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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 3/21/2005

File Folder MATLOCK CHRON JUNE 1983

FOIA

F06-114/1

Box Number 1

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106

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
5800	RELEASE FORM	AUTHORITY TO RELEASE INFORMATION FORM [2]	1	6/13/1983	B6
5801	WAIVER FORM	TAX CHECK WAIVER FORM [3]	1	6/13/1983	B6
5803	SF-86	SF-86 FORM [4-16]	12	6/13/1983	B6
5784	MEMO	MEMO TO WILLIAM CLARK FROM JACK MATLOCK RE RENEWAL OF US-USSR AGREEMENT ON TRANSPORTATION [17-18] R 3/3/2011 F2006-114/1	2	6/15/1983	B1
5785	MEMO	MEMO TO PRESIDENT REAGAN FROM WILLIAM CLARK RE US-USSR AGREEMENT ON TRANSPORTATION [19-20] R 3/3/2011 F2006-114/1	2	6/14/1983	B1
5792	MEMO	MEMO FOR WILLIAM CLARK RE US-USSR AGREEMENT ON COOPERATION IN TRANSPORTATION [21-28] R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1	8	6/14/1983	B1
5786	PAPER	U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION POSITION PAPER ON US-USSR AGREEMENT [30-41] R 8/20/2008 F06-114/1 DOCUMENT PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O. 13233	12	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
5787	MEMO	MEMO TO WILLIAM CLARK FROM JACK MATLOCK RE ANDROPOV REPLY TO PRESIDENT REAGAN [58] <i>R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1</i>	1	6/24/1983	B1
5793	MEMO	MEMO TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE NSDD-75 [65-69] <i>R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1</i>	5	ND	B1
5788	MEMO	MEMO TO WILLIAM CLARK FROM JACK MATLOCK RE ANDROPOV REPLY TO PRESIDENT REAGAN [75] <i>R 3/3/2011 F2006-114/1</i>	1	6/27/1983	B1
5789	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #5788 [76] <i>R 3/3/2011 F2006-114/1</i>	1	6/27/1983	B1
5790	MEMO	MEMO TO WILLIAM CLARK FROM JACK MATLOCK RE USSR CALLS FOR NORMALIZATION [79] <i>R 3/3/2011 F2006-114/1</i>	1	6/28/1983	B1
5791	BIO	BIO OF EIGIL JORGENSEN OF DENMARK [82] <i>R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1</i>	1	ND	B1

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MATLOCK: Proposed dates for Washington

June 13-29

July 6 to early August

Sept. 12 to mid-October

move permanently mid-November

(all subject to adjustment, of course)

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

June 7, 1983

TO: ADMIRAL POINDEXTER

FYI. Attached is a copy of
Ambassador Matlock's working
schedule from now until November.

Paula Dobriansky

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 15, 1983

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Renewal of U.S.-USSR Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Transportation

At Tab A is a State Department memorandum recommending that a) the 1973 U.S.-USSR Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Transportation (which will expire automatically on June 19) be extended by an exchange of notes for a further six-month period, and b) that during this period a working level meeting of the two sides be convened to consider an amended agreement for a longer period of time.

State proposes extension of the agreement for primarily the following reasons:

- NSDD 75 states that the USG should not further dismantle the framework of exchanges it has established with the USSR (i.e., in December 1982, the Agriculture Agreement was automatically renewed).
- The Department of Transportation (report attached at Tab A-1) believes the agreement has resulted in tangible benefits to the U.S.

According to State's memorandum, all agencies apparently do not oppose six-month extension of the agreement. However, Commerce and DOD have expressed some concern about the risk of technology transfer through certain activities conducted under the agreement.

As extension of the agreement upholds the guidelines set forth in NSDD 75, I concur with State's recommendation that it be extended for six months. However, before a working level meeting is proposed to the Soviets, a thorough review of the agreement and the risks of technology transfers entailed should be made by the Polish-Soviet Sanctions Monitoring Group. If a negotiating strategy is developed through the normal interagency process, it should be submitted to the Monitoring Group for consideration.

W
Norman Bailey and Walt Raymond concur.

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Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114#5784

BY *RW* NARA DATE 3/3/11

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RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I Memorandum to the President

Tab A State's Memorandum, June 14, 1983

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTONCONFIDENTIALACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

SUBJECT: Renewal of U.S.-USSR Agreement on Cooperation in
the Field of Transportation

Issue: Should the 1973 U.S.-USSR Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Transportation (which will expire automatically on June 19, 1983) be extended for a further six-month period? Should we propose to the Soviets now that a working-level meeting take place during the six-month period to consider a longer term amended agreement?

Facts: The 1973 U.S.-USSR Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Transportation will expire on June 19, 1983. State forwarded a memorandum (Tab A) recommending that the agreement be extended for a further six-month period and that during this time a working-level meeting of both sides be convened to consider a longer term agreement. State endorses renewal of the agreement as it is consistent with our policy enunciated in NSDD 75 (U.S. Policy Toward the Soviet Union) -- not to dismantle further the framework of exchanges with the USSR. The Department of Transportation (Tab A-2) believes the agreement has resulted in tangible benefits to the U.S.

Discussion: Six-month renewal of this agreement has been approved by the appropriate agencies. However, Commerce and DOD have expressed some concern about the risk of technology transfers through certain activities conducted under the agreement.

