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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

**Withdrawer**

JET 3/21/2005

**File Folder** MATLOCK CHRON SEPTEMBER 1983

**FOIA**

F06-114/1

**Box Number** 1

YARHI-MILO

110

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
6052	MEMO	JACK MATLOCK FAREWELL CALL ON FOREIGN MINISTER CHNOUPEK OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA [2-7] <i>R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1</i>	6	9/15/1983	B1
6047	MEMO	MEMO FOR WILLIAM CLARK RE PRESIDENT REAGAN'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT KOIVISTO OF FINLAND--USSR ANGLE [8-9] <i>R 3/3/2011 F2006-114/1</i>	2	9/27/1983	B1
6048	MEMO	MEMO FOR GEORGE SHULTZ AND WILLIAM CLARK RE GEORGE BUSH MEETING WITH PRESIDENT KOIVISTO OF FINLAND [10-11] <i>R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1</i>	2	9/26/1983	B1
6049	MEMO	MEMO FOR WILLIAM CLARK RE ANDROPOV ANSWERS PRESIDENT REAGAN [13] <i>R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1</i>	1	9/29/1983	B1
6053	MEMO	MEMO FOR WILLIAM CLARK RE ANDROPOV ANSWERS PRESIDENT REAGAN [14-15] <i>R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1</i>	2	9/28/1983	B1
6050	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #6049 [20] <i>R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1</i>	1	9/29/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

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YARHI-MILO

110

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
6054	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #6053 [21-22] <b>R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1</b>	2	9/28/1983	B1
6051	MEMO	MEMO OF CONVERSATION RE PRESIDENT REAGAN MEETING WITH PRESIDENT KOIVISTO OF FINLAND [26-30] <b>R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1</b>	5	9/27/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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FROM THE DESK OF  
Bill Farrant

September 28, 1983  
Prague

Dear Jack:

I trust you and Rebecca found your way home without too many hitches and/or delays. Dan and I learned after returning to the Embassy last week (Tues, 9/20) that Brussels airport remained closed. So we hope the rental car went OK.

I also hope I did justice to your thoughts and words on the enclosed memo.

The Vienna Speech by Bush has caused quite a stir about differentiation, etc., here. All <sup>the best</sup> will



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Chron File ✓

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

September 23, 1983

PARTICIPANTS: Foreign Minister Bohuslav Chnoupek  
(FNU) Strasník, MFA Official  
Dr. Jaroslav Cesar, Minister's Chef du Cabinet  
Mr. Rudolf Jakubík, Head of MFA 6th Department  
(English speaking countries)

Ambassador Matlock  
R. W. Farrand, Deputy Chief of Mission

PLACE: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Czernin Palace, Prague

DATE: September 15, 1983

SUBJECT: Ambassador Matlock's Farewell Call on Foreign  
Minister Chnoupek

DISTRIBUTION: EUR - DAS Palmer Charge  
EUR/EEY POLEC  
INR/SEE P&C  
NSC - Ambassador Matlock ✓

Summary: Foreign Minister Chnoupek received the Ambassador September 15 for the latter's farewell call. During 75 minute discussion, Chnoupek expressed the GOC's appreciation for the Ambassador's efforts on behalf of U.S./Czechoslovak relations, in particular for his contributions in resolving the long-standing gold/property dispute. Characterizing world situation as "complicated, deteriorating," Chnoupek said he had been pleased to have opportunity to meet informally with Secretary Shultz and other senior USG officials at the final CSCE review session in Madrid. Although little optimism had been shown, Chnoupek found Secretary's explanation of U.S. differentiation policy toward EE countries "interesting" and expressed hope that it would not prove an impediment to possible improvement in U.S./Czechoslovak relations.

DECLASSIFIED

DECL: OADR

NLRR F06-114/1 #105

BY CH NARA DATE 11/27/87

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Chnoupek saw little alternative to a continued policy of peaceful coexistence among super-powers. The "Spirit of Helsinki" must continue at Stockholm where, Chnoupek stressed, the first ever European conference on disarmament would take place. Czechoslovakia did not shrink from its obligations under the Final Act, although Basket III "was not so pleasant." He said that no Western replies had yet been received to the Warsaw Pact's Prague declaration which should be "reasonably weighed." On question of anti-U.S. stridency in Czechoslovak press and media, Chnoupek said issue had "hen and egg" aspect pointing to continued appearance of articles critical of Czechoslovakia in U.S. press. On KAL airliner, Chnoupek responded to Ambassador's statement by claiming that some of USSR's most sensitive strategic installations were located on Kamchatka. There were many unanswered questions in this "strange and complex" affair. Ambassador said that any unanswered questions lay solely in the Soviet defense of their inexplicable act. We had answers to most questions open to us and we knew that there is no excuse either for Soviet action or its preposterous attempts to shift the blame. End Summary

Bilateral Relations: Chnoupek said he was pleased to have opportunity to thank Ambassador privately for his efforts on behalf of U.S./Czechoslovak relations over past two years. It had been apparent from Chnoupek's talks with USG officials dating back to 1975 in Helsinki that there had been expectations on the part of the latter that bilateral relations would move forward, beginning perhaps with consular and cultural issues. In the event, such progress had not taken place and he did not know whether to ascribe that to the state of bilateral relations, to international events, or to both. Chnoupek nonetheless thought it possible to develop better bilateral relations, e.g., in trade and other spheres. He had been pleased to see the Judaica Project move forward, since he had "lost plenty of time" on it personally. The gold/property claims issue, too, had required a great deal of internal cajoling and persuasion on the part of MFA, since there were those in the GOC who did not understand the way things had to be done in working out such arrangements with the United States. Chnoupek said that he and his colleagues had taken note of fact that the Ambassador was returning to Washington to take up a position of significant influence in U.S. foreign policy. He expressed hope that the Ambassador's experience in the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia would be helpful in dampening East-West tensions and that even Czechoslovakia might benefit from it.

