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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 3/21/2005

File Folder MATLOCK CHRON JULY 1983

FOIA

F06-114/1

Box Number 1

YARHI-MILO

108

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
5849	MEMO	MEMO FOR WILLIAM CLARK RE IMPACT ON LEAKS AND USSR [1-2] <i>R 3/3/2011 F2006-114/1</i>	2	7/14/1983	B1
5850	MEMO	MEMO FOR ROBERT MCFARLANE RE EXPANDED ROLE FOR DAVID ABSHIRE [7] <i>R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1</i>	1	7/14/1983	B1
5844	MEMO	MEMO TO WILLIAM CLARK RE CULTURAL EXCHANGE AGREEMENT WITH USSR [10-13] <i>R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1</i>	3	7/14/1983	B1
5845	MEMO	KIEV AND NEW YORK CONSULATES TERMS OF REFERENCE [14-15] <i>R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1</i>	2	ND	B1
5851	MEMO	DEPARTMENT OF STATE MEMO RE KIEV AND NEW YORK CONSULATES [17-20] <i>R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1</i>	4	9/24/1976	B1
5852	MEMO	DEPARTMENT OF STATE DIVISION OF LANGUAGE SERVICES (TRANSLATION) MEMO RE KIEV AND NEW YORK CONSULATES [21-23] <i>R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1</i>	3	10/4/1976	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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FOIA

F06-114/1

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YARHI-MILO

108

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
5853	MEMO	DEPARTMENT OF STATE DIVISION OF LANGUAGE SERVICES (TRANSLATION) MEMO RE KIEV AND NEW YORK CONSULATES [24-25] R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1	2	11/9/1976	B1
5855	MEMO	SAME MEMO AS DOC #5854 IN RUSSIAN LANGUAGE [26-27] R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1	2	11/19/1976	B1
5854	MEMO	DEPARTMENT OF STATE MEMO RE KIEV AND NEW YORK CONSULATES [28-29] R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1	2	11/19/1976	B1
5846	MEMO	MEMO FOR WILLIAM CLARK RE INVITATION TO SOLZHENITSYN [30-32] R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1	3	7/15/1983	B1
5858	MEMO	MEMO FOR WILLIAM CLARK RE PRESIDENT REAGAN MEETING WITH TOM FOLOWY [56-58] R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1	3	7/23/1983	B1
5860	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #5850 [75] R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1	1	7/14/1983	B1
5847	MEMO	MEMO TO KEN DEGRAFFENREID RE ALLEGATIONS OF INADEQUACY IN NSA RUSSIAN LANGUAGE TRAINING [78] R 3/3/2011 F2006-114/1	1	7/29/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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FOIA

F06-114/1

Box Number 1

YARHI-MILO

108

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
5848	LETTER	LETTER RE RUSSIAN LANGUAGE TRAINING [79-82] <i>R 3/3/2011 F2006-114/1</i>	4	7/29/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

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B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

Sensitive

July 14, 1983

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Impact of Leaks on Our Ability to Deal with the Soviets

Today's article by Bernie Gwertzman in the New York Times (Tab I) is but the latest in what has been a veritable flood of leaks in recent days revealing details of our negotiations with the Soviets. This one is particularly damaging in two respects:

-- It may convince the Soviets that we are unwilling or incapable of abiding by the implicit but firm "ground rules" of private channel communication. Therefore, they may refuse to indulge in this potentially useful mode of communication even if we desire to do so.

- The inaccuracies in the report (specifically that we had no assurances on Shcharansky) could be read by the Soviets as a signal that we do not in fact consider him part of the "package" whatever Kampelman may say.

The damage that this particular leak will cause may be irreparable in the short term. Coming on top of the leaks regarding the START negotiations, Shultz's conversations with Dobrynin, and Eagleburger's with the Polish Charge, the Soviets have every reason to conclude that it is quite impossible to deal with us on a confidential basis. If we are to have any hope of establishing useful dialogue with the Soviets, we are going to have to demonstrate that we can in fact keep our conversations out of the public eye or else the Soviets will systematically avoid conveying any views to us which deviate from their public position.

It will be a tragedy for the nation if we are prevented from reaching agreements with the Soviets because of our inability to ensure a confidential dialogue. Therefore, coming to grips with the problem of leaks is a matter of great urgency.

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR F06-114/1 #5849
BY RW) NARA DATE 3/3/11

2

In the specific case of the Kampelman discussions, I had earlier noticed that knowledge of this channel was spread much more widely in the bureaucracy (including here at the White House) than was strictly necessary since several persons who had no real need to know about it mentioned it to me. And last week I was disturbed to note that Paula got a call from the Canadian Embassy asking whether "the Shcharansky deal" had fallen through--the result of reporting from the Canadian delegation at Madrid. It obviously was not wise for members of our delegation to brief even close Allies in the details of a matter of such sensitivity. (Since the story itself indicates that it was leaked by a person or persons whose knowledge of the facts was incomplete, the problem clearly arises as the result of loose talk among colleagues and Allied diplomats.)

The only solution to this problem, it seems to me, is to limit access to the details of such contacts much more severely than we do at present. I believe that we should establish procedures comparable to those used for compartmentalized "code-word" material, which would involve a master list of those few officials authorized access to information of this type, special briefings of each individual and signed commitments precluding discussion with persons not on the special list, and tight procedures for accounting for and timely destruction of copies of relevant documents. It will be a nuisance to maintain such a tight system, but I believe it is absolutely necessary. Since our record in holding code-word material is relatively good, the procedures used there offer some useful precedents.

Control of such a system, I believe, should be maintained either by John Poindexter or Bob Kimmitt. I have several specific ideas as to how the system might work, and if you agree in principle I'll discuss them in detail with Bob so that we can have a concrete plan to discuss with John, Bud, and yourself when John returns on Monday.

RECOMMENDATION

OK NO

— — That I discuss with Bob Kimmitt details of a code-word system.

Attachment:

Tab I New York Times article dated 7/14/83

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

JM

3

Auita:

Please put draft in
single spaced form
(one page) & send to
McFurlane with copy of
package & covering note -

JM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

EYES ONLY

Mr. McFarlane

SUB: Expanded Charter for Dave Abshire

I have massaged the points for the proposed letter and believe that it meets the concerns Eagleburger expressed.

Regarding membership in the START Delegation, I have dropped it since I don't know Rowny's feelings and think that it carries other handicaps mentioned previously. I doubt if State would object strongly to this, however, if it is OK with Rowny.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to be 'Jad', is located below the typed text.

NOTES ON PROPOSED PRESIDENTIAL LETTER

1. Follow closely evolving NATO country attitudes and plans to achieve better communication of U.S. policies, programs and aspirations in Europe. Consult with other U.S. Ambassadors in Europe in developing an overall analysis and advising the Department on planning and implementing information programs.
2. Undertake special efforts to accelerate developments toward armaments cooperation, thereby enhancing military effectiveness and providing more common defense per investment.
3. In follow up to the Williamsburg Summit's statement about the indivisibility of global security, seek ways to improve Alliance understanding of the relationship between area issues and NATO.
4. Ensure that NATO governments are appropriately briefed on START negotiations and that negotiating positions on INF, MBFR and other arms reduction negotiations are properly coordinated in the Alliance.
5. Work to move NATO toward the original intention of the Treaty in bettering economic collaboration (Article 2).
6. Support multilateral (in IAEA and elsewhere) and bilateral efforts to achieve full compliance with safeguards in accord with the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
7. Maintain close congressional consultations on NATO matters and encourage Parliamentary interaction toward building broad political support--bipartisan and bigenerational--for the alliances of democracy.

2

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

EYES ONLY

CAS 6/13/82

July 15, 1983

Jack Matlock

Subject: Expanded charter for Dave
Abshire

I've talked to Larry about his note.
He says he is not as negative as
the note makes it appear.

Could you please work up a draft
letter which you believe threads this
needle and run it by ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~
then send it on over?

many thanks

Bud
Bud

EYES ONLY

CH 6/3/82

United States Department of State 1

*Under Secretary of State
for Political Affairs*

Washington, D.C. 20520

July 14, 1983

EYES ONLY/BY COURIER

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MC FARLANE

SUBJECT: Expanded Role for David Abshire

Given how good David is, the idea of expanding his responsibilities beyond the traditional boundaries of the NATO job is obviously attractive. But we also need to be clear-eyed about the problems it would raise, the largest of which stems from the fact that so many of our Embassies in Europe are headed by prima donnas: Rabb, Burns, and Galbraith would resist anything which they believe encroached on their prerogatives.

I therefore think we should try to characterize as much of David's expanded brief as possible in terms of the traditional responsibilities of the NATO job and our expectation that he will be an energetic ambassador to NATO. We should think very carefully about any duties which could not be squeezed into that definition. (I have in mind such things as being a formal member of the START delegation, and additional formal titles e.g., "special advisor.")

In any event, I would want to show the Secretary any Presidential letter along the lines which have been suggested before it was signed.


Lawrence S. Eagleburger

DECLASSIFIED/RELEASED

NLRR F06-114/1 #5880

BY CW NARA DATE 11/27/07

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

July 8, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Notes on Proposed Presidential Letter
(re Abshire)

In my view, these are all very important tasks, and the Ambassador to NATO is in the best position to play a key role in them. To avoid the appearance of giving the Ambassador to NATO a supervisory role over some of his colleagues, however, a few of the points might need to be reworded slightly. For example:

1. Membership in START delegation should be done only with Ambassador Rowny's approval. In addition, there is a further consideration which should be weighed: members of the delegation are limited in what they can say publicly on the negotiations because of the rule of confidentiality. While being a formal member of the delegation might facilitate Abshire's ability to brief the allies confidentially, it also might impinge on his freedom to speak publicly on START issues, and we should be sure that the trade-off is justified.

Finally, the question may arise as to why he should be a member of the START delegation, but not a member of the INF and MBFR delegations. To put him on all three would overload the circuit (his, at least!), but we should be sure of the rationale for singling out START.

