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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

**Withdrawer**

JET 3/22/2005

**File Folder** MATLOCK CHRON AUGUST 1983

**FOIA**

F06-114/1

**Box Number** 1

YARHI-MILO

109

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
6041	MEMO	MEMO FOR WILLIAM CLARK RE NEW MAP OF AREAS CLOSED TO USSR DIPLOMATS [1] <b>R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1</b>	1	8/2/1983	B1
6044	MEMO	MEMO FOR WILLIAM CLARK RE NEW MAP OF AREAS CLOSED TO TRAVEL BY USSR DIPLOMATS [2-3] <b>R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1</b>	2	7/29/1983	B1
6045	PAPER	PAPER ON AREAS CLOSED TO TAVEL BY USSR DIPLOMATS [4-20] <b>R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1</b>	17	ND	B1
6042	MEMO	MEMO FOR WILLIAM CLARK RE STRATEGY PAPER FOR CONSULATES IN KIEV AND NEW YORK [21-23] <b>R 3/3/2011 F2006-114/1</b>	3	8/8/1983	B1
6046	MEMO	MEMO FOR WILLIAM CLARK RE STRATEGY PAPER FOR NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE USSR ON CONSULATES IN KIEV AND NEW YORK [24-32] <b>PAR 3/3/2011 F2006-114/1</b>	9	8/5/1983	B1
6043	MEMO	MEMO FOR CHARLES HILL RE STRATEGY PAPER FOR NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE USSR ON CONSULATES IN KIEV AND NEW YORK [33-34] <b>PAR 5/26/2011 F2006-114/1</b>	2	8/8/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

MEMORANDUM

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~~~INFORMATION~~

August 2, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM:

JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT:

New Map of Areas Closed to Soviet Diplomats

State has submitted, in the memorandum attached at Tab I, a new map of areas in the U.S. closed to Soviet diplomats and a draft note to the Soviet Embassy notifying it of the changes in the travel rules.

These changes were coordinated with Defense and other interested agencies and should insure both more exact reciprocity in the travel controls and more effective protection of security-sensitive areas. I therefore consider them desirable and recommend that they be approved.

One aspect of State's proposed Note deserves special attention. That is the reiteration of our longstanding offer to abolish travel controls on Soviet diplomats if they drop their controls on ours. This has been the U.S. position since we instituted travel controls, in response to Soviet controls, in 1952, and I agree with State that we should hold to this position. It is not only consistent with traditional U.S. policy, but with our desire for better access to Soviet society and for more effective verification of arms control agreements. There is no likelihood that it will be accepted, but it should be maintained to make clear that our controls are established on the basis of reciprocity, and that we can live with a more open system of travel if the Soviets are willing.

Oliver North, Richard Beal and Gilbert Rye concur.

Tab I Hill to Clark Memo with attachments

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR FOI-114/1 #6041

BY CJ NARA DATE 11/27/07~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

Washington, D.C. 20520



83 JUL 30 A 1: 26

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

July 29, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK  
THE WHITE HOUSE

SITUATION ROOM

SUBJECT: New Map of Areas Closed to Travel by Soviet Diplomats

As part of the Administration's effort to enforce reciprocity with the Soviet Union, the Department of State has for some time been engaged in revising the list of areas closed to travel by Soviet diplomats in the United States. This map of closed areas was last revised in 1967. Since then, the Soviets themselves have revised their map. Moreover, there have been substantial changes in the areas to which we deny access to Soviet travelers. A prime example of this is the Silicon Valley area of California, which we have closed de facto for some time and which will now be formally closed.

The new map will match the reductions in percentage of closed territory made by the Soviets in 1978. It will also add Alaska and Hawaii -- areas excluded from the 1967 map. By closing all points in Hawaii, and the five major cities in Alaska, we will be able to reduce the percentage of closed area with only a modest reduction in the actual square mileage of closed areas in the 48 contiguous states, and at the same time meet all the major security concerns of the Department of Defense.

Attached at Tab 1 is a draft diplomatic note to the Soviet Embassy announcing these changes, at Tab 2 a list of areas proposed for closing, at Tab 3 a list of open cities in closed areas, and at Tab 4 a list of approved transit routes through closed areas. There are, of course, substantial changes in the lists of closed areas, open cities, and approved transit routes. The draft note, which sets forth the framework of our travel control program and delineates the note-free travel zones, does not incorporate any procedural changes in the system. The only major change in the draft note from the 1967 version is a complete revision of the accessible area for Soviets assigned to the Consulate General in San Francisco. The note also re-states existing regulations and reduces to writing some practices long-followed, but not previously included in any formal notification to the Soviet Embassy.

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR FO6-114/1 #6044

BY CW NARA DATE 11/27/07~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECL: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3

Attached at Tab 5 is a list of significant cities and areas that will be newly opened or closed. We anticipate presenting this package to the Soviets in a positive spirit, noting its reciprocal nature but also indicating that a number of previously closed cities and areas will now be open to them. As has been our practice since 1952, and in accordance with long-standing U.S. policy, we intend to re-state our offer to abolish travel controls on a mutual basis.

This proposal has been fully discussed with the Army, Air Force and Navy to ensure that all areas of military sensitivity have been included in closed areas. This project has also been fully discussed with the Federal Bureau of Investigation. All areas of concern have been fully worked out at the working level with each of the services and the Bureau. In addition, we have also consulted the National Security Agency and, to the extent possible, have met their concerns as well. Assistant Secretary for European Affairs Burt will be transmitting copies of the proposed closed areas to members of the Interagency Coordinating Committee for US-Soviet Affairs (ICCUSA), which is comprised of all agencies concerned with US-Soviet affairs, for their comment. The Bureau of Intelligence and Research will be transmitting this material to intelligence community agencies not represented on ICCUSA.

The new maps will enter their final stage of production about August 15. Any proposals for changes received after that date would, naturally, present nearly insurmountable problems to incorporate.

*Charles Hill*

Charles Hill  
Executive Secretary

Enclosures:  
As stated.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

The Department of State refers to its note of July 26, 1967, to the Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, concerning regulations applicable to certain Soviet citizens traveling in the United States.

The Soviet Government first instituted a system of stringent travel restrictions for foreigners in 1941. After attempts to secure the abolition of travel controls and closed areas in the Soviet Union, the United States reluctantly instituted its own system of closed areas for Soviet citizens on January 3, 1955. Since then, the United States has on many occasions proposed mutual abolition or reduction of all travel restrictions. The United States avails itself of this opportunity to reiterate its offer to abolish or reduce travel restrictions or closed areas on the basis of reciprocity.

The United States Government, taking into account Note. No. 1/Pr of January 4, 1978, issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, has reduced the percentage of United States territory closed to Soviet travelers. The areas closed to Soviet travelers are listed in enclosure 1. Open cities in closed areas are listed in enclosure 2. Open transit routes through closed areas are listed in enclosure 3. Special permission is required for travel to United States possessions, territories and areas under United States administration.

