

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections

This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.

Collection: Matlock, Jack: Files
Folder Title: Matlock Chron July 1983 (1)
Box: 1

To see more digitized collections visit:

<https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library>

To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:

<https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection>

Contact a reference archivist at: reagan.library@nara.gov

Citation Guidelines: <https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing>

National Archives Catalogue: <https://catalog.archives.gov/>

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 3/21/2005

File Folder MATLOCK CHRON JULY 1983 (1/4)

FOIA

F06-114/1

Box Number 1

YARHI-MILO

107

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
5833	MEMO	LTA WITH USSR [1] R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1	1	7/8/1983	B1
5838	CABLE	081027Z JUL 83 [16] R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1	1	7/8/1983	B1
5834	MEMO	MEMO FOR WILLIAM CLARK FROM JACK MATLOCK RE CULTURAL EXCHANGE NEGOTIATIONS WITH USSR [38-40] R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1	3	7/14/1983	B1
5836	MEMO	KIEV AND NEW YORK CONSULATES: TERMS OF REFERENCE [41-42] R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1	2	ND	B1
5839	MEMO	KIEV AND NEW YORK CONSULATES [44-47] R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1	4	ND	B1
5840	MEMO	DEPARTMENT OF STATE DIVISION OF LANGUAGE SERVICES (TRANSLATION) MEMO RE KIEV AND NEW YORK CONSULATES [48-50] R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1	3	10/4/1976	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 3/21/2005

File Folder MATLOCK CHRON JULY 1983

FOIA

F06-114/1

Box Number 1

YARHI-MILO

107

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
5841	MEMO	DEPARTMENT OF STATE DIVISON OF LANGUAGE SERVICES (TRANSLATION) MEMO RE KIEV AND NEW YORK CONSULATES [51-52] R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1	2	11/9/1976	B1
5842	MEMO	SAME TEXT WRITTEN IN RUSSIAN LANGUAGE AS DOC#5841 [53-54] R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1	2	11/9/1976	B1
5843	MEMO	DEPARTMENT OF STATE DIVISON OF LANGUAGE SERVICES (TRANSLATION) MEMO RE KIEV AND NEW YORK CONSULATES [55-56] R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1	2	11/19/1976	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

July 8, 1983

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TO: DOUG MCMINN
FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JGM*
SUBJECT: LTA with Soviet Union
8304439

In regard to Lighthizer's report of the second round with the Soviets, it seems to me that the Soviets are playing a bit of hard ball on the assumption that domestic pressures will force us to agree to another LTA on their terms. I hope we can stand firm, even in the face of a good Soviet crop this year (which, of course, would strengthen their hand). I would consider another one-year renewal preferable to locking us into the 6-8 million range over the next five years. Agriculture may not agree, but it seems to me that we have a good chance to get a significantly higher commitment if we hold out, and that if we cannot, we lose nothing by extending the agreement for another year.

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

NLRR FOI-114/1 #5833
BY CW NARA DATE 11/27/07

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

July 8, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Notes on Proposed Presidential Letter
(re Abshire)

In my view, these are all very important tasks, and the Ambassador to NATO is in the best position to play a key role in them. To avoid the appearance of giving the Ambassador to NATO a supervisory role over some of his colleagues, however, a few of the points might need to be reworded slightly. For example:

1. Membership in START delegation should be done only with Ambassador Rowny's approval. In addition, there is a further consideration which should be weighed: members of the delegation are limited in what they can say publicly on the negotiations because of the rule of confidentiality. While being a formal member of the delegation might facilitate Abshire's ability to brief the allies confidentially, it also might impinge on his freedom to speak publicly on START issues, and we should be sure that the trade-off is justified.

Finally, the question may arise as to why he should be a member of the START delegation, but not a member of the INF and MBFR delegations. To put him on all three would overload the circuit (his, at least!), but we should be sure of the rationale for singling out START.

2. In point 5, add at beginning, "In cooperation with our Ambassadors to the EC and the OECD..." Since they have the primary responsibility for the economic issues, their role in this effort should be acknowledged.

3. Similarly, in point 6, add "In cooperation with the Ambassador to the IAEA..."

4. Finally, since Abshire will be reporting directly to State, it might be well to consult Larry Eagleburger on the text before it goes to the President for signature.

cc: Don Fortier

7/6/83

NOTES ON PROPOSED PRESIDENTIAL LETTER

(from conversations between Bud McFarlane and Dave Abshire, subsequently discussed with Judge Clark)

Roles for U.S. Ambassador to NATO in addition to regular designated duties as Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council:

1. Serve as member (delegate-at-large) of START delegation -- thus affording a link between NAC and START. This role demonstrates President Reagan's commitment to the consultative process between the United States and NAC in strategic and arms control matters.
2. Serve as special advisor from Europe on evolving NATO country attitudes and on better communication of U.S. policies, programs and aspirations in Europe. Have a coordinating role with other U.S. Ambassadors in Europe in developing such an overall analysis.
3. Undertake special efforts to accelerate developments toward armaments cooperation, thereby enhancing military effectiveness and providing more common defense per investment.
4. In follow up to the Williamsburg Summit's statement about the indivisibility of global security, seek ways to improve Alliance understanding of the relationship between area issues and NATO.
5. Seek ways to better relate military and economic problems, whether burdensharing, east-west trade, technology transfer, etc. Work to move NATO toward the original intention of the Treaty in bettering economic collaboration. (Article 2)
6. Undertake special efforts with NATO countries on the necessity for full compliance with safeguards in accord with the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
7. Maintain close Congressional consultations on NATO matters and encourage Parliamentary interaction toward building broad political support -- bipartisan and bigenerational -- for the alliances of democracy.

Do not
Jack Mabolock
3.
You will
Bud
(7/7/83)

4

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

July 11, 1983


Dear Ms. Finder:

Thank you for your letter of June 9 concerning your interest in a position on the National Security Council staff. Unfortunately, there are no openings at present, but I appreciate your interest.

Should you be interested in the Foreign Service as a career, you can receive information about the examination process from the Board of Examiners for the Foreign Service, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,



Jack F. Matlock

Ms. Susan A. Finder
51 Patroon Place
Loudonville, New York 12211

51 Patroon Place
Loudonville, NY 12211
June 9, 1983

Ambassador Jack F. Matlock
American Embassy Prague
APO New York 09757

Dear Ambassador Matlock:

I would like to be considered for a position on your staff at the National Security Council. I am a 1976 graduate of Yale College, where I majored in Russian Studies. At Harvard Law School, from which I graduated in 1979, I studied Soviet law with Professor Harold Berman. Most recently, I spent a year in Moscow as an IREX scholar at the Institute of State and Law, USSR Academy of Sciences. I have some familiarity with Chinese affairs as well, having studied Chinese at Yale and Chinese law at Harvard Law School.

Enclosed is a copy of my resume. I would be pleased to go to Washington to meet with you, at your convenience. Thank you for your consideration.

Yours sincerely,


Susan A. Finder

6

SUSAN A. FINDER
51 Patroon Place
Loudonville, New York 12211
(518) 434-6914

Education:

- 1976-79 Harvard Law School, Cambridge, Mass., J.D.
Harvard International Law Journal, Projects Editor.
Women's Law Association, Coordinating Council member.
- 1972-76 Yale College, New Haven, Conn., B.A.
Cum laude, with departmental honors in Russian
Studies. Additional concentration in Chinese Studies.

Legal experience:

- 1981-82 Research exchange scholar, Moscow, USSR.
Researched Soviet environmental law under the
auspices of the scholarly exchange between the
Soviet Union and the United States. Was affiliated
with the USSR Academy of Sciences, Institute of
State and Law.
- 1980-81 Environmental Protection Agency, Washington, D.C.
Attorney-advisor. Legal research and writing on
questions of administrative and environmental law.
- 1979 Greater Boston Elderly Legal Services, Boston, Mass.
Intern. General representation of clients, including
the argument of a Supplemental Security Income
appeal before an administrative law judge.
- 1978 Department of the Treasury, Office of the Assistant
General Counsel for International Affairs, Washington,
D.C. Law clerk. Legal research on questions of
administrative and international law.
- 1977 Kirkwood, Kaplan, Russin and Vecchi, Washington, D.C.
Law clerk. General legal research and writing.

Admitted to the District of Columbia Bar, 1979.

Publication:

Legal Regulation of Agricultural Private Enterprise
in the People's Republic of China and the Soviet
Union, 6 Review of Socialist Law 343-72 (1980).

Languages:

Mandarin Chinese and Russian.

Personal:

Born: February 2, 1955.

References:

Available upon request.

1 C

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

July 11, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Invitations to Participate in Ditchley Conference and to Speak at Council on Foreign Relations in New York

I have received an invitation to participate in a conference in England in October sponsored by the Ditchley Foundations (letter and terms of references at Tab A). The conference will deal with "The Assertion of National Identity in Eastern Europe," will be chaired by Fitzroy MacLean, and will involve 25-30 persons from the U.S., U.K., and continental Europe. Accommodation at the conference is provided, but participants must pay their international travel.

While I am not at all eager to add to my already heavy travel schedule, it seems to me that the prestige of the conference and the subject dealt with (clearly relevant to our democratization efforts and to my recent experience) would make my participation desirable. It is scheduled for a long weekend (October 21-23), which would minimize time away from the office. Round-trip travel to London would have to be provided, however.

I have also received an invitation to speak off the record on U.S.-Soviet relations to the Council on Foreign Relations in New York sometime this fall (Tab B). Inasmuch as an appearance before the Council could be used to improve understanding of our current policies, yet not run the risk of misleading press coverage, I think it might be useful to accept in principle, with the precise date to be determined later. Obviously, any remarks I would make would be cleared in appropriate fashion beforehand.

RECOMMENDATION

That I accept the invitation to attend the Ditchley conference and that travel be authorized.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

That I accept in principle the invitation to speak at CFR this fall.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

THE AMERICAN DITCHLEY FOUNDATION

477 Madison Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10022
Phone (212) 752-6515
Telex 236554 Cable Address: MURDENCO

Honorary Directors

George S. Franklin, Jr.
Henry J. Heinz, II, KBE
Louis B. Warren, CBE

Officers and Directors

Cyrus R. Vance
Chairman

Kingman Brewster
Vice Chairman

Hoyt Ammidon, CBE
President

Keith Highet
Vice President

J. G. Clarke
Treasurer

John Brademas
Mrs. Anne Cox Chambers

Sir Patrick Dean, GCMG
Robert G. Engel

Douglas Fairbanks, Jr.