2. In point 5, add at beginning, "In cooperation with our Ambassadors to the EC and the OECD..." Since they have the primary responsibility for the economic issues, their role in this effort should be acknowledged.

3. Similarly, in point 6, add "In cooperation with the Ambassador to the IAEA..."

4. Finally, since Abshire will be reporting directly to State, it might be well to consult Larry Eagleburger on the text before it goes to the President for signature.

cc: Don Fortier

7/6/83

Notes on Proposed Presidential Letter

(from conversations between Bud McFarlane and Dave Abshire, subsequently discussed with Judge Clark)

Roles for U.S. Ambassador to NATO in addition to regular designated duties as Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council:

1. Serve as member (delegate-at-large) of START delegation -- thus affording a link between NAC and START. This role demonstrates President Reagan's commitment to the consultative process between the United States and NAC in strategic and arms control matters.
2. Serve as special advisor from Europe on evolving NATO country attitudes and on better communication of U.S. policies, programs and aspirations in Europe. Have a coordinating role with other U.S. Ambassadors in Europe in developing such an overall analysis.
3. Undertake special efforts to accelerate developments toward armaments cooperation, thereby enhancing military effectiveness and providing more common defense per investment.
4. In follow up to the Williamsburg Summit's statement about the indivisibility of global security, seek ways to improve Alliance understanding of the relationship between area issues and NATO.
5. Seek ways to better relate military and economic problems, whether burdensharing, east-west trade, technology transfer, etc. Work to move NATO toward the original intention of the Treaty in bettering economic collaboration. (Article 2)
6. Undertake special efforts with NATO countries on the necessity for full compliance with safeguards in accord with the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
7. Maintain close Congressional consultations on NATO matters and encourage Parliamentary interaction toward building broad political support -- bipartisan and bigenerational -- for the alliances of democracy.

Donator
Jack Mabolock

Your wife
Bud
7/1/83

9

MEMORANDUM

90867

mkc 10

Matlock

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WHO HAS SEEN

~~SECRET~~

July 14, 1983

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Terms of Reference for Negotiations with USSR
on Cultural Exchange Agreement and Consulates

Attached are the terms of reference submitted by State for planning negotiations with the Soviets on the cultural exchanges agreement and consulates. Restricted interagency meetings are planned to develop a detailed negotiating strategy and coordinated strategy papers are promised on July 27.

As for negotiating modalities, State suggests that the exchange agreement be negotiated in Moscow by Ambassador Hartman, supported by his PAO and a team from Washington. The opening of consulates would be negotiated in normal diplomatic channels.

We do not yet have an official reply from the Soviets on our proposal for negotiations, but State anticipates that they will accept our proposal and Soviet Embassy officials have indicated that they may have an official reply on July 15.

The terms of reference, while general, appear to be sound pending elaboration of detailed negotiating positions. The latter, of course, should be reviewed carefully when they are submitted. As for the timing, it seems to me that July 27 is adequate, given the fact that it will take several weeks to arrange for negotiations after we have the official reply from the Soviets. The date proposed should not be allowed to slip, however, so that we will have adequate time to review the negotiating plans.

Paula Dobriansky and John Lenczowski concur.

Attachment:

Tab I Terms of Reference

DECLASSIFIED

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Declassify on: OADR

NLRR 606-714/1 #5844

BY CW NARA DATE 11/27/07



4756

S/S 8321028

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

SYSTEM II
90867

July 11, 1983

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Terms of Reference for Negotiations with the Soviet Union on a Cultural Exchanges Agreement and the Establishment of New Consulates in Kiev and New York

Enclosed are the Terms of Reference for the two sets of negotiations requested by you on July 5.

Charles Hill

Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:
As stated.

DECLASSIFIED
Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
By CAH NARA, Date 6/3/02

~~SECRET~~

12

~~SECRET~~

US-USSR Cultural Exchanges Agreement: Terms of Reference

BASIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

- - The President has approved offering the Soviets negotiation of a cultural exchanges agreement. Secretary Shultz conveyed this to Ambassador Dobrynin June 18.
- - NSDD-75 provides the policy basis for seeking an agreement "to promote . . . the process of change in the Soviet Union toward a more pluralistic political and economic system . . ." and ". . . to reach agreements which protect and enhance U.S. interests and are consistent with the principle of strict reciprocity and mutual interest."
- - In the absence of an agreement the Soviets are able to do things in the cultural, informational, and ideological areas for which we cannot enforce reciprocity. An agreement would enhance our ability to require reciprocity and add to our means of ideologically penetrating Soviet society.

SUBSTANCE OF U.S. POSITION

- - A restricted interagency group (State, NSC, USIA, CIA and FBI) has been formed under State chairmanship to develop negotiating strategy. USIA has undertaken to provide, by July 20, the first draft of a strategy paper, which we will want to review together at the next meeting of this group.

~~SECRET~~

B

~~SECRET~~

-2-

- - The paper will address both long-term issues and problems expected to arise in the negotiations. It will also append an illustrative draft agreement.

NEGOTIATING MODALITIES

- - At this time we plan to conduct the negotiations in Moscow. Ambassador Hartman would head our negotiating team, assisted by the PAO with the interagency group providing back-up.

NEXT STEPS

- - State will forward to the NSC an interagency-cleared strategy paper not later than July 27.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

14

Kiev and New York Consulates: Terms of Reference

Basic Policy Considerations

- The President has approved in principle the desirability of establishing new Consulates in Kiev and New York, and Secretary Shultz informed Ambassador Dobrynin of this on June 18.

- NSDD 75 provides the policy framework for this move, noting in particular that the USG should seek "to reach agreements which protect and enhance U.S. interests and are consistent with the principle of strict reciprocity and mutual interest." Also relevant is the original Consulates Agreement (Aide-Memoire of July 3, 1974) and the subsequent exchange of notes between the US and USSR of September 1976 (attached).

- At the time of the suspension in January 1980, we were approximately six months away from completion of the work on the Consulate office building and officially opening our Consulate in Kiev. The absence of a Consulate has deprived us of an important source of intelligence collection and of continuing contacts with important nationality and religious groups in the area. Establishing the Consulate will mark a major new U.S. penetration into this geographically key area which contains the second largest Soviet nationality group.

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NLRR F06-114/1 #5845

BY CW NARA DATE 11/27/09

~~SECRET~~

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15

Substance of U.S. Position

-- An interagency group, chaired by State and including NSC, CIA, FBI, USIA and NSA, has been formed to develop our negotiating strategy. State has undertaken to produce by July 20 the first draft of a strategy paper, incorporating the positions of other interested parties, which will form the basis of our negotiations with the Soviets.

-- The paper will include both long-term issues requiring resolution and the following immediate problems associated with sending an Advance Team to Kiev:

- Personnel - number and source of positions required.
- Timing - target date and time needed for training and other preparation;
- Funding - estimation of costs, acquisition of funds, and congressional involvement;
- Technical considerations - housing and office space, logistical support, security factors, and coordination of interagency requirements.

Negotiating Modalities

-- State Department will handle the negotiations through diplomatic channels backstopped by the interagency group.

Next Steps

-- State will forward to the NSC an interagency-cleared strategy paper not later than July 27.

~~SECRET~~

14

Establishment of New Consulates

Taking into consideration the intensive development of ties between the US and the USSR and the importance of further expanding consular relations on the basis of the US-USSR Consular Convention, and desiring to promote trade, tourism and coopera-

tion between them in various areas, both Sides agreed to open additional Consulates General in two or three cities of each country.

As a first step they agreed in principle to the simultaneous establishment of a United States Consulate General in Kiev and a USSR Consulate General in New York. Negotiations for implementation of this agreement will take place at an early date.

* * * * *

Both Sides highly appreciate the frank and constructive atmosphere and fruitful results of the talks held between them in the course of the present meeting. They are convinced that the results represent a new and important milestone along the road of improving relations between the USA and the USSR to the benefit of the peoples of both countries, and a significant contribution to their efforts aimed at strengthening world peace and security.

Having again noted in this connection the exceptional importance and great practical usefulness of US-Soviet summit meetings, both Sides reaffirmed their agreement to hold such meetings regularly and when considered necessary for the discussion and solution of urgent questions. Both Sides also expressed their readiness to continue their active and close contacts and consultations.

The President extended an invitation to General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, L. I. Brezhnev, to pay an official visit to the United States in 1975. This invitation was accepted with pleasure.

July 3, 1974

For the United States
of America;

RICHARD NIXON

*President of the United
States of America*

For the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics:

L. BREZHNEV

*General Secretary of the
Central Committee
of the CPSU*

The Department of State refers to the aide memoire of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs of September 2, 1976 and the Embassy's note No. 38 of May 21, 1976 and wishes to communicate the following regarding the establishment of a Consulate General of the United States in Kiev and a Consulate General of the USSR in New York.

The Department is ready to receive a Soviet Advance Party in New York as of September 24, and agrees that the members of this group will be considered as "appointed consular officers and employees" temporarily assigned to the Embassy of the USSR in Washington but carrying out their functions in New York in connection with the preparation for the official opening of the Soviet Consulate General in that city. The Department also agrees that these appointed consular officers, in their capacity of Embassy employees may also be concerned with matters related to the security of Soviet establishments and personnel in New York not connected with the United Nations and may maintain working contacts on these matters with the appropriate U.S. authorities. As is the usual procedure, upon the opening of the Soviet Consulate General in New York, these officers or employees will be recognized as permanent members of the Soviet Consulate General and will receive privileges and immunities in accordance with the US-USSR Consular Convention.

DECLASSIFIED/RE/EA/SD

NLRR 106-114/1 #5851

BY CW NARA DATE 11/27/07

18

The Department is prepared to agree to the establishment of a Soviet advance group consisting of not more than ten (10) diplomatic and service and technical personnel. When reconfiguration of the office buildings in Kiev and New York is ready to be initiated simultaneously, the Department will consider an increase in the size of the Soviet Advance Party. The Department requests that the Soviet Embassy inform it of the names of the individuals who will constitute the Soviet advance group.

