to emigrate as they have long desired. Although we have very little influence over the Soviets in these matters--particularly when our relations are strained as they are now--I am asking the Department of State to inform our Embassy in Moscow of your appeal so that it can be supported in all appropriate ways.

Sincerely,

Robert C. McFarlane

The Honorable Mike Lowry  
United States Representative  
Washington, D. C. 20515



7823

MIKE LOWRY  
SEVENTH DISTRICT  
WASHINGTON

1206 LONGWORTH HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515  
(202) 225-3106

107 PREFONTAINE PLACE SOUTH  
SEATTLE, WASHINGTON 98104  
(206) 442-7170

**Congress of the United States**  
**House of Representatives**  
**Washington, D.C. 20515**

COMMITTEES:  
BUDGET

CHAIRMAN:  
TASK FORCE ON INTERNATIONAL FINANCE AND TRADE

BANKING, FINANCE AND URBAN  
AFFAIRS

SUBCOMMITTEES:

HOUSING AND COMMUNITY  
DEVELOPMENT

INTERNATIONAL TRADE, INVESTMENT  
AND MONETARY POLICY

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT  
INSTITUTIONS AND FINANCE

MERCHANT MARINE AND FISHERIES  
(ON LEAVE)

October 28, 1983

The Honorable Robert McFarlane  
National Security Council  
Washington, D.C. 20506

Dear Mr. McFarlane:

I have enclosed a copy of a letter to Mr. Aleksandr Rekunkov, the Procurator General of the Soviet Union, concerning the Elbert family of Kiev. My colleagues and I wanted you to know of our concern about Lev and Inna Elbert and their son Karmi, and our hope that Soviet officials will allow them to emigrate to Israel.

Anything you can do to assist in this matter would be greatly appreciated.

Sincerely,



Mike Lowry  
Member of Congress

Enclosure

**Congress of the United States**

**House of Representatives**

**Washington, D.C. 20515**

October 28, 1983

Aleksandr M. Rekunkov  
Procurator General  
ul. Pushkinskaya 15-A  
Moscow 103009  
RSFSR, USSR

Dear Mr. Rekunkov:

We are writing to you to express our deep concern about Lev Elbert and his family. An investigation of Lev Elbert on charges of drug possession is scheduled to end on November 4. We are also disturbed by the possibility that similar charges might be brought against Mrs. Elbert.


We have followed the Elbert family's situation for several years; many of us have met them, their relatives, or friends of the family. We find the allegations against Lev and Inna Elbert to be totally inconsistent with their character and integrity.

In addition, it is our understanding that Lev's parents have been questioned by the authorities. These reports also concern us, especially since his father, a decorated war hero, is in very poor health.


We urge you to personally intervene and drop these charges against Lev Elbert, and to permit the family to emigrate. They have sought permission to emigrate for nine years; during the last three years there has been no official reason for refusal. The Elberts' case is a clear-cut instance of family reunification and repatriation to the historic Jewish homeland of Israel, where Mrs. Elbert's mother and brother now live. Failure to allow the Elberts to emigrate is inconsistent with the consensus at Madrid to strengthen the Helsinki Final Act.


Again, we wish to express our deep interest in the Elberts, and to stress that the resolution of this and similar human rights cases is a barometer of our relations.

Sincerely,


  
William Lehman, M.C.

  
Mike Lowry, M.C.

  
Parren J. Mitchell, M.C.

  
Dale E. Kildee, M.C.

  
Augustus F. Hawkins, M.C.

  
Ted Weiss, M.C.

Sidney R. Yates  
Sidney R. Yates, M.C.

Les AuCoin  
Les AuCoin, M.C.

Benjamin A. Gilman  
Benjamin A. Gilman, M.C.

Edward P. Boland  
Edward P. Boland, M.C.

Norman F. Lent  
Norman F. Lent, M.C.

Walter E. Fautroy  
Walter E. Fautroy, M.C.

James L. Oberstar  
James L. Oberstar, M.C.

Hamilton Fish Jr.  
Hamilton Fish Jr., M.C.