Global Outlook: Chnoupek said that the world situation was "complicated, deteriorating." While we could all agree on the condition, it was in the analysis where we differed. From Czechoslovakia's perspective, the policy of "peaceful coexistence" must continue and not be replaced by confrontation. Chnoupek had been struck by Secretary Shultz's referring in his Madrid speech to the year 1976 (sic) when the Soviets had only deployed about 16 (SS-20) missiles. The Secretary's thoughts needed to be discussed and resolved. There were also the ongoing arms talks



in Geneva in which Czechoslovakia hoped for progress. On CSCE, the "Spirit of Helsinki" needed to continue and the international cooperation it had induced should be "brought to Stockholm." Czechoslovakia shrank from none of its obligations under the Final Act's three baskets, although Basket III was "not so pleasant." In fact, the MFA had only recently placed seventy proposals before the GOC which would soon be acted upon and published in order to bring Czechoslovak law into line with Czechoslovakia's CSCE obligations. As for the Final Act itself, Czechoslovakia adjudged its political contents (or "cartridge," as Chnoupek said it was called within the GOC) balanced and the most important element of the document. In Chnoupek's view, there were still considerable "reserves" (of good will) left in detente. He conceded, however, that he had found little optimism in his brief encounters with senior USG officials, including Secretary Shultz and Ambassador Hartman, in Madrid. He had been pleased to have opportunity to meet informally with the Secretary and had been particularly struck by the Secretary's explanation of the U.S. policy of differentiation in Eastern Europe which he found "interesting." He hoped that the policy in its execution would not prove an impediment to better relations with Czechoslovakia. Chnoupek said that when he had used the term "cold winter" as a tentative political description of the months which lay ahead, the Secretary had neither repeated nor rejected his characterization. In any case, with the claims/gold issue resolved, the GOC remained interested in positive relations with the U.S.

Agreement Request: The Ambassador led off by presenting the Minister with the request for agreement for his successor (Reftel A). Noting that our candidate was an able and accomplished diplomat with long experience in Eastern European and Soviet affairs, the Ambassador hoped that the Czechoslovak Government would be able quickly to grant him agreement. Chnoupek said that Secretary Shultz had mentioned the name to him during their conversation at Madrid and indicated that early and positive action on the agreement request would be forthcoming.

Bilateral Relations: The Ambassador said that successful conclusion of the gold/property claim issue proved that agreements could be struck even when relations were not all that they could be. But to say that there had been little progress on the bilateral front, was not to say there had been none. There had been some expansion in cultural exchanges and the Judaica Project was a notable achievement. His successor would come committed to improving the relationship and might have some concrete suggestions. In the meantime, the Ambassador urged the GOC to think over any proposals it might have. There were factors which needed to be aired openly. While actions counted much more than words, words - such as those habitually used by Czechoslovak media - could harm the atmosphere. Policymakers in Washington keyed on words and took signals from them. The perception there now was that Czechoslovakia in a calculated way had unleashed a hostile stream of anti-American invective which raised the question of whether Prague was truly interested in an improved bilateral relationship.



Differentiation Policy: The Ambassador had taken note of the Foreign Minister's comments on his meeting with Secretary Shultz and, as regarded our policy toward Eastern Europe, said that the policy of "differentiation" meant essentially that the United States would deal with each country as a sovereign state and would gauge our relationship by the demonstrated interest of each country in good relations with the U.S.

Multilateral Affairs: The Ambassador assured the Foreign Minister that President Reagan is deeply committed to reducing levels of arms. But, frankly, the President thought the other side had shown no flexibility, nor was there any indication that our point of view was being seriously taken into account. Speaking personally, the Ambassador said the American people were most concerned about three intertwining aspects of the global scene. They were:

- A growing tendency to use force to settle disputes;
- The level of arms was growing higher and higher;
- A serious lack of trust and confidence between the major adversaries.

To make progress, we must find ways to move on all three aspects simultaneously, since they are interdependent.

KAL Downing: The Ambassador said that Soviet reaction to their downing of the KAL airliner with its shocking loss of life had been a great blow to the element of trust and to the principle of restraint in the use of force. One could understand that mistakes were sometimes made, but it was inexplicable when an offending party refused to accept responsibility for its error. These things mattered greatly, since as Americans we could not accept idea that a military aircraft would shoot down a civilian airliner. We did not do it when Soviet and other civil aircraft strayed from our designated air corridors. Last year when a Czechoslovak airliner persistently ignored ground instructions over the U.S., we neither shot it down nor forced it to land out of concern for lives on board. The Soviet KAL downing raised basic issues--how to keep it from happening again? The Ambassador hoped that Chnoupek could give Soviets sound advice on these points. Chnoupek said that he had visited Kamchatka and could affirm the existence of highly sensitive and strategic installations there. There were many unanswered questions about this "strange and complicated" affair. He wondered how long the effects of this "burden" to international affairs would last. When would it be over? A "hot autumn"?; "cold winter"?; the sooner, the better. The Ambassador responded that the questions are artificial and in fact had been answered. Since Soviet experts knew the answers, we could not accept unfounded and preposterous charges by Soviet policymakers.