The Department recalls the principles set forth in the Garrison to Vorontsov letters of June 18, 1975 and Vorontsov to Garrison reply of June 26, 1975, reiterated in the Garrison to Vorontsov letter of June 4, 1976 which must continue to govern the use of the Soviet buildings in New York pending the establishment of consulates. These principles which should continue to govern the Embassy and the advance group which goes to New York are:

1. Reconfiguration of the respective office buildings at Streletskaya and 9 East 91st Street, including remodeling or repair, will start simultaneously on a date to be mutually agreed.

2. Specific changes at the premises in New York for the sole purpose of ensuring their physical security to be made in advance of the beginning of reconfiguration work on the building will be considered by the Department upon the written request of the Embassy.

19
3. Office buildings at Streletskaya and 9 East 91st Street will not be used for any purpose prior to the beginning of reconfiguration except by mutual agreement.

4. The Department agrees that three members of the Soviet Advance Party together with their families may reside in the building at 9 East 91st Street.

5. The Department agrees that up to three members of the Soviet advance party together with their families may reside in the building at 11 East 91st Street.

The Department plans to send an advance party of future consular officers and employees to Kiev on or about September 24 to carry out their functions in preparation for the official opening of the United States Consulate in that city. These designated consular officers and employees will be temporarily assigned to the United States Embassy in Moscow. The size of the American group will initially be four and when the reconfiguration of the office buildings is ready to be initiated in Kiev and New York, the Department will consult with the Soviet side as to any increase in the U.S. Advance Party. The Embassy of the United States in Moscow will inform the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the names of the four individuals who will constitute the American Advance Party in Kiev. As is the usual procedure, upon the opening of the United States Consulate General in Kiev, these officers or employees will be recognized as permanent members of the United States Consulate General and will receive privileges and immunities in accordance with US-USSR Consular Convention.

20

The Department wishes to inform the Embassy that the point of contact for the Soviet Advance Party for routine matters involving its stay in New York and on questions of travel beyond the 25-mile zone will be the U.S. Mission to the United Nations. The Department understands that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR will be the point of contact for the U.S. Advance Party in Kiev for routine matters involving its stay and for related travel questions.

The Department is prepared to proceed in formally establishing advance parties in New York and Kiev based on the response by the Soviet Embassy.

Department of State,

Washington, *September 24, 1976,*

Drafted: EUR/SOV:MDGrimes:vpb
x28670, 9/21/76

Cleared: EUR/EX:JClark
A/FBO:PStange

L:hfshamwell
S/CPR:HDavis

IO:LHage
S/S-S:MEDham

21

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF LANGUAGE SERVICES

(TRANSLATION)

LS NO.

58852

PA/DZ

Russian

No. 63

✓ The Embassy of the U.S.S.R. confirms receipt of the note of the Department of State of the U.S.A. of September 24, 1976 on questions related to the establishment of Consulates-General of the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. in New York and Kiev, and taking into account the discussion of these questions during talks held between the Deputy Minister of the U.S.S.R., G. M. Korniyenko, and Assistant Secretary of State of the U.S.A., Mr. Arthur A. Hartman, on October 1 of this year, has the following to transmit.

The Embassy takes into consideration the willingness of the Department of State to officially establish, beginning on September 24, 1976, advance groups composed of designated consular officials and staff members temporarily assigned to the Soviet and U.S. Embassies in Washington and Moscow, which shall carry out their functions in New York and Kiev, respectively, in connection with the preparations for the official opening of the Consulates-General in both cities.

✓ This is to inform the Department of State that as of today⁰ the following personnel of the Embassy shall be among the members of the Soviet advance group.

Department of State
of the United States of America,
Washington, D.C.

DECLASSIFIED / (R/10960)

NLRR F06-114/1 #58852

BY CW NARA DATE 1/27/07

✓ Counsellor A. G. Mushkov, as the designated Consul-General of the U.S.S.R. in New York, who has been charged with heading the advance group; First Secretary V. A. Kuleshov and Second Secretary I. A. Kuznetsov, as ✓ designated Consuls; Second Secretary V. V. Grishaev, as the designated Vice-Consul, staff member of the Embassy V. V. Grachev, as a designated consular official; and staff members of the Embassy, V. I. Konovalov, V. M. Kuznetsov, A. N. Matusevich, and Ye. A. Sulin, as staff members of the Consulate-General being established.

The names of the other members of the advance group shall be additionally transmitted to the Department of State.

The intention of the Department of State to transmit to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., through the Embassy of the U.S.A. in Moscow, the list of the U.S. advance group in Kiev, is taken into consideration.

The Embassy notes that the Department of State agrees that prior to the official opening of both Consulates-General, the Soviet advance group, in addition to carrying out the functions connected with preparations for the opening of the Consulate-General of the U.S.S.R., will deal with questions related to the safety of Soviet institutions and Soviet citizens in New York (including Soviet citizens who are personnel of the U.N. Secretariat), excepting personnel of the Permanent Mission of the U.S.S.R. to the U.N., and will be able to be in contact with appropriate U.S. authorities regarding these questions, as well as handle protocol matters with regard to Soviet delegations arriving in New York which are not connected with the U.N.

23

The Embassy takes into consideration the fact that on questions of their daily stay in New York, as well as trips beyond the 25-mile zone, the Soviet advance group will be able to refer to the Mission of the U.S.A. to the U.N.

Washington, October 4, 1976

11/9/74 24

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF LANGUAGE SERVICES

(TRANSLATION)

LS NO. 59235
PA/DZ
Russian

[Seal of the U.S.S.R.]

Embassy of the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics

No. 70

The Embassy of the U.S.S.R., as an addition to its note No. 60 of October 4 of this year, communicates to the Department of State of the U.S.A. that from this day on, the members of the Embassy listed below are included in the advance group of the Consulate General of the U.S.S.R. being established in New York, and as appointed authorized personnel shall perform functions in New York related to the preparations for the official opening of the Consulate General and shall deal with questions, an understanding about which has been established through an exchange of notes between the Embassy and the Department of State of October 4 and September 24 of this year, respectively:

- Matsenov, V. G. - as First Secretary of the Embassy and designated Consul;
- Moskvin, L. A. -- as Second Secretary of the Embassy and designated Vice-Consul.

The surnames of the remaining members of the advance group shall be given additionally.

At the same time, the Embassy informs the Department of State that the Second Secretary of the Embassy, V. V. Grishayev, named in Note No. 60

Department of State
of the United States of America,
Washington, D.C.
[Initialled: Yu. V.]

DECLASSIFIED/RELEASD
NLRR 106-114/1 #5853
BY CH NARA DATE 11/27/07

of October 4 of this year as a member of the Soviet advance group in New York, has returned to Washington from New York to work at the Embassy.

Washington, November 9, 1976

RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1976 NOV 9 PM 4 24

FADRS
DOCUMENT ANALYSIS

№ 70

26
RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1976 NOV 9 PM 4 54

OFFICE OF
EASTERN UNION AFFAIRS
SOV

Посольство СССР в дополнение к своей ноте № 60 от 4 октября с.г. сообщает Государственному Департаменту США, что нижепоименованные сотрудники Посольства с сего дня включаются в состав советской передовой группы учреждаемого Генерального консульства СССР в Нью-Йорке и в качестве назначенных консульских должностных лиц будут выполнять в Нью-Йорке функции в связи с подготовкой к официальному открытию Генерального консульства и заниматься вопросами, договоренность о которых зафиксирована путем обмена нотами Посольства и Государственного Департамента соответственно от 4 октября и 24 сентября с.г.:

Маценов В.Г. - в качестве первого секретаря Посольства и назначенного консула;

Москвин Л.А. - в качестве второго секретаря Посольства и назначенного вице-консула.

Фамилии остальных членов передовой группы будут названы дополнительно.

В ГОСУДАРСТВЕННЫЙ ДЕПАРТАМЕНТ
СОЕДИНЕННЫХ ШТАТОВ АМЕРИКИ

г. Вашингтон

DECLASSIFIED/RE/EX/EJ

NLRR FOI-114/1 #5455

BY CJ NARA DATE 11/27/07

Одновременно Посольство информирует Государственный Департамент о том, что второй секретарь Посольства Гришаев В.В., названный в ноте № 60 от 4 октября с.г. в качестве члена советской передовой группы в Нью-Йорке, вернулся из Нью-Йорка в Вашингтон для работы в Посольстве.

г.Вашингтон, 9 ноября 1976 года

DECLASSIFIED/RE/EX/100

Subject copy
→
28

NLRR F06-714/1 #5854
BY CW. NARA DATE 11/27/07

The Department of State acknowledges receipt of Note No. 70 dated November 19, 1976, from the Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, informing the Department of the appointment of V. G. Matsenov and L. A. Moskvina as members of the Embassy advance party in New York and of the fact that V. V. Grishayev, formerly a member of the advance group, has returned to Washington to work at the Embassy.

By the Department's count, the addition of these two employees brings the total number of Soviet advance party members in New York to ten. In order to avoid misunderstandings, the Department calls the attention of the Embassy to the discussion of October 1, 1976, between Assistant Secretary of State Hartman and Deputy Foreign Minister Korniyenko in which Mr. Hartman informed Mr. Korniyenko that the Department would authorize ten Embassy employees to live and work in New York as members of the Soviet advance party. Mr. Hartman told Mr. Korniyenko at that time that the Department would consider an increase in the size of the Soviet advance party in New York once reconfiguration of the two official buildings begins simultaneously in Kiev and New York. As the Embassy is aware, this reconfiguration has not yet begun.

The Department also notes that extension of the visas for temporary Embassy employees Bayev and Makarov until February 15, 1977, has been requested by the Embassy. In a meeting on September 24 between Minister Counselor Vorontsov and Mr. Garrison of the Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Mr. Garrison agreed that Mr. Bayev and Mr. Makarov could remain in the United States for two more months. Nevertheless, the Department is prepared to extend the visas of Mr. Bayev and Mr. Makarov until January 15, 1977, at which time it will consider a further extension based on an assessment of the progress to that date regarding the reconfiguration of the future United States office building in Kiev.