These regulations apply to travel in the fifty United States by all Soviet citizens possessing valid passports issued by the Government of the USSR, except for Soviet citizen officers and employees of the Secretariat of the United Nations while their conduct is the responsibility of the Secretary General of the United Nations and Soviet tourists on private visits to the United States. Soviet citizens who are visiting the United States within the framework of US-USSR exchanges agreements may visit closed areas in accordance with the particular exchange program and itinerary as approved by the Department of State.

DECLASSIFIED (RELEASABLE)  
NLRR F06-114/1 #6045  
BY CW NARA DATE 11/27/07

Except as otherwise provided herein, all Soviet citizens to whom these regulations apply who have not declared their itinerary for travel in the United States at the time of application for a United States visa must submit official notification at least forty-eight hours in advance of any travel to any point outside the free-movement zones of New York, Washington, or San Francisco as defined herein. In the case of Soviet citizens assigned permanently or temporarily to the Soviet Embassy in Washington, the Soviet Mission to the United Nations, or to Soviet commercial organizations in the United States, this notification must be addressed in writing to the Department of State, the Army, Navy or Air Force Foreign Liaison Offices, or the United States Mission to the United Nations, as appropriate. In the case of Soviet correspondents temporarily or permanently assigned in the United States, written notification is to be addressed to the Department of State. In the case of persons present in the United States in the framework of US-USSR exchange agreements notification is to be made to the Department of State. Notifications will include the names of all travelers, description of their itinerary, identification of means of transportation used, route numbers of all roads traveled by car listed in the order in which the roads are taken, and the location of each overnight stop. Listing of any city by name in the itinerary shall be deemed to include only such areas as are within the city limits unless specifically stated otherwise. (In the case of diplomats and journalists the listing of San Francisco, New York or Washington shall be deemed to include all areas within the respective free-movement zones.)

Travel by railroad or commercial airlines through closed areas is permitted when necessary to reach open areas or open cities in otherwise closed areas. During such transit travel Soviet citizens may not leave the immediate vicinity of rail or

air terminals within closed areas. Transit travel by automobile is permitted only on the designated transit routes listed in enclosure 2. While utilizing these transit routes, no stops or deviations are permitted except at public facilities (i.e., restaurants, gas stations and roadside rests) in the immediate vicinity of the transit route.

Soviet citizens subject to these regulations may not hire unchauffered motor vehicles nor may they charter helicopters, ships or aircraft. Boat travel through closed areas or within United States territorial waters bordering closed areas is also prohibited. Unless specifically authorized, entry into or stopping in the vicinity of identifiable military installations is prohibited.

The zone of free movement in the Washington, D.C. area for diplomats and journalists, and for other Soviets subject to these regulations and resident in Washington, D.C., is defined as follows. First, all open areas within 25 miles of the White House. Second, King's Dominion amusement park in Doswell, Virginia via route I-95. Third, Front Royal, Virginia via routes I-66 and U.S. 340. Fourth, Luray, Virginia via routes I-66 and U.S. 340. Fifth, Annapolis, Maryland via route U.S. 50. Sixth, Colonial Williamsburg and William and Mary College at Williamsburg, Virginia via routes I-95, I-295 and I-64. Sixth, Ocean City, Maryland via route U.S. 50. Seventh, the Soviet recreational property at Pioneer Point, Maryland via routes U.S. 50, U.S. 301 and Maryland 18.

The zone of free movement in the New York City area for diplomats and journalists, and for other Soviets subject to these regulations and resident in New York City, is defined as all open areas in the States of New York and Connecticut within 25 miles of Columbus Circle, and in the State of New Jersey those portions of the counties of Bergen, Essex (except for the City of Nutley), Hudson (except for the City of Bayonne),



Middlesex, Monmouth, Morris, Passaic, and Union within 25 miles of Columbus Circle.

The zone of free movement in the San Francisco area for diplomats and journalists, and for other Soviets subject to these regulations and resident in San Francisco, is defined as follows. First, the City and County of San Francisco. Second, San Francisco International Airport via route U.S. 101 from and to the City and County of San Francisco. Third, in Alameda and Contra Costa Counties (via the San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge) an area bounded by California Route 17 from the San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge to its intersection with route I-580, thence east on route I-580 to route I-680, thence north on route I-680 to California Route 24, thence west on California Route 24 to the point where California Route 24 intersects an arc of 18.5 statute miles radius centered at the intersection of the roads Skyview Way and City View Way (southwest of Twin Peaks Park) in San Francisco, thence northwest along the arc to the Contra Costa County/Marin County boundary in San Pablo Bay. Fourth, in Marin County (via the Golden Gate Bridge) an area bounded by a continuation of the 18.5 mile radius arc from its intersection with the Contra Costa/Marin County boundary in San Pablo Bay to its intersection with route U.S. 101 in Marin County, thence north on U.S. 101 to Lucas Valley Road, thence west on Lucas Valley Road to Nicasio Valley Road, west on Nicasio Valley Road to Petaluma-Pt. Reyes Road, and west on Petaluma-Pt. Reyes Road to its intersection with California Route 1 (Shoreline Highway), and thence north on California Route 1 for two statute miles, thence by a line due west to the low water line in Tomales Bay, thence, following the low water line, along the west side of Tomales Bay to the Pacific Ocean and south to the Golden Gate Bridge. Drake's Estero, Estero de Limatour and Bolinas Lagoon are included within the free movement zone. In Marin County, only those portions of San

Francisco Bay within one kilometer of the low water line are included in the free movement zone. Angel Island is included in the free movement zone and may be reached by any commercial means of transport.

The Chief of Mission of the Soviet Embassy in Washington, and the Principal Representative of the USSR to the United Nations in New York may travel without prior notification by any means of transport not otherwise prohibited herein to open areas and cities in the United States accompanied by members of his or her immediate family, an interpreter, and personal chauffeur. Family members unaccompanied by the Chief of Mission may also travel without prior notification and may be accompanied by a chauffeur if travel is by automobile.

Embassy and Consulate General personnel, and Soviet journalists, may travel by any means of transport not otherwise prohibited herein, on the basis of notification in writing at least 24 hours in advance (eight hours of which correspond to one working day), between Washington and San Francisco and between Washington and New York, and to cities and towns otherwise open to travel by Soviet official personnel which are located either on the interstate highway network in the States of New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, West Virginia, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, and Tennessee, or in the State of California on interstate route 80 and on interstate route 5 north of Kern County.

This note does not modify or supersede the provisions of the Department's note of March 18, 1983, regarding the furnishing of travel services by the Office of Foreign Missions.

The United States Government wishes to emphasize again that its firm preference is to abolish all restrictions on free travel, and repeats its earlier offers to discuss with the Soviet Government any proposal to this end.

**DRAFT**

9

Enclosures:

1. Areas closed to Soviet citizens subject to US travel regulations.
2. Open cities in closed areas.
3. Open transit routes through closed areas.

Department of State,  
Washington, \_\_\_\_\_, 1983.

Enclosure 1

AREAS CLOSED TO SOVIET CITIZENS  
SUBJECT TO US TRAVEL REGULATIONS

Names listed under each State are names of counties, unless otherwise indicated.