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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CSCE and Arms Issues: Differing interpretations of the Helsinki accords had constantly to be borne in mind by both sides, and should be frankly discussed. When interpretations diverged too sharply, when the failings of signatories in the area of human rights proved not amenable to correction through diplomatic channels, then we had to go public--a step we regretted being forced to take. On INF, the charge that the President wanted only to deploy such missiles in Europe was incorrect; he'd like not to have to do it. But we needed balance, parity. If the Soviets would accept parity on the basis of their and our weapons alone, excluding the British and French forces, then an agreement should be possible. On START, some progress has been made in the negotiation, and in MBFR as well. Despite the blow dealt by the KAL downing, we were determined to go on with these negotiations.

Media Rhetoric: On media attacks, the Ambassador said that the United States had been under siege by the Soviet and Eastern European press for several decades. It had become a fact of life which we can live with, so long as basic agreements and commitments made by those governments were scrupulously carried out. The Soviet Union and its allies had made it clear that detente had not meant cessation of its drum-beat of criticism of the United States. We had reluctantly accepted those ground rules, so there should have been no surprise in the East when we also decided to put our political philosophy and convictions before the court of world opinion. We were only doing what the Soviets and others have been doing for many years. We do not fear polemics, but the key was to reestablish confidence and trust. Agreements had to begin to be carried out in spirit as well as in letter.

Political Consultations: Chnoupek replied that senior American diplomats -- beginning with Secretary Rogers ten years ago and continuing with Secretaries Kissinger and Vance -- had consistently raised the point about press treatment with him. But no sooner had these urgings been made, however, than the U.S. press had resumed its attacks on the Czechoslovak Government. Thus, a chain reaction had been set in motion. Perhaps the way out of this "hen and egg" situation would be to establish some form of regular bilateral political consultation, as Czechoslovakia had done with Austria and Yugoslavia to good effect. For his part, Chnoupek had last been received officially by the U.S. Government two years ago when he met with Assistant Secretary Hartman. There had been no similar meetings since, except for DepForMin Johanes' meeting with Undersecretary Eagleburger earlier this year. In this regard, he noted that he would probably be in Washington during his trip to the U.S. this fall for the UNGA to consult with the new Czechoslovak Ambassador (Suja) to the U.S. (Comment: Although broadly hinting, Chnoupek made no direct request for bilateral consultations should he in fact come to Washington.)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Biographic: The Foreign Minister appeared vigorous and in good health, although he had greyed considerably since the last time the DCM had met him on the occasion of Secretary Rogers' visit to Prague in 1973. He spoke in Czech, confidently and without notes, often over-riding his interpreter with the speed of his delivery. He smiled frequently, appeared relaxed and secure in his position.

Drafted: DCM-RWFarrand

Cleared: Ambassador Matlock

*AM*

DCM: RWFarrand:pj

*Handwritten signatures and initials, including "AM" and "RWF"*



Chron

6822

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

September 27, 1983

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK, JR. *JFM*

SUBJECT: President's Meeting with Koivisto--Soviet Angle

Attached for your signature is a memorandum to the President informing him of some questions raised by Koivisto with the Vice President regarding our attitude toward the Soviets, and providing some suggested talking points on these topics. These are supplementary to the points covered in our previous memo, which dealt with U.S-Finnish issues.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at TAB I.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Tab I Memorandum to the President

Tab A Memorandum from the Vice President

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
NLRR F06-114/1 #6047  
BY RW NARA DATE 3/3/11

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON~~SECRET~~INFORMATION

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

SUBJECT: Meeting With Koivisto: Soviet Angle

Koivisto told George Bush yesterday morning that the Russians had asked him to give an assessment on two points following his return from his trip here:

- Is the Reagan Administration prepared to improve relations before the 1984 election; and
- How the US assesses the Soviet attitude toward a summit meeting.

Whether or not the Russians are as confused about our current policy as these questions imply, it seems that Koivisto is acting as an honest broker and I believe it would be useful to give him answers along the following lines:

- We are definitely interested in improving relations if Soviet policies permit. The Soviet reaction to their destruction of the Korean Airliner, their intransigence in clarifying verification questions and their continued hostile attitude on most regional issues, however, create serious doubts in our minds as to whether there is any interest on their part.
- We would, of course, welcome any indication, private or public, of a genuine Soviet interest in improving relations and are determined to continue our dialogue with the Soviets.
- Regarding the possibility of a summit, we believe that both sides agree that one would be useful if it could be productive. At this time, there does not seem to be an adequate basis for a successful meeting. We would of course be pleased if that situation were to change in the future.

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

THE VICE PRESIDENT  
WASHINGTON

September 26, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY GEORGE SHULTZ  
JUDGE CLARK

SUBJECT: Meeting with President Koivisto of Finland

I had a private meeting this morning with President Koivisto of Finland at his Watergate suite. The main purpose of the meeting was to go over some of the things that he wanted to discuss with President Reagan.

He asked if President Reagan would be interested in his views on Andropov. I said that he definitely would be interested. At that point, President Koivisto took a folded paper from his back pocket which turned out to be notes on things that the Russians wanted him to observe while in Washington.

Koivisto said that he had been asked to give an assessment to the Russians on his return. The first item was to determine if the Reagan Administration is prepared to improve relations with the USSR before the 1984 elections. Secondly, they wanted his view on the US assessment of Soviet attitudes towards talks at the Reagan/Andropov level.

Koivisto said that in his view Andropov and those around him are searching for the right thing to do as far as US-USSR relations are concerned. Koivisto believes that President Reagan has much more personal power than Andropov at this time but that if Andropov felt confidence in a particular course of action as being the right thing to do, then he could bring enough personal power to bear to make it happen. Koivisto also added that Andropov is running things although he does have a health problem.