Department of State,

Washington, November 19, 1976.

Handed to Kavalierov 11-19-76

Drafted:
EUR:SOV:MLevitsky:reh
11/18/76 x 28671

Cleared:
EUR:SOV:MGarrison
EUR/EX:NBaskey (in draft)
S/S-S - in draft

Matlock
30

4711 add-on

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

July 15, 1983

ACTION

DECLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

NLRR Feb-114/1 #5846

THROUGH: CHARLES P. TYSON

BY CW NARA DATE 11/27/87

FROM: JOHN LENCZOWSKI JL

SUBJECT: Invitation to Solzhenitsyn

I fully agree with Walter Annenberg that the President should invite Solzhenitsyn to lunch. And I believe that now is a particularly good time, since he has just received the Templeton Foundation Prize for Progress in Religion which cited him as a "pioneer in the renaissance of religion in atheist nations," and "a living symbol of the continuing vitality of the Orthodox tradition of spirituality." A Presidential meeting with him at this time could have a powerful symbolic political effect that would serve the security interests of our country and the entire Free World.

There are several reasons for this:

- Solzhenitsyn is a unique symbol of the superior power of faith over totalitarian oppression.
- He is the most prominent political figure in the world today unabashedly articulating the political consequences of our failure to recognize the existence of absolute good and absolute evil and the relationship of these concepts to the contemporary world situation. He therefore serves an indispensable role in explaining the fundamental moral essence of the East-West conflict. His Templeton address and subsequent press conference remarks are only the most recent of his powerful expositions on the importance of religion and moral consciousness in avoiding the totalitarian temptation and the spiritual and therefore geo-political capitulation to communism.
- His message included one key point that should be broadcast repeatedly across the land: that a false confidence from relying on our nuclear umbrella has "relaxed the West, sapping its strength, its moral qualities, its courage. Freedom does not depend on any 'umbrella', it depends on stout hearts and steadfast men." The President should be the premier promoter of this idea, and should use Solzhenitsyn as part of his campaign.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

- Such a meeting would be a major symbolic reaffirmation of the President's renunciation of the policy of appeasement which inspired Kissinger to recommend against a meeting between Solzhenitsyn and President Ford.
- Such a meeting would signal our willingness to conduct a policy of true reciprocity. Do Soviet Party leaders ever hesitate to meet with any opponent of American democracy (e.g., Angela Davis, et al.) to avoid offending the U.S. Government?
- Such a meeting would do valuable service to our public diplomacy effort. One photograph with Solzhenitsyn will tell a thousand words to millions of people.
- Solzhenitsyn is a hero to the American labor movement. In appreciation for all he has done in the interests of the working man, the AFL-CIO gave him a national platform for two of his most powerful addresses.

I do not believe the arguments presented to you in opposition to inviting Solzhenitsyn now outweigh the arguments in favor.

-- Argument: Solzhenitsyn represents one strain of "emigre" thinking which is at variance with that of Sakharov. Receiving Solzhenitsyn would not be universally welcomed and would be seen as a slap at Sakharov especially now after his recent Foreign Affairs article.

Response: Sakharov's article reveals that he is much closer to Solzhenitsyn than many people think. The President has already given recognition to one courageous man, with one strain of thought. It would therefore be neither unbalanced nor insulting to give recognition to another courageous man with another strain of thought.

-- Argument: Solzhenitsyn refused a previous invitation to a White House lunch last year.

Response: It is my understanding that the way the invitation was handled almost guaranteed that Solzhenitsyn would decline it. He originally learned of the invitation and the controversy surrounding it in the newspapers. In any event this argument appears to be designed not to oppose an invitation now but rather to oppose any further invitation ever.

-- Argument: An invitation now would be seen by Western publics as running counter to our desire for negotiations with the Soviets.

Response: This argument dictates that our public diplomacy efforts in dealing with the Soviet threat be guided not by the necessity of telling the truth about the nature of that threat but by appeasing and abetting the pacifist, isolationist and neutralist sentiments and wishful thinking of elements of the Western public. This is the perfect prescription for self-censorship "in the interests of negotiations."

-- Argument: (Presented at our staff discussion.) An invitation now would harm our efforts to free Shcharansky.

Response: If one accepts this logic, then all the Soviets have to do to preclude us from any freedom of action whatsoever is keep another prominent, courageous soul in the Gulag whose release many Americans would like to secure. We must never let our freedom of action be held hostage by either Soviet terrorism or the prospect of Soviet concessions in any negotiations. In any event, the theory underlying this argument has been proven false from another perspective: President Nixon's mining of Haiphong harbor a few weeks before the Moscow summit of 1972 did not prevent that summit (and all its results) from taking place.

CONCLUSION: I suspect that to say that Solzhenitsyn should not be invited now on account of the arguments presented is another way of opposing any invitation ever. Now is as good a time as any. Solzhenitsyn was received by Prime Minister Thatcher with great accolades. His picture and his message have been all over the European press, and the alleged ill effects on pacifist opinion do not appear to have taken place. To the contrary, Europe has been given a moral boost. As Phil Nicolaides recommended in an earlier memo to you, now is the time for the President to applaud the man's courage, wisdom and genius.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Admiral Poindexter to forward the Schedule Proposal at Tab I to Fred Ryan requesting a Presidential luncheon with Solzhenitsyn.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I Proposed Schedule Proposal

Tab II Jack Matlock's memorandum, July 13

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SCHEDULE PROPOSAL

TO: FREDERICK J. RYAN, JR., DIRECTOR
PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS AND SCHEDULING

FROM: JOHN M. POINDEXTER

REQUEST: To invite Alexandr Solzhenitsyn for a private lunch with the President.

PURPOSE: That the President may hear Solzhenitsyn's message first hand and applaud the man's courage and wisdom.

BACKGROUND: A previous attempt to honor Solzhenitsyn at the White House was rejected by the Ford Administration. The handling of an earlier attempt in this Administration to invite him faced some problems and controversy, the result of which was that Solzhenitsyn declined. He has just received the Templeton Award and was received by Prime Minister Thatcher in Britain.

PREVIOUS PARTICIPATION: None.

DATE AND TIME: To be determined.

LOCATION: Oval Office and White House

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Mrs. Reagan (?)
Mr. Alexandr Solzhenitsyn

OUTLINE OF EVENTS: President to receive Solzhenitsyn in Oval Office, photo opportunity, proceed to lunch.

REMARKS REQUIRED: Talking points to be provided.

MEDIA COVERAGE: Press pool photo

RECOMMENDED BY: John Lenczowski, NSC

OPPOSED BY: Jack Matlock, NSC

PROJECT OFFICER: Charles P. Tyson

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By CAJ NARA, Date 6/3/02

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

July 13, 1983

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *gm*

SUBJECT: Appointment Request for Solzhenitsyn

Walter Annenberg has written the President to call his attention to an article in the Wall Street Journal on Alexander Solzhenitsyn. He suggests that there may come a time when it would be advantageous to invite Solzhenitsyn to lunch at the White House. The article is an interesting one and worth reading. As for inviting Solzhenitsyn, I feel that this is an option we should keep open for the future, but that now is not an appropriate time for the following reasons:

- Solzhenitsyn represents only one strain of anti-Soviet emigre thinking, which is at considerable variance with that of Sakharov, for example. A meeting at the White House would not be universally welcomed by anti-Soviet emigres and even could be seen as a gratuitous slap at Sakharov following his courageous and very helpful article in Foreign Affairs.
- Solzhenitsyn refused an invitation last year to attend on May 11 both a lunch and a subsequent private meeting with the President at the White House. While he would probably accept an invitation to meet with the President alone, the fact remains that he has passed up a previous opportunity for a meeting.
- A meeting at this time would be interpreted by some segments of U.S. and allied public opinion as running counter to our desire for negotiations with the Soviet Union.

At Tab I is a memorandum from you to Fred Ryan recommending against inviting Solzhenitsyn to lunch at the White House at this time but pointing out that this is an option that we should keep open for the future.

TD Paula Dobriansky, Peter Sommer, and *TWC* Ty Cobb concur. John Lenczowski believes that a lunch with Solzhenitsyn should be arranged now and will be forwarding his comments to you separately.

RECOMMENDATIONOK NO

— —

That you send the memo at Tab I to Fred Ryan.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR FREDERICK J. RYAN, JR.

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

SUBJECT: Lunch with Alexander Solzhenitsyn

With regard to Walter Annenberg's suggestion that Alexander Solzhenitsyn be invited to lunch at the White House, I feel that this is an option we should keep open for the future, but that now is not an appropriate time for the following reasons:

- Solzhenitsyn represents only one strain of anti-Soviet emigre thinking, which is at considerable variance with that of Sakharov, for example. A meeting at the White House would not be universally welcomed by anti-Soviet emigres and even could be seen as a gratuitous slap at Sakharov, following his courageous and very helpful article in Foreign Affairs.
- Solzhenitsyn refused an invitation last year to attend on May 11 both a lunch and a subsequent private meeting with the President at the White House. While he would probably accept an invitation to meet with the President alone, the fact remains that he has passed up a previous opportunity for a meeting.
- A meeting at this time would be interpreted by some segments of U.S. and allied public opinion as running counter to our desire for negotiations with the Soviet Union.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 18, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR FREDERICK J. RYAN, JR.

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK *WPC*
SUBJECT: Lunch with Alexander Solzhenitsyn

With regard to Walter Annenberg's suggestion that Alexander Solzhenitsyn be invited to lunch at the White House, I feel that this is an option we should keep open for the future, but that now is not an appropriate time for the following reasons:

- Solzhenitsyn represents only one strain of anti-Soviet emigre thinking, which is at considerable variance with that of Sakharov, for example. A meeting at the White House would not be universally welcomed by anti-Soviet emigres and even could be seen as a gratuitous slap at Sakharov, following his courageous and very helpful article in Foreign Affairs.
- Solzhenitsyn refused an invitation last year to attend on May 11 both a lunch and a subsequent private meeting with the President at the White House. While he would probably accept an invitation to meet with the President alone, the fact remains that he has passed up a previous opportunity for a meeting.
- A meeting at this time would be interpreted by some segments of U.S. and allied public opinion as running counter to our desire for negotiations with the Soviet Union.