Mississippi River (entire length)

ALABAMABlount  
Calhoun  
Coffee  
De Kalb  
Dale  
Etowah  
Fayette  
Geneva  
Henry  
Jackson  
Jefferson  
Lamar  
Marion  
Marshall  
Madison  
Russell  
St. Clair  
Talladega  
Walker  
WinstonALASKACity of Anchorage  
City of Fairbanks  
City of Juneau  
City of Ketchikan  
City of NomeARIZONAApache  
Cochise  
Coconino  
Maricopa  
Mohave  
Navaho  
Pima  
Pinal  
Santa CruzARKANSASCleburne  
Conway  
Crittenden  
Cross  
Faulkner  
Jefferson  
Lee  
Mississippi  
Monroe  
Ouachita  
Pulaski  
St. Francis  
Van Buren  
White  
WoodruffCALIFORNIA#Alameda  
#Contra Costa  
Fresno  
Humboldt  
Inyo  
Kern  
\*Los Angeles  
Merced  
Monterey  
Napa  
Orange  
Riverside  
Sacramento  
San Bernardino  
San Diego  
San Joaquin  
San Luis Obispo  
San Mateo  
Santa Barbara  
Santa Clara  
Solano  
Sonoma  
YubaCOLORADOAdams  
Arapahoe  
Bent  
Boulder  
City of Denver  
Douglas  
Elbert  
El Paso  
Jefferson  
Las Animas  
Logan  
Prowers  
Pueblo  
Teller  
WeldCONNECTICUTFairfield  
Hartford  
New LondonDELAWARE

Kent

FLORIDA

Alachua  
Baker  
Bay  
Bradford  
Brevard  
Columbia  
Dade  
Duval  
Franklin  
Gulf  
Hillsborough  
Holmes  
Monroe  
Nassau  
Orange  
Osceola  
Okaloosa  
Polk  
Pinellas  
Santa Rosa  
Seminole  
Union  
Walton

GEORGIA

Bibb  
Bryan  
Bullock  
Burke  
Camden  
Cobb  
Chattahouchee  
Columbia  
Crawford  
Dawson  
DeKalb  
Fanin  
Forsyth  
Fulton  
Houston  
Jefferson  
Jenkins  
Lincoln  
Lumpkin  
Marion  
McDuffie  
Muscogee  
Quitman  
Richmond  
Stewart  
Talbot  
Taylor  
Union  
White

HAWAII  
All points

IDAHO

Butte  
Canyon  
Elmore  
Fremont  
Owyhee  
Payette

ILLINOIS

Carroll  
Cook  
De Kalb  
Du Page  
Henry  
Kane  
Lake  
Lee  
Mercer  
Ogle  
Rock Island  
Scott  
St. Clair  
Whiteside  
Will

INDIANA

Allen  
Bartholomew  
Boone  
Brown  
Clark  
Davies  
Decatur  
Dearborn  
Floyd  
Franklin  
Greene  
Hamilton  
Hancock  
Jackson  
Jefferson  
Jennings  
Johnson  
Lawrence  
Marion  
Martin  
Miami  
Morgan  
Ohio  
Ripley  
Scott  
Shelby  
Switzerland  
Vermilion

IOWA

Clinton  
Des Moines  
Louisa  
Mills  
Muscatine  
Pottawatamie  
Scott

KANSAS

Butler  
Chataugua  
Cherokee  
Crawford  
Cowley  
Douglas  
Elk  
Harvey  
Jefferson  
Johnson  
Kingman  
Labette  
Leavenworth  
Meosho  
Montgomery  
Reno  
Sedgwick  
Shawnee  
Sumner  
Wilson

KENTUCKY

Bourbon  
Bullitt  
Calloway  
Carlisle  
Christian  
Clark  
Fulton  
Graves  
Hickman  
Hardin  
Jefferson  
Lyon  
Marshall  
Madison  
McCracken  
Meade  
Oldham  
Todd  
Trigg  
Trimble

LOUISIANA

Beauregard  
Bossier  
Caddo  
De Soto  
Jefferson  
Natchitoches  
Plaquemines  
Rapides  
Sabine  
St. Bernard  
St. Charles  
Vernon  
Webster

MAINE

Androscoggin  
Aroostook  
Cumberland  
Kennebec  
Lincoln  
Penobscot  
Sagadahoc  
Somerset  
Washington  
York

MARYLAND

Allegany  
\*\*Anne Arundel  
Baltimore  
Charles  
Frederick  
Harford  
Howard  
Kent  
Washington

MASSACHUSETTS

Barnstable  
Essex  
Middlesex  
Norfolk  
Plymouth  
Suffolk  
Worcester

MICHIGAN

Arenac  
Charlevoix  
Emmett  
Iosco  
Macomb  
Marquette

MINNESOTA

City of Minneapolis  
City of St. Paul  
Hennepin  
Ramsey

MISSISSIPPI

Hancock  
Harrison  
Jackson  
Lowndes

MISSOURI

Benton  
Barton  
Bates  
Boone  
Camden  
Cass  
Cedar  
Cooper  
Dallas  
Dent  
Henry  
Hickory  
Howard  
Iron  
Jackson  
Jasper  
Jefferson  
Laclede  
Madison  
Moniteau  
Morgan  
Pettis  
Pulaski  
Reynolds  
Shannon  
Sr. Francois  
St. Genieve  
Saline  
St. Clair  
St. Louis  
Texas  
Vernon

MONTANA

Cascade  
Chouteau  
Fergus  
Judith Basin  
Liberty  
Pondera  
Teton  
Toole  
Wheatland

NEBRASKA

Adams  
Banner  
Burt  
Cheyenne  
Douglas  
Hall  
Kimball  
Sarpy

NEVADA

Clark  
Lincoln  
Mineral  
Nye

NEW HAMPSHIRE

Hillsborough  
Rockingham

NEW JERSEY

Atlantic  
#Bergen  
Burlington  
Camden  
#Essex  
#Hudson  
Mercer  
#Monmouth  
#Morris  
Ocean  
#Passaic  
Salem  
#Union

NEW MEXICO

Bernalillo  
Curry  
Dona Ana  
Lincoln  
Los Alamos  
McKinley  
Mora  
Otero  
Roosevelt  
Santa Fe  
Sierra  
Socorro  
Taos  
Torrance

NEW YORK

Albany  
Broome  
Cayuga  
Clinton  
Erie  
Jefferson  
Lewis  
Madison  
Niagara  
Oneida  
Onondaga  
St. Lawrence  
Saratoga  
Schenectady  
Seneca  
Suffolk  
Tioga

NORTH CAROLINA

Brunswick  
Buncombe  
Cumberland  
Dare  
Harnett  
Hoke  
Hyde  
Johnston  
Madison  
Moore  
Sampson  
Scotland  
Transylvania  
Wayne