As extension of the agreement upholds the guidelines set forth in NSDD 75, I concur with State's recommendation that it be extended. However, before a working level meeting is proposed to the Soviets, a thorough review of the agreement and the risks of technology transfers entailed should be made. The appropriate vehicle to undertake this review would be the NSC-chaired Polish-Soviet Sanctions Monitoring Group. Also, if a negotiating strategy is developed through the interagency process, it should be submitted to the Monitoring Group for consideration.

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Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114#5785
BY RW NARA DATE 3/3/11

RECOMMENDATION

OK No

- — 1. That the 1973 U.S.-USSR Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Transportation be extended for a further six-month period.

- — 2. That a working level meeting of both sides not be proposed to the Soviets now, but that the Polish-Soviet Sanctions Monitoring Group undertake a thorough review of the agreement.

Prepared by:
Jack F. Matlock

Attachment:

Tab A State's Memorandum, June 14, 1983



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

June 14, 1983

CONFIDENTIALMEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSESUBJECT: Renewal of US-USSR Agreement on Cooperation
in the Field of Transportation

The 1973 US-USSR Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Transportation will expire automatically on June 19, 1983. A new agreement extending or amending the current agreement will be required if we are to continue cooperation in this area.

BACKGROUND

As you know, official science and technology exchange activities with the Soviet Union have been cut back substantially on two occasions - in 1980 at the time of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and in December 1981 when, as part of the sanctions taken against the Soviet Union for its actions in Poland, the President announced that three agreements (space, energy, and science and technology) would be allowed to expire in 1982. Since then, consistent with our policy (made explicit in NSDD-75) not to dismantle further the framework of exchanges, the USG decided in December 1982 to allow the automatic renewal of the Agriculture Agreement to take place.

As the attached report indicates, the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) believes the agreement has resulted in tangible benefits to the U.S. and should be extended. With the decline in activities under all science and technology agreements since 1979, the Transportation Agreement currently is one of our least active areas of cooperation with the Soviet Union. The extent of benefit currently is limited to civil aviation, the only area still active. Based on its assessment of the agreement's limited program, the intelligence community sees no problem with the proposed renewal of the agreement and no significant potential for a loss of U.S. technology, although Commerce and the Department of Defense question that view.

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL
DECL: OADR

NLRR 106-714/1 #5792

BY CU NARA DATE 11/27/07

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STATE'S VIEWS

The cooperative program carried out by the Department of Transportation under this agreement is rather limited in scope and benefit compared to most of the other science and technology agreements with the USSR. We note DOT's view that the activities in the civil aviation area, the only ones currently active, have been beneficial to the U.S. and can be expected to continue to be so. In this light it would be reasonable to extend the agreement on scientific grounds. Given the level of control which the USG can exert over the content of activities under an exchange agreement, we foresee little danger of unwanted transfer of sensitive technology.

As part of the sanctions against the Soviet Union for its heavy and direct responsibility for repression in Poland, three exchange agreements (space, energy, and science and technology) expired in mid-1982. Later, in December 1982 (acting on the Department's recommendation), the NSC decided that the Agriculture Agreement would be allowed to extend automatically. This was in line with the policy formally enunciated in NSDD-75 in January 1983. On political grounds, consistent with the policy of NSDD-75 that the "U.S. should not further dismantle the framework of exchanges," it also would be in the U.S. interest to extend the Transportation Agreement.

The Soviets have indicated a clear interest in extending the Transportation Agreement, and view the exchanges framework as an important aspect of our overall bilateral relationship. In this regard, an extension would provide us some flexibility to adjust the tightening or relaxing of our exchanges policy to future shifts in the political situation. We follow this approach under other agreements where we are continuing with certain routine exchanges, particularly in areas relating to health, pollution control, and safety.

We would propose an exchange of notes providing for an interim six-month extension of the existing agreement. Assuming the expected favorable Soviet response, a working-level meeting of the two sides would be scheduled. The

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
Department would provide appropriate foreign policy guidance to the DOT participants in negotiating mutually-acceptable language for an amended agreement, covering a longer period of time (a similar six-month extension/amendment arrangement occurred in 1978 for the three-year extension of the US-USSR Agreement on the Study of the World Ocean).

STATE'S RECOMMENDATION

State recommends that we propose to the Soviets that:

--The agreement be extended by an exchange of notes for a further six-month period; and

--During this period a working-level meeting take place to consider a mutually-acceptable amended agreement for a longer period of time.


Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

Attachments:

1. EUR/IG Report on the Extension of the US-USSR Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Transportation
2. DOT Evaluation of US-USSR Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Transportation
3. US-USSR Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Transportation

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EUR/IG REPORT ON THE EXTENSION OF THE US-USSR
AGREEMENT ON COOPERATION IN THE FIELD OF TRANSPORTATION

The US-USSR Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Transportation will expire on June 19, 1983. An explicit action -- signature of a new agreement or exchange of Diplomatic Notes -- is required if the agreement is to be extended beyond its expiration date.

The Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Transportation was signed in Washington by Secretary of State Rogers and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko on June 19, 1973 during the Nixon-Brezhnev Summit. It was one of the eleven such agreements concluded at three summits between 1972 and 1974. Of the others, five have been renewed successively for five year terms, one other for a reduced term, and one was initially signed for a ten year period. Three agreements, (space, energy, and science and technology) were allowed to expire in 1982 in accordance with the President's December, 1981 announcement of sanctions against the Soviet Union.

The Transportation Agreement was amended at the conclusion of its first five-year term in 1978 and extended until June 19, 1980. By then, US-Soviet relations had cooled considerably and cooperative activities under all the eleven science and technology agreements were cut back significantly as a result of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. While activities under the agreement had declined to a very low level largely as a consequence of our Afghanistan sanctions, following a review of the agreement the Carter Administration allowed its automatic three-year renewal to take place, extending it until June 19, 1983.