Please call me if you do not agree -

WPC

National Security Council
The White House

739

RECEIVED

Package#

4711

83 JUL 13 P 3: 11

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Bud McFarlane	1	M	A
Jacque Hill	2	✓	_____
Judge Clark	3	✓	_____
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Executive Secretary	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Strongly agree

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

July 13, 1983

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *gm*

SUBJECT: Appointment Request for Solzhenitsyn

Walter Annenberg has written the President to call his attention to an article in the Wall Street Journal on Alexander Solzhenitsyn. He suggests that there may come a time when it would be advantageous to invite Solzhenitsyn to lunch at the White House. The article is an interesting one and worth reading. As for inviting Solzhenitsyn, I feel that this is an option we should keep open for the future, but that now is not an appropriate time for the following reasons:

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- Solzhenitsyn refused an invitation last year to attend on May 11 both a lunch and a subsequent private meeting with the President at the White House. While he would probably accept an invitation to meet with the President alone, the fact remains that he has passed up a previous opportunity for a meeting.
- A meeting at this time would be interpreted by some segments of U.S. and allied public opinion as running counter to our desire for negotiations with the Soviet Union.

At Tab I is a memorandum from you to Fred Ryan recommending against inviting Solzhenitsyn to lunch at the White House at this time but pointing out that this is an option that we should keep open for the future.

TD
Paula Dobriansky, Peter Sommer, and Ty *TWC* Cobb concur. John Lenczowski believes that a lunch with Solzhenitsyn should be arranged now and will be forwarding his comments to you separately.

RECOMMENDATION

OK

NO

That you send the memo at Tab I to Fred Ryan.

Attachment:

Tab I

Memo to Fred Ryan

THE WHITE HOUSE

4711

WASHINGTON

JULY 8, 1983

MEMORANDUM

TO: WILLIAM CLARK

FROM: FREDERICK J. RYAN, JR., DIRECTOR
PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS AND SCHEDULING

SUBJ: REQUEST FOR SCHEDULING RECOMMENDATION

PLEASE PROVIDE YOUR RECOMMENDATION ON THE FOLLOWING
SCHEDULING REQUEST UNDER CONSIDERATION:

EVENT: Lunch with Alexander Solzhenitsyn

DATE: ---

LOCATION: The White House

BACKGROUND: See attached

YOUR RECOMMENDATION:

Accept ___ Regret ___ Surrogate ___ Message ___ Other ___
Priority ___
Routine ___

IF RECOMMENDATION IS TO ACCEPT, PLEASE CITE REASONS:

RESPONSE DUE ASAP

TO Sarah Long *Long*

WALTER H. ANNENBERG

151961

40

June 23, 1983

Staff to
N/C
(ASAP)

The Hon. Ronald Reagan
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

I don't know whether anyone called your attention to the Alexander Solzhenitsyn article in The Wall Street Journal, but I respectfully suggest you read it.

There may come a time when it would be advantageous for you to invite Alexander Solzhenitsyn for lunch at The White House.

Respectfully,



Walter Annenberg

Enclosure

P. O. Box 750
100 Matsonford Road
Radnor, PA 19088

The Lonely Voice of Alexander Solzhenitsyn

By JOHN TRAIN

When Alexander Solzhenitsyn came to America nine years ago, the then incumbent of the White House declined to see him. Such a gesture might annoy the Soviets, it was thought.

I recently accompanied Mr. Solzhenitsyn and his wife to England. What a difference! He was welcomed by the royal family, addressed over a thousand notables in London's Guildhall to acknowledge the Templeton Prize, spent an evening with the archbishop of Canterbury, was pictured on the front pages conferring with Prime Minister Thatcher and brought a shower of approval from the boys of Eton after addressing them in chapel. Television coverage was extensive. The Times of London printed his Guildhall address in full and carried a long editorial on it. Day after day the Times ran a stream of letters; an eminent editorialist, Bernard Levin wrote a column, and later consecrated an entire page to an interview.

The American press, although present, virtually ignored these events. Indeed, says Mr. Solzhenitsyn, the Washington Post through selective editing misrepresented his message. What does he in fact have to say? And why are his words so differently received in the two countries?

The families of the Russian dissidents are exceedingly close to Mr. Solzhenitsyn's heart, and in his London talks he often turned, anguished, to their plight. In the Soviet Union a husband and wife can still rarely support a family even if both work. When a dissident, exercising his rights under the Helsinki agreement (which Mr. Solzhenitsyn had always warned the Soviets would ignore), is sent to prison, his wife alone may no longer be able to earn enough to feed the children and herself. Ordinarily, the wives are also deprived of work; and heavy official disfavor falls on any who help such families. So their situation is desperate.

Reasons of Conscience

While still in Zurich in 1974, after leaving Russia but before coming to America, Mr. Solzhenitsyn created the Russian Social Fund to help the families of Russian dissidents imprisoned, contrary to the Soviet Constitution, for reasons of conscience. To this fund of which his wife is president, Mr. Solzhenitsyn assigned all the proceeds of "The Gulag Archipelago," his most valuable asset.

The fund has assisted many hundreds of families, including more than a thousand children. Its directors inside Russia, who look after the distribution of what is brought in (perforce unofficially), are heroes and martyrs, like a doctor who works during a plague knowing that sooner or later he must fall victim himself. Such is the hatred of freedom in the Soviet Union that helping the families of prisoners of conscience to stay alive has been declared an act of treason. In 1981 Valery Repin, who ran the fund in Leningrad, was seized

and taken on television to "confess" that the fund was engaged in a witches' brew of anti-state machinations. It was all a fake, since the fund, a Swiss—i.e., neutral—foundation, is purely philanthropic. Mr. Repin has been tried and convicted. The fund's chief Soviet Union representative, Sergei Khodorovich, has just been arrested also. If he, too, can be broken, he may be subjected to a show trial. If, as seems more likely since he is a man of spiritual strength, he stands fast, then, condemned in secret, he will disappear. His only hope is Western public opinion. If we manifest enough concern in the media and in Washington, he may be saved.

A successor, Andrei Kistyakovsky, has stepped into Mr. Khodorovich's place, an act of extraordinary courage. Mr. Kistyakovsky's time of travail has yet to come. "Do you believe," I asked Mr. Solzhenitsyn, "that the Soviet government is in-

"Almost everyone in Russia is sick of Leninism. The West, standing on the brink of catastrophe, has immensely strong allies of which it makes no use."

deed a 'focus of evil,' to use President Reagan's words?"

"Of course. But nobody has a monopoly on evil or good. There is also evil in the West. Still, the Soviet government is the home of communism, and communism is the most dreadful engine of oppression on our planet. Besides bringing about the annihilation of tens of millions, and the physical and spiritual crushing of countless more, it has destroyed the Soviet economy. And no conqueror in history has taken over so much territory."

Does Andropov represent a change?

"Not in the least. I am constantly struck by the ignorance of so-called experts on Soviet matters, who seem to think that the change of one face, or many faces, in the Kremlin can possibly affect how Soviet communism will act. This is a naive view of communism, not based on observation. The only thing that would change the behavior of the Soviet Union would be the accession to power of a noncommunist leader. He would reverse Soviet policy, both domestically and internationally."

What have been the West's chief mistakes?

"Since 1918, the West has made only mistakes, one after another, in dealing with the Soviet Union. Since the discovery of the atomic bomb it had just one good idea—the Baruch Plan, to put the atom under international control—which Stalin brushed aside.

"Sixty-five years ago Lenin pronounced a sentence of death on the Western world. Sixty years ago nobody seriously supported the Russian forces fighting communism. There was a torrent of fugitives, including some of the finest persons in the country, who testified that what was happening was

there was a second wave of emigrants, bearing witness to Stalin's mass murders. Again, the West was indifferent. Thirty years ago, Kravchenko defected, revealing to the West the terrible things that were going on; people preferred to listen to Bertrand Russell. Eight or nine years ago I described what was really happening—and again, except for a few, the West paid no attention. At that time, I proposed specific political remedies for the desperate problems we face. Nothing was done. Now it is probably too late.

"The single worst mistake of the post-war era was relying on the 'nuclear umbrella.' False confidence in this 'umbrella' relaxed the West, sapping its strength, its moral qualities, its courage. Freedom does not depend on any 'umbrella,' it depends on stout hearts and steadfast men. Today the 'umbrella,' neutralized, no longer protects, but the habit of weakness, of lack of

courage, persists. As a result, the West lies gravely weakened before the expansionist aims of the Soviet Union."

What next?

"It is far better to fight on your feet than on your knees, but you can still fight on your knees. The Russian people are still resisting after 65 years. One man in the Soviet Union wrote me to urge Western scientists to invent a do-it-yourself copying machine. In a dictatorship, that would be a lot more valuable than an arms cache."

What hope is there, then, for the West?

"The time when the West could save itself by its own exertions may already have passed. To save itself would require a complete change in its attitudes, when in fact these attitudes are still going the wrong way. Instead of girding itself for struggle, the West is still hoping for outside forces to save it, through some kind of miracle—perhaps a miracle in the Kremlin. Solidarity was hailed as such a miracle. But the only miracle that the people of the West can pray for is a profound change in their own hearts."

And what about Afghanistan?

"In the three years of Soviet aggression against that country, the West has in essence done nothing. Had it dared, it could by now have supported several regiments of ex-Soviet soldiers—defectors—who would be ready to fight against this aggression. Then things would look very different."

Could Western broadcasting to the Soviet Union be more effective?