NORTH DAKOTA

Bottineau  
Burke  
Burleigh  
Cass  
Cavalier  
Emmons  
Grant  
Grand Forks  
Griggs  
McHenry  
McLean  
Mercer  
Morton  
Mountrail  
Nelson  
Oliver  
Pembina  
Ramsey  
Renville  
Sioux  
Sheridan  
Steele  
Walsh  
Ward

OHIO

Ashland  
Ashtabula  
Auglaize  
Allen  
Butler  
Champaign  
Clark  
Delaware  
Franklin  
Greene  
Hardin  
Logan  
Madison  
Marion  
Miami  
Morrow  
Medina  
Montgomery  
Pike  
Preble  
Portage  
Richland  
Shelby  
Summit  
Union

OKLAHOMA

Comanche  
Jackson  
Oklahoma  
Pittsburg

OREGON

Coos  
Douglas  
Morrow  
Multnomah  
Umatilla  
Washington

PENNSYLVANIA

Adams  
Allegheny  
Beaver  
Centre  
Cumberland  
Dauphin  
Franklin  
Lackawanna  
Lebanon  
Monroe  
Montgomery  
York

SOUTH CAROLINA

Aiken  
Barnwell  
Beaufort  
Berkeley  
Calhoun  
Charleston  
Colleton  
Dorchester  
Edgefield  
Horry  
Lexington  
McCormick  
Orangeburg  
Richland  
Sumter

SOUTH DAKOTA

Butte  
Corson  
Haakon  
Jackson  
Lawrence  
Meade  
Pennington  
Ziebach



TENNESSEE

Anderson  
Blount  
Bradley  
Benton  
Cocke  
Carroll  
Cheatham  
Coffee  
Crockett  
Dyer  
Decatur  
Dickson  
Franklin  
Greene  
Grundy  
Hamblen  
Hamilton  
Hawkins  
Henry  
Houston  
Humphreys  
Jefferson  
Knox  
Loudon  
Lauderdale  
Lincoln  
Marion  
Meigs  
Monroe  
McMinn  
Montgomery  
Moore  
Obion  
Polk  
Perry  
Rhea  
Roane  
Sequatchie  
Sevier  
Stewart  
Sullivan  
Unicoi  
Washington  
Weakley

TEXAS

Bell  
Bexar  
Bowie  
Coryell  
Dallas  
El Paso  
Harris  
Harrison  
Hunt  
Lampasas  
McLennan  
Potter  
Randall  
Tarrant  
Taylor  
Tom Green  
Travis

UTAH

Davis  
Salt Lake  
Tooele  
Weber

VERMONT  
Chittenden

VIRGINIA  
Albermarle  
Campbell  
Clarke  
Craig  
Gloucester  
Isle Of Wight  
King George  
#Loudon  
Matthews  
Montgomery  
Northampton  
Prince William  
Pulaski  
Surry  
York  
City of James  
City of  
Chesapeake  
City of Newport  
News  
City of  
Virginia Beach  
City of Norfolk  
City of  
Portsmouth  
City of Hampton

WASHINGTON

Benton  
Clark  
Cowlitz  
Franklin  
Jefferson  
King  
Kitsap  
Kittitas  
Lewis  
Mason  
Pierce  
Spokane  
Thurston  
Yakima

WEST VIRGINIA  
Mineral  
Pendleton

WISCONSIN  
Brown  
Kenosha  
Milwaukee  
Racine

WYOMING

Big Horn  
Campbell  
Converse  
Goshen  
Laramie  
Natrona  
Platte  
Sweetwater  
Weston

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# Except for those portions within the New York, San Francisco or Washington free-movement zones.

\* Except for the open city of Los Angeles, as defined in Enclosure No. 2.

\*\* Only those portions north of route 50.

Enclosure 2

## OPEN CITIES IN CLOSED AREAS

Albany, New York  
 Anaheim, California  
 Atlanta, Georgia  
 Austin, Texas  
 Baltimore, Maryland  
 Birmingham, Alabama  
 Boston, Massachusetts  
 Bridgeport, Connecticut  
 Brookline, Massachusetts  
 Buffalo, New York  
 Cambridge, Massachusetts  
 Camden, New Jersey  
 Chattanooga, Tennessee  
 Chicago, Illinois (incl O'Hare Airport)  
 Columbia, South Carolina  
 Columbus, Ohio  
 Great Adventure Amusement Park, New Jersey  
 Hartford, Connecticut  
 Independence, Missouri  
 Indianapolis, Indiana (incl all enclaves)  
 Kansas City, Kansas  
 Kansas City, Missouri  
 Kenner, Louisiana  
 Knoxville, Tennessee  
 Lawrence, Kansas  
 Little Rock, Arkansas  
 \*Los Angeles, California  
 Louisville, Kentucky  
 Macon, Georgia  
 Metairie, Louisiana  
 Miami Beach, Florida  
 Miami, Florida  
 Milwaukee, Wisconsin  
 New Orleans, Louisiana  
 Omaha, Nebraska  
 Phoenix, Arizona  
 Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania  
 Portland, Oregon  
 Savannah, Georgia  
 Shreveport, Louisiana  
 Somerville, Massachusetts  
 Spokane, Washington  
 Stamford, Connecticut  
 Stockton, California  
 Topeka, Kansas  
 Trenton, New Jersey  
 Tucson, Arizona  
 Worcester, Massachusetts

\* Only those portions of the County of Los Angeles within the following boundaries are open: the Pacific Ocean coast from route I-10 (the Santa Monica Freeway) northwest to California route 27 (Topanga Canyon Road) thence north on California route 27 to route US 101 (the Ventura Freeway), east on U.S. 101 to California route 2, and north and east on California route 2 to the area of "Little Jimmy Spring" in Angeles National Forest (34° 20' 43" N., 117° 49' 42" W), then south along a straight line bearing 183.5° East of North to California route 39, thence south on California route 39 to route I-10 (the San Bernardino Freeway), west on route I-10 to California route 19 (Rosemead Blvd.), south on California route 19 to route I-5 (the Santa Ana Freeway), north on route I-5 to Slauson Avenue, west on Slauson Avenue to route I-465 (the San Diego Freeway), north on route I-465 to route I-10 (the Santa Monica Freeway), and west on I-10 to the Pacific Coast. Off shore, along the Pacific Coast between I-10 and California route 29, the open area is limited to an area within 100 meters of the low water line.

OPEN TRANSIT ROUTES  
THROUGH CLOSED AREAS

California

I-5                   Entire length north of Anaheim  
I-80                   Entire length  
I-580                  between Castro Valley and junction of I-5  
Cal.152                between intersection of I-5 and Santa Cruz  
County line.