Richard N. Gardner

Mrs. Rita E. Hauser

Sir Reginald Hibbert, GCMG

Lord Hunt of Tanworth, GCB

Philip M. Kaiser

William F. May

Dr. Elizabeth J. McCormack

Donald F. McHenry

Peter S. Paine, Jr.

Elliot Richardson

Dr. Donna E. Shalala

Stephen Stamas

Mrs. Ronald Tree

Sir H.D.H. Wills, CBE, TD, DL

Paul Guth
Secretary

Charles W. Muller
Administrative Director

Carol S. Arnold
Assistant Secretary

June 30, 1983

The Hon. Jack F. Matlock, Jr.
National Security Council
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

The Ditchley Foundations will hold a conference on "Assertion of National Identity in Eastern Europe: Variants of the Path to Socialism: Where Do They Lead?" October 21-23, 1983 at Ditchley Park, England, and I am writing to ask if you would be available to attend.

The conference chairman will be Sir Fitzroy Hew MacLean, whose diplomatic and military career centered on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The Terms of Reference are enclosed.

In the event that you are not familiar with the Ditchley Foundations, I enclose a descriptive brochure. The meetings are participated in by 25 to 30 distinguished individuals from government, business, labor, and the professions principally from the United Kingdom, the United States, and continental Europe. They take place over a long weekend, beginning late Friday afternoon and ending Sunday afternoon.

If you wish to participate, please let me know and I will advise Sir Reginald Hibbert, Director of British Ditchley. I would appreciate your mailing me a brief biography to be used with the list of participants.

We look forward to having you at Ditchley Park.

Sincerely,

7/8
-- no exp. at Ditchley
-- pick up at airport
-- no exp. on airfare
Charles W. Muller

THE DITCHLEY FOUNDATIONS

CONFERENCE ON

THE ASSERTION OF NATIONAL IDENTITY IN EASTERN EUROPE:

VARIANTS OF THE PATH TO 'SOCIALISM':

WHERE DO THEY LEAD?

21-23 October, 1983

DRAFT TERMS OF REFERENCE

1. To analyse the longer term significance of modifications to the Soviet Party and Government model in the Eastern European countries; the extent to which the Soviet Union is ready to acquiesce in divergence in economic and social organisation, in matters of foreign policy and defence, and in ideological and cultural matters; and the efficiency or otherwise of the various means of influence which are open to the Soviet Union.
2. To consider the challenge from within the communist movement in Eastern Europe to the authority of the Soviet Communist Party and Government, starting with Yugoslavia and continuing through Albania, GDR, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Romania and Poland; the factors determining success, partial success or failure in the various instances; the relative merits of gradualism (Hungary), and long term brinkmanship (Romania); the close association of Bulgaria; the pitfalls of over rapid change (Czechoslovakia and Poland); the unique nature of the Yugoslav and Albanian experiences; the special and perhaps crucial case of the German Democratic Republic. Current signs of tension between Eastern European countries.
3. To assess the extent to which the Brezhnev doctrine remains valid and the circumstances in which the Soviet Union can apply it or be frustrated in its desire to do so; and whether the existence of the Warsaw Pact and COMECON makes it easier or more difficult for the Soviet Union to discipline the Eastern European countries.

4. To assess whether there is a link between internal evolution in the Eastern countries and the level of East/West tension; and the effect and importance in Eastern Europe of the Helsinki Final Act.

5. To examine the Yugoslav experience in evolving a socialist system suited to Yugoslav conditions which, while preserving indefinitely the authority and primacy of the Communist Party, makes them more acceptable to the people. The difficulty of doing this elsewhere.

6. Do non-Soviet variants lead away from 'socialism' towards some more plural social and political structure? Which, if any, of the national models pursued in Eastern Europe has staying power? How capable is the Soviet Union of turning back unwelcome change in Eastern Europe?

THE DITCHLEY FOUNDATIONS

CONFERENCE ON

THE ASSERTION OF NATIONAL IDENTITY IN EASTERN EUROPE:

VARIANTS OF THE PATH TO 'SOCIALISM':

WHERE TO THEY LEAD?

21-23 October, 1983

OUTLINE PROGRAMME AND AGENDA

Friday, October 21

4.00 p.m.

Assemble. (Recommended train leaves London (Paddington) at 2.15 p.m., arrives Oxford Station at 3.15 p.m. and will be met.)

4.30-6.00 p.m.

Session I.

Short five-minute presentations on the differences achieved by each of the Eastern European states in modifying Soviet practice and evading or defying Soviet control: GDR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Albania.

Comments, criticism and elaborations of these presentations.

6.15-7.30 p.m.

Session II.

The view from Moscow: the control instruments available to the Soviet Union and their relative effectiveness; the presence in some countries of Soviet forces; inter-Party consultation; ideology and culture; the Warsaw Pact; the bilateral treaty structure; COMECON; Soviet trade practices; Soviet energy and raw material resources; the Soviet market for manufactured products. Do the leaderships of the Eastern European countries have an interest in greater independence from Moscow? What instruments do they have for enlarging their freedom of manoeuvre? How

far if at all can they harness popular feeling to this end? The rôle of economic difficulties and burdens as corrosive agents on the Soviet system in Eastern Europe. The hiatus between economic and political change: can it be overcome?

7.30 p.m.

Formation of Groups.

Saturday, October 22

9.30-11.00 a.m.

11.15 am-12.45 pm

4.30-6.00 p.m.

Group Discussions with the following terms of reference:

Group A

The economic factors at work in Eastern Europe. The extent of the benefits and burdens accruing to the Soviet Union from its economic stake in Eastern Europe, particularly now that the terms of trade for Eastern European countries have been reversed. What is the likely evolution of the economic and social structures in Eastern Europe and in what timescale? What are the external forces which will affect this evolution?

Group B

The rôle of 'national' interest in Eastern Europe. The lessons of the Yugoslav, Romanian, Polish, Hungarian and (Albanian) experiences. The significance of the current apparent lack of movement in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and the GDR. How far are personal elements decisive in 'national' communist leadership? Can successors hold and consolidate what has been gained? The nature of the Party as a conservative instrument of power. Can it be an instrument of evolution (as in Czechoslovakia in 1968)?

Group C

The ideological, security and military factors. What now provides a sense of direction in Eastern Europe? Ambiguities resulting from resistance to Soviet authority on the one hand and acceptance of membership of the Soviet Bloc on the other. The Party and security apparatuses and the armed forces (officer corps) of the Eastern European states as instruments for and against the Soviet Union. The extent to which change in Eastern Europe depends ultimately on change in the Soviet Union.

Before dinner

Group Chairmen and Rapporteurs prepare speaking notes for oral presentation of reports to the conference.

Sunday, October 23

9.30-10.30 a.m.

Session III

Presentation and discussion of Group A's report.

10.35-11.35 a.m.

Session IV

Presentation and discussion of Group B's report.

11.50 am-12.50 pm

Session V

Presentation and discussion of Group C's report.

2.30-4.00 p.m.

Session VI

Final debate.

Departure Train - Sunday

Transport will leave Ditchley for Oxford Station at:

4.35 p.m.

to catch the 5.30 p.m. train to London (Paddington) due at 6.38 p.m.

Note 1: Arrangements can be made for members catching a Monday morning flight to stay at an hotel near the Airport.

Note 2: Dinner Jackets are worn optionally on Saturday evening; those who can conveniently bring them do so, but dark suits are perfectly in order.

M
22.36

⊕
121196 AMEM C
239852 CFR UR


TO: THE HONORABLE JACK F. MATLOCK
AMBASSADOR OF THE U.S. TO CZECHOSLOVAKIA
U.S. EMBASSY
PRAGUE

ON BEHALF OF THE COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, I WOULD LIKE TO CONGRATULATE YOU ON YOUR NEW APPOINTMENT AND INVITE YOU TO SPEAK AT A MEETING IN YOUR HONOR HERE AT THE COUNCIL IN NEW YORK.

AS YOU MAY KNOW, THE COUNCIL IS A PRIVATE, NON-PARTISAN ORGANIZATION DEVOTED TO THE DISCUSSION OF FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS. MEMBERS ARE LEADERS IN GOVERNMENT, BUSINESS, MEDIA AND ACADEMIA WHO WOULD APPRECIATE THE OPPORTUNITY TO HEAR YOUR VIEWS ON U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS. THE SPECIFIC TOPIC WOULD, OF COURSE, BE UP TO YOU. YOUR REMARKS MAY BE INFORMAL AND 15-20 MINUTES IN LENGTH, LEAVING AMPLE TIME FOR QUESTIONS AND DISCUSSION. ALL PROCEEDINGS ARE, BY COUNCIL TRADITION, OFF-THE-RECORD.

SHOULD YOU ACCEPT OUR INVITATION IN PRINCIPLE, I AM CERTAIN WE CAN ARRANGE A MUTUALLY CONVENIENT DATE. AS WE ARE CURRENTLY PLANNING OUR FALL SCHEDULE, I LOOK FORWARD TO HEARING FROM YOU SOONEST, AND TO THE PLEASURE OF WELCOMING YOU TO THE COUNCIL IN THE FUTURE.

SINCERELY,
MARGARET OSMER-MCQUADE
DIRECTOR OF PROGRAMS
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
TELEX: 239852 CFR UR



:CT
⊕
121196 AMEM C

.....
ABOVE VIA RCA FROM 239852 CFR URM

15
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

11 Jul 83

Requested by Matlock

CONFIDENTIAL

16

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
MESSAGE CENTER

PAGE 01 PRAGUE 3124 DTG: 081027Z JUL 83 PSN: 041565
EOB720 AN007992 TOR: 192/1448Z CSN: HCE396

WAS "ORGNICALLY LINKED" TO THE WORLD PEACE ASSEMBLY"
WHICH NATO GOVERNMENTS CONSIDERED BIASED AND ONE-SIDED.