Koivisto then put the memo back in his pocket.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-714/1 #0098

BY CH NARA DATE 11/27/07



I would say that the message that Koivisto is bringing to Washington is that the Soviets are quite confused at this point. They just don't know which way to go -- whether to be more conciliatory towards the United States, or whether to be more hard-lined. It appears that Koivisto is being used to test the water here in Washington.

After the above discussion, Koivisto gave some of his own views on how to deal with the Russians. He said that the Russians feel very strongly that any summit talk must produce results or that relations would deteriorate greatly. It was quite evident that Koivisto concurred in this view, using even stronger language like, "a failure to have some agreement at the summit would be catastrophic."

He made the point that if the United States wants better relations with the USSR then the United States should say so openly and clearly. He said that you have to use big words and a lot of words when you are dealing with the Soviet Union. In the minds of the people in the Kremlin, words have to come ahead of deeds. because there is a lack of such words, the Russians are having a lot of trouble assessing the true American attitude.

I pointed out to him that the KAL shoot-down certainly has made it difficult. Koivisto agreed and said that in the Soviet Union this incident has further confused them and has made them unhappy.

The above generally covers the most important parts of our meeting. We had some discussion of START and INF but the points above were those I thought you both should have before any other meetings with President Koivisto.

Bill, I feel the President should be aware of these points before his meeting with Koivisto.

  
George Bush

C 12

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 29, 1983

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

Mr. Robert W. Farrand  
Charge d'Affaires  
American Embassy  
PRAGUE

Dear Bill:

I am sending along a clean copy of the Vice President's  
Vienna speech so that you can call our friend's attention to  
the passage on page 4.

Things have been hectic since we returned but are going very  
well.

We send our very best to you and Pam.

Sincerely,



Jack F. Matlock

Enclosure:

Vice President's September 21 Speech

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997  
By CS NARA, Date 6/3/02

13

6903

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

September 29, 1983

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT: Andropov Answers Reagan

State's analysis of Andropov's statement yesterday is attached at TAB I. I concur in the analysis, but would stress two points:

-- Andropov's wholesale denunciation of the United States has about it a tone of desperation. He is hurting badly from his handling of the KAL massacre, and the vehemence of his attack shows it.

-- The blatant attempt to frighten Western Europe is clearly aimed at blocking INF deployments. We had of course expected the Soviets to step up their propaganda campaign, but in issuing a statement this strong in Andropov's name, they may well be overplaying their hand.

In any event, Andropov's intemperate blast gives the President the opportunity to consolidate his position on the high ground which he occupied in his UNGA address. In my opinion, the most effective counter to Andropov's diatribe will be to stress that we continue, despite everything, to work in practical, concrete ways to resolve differences, and let the implicit contrast with Andropov's mud slinging do its work. Above all, we must undercut Andropov's obvious effort to heighten fears in Europe, which only feed the anti-nuclear groups.

*DF*  
Don Fortier and David Laux *DL* concur.

Attachment:

Tab I Memorandum from State

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR EO 114/1 #6049

BY CW NARA DATE 11/27/07

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR



September 28, 1983

~~SECRET~~MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Andropov Answers Reagan

Andropov's rejoinder to the President betrayed continuing sensitivity in the Soviet leadership over the KAL Incident and an apparent feeling that the President's latest INF move was getting the better of the USSR in the public-relations arena. The result was a shrill response.

Andropov used the unusual vehicle of a "statement" printed in Soviet newspapers to put on record a harsh and authoritative answer to the President's UNGA speech.

- He was exceptionally negative toward the President, asserting that if anyone had any illusions of any turn for the better in US policy, recent events had dispelled them once and for all.
- In his first statement on the issue, Andropov sought to depict the KAL incident as a bilateral US-Soviet issue. He repeated the charge that it was a provocation and dismissed the President's statements as "foul-mouthed abuse mingled with hypocritical sermons on morality..."
- Following up on Gromyko's statement yesterday, Andropov dismissed the latest US initiative on INF as nothing new. He charged that the US was not interested in any agreement but merely procrastinating until starting the Pershing deployment.
- Despite his bitter denunciation of those "blinded by anti-communism," Andropov insisted that "we have strong nerves and we do not build our policy on emotion." He reaffirmed Moscow's continuing desire for peace and disarmament, but used a reference to Soviet military to buttress his assertion that Soviet interest in agreement is not to be taken as a sign of weakness.

The final portion of the speech was an emotional appeal to Europeans to resist NATO INF deployments, which Andropov

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NLRR Feb 7/14/11 #6053

BY CU NARA DATE 11/27/09~~SECRET~~

DECL: OADR

~~SECRET~~

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described as "a step of fundamental dimensions that is hostile to the cause of peace". Andropov depicted the Europeans as hostages of the US, who are preparing to accept a policy that disregards their own interests. He described opponents of the INF deployment as "manifesting the utmost force" of reason in the breadth and scope of their activities.

*For minor-McKuley*  
Charles Hill  
Executive Secretary

~~SECRET~~



MEMORANDUM

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

September 29, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. CHARLES HILL  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

SUBJECT: Recommendation by Senator Lugar that  
President Receive Vashchenkos and Chmykalovs

Senator Lugar has recommended, in the letter attached, that the President receive the Pentacostalist families who took refuge in the Embassy in Moscow and who were allowed to emigrate recently.

The Department's recommendation regarding the desirability of a call on the President would be appreciated.