Over the life of the agreement, activities have taken place under the Transportation Agreement in the following areas:

1. Civil Aviation - including air traffic control, microwave landing systems, accident investigation, training and education and environmental factors.

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2. Transport of the Future - including magnetic levitation and urban research and development.
3. Transport Construction - including bridge construction and tunneling.
4. Railroad Transport.
5. Automobile Transport - including highway safety.
6. Hazardous Materials Transport.
7. Facilitation - including cargo documentation.
8. Urban Transport Policy.

While activities in all but the civil aviation area ceased entirely since January, 1980 for a variety of reasons, some performance- and others Afghanistan-related, the structure of cooperation remained intact.

The Soviets clearly are interested in the access the agreement gives them to U.S. developments in civil aviation and microwave landing systems. DOT and other USG elements believe the technology involved is of a generally open or commercial nature and potential technology transfer is carefully controlled by the U.S. side. However, DOD and Commerce have expressed the view that some activities in the civil aviation area conducted under the agreement have military applications.

SUMMARY CONCLUSIONS AND AGENCY RECOMMENDATIONS

DOT's evaluation comments indicated:

--Soviet and Eastern Bloc support in the International Civil Aviation Organization for the standardization of U.S.-developed air navigational, safety-related equipment; the capability of keeping abreast of Soviet technological developments; and the potential for showcasing U.S. transportation technology for export are all enhanced through the existence of the agreement and the activities conducted pursuant to it.

--Cooperation with the Soviets, particularly collaboration on perfecting the design and operation of civil aviation navigational systems, has been technically beneficial and has contributed in varying degrees to the improvement of U.S. transportation systems.

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--The agreement has provided a framework for keeping abreast of Soviet technological developments in transportation and has contributed to the promotion of sales of U.S. transportation technology and equipment.

DOT recommends the agreement be renewed, with modifications, for a period of five years. As set forth in their report (attached), DOT recommends the following modifications:

--Establishment of a working group on sea navigation.

--Bring under the Transport Construction Working Group cooperation on welding technology, which was formerly carried out under the U.S./U.S.S.R. Science and Technology Agreement (now expired) and supported by DOT research funds.

--Cancellation of cooperation in the area of hazardous material transport (already taking place in multilateral organizations) and magnetic levitation (because the Soviets have not been forthcoming in sharing their work in the field).

--Resumption or cessation of cooperation in transport construction, bridge construction and tunneling, urban research and development and rail transport areas based on a joint U.S.-Soviet technical-level determination.

State recommends proposing an exchange of notes with the Soviets providing for an interim six-month extension of the existing agreement. Assuming the expected favorable Soviet response, a working-level meeting of the two sides would be scheduled. State would provide appropriate guidance to the DOT participants in negotiating mutually-acceptable language for an amended agreement, covering a longer period of time (a similar six-month extension/amendment arrangement occurred in 1978 for the three-year extension of the US-USSR Agreement on the Study of the World Ocean).

Consistent with the policy directive in NSDD-75, State believes that while we should continue to limit and monitor the overall level of exchanges in response to Soviet actions, we should avoid further dismantling of the framework of exchanges. Moreover, State believes that extending the

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agreement would provide a certain flexibility for us to tighten or relax exchange activities as deemed desirable in response to changes in overall U.S.-Soviet relations.

Given the very minimal level of activities currently taking place under the agreement, the expansion of activities as proposed by DOT would represent an apparently significant increase in cooperation under an amended agreement. However, in the context of all exchange activities under the eight agreements, this would actually amount to a miniscule overall expansion in cooperation. As such, the DOT proposal would not be inconsistent with our policy not to expand significantly the level or scope of our cooperative activities in the absence of improvements in Soviet behavior. Nevertheless, this question would more appropriately be addressed in the context of the negotiations for a longer-term agreement during the interim six-month extension.

DOD made no recommendation on the extension of the agreement. However, DOD's Office of Strategic Trade Policy expressed some concern about the risk of technology transfer through activities conducted under the agreement. This office suggested that language be incorporated in any amended agreement that cooperation is subject to the laws, regulations and international agreements of the cooperating parties.

Commerce's International Trade Administration (ITA) expressed the view that DOT did not make a good case for extending the agreement, and that the areas it wishes to address in the years ahead have potential military applications.

Committee on Exchanges (COMEX) reported it finds no particular problems with the proposed renewal of the agreement. It stated that since most of the details on commercial equipment involved in the exchange activities (OMEGA navigation systems and microwave landing systems) are available in the open literature it sees no significant potential for a loss of U.S. technology. COMEX did suggest, however, that the Intelligence Community be kept apprised of any Soviet developments on these systems.

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Other agencies, with the exception of the National Science Foundation (NSF), offered no comment or concurred. NSF commented informally that it does not agree with DOT's statement that NSF "supports" inclusion of welding technology under the agreement. NSF's comment is that it has "no objection" to the DOT proposal. NSF also expressed the view informally that in the past the balance of benefits favored the Soviets.

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**U.S. Department of
Transportation**

Office of the Secretary
of Transportation

400 Seventh St., S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20590

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MAR 15 1983

Mr. Byron Morton
Deputy Director for Exchanges
Office of Soviet Union Affairs
U.S. Department of State
Washington, D. C. 20520

Dear Byron:

Enclosed is the Department of Transportation's Position Paper on Renewal of the US-USSR Transportation Agreement as requested in your memorandum of December 20, 1982.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Bernard A. Ramundo".