DISTRIBUTION: STER-01 MYER-01 DOBR-01 LENC-01 MAT-01
/005 A3

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:
SIT:
EOB:

4. PERHAPS THE MOST INTERESTING AND INSTRUCTIVE COMMENT
GLEANED FROM RECENT NATO CONVERSATIONS WITH GOC OFFICIALS
ON THIS MATTER HAS COME FROM MFA CHIEF OF PROTOCOL
TUCEK, WHO APPROACHED THE SPANISH AMBASSADOR TO TELL
HIM THAT THE PRESIDENT'S OFFICE HAD REQUESTED A LIST OF
ALL AMBASSADORS WHO HAD NOT EEN PRESENT AT THE JUNE 26
RECEPTION. TUCEK FURTHER INDICATED TO THE SPANISH
(PLEASE PROTECT) THAT IN HIS RESPONSE HE HAD NOT REPEAT
NOT INCLUDED EITHER THE SPANISH AMBASSADOR, OR THE GREEK
AMBASSADOR, THEREBY LEAVING THE IMPRESSION THAT THEY DID
ATTEND WHEN IN FACT THEY DID NOT. HAVING CONFIRMED THE
FACT THAT HE (AND OTHERS HERE) COMMONLY REPORT WHAT THEY
FEEL THEIR BOSSES WANT TO HEAR, RATHER THAN REALITY, TUCEK
TURNED AND DEPARTED WITHOUT GIVING THE SPANISH AMBASSADOR
A CHANCE TO RESPOND. CONNEL
BT

ROUTINE
VSK583 510 STU0448
DE RUDKRP #3124 1891225
R 081027Z JUL 83
FM AMEMBASSY PRAGUE

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1377

INFO AMEMBASSY BELGRADE 4152
AMEMBASSY BERLIN 2045
AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST 4611
AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST 4928
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 4999
AMEMBASSY SOFIA 4170
AMEMBASSY WARSAW 5031
AMEMBASSY MADRID 295
AMEMBASSY ATHENS 289
USMISSION USNATO 2156

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ PRAGUE 3124

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PROP, CZ
SUBJ: WORLD PEACE ASSEMBLY: PROTOCOL MATTERS

1. ~~(C)~~ ENTIRE TEXT.
2. IN ADDITION TO GOC IRE OVER WESTERN REPORTING (OR NON-REPORTING) OF THE JUNE 21-26 WORLD ASSEMBLY FOR PEACE AND LIFE, AGAINST NUCLEAR WAR, AN ADDITIONAL RAW NERVE APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN STRUCK BY THE UNANIMOUS REFUSAL OF NATO AMBASSADORS HERE TO ATTEND PRESIDENT HUSAK'S JUNE 26 CLOSING RECEPTION. ALTHOUGH THERE WAS SOME INITIAL EQUIVOCATION ON THE PART OF SOME OF THE LOCAL NATO AMBASSADORS, UNANIMITY WAS FINALLY ACHIEVED AND A TOTAL BOYCOTT DID OCCUR. IT DID NOT GO UNNOTICED AND MFA PROTOCOL AND OTHER OFFICIALS HAVE BEEN APPROACHING VARIOUS NATO AMBASSADORS ASKING HOW AND WHY THEY COULD REFUSE A PRESIDENTIAL INVITATION.
2. THE MOST INTENSE GRILLING WAS APPARENTLY GIVEN TO THE NORWEGIAN AMBASSADOR, JUST PRIOR TO THE PRESIDENTIAL RECEPTION, BY DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTERS JOHANES AND NAROZNY WHO EXPRESSED SHOCK AT SUCH AN "INSULT" WHICH THEY CONSIDERED A "GRAVE MATTER, THE CONSEQUENCES OF WHICH WOULD HAVE TO BE EVALUATED." ACCORDING TO OTHER REPORTS, SOME MFA PROTOCOL OFFICIALS WERE HINTING DARKLY THAT NATO AMBASSADORS WOULD NO LONGER BE INCLUDED IN SUCH ANNUAL MFA EXCURSIONS AS VISITS TO COOPERATIVES, HUNTS OR FISHING TRIPS. OFFICIALS ARE APPARENTLY ALSO CONVINCED THAT THIS WAS A "LOCAL DECISION" INFLUENCED, TO QUOTE ONE OFFICIAL, "BY A MAN WHO IS NO LONGER HERE," I.E. AMBASSADOR MATLOCK. IN ALL CASES THAT WE KNOW OF THE RESPONSE TO THIS LINE OF QUESTIONING AND ASSERTION WAS THAT THE DECISION NOT TO ATTEND WAS NOT A LOCAL DECISION, BUT A NATIONAL ONE, AND THAT IT WAS BASED UPON THE CLEAR INDICATION IN THE INVITATION THAT THE RECEPTION

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 06-14/1 #5838

BY CI NARA DATE 11/27/07

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

July 13, 1983

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *gm*

SUBJECT: Appointment Request for Solzhenitsyn

Walter Annenberg has written the President to call his attention to an article in the Wall Street Journal on Alexander Solzhenitsyn. He suggests that there may come a time when it would be advantageous to invite Solzhenitsyn to lunch at the White House. The article is an interesting one and worth reading. As for inviting Solzhenitsyn, I feel that this is an option we should keep open for the future, but that now is not an appropriate time for the following reasons:

- Solzhenitsyn represents only one strain of anti-Soviet emigre thinking, which is at considerable variance with that of Sakharov, for example. A meeting at the White House would not be universally welcomed by anti-Soviet emigres and even could be seen as a gratuitous slap at Sakharov following his courageous and very helpful article in Foreign Affairs.
- Solzhenitsyn refused an invitation last year to attend on May 11 both a lunch and a subsequent private meeting with the President at the White House. While he would probably accept an invitation to meet with the President alone, the fact remains that he has passed up a previous opportunity for a meeting.
- A meeting at this time would be interpreted by some segments of U.S. and allied public opinion as running counter to our desire for negotiations with the Soviet Union.

At Tab I is a memorandum from you to Fred Ryan recommending against inviting Solzhenitsyn to lunch at the White House at this time but pointing out that this is an option that we should keep open for the future.

TD Paula Dobriansky, Peter Sommer, and *TWC* Ty Cobb concur. John Lenczowski believes that a lunch with Solzhenitsyn should be arranged now and will be forwarding his comments to you separately.

RECOMMENDATIONOKNO

—

—

That you send the memo at Tab I to Fred Ryan.

Attachment:

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR FREDERICK J. RYAN, JR.

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

SUBJECT: Lunch with Alexander Solzhenitsyn

With regard to Walter Annenberg's suggestion that Alexander Solzhenitsyn be invited to lunch at the White House, I feel that this is an option we should keep open for the future, but that now is not an appropriate time for the following reasons:

- Solzhenitsyn represents only one strain of anti-Soviet emigre thinking, which is at considerable variance with that of Sakharov, for example. A meeting at the White House would not be universally welcomed by anti-Soviet emigres and even could be seen as a gratuitous slap at Sakharov, following his courageous and very helpful article in Foreign Affairs.
- Solzhenitsyn refused an invitation last year to attend on May 11 both a lunch and a subsequent private meeting with the President at the White House. While he would probably accept an invitation to meet with the President alone, the fact remains that he has passed up a previous opportunity for a meeting.
- A meeting at this time would be interpreted by some segments of U.S. and allied public opinion as running counter to our desire for negotiations with the Soviet Union.

Matlock 19

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

RCM HAS SEEN

July 13, 1983

RCM:

Attached is Matlock's response to your note.

Matlock called to indicate that there is now some urgency on this given developments on the Hill.

He needs to speak with you ASAP (hopefully before a scheduled event at 11:30 on the Hill).

Wilma

11:20 am
Per RCM, you (matlock)
should go see
at Hill
right
away.
Wil

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

7-11-83

Please run by Clehman.

BK

Bob,
 Jack Matlock is very
 persuasive and I agree
 that if the proposal is sup-
 ported it should only be on
 the basis of offers.
 In sum though I agree
 with de Keel it is in the "nice
 to have" category Chris L.

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

July 11, 1983

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: HR 601, the Soviet-East European Research and Training Act of 1983

REF: Mr. Keel's memorandum of July 1, 1983

My views, in brief, are the following:

-- Personnel and infrastructure for training and research in the Soviet and East European area have suffered serious erosion over the past few years and we face a crisis in maintaining an adequate private sector capacity.

-- It is clearly in the national interest to preserve for the future a strong training and research program, not merely to insure an adequate flow of trained specialists for government service, but also to insure wider public knowledge of our principal adversary and thus bolster our public diplomacy efforts.

-- Private funding, while improving slightly of late, is inadequate to do the job alone.

-- The proposed legislation might benefit from fine-tuning--and indeed there may be alternate approaches to achieve the same end--but unless the Executive Branch can agree promptly on a better approach and present a viable alternative to the Congress, it seems preferable to support the Congressional proposal.

-- To insure a sustained, well-planned effort, a "trust fund" approach has many advantages. It might well start at a lower figure, however (e.g., \$20-25 Million).

-- Since this is an effort in the broad national interest, budget offsets should not be sought from a single department, but from a combination of those whose interests are served by it (State, Defense, USIA, CIA and--not least--Education and the National Endowment for the Humanities).

-- OMB should be encouraged to take the lead in putting together a "package" of offsets to bring this funding within the budget ceiling, with the Department of Education sharing the burden with the foreign affairs agencies.

A more detailed exposition of my thoughts on the subject is attached.

RECOMMENDATION

That I discuss informally along these lines with OMB.

Approve REM Disapprove _____

That I discuss informally with Hamilton (the Congressional sponsor) to obtain his view regarding possible offsets and variants (e.g., lower funding initially).

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

subject to OMB agreement

D
23

RESEARCH AND TRAINING ON
THE SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE
(HR 601)

The Problem: Following the launching of sputnik in 1956 and the National Defense Education Act which followed it, area and language studies, including notably those related to the USSR and Eastern Europe, were greatly expanded and with very substantial results. By the early seventies we had developed a strong base and the academic community produced many research studies of direct usefulness to the government (for example, techniques for analyzing Soviet national income, psychological profiles of Soviet citizens--based on emigre interviews, analyses of Soviet decision-making processes, and many case studies of Soviet activities in the "Third World").