Connecticut

I-95                   Entire length  
I-91                   Entire length

Georgia

I-75                   between Macon and Monroe County line  
I-16,I-95              between Savannah and Candler County line

Illinois

I-190                  between O'Hare Airport and Chicago

Kansas

I-70                   between Kansas City and Lawrence

Maine

Maine 202              between Rochester and Augusta  
Maine 105              between Augusta and Knox County line

Maryland

I-95                   entire length  
US 301                 between Pioneer Pt. and Delaware State line  
I-270                  between Rockville and junction of I-70  
I-70                   between junction of I-270 and Pennsylvania  
State line

Massachusetts

I-90 entire length  
I-95 between Rhode Island State line and junction of I-90

New Jersey

N.J. Turnpike entire length  
N.J. 33, 571 between NJT exit 8 and Princeton  
US 206 between NJT and Trenton  
NJ 73 between Philadelphia and NJT exit 4  
I-195 between NJT and Great Adventure  
NJ 38 between Camden and NJT exit 4

New York

I-87 between Albany county line and Glens Falls  
I-87 between exit 34 and exit 41  
US 9, 9B between I-87 and Rouse's Point through Chazy and Coopersville (transit to and from Canada only)  
I-90 entire length  
I-190 between Buffalo and Niagara Falls

Pennsylvania

Pa. Turnpike entire length

South Carolina

I-26 between Columbia and exit 85 (Little Mountain)

Tennessee

I-75 between Knoxville and Caryville

Virginia

I-95 between Alexandria and Fredricksburg  
I-66 between Fairfax and Front Royal

Washington

I-90 between Spokane and Coeur d'Alene

Wisconsin

I-94 between Milwaukee and Waukesha County line

5

MAJOR CHANGES FROM 1967 MAP

CITIES NEWLY CLOSED

Denver, Colo.  
Fremont, Calif.  
Houston, Texas  
Minneapolis, Minn  
Oklahoma City, Okla.  
San Antonio, Texas  
San Jose, Calif.  
Seattle, Washington  
St. Paul, Minn.

CITIES NEWLY OPENED - 100,000+

Birmingham, Alabama  
Cedar Rapids, Iowa  
Cleveland, Ohio  
Columbia, S.C.  
Duluth, Minn.  
Indianapolis, Ind.  
Little Rock, Ark.  
Livonia, Mich.  
Louisville, Ky.  
Lubbock, Texas  
Memphis, Tenn.  
Metairie, Louisiana  
Mobile, Alabama  
Montgomery, Alabama  
New Bedford, Mass.  
Parma, Ohio  
Peoria, Ill.  
Phoenix, Ariz.  
Raleigh, N.C.  
Rochester, N.Y.  
Rockford, Ill.  
Savannah, Georgia  
Shreveport, Louisiana  
Spokane, Wash.  
Springfield, Mass.  
Stockton, Calif.  
Topeka, Kansas  
Tucson, Ariz.  
Warren, Mich.  
Winston-Salem, N.C.

NEWLY OPENED - UNDER 100,000

Adirondack Mtn. Area, N.Y.  
Boise, Idaho  
Carson City, Nevada  
Decatur, Alabama  
Eugene, Ore.  
Helena, Mont.  
Lake Tahoe Area, Calif./Nev.  
Newport, R.I.  
Oxnard, Calif.  
Port Huron, Mich.  
Provo, Utah  
Reno, Nevada  
Saginaw, Mich.  
Salem, Ore.  
Salina, Kansas  
Sioux City, Iowa  
Springfield, Ill.  
Terre Haute, Ind.  
Twin Falls, Idaho  
Ventura, Calif.

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

August 8, 1983

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JW*

SUBJECT: Strategy Paper for Consulates in Kiev and New York

State's memorandum outlining recommended strategy for negotiating an opening of consulates in Kiev and New York is attached at TAB A.

Background: Following agreement at the 1974 Nixon-Brezhnev summit, steps were taken to open consulates general in Kiev and New York. The Soviets had long resisted an American office in Kiev, offering instead less advantageous locations, but finally agreed to Kiev under the pressure of reaching agreements for the 1974 summit. Subsequently, the Soviets were allowed to purchase a building in New York (the location of which was approved by the FBI) for their consulate general and we were offered the choice of several properties in Kiev for rental (no sale of real estate is permitted by Soviet law). We selected a large building, with NSA's concurrence, had American architects design the reconfiguration for our use, and both sides sent small "advance parties" to oversee preparations for formal openings, which we insisted be simultaneous, so that the Soviets could not open in New York before our building was ready in Kiev.

We had invested \$1.5 million in the renovation of the building when we ordered the withdrawal of both advance parties in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The Soviets still have title to their building in New York, while we have continued to pay rent on three apartments (previously occupied by our advance party) in Kiev. We have not paid rent on the building we had selected for the office and a number of staff apartments, and our understanding is that, after holding it for us for more than a year, the Soviets are now using it. Its status, therefore, is not entirely clear.

This complicated background is relevant to some of the questions raised in the strategy paper. Broadly speaking, our options are to aim for an opening as quickly as possible, and thus establish our presence in the capital of the largest non-Russian republic, or to attempt to improve on the arrangements already negotiated, which could entail considerable delay with little prospect of significant improvement.

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR Folio 114/1 #6042

BY RW NARA DATE 3/3/11

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Declassify on: OADR

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Issues: There is general interagency agreement on the negotiating plan except for the following three points:

A. Office Site: State and NSA believe that we should accept the old building if it is available. The FBI believes that we should press for a new one.

B. Staffing: State and NSA believe that the staffing level should be set according to need; the FBI, supported by CIA, believe that we should insist that the Soviets staff their consulate from the current personnel allowed them in Washington, or from their mission to the UN.

C. Status of Property: State and NSA believe that we should seek more advantageous rental arrangements (i.e., a long-term lease with guarantees on the rent), while the FBI wants us to demand either the right to purchase the building in Kiev, or divestiture of the building owned by the Soviets in New York, followed by a rental arrangement.

Analysis: My judgment on the three issues above is as follows:

A. Since the building already selected and partially reconfigured for our use is acceptable, and we already have a substantial sum invested in it, no useful purpose would be served by demanding another one. The State-NSA position seems sound.

B. If we insisted that the Soviets staff their consulate from their current quota in Washington and New York, we would have to staff Kiev from our Embassy in Moscow. The sixteen persons necessary for Kiev could not be spared from Moscow without seriously impairing the Embassy's ability to perform its functions. Therefore, it seems preferable to set our staff at the level we need, and then impose an identical quota on the Soviets in New York. This would preserve reciprocity, and while the FBI's task in New York would be increased, its additional problems would be no greater than those faced by the KGB in Kiev.

C. Although it is unfortunate that the Soviets were allowed to purchase their consulate building in New York, it will be most difficult to turn the clock back on this arrangement. In the interest of moving as rapidly as possible to establish our presence in Kiev (a net gain for us, since we have no one there now) in return for a small incremental gain for the Soviets (they already have hundreds of officials in New York), I would recommend using the Soviet ownership of their building in New York as leverage to insist upon favorable long-term rental arrangements in Kiev.

I believe that two other points should be covered specifically in the NSC response:



(1) State should be instructed that any staffing arrangement provide for strict reciprocity of numbers at the two consulates. This need not be the subject of negotiation, but simply a statement of U.S. policy, comparable to that used in imposing personnel ceilings on the Soviet Consulate General in San Francisco.

(2) Before proceeding to plan for 12 local employees, a close study should be made of the feasibility of staffing Kiev entirely with American citizens.