Joseph P. Addabbo  
Joseph P. Addabbo, M.C.

Doug Walgren  
Doug Walgren, M.C.

Lawrence Foughlin  
Lawrence Foughlin, M.C.

Jack Kemp  
Jack F. Kemp, M.C.

James H. Scheuer  
James H. Scheuer, M.C.

Norman Y. Mineta  
Norman Y. Mineta, M.C.

Mario Biaggi  
Mario Biaggi, M.C.

Don Edwards  
Don Edwards, M.C.

Tom Corcoran  
Tom Corcoran, M.C.

Berkley Bedell  
Berkley Bedell, M.C.

Bob Edgar  
Bob Edgar, M.C.

Dan Glickman  
Dan Glickman, M.C.

Patricia Schroeder  
Patricia Schroeder, M.C.

Louis Stokes  
Louis Stokes, M.C.

  
Douglas H. Bosco, M.C.

  
Pat Williams, M.C.


  
Tom Vandergriff, M.C.


  
Bobbi Fiedler, M.C.


  
Tom Lantos, M.C.


  
Gary L. Ackerman, M.C.

  
Barney Frank, M.C.

  
William Carney, M.C.

  
Bill Frenzel, M.C.

  
Tony P. Hall, M.C.


  
John Edward Porter, M.C.

  
Stephen J. Solarz, M.C.

  
Mike Synar, M.C.


  
Sam Gejdenson, M.C.


  
John F. Seiberling, M.C.


  
Martin Frost, M.C.

  
Sala Burton, M.C.

  
Nicholas Mavroules, M.C.

  
Vic Fazio, M.C.

  
Norman Sisisky, M.C.

  
Matthew G. Martinez, M.C.

  
Barbara B. Kennelly, M.C.

Nancy L. Johnson  
Nancy L. Johnson, M.C.

Ray Kodovsek  
Ray Kodovsek, M.C.

Brian J. Donnelly  
Brian J. Donnelly, M.C.

Bruce A. Morrison  
Bruce A. Morrison, M.C.

Ray McGrath  
Raymond J. McGrath, M.C.

Ed Markey  
Edward J. Markey, M.C.

Mark Siljander  
Mark D. Siljander, M.C.

William R. Ratchford  
William R. Ratchford, M.C.

Lawrence J. Smith  
Lawrence J. Smith, M.C.

Richard J. Durbin  
Richard J. Durbin, M.C.

Jerry M. Patterson  
Jerry M. Patterson, M.C.

Sander M. Levin

Sander M. Levin, M.C.

Julian C. Dixon  
Julian C. Dixon, M.C.

Robert T. Matsui  
Robert T. Matsui, M.C.

Michael D. Barnes  
Michael D. Barnes, M.C.

Ken Kramer  
Ken Kramer, M.C.

Thomas J. Downey  
Thomas J. Downey, M.C.


George C. Wortley  
George C. Wortley, M.C.

Geraldine A. Ferraro  
Geraldine A. Ferraro, M.C.

Major Owens  
Major Owens, M.C.

Mel Levine  
Mel Levine, M.C.

Charles E. Schumer  
Charles E. Schumer, M.C.

  
Marcy Kaptur, M.C.

  
Barbara Boxer, M.C.

  
Thomas R. Carper, M.C.

  
Howard L. Berman, M.C.

cc: Yuri V. Andropov  
Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin  
Secretary of State George Shultz  
National Security Adviser Robert C. McFarlane.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 31, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. CHARLES HILL  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

SUBJECT: Letter from Congressman Lowry Regarding Elbert  
Family of Kiev

Attached, for appropriate action, are copies of an exchange of correspondence between Congressman Lowry and Mr. McFarlane concerning the desire of the Elbert family of Kiev to emigrate to Israel and charges recently brought by Soviet authorities against Mr. Elbert.