During the seventies, however, this base suffered serious erosion. The following factors were relevant:

-- The "post-Vietnam" syndrome, including a turning inward by many young people. Enrollments in Russian language, for example, dropped to less than half of the peak reached in the 60's.

-- End of the NDEA coincided with the phasing out of much Foundation funding, itself increasingly directed to domestic concerns.

-- The combination of low enrollments and financial stringency caused many universities to cut back on support for Soviet and East European area studies. The recent termination of Georgetown's PhD program in Soviet studies is but the latest in a series of such actions.

While the productivity of scholars already trained and in place masks these trends, inroads in our training capacity have reached proportions which are truly alarming for the national interest in the future. It takes many years to develop research centers and to train specialists; if something is not done now to stem the erosion, we shall be sorely lacking in needed expertise in the 1990's. And if we wait until then, it will take another ten years or so to build it up again.

The Federal Government Interest

One of the reasons it has been difficult to focus the attention of the bureaucracy on this growing problem is that the question is usually posed in narrow terms. Specifically, agencies have been asked if they can still recruit a sufficient number of specialists to meet their personnel needs. The answer is normally yes, and many then assume that cries of alarm are unfounded. But this is not the key question, because government agencies hire very few young specialists, and if we ever reach the point that we cannot find those limited numbers, then this

will only confirm that relevant training facilities have already collapsed.

There is another reason for not basing our judgment entirely on the potential pool of recruits for government service. In our democracy we can only sustain an effective foreign policy if familiarity with our adversaries is widely spread among the population, particularly among influential citizens. Nothing contributes more to a basic understanding of what is at stake in defending our values and our way of life, and of the need for firmness, than a close study of the Soviet Union. While relatively few Americans will ever specialize in Soviet studies, the existence of area study centers at universities throughout the U.S. facilitates a healthy input of facts and realism into the stream of public opinion formation.

Finally, the research efforts of scholars are of frequent and direct utility to policy makers. Not being burdened by the need to make day-to-day operational decisions, scholars can often take a longer and more detached view of developments and bring important insights to bear that might otherwise be clouded by a preoccupation with short-term problems. And the existence of competent, well-informed private researchers provides some insurance against "group thinking" inside a bureaucracy. Remember the "Team B" intelligence analysis--something which would not have been possible if all the expertise were concentrated within the government.

Is Federal Funding the Answer?

I wish it weren't, but practically speaking I see no other source of funding which will be adequate to the task. Not that private money is totally absent--the universities still commit considerable resources, the Harriman gift will strengthen things at Columbia, and government research funds help keep the think tanks afloat--but this is not sufficient to maintain a strong overall base. And whereas other area studies can benefit from corporate donations and even support from governments of the countries in question (Arab money for chairs in ME studies, for example), neither is feasible for Soviet studies.

The Congressional Proposal: HR 601: This is the first concrete proposal, to my knowledge, which addresses the overall problem which we face. I am not in a position to pass judgment on its details--it clearly represents only one way to go, and there may well be others--but I am convinced that something like it is necessary, and necessary very soon. Unless the Executive Branch can gear up to produce very quickly an alternate--and I doubt that we can--I think that we should go with the bird in hand. If we detect any glaring deficiencies, we should of course try to get them corrected, but my initial impression is that it is a workable approach, although it might be desirable to spell out more specifically how the "trust fund" will work and provide more specifics as to how it would be managed.

25

While OMB is dubious about the multi-year funding aspects of the "trust fund" approach, I believe that this is justified in this instance, since we need to address a long-term problem, and erratic levels of annual funding would simply be a waste of money. The field needs predictable and steady--even if modest--support if the funds are to be used effectively.

That said, I am not certain that a \$50 million fund is necessary from the very beginning. It will take some time to plan expenditures and to obligate the funds wisely. One might consider as an alternative, an initial allocation of \$20-25 million, with the possibility of adding a like amount after a year or two, if the initial experience justifies it. A staged approach would also reduce the offset problem, facilitate course corrections in light of experience, and meet some of the concerns for future oversight.

As for the offsets required to stay within budget ceilings, I think it is clear that these should not be the burden of a single agency of the government. The need and potential benefits are quite general and each individual agency can argue logically that it has higher priorities. They will also resist reducing their own budgets to provide money for someone else. From their parochial points of view, they are doubtless right. Yet I believe this effort represents a fairly high national priority, and our task is to find a way to accommodate this to responsible fiscal planning.



EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

July 1, 1983

E
C Lehman
J Matlock
P. Sommer
our views
Burd
20

REVEN

Burd

AL

MEMORANDUM FOR: Robert C. McFarlane
Deputy Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

FROM: Alton G. Keel Jr.
Associate Director for National Security and
International Affairs

SUBJECT: H.R. 601, the Soviet-Eastern European
Research and Training Act of 1983

I am writing to seek your views and assistance in formulating a coherent Executive Branch position on H.R. 601, which would authorize a \$50 million endowment to support U.S. education and research on Soviet and Eastern European Affairs. On April 29, we returned to the State Department their proposed draft of a letter to the Congress supporting the bill. At that time we indicated OMB concerns about H.R. 601 and requested further information and justification. As yet we have received no reply and, in spite of a staff level meeting on May 25, no progress has been made in developing an Executive Branch position. Congressional consideration of the bill is proceeding without Executive Branch views.

Our concerns about the bill are threefold:

1. No adequate justification of the need for this new Federal activity has been provided by the Department. There has been no specification of the deficiencies in numbers or types of people or kinds of research that may exist. To the contrary there is some evidence that State has considerably more qualified applicants than it needs in the area of Eastern European studies. Moreover, it appears that private sector fund raising activities may finance any needed enhancements of university programs related to Eastern Europe.
2. To fund the bill as drafted would require \$50 million in budget authority beyond what has been requested by the President. As you know, the Administration has serious problems with the excessive funding levels contained in a number of the 1984 appropriation bills,

already reported or passed in the Congress. We have asked State to identify budget offsets that would make this additional request acceptable, but the Department has failed to respond.

- 3. The administrative provisions of the bill are not appropriate. No Federal agency is made responsible for the program and, therefore, adequate Federal financial oversight is lacking. Furthermore, a trust fund is not the appropriate funding mechanism, because no "trust" relationship would exist under the bill. Annual appropriations subject to Presidential review and congressional enactment are more appropriate.

On the basis of the above concerns, we are inclined to oppose the bill as it is presently drafted. However, we are aware that Judge Clark and some NSC staff members are particularly interested in it. We would appreciate your views on how the bill might be improved. Perhaps an annually appropriated research grant program under State's INR bureau would accomplish the same ends with significantly smaller first year costs.

Bob -

Frankly, this looks like a "nice-to-have", but low priority item in State. Private funding effort is preferred approach and apparently is on-going. It's tough to justify given other Foreign Assistance items which are highly unneeded

Also, how much do we we have to survive in Congressional initiatives -- doesn't seem to be buying us much. Maybe we should learn to say "no" - Appreciate your views

98TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. R. 601

To help ensure the Nation's independent factual knowledge of the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries, to help maintain the national capability for advanced research and training on which that knowledge depends, and to provide partial financial support for national programs to serve both purposes.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JANUARY 6, 1983

Mr. HAMILTON (for himself and Mr. SIMON) introduced the following bill; which was referred jointly to the Committees on Foreign Affairs and Education and Labor

A BILL

To help ensure the Nation's independent factual knowledge of the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries, to help maintain the national capability for advanced research and training on which that knowledge depends, and to provide partial financial support for national programs to serve both purposes.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 SHORT TITLE

4 SECTION 1. This Act may be cited as the "Soviet-East-
5 ern European Research and Training Act of 1983".

29

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

FINDINGS AND DECLARATIONS

SEC. 2. The Congress finds and declares that—

(1) factual knowledge, independently verified, about the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries is of the utmost importance for the national security of the United States, for the furtherance of our national interests in the conduct of foreign relations, and for the prudent management of our domestic affairs;

(2) the development and maintenance of knowledge about the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries depends upon the national capability for advanced research by highly trained and experienced specialists, available for service in and out of Government;

(3) certain essential functions are necessary to ensure the existence of that knowledge and the capability to sustain it, including—

(A) graduate training;

(B) advanced research;

(C) public dissemination of research data, methods, and findings;

(D) contact and collaboration among Government and private specialists and the facilitation of research based on the extensive data holdings of the United States Government; and

1 (E) firsthand experience of the Soviet Union
 2 and Eastern European countries by American
 3 specialists including onsite conduct of advanced
 4 training and research to the extent practicable;

5 (4) three existing institutions already organized to
 6 conduct the functions described in this section on a na-
 7 tional scale are the National Council for Soviet and
 8 East European Research, the Woodrow Wilson Inter-
 9 national Center for Scholars, and the International Re-
 10 search and Exchanges Board of the American Council
 11 of Learned Societies; and

12 (5) it is in the national interest for the United
 13 States Government to provide a stable source of finan-
 14 cial support for the functions described in this section
 15 and to supplement the financial support for those func-
 16 tions which is currently being furnished by Federal,
 17 local, State, regional, and private agencies, organiza-
 18 tions, and individuals, and thereby to stabilize the con-
 19 duct of these functions on a national scale, consistently,
 20 and on a long range basis.

21 DEFINITIONS

22 SEC. 3. As used in this Act—

23 (1) the term "Board" means the International Re-
 24 search and Exchanges Board organized in 1968 by the

1 American Council of Learned Societies and the Social
2 Science Research Council;

3 (2) the term "Center" means the Woodrow
4 Wilson International Center for Scholars of the Smith-
5 sonian Institution;

6 (3) the term "Fund" means the Soviet-Eastern
7 European Research and Training Fund established by
8 section 4;

9 (4) the term "institution of higher education" has
10 the same meaning given such term in section 1201(a)
11 of the Higher Education Act of 1965;

12 (5) the term "National Council" means the Na-
13 tional Council for Soviet and East European Research,
14 a not-for-profit corporation organized under the laws of
15 the District of Columbia in 1978; and

16 (6) the term "Secretary" means the Secretary of
17 the Treasury.