(3) The apparent lack of interest of the CIA in establishing a base in Kiev when it opens seems questionable in view of the objective set forth in NSDD-75 to increase our presence in the USSR, particularly in minority areas. The Agency should be requested to review and justify its position before final plans for staffing are made.

The foregoing recommendations are incorporated in a memorandum to State at TAB B.

<sup>77</sup>  
Paula Dobriansky and John Lenczowski concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the memorandum at TAB B.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments:

- Tab A State's Memo
- Tab B Memo to State



A  
24

August 5, 1983

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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Strategy Paper for Negotiations with the Soviet Union on  
the Establishment of Consulates in Kiev and New York

In response to your July 5 request, the State Department convened interagency meetings to draft Terms of Reference and a strategy paper for negotiating with the Soviets on the establishment of Consulates in Kiev and New York. There are still some differences of view among agencies, and these are set forth in the paper transmitted herewith, which has been cleared by the FBI, NSA, CIA and USIA. We recommend concurrence in the State/NSA positions.

*Charles Hill*  
Charles Hill  
Executive Secretary

Attachments:  
As stated.

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DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
NLRR FD6-114/1 #6046  
BY RW NARA DATE 3/3/4

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Strategy Paper  
Kiev and New York Consulates


Summary:

1. Initial Step: There is agreement that we should inquire officially of the Soviets whether the previously designated office site will be available to us in Kiev.

2. Issues for Decision:

A. Office Site. If the Soviets say the building is not available, all agencies agree that we should press for a new and better site. If the Soviets tell us the old site is available, State and NSA believe we should accept it, and send an inspection team to determine its adequacy and assess further work needed on both apartments and office site. FBI believes we should press for a new site, whether or not the old site is available.

B. Staffing. State and NSA believe we should set staffing patterns according to need, without imposing demands that the Soviets would counter with unacceptable reciprocal requirements. supported by CIA,



C. Purchase vs. Lease. State and NSA believe we should seek more advantageous long-term rent arrangements without insisting on purchase in Kiev, and hence on full reciprocity, which Soviets certainly would turn down. (The legality of requiring Soviets to sell their present building and lease it instead is questionable. Legal action in any case would result in prolonged delays if we adopted this course.) FBI believes we should make the demand despite the probability that the Soviets would turn it down, forcing us to fall back on a demand for long-term leasing arrangements.

Recommendation:

NSC concurrence with the interagency proposal to inquire officially of the Soviets as to the availability of the previous site; and NSC concurrence with the State/ NSA positions on office site, staffing and purchase vs. lease.

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DECL: OADR

FOIA(b)(1), (3)


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BACKGROUND

Secretary Shultz informed Ambassador Dobrynin on June 18 that the President had approved in principle the establishment of new Consulates in Kiev and New York. Judge Clark subsequently requested the State Department to convene an interagency meeting to draft the terms of reference and develop a negotiating strategy. At the July 1 meeting called by the State Department, representatives of CIA, FBI, and NSA accepted the attached terms of reference (Tab A) and agreed to reconvene with the objective of forwarding an agreed negotiating strategy to the NSC. The group, augmented by USIA representatives, met on July 26, and it did not prove possible fully to reconcile agency views. Divergent views are set forth, where appropriate, in this paper.

POLICY OBJECTIVES

In noting that the USG should seek to reach agreements which "protect and enhance US interests and are consistent with the principle of strict reciprocity", NSDD-75 provides the fundamental policy framework for establishing the new Consulates. A Consulate in Kiev



will give us a unique vantage point for economic and political reporting, a base in the Soviet agricultural heartland for crop monitoring, a facility to provide on-the-spot consular protection and assistance to American visitors in the area, and the opportunity to initiate new cultural, informational, and educational exchanges, thereby heightening awareness of US values and goals in the region.

MODALITIES OF NEGOTIATIONS


On July 15, Secretary Shultz received a positive Soviet response on the Consulates from Ambassador Dobrynin. Assistant Secretary Burt will work out with Chargé Sokolov the modalities of the negotiations. The State Department will handle the actual negotiations using normal diplomatic channels, in coordination with interested agencies.

The Department anticipates opening the talks in Washington as soon as is mutually convenient. Technical discussions may subsequently take place in Moscow. Since our logistical problems in Kiev may well prove greater than those of the Soviets in New York, it might be advantageous to hold such talks at closer range.

SPECIFIC GOALS

1. Early Establishment of U.S. Presence: Our first agenda item in negotiating with the Soviets will be to obtain agreement on the terms under which we will send advance parties to the two

consular sites. The fact that we and the Soviets have both had previous advance teams in Kiev and New York, respectively, under mutually agreed arrangements, should ease our negotiations with them on this matter, but it would be unrealistic not to expect problems. Nevertheless, our retention of three apartments in Kiev from the time of the original Advance Party should enable us to put an advance team into place rather quickly (within three months). Having personnel on the spot will be a key to gaining movement from the Soviets on housing and office facilities, as well as support from the home front on logistics and funding.



2. Acquisition of Suitable Housing and Office Facilities:

Concurrently, we must ascertain whether the Soviets are still holding for our use the previously designated office building and Consul General residence. NSA has indicated that the previously designated building remains valuable for its purposes, although recent additions to the height of nearby buildings have decreased its utility somewhat. If the Soviets resist returning the building, NSA would prefer that, rather than pursuing the issue, we use the Soviets' failure to keep it for us as leverage to attempt to gain a better site. State concurs in this approach.

State and NSA agree that if the Soviets tell us they have kept the building available, we should accept it. We have already invested \$1.5 million in renovation, which would be lost if we refused the building. Moreover, the negotiations for a more desirable site would be long and the end result would not necessarily be a site preferable to the one we now have. If the current site remains available, State and NSA believe that we should send a team to Kiev as soon as possible for an inspection and evaluation of the work and time that will be required to put it into suitable condition. The FBI, on the other hand, would prefer that we seek new facilities whether or not the Soviets are willing to make the previously designated office site available, in order not to set our sights too low at the outset.

Finally, with regard to terms of occupancy we should note that the previous agreement on establishing Consulates permitted the Soviets to purchase property in New York in return for short-term leasing rights in Kiev. This situation was clearly not reciprocal and cannot be allowed to recur. Further negotiations on the reopening of our respective Consulates will include insistence on greater reciprocity vis-a-vis our housing and office space requirements. The FBI has suggested that we try to purchase property in Kiev. Since, to the best of our knowledge, the

Soviets have never permitted a foreign mission to own property and there is no chance that they would reverse this long-standing policy in this instance, State's view is that no purpose is served by making such a demand. Although we could theoretically insist that the Soviets divest themselves of their property and require a lease arrangement, such an approach would be quite problematical. The Office of Foreign Missions has indicated that a forced divestiture of this type could be legally contested and if so could involve legal proceedings.

We should instead concentrate on obtaining what is possible -- long-term leases at reasonable prices. The Soviets will have a strong incentive to move on our requirements. We fully expect them to seek immediate occupancy of the building that they previously purchased in New York for their Consulate. Consequently, State believes our approach should be to insist on an agreement to the effect that the Soviets may only occupy their building when we have obtained the following in Kiev: adequate temporary offices for the Consulate, an official agreement on our permanent facilities, and approved construction plans for necessary renovations.