Bernard A. Ramundo, Chief
International Cooperation Division
and Secretariat
Office of International Policy
and Programs

Enclosure

U.S. Department of Transportation
Position Paper

ISSUE

Renewal of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Transportation (the Agreement) which expires on June 19, 1983.

SUMMARY

Based upon the technical benefits already realized; the importance of Soviet (and with it, Eastern Bloc) support in the International Civil Aviation Organization for the standardization of U.S.-developed air navigational, safety-related equipment; the capability of keeping abreast of Soviet technological developments; and the potential for showcasing U.S. transportation technology for export, the renewal of the Agreement is recommended as being fully compatible with the Administration's criteria for program continuation: technical benefit or humanitarian purpose.

The suggested negotiating position is that the Agreement be renewed for (a) continuation of cooperation in the civil aviation and automobile transport (highway safety) areas, (b) expansion of cooperation on sea and air navigation systems, and (c) cancellation of cooperation in the areas of hazardous material transport and the magnetic levitation portion of transport of the future activities. Cooperation in the transport construction, urban research and development, and rail transport areas would be subject to technical-level determination concerning the desirability of resumption. As for term, we anticipate that five years will be needed to complete the work in the civil aviation area. If deemed desirable from the negotiating or monitoring of performance points of view, we could accept a two-year, automatic three-year renewal formula.

HISTORY

Cooperation in transportation between the United States and the Soviet Union, which began in 1968 with exploratory exchanges of technical delegations in the areas of bridge construction and tunneling, high-speed rail and containerization, and urban transport and the environment, was formalized by the conclusion on June 19, 1973, of the five-year U.S.-U.S.S.R. Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Transportation which was renewed on June 19, 1978, for two years and automatically extended in June 1980 for three years (until June 1983).

The U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) and the U.S.S.R. State Committee for Science and Technology (SCST) were designated as the Executive Agents for the respective parties. The Agreement established a U.S.-U.S.S.R. Joint Committee (JC) to oversee its implementation by meeting annually, alternating between Moscow and Washington. The Assistant Secretary of Transportation for Policy and International Affairs has, ex officio, served as the Chairman of the U.S. Section of the JC. The Deputy Chairman of the SCST, G.V. Aleksenko, who retired early in 1981 and since died, served as Chairman of the Soviet Section of the JC. His successor has not been named. During 1974-1979, the JC met five times and established Working Groups in technical areas of mutual interest, reviewed cooperative results, and approved annual programs.

Early in February 1978, the U.S. side cancelled all work in the Marine Transport Working Group because of continued Soviet recalcitrance in sharing ice transiting technology. After a program review carried out in late 1978 and early 1979, the JC, at its fifth meeting in Moscow in June 1979, agreed to curtail further cooperation in

accordance with U.S. proposals; i.e., to continue work only as need arose in the Civil Aviation subgroup areas of airworthiness, general aviation, security, and medical factors and discontinue the Facilitation (Cargo Documentation) and the Urban (Policy) Transport Working Groups. It was also agreed to expand the Transport of the Future Working Group to include urban research and development (R&D) topics. As a result, there are currently six Working Groups under the Agreement, as follows:

Transport of the Future (Magnetic Levitation and Urban R&D Topics)

Transport Construction (Bridge Construction and Tunneling)

Railroad Transport

Civil Aviation - with five subgroups:

Air Traffic Control (ATC)

Microwave Landing System (MLS)

Accident Investigation

Training and Education

Environmental Factors

Automobile Transport (Highway Safety)

Hazardous Materials Transport

After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, the Interagency Coordinating Committee for U.S.-Soviet Affairs (ICCUSA) adopted the policy of not scheduling any senior-level meetings with the Soviets, although agencies were requested to maintain technical cooperation beneficial to the United States, humanitarian activities, and participation with Soviet counterparts in multilateral cooperative forums. This policy was reinforced by the imposition of sanctions following the declaration of martial law in Poland in December 1981.

DOT implementation of the above policy resulted in suspension of JC or senior-level meetings during CYs 1980-82 and a 75% reduction in technical-level cooperative activity. Since January 1980, all meetings and activities with Soviets on subjects under the Agreement have been in the Civil Aviation Air Traffic Control and Microwave Landing System areas, which were continued under the guidance then in effect. Additional meetings and activities on these topics are planned for 1983 and 1984. Cooperative activities in all other Working Group areas were halted for a variety of problems, some performance and others Afghanistan-related, which could not be resolved because of the suspension of senior-level meetings. The Soviet side did propose a Third Symposium on Highway Safety in the U.S.S.R. in late 1981 or early 1982, but DOT had to decline due to lack of foreign travel funds.

Outside the Agreement, the U.S. Coast Guard hosted a Soviet Delegation in December 1980 for discussions on the compatibility of each country's sea navigation (communication) systems. In certain situations, signals of these systems interfere with each other, rendering them inoperable. Good progress was made during the 1980 meeting on gaining technical knowledge of each country's systems. As the Soviet representatives and U.S. Coast Guard officials considered it important to continue this dialogue in the interests of humanitarian and economic aspects of sea navigation safety, it was agreed that a follow-on meeting in the Soviet Union would be scheduled during 1981. While the senior Soviet representative has indicated in discussions with U.S. officials at various international meetings that an invitation for a meeting on this subject would be forthcoming, no official word concerning it has been received. The U.S. Coast Guard recommends that this important area be included as a major activity under the Agreement to benefit from support at the government level.