18 ESTABLISHMENT OF THE SOVIET-EASTERN EUROPEAN
19 RESEARCH AND TRAINING FUND

20 SEC. 4. There is established in the Treasury of the
21 United States a trust fund to be known as the Soviet-Eastern
22 European Research and Training Fund. The Fund shall con-
23 sist of—

24 (1) amounts appropriated to it under section 5;
25 and

1 (2) interest and proceeds credited to it under sec-
2 tion (8)(c).

3 AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE FUND

4 SEC. 5. Effective October 1, 1983, there are authorized
5 to be appropriated to the Fund, without fiscal year limitation,
6 \$50,000,000.

7 USES OF PAYMENTS FROM THE FUND

8 SEC. 6. (a) The interest on any obligations held in the
9 Fund shall be available for payments to the National Council,
10 upon approval of an application in accordance with section 7,
11 for use in accordance with subsection (b).

12 (b)(1) One part of the payments made in each fiscal year
13 shall be used by the National Council—

14 (A) in consultation with officials of the United
15 States Government designated by the Secretary of
16 State, to develop and keep current a research agenda
17 of fundamental research dealing with major policy
18 issues and questions of Soviet and Eastern European
19 development; and

20 (B) to conduct a national research program at the
21 postdoctoral or equivalent level in accordance with that
22 agenda, such program to include—

23 (i) the dissemination of information about the
24 research program and the solicitation of proposals
25 for research contracts from American institutions

1 of higher education and not-for-profit corporations,
2 which contracts shall contain shared-cost provi-
3 sions; and

4 (ii) the awarding of contracts for such re-
5 search projects as the Board of Trustees of the
6 National Council determines will best serve to
7 carry out the purposes of this Act after reviewing
8 the proposals submitted under clause (i).

9 (2) One part of the payments made in each fiscal year
10 shall be used by the National Council—

11 (A) to establish and carry out a program of gradu-
12 ate, postdoctoral, and teaching fellowships for ad-
13 vanced training in Soviet and Eastern European stud-
14 ies and related studies, such program—

15 (i) to be coordinated with the research pro-
16 gram described in paragraph (1);

17 (ii) to be conducted, on a shared-cost basis,
18 at American institutions of higher education; and

19 (iii) to include—

20 (I) the dissemination of information on
21 the fellowship program and the solicitation of
22 applications for fellowships from qualified in-
23 stitutions of higher education and qualified
24 individuals; and

1 (II) the awarding of such fellowships as
 2 the Board of Trustees of the National Coun-
 3 cil determines will best serve to carry out
 4 the purposes of this Act after reviewing ap-
 5 plications submitted under subclause (I); and

6 (B) to disseminate research, data, and findings on
 7 Soviet and Eastern European studies and related fields
 8 in such a manner and to such extent as the Board of
 9 Trustees of the National Council determines will best
 10 serve to carry out the purposes of this Act.

11 (3) One part of the payments made in each fiscal year to
 12 the National Council shall be used for payments to the
 13 Center—

14 (A) to provide fellowship support and research
 15 facilities in the District of Columbia for American spe-
 16 cialists in the fields of Soviet and Eastern European
 17 studies and related studies to conduct advanced re-
 18 search with particular emphasis upon the use of data
 19 on the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries;
 20 and

21 (B) to conduct seminars, conferences, and other
 22 similar workshops designed to facilitate research col-
 23 laboration between Government and private specialists
 24 in the fields of Soviet and East European studies and
 25 related studies.

1 (4) One part of the payments made in each fiscal year to
 2 the National Council shall be used for payments to the Board
 3 to conduct specialized programs in advanced training and re-
 4 search on a reciprocal basis in the Union of Soviet Socialist
 5 Republics and the countries of Eastern Europe designed to
 6 facilitate access for American specialists to research insti-
 7 tutes, personnel, archives, documentation, and other research
 8 and training resources located in the Union of Soviet Social-
 9 ist Republics and Eastern European countries.

10 APPLICATIONS; PAYMENTS TO THE NATIONAL COUNCIL

11 SEC. 7. (a) The National Council shall prepare and
 12 submit an application to the Secretary once each fiscal year.
 13 Each such application shall—

14 (1) provide a description of the purposes for which
 15 the payments will be used in accordance with section
 16 6; and

17 (2) provide such fiscal control and such accounting
 18 procedures as may be necessary (A) to insure a proper
 19 accounting of Federal funds paid to the National Coun-
 20 cil under this Act, and (B) to insure the verification of
 21 the costs of the continuing education and research pro-
 22 grams conducted by the National Council under this
 23 Act.

24 (b) The Secretary shall expeditiously approve any appli-
 25 cation that meets the requirements of this section.

1 (c)(1) Payments to the National Council under this Act
2 shall be made as soon after approval of the application as
3 practicable.

4 (2) Payments to the National Council under this Act
5 may be made in installments, in advance, or by way of reim-
6 bursement, with necessary adjustments on account of over-
7 payments and underpayments.

8 MANAGEMENT OF THE FUND

9 SEC. 8. (a) It shall be the duty of the Secretary to invest
10 such portion of the Fund as is not, in his judgment, required
11 to meet current withdrawals. Such investments may be made
12 only in interest-bearing obligations of the United States or in
13 obligations guaranteed as to both principal and interest by
14 the United States. For such purpose, such obligations may be
15 acquired on original issue at the issue price or by purchase of
16 outstanding obligations at the market price. The purposes for
17 which obligations of the United States may be issued under
18 the Second Liberty Bond Act are extended to authorize the
19 issuance at par of special obligations exclusively to the Fund.
20 Such special obligations shall bear interest at a rate equal to
21 the average rate of interest, computed as to the end of the
22 calendar month next preceding the date of such issue, borne
23 by all marketable interest-bearing obligations of the United
24 States then forming a part of the public debt; except that
25 where such average rate is not a multiple of one-eighth of 1

1 per centum, the rate of interest of such special obligations
 2 shall be the multiple of one-eighth of 1 per centum next
 3 lower than such average rate. Such special obligations shall
 4 be issued only if the Secretary determines that the purchase
 5 of other interest-bearing obligations of the United States, or
 6 of obligations guaranteed as to both principal and interest by
 7 the United States on original issue or at the market price, is
 8 not in the public interest.

9 (b) Any obligation acquired by the Fund (except special
 10 obligations issued exclusively to the Fund) may be sold by the
 11 Secretary at the market price, and such special obligations
 12 may be redeemed at par plus accrued interest.

13 (c) The interest on, and the proceeds from the sale or
 14 redemption of, any obligations held in the Fund shall be cred-
 15 ited to and form a part of the Fund.

REPORT

16
 17 SEC. 9. The National Council shall prepare and submit
 18 to the President and the Congress at the end of each fiscal
 19 year in which the National Council receives assistance under
 20 this Act a report of the activities of the National Council, and
 21 the activities of the Board and the Center, supported by as-
 22 sistance under this Act, together with such recommendations
 23 as the National Council deems advisable.



MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

July 14, 1983

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*SUBJECT: Terms of Reference for Negotiations with USSR
on Cultural Exchange Agreement and Consulates

Attached are the terms of reference submitted by State for planning negotiations with the Soviets on the cultural exchanges agreement and consulates. Restricted interagency meetings are planned to develop a detailed negotiating strategy and coordinated strategy papers are promised on July 27.

As for negotiating modalities, State suggests that the exchange agreement be negotiated in Moscow by Ambassador Hartman, supported by his PAO and a team from Washington. The opening of consulates would be negotiated in normal diplomatic channels.

We do not yet have an official reply from the Soviets on our proposal for negotiations, but State anticipates that they will accept our proposal and Soviet Embassy officials have indicated that they may have an official reply on July 15.

The terms of reference, while general, appear to be sound pending elaboration of detailed negotiating positions. The latter, of course, should be reviewed carefully when they are submitted. As for the timing, it seems to me that July 27 is adequate, given the fact that it will take several weeks to arrange for negotiations after we have the official reply from the Soviets. The date proposed should not be allowed to slip, however, so that we will have adequate time to review the negotiating plans.

Paula Dobriansky and John Lenczowski concur.

Attachment:

Tab I Terms of Reference

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR P06-114/ 75834

BY OW NARA DATE 11/27/07

301

~~SECRET~~

US-USSR Cultural Exchanges Agreement: Terms of Reference

BASIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

- - The President has approved offering the Soviets negotiation of a cultural exchanges agreement. Secretary Shultz conveyed this to Ambassador Dobrynin June 18.
- - NSDD-75 provides the policy basis for seeking an agreement "to promote . . . the process of change in the Soviet Union toward a more pluralistic political and economic system . . ." and ". . . to reach agreements which protect and enhance U.S. interests and are consistent with the principle of strict reciprocity and mutual interest."
- - In the absence of an agreement the Soviets are able to do things in the cultural, informational, and ideological areas for which we cannot enforce reciprocity. An agreement would enhance our ability to require reciprocity and add to our means of ideologically penetrating Soviet society.

SUBSTANCE OF U.S. POSITION

- - A restricted interagency group (State, NSC, USIA, CIA and FBI) has been formed under State chairmanship to develop negotiating strategy. USIA has undertaken to provide, by July 20, the first draft of a strategy paper, which we will want to review together at the next meeting of this group.

~~SECRET~~

40

~~SECRET~~

~~-2-~~

- - The paper will address both long-term issues and problems expected to arise in the negotiations. It will also append an illustrative draft agreement.

NEGOTIATING MODALITIES

- - At this time we plan to conduct the negotiations in Moscow. Ambassador Hartman would head our negotiating team, assisted by the PAO with the interagency group providing back-up.

NEXT STEPS

- - State will forward to the NSC an interagency-cleared strategy paper not later than July 27.

~~SECRET~~

41

~~SECRET~~

Kiev and New York Consulates: Terms of Reference

Basic Policy Considerations

- The President has approved in principle the desirability of establishing new Consulates in Kiev and New York, and Secretary Shultz informed Ambassador Dobrynin of this on June 18.

- NSDD 75 provides the policy framework for this move, noting in particular that the USG should seek "to reach agreements which protect and enhance U.S. interests and are consistent with the principle of strict reciprocity and mutual interest." Also relevant is the original Consulates Agreement (Aide-Memoire of July 3, 1974) and the subsequent exchange of notes between the US and USSR of September 1976 (attached).