3. Reciprocal Agreement on Staffing Patterns: As soon as we have decided on the number of persons we wish to send to Kiev both as a TDY-Advance Team and as a permanent staff (recommendations on these issues follow below), we will raise the issue of a reciprocal staffing arrangement with the Soviets. We will need to proceed cautiously on this point, with strict reciprocity as a goal.

[REDACTED] State anticipates strong Soviet resistance to such a proposal. Having frequently decried the existence of the current ceilings, the Soviets will balk at a perceived attempt to reduce staffing levels at existing posts as a precondition to an agreement on opening Kiev and New York. If pressed, they would probably demand a similar arrangement in Kiev, which would prove extremely costly in terms of staffing at our Moscow Embassy. The Department and NSA believe that we should negotiate on the basis of our requirements - consular, political, and intelligence -- in Kiev and insist on reciprocity in any final decision on staffing patterns.

4. Resolution of Long-Range Issues and General Problems: Although Kiev's location is ideal in certain respects, its isolation, coupled with the absence of a large diplomatic community, may produce a difficult work environment for consular personnel, as well as create numerous logistical problems. In our negotiations we shall also address these general issues and attempt to arrive at mutually agreed solutions to both existing and potential problems. Specifically, we shall strive to obtain clearly defined privileges and immunities for American personnel;

an expansion of exit/entry points to facilitate shipment of requisite materials to put our facilities into shape for the final opening (we are currently limited to entry at Moscow, Leningrad, and Vyborg near Leningrad); a relaxation of travel controls in the area; and a commitment to provide a suitable recreational facility for the permanent staff.

5. Implementation of USG Scenario: An interagency group will have to make some immediate decisions with regard to timing, personnel, and funding. It will also have to address questions of logistical support and the acquisition of financial and other resources. For preliminary planning purposes, we propose the following timetable and base our discussion of estimated costs and resource requirements on this opening scenario, which assumes that we will obtain the previously designated office building.

1. Fall 1983 - Initial TDY Advance Team takes up residence in Kiev;
2. Summer 1984 or earlier - Permanent Advance Staff arrives in Kiev;
3. Summer 1985 - Consulate is officially opened.

A. Funding:

State has already presented to Congress its FY-84 budget submission, which does not include a request for funds or positions for the opening of Kiev. Therefore, the estimated \$200,000 operating costs needed to support the initial TDY presence in Kiev would have to be secured either by amendment to the FY-84 budget, or reprogrammed from within State's existing budget.

State anticipates an additional outlay of \$2.5 million annually (for two years) to prepare for the opening of the Consulate (total estimated cost of \$5.2 million). Not included in this estimate is the cost of a suitable recreational facility for the permanent staff assigned to Kiev, which would contribute substantially to improving morale and the quality of life at an extremely isolated post (roughly another \$1.0 million).

Ultimately, any decision to move ahead on establishing a Consulate in Kiev is conditioned on our ability to secure supplemental funding from Congress. In view of budgetary stringencies, we should anticipate questions from Congress as to why we are taking this step at the present time. We should be prepared to brief key members whose support will be necessary in order to obtain the requisite funds.

B. Personnel:

In selecting an Advance Team, we will try to identify personnel for permanent assignment, but may initially have to use

personnel from Embassy Moscow and appropriate Washington offices on a 1-3 month TDY basis. The initial Advance Team should include a Team Leader, an Administrative Officer, and a Political/Consular Officer with reporting responsibilities.

In tandem with these arrangements, we need a prompt decision on the size of our permanent advance team. Language training and the vagaries of the assignment process will make it difficult to assign people to Kiev for regular tours prior to the summer of 1984. Even meeting that deadline will require speedy action to obtain positions, identify individuals for particular slots, and secure funding. We believe that with the addition to the advance team of a General Services Officer and a secretary we will have the personnel necessary to prepare for the official opening of the Consulates.

We suggest that the consular staff consist of 16 Americans plus 12 Soviet National employees. In the past, this was considered the right size to advance our interests in Kiev and it still appears to meet our needs. We intend, however, to schedule interagency meetings as soon as feasible to determine whether their personnel requirements for the Consulate warrant a larger or smaller staff. We will also solicit Embassy Moscow's views on both the question of timing and its ability to provide personnel and logistical support. The following are the proposed permanent positions for Kiev:

- Principal Officer
- Deputy Principal Officer
- Consular Officer
- Administrative Officer
- Agricultural Officer
- Press and Culture Officer
- Communications Program Officers (2)
- Secretaries (2)
- Marine Security Guards (6)



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Kiev and New York Consulates: Terms of Reference

Basic Policy Considerations

- The President has approved in principle the desirability of establishing new Consulates in Kiev and New York, and Secretary Shultz informed Ambassador Dobrynin of this on June 18.
  
- NSDD 75 provides the policy framework for this move, noting in particular that the USG should seek "to reach agreements which protect and enhance U.S. interests and are consistent with the principle of strict reciprocity and mutual interest." Also relevant is the original Consulates Agreement (Aide-Memoire of July 3, 1974) and the subsequent exchange of notes between the US and USSR of September 1976.
  
- At the time of the suspension in January 1980, we were approximately six months away from completion of the work on the Consulate office building and officially opening our Consulate in Kiev. The absence of a Consulate has deprived us of [REDACTED] continuing contacts with important nationality and religious groups in the area. Establishing the Consulate will mark a major new U.S. penetration into this geographically key area which contains the second largest Soviet nationality group.

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Substance of U.S. Position

- An interagency group, chaired by State and including NSC, CIA, FBI, USIA and NSA, has been formed to develop our negotiating strategy. State has undertaken to produce by July 20 the first draft of a strategy paper, incorporating the positions of other interested parties, which will form the basis of our negotiations with the Soviets.
  
- The paper will include both long-term issues requiring resolution and the following immediate problems associated with sending an Advance Team to Kiev:
  - Personnel - number and source of positions required.
  - Timing - target date and time needed for training and other preparation;
  - Funding - estimation of costs, acquisition of funds, and congressional involvement;
  - Technical considerations - housing and office space, logistical support, security factors, and coordination of interagency requirements.

Negotiating Modalities

- State Department will handle the negotiations through diplomatic channels backstopped by the interagency group.

Next Steps

- State will forward to the NSC an interagency-cleared strategy paper not later than July 27

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

August 8, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. CHARLES HILL  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

SUBJECT: Strategy Paper for Negotiations with the Soviet  
Union on the Establishment of Consulates in Kiev  
and New York

We have reviewed the strategy paper transmitted by your  
memorandum of August 5, 1983, and approve it with the  
following stipulations:

1. If the old building site is available, it  
should be accepted. If it is not available, we should  
insist on a site equally or more advantageous, and at no  
greater cost, than the one previously selected.