Beneficial cooperative activities in the area of welding technology of special interest to DOT highway specialists were being carried out under Project 01.0307 of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Joint Working Group on Electrometallurgy and Materials, chaired on the U.S. side by the National Science Foundation (NSF), under the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Science and Technology (S&T) Agreement. DOT was unable to bring cooperative work in this area of acknowledged Soviet excellence under the program of the Transport Construction Working Group because of jurisdictional problems on the Soviet side (i.e., the Paton Institute was not subordinated to the Ministry of Transport Construction, the Soviet counterpart of the DOT Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) in the Working Group). FHWA, however, supported the work under the S&T Agreement by furnishing technical expertise and, later, supplying welded specimens in exchange for specially developed fluxes from the Paton Institute for joint testing and sharing of results. As this work is now halted due to the expiration of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. S&T Agreement, DOT believes it would be worthwhile to pursue it under the Transportation Agreement and that SCST should be able to resolve the jurisdictional issue. NSF officials support the transfer of this activity.

ASSESSMENT OF BENEFITS

General

DOT specialists agree that cooperation with the Soviets has been, on the whole, technically beneficial and has contributed in varying degrees to the improvement of U.S. transportation systems. Although exchanges in the rail, tunneling, bridge construction, urban transport, and driver training areas were beneficial, the results of collaboration on perfecting the design and operation of civil aviation navigational

systems far outweigh benefits in other areas. DOT believes that as international air travel increases and systems are designed to support that expansion, it is important for humanitarian and economic reasons to cooperate with other major civil aviation countries to ensure that such systems the U.S. desires to use are not only compatible worldwide but accepted by competent international organizations as technically superior, best state-of-the-art, world standard equipment. In recognition of the above, cooperation in avionic systems has prospered and, in the case of one critical air traffic control system, has expanded to include close collaboration with United Kingdom (U.K.) specialists, giving this work an important trilateral character. (See details under Specific Benefits.)

The Agreement has also provided a vehicle to keep abreast of Soviet technological developments in transportation and has contributed to the promotion of sales of U.S. transportation technology and equipment. As a result of exposure to U.S. industry facilities under Agreement activities, the Soviets purchased rail-related equipment from Cardwell Westinghouse Company of Chicago, several large tunnel boring machines from the Robbins Manufacturing Company of Seattle, and have negotiated with many other companies for purchases of transportation equipment.

While problems associated with the compartmentalized Soviet bureaucracy have hampered cooperation at various times and frustrated efforts to maintain momentum in completing some of the planned activities, DOT specialists have learned to cope and, when deemed necessary, to recommend termination of nonproductive cooperative activity. Areas in which the Soviets have been apparently unwilling to share technology are: ice transiting technology, rail freight movement statistics, and magnetic levitation technology.

Specific Benefits - Policy Issues - Civil Aviation

Exceptional technical benefit and international support were derived from the activities of the Civil Aviation Microwave Landing System (MLS) and Air Traffic Control (ATC) Subgroups. While the MLS subgroup activities concentrate on a specific system, the ATC subgroup embodies a wide range of navigation, surveillance, and communications subjects. Established under the auspices of the ATC Subgroup is the above-mentioned trilateral U.S.-U.S.S.R.-U.K. Special Working Group focusing on Mode S development (improved secondary surveillance radar).

Currently, the Distance Measuring Equipment portion of the MLS and Mode S signal formats are undergoing the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) international standardization process. The United States has a substantial investment interest in these areas and benefits from Soviet technical input and voting support for the standardization of this equipment in ICAO. Other ATC activities consist mostly of technical information exchanges, generally beneficial to both parties, covering areas such as primary and secondary radar, the OMEGA navigation system, collision avoidance, human factors, and weather. Future exchanges could also include the use of satellites for civil aviation navigation which the Soviet side has expressed a willingness to discuss. This could provide useful information concerning their GLONASS satellite system.

Microwave Landing System (MLS)

The international acceptance of the signal format proposed by the United States and Australia for microwave landing system angle guidance was achieved with Soviet support at ICAO in 1978 after a difficult competition with the United Kingdom. The

Soviet bloc representatives accounted for 15% of the votes in support of the U.S. proposal. Without this support, the U.S.-Australian-designed system might not have been chosen, jeopardizing a U.S. research and development investment of over \$100 million but, more importantly, resulting in the choice of a technically inferior system. Cooperation with the Soviet Union in this area is still required to achieve U.S. goals for:

1. the standardization of the Precision Distance Measuring Equipment signal format associated with the MLS,
2. MLS operational procedures,
3. the acceptance of a transition plan from the current Instrument Landing System (ILS) to the new MLS, and
4. the determination of an ILS protection date favorable to the United States.

Some of the above subjects are still contentious and could substantially penalize U.S. aviation industry interests if adverse decisions were taken in ICAO.

Within the next two years, tests of Soviet and U.S. MLS receivers are planned at the DOT Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Technical Center (using U.S. ground equipment) and in Leningrad (using Soviet ground equipment). Besides demonstrating to the international civil aviation community the universal compatibility of MLS, these tests will promote an exchange of design concepts and related technologies which could improve the U.S. and U.S.S.R. systems and enhance the potential for U.S. manufacturers.