"Yes. In fact, that is a matter of the greatest importance. Today, all broadcasts

Soviet government: lin. As long as this d prime policy objecti ernments will be resing their own world. currently bound by a should say nothing a never insult the Sov policy' is insane. woman and child i Leninism. The West, of catastrophe, has lies of which it make the Soviet Union, and subject nations. It hands to those oppr 'A Need for Selfie Is the Soviet Unio control?"

"There are two So ple—millions of them wars, to armaments the contrary, does idea even for a minu want the West to dis of Soviet military ec given up."

What about our their concern for di

"It is normal to weapons. I would con But the generation Western schools is good from bad. Ever acceptable. This resu ing ability. Isaac N would never have be munism! These you look back on photo demonstrations and c late. I say to them: Y clear arms. But are defend your homela arms? No: These you pared for any kind

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In America, Mr. taken as a repetitio concerns need not be if true, they're not ne rises around us, we says, hope to be save

Mr. Train is presi

Solzhenitsyn

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the West lies expansionist

your feet a still fight ple are still n in the So- tern scien- pying ma- ld be a lot- ache."

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1? aggression has in esd, it could regiments ctors—who st this ag- k very dif-

to the So-

Soviet government: not to vex the Kremlin. As long as this delusion is considered a prime policy objective, the Western governments will be responsible for undermining their own world. Such broadcasting is currently-bound by a narrow limitation: It should say nothing against Lenin, it should never insult the Soviet government. This policy is insane. Almost every man, woman and child in Russia is sick of Leninism. The West, standing on the brink of catastrophe, has immensely strong allies of which it makes no use: the people of the Soviet Union, and, indeed, of the other subject nations. It must stretch out its hands to those oppressed people."

'A Need for Selflessness'

Is the Soviet Union serious about arms control?

"There are two Soviet Unions. The people—millions of them—dream of an end to wars, to armaments. The government, on the contrary, does not contemplate that idea even for a minute. It does, of course, want the West to disarm. But not one item of Soviet military equipment will ever be given up."

What about our younger people and their concern for disarmament?

"It is normal to be afraid of nuclear weapons. I would condemn no one for that. But the generation now coming out of Western schools is unable to distinguish good from bad. Even those words are unacceptable. This results in impaired thinking ability. Isaac Newton, for example, would never have been taken in by communism! These young people will soon look back on photographs of their own demonstrations and cry. But it will be too late. I say to them: You are protesting nuclear arms. But are you prepared to try to defend your homeland with nonnuclear arms? No: These young people are unprepared for any kind of struggle."

Do we have a single main underlying moral ill that one can identify?

"Besides cowardice, selfishness. We hear a constant clamor for rights, rights, always rights, but so very little about responsibility. And we have forgotten God. The need now is for selflessness, for a spirit of sacrifice, for a willingness to put aside personal gains for the salvation of the whole Western world."

Such, then, is Mr. Solzhenitsyn's message. It was received in England as an inspiring evocation of ancient values.

In America, Mr. Solzhenitsyn is often taken as a repetitious Cassandra, whose concerns need not be faced, because even if true, they're not new. As the hostile tide rises around us, we would rather, as he says, hope to be saved by some miracle.

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

July 19, 1983

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT: Response to Letter from Casimir Oksas

Attached at Tab I is a letter for your signature to Mr. Casimir G. Oksas regarding the desirability of appointing an American of Baltic heritage as a public member of the U.S. Delegation to the United Nations. Mr. Oksas' incoming letter of June 7 is at Tab IV.

I have also attached memoranda from Bob Kimmitt to John Herrington (Tab II) and Charles Hill (Tab III) forwarding copies of Mr. Oksas's letter and resume for their consideration.

John Lenczowski *sl* and Cary Lord *a* concur.

RECOMMENDATION

1. That you sign the letter at Tab I to Mr. Oksas.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

2. That you authorize Bob Kimmitt to forward the memoranda at Tabs II and III.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

- Tab I Proposed response to Mr. Oksas
- Tab II Kimmitt memorandum to John Herrington
- Tab III Kimmitt memorandum to Charles Hill
- Tab IV Incoming correspondence of June 7

44

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. Oksas:

Thank you for your letter of June 7 regarding the desirability of appointing an American of Baltic heritage as a public member of the U.S. Delegation to the United Nations.

I believe that it is a good idea to seek ways to emphasize our policy of not recognizing the incorporation of the Baltic states into the Soviet Union, and am passing on your suggestion to the Department of State for appropriate consideration.

Sincerely,

Mr. Casimir G. Oksas
10520 S. Hamilton Avenue
Chicago, Illinois 60643

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN HERRINGTON

FROM: ROBERT M. KIMMITT

SUBJECT: Correspondence with Mr. Casimir G. Oksas

Attached for your information and consideration is a letter from Mr. Oksas regarding the desirability of appointing an American of Baltic heritage as a public member of the U.S. Delegation to the United Nations.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR CHARLES HILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Correspondence with Mr. Casimir G. Oksas

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Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary

Attachment

4744
47

CASIMIR G. OKSAS

10520 S. HAMILTON AVENUE • CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60643

June 7, 1983

Hon. William Clark
Assistant to the President for National Security
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Judge Clark:

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A review of candidates for the nonsalaried annual appointment as a public member of the U.S. Delegation to the United Nations Organization will probably begin soon. I wish to advise that I have a great interest in serving in such a capacity and request your consideration for an endorsement. A copy of my resume is enclosed.

TELEPHONE 443-5519

With kind regards,



CASIMIR G. OKSAS

JURY COMMISSIONER
OF COOK COUNTY

RICHARD J. DALEY CENTER
ROOM 1002
CHICAGO, ILL. 60602

RESUME

48

CASIMIR G. OKSAS
10520 S. Hamilton Ave
Chicago, IL 60643
home phone: 312 779-0362
office phone: 312 443-5519

born: 27 May 1925
Chicago, IL
wife: Joan
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RESUME continued

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Republican Precinct Captain and later Area Chairman, 19th Ward of Chicago, 1968 - 1974.



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Prague, Czechoslovakia

File 50

July 19, 1983

OFFICIAL-INFORMAL

Ambassador Jack F. Matlock
c/o EUR/EEY - Room 5220
Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Jack:

Well, I am on board and functioning--after a fashion. Your helpful comments before departure, along with Marty's excellent debriefing and Jim Connell's good work in keeping on top of things, have made it a relatively easy transition for me.

The major issue now before us will be your plans for departure and farewell receptions, dinners, etc. I have already transferred \$500 from ADMIN and DCM representation monies to your account in preparation for a heavy period of expenses in September. We can, of course, reshuffle more money as necessary, although our overall ceiling now is \$2,600. In this connection, I have relit fires under section chiefs (POLEC, CONS) to ensure that representation monies allotted to them will be expended by September 30.

Given the slowness of the pouch, I will be advising you of the above in the O-I before you receive this letter and we should probably continue in that channel through EUR/EEY in fine tuning your farewell reception plans. I am in touch with Rebecca to ensure that problems at the residence are kept under control, and things seem to be going well there.

Incidentally, I understand from Bob Piper that you did not feel you would be able to make the wreathlaying at Polomka in Slovakia on August 26. Thus, if you have to objection, I thought I would accompany the new Defense Attache, Colonel Butschek, that weekend (August 25-28) to do the necessary at Polomka.

[Handwritten mark]

51

-2-

I am enclosing a copy of the two articles on Prague which I mentioned to you over the phone from the "Philadelphia Inquirer" for July 8. Fisher's article also made the "Herald Tribune".

Warm regards.

Sincerely,

Bill

Robert W. Farrand
Charge d'Affaires a.i.

Enclosures:
as stated

MEMORANDUM
OF CALL

Previous editions usable

52

TO:

JSM

YOU WERE CALLED BY— YOU WERE VISITED BY—

OF (Organization)

PLEASE PHONE ► FTS AUTOVON

WILL CALL AGAIN IS WAITING TO SEE YOU

RETURNED YOUR CALL WISHES AN APPOINTMENT

MESSAGE

*John Spavacek
OMB Int'l Div.
x 4580*

RECEIVED BY	DATE	TIME

63-110 NSN 7540-00-634-4018 STANDARD FORM 63 (Rev. 8-81)
Prescribed by GSA
☆ GPO : 1982 O - 361-529 (210) FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

7/21/83

Talking Points

Major concerns with H.R. 601

- (1) An agency must be made responsible in the law for the new activity. (H.R. 601 does not do so; it merely makes Treasury the fund custodian.)
 - ° If this activity is as important to U.S. security and foreign relations as claimed, Federal agency, State Department, should be accountable and responsible for providing policy guidance, seeking and defending appropriations, and making grants.

- (2) A \$50 million "trust fund" is neither necessary nor appropriate. (Treasury also has strong opinions on this.) Annual appropriations should fund the activity.
 - ° Trust arrangements pertain to U.S. Government use of non-Federal monies, which the \$50 million would not be.
 - ° The "investing" arrangement results in a hidden subsidy which is financed from the appropriation which pays interest on the public debt.
 - ° It is not good policy to "back door finance" requirements through investment income that hides from the President and the Congress the annual cost of an activity.
 - ° Appropriations committees generally oppose such permanent hidden appropriations.
 - ° It would be easier to budget \$3-5 million in 1985 (about the annual level assumed by H.R. 601) than for the President's budget or Congressional appropriations to cover an additional \$50 million.

7/21/83

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55
Cohen

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

July 25, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*SUBJECT: President's Meeting with Representative Foley
Monday, July 25; 11:00 a.m.

Attached is State's memorandum regarding the President's meeting with Congressman Foley this morning. The memorandum and talking points look sound to me.