- At the time of the suspension in January 1980, we were approximately six months away from completion of the work on the Consulate office building and officially opening our Consulate in Kiev. The absence of a Consulate has deprived us of an important source of intelligence collection and of continuing contacts with important nationality and religious groups in the area. Establishing the Consulate will mark a major new U.S. penetration into this geographically key area which contains the second largest Soviet nationality group.

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/1 75836

~~SECRET~~

BY ON NARA DATE 11/27/07

~~SECRET~~

42

Substance of U.S. Position

-- An interagency group, chaired by State and including NSC, CIA, FBI, USIA and NSA, has been formed to develop our negotiating strategy. State has undertaken to produce by July 20 the first draft of a strategy paper, incorporating the positions of other interested parties, which will form the basis of our negotiations with the Soviets.

-- The paper will include both long-term issues requiring resolution and the following immediate problems associated with sending an Advance Team to Kiev:

- Personnel - number and source of positions required.
- Timing - target date and time needed for training and other preparation;
- Funding - estimation of costs, acquisition of funds, and congressional involvement;
- Technical considerations - housing and office space, logistical support, security factors, and coordination of interagency requirements.

Negotiating Modalities

-- State Department will handle the negotiations through diplomatic channels backstopped by the interagency group.

Next Steps

--State will forward to the NSC an interagency-cleared strategy

Establishment of New Consulates

Taking into consideration the intensive development of ties between the US and the USSR and the importance of further expanding consular relations on the basis of the US-USSR Consular Convention, and desiring to promote trade, tourism and coopera-



tion between them in various areas, both Sides agreed to open additional Consulates General in two or three cities of each country.

As a first step they agreed in principle to the simultaneous establishment of a United States Consulate General in Kiev and a USSR Consulate General in New York. Negotiations for implementation of this agreement will take place at an early date.

* * * * *

Both Sides highly appreciate the frank and constructive atmosphere and fruitful results of the talks held between them in the course of the present meeting. They are convinced that the results represent a new and important milestone along the road of improving relations between the USA and the USSR to the benefit of the peoples of both countries, and a significant contribution to their efforts aimed at strengthening world peace and security.

Having again noted in this connection the exceptional importance and great practical usefulness of US-Soviet summit meetings, both Sides reaffirmed their agreement to hold such meetings regularly and when considered necessary for the discussion and solution of urgent questions. Both Sides also expressed their readiness to continue their active and close contacts and consultations.

The President extended an invitation to General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, L. I. Brezhnev, to pay an official visit to the United States in 1975. This invitation was accepted with pleasure.

July 3, 1974

For the United States
of America;

For the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics:

RICHARD NIXON

L. BREZHNEV

*President of the United
States of America*

*General Secretary of the
Central Committee
of the CPSU*

Sch/108
44

The Department of State refers to the aide memoire of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs of September 2, 1976 and the Embassy's note No. 38 of May 21, 1976 and wishes to communicate the following regarding the establishment of a Consulate General of the United States in Kiev and a Consulate General of the USSR in New York.

The Department is ready to receive a Soviet Advance Party in New York as of September 24, and agrees that the members of this group will be considered as "appointed consular officers and employees" temporarily assigned to the Embassy of the USSR in Washington but carrying out their functions in New York in connection with the preparation for the official opening of the Soviet Consulate General in that city. The Department also agrees that these appointed consular officers, in their capacity of Embassy employees may also be concerned with matters related to the security of Soviet establishments and personnel in New York not connected with the United Nations and may maintain working contacts on these matters with the appropriate U.S. authorities. As is the usual procedure, upon the opening of the Soviet Consulate General in New York, these officers or employees will be recognized as permanent members of the Soviet Consulate General and will receive privileges and immunities in accordance with the US-USSR Consular Convention.

DECLASSIFIED / R E / (A S E D)
NLRR F06-114/1 #5829
BY CW NARA DATE 11/27/07

45

The Department is prepared to agree to the establishment of a Soviet advance group consisting of not more than ten (10) diplomatic and service and technical personnel. When reconfiguration of the office buildings in Kiev and New York is ready to be initiated simultaneously, the Department will consider an increase in the size of the Soviet Advance Party. The Department requests that the Soviet Embassy inform it of the names of the individuals who will constitute the Soviet advance group.

The Department recalls the principles set forth in the Garrison to Vorontsov letters of June 18, 1975 and Vorontsov to Garrison reply of June 26, 1975, reiterated in the Garrison to Vorontsov letter of June 4, 1976 which must continue to govern the use of the Soviet buildings in New York pending the establishment of consulates. These principles which should continue to govern the Embassy and the advance group which goes to New York are:

1. Reconfiguration of the respective office buildings at Streletskaya and 9 East 91st Street, including remodeling or repair, will start simultaneously on a date to be mutually agreed.

2. Specific changes at the premises in New York for the sole purpose of ensuring their physical security to be made in advance of the beginning of reconfiguration work on the building will be considered by the Department upon the written request of the Embassy.

3. Office buildings at Streletskaya and 9 East 91st Street will not be used for any purpose prior to the beginning of reconfiguration except by mutual agreement. 46

4. The Department agrees that three members of the Soviet Advance Party together with their families may reside in the building at 9 East 91st Street.

5. The Department agrees that up to three members of the Soviet advance party together with their families may reside in the building at 11 East 91st Street.

The Department plans to send an advance party of future consular officers and employees to Kiev on or about September 24 to carry out their functions in preparation for the official opening of the United States Consulate in that city. These designated consular officers and employees will be temporarily assigned to the United States Embassy in Moscow. The size of the American group will initially be four and when the reconfiguration of the office buildings is ready to be initiated in Kiev and New York, the Department will consult with the Soviet side as to any increase in the U.S. Advance Party. The Embassy of the United States in Moscow will inform the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the names of the four individuals who will constitute the American Advance Party in Kiev. As is the usual procedure, upon the opening of the United States Consulate General in Kiev, these officers or employees will be recognized as permanent members of the United States Consulate General and will receive privileges and immunities in accordance with US-USSR Consular Convention.

4

The Department wishes to inform the Embassy that the point of contact for the Soviet Advance Party for routine matters involving its stay in New York and on questions of travel beyond the 25-mile zone will be the U.S. Mission to the United Nations. The Department understands that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR will be the point of contact for the U.S. Advance Party in Kiev for routine matters involving its stay and for related travel questions.

The Department is prepared to proceed in formally establishing advance parties in New York and Kiev based on the response by the Soviet Embassy.

Department of State,

Washington, *September 24, 1976,*

Drafted:EUR/SOV:MDGrimes:vpb
x28670, 9/21/76

Cleared:EUR/EX:JClark
A/FBO:PStange

L:hfshamwell
'S/CPR:HDavis

IO:LHage
S/S-S:MEDham

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF LANGUAGE SERVICES

48

(TRANSLATION)

LS NO.
58852
PA/DZ
Russian

No. 68

The Embassy of the U.S.S.R. confirms receipt of the note of the Department of State of the U.S.A. of September 24, 1976 on questions related to the establishment of Consulates-General of the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. in New York and Kiev, and taking into account the discussion of these questions during talks held between the Deputy Minister of the U.S.S.R., G. M. Korniyenko, and Assistant Secretary of State of the U.S.A., Mr. Arthur A. Hartman, on October 1 of this year, has the following to transmit.

The Embassy takes into consideration the willingness of the Department of State to officially establish, beginning on September 24, 1976, advance groups composed of designated consular officials and staff members temporarily assigned to the Soviet and U.S. Embassies in Washington and Moscow, which shall carry out their functions in New York and Kiev, respectively, in connection with the preparations for the official opening of the Consulates-General in both cities.

This is to inform the Department of State that as of today the following personnel of the Embassy shall be among the members of the Soviet advance group.

Department of State
of the United States of America,
Washington, D.C.

DECLASSIFIED/RE/OBSC

NLRR FOI-114/1 #5840

BY CN NARA DATE 11/27/07

✓ Counsellor A. G. Mushkov, as the designated Consul-General of the U.S.S.R. in New York, who has been charged with heading the advance group; First Secretary V. A. Kuleshov and Second Secretary I. A. Kuznetsov, as ✓ designated Consuls; Second Secretary V. V. Grishacv, as the designated Vice-Consul, staff member of the Embassy V. V. Grachev, as a designated consular official; and staff members of the Embassy, V. I. Konovalov, V. M. Kuznetsov, A. N. Matusevich, and Ye. A. Sulin, as staff members of the Consulate-General being established.

The names of the other members of the advance group shall be additionally transmitted to the Department of State.

The intention of the Department of State to transmit to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., through the Embassy of the U.S.A. in Moscow, the list of the U.S. advance group in Kiev, is taken into consideration.

The Embassy notes that the Department of State agrees that prior to the official opening of both Consulates-General, the Soviet advance group, in addition to carrying out the functions connected with preparations for the opening of the Consulate-General of the U.S.S.R., will deal with questions related to the safety of Soviet institutions and Soviet citizens in New York (including Soviet citizens who are personnel of the U.N. Secretariat), excepting personnel of the Permanent Mission of the U.S.S.R. to the U.N., and will be able to be in contact with appropriate U.S. authorities regarding these questions, as well as handle protocol matters with regard to Soviet delegations arriving in New York which are not connected with the U.N.

50

The Embassy takes into consideration the fact that on questions of their daily stay in New York, as well as trips beyond the 25-mile zone, the Soviet advance group will be able to refer to the Mission of the U.S.A. to the U.N.

Washington, October 4, 1976

11/9/74 51

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF LANGUAGE SERVICES

(TRANSLATION)

LS NO. 59235
PA/DZ
Russian

[Seal of the U.S.S.R.]

Embassy of the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics

No. 70

The Embassy of the U.S.S.R., as an addition to its note No. 60 of October 4 of this year, communicates to the Department of State of the U.S.A. that from this day on, the members of the Embassy listed below are included in the advance group of the Consulate General of the U.S.S.R. being established in New York, and as appointed authorized personnel shall perform functions in New York related to the preparations for the official opening of the Consulate General and shall deal with questions, an understanding about which has been established through an exchange of notes between the Embassy and the Department of State of October 4 and September 24 of this year, respectively:

Matsenov, V. G. - as First Secretary of the Embassy and designated Consul;

Moskvin, L. A. - as Second Secretary of the Embassy and designated Vice-Consul.