Air Traffic Control (ATC)

Mode S (Improved Secondary Surveillance Radar)

Discussions with Soviets were instrumental in achieving a common view for the Mode S signal format. The Soviet Union is represented on the Secondary Surveillance

Radar (SSR) Improvement and Collision Avoidance Systems (SICAS) panel of ICAO, which is scheduled to meet for the first time in May 1983. The SICAS panel will then initiate the standardization process of Mode S and of the Traffic Alert Collision Avoidance System (TCAS), a key element of the FAA's National Airspace Plan. Delaying tactics from country members not yet willing to invest in Mode S equipment are anticipated in this panel. Soviet support will help to counter these delaying efforts and ensure that the U.S. Mode S equipment, scheduled for operational use within the next few years, will be covered by accepted international standards.

In September 1981, a Soviet Mode S transponder was installed on FAA aircraft and successfully tested at the FAA Technical Center. At the May 1982 meeting, the U.S. and U.S.S.R. agreed to jointly test their Mode S transponders in Leningrad in 1984 in order to demonstrate Mode S compatibility and capability to the ICAO community, the success of which would enhance the U.S. technical position in ICAO. The technical exchange generated by this joint engineering effort will promote a better understanding of Soviet concepts and techniques, which could find application in the U.S. Mode S system and enhance the export potential for U.S. manufacturers. Several possible applications of the Mode S Data Link will also be ready to test at that time. (The Data Link is a means to provide useful information to the pilot, such as weather conditions, clearance information, certain types of alarms, and other useful functions.) The international civil aviation community has not yet indicated which applications it prefers. The tests would demonstrate, in an international context, the desirability of specific applications of interest to the United States, and significantly encourage their

international acceptance. The Soviet technical input would also be significant because development work could be coordinated to supplement our own programs, thereby reducing research costs.

The U.S. candidate for a collision avoidance system, TCAS, is dependent on the Mode S Data Link. TCAS will be discussed at the SICAS panel meeting. Although the Soviet Union has expressed little interest in this type of system for domestic use, cooperation on Mode S will almost certainly result in Soviet support for TCAS and will be useful to offset any possible opposition from other members of the panel.

Other ATC Activities

- a. Discussions on ATC-related subjects (control center configurations, weather data processing, Data Link applications, and training of controllers) provided an opportunity to examine and evaluate Soviet technical progress in these areas. The new Moscow ATC center uses techniques not yet applied in U.S. centers, which indicates that equipment at least as advanced as U.S. systems will be used at their major centers. This kind of information is useful in assessing and adjusting FAA programs.
- b. The Soviet Union is cooperating with the United States in evaluating the air signal reliability of the OMEGA navigation system. This is a system used by pilots to determine their in-flight positions, and signal strength variations (with respect to time of day and location) need to be known in order to assure the accuracy of the position. The Soviets have installed two U.S.-provided recorders on their aircraft for this purpose and are to provide OMEGA signal recordings obtained over areas unavailable to the Western World. They have

also provided useful papers describing OMEGA signal behavior over the Polar area bordering the Soviet Union. Cooperation in this field is productive and ought to be continued.

- c. The use of satellites for civil aviation navigation is a subject which is now ready for discussion with the Soviet Union. Discussions of this topic within the ATC Subgroup could provide information on Soviet techniques and procedures, such as might be embodied in GLONASS and other Soviet navigation satellites. Such discussions could also provide a foundation for an approach to the international use of a satellite-generated signal by the world civil aviation community. This is a complex problem, involving difficult control techniques and procedures, soon to be discussed in ICAO. The potential for avoiding preemptive unilateral action by the Soviet Union in this area would be enhanced by a bilateral cooperative effort.

DOT believes that much, if not all, of the ongoing work in the above areas, importantly related to the safety of air travel and the investment involved in the development of these new systems, would be seriously jeopardized if the Agreement is not renewed.

RECOMMENDED NEGOTIATING POSITION

1. The Department of Transportation recommends that the Agreement be renewed, with modifications, for a period of five years. If deemed desirable from the negotiating or monitoring of performance points of view, we could accept a two-year, automatic three-year renewal formula along the lines of the one adopted in 1978.

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

2. If the Agreement is approved for renewal, the Department would like to make the following modifications:

- establishment of a working group on sea navigation systems.
- bring cooperation in welding technology under the Transport Construction Working Group, which work was formerly carried out under the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Science and Technology Agreement and supported by DOT research funds.
- cancellation of cooperation in the area of hazardous material transport (as duplicative of exchanges with Soviet specialists in multilateral organizations) and the magnetic levitation portion of the Transport of the Future Working Group activities (because the Soviets have not been forthcoming in sharing their work in this field).
- cooperation in the transport construction, bridge construction and tunneling, urban R&D, and rail transport areas would not be deleted until a U.S.-Soviet technical-level determination is made concerning the desirability of resumption.

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

COOPERATION IN TRANSPORTATION

**Agreement Between the
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
and the UNION OF
SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS**

Signed at Washington June 19, 1973



UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

Cooperation in Transportation

*Agreement signed at Washington June 19, 1973;
Entered into force June 19, 1973.*

AGREEMENT BETWEEN
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
ON COOPERATION IN THE FIELD OF TRANSPORTATION

The Government of the United States of America and the
Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics;

Recognizing the important role played by safe and efficient
transportation systems in the development of all countries;

Considering that the improvement of existing transportation
systems and techniques can benefit both of their peoples;

Believing that the combined efforts of the two countries in
this field can contribute to more rapid and efficient solutions of
transportation problems than would be possible through separate,
parallel national efforts;

Desiring to promote the establishment of long-term and
productive relationships between transportation specialists and
institutions of both countries;

In pursuance and further development of the Agreement between
the Government of the United States of America and the Government of
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Cooperation in the Fields
of Science and Technology of May 24, 1972,^[1] and in accordance with
the Agreement on Exchanges and Cooperation in Scientific, Technical,
Educational, Cultural and Other Fields of April 11, 1972,^[2] and in
accordance with the Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of
Environmental Protection of May 23, 1972;^[3]

Have agreed as follows:

¹ TIAS 7346; 23 UST 856.