Robert M. Kimmitt  
Executive Secretary

Attachments

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OCTOBER 31, 1980

# RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 5 LISTED ON THE  
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PAGE 02 OF 06 STATE 291811  
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*TO* *→* *Mablock*  
*10/31/83*

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APPROVED BY P: LSEAGLEBURGER  
EUR: MPALMER  
S/S: BMCKINLEY  
S/S-O: RADAVIS

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: US, UR  
SUBJECT: DOBRYNIN MEETING WITH EAGLEBURGER  
1.  - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY. ACTING UNDER INSTRUCTIONS, AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN CALLED ON UNDER SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER TO HAND HIM COPIES OF SOVIET UN INITIATIVES ON "CONDEMNATION OF NUCLEAR WAR" AND A "NUCLEAR ARMS FREEZE." THE UNDER SECRETARY PROMISED A US RESPONSE, BUT NOTED HIS OWN OFF-THE-CUFF VIEW THAT THEY RAISE MAJOR VERIFICATION PROBLEMS AND THAT PROPOSALS WERE TOO GENERAL; WE PREFER SPECIFIC APPROACHES. THE UNDER SECRETARY RAISED THE BOMBING IN BURMA AND REITERATED THE NEED FOR ALL PARTIES TO ACT WITH CAUTION. THE TWO THEN EXCHANGED VIEWS ON US-SOVIET RELATIONS WITH EMPHASIS ON PROBLEMS IN COMMUNICATION, ANDROPOV'S SPEECH, AND ARMS CONTROL.  
END SUMMARY.

DECLASSIFIED  
NLS 95-074/2 #103  
BY LOJ, NARA, DATE 7/18/00



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Department of State

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PAGE 03 OF 06 STATE 291811

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3. UN INITIATIVES. DOBRYNIN HANDED OVER COPIES OF LETTERS FROM ANDROPOV TO UN SECRETARY-GENERAL PEREZ DE CUELLAR ON "CONDEMNATION OF NUCLEAR WAR" AND A "NUCLEAR ARMS FREEZE." HE SAID THAT WE WERE BEING GIVEN COPIES SINCE OUR TWO COUNTRIES WERE THE MOST CLOSELY INVOLVED

---  
IN THESE MATTERS. UNDER SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER SAID THAT WE HAD NOT RASHLY REJECTED THE PROPOSALS, THAT WE WOULD STUDY THEM AND GIVE A CONSIDERED RESPONSE. SPEAKING PERSONALLY AND AFTER ONLY A QUICK READING, HE SAW TWO IMMEDIATE PROBLEMS: FIRST, VERIFICATION WAS A MAJOR PROBLEM; AND SECOND, ~~THE~~ PROPOSALS WERE BOTH EXTREMELY GENERAL -- WE PREFERRED SPECIFIC APPROACHES.

4. THE KOREAN PROBLEM. THE UNDER SECRETARY SAID THAT THE SECRETARY HAD ASKED HIM TO RAISE THE BOMBING IN BURMA WITH THE AMBASSADOR. EMPHASIZING THAT THE INFORMATION WAS FRAGMENTARY AND NOT CONCLUSIVE, HE SAID THAT THE EVIDENCE SEEMS TO BE POINTING IN THE DIRECTION OF NORTH KOREAN INVOLVEMENT. THE SOUTH KOREANS ARE BECOMING MORE CONVINCED OF THEIR INVOLVEMENT AS TIME GOES ON. THE UNDER SECRETARY SAID THAT THE USG WANTED THE SOVIETS TO KNOW THAT SECRETARY WEINBERGER AND DEPUTY SECRETARY DAM, NOW TRAVELING TO SOUTH KOREA FOR THE FUNERAL, HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO REPEAT OUR EARLIER CAUTIONS TO THE SOUTH KOREANS TO EXERCISE RESTRAINT AND TO KEEP ACTION IN THE DIPLOMATIC AND POLITICAL CHANNELS. HE ADDED THAT THE SOUTH KOREANS ARE UNDERSTANDABLY HYPER-SENSITIVE NOW, BUT THAT WE ARE TRYING TO STOP THEM FROM UNDERTAKING ANY RASH ACTS AND HOPEFULLY, THE SOVIETS WOULD CONVEY THE SAME MESSAGE TO PYONG YANG. WE HAD URGED THE CHINESE TO DO SO AS WELL. DOBRYNIN SAID HE WOULD REPORT

OUR VIEWS TO MOSCOW AND NOTED THAT THE CHINESE WERE CLOSER THAN SOVIETS TO BOTH NORTH AND SOUTH KOREA.