Robert M. Kimmitt  
Executive Secretary

Attachment

RICHARD G. LUGAR  
INDIANA

SH 306 SENATE OFFICE BUILDING  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510  
202-224-4814

#162457

COMMITTEES:  
FOREIGN RELATIONS  
AGRICULTURE, NUTRITION AND FORESTRY  
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

# United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

17

September 15, 1983

President Ronald Reagan  
The White House  
Washington, D.C. 20500

2120


Dear Mr. Reagan:

I am writing to urge you to consider a request which was made through Morton Blackwell's office for you to receive the members of the two Soviet families known as "the Siberian Seven." The Vaschenko and Chymkhalov families, as you know had been residing in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow since 1978 and were finally allowed by the Soviet government to emigrate from the Soviet Union this past June and July.

These individuals suffered religious persecution in the Soviet Union, yet they persisted in their effort to practice their religion. They were advocates in their homeland of their strong evangelical faith, and for this they are deserving of recognition and honor.

I greatly appreciate your attention to this request. If there is anything that I or my staff may do to be of assistance, please let me know.

Sincerely,

  
Richard G. Lugar  
United States Senate

RGL/am



6797  
18

D: 162457 CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET  
INCOMING CORRESPONDENCE DATE 830915 RECEIVED DATE 830920  
(PREFIX) (FIRST) (LAST) (SUFFIX)  
HE HONORABLE DICK LUGAR  
TITLE:

ORGANIZATION: UNITED STATES SENATE

STREET:

CITY: WASHINGTON

STATE: DC ZIP: 20510

COUNTRY:

SUBJECT: URGES THE PRESIDENT TO RECEIVE THE MEMBERS OF  
TWO SOVIET FAMILIES KNOWN AS "THE SIBERIAN  
SEVEN," THE VASCHENKO AND CHYMKHALOV FAMILIES

AGENCY/OFF ACTION CODE TRACKING DATE  
ADUBE ORG 830920

K D A 830922 **ED**

STAFF NAME: PRESIDENT REAGAN  
COMMENTS:

MEDIA: L OPID: LW TYPE: IBA

MODES: REPORT INDIV: 1220

USER:

SC RYAN A 830925 **ED**

INS/SECRETARIAT A 830928 **ED**

September 22, 1983

Dear Senator Lugar:

On behalf of the President, I would like to thank you for your September 15 letter endorsing the request for the President to meet with members of the Vaschenko and Chynkhalov families.

We very much appreciate knowing of your interest in this request and your offer to be of assistance. Please know that we will be checking with the appropriate offices here regarding the possibility of making these arrangements. You should be hearing further as soon as a determination is made.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

Kenneth M. Duberstein  
Assistant to the President

The Honorable Richard G. Lugar  
United States Senate  
Washington, D.C. 20510

KMD:CMF:lm

cc: w/copy of inc to Fred Ryan - for appropriate action

cc: w/copy of inc to NSC Secretariat - for input to Fred &  
Ryan

cc: w/copy of inc to Morton Blackwell - FYI

*Recommendation*

WH RECORDS MANAGEMENT HAS RETAINED ORIGINAL



Matlock  
6903  
20

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

September 29, 1983

SECRET

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT: Andropov Answers Reagan

State's analysis of Andropov's statement yesterday is attached at TAB I. I concur in the analysis, but would stress two points:

-- Andropov's wholesale denunciation of the United States has about it a tone of desperation. He is hurting badly from his handling of the KAL massacre, and the vehemence of his attack shows it.

-- The blatant attempt to frighten Western Europe is clearly aimed at blocking INF deployments. We had of course expected the Soviets to step up their propaganda campaign, but in issuing a statement this strong in Andropov's name, they may well be overplaying their hand.

In any event, Andropov's intemperate blast gives the President the opportunity to consolidate his position on the high ground which he occupied in his UNGA address. In my opinion, the most effective counter to Andropov's diatribe will be to stress that we continue, despite everything, to work in practical, concrete ways to resolve differences, and let the implicit contrast with Andropov's mud slinging do its work. Above all, we must undercut Andropov's obvious effort to heighten fears in Europe, which only feed the anti-nuclear groups.

Don Fortier <sup>DF</sup> and David Laux <sup>DL</sup> concur.

Attachment:

Tab I Memorandum from State

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 106-114/1 #6000

BY AW NARA DATE 11/27/07

SECRET

Declassify on: OADR

September 28, 1983

~~SECRET~~MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Andropov Answers Reagan

Andropov's rejoinder to the President betrayed continuing sensitivity in the Soviet leadership over the KAL Incident and an apparent feeling that the President's latest INF move was getting the better of the USSR in the public-relations arena. The result was a shrill response.

Andropov used the unusual vehicle of a "statement" printed in Soviet newspapers to put on record a harsh and authoritative answer to the President's UNGA speech.

- He was exceptionally negative toward the President, asserting that if anyone had any illusions of any turn for the better in US policy, recent events had dispelled them once and for all.
- In his first statement on the issue, Andropov sought to depict the KAL incident as a bilateral US-Soviet issue. He repeated the charge that it was a provocation and dismissed the President's statements as "foul-mouthed abuse mingled with hypocritical sermons on morality..."
- Following up on Gromyko's statement yesterday, Andropov dismissed the latest US initiative on INF as nothing new. He charged that the US was not interested in any agreement but merely procrastinating until starting the Pershing deployment.
- Despite his bitter denunciation of those "blinded by anti-communism," Andropov insisted that "we have strong nerves and we do not build our policy on emotion." He reaffirmed Moscow's continuing desire for peace and disarmament, but used a reference to Soviet military to buttress his assertion that Soviet interest in agreement is not to be taken as a sign of weakness.