² TIAS 7343; 23 UST 790.

³ TIAS 7345; 23 UST 845.

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ARTICLE 1

The Parties will develop and carry out cooperation in the field of transportation on the basis of mutual benefit, equality and reciprocity.

ARTICLE 2

This cooperation will be directed to the investigation and solution of specific problems of mutual interest in the field of transportation. Initially, cooperation will be implemented in the following areas:

- a. Construction of bridges and tunnels, including problems of control of structure stress and fracture, and special construction procedures under cold climatic conditions.
- b. Railway transport, including problems of rolling stock, track and roadbed, high speed traffic, automation, and cold weather operation.
- c. Civil aviation, including problems of increasing efficiency and safety.
- d. Marine transport, including technology of maritime shipping and cargo handling in seaports.
- e. Automobile transport, including problems of traffic safety.

Other areas of cooperation may be added by mutual agreement.

ARTICLE 3

Cooperation provided for in the preceding Articles may take the following forms:

- a. Exchange of scientists and specialists;
- b. Exchange of scientific and technical information and documentation;
- c. Convening of joint conferences, meetings and seminars; and
- d. Joint planning, development and implementation of research programs and projects.

Other forms of cooperation may be added by mutual agreement.

ARTICLE 4

In furtherance of the aims of this Agreement, the Parties will, as appropriate, encourage, facilitate and monitor the development of cooperation and direct contacts between agencies, organizations and firms of the two countries, including the conclusion, as appropriate, of implementing agreements for carrying out specific projects and programs under this Agreement.

ARTICLE 5

1. For the implementation of this Agreement, there shall be established a US-USSR Joint Committee on Cooperation in Transportation. This Committee shall meet, as a rule, once a year, alternately in the United States and the Soviet Union, unless otherwise mutually agreed.

2. The Joint Committee shall take such action as is necessary for effective implementation of this Agreement, including, but not limited to, approval of specific projects and programs of cooperation; designation of appropriate agencies and organizations to be responsible for carrying out cooperative activities; and making recommendations, as appropriate, to the Parties.

3. Each Party shall designate its Executive Agent which will be responsible for carrying out this Agreement. During the period between meetings of the Joint Committee, the Executive Agents shall maintain contact with each other, keep each other informed of activities and progress in implementing this Agreement, and coordinate and supervise the development and implementation of cooperative activities conducted under this Agreement.

ARTICLE 6

Nothing in this Agreement shall be interpreted to prejudice other agreements between the Parties or their respective rights and obligations under such other agreements.

ARTICLE 7

1. This Agreement shall enter into force upon signature and shall remain in force for five years. It may be modified or extended by mutual agreement of the Parties.

2. The termination of this Agreement shall not affect the validity of implementing agreements concluded under this Agreement between interested agencies, organizations and firms of the two countries.

DONE at Washington, this 19th day of June, 1973, in duplicate, in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS:

William P. Rogers [1] *A. Gromyko* [2]

¹ William P. Rogers
² A. Gromyko

COOPERATION IN TRANSPORTATION

**Agreement Between the
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
and the UNION OF SOVIET
SOCIALIST REPUBLICS**

**Amending and Extending the
Agreement of June 19, 1973**

**Effected by Exchange of Notes
Dated at Washington June 19, 1978**





NOTE BY THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Pursuant to Public Law 89-497, approved July 8, 1966 (80 Stat. 271; 1 U.S.C. 113)—

“. . . the Treaties and Other International Acts Series issued under the authority of the Secretary of State shall be competent evidence . . . of the treaties, international agreements other than treaties, and proclamations by the President of such treaties and international agreements other than treaties, as the case may be, therein contained, in all the courts of law and equity and of maritime jurisdiction, and in all the tribunals and public offices of the United States, and of the several States, without any further proof or authentication thereof.”

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. Subscription Price: \$100 per year; \$25 additional for foreign mailing. Single copies vary in price. This issue \$1.00.



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UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS


Cooperation in Transportation

*Agreement amending and extending the agreement of
June 19, 1973.*

Effected by exchange of notes

Dated at Washington June 19, 1978;

Entered into force June 19, 1978.



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The Department of State to the Soviet Embassy

The Department of State presents its compliments to the Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and has the honor to propose the following:

With reference to the Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Cooperation in Transportation,^[1] which expires on June 18, 1978, the Department, acting pursuant to Article 7, proposes that the Agreement be extended until June 19, 1980 with the following modifications:

The Preamble to read as follows:

The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics;
Noting that the Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Cooperation in the Field of Transportation, signed in Washington on June 19, 1973, has a term of five years;

Recognizing the important role played by safe and efficient transportation systems in the development of all countries and that the improvement of existing transportation systems and techniques can benefit both of their peoples;

Believing that the combined efforts of the two countries

¹ TIAS 7652; 24 UST 1463.