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# Department of State

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PAGE 04 OF 06 STATE 291811

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5. ANDROPOV'S STATEMENT. THE TWO EXCHANGED VIEWS ON THE MEANING OF ANDROPOV'S SPEECH. UNDER SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER SAW IT AS TOTALLY CONFRONTATIONAL AND HARDLINE, LIKE "SLAMMING A DOOR" ON DIALOGUE. MOREOVER, IT WAS VERY DIFFICULT FOR THE US TO MOVE IN POSITIVE DIRECTIONS WHEN THE LEADER OF THE SOVIET UNION REPEATS STATEMENTS ALREADY MADE BY LOWER LEVELS THAT THE SOVIETS SHOT DOWN KAL-007, THEY WOULD DO IT AGAIN, AND IT IS NOT THEIR FAULT. FURTHER, AT A TIME WHEN COMMUNICATION LINES ARE TENUOUS, IT IS UNFORTUNATE THAT THE SOVIETS REACTED SO QUICKLY AND SO NEGATIVELY TO OUR INF PROPOSAL. THE UNDER SECRETARY POINTED OUT THAT IN CONTRAST TO THE SOVIET REACTION, PRESIDENT REAGAN HAD CAREFULLY STATED THAT ARMS CONTROL AND CERTAIN OTHER AREAS WOULD NOT BE AFFECTED BY THE KAL-007 SHOOTDOWN. DOBRYNIN RESPONDED THAT ANDROPOV WAS NOT TAKING THE INITIATIVE TO PUT IN A NEW POLICY, BUT SIMPLY DRAWING CONCLUSIONS AS TO OUR POLICY AND THE POSSIBILITY OF WORKING WITH THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION. HE ADDED THAT ANDROPOV'S REMARKS SHOULD NOT BE INTERPRETED TO MEAN THAT OUR DISCUSSION COULD NOT BE CONTINUED.

6. ARMS CONTROL. WHILE BLAMING THE US SIDE FOR INITIATING AND CONTINUING THE PRACTICE OF "LEAKS" AND ANNOUNCING INITIATIVES IN THE PRESS, DOBRYNIN ACKNOWLEDGED THAT BOTH SIDES WERE NOW GUILTY OF THIS PRACTICE. HE SAID THAT IF WE BOTH WERE SERIOUS, THAT BEFORE A NEW INITIATIVE WAS ANNOUNCED AT THE NEGOTIATING TABLE, A "WARNING" OR "HEADS-UP" WOULD BE GIVEN TO THE OTHER SIDE TO HELP THEM PREPARE. HE USED THE CURRENT US START INITIATIVE AS AN EXAMPLE OF HOW NOT TO PROCEED. NOT ONLY WAS THE SOVIET SIDE NOT GIVEN ANY WARNING OF THE INITIATIVE, BUT WHEN THEY SOUGHT CLARIFICATION OF THE PROPOSAL AT THE NEGOTIATING TABLE, GENERAL ROWNY - AT LEAST FOR

THE FIRST TWO OR THREE MEETINGS FOLLOWING THE PRESIDENT'S ANNOUNCEMENT - COULD NOT GIVE IT TO THEM.



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TURNING TO THE US INF PROPOSAL, DOBRYNIN SAID THAT OUR METHOD OF HANDLING THE ANNOUNCEMENT AS WELL AS OTHER UNSPECIFIED "HIGH-LEVEL STATEMENTS" HAD TAKEN AWAY THE FLEXIBILITY THAT KVITSINSKIY HAD.

HE WENT ON TO ADD, HOWEVER, THAT IT WAS SIMPLE FOR THE SOVIETS TO TURN IT DOWN BECAUSE IT DID NOT DEAL WITH THE TWO ISSUES CENTRAL TO THE SOVIETS:

(A) IT DOES NOT ADDRESS THE BRITISH AND FRENCH SYSTEMS.