The final portion of the speech was an emotional appeal to Europeans to resist NATO INF deployments, which Andropov

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR fcb-114/1 #634

BY CIV NARA DATE 11/27/07~~SECRET~~

DECL: OADR



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~~SECRET~~

described as "a step of fundamental dimensions that is hostile to the cause of peace". Andropov depicted the Europeans as hostages of the US, who are preparing to accept a policy that disregards their own interests. He described opponents of the INF deployment as "manifesting the utmost force" of reason in the breadth and scope of their activities.

*Forunner-McKuley*  
Charles Hill  
Executive Secretary

~~SECRET~~

23

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# National Security Council The White House

System # I  
Package# 5903  
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27 FEB 61

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Executive Secretary	<u>1</u>	<u>K</u>	
John Poindexter	<u>2</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	
Bud McFarlane			
Jacque Hill	<u>3</u>	<u>✓</u>	
Judge Clark	<u>4</u>	<u>✓</u>	<u>I</u>
John Poindexter			
Executive Secretary			
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room			

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

### DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)



C  
24

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET Attachment~~

September 30, 1983

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation of Finnish President Koivisto's Visit, September 27

Attached is a memorandum to the President (Tab I) transmitting for his approval the memorandum of conversation of his meeting with Finnish President Koivisto on September 27. At Tab II is a memorandum for Bob Kimmitt's signature transmitting this memorandum to the Department of State.

RECOMMENDATION

1. That you forward the memorandum at Tab I to the President.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

2. That you approve the memorandum at Tab II for Bob Kimmitt's signature forwarding the memorandum of conversation to State.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments:

- Tab I Memorandum to the President
- Tab A Memorandum of Conversation
- Tab II Kimmitt/Hill Memorandum

~~SECRET Attachment~~  
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997  
By *CRS* NARA, Date *6/3/02*

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON~~SECRET Attachment~~ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation of Finnish President  
Koivisto's Visit, September 27

Attached for your approval is the memorandum of conversation from your meeting with Finnish President Koivisto on September 27, for the record.

RECOMMENDATION

OK      No      That you approve the memorandum of conversation at  
Tab A.

—      —

## Attachment:

Tab A      Memorandum of Conversation of Finnish President  
Koivisto

~~SECRET Attachment~~  
Declassify on: OADRDECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, August 18, 1997  
By CPV NARA, Date 6/3/02

20

NLRR F06-114/1 #6057

BY CW NARA DATE 11/27/07THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: The President's Meeting with President  
Koivisto of FinlandPARTICIPANTS: President Ronald Reagan  
Vice President George Bush  
William P. Clark, Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs  
Edwin Meese, Counselor to the President  
Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Dam  
Deputy Assistant Secretary John H. Kelly  
Jack F. Matlock, NSCPresident of Finland Mauno Koivisto  
Foreign Minister Paavo Vayrynen  
Ambassador to the U.S. Richard Muller  
Special Assistant Jaakko KalelaDATE, TIME AND PLACE: September 27, 1983; 11:30 - 12:15, Oval  
Office, followed by lunch, State Dining Room,  
12:15 - 1:15

After stepping outside for a photo opportunity, the President opened the conversation by describing the history of his desk in the Oval Office, and said that he was delighted with President Koivisto's visit and regretted the delay in their meeting, but that it was important to deliver his speech at the United Nations yesterday. He added that we are proud of our strong relations with Finland and are pleased that we have no problems.

President Koivisto responded that they were also pleased with our relationship, and pointed out that his visit to the United States is important to Finland. They must maintain good relations with their neighbors, but also want good relations with others. He had made several visits to the Soviet Union: two since Brezhnev's funeral, one official and one working visit. He had been pleased with his warm reception in Washington and was happy to say that he came with no big problems and no requests for favors. He added that there is not much tension in Finnish society, although it is suffering from inflation and growing unemployment. Trade is important to them and they are proud that, among the Nordic nations, with which they maintain a special relationship, they have the least foreign indebtedness.

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Declassify on: OADR



27

Koivisto continued that world events have not touched Finland greatly, but that the state of East-West relations is of importance to them. The Finns try to have close relations with their Nordic neighbors, although the members of the Nordic group have different defense policies. He pointed out, in particular, the difference in Swedish and Finnish neutrality: the Finns maintain a lower profile than the Swedes. They must maintain good relations with their neighbor to the East and therefore they are not as active as the Swedes are in speaking out. For example, during the war in Vietnam, they had little to say, in contrast to the Swedes. Their policy of neutrality has permitted them to host many international gatherings, such as the CSCE conference and, last year, a track and field meet where both Iraq and Iran and both Koreas participated.

Regarding the USSR, the Finns had no complaints. He had been received well on his visits and the Russians were willing to talk. They had some hopes--he was not sure why--that he could be of assistance in U.S.-Soviet relations. The Soviet leaders are hoping that something could emerge to improve the present atmosphere. Andropov had told him during his June visit that if you play poker and lose, you can hope to play again and perhaps win. But if you play with missiles, no one will survive to play again.

The President said that he hopes that Andropov feels that way, because he does. But he did not understand Soviet intransigence if that is Andropov's feeling. He (the President) had tried to establish communication and to indicate to the Soviet leaders that words are not enough and that we must have deeds. And before the KAL massacre, small things had started to happen which could have removed some of the burrs under the saddle. We tried to be responsive. But now he has begun to wonder, in light of this tragic affair, whether the Soviet military has more authority in policy making than we have assumed in the past.