The surnames of the remaining members of the advance group shall be given additionally.

At the same time, the Embassy informs the Department of State that the Second Secretary of the Embassy, V. V. Grishayev, named in Note No. 60

Department of State
of the United States of America,
Washington, D.C.
[Initialled: Yu. V.]

DECLASSIFIED / RE/CA/CS
NLRR 606-114/1 75841
BY CN NARA DATE 11/27/07

52

-2-

of October 4 of this year as a member of the Soviet advance group in New York, has returned to Washington from New York to work at the Embassy.

Washington, November 9, 1976

RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1976 NOV 9 PM 4 24

FABRO
DOCUMENT ANALYSIS

№ 70

53
RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1976 NOV 9 PM 4 54

OFFICE OF
EAST UNION AFFAIRS
SOV

Посольство СССР в дополнение к своей ноте № 60 от 4 октября с.г. сообщает Государственному Департаменту США, что нижепоименованные сотрудники Посольства с сего дня включаются в состав советской передовой группы учреждаемого Генерального консульства СССР в Нью-Йорке и в качестве назначенных консульских должностных лиц будут выполнять в Нью-Йорке функции в связи с подготовкой к официальному открытию Генерального консульства и заниматься вопросами, договоренность о которых зафиксирована путем обмена нотами Посольства и Государственного Департамента соответственно от 4 октября и 24 сентября с.г.:

Маценов В.Г. - в качестве первого секретаря Посольства и назначенного консула;

Москвин Л.А. - в качестве второго секретаря Посольства и назначенного вице-консула.

Фамилии остальных членов передовой группы будут названы дополнительно.

В ГОСУДАРСТВЕННЫЙ ДЕПАРТАМЕНТ
СОЕДИНЕННЫХ ШТАТОВ АМЕРИКИ

г. Вашингтон

DECLASSIFIED / RE / EASED

NLRR 106-114/1 #5842

BY CH NARA DATE 11/27/07

Одновременно Посольство информирует Государственный Департамент о том, что второй секретарь Посольства Гришаев В.В., названный в ноте № 60 от 4 октября с.г. в качестве члена советской передовой группы в Нью-Йорке, вернулся из Нью-Йорка в Вашингтон для работы в Посольстве.

г.Вашингтон, 9 ноября 1976 года

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR EOB-114/1 5843

BY CW NARA DATE 11/27/07

Subject copy
→ 5

The Department of State acknowledges receipt of Note No. 70 dated November 19, 1976, from the Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, informing the Department of the appointment of V. G. Matsenov and L. A. Moskvin as members of the Embassy advance party in New York and of the fact that V. V. Grishayev, formerly a member of the advance group, has returned to Washington to work at the Embassy.

By the Department's count, the addition of these two employees brings the total number of Soviet advance party members in New York to ten. In order to avoid misunderstandings, the Department calls the attention of the Embassy to the discussion of October 1, 1976, between Assistant Secretary of State Hartman and Deputy Foreign Minister Korniyenko in which Mr. Hartman informed Mr. Korniyenko that the Department would authorize ten Embassy employees to live and work in New York as members of the Soviet advance party. Mr. Hartman told Mr. Korniyenko at that time that the Department would consider an increase in the size of the Soviet advance party in New York once reconfiguration of the two official buildings begins simultaneously in Kiev and New York. As the Embassy is aware, this reconfiguration has not yet begun.

The Department also notes that extension of the visas for temporary Embassy employees Bayev and Makarov until February 15, 1977, has been requested by the Embassy. In a meeting on September 24 between Minister Counselor Vorontsov and Mr. Garrison of the Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Mr. Garrison agreed that Mr. Bayev and Mr. Makarov could remain in the United States for two more months. Nevertheless, the Department is prepared to extend the visas of Mr. Bayev and Mr. Makarov until January 15, 1977, at which time it will consider a further extension based on an assessment of the progress to that date regarding the reconfiguration of the future United States office building in Kiev.

Department of State,

Washington, November 19, 1976.

Handed to Ravelow 11-19-76

Drafted:
EUR:SOV:MLevitsky:reh
11/18/76 x 28671

Cleared:
EUR:SOV:MGarrison
EUR/EX:NBaskey (in draft)
S/S-S - in draft

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

July 14, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR MORT ALLIN

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Cornell's AP Story on TV Report of Religion
in USSR

My views of story:

Some comments (of persons quoted) are accurate, many misleading, and a few reflect remarkable naivete. For instance:

-- It is true that believers in the Soviet Union exhibit genuine religious fervor and that faith has not been snuffed out.

-- It is true that operating churches are often crowded on major holidays (I wonder if the film was not made at Easter when church attendance is unusually high.)

-- It is true that there is growing interest among young people.

However:

-- It is inconceivable that the filming was not carefully staged by the authorities to leave the impression they want to convey. (They don't have to "stage" the fervor of believers; what they stage is the time, place and circumstances, and make sure controls are not visible.)

-- In the land that originated Potemkin villages, camera crews who do not know Russian or know Soviet society well are probably incapable of detecting the staged aspects, their apparent confidence to the contrary notwithstanding.

-- A figure of "50 million" practicing church goers is highly questionable and in any event not comparable to estimates of attendance in other countries.

-- While many churches are indeed very well maintained, and that from the contributions of church goers, only a tiny fraction of those churches once operating are now in use. A drive through the countryside (or even through Moscow, if you know where to look) reveals many more churches in abandoned,

58

decrepit condition (or used for such things as storing potatoes) than there are operating churches. The city of Yaroslav (500,000 people more or less) has exactly four now in operation. Before the revolution there were hundreds. No wonder the ones remaining are full.

-- Even of those few churches now operating, only a small fraction offer daily services. Sunday services, however, are well attended in most places I have observed.

-- All churches in the USSR operate under the most stringent state and police controls. Religious education of minors is a crime punishable under the criminal code. And no one who aspires to a position of any responsibility in government service (and virtually all employment is government service) can risk going to church regularly. Church attendance is, of course, totally incompatible with Party membership, which in turn is in effect required for most positions involving supervision of others. The state conducts a vigorous anti-religious campaign in the media and throughout the educational system.

-- To suggest that there is anything remotely similar to freedom of religion as we understand it is simply absurd. What exists is a degree of official toleration of church attendance by those who have nothing to lose (peasants, simple workers).

In short:

-- Religion is very much alive in the Soviet Union despite the severe handicaps imposed upon it. It is a moving experience to witness the religious devotion of persons who attend services. The piety is genuine, and many believers incur substantial penalties because they insist on practicing their religion. Interest of young people is growing, but the rest of the comments are baloney or worse.

No #59-62

T. Amb MATLOCK -

4289

A A BYLRYBYV 381

AM-RELIGION TODAY: ADV15:760

ADV15

RUSSIAN RELIGIOUS LIFE SHOWN IN UNUSUAL TV SERIES

FOR RELEASE AM FRI JULY 15

WITH LASERPHOTO

BY GEORGE W. CORNELL

AP RELIGION WRITER

NEW YORK (AP) - TO A SURPRISING EXTENT, RELIGIOUS LIFE IS VIGOROUS AND APPARENTLY GROWING IN THE SOVIET UNION; CONCLUDES AN NBC-TV DOCUMENTARY. ||

IT TAKES A RARE AND REMARKABLY PROBING LOOK AT RUSSIAN ORTHODOXY; ITS LEADERS; ITS DAY-TO-DAY OPERATIONS; THE PEOPLE; YOUNG AND OLD; FLOCKING TO ITS CHURCHES AND FINDS RELIGIOUS LIFE THERE "VERY MUCH ALIVE." ||

AFTER 65 YEARS OF OFFICIAL SOVIET ATHEISM, THE CHURCHES "STILL PROCLAIM CHRIST" THROUGHOUT THE LAND AND ARE "TO ALL INDICATIONS, GROWING," SAYS THE NARRATOR, U.S. RELIGIOUS SCHOLAR BRUCE RIGDON OF CHICAGO.

THE TWO-HOUR TV REPORT, "THE CHURCH OF THE RUSSIANS," IS TO BE SHOWN IN TWO PARTS ON SUNDAYS, JULY 17 AND 24. IT WAS COMPILED IN A MONTH OF FILMING AND INTERVIEWING IN SOVIET CITIES AND COUNTRYSIDE.

"EVERY POSSIBLE DOOR WAS OPENED TO US," SAYS NEWSWOMAN HELEN HARMON, EXECUTIVE PRODUCER OF RELIGIOUS PROGRAMS FOR NBC NEWS. SHE SAYS THERE WAS NO GOVERNMENT INTERFERENCE OR ATTEMPTS AT IT, ADDING: "ALL OF OUR CREW WERE PROS WHO HAVE WORKED ALL OVER THE WORLD, AND THEY WOULD HAVE BEEN THE FIRST TO RECOGNIZE ANY ATTEMPTS AT CONTROL HAD THERE BEEN ANY." ||

"THEY WERE STUNNED AT THE RELIGIOUS FERVOR; STUNNED AT THE KIDS AND YOUNG PEOPLE IN CHURCH. NOTHING WAS BEING STAGED. WE WOULDN'T HAVE BELIEVED IT IF WE HADN'T SEEN IT OURSELVES." ||

AT A PRIVATE SCREENING FOR A GROUP OF U.S. EASTERN ORTHODOX LEADERS, METROPOLITAN THEODOCIOUS, HEAD OF THE ORTHODOX CHURCH IN AMERICA, SAID "IT'S THE FIRST TIME FOR ANYTHING LIKE THIS" TO BE PRESENTED IN THIS COUNTRY.