2. The staffing level should be set according to  
our needs and the Soviets granted a quota in New York of an  
identical number. On the latter point, there seems no need  
to negotiate a reciprocal agreement. A clear statement of  
U.S. policy in regard to issuance of visas (such as was used  
in establishing a quota for the Soviet consulate general in  
San Francisco) should suffice.

3. Inasmuch as the Soviets own the building in New  
York that they will use for their consulate general, we  
should insist upon long-term lease arrangements at a  
reasonable rent for our building in Kiev. Legal wording  
has been developed and accepted for some properties in  
Moscow and Leningrad which provides adequate long-term  
protection while conforming to Soviet law. Such  
arrangements would be acceptable, so long as the long-term  
commitment is clearly established, and there is adequate  
protection against arbitrary or excessive rent increases.

4. Before deciding on the final staffing pattern  
in Kiev, a careful study of the feasibility of operating the  
consulate without local employees should be made. Since it  
is highly desirable to reduce our dependence on local  
employees in the USSR, we should look for innovative ways  
that this can be done, and perhaps use Kiev as a pilot  
project. A study of this question should be done and  
forwarded to the NSC for review by September 30.

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
NLR 606-1141 #6043  
BY RWS NARA DATE 5/26/11

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(3)



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Declassify on: OADR

- 2 -

The Department is requested to proceed with the negotiation of this question on the basis of the negotiating plan submitted, incorporating points 1-3 above. The clarification of points 4 and 5 can proceed while negotiations are in progress since determination of the final staffing level can be deferred.

Robert M. Kimmitt  
Executive Secretary

PRES ADDRESS Sept. 5, 1983

Viaticlock suggestions -

9:00 PM

Sept 4

35

The Soviets face a clear choice in dealing with this tragedy. If they have any concern for innocent human life--as they repeatedly claim--they will immediately and publicly investigate the incident, explain to the world how it came about, punish those guilty of this hideous crime, cooperate in efforts to find the wreckage and recover the bodies, and offer compensation to the bereaved families. They must, moreover, change the standing orders given to their military units so that calculated attacks on civilian aircraft, whatever the circumstances, will not be permitted.

If, on the other hand, they refuse to accept responsibility, continue to deny the facts and attempt to confuse the public with fabrications, distortions and innuendo--as their controlled media and diplomatic representatives have done up to now--then they will stand exposed to the world as callous brutes who recognize no limits on the use of violence, so long as it can be used with impunity.

Not long ago, in a tragic accident, a Soviet passenger boat struck a bridge while travelling down the Volga River. Hundreds of Soviet citizens died. The Soviet Government immediately had one of its most senior officials lead an inquiry. Within a very short time the government announced its findings. Negligence was found and procedures were instituted to prevent further accidents. Certainly the Soviet Government bears a heavy responsibility for launching a similar investigation of the attack on the Korean airliner. Or do they believe that a foreign life is worth less than a Russian life?

The civilized world must not stand aside and allow violence to be used against humanity without exacting a penalty and without taking steps to protect itself. That is why I spent this weekend consulting with my advisers, Congressional leaders, representatives of other countries and the public regarding the steps we should take.

My meeting with the Congressional leadership yesterday was particularly useful, and I was encouraged by the fine sense of bipartisanship and the many useful suggestions I received. I will be working in the closest cooperation with the congress in carrying out my responsibility to deal with this tragedy.

Now this is what the United States is doing on its own:

--We immediately informed the world of the shocking facts. We did so responsibly and carefully, as we learned the facts ourselves, and the Voice of America broadcast them to all corners of the world.

--We are conducting and assisting search efforts in international waters where the plan may have fallen.

--We have notified the Soviets that we will not renew our bilateral agreement for cooperation in the field of transportation, since it would be unthinkable to offer

cooperation in this area so long as the Soviets threaten the security of civil aviation.

--We have also reaffirmed our previous order denying the Soviet airline--Aeroflot-- the right to fly to the United States, and are examining whether there are other steps which can be taken to end other Aeroflot activities in this country.

--We have notified the Soviets that we are suspending negotiations on several bilateral arrangements which we had under consideration.

--I am asking Congress to pass a joint resolution of condemnation of this Soviet crime.

--Along with these steps, we are continuing to press the Soviet leaders to follow the honorable course of investigating and disclosing the facts, taking corrective action, making restitution, and providing concrete assurances that such wanton acts will not be repeated. I have instructed Secretary Shultz to make this matter the center of his meeting with Foreign Minister Gromyko next week. And let me say that I believe compensation to the relatives of the victims is a moral duty which the Soviets must assume.

Some steps we can take ourselves, but the most effective ones must be in concert with other concerned nations. The issue is not one just between the Soviet Union

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and the United States, but between the Soviet regime and humanity.

Working with other nations, we are doing the following:

First, along with Korea and Japan, we called an emergency meeting of the United Nations Security Council. Debate began Friday and many governments--Korea, Japan, Canada, Australia, the Netherlands, Pakistan, France, China, the United Kingdom, New Zealand and Zaire--joined us in expressing horror at the Soviet action. The session will resume tomorrow and more countries will be heard.

Second, we will work with other nations to seek reparations for those who were killed. Americans made up a large contingent on the plane, but there were also citizens on there from over a dozen other nations.

Third, we are cooperating with other countries to find better means to insure the safety of civil aviation. One aspect of this effort should be a clear recognition that, if the Soviet leaders refuse to satisfy the cries of humanity for justice, Aeroflot should not be accepted as a normal member of the international civil air community. We will also be raising the matter with international organizations which deal with civil aviation such as ICAO.

Fourth, we are listening carefully to private groups, both American and international, who have a special interest



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in civil air safety--airline pilots, passenger associations and others--so that we can take their views into account as we seek ways to improve the security of air transport.

Fifth, in the economic area in general, we will redouble our efforts to work with our Allies to end the flow of military and strategic items to the Soviet Union. We have already made progress in this area. We hope for more.

We will pursue these courses of action vigorously and will not flag in the effort to impress upon the Soviet leaders the just demands of the world public. That is why I have instructed Secretary Shultz to proceed with his scheduled meeting with Foreign Minister Gromyko in Madrid this week since we must seize every opportunity to communicate our views directly to decision-makers in Moscow.

The barbarous Soviet act brings home to us once again the urgent necessity to rebuild and maintain our military and economic strength, and to assist our Allies and friends maintain theirs. For we must have the means to defend ourselves and maintain the peace in a world where some respect only strength. We cannot rely on the good will and civilized restraint of a power which shoots down civilian aircraft. And without strength, we will never be able to achieve the balanced, verifiable reductions in arms which we so much desire.

True arms reduction remains one of our most important goals. And that is why I have sent Ambassador Nitze back to

Geneva for the next round of negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear weapons in Europe. Our policy of seeking to reduce the arms burden has not changed and will not change.

Let us rededicate ourselves to achieving the goals we have pursued from the beginning of this Administration. Our policy is based on realism, strength and willingness to talk. We know our responsibilities. We know it will be hard to make a nation that rules its own people through force cease using force against the rest of the world. But that is the task before us.