Koivisto said that he did not think so. He noted that both Khrushchev and Brezhnev had referred at times to their problems with the military, but that he did not think the military leaders played a major, independent policy-making role. They are important, of course, in the Soviet system, but he does not believe they are independent. Regarding the action in shooting down the KAL airliner, he believes the military were obeying standing orders to fire on intruders, but the Soviet leadership is unhappy with the result. Nevertheless, they feel that they must back up the people who did what they were told to do. It is a sign of weakness that they were unable to apologize. He is sure that orders would not have been given to fire on the plane if the circumstances had been known.



The President observed that we are in dead earnest in the INF negotiations. He still believes that our original proposal was the proper one. Why should there be any of these missiles in Europe? He then referred to his speech at the UN General Assembly yesterday when he quoted President Eisenhower's statement that nuclear weapons are so destructive that in the future neither side can depend on victory. He recalled that as a young man, before World War I, he had learned about the rules of warfare worked out over the centuries which were designed to protect civilians. But this is no longer the case, since in a war nuclear weapons would be aimed at civilians. It is now time to get back to a civilized point of view.

Koivisto observed that there seems to be much excess capacity in nuclear weapons. Some say that 300 modern missiles are enough to kill everyone. If this is the case, what is the meaning of having more? Insistence on equal numbers must be a matter primarily of prestige. And the French and British nuclear systems must be a question primarily of prestige, since it is not likely they intend to use these weapons.

The President said that he did not think it is that way. The only reason for building up is to deter war. Our only defense against the use of nuclear weapons is our capacity to retaliate. For 38 years there has been peace in Europe and he believed this was in large part because of an awareness on both sides that if nuclear war were unleashed there would be retaliation. He recalled that many had assumed that poison gas would be used in World War II because it had been used in World War I. But it was not because neither side wanted to be subjected to it. And one had to ask if the United States would have used nuclear weapons against Japan--which it did to end the war--if Japan had possessed nuclear weapons and could have threatened our cities on the West coast.

We have tried to open channels of communication with the Soviet Union, the President continued, but in its massacre of the Korean airliner, the Soviet Union has offended the world. What is needed is an admission and an attempt to ensure that it will not happen again. The Soviets have violated our airspace, but we would never shoot a civilian plane down.

The Vice President mentioned that a Cuban airliner had, for example, flown off the designated course and over a nuclear submarine construction facility in Groton, Connecticut.



29

Koivisto recalled a speech at the Kremlin on the 60th anniversary of the Soviet Union, when it was said that nobody's security is increased by additional weapons. He believed that there are people in the Soviet Union who believe that increased weapons mean more security. But there are also those who believe the build-up must be stopped. He went on to mention the actions of submarines in the Baltic, noting that the Swedes are convinced that Soviet submarines have been violating their territorial waters. He had taken this up with Andropov and Andropov had stated that Soviet submarine commanders had been ordered to stay at least 50 kilometers from the Swedish coast. Koivisto had told him that words are not enough since if there is evidence that the Russians are always pushing, this makes them nervous. Nevertheless, he felt that even if the submarines violating Swedish waters had been Soviet, the Soviets do not intend to change the current situation. Why should they wish to push the Swedes further toward the West?

The President said that he hoped UNIFIL would stay in Lebanon. The cease fire provides a ray of light. He had talked to the UN Secretary General and he believes it could be helpful if UNIFIL could be the observer of the cease fire, since we might not be acceptable to all the parties.

Koivisto congratulated the President on the cease fire, since everyone felt that something must be done about the fighting there. As for Finland, it would send troops only upon a request by the UN Secretary General. It happened that troops were available for UNIFIL since plans had been made to have a contingent available for Namibia, and these were used when participation in UNIFIL was requested.

The President observed that, if the hot spot in Lebanon cooled down, then this would open up possibilities for progress toward a peace settlement. He mentioned that King Hassan feels that there must be a solution to the Palestinian problem. However, there can be no solution while shooting goes on.

The Vice President asked for Koivisto's impressions of Andropov's health.

Koivisto said that when he saw Andropov last June, the latter did not seem to be in very good shape. In fact, he was shocked by his appearance. He did not know what his difficulties were, but in any event he seemed authoritative and fully in charge. He added that we cannot expect every Russian leader to last as long as Brezhnev or Stalin. Andropov seems to be working to improve the way the Soviet



~~SECRET~~

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government functions, and is replacing people in the interests of efficiency. Andropov's approach is business-like and he seems anxious to get something accomplished during his tenure.

The President said he hoped that what Andropov desires is directed at achieving a more peaceful world.

At this point the meeting ended and the participants proceeded to the State Dining Room for lunch.

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET Attachment~~

September 30, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. CHARLES HILL  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation of Finnish President  
Koivisto's Visit, September 27

Attached is the memorandum of conversation from the President's meeting with Finnish President Koivisto on September 27.

This memorandum, and others similar, are Presidential records containing sensitive information, including foreign government information. They are generally shared only with the Department of State. Further reproduction should be strictly limited, and any request, now or in the future, for access or release outside the Department must be cleared by the NSC staff.

Robert M. Kimmitt  
Executive Secretary

Attachment

~~SECRET Attachment~~  
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997  
By CIS NARA, Date 6/3/02

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32

MEMORANDUM

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

September 30, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR SALLY KELLEY

FROM: ROBERT M. KIMMITT

SUBJECT: Proposed Response to Reverend Boris P. Vlasenko

We have reviewed and concur in the proposed response prepared by the Department of State to Reverend Boris P. Vlasenko's letter of June 6 urging funding by the State Department of the Tolstoy Foundation.