(B) IT DOES NOT ADDRESS THE US BUILD-UP OF MISSILES IN EUROPE.

DOBRYNIN SAID THAT THESE ISSUES WERE THE BASIS OF THEIR TURN DOWN AND THAT REGARDLESS OF CHANGES ON OTHER ISSUES, THESE HAD TO BE ADDRESSED.

THE TWO THEN DISCUSSED THE ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST INCLUSION OF BRITISH AND FRENCH FORCES IN SOME DETAIL.

7. GENERAL BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP. IN RESPONSE TO DOBRYNIN'S REQUEST, UNDER SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER GAVE HIS VIEW OF OUR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP. HE SAID THAT THIS IS A TOUGH TIME THAT BOTH SIDES NEED TO MANAGE VERY CAREFULLY. WHILE OUR RELATIONSHIP IS ALWAYS DIFFICULT, IT NOW HAS BECOME EVEN MORE SO - EVEN DANGEROUS.

DOBRYNIN AGREED AND WENT ON TO SAY THAT IN TERMS OF ACTUAL COMMUNICATION, THIS WAS THE WORST TIME THAT HE CAN RECALL. HE DID NOT MEAN FORMAL COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN OUR GOVERNMENTS, BUT RATHER FRANK, OPEN CONVERSATIONS

BETWEEN SENIOR OFFICIALS. HE DID RECALL THAT HIS MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT HAD BEEN VERY GOOD. HE SAID THAT WE CURRENTLY DO NOT ATTEMPT TO HAVE A DIALOGUE, TO EXPLAIN POSITIONS AND VIEWS TO EACH OTHER. THERE IS JUST TOO MUCH MISUNDERSTANDING ON BOTH SIDES.



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UNDER SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER REPLIED THAT THERE WAS ONE EXAMPLE HE KNEW OF A SERIOUS MISUNDERSTANDING. THAT WAS AT MADRID OVER THE QUESTION OF CERTAIN HUMAN RIGHTS AGREEMENTS BETWEEN OUR TWO SIDES. IN OUR VIEW, WE WERE MISLED. DOBRYNIN STRONGLY AFFIRMED THAT THERE WAS A MISUNDERSTANDING. UPON HEARING OUR VERSION, THE SOVIETS HAD INTENSELY "GRILLED" THE SOVIET INVOLVED. HE STRONGLY DENIED MAKING OR PROPOSING ANY SUCH DEAL. DOBRYNIN WENT ON TO SAY THAT NATURALLY THE SOVIETS BELIEVE THEIR MAN AND THE US SIDE WILL BELIEVE THEIRS. WHAT HE CAN CONFIDENTLY SAY, HOWEVER, IS EVEN IN THE EVENT THAT KONDRASHEV DID DISCUSS A DEAL WITH KAMPELMAN, IT WAS NOT AUTHORIZED. DOBRYNIN SAID THAT THE SOVIETS SIMPLY DO NOT OPERATE THIS WAY. ANY SUCH ARRANGEMENT WOULD HAVE BEEN PROPOSED OR AT LEAST CONFIRMED AT A HIGHER LEVEL. THE U. S. SIDE SHOULD HAVE CHECKED.

8. TEXT OF THE TWO SOVIET UN PROPOSALS WILL BE SENT SEPARATELY.

SHULTZ

Oct. 31, 1983

--Soviet and Soviet-backed Cuban penetration of Grenada is just one more example of the Soviet policy of using local disputes to penetrate a strategic area militarily.

--This, combined with the unrelenting Soviet military build-up, presents us with a serious, world-wide challenge. We must make it clear that we will not stand still and allow them to spread their poison at will.

--At the same time, we know we must live on the same planet with the Soviet Union. We are interested in finding negotiated solutions to our differences.

--We are dedicated, in particular, to finding ways to negotiate lower arms levels, on a fair, verifiable basis. We are negotiating very seriously and with determination.

--But we have to recognize that the Soviets will not act with restraint and negotiate seriously unless we make it clear that we have the strength and will to deprive them of the benefits of unrestrained competition.