Attachments:

Tab I Memo from State/talking points

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 23, 1997
By *GAJ* NARA, Date *6/3/12*



03 JUL 23 8:12

July 23, 1983

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SITEMS/MLM

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: President Reagan's Meeting With Congressman Tom Foley
on his U.S.S.R. Trip, July 25, 11:00- 11:20 AM

House Majority Whip Tom Foley (D.-Wash.) has asked to see the President briefly to report on a Congressional delegation trip he led to the U.S.S.R. July 4-9. He was careful to select quality members from both parties and worked hard to ensure there was no daylight between the Administration's Soviet policy and the message the delegation would give the Soviets. He also wanted formal blessing of the trip from the Department. Because deferral of parliamentary contacts is an Afghanistan sanction, we told him we thought the trip could be useful, but going was a decision for the Legislative Branch to take, since the sanctions program remains in effect. The Department provided extensive briefing and full administrative support, however. The Soviets rolled out the red carpet and gave them quality people to talk to. They were in Leningrad, Moscow and Yerevan, Armenia.

Substantively, the Soviets concentrated on arms control and especially on Pershing II deployments, pleading for a delay, promising countermeasures and hinting (but without threatening) that they would walk out of INF talks. Most of the press play came from Congressman Tom Downey's claim that one remark by a Soviet general signals new serious interest in the "walk-in-the-woods" formula on INF. Other Congressmen and the Embassy notetaker think this is a far-fetched interpretation, and the Soviets are downplaying the remark privately. The whole delegation responded sharply and negatively to suggestions that the Soviets might counterdeploy against the new U.S. INF outside the Soviet Union and the bloc. In general, the delegation also insisted that every part of our balanced agenda--human rights and regional issues as well as arms control and bilateral topics--is important to us if relations are to improve. Since Jack Kemp dropped out to make his visit private, the delegation had a leftish cast, and it was good for the Soviets to hear the same message we are sending them from such a Congressional group.

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NLRR P06-114/1 #5850

Decl: OADR

BY CU NARA DATE 11/27/07

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

The Soviets are angling for a return invitation from the Congress. Foley deflected this in Moscow, but he may want to talk to the President about it. If he does, the President should encourage him to keep putting it off in the interest of keeping our sanctions program in place even if we proceed to lift some outmoded sanctions. Attached are some suggested talking points for the President's use.

Donna Metcalfe
for Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

As stated.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUGGESTED TALKING POINTS

-- I would like to hear how the visit went.

-- You and your people seemed to be telling the Soviets pretty much the same thing we are about what is needed to improve relations, and it is good for them to hear the same message from across the whole American political spectrum.

-- If we can keep it up, it should help us in negotiations, and I certainly hope it will.

-- We still have sanctions on high-level contacts with the Soviets. They were put in for a reason, and the kind of Soviet behavior that caused them has not changed much.

-- If we want to move the Soviets toward the sort of constructive relationship we want, we are going to have to move very carefully on sanctions. We may wish to adjust items if they are outmoded or if Soviet behavior improves, but we will also want to keep the program as such in place.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~Not to be:~~ 59

July 25, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR CHARLES HILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Correspondence with Mr. Casimir G. Oksas

Attached for your information and consideration is a letter from Mr. Oksas regarding the desirability of appointing an American of Baltic heritage as a public member of the U.S. Delegation to the United Nations.

Robert M. Kimmitt
Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary

Attachment

60

CASIMIR G. OKSAS

10520 S. HAMILTON AVENUE • CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60643

June 7, 1983

Hon. William Clark
Assistant to the President for National Security
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Judge Clark:

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Each U.S. administration since 1940 has expressly refused to recognize the forcible incorporation of the Republics of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia into the U.S.S.R. The manner of expressing this policy has varied thru the years according to each current perception of detente and the discerned aggressiveness of Russian expansionism. It may well be that a much higher visibility of this long term position which involves our nation's basic principles is now appropriate.

A review of candidates for the nonsalaried annual appointment as a public member of the U.S. Delegation to the United Nations Organization will probably begin soon. I wish to advise that I have a great interest in serving in such a capacity and request your consideration for an endorsement. A copy of my resume is enclosed.

TELEPHONE 443-5519

With kind regards,



CASIMIR G. OKSAS

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Casimir G. Oksas".

JURY COMMISSIONER
OF COOK COUNTY

RICHARD J. DALEY CENTER
ROOM 1002
CHICAGO, ILL. 60602

CASIMIR G. OKSAS
10520 S. Hamilton Ave
Chicago, IL 60643
home phone: 312 779-0362
office phone: 312 443-5519

born: 27 May 1925
Chicago, IL
wife: Joan
children: Stephen,
Mary

Current position (since Aug 1979): Jury Commissioner of Cook County
Room 1002 50 W. Washington Street Chicago, IL 60602

BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL:

Previously employed as Executive Vice President at Mutual Federal Savings and Loan Association of Chicago, 1962 - 1979
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RESUME continued

42
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POLITICAL ACTIVITY:

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

July 25, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN HERRINGTON

FROM:

ROBERT M. KIMMITT *RMK*

SUBJECT:

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75
64

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

July 19, 1983

ACTION

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FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JW*

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I have also attached memoranda from Bob Kimmitt to John Herrington (Tab II) and Charles Hill (Tab III) forwarding copies of Mr. Oksas's letter and resume for their consideration.

John Lenczowski *sl* and Cary Lord *a* concur.

RECOMMENDATION

1. That you sign the letter at Tab I to Mr. Oksas.

Approve Disapprove

2. That you authorize Bob Kimmitt to forward the memoranda at Tabs II and III.

Approve Disapprove

Attachments:

Tab I	Proposed response to Mr. Oksas
Tab II	Kimmitt memorandum to John Herrington
Tab III	Kimmitt memorandum to Charles Hill
Tab IV	Incoming correspondence of June 7

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

C
69

EYES ONLY

July 26, 1983

TO: Robert C. McFarlane
FROM: Jack F. Matlock *JFM*
SUBJECT: Expanded Charter for Dave Abshire

Attached at Tab I is a letter for the President's signature incorporating the points previously approved. It also contains some courtesy language ~~and~~_{out} the opening and close.

Earlier, Larry Eagleburger indicated that he would like to show the letter to Secretary Shultz before it is signed. If you want me to send it to Eagleburger for this purpose, I can do so. Alternatively, someone could show it to Shultz the next time he is over.

Attachment:

Tab I Letter to David Abshire
Tab II Background material

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Dear Dave:

As you undertake your duties as Ambassador to NATO, I hope you will devote particular attention to the following activities:

(1) Follow closely evolving NATO country attitudes to achieve better communication of American policies, programs, and aspirations in Europe. Consult with other American Ambassadors in Europe in developing an overall analysis and advising our government on planning and implementing information programs.

(2) Undertake special efforts to accelerate developments toward armaments cooperation, thereby enhancing military effectiveness and providing more common defense for the investment.

(3) Seek ways to improve Alliance understanding of the relationship between area issues and NATO in accord with the statement made at the Williamsburg Summit on the indivisibility of global security.

(4) Ensure that NATO governments are appropriately briefed on START negotiations and that negotiating positions on INF, MBFR and other arms reduction negotiations are properly coordinated in the Alliance.

(5) Work to move NATO toward the original intention of the North Atlantic Treaty in bettering economic collaboration.

(6) Support multilateral and bilateral efforts to achieve full compliance with nuclear fuel safeguards in accord with the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

(7) Maintain close congressional consultations on NATO matters and encourage parliamentary interaction toward building broad political support--bipartisan and bigenerational--for the alliances of democracy.

I know that you will provide astute and active support to our policies in NATO, and you have my full confidence and best wishes for success in carrying out your duties.

Sincerely,

The Honorable
David Abshire
U.S. Permanent Representative
to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Brussels

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

EYES ONLY

Mr. McFarlane

SUB: Expanded Charter for Dave Abshire

I have massaged the points for the proposed letter and believe that it meets the concerns Eagleburger expressed.

Regarding membership in the START Delegation, I have dropped it since I don't know Rowny's feelings and think that it carries other handicaps mentioned previously. I doubt if State would object strongly to this, however, if it is OK with Rowny.

*This looks like
very good. Could
I tell you to please
put to state
smoothly?
for signature*

NOTES ON PROPOSED PRESIDENTIAL LETTER

73

1. Follow closely evolving NATO country attitudes and plans to achieve better communication of U.S. policies, programs and aspirations in Europe. Consult with other U.S. Ambassadors in Europe in developing an overall analysis and advising the Department on planning and implementing information programs.
2. Undertake special efforts to accelerate developments toward armaments cooperation, thereby enhancing military effectiveness and providing more common defense per investment.
3. In follow up to the Williamsburg Summit's statement about the indivisibility of global security, seek ways to improve Alliance understanding of the relationship between area issues and NATO.
4. Ensure that NATO governments are appropriately briefed on START negotiations and that negotiating positions on INF, MBFR and other arms reduction negotiations are properly coordinated in the Alliance.
5. Work to move NATO toward the original intention of the Treaty in bettering economic collaboration (Article 2).
6. Support multilateral (in IAEA and elsewhere) and bilateral efforts to achieve full compliance with safeguards in accord with the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
7. Maintain close congressional consultations on NATO matters and encourage Parliamentary interaction toward building broad political support--bipartisan and bigenerational--for the alliances of democracy.

74

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~EYES ONLY~~

July 15, 1983

Jack Matlock

Subject: Expanded charter for Dave
Abshire

I've talked to Larry about his note.
He says he is not as negative as
the note makes it appear.

Could you please work up a draft
letter which you believe threads this
needle and run it by ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~
then send it on over?

many thanks

Bud
Bud

~~EYES ONLY~~

CAS 6/3/82

75
United States Department of State

*Under Secretary of State
for Political Affairs*

Washington, D.C. 20520

July 14, 1983

EYES ONLY/BY COURIER

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MC FARLANE

SUBJECT: Expanded Role for David Abshire

Given how good David is, the idea of expanding his responsibilities beyond the traditional boundaries of the NATO job is obviously attractive. But we also need to be clear-eyed about the problems it would raise, the largest of which stems from the fact that so many of our Embassies in Europe are headed by prima donnas: Rabb, Burns, and Galbraith would resist anything which they believe encroached on their prerogatives.