"IT'S BEAUTIFUL," HE SAID. CONTRARY TO SOME AMERICAN OPINION THAT RUSSIAN FAITH IS DORMANT, HE SAID IT'S CLEARLY THRIVING. "THAT COMES THROUGH OVERWHELMINGLY. YOU CAN SEE IT IN THE FACES OF THE PEOPLE." ||

THE REV. JOHN MEYENDORFF, A RUSSIAN CHURCH HISTORIAN OF ST. VLADIMIR'S SEMINARY IN YONKERS, N.Y., SAID "THE IMPRESSION IN THE WEST THAT FAITH HAS BEEN SNUFFED OUT IN RUSSIA IS QUITE WRONG.

"THERE'S A VIBRANT FAITH AMONG THE PEOPLE. RELIGION IS A POPULAR THING THERE; NOT TIED TO ANY SYSTEM. PARADOXICALLY, EVEN WHEN PERSECUTED, IT FLOURISHES MORE."

... ..

*Jack -
What do you think?
Mort*

PRESERVATION COPY

THE CHURCHES WERE FULL AND RELIGION SEEMED UNREPRESSSED; HE GOT CONSIDERABLE FLAK FOR IT. NBC MIGHT GET SOME OF THE SAME; BUT IT OFFERS THE FILMED EVIDENCE.

IN THE DOCUMENTARY; BOTH RUSSIAN CHURCH LEADERS AND GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES REPEATEDLY AND STRONGLY DENIED ANY RESTRICTIONS ON THE CHURCH; A CONTENTION THAT MEYENDORFF CALLED "BALONEY."

HOWEVER; HE SAID THAT UNQUESTIONABLY; THE RUSSIAN CHURCH LEADERS ARE "ABSOLUTELY AUTHENTIC" IN THEIR FAITH; ALTHOUGH THERE ARE GOVERNMENT RESTRAINTS ON THEM. "SOME ARE MORE COOPERATIVE THAN OTHERS;" HE SAID.

THE FILM SERIES RANGES WIDELY THROUGH THE CHURCH INSTITUTIONS; FROM ITS CROWDED CATHEDRALS TO A RURAL PARISH; FROM BULGING SEMINARIES AND BUSY PUBLISHING HOUSES TO TRANQUIL MONASTERIES.

THE CAMERAS DWELLS INTIMATELY ON ORDINARY PEOPLE IN ACTS OF REVERENCE AND DEVOTION - PRAYING; MAKING CONFESSIONS; COUPLES WITH THEIR WHIMPERING BABIES BEING BAPTIZED; PEOPLE RECEIVING COMMUNION FROM A SPOON; A YOUNG BOY LIGHTING CANDLES.

THEOLOGIAN VITALY KOROVDY OF THE MOSCOW PATRIARCHATE SAYS IN A FILMED INTERVIEW THAT RUSSIAN ORTHODOXY; ONCE THE OFFICIALLY ESTABLISHED CHURCH WITH "GLORIOUS IMPERIAL POWER;" NOW LIVES IN A NEW AND "RADICALLY SECULARIZED" SITUATION.

NOTING THAT THE COMMUNIST REVOLUTION BROUGHT "COMPLETELY NEW RELATIONS WITH THE STATE AND SOCIETY;" HE SAID: "THIS NEWNESS OF THE SITUATION IS VERY PAINFUL AND SHARP FOR BOTH SIDES."

HE LIKENED PRESENT CONDITIONS INDIRECTLY TO THOSE FOR CHRISTIANS UNDER

ANCIENT ROME'S PAGAN EMPIRE AND SAID: "SOME SENTIMENTAL FEELING FOR THE GLORIOUS PAST STILL REMAINS... BUT WE HAVE PROVED THAT WE ARE NOT ONLY ABLE TO SURVIVE BUT TO GROW IN THIS COMPLETELY NEW SITUATION."

THERE ARE AN ESTIMATED 50 MILLION PRACTICING RUSSIAN ORTHODOX BELIEVERS; NEARLY A FOURTH OF THE POPULATION; MEYENDORFF SAID; MUCH GREATER THAN THE 10 PERCENT OR LESS IN FRANCE AND BRITAIN; WITH THE NUMBER OF BAPTIZED RUSSIANS EVEN GREATER - AN ESTIMATED 100 MILLION.

THERE ALSO ARE MORE THAN 3 MILLION ROMAN CATHOLICS AND A MILLION PROTESTANTS IN RUSSIA; PLUS ABOUT 24 MILLION MOSLEMS.

"THE CHURCHES ARE SPLENDIDLY ATTENDED BY THE PEOPLE;" ORTHODOX ARCHBISHOP MAKARII OF KIEV SAYS IN THE FILM; "AND ARE VERY WELL FINANCED BY THE PEOPLE." AS THE COLLECTION BASKETS ARE PASSED; THEY'RE HEAPED WITH RUBLES AND KOPECS.

THERE ARE DAILY MORNING AND EVENING SERVICES; AND SEVERAL OF THEM ON SUNDAYS TO ACCOMMODATE THE CROWDS; MAKARII SAYS; SAYING THAT ABOUT 60 PERCENT OF THOSE PRESENT ARE

EFFON2 PEOPLE; FROM 20 TO 30.

END ADV AM FRI JULY 15
AP-NY-07-12 2337EDT

PRESERVATION COPY

AP/79

A & C ZEEVGVY 8159

PM-RELIGION IN THE NEWS; ADV15; 810

4ADV15

FAITH DEPICTED AS THRIVING IN RUSSIA DESPITE 65 YEARS OF ATHEISM
FOR RELEASE PM FRI JULY 15.

WITH LASERPHOTO

BY GEORGE W. CORNELL

AP RELIGION WRITER

*Jack Mitchell -
FBI -
Int*

67

NEW YORK (AP) - IN THE EARLY DAYS OF THE SOVIET UNION, ITS LEADER V. I. LENIN SAID ITS SYSTEM WAS "DISPERSING THE FOG OF RELIGION AND LIBERATING THE WORKERS" FROM IT.

BUT AFTER 65 YEARS OF COMMUNIST RULE IN AN OFFICIALLY ATHEIST NATION, "THE WORKERS REFUSE TO BE LIBERATED FROM THEIR FAITH," SAYS THE NARRATOR ON AN EXTRAORDINARY NBC-TV DOCUMENTARY EXPLORING RELIGIOUS LIFE IN RUSSIA.

"RELIGION REMAINS A DAILY FACT OF LIFE IN THE SOVIET UNION," SAYS THE NARRATOR; THE REV. BRUCE RIGDON OF CHICAGO, A SPECIALIST ON THE RUSSIAN CHURCH. HE SAYS IT NOW IS DISPLAYING SIGNS OF GREATER STRENGTH AND GROWTH.

THE CANDIDLY SEARCHING FILMED REPORT, "THE CHURCH OF THE RUSSIANS," TURNED OUT TO PACK SO MUCH REVEALING DETAIL THAT IT'S TO BE SHOWN IN TWO HOUR-LONG SEGMENTS, ON THIS SUNDAY AND NEXT, INSTEAD OF ONE AS ORIGINALLY INTENDED.

"RELIGION IS INDEED ALIVE AND THRIVING IN THE U.S.S.R.," SAYS VETERAN NEWSWOMAN HELEN HARNOR, EXECUTIVE PRODUCER OF RELIGIOUS PROGRAMS FOR NBC NEWS. "THAT'S THE STORY WE CAME BACK WITH BECAUSE IT'S THERE."

THE TV NEWS CREW SPENT A MONTH EXPLORING CHURCH ACTIVITIES IN CITIES AND RURAL SETTINGS.

IN INTERVIEWS BOTH WITH CHURCH LEADERS AND GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, AS WELL AS WITH PASTORS, SEMINARY STUDENTS AND ORDINARY PEOPLE, THE DOCUMENTARY OFFERS A STRIKINGLY VIVID LOOK AT THE RELIGIOUS SITUATION, BOTH ITS VIGOR AND STRAINS.

RIGDON OF CHICAGO'S MCCORMICK THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY AT ONE POINT ASKS THE GOVERNMENT VICE CHAIRMAN FOR RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS, PETER MAKARTEEV, WHY RELIGION SURVIVES WHEN THE GOVERNMENT DOES ALL IT CAN TO SPREAD ATHEISM.

"BECAUSE IT EXISTS," MAKARTEEV SAYS, APPARENTLY STUMPED AT ANY EXPLANATION OF IT. "IT IS. RELIGION WILL EXIST AS LONG AS BELIEVERS EXIST."

THEIR THROGGING, DEVOUT EXISTENCE IS SHOWN FIRSTHAND IN THE CROWDED CHURCHES; THE YOUNG COUPLES LINED UP FOR BAPTIZING OF BABIES; IN A BUSY NEW PUBLISHING HOUSE TURNING OUT BIBLES, AND OTHER MATERIALS; IN THE BULGING SEMINARIES.

PRESERVATION COPY

GREENER; TRIMMER SANCTUARIES; STILL WITH ORNATE INTERIORS; THE GARDENS;
SIDEWALKS AND PEOPLE OF RUSSIA.

THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES PROVIDE MANY OF THE MOST TOUCHING GLIMPSES; A
YOUNG BOY LIGHTING CANDLES; AN OLD MONK; SAID TO BE 100; WALKING THE
MONASTERY GROUNDS; DISPENSING BLESSINGS; A WOMAN FEEDING PIGEONS AND
SINGING AN OLD RUSSIAN FOLK SONG.

"PLEASE DO NOT FORSAKE US; HAVE MERCY;" IT GOES. "THE KINGDOM OF
GOD WE ACCEPT AND LOVE."

IN THE DOCUMENTARY'S APPROACH; RIGDON SAYS; "WE ALLOW THE CHURCH TO
SPEAK FOR ITSELF; ALTHOUGH WE WERE AWARE THAT THE ISSUES SURROUNDING
THE CHURCH ARE COMPLEX AND COULD NOT ALWAYS BE VOICED."

AT THE VILLAGE OF LISI NDE; A RURAL PASTOR; FATHER OLEG; TALKS OF
FAITH IN A LONGIVER HIGHER THAN THE CONSTRICTED VIEWS OF MATERIALISM;
OF GOD'S SUMMONS OF HUMANITY TO LOVE. THE PRIEST ADDS:

"THAT IS HIS COMMANDMENT AND WE SHOULD FULFILL IT."

END ADV. PM FRI JULY 15

AP-NY-07-13 1013EDT

PRESERVATION COPY