Attachment

6906

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

September 30, 1983

TO: BOB KIMMITT

I have reviewed the attached package and recommend that you sign the attached memo to Sally Kelley.



Jack Matlock





(Classification)

6906  
33

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT  
TRANSMITTAL FORM

S/S 8324263

Date SEP 28 1983

For: Mr. William P. Clark  
National Security Council  
The White House

Reference:

To: The President From: Reverend Boris P. Vlasenko

Date: June 6, 1983 Subject: Urges funding by the State

Department of the Tolstoy Foundation

WH Referral Dated: August 8, 1983 NSC ID# 159566  
(if any)

\_\_\_\_\_ The attached item was sent directly to the  
Department of State.

Action Taken:

xx A draft reply is attached.

\_\_\_\_\_ A draft reply will be forwarded.

\_\_\_\_\_ A translation is attached.

\_\_\_\_\_ An information copy of a direct reply is attached.

\_\_\_\_\_ We believe no response is necessary for the reason  
cited below.

\_\_\_\_\_ The Department of State has no objection to the  
proposed travel.

\_\_\_\_\_ Other.

Remarks:

*Walter S. Flanner*  
Charles Hill  
Executive Secretary

(Classification)

SUGGESTED REPLY

Dear Rev. Vlasenko:

Thank you for your letter of June 6, addressed to the President, in which you request that the United States Government continue its funding of voluntary agency assistance to refugees in the countries of France, Belgium, and Sweden. The Department of State has reviewed its intention to terminate funding of activities in those countries at the end of this fiscal year, and it has determined that the decision will stand.

The decision to terminate funding was based primarily on our need to utilize better the Government's limited budgetary resources through concentrating on the major first-asylum operations in Europe. In fiscal year 1982, fewer than 700 refugees were resettled out of France to the U.S. and other countries, and only 84 refugees in Belgium were resettled elsewhere.

The decision to terminate funding for voluntary agencies in France, Belgium, and Sweden is in no way a signal that the United States Government is unappreciative of the important

Reverend Boris P. Vlasenko,  
Chairman, Congress of Russian-Americans,  
2463 Second Avenue, North,  
St. Petersburg, Florida 33713.

and generous role performed by voluntary agencies in these countries. On the contrary, we salute their impressive accomplishments. Nor is it indicative of any desire on the part of our Government that the affected agencies terminate operations in these countries. The Department would hope that at least some of the agencies might be able to attract sufficient funds from the private sector to enable them to maintain their offices in these countries. The concerned voluntary agencies have been told that under U.S. law they may continue to present applications for U.S. resettlement of refugees to U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service officers who periodically visit those countries on other official business.

In making this decision we gave careful consideration to the concerns expressed by the Tolstoy Foundation and other interested voluntary agencies. With reference to the view that this decision could affect a long-standing tradition and might therefore be taken as a sign of lessened U.S. interest in refugees, we are confident that our country's record and continuing assistance in worldwide relief and resettlement of refugees make clear the strong concern of the United States for those unfortunate people.

Sincerely yours,



T H E   W H I T E   H O U S E   O F F I C E

REFERRAL

AUGUST 8, 1983

TO: DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ACTION REQUESTED:

DRAFT REPLY FOR SIGNATURE OF WHITE HOUSE STAFF MEMBER

DESCRIPTION OF INCOMING:

ID: 159566

MEDIA: LETTER, DATED JUNE 6, 1983

TO: PRESIDENT REAGAN

FROM: REVEREND BORIS P. VLASENKO  
CHAIRMAN  
CONGRESS OF RUSSIAN - AMERICAN,  
INC.  
2463 2ND AVENUE NORTH  
ST. PETERSBURG FL 33713

SUBJECT: URGES FUNDING BY THE STATE DEPARTMENT OF THE  
TOLSTOY FOUNDATION

PROMPT ACTION IS ESSENTIAL -- IF REQUIRED ACTION HAS NOT BEEN  
TAKEN WITHIN 9 WORKING DAYS OF RECEIPT, PLEASE TELEPHONE THE  
UNDERSIGNED AT 456-7486.

RETURN CORRESPONDENCE, WORKSHEET AND COPY OF RESPONSE  
(OR DRAFT) TO:  
AGENCY LIAISON, ROOM 91, THE WHITE HOUSE

SALLY KELLEY  
DIRECTOR OF AGENCY LIAISON  
PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE

*RECEIVED IN S/S-1 ON 8/8  
AT 11:10 AM S/KM*

*Trina K.*

37



# CONGRESS OF RUSSIAN-AMERICANS, INC.

## FLORIDA WEST COAST CHAPTER

2463 - 2nd Avenue North • St. Petersburg, FL 33713 • Phone (813) 327-3535

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*Handwritten signature/initials*

June 6th, 1983

159566

Honorable Ronald Reagan  
 President of the United States of America  
 White House  
 Washington, D. C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

I beg you to give vigorous support to the funding by the State Department of the Tolstoy Foundation and other refugee voluntary agencies operating in Paris, Brussels and Stockholm, which funding the State Department has decided to stop.

With a very small budget, the Tolstoy Foundation does an excellent job of assisting refugees, which is so important to the United States Government.

To drop American support to these posts now, would signal to Mr. Andropov and the Soviets that the United States does not care enough for those who seek freedom.

Please ask Secretary of State Shultz to change the decision taken by his staff in withdrawing this help.

Thank you for your consideration of this important matter.

*Handwritten signature of Boris P. Vlasenko*

V. Rev. Boris P. Vlasenko, Chairman

Si

*Handwritten notes:*  
 JTBORIS  
 BUR/SOV  
 would like to  
 clear your  
 award

To  
 Te