I therefore think we should try to characterize as much of David's expanded brief as possible in terms of the traditional responsibilities of the NATO job and our expectation that he will be an energetic ambassador to NATO. We should think very carefully about any duties which could not be squeezed into that definition. (I have in mind such things as being a formal member of the START delegation, and additional formal titles e.g., "special advisor.")

In any event, I would want to show the Secretary any Presidential letter along the lines which have been suggested before it was signed.


Lawrence S. Eagleburger

DECLASSIFIED/2/05/03

NLRR 606-714/1 #5860

BY CW NARA DATE 11/27/07

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

July 8, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Notes on Proposed Presidential Letter
(re Abshire)

In my view, these are all very important tasks, and the Ambassador to NATO is in the best position to play a key role in them. To avoid the appearance of giving the Ambassador to NATO a supervisory role over some of his colleagues, however, a few of the points might need to be reworded slightly. For example:

1. Membership in START delegation should be done only with Ambassador Rowny's approval. In addition, there is a further consideration which should be weighed: members of the delegation are limited in what they can say publicly on the negotiations because of the rule of confidentiality. While being a formal member of the delegation might facilitate Abshire's ability to brief the allies confidentially, it also might impinge on his freedom to speak publicly on START issues, and we should be sure that the trade-off is justified.

Finally, the question may arise as to why he should be a member of the START delegation, but not a member of the INF and MBFR delegations. To put him on all three would overload the circuit (his, at least!), but we should be sure of the rationale for singling out START.

2. In point 5, add at beginning, "In cooperation with our Ambassadors to the EC and the OECD..." Since they have the primary responsibility for the economic issues, their role in this effort should be acknowledged.

3. Similarly, in point 6, add "In cooperation with the Ambassador to the IAEA..."

4. Finally, since Abshire will be reporting directly to State, it might be well to consult Larry Eagleburger on the text before it goes to the President for signature.

cc: Don Fortier

7/6/83

NOTES ON PROPOSED PRESIDENTIAL LETTER

(from conversations between Bud McFarlane and Dave Abshire, subsequently discussed with Judge Clark)

Roles for U.S. Ambassador to NATO in addition to regular designated duties as Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council:

1. Serve as member (delegate-at-large) of START delegation -- thus affording a link between NAC and START. This role demonstrates President Reagan's commitment to the consultative process between the United States and NAC in strategic and arms control matters.
2. Serve as special advisor from Europe on evolving NATO country attitudes and on better communication of U.S. policies, programs and aspirations in Europe. Have a coordinating role with other U.S. Ambassadors in Europe in developing such an overall analysis.
3. Undertake special efforts to accelerate developments toward armaments cooperation, thereby enhancing military effectiveness and providing more common defense per investment.
4. In follow up to the Williamsburg Summit's statement about the indivisibility of global security, seek ways to improve Alliance understanding of the relationship between area issues and NATO.
5. Seek ways to better relate military and economic problems, whether burdensharing, east-west trade, technology transfer, etc. Work to move NATO toward the original intention of the Treaty in bettering economic collaboration. (Article 2)
6. Undertake special efforts with NATO countries on the necessity for full compliance with safeguards in accord with the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
7. Maintain close Congressional consultations on NATO matters and encourage Parliamentary interaction toward building broad political support -- bipartisan and bigenerational -- for the alliances of democracy.

Donator
Jack Mabolock
You OK
Bud
7/7/83

MEMORANDUM

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
July 29, 1983

Chom
78

TO: KEN DEGRAFFENREID
FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*
SUB: Allegation of Inadequacy in NSA Russian-language Training

Alexander Ginsburg, a former Soviet dissident who came to the United States several years ago and who is active in working with the AFL-CIO, Radio Liberty and the U.S. Army Russian Institute in Garmisch, called on me this morning to express his concern over the adequacy of training in the Russian language which NSA provides intercept operators. Apparently, he has visited both the DLI School at Monterrey and the one at Lackland AFB, has talked to students and knows some of the emigre language instructors. He says that he is convinced that persons graduating from the language courses are absolutely incapable of understanding Soviet military voice communications, and that they are not tested realistically to determine whether they have the capability. He also passed on some specific complaints by a language instructor at Lackland (attached). Ginsburg asked for the opportunity to meet with the person "in command of the training schools," and will be in Washington for most of August if such an appointment can be arranged.

Having been involved previously in managing language training at the Foreign Service Institute, I have the feeling that Ginsburg may have put his finger on a real problem. Although he has an excellent reputation for reliability, and has a lengthy and outstanding record of vigorous anti-Soviet activity, I doubt that he possesses any formal USG clearances. Nevertheless, I believe that it would be useful for someone at a reasonably senior level at NSA to hear his views. My experience has been that language trainers often in fact do not train very effectively for the specific tasks to be undertaken, and this general problem may be exaggerated in NSA because of clearance and classification considerations. Nevertheless, if it is the case that these people are being trained to understand intercepts, then Ginsburg's comments bring into question how effective the training is. Bureaucratically it is rather easy to leave an impression of effective training by administering tests which fail to simulate actual work conditions.

Could you look into the possibility of an appropriate person from NSA or DLI meeting with Ginsburg to hear his observations? Ginsburg's local telephone number is 797-0284.

~~SECRET~~

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BY *CS* NARA DATE *11/10/07* 3/3/11
NLRR F06-114/1 #5847
RW

Supplied by Alexander Ginsburg⁷⁹
to Jack Matlock, 29 July 83

April 21, 1983

Gentlemen:

My name is Anatoly Radygin. I am a former naval officer, a writer, a dissident, and a long-term political prisoner of the Soviet concentration camps. Now I am a citizen of the United States, and an instructor of the Defense Language Institute at Lackland AFB, Texas (a branch of the Monterey DLI).

I consider it my duty to report that both the military and the civilian administrations at the Russian Department of the DLI deliberately or indeliberately undermine the defense capabilities of the United States.

Year after year the professional military training of our students under the pressure from the civilian administration and with the permissiveness of the military administration decreases the potential of our graduates to perform their military duties. The recently introduced "New Course", evidently underdeveloped, increased the cost of training and, which is most important, removed the students even further from professional knowledge and skills.

Almost all existing textbooks and aids on military training were displaced from the schedules or are totally neglected. The new course decreased the headphone listening and active translation parts of the program. The movies, owned by the DLI, are not utilized on a regular, systematic and competent basis. The films from the AFB library are not used altogether. Our students graduate just three months before the active duty, being illiterate and infantile in military respect.

All this takes place because the evaluation of our work is done not according to the performance of our students in radio interception, but in order to please some unknown people, most likely civilians, who compile and conduct the "Pro" exams in total secrecy from the civilian language instructors, i.e., from us. However, as far as we know, this exam has nothing to do with the military lexicon. Not knowing those people personally, but having encountered on several occasions the professors and academic administrators of the local universities' Russian departments, I became convinced that this milieu is

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profoundly pacifistic, anti-government and often pro-Russian. (After these encounters I left the professional teachers' association.) However, the influence of these people on the careers of both civilian and military administrators of our school is so great that the military personnel in turn, displays an abnormal and harmful neglect to the military programs.

Knowing the level of professional training for the Soviet military specialists in the same discipline, we have no right to allow Soviet advantage also in this, one more, area of military preparedness. We have no right for the sake of "academic pronunciation", intonational intricacies, poetry, or reading the Russian classic literature to force hundreds of American servicemen to stay useless and helpless at the real military positions, doing the catching up on their own.

It costs too much when a serviceman becomes a danger to a potential adversary only during the last year of his four-year service. In Monterey the military program is practically cancelled. We at Lackland AFB have certain supervisors who have cleared their shelves of the "useless" (military!) materials, and the personnel of the acoustic laboratories are waiting impatiently for the order to do the same.

Military specialists are not able to defend the program. They are high on experience and low on rank; therefore they have to follow absurd orders.

I insist on immediate inspection of our school, conducted by the U.S. Military Officers of rank high enough to give them the authority to put a stop to this harmful practice.

I claim that the old course with rescheduled TLA contains necessary and sufficient material both for fluent Russian language and professional skills.

In my view, the new course can be utilized, after revision, for special advanced courses, i.e., for those radio intercepting personnel who have completed their service in that capacity and intend to work in cryptography, diplomacy or counter-intelligence. The new program, most regretfully, is above the heads of our students who come to our school with such low I.Q. levels and which will stay low, unless the military draft system is changed.

I insist that the "Pro" exam which now abnormally reorientates the whole direction of the school be placed second after the "Pro" exam on radio interception, which should be established.

I believe that in the process of hiring new instructors, all other qualifications being equal, the score should include points for previous military service, regardless of the fact in which country's military service the applicant served.

I request that in spite of the volume of changes the future inspection may find necessary to initiate, I would be allowed to take charge of one or two classes of new students with instructors and a supervisor (preferably of my choice) to prove the possibility of producing full-fledged specialists.

The inspection will face no easy task. It is difficult to expect sincerity from the personnel of our school. All of them will defend the existing practices - some guided by material incentives, some - by career considerations, and some - by zoological fear of losing their jobs. The main argument would be as follows: "our goal is to teach the language, but later on they will be taught over there". This argument is deliberately false. During the three-month training at Goodfellow AFB, nobody would be capable of learning, even in his native language, the vocabulary, forms of military activities, ranks and organization, military slang, abbreviations, etc., but this is a foreign language, and even without training by a native speaker!

There is no "over there"! With full responsibility I claim that a person without the military vocabulary, even with a good knowledge of the target language, will be as useless and helpless in front of the radio interception equipment as a person without any knowledge of the language!

It should be noted that the students who knew something about the military service before the enlistment and rated poorly in our school, became leaders at Goodfellow AFB, whereas brilliant students often sink down to a low level, all the way down to "recycle".

Personally, I am not seeking any special positions or monetary advantages in this matter. My initiative is rooted exclusively in the interests of the U.S. defense and to the disadvantage of the Soviet Union.

I do not ask for or wish any punishment, dismissal or demotion for any of the people disoriented by orders from above.