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in this field can contribute to more rapid and efficient solutions of transportation problems than would be possible through separate, parallel national efforts; Desiring to continue to promote the establishment of long-term and productive relationships between transportation specialists and institutions of both countries; In pursuance and further development of the Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Cooperation in the fields of Science and Technology of May 24, 1972, as extended;^[1] and in accordance with the Agreement on Exchanges and Cooperation in Scientific, Technical, Educational, Cultural and other fields of June 19, 1973;^[2] and in accordance with the Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Environmental Protection of May 23, 1972,^[3] as extended;

Have agreed as follows:

Article 2 to read as follows:

This cooperation will be directed to the investigation and solution of specific problems of mutual interest in the Field of Transportation. The specific problems will be established by mutual agreement.

Article 4 to read as follows:

In furtherance of the aims of this agreement, the Parties will, as appropriate, encourage, facilitate and monitor the development of cooperation and direct contacts between agencies, organizations and firms of the two countries, including the facilitation of national participation across organizational lines and the conclusion, as appropriate, of implementing agreements for carrying out specific

¹ TIAS 7346, 8619; 23 UST 856; 28 UST 5191.

² TIAS 7640; 24 UST 1395.

³ TIAS 7345; 23 UST 845.

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projects and programs under this Agreement. The Parties will also ensure that, in accordance with agreed cooperative activity, access to technology, institutes, organizations, and individuals participating in joint cooperative activity, and to scientific and technical data will be made available on an equal, reciprocal and mutually beneficial basis.

Article 5, paragraph 3 to read as follows:

Each Party shall designate its Executive Agent which will be responsible for carrying out this Agreement. During the period between meetings of the Joint Committee, the Executive Agents shall maintain contact with each other, including appropriate mid-year reviews; keep each other informed of activities and progress in implementing this Agreement; and coordinate and supervise the development and implementation of cooperative activities conducted under this Agreement.

Article 7, paragraph 1 to read as follows:

This Agreement as modified and extended shall remain in force until June 19, 1980. The Agreement will be extended for an additional three year period unless one party notifies the other of the termination thereof not less than thirty days prior to June 19, 1980.

If the foregoing proposal is acceptable to the Soviet side, it is proposed that this note and the Embassy's reply to that effect shall constitute an agreement between the Parties.

Department of State,

Washington, June 19, 1978.

raw

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MEMORANDUM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

June 15, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR ADM. JOHN POINDEXTER

THROUGH: CHARLES P. TYSON

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*SUBJECT: Schedule Proposal for President's Meeting with
FRG Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher

Attached at Tab I is a schedule proposal for FRG Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher to meet with the President on for July 11. Genscher will brief the President on Chancellor Kohl's trip to Moscow. The President agreed to the meeting at Williamsburg.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the schedule proposal at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Tab I Schedule proposal
Tab A State memo with Genscher schedule

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 26, 1997
By *CAH* NARA, Date *5/31/02*

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~SCHEDULE PROPOSAL

TO: FREDERICK J. RYAN, JR.
PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS AND SCHEDULING

FROM: JOHN M. POINDEXTER

REQUEST: Meeting between the President and FRG
Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher

PURPOSE: To receive direct briefing on Chancellor
Kohl's Moscow trip.

BACKGROUND: During the President's bilateral discussion
with Chancellor Kohl at Williamsburg, Kohl
proposed to send Foreign Minister Genscher
to Washington to brief the President on
Kohl's trip to Moscow. Both the President
and Secretary Shultz accepted Chancellor
Kohl's offer.

PREVIOUS:
PARTICIPATION: President has met with Genscher on two
previous occasions, most recently in
January, 1983

DATE AND TIME: July 11, 1983, 2:00 p.m.
DURATION: 30 minutes

LOCATION: Oval Office

PARTICIPANTS: U.S.: The President, Vice President,
Secretary Shultz, William P. Clark,
Assistant Secretary Richard Burt, Amb.
Jack Matlock
German: Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich
Genscher, Amb. Hermes, plus interpreter

OUTLINE OF EVENT: 30 minute briefing session

REMARKS REQUIRED: Briefing paper and talking points to be
provided by NSC.

MEDIA COVERAGE: Photo opportunity at beginning of meeting or
White House photo release at minimum.

RECOMMENDED BY: Department of State

OPPOSED BY: None.

PROJECT OFFICER: Charles P. Tyson

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By CS NARA, Date 5/31/02

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 10, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Request for Appointment with the President
for FRG Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher

During the bilateral discussion at Williamsburg, FRG Chancellor Kohl proposed to send Genscher to Washington after the Germans' Moscow trip, July 4-8. Both the President and the Secretary accepted the offer.

The Germans have suggested Monday, July 11, which is the earliest that Genscher can come. (He is committed to reporting to the Bundestag on July 7 and 8 on the German EC Presidency.) He will see the Secretary for a meeting and working lunch, and we recommend that the President receive him for thirty minutes in the afternoon.

A tentative schedule for Genscher's visit is attached.

Attachment:

Tentative Schedule

Charles Hill
Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

DECLASSIFIED
Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
By CAS NARA, Date 5/31/02

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TENTATIVE SCHEDULE FOR THE VISIT OF
FRG FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER

Sunday, July 10

Evening Arrival at Washington-Dulles (to be greeted by Assistant Secretary for European Affairs Richard Burt)

Monday, July 11

11:00 a.m. The Foreign Minister's Meeting with Secretary Shultz

12:30 p.m. Working Lunch hosted by the Secretary

Afternoon Meeting with the President (30 minutes)

Departure for Bonn

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET~~

June 24, 1983

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Andropov Reply to President's Congratulatory Message

Andropov's reply to the President's congratulations avoids code words known to be offensive to us (such as "peaceful coexistence"). However, instead of speaking of working together, as the President did, he implies in his last sentence that the burden of proof is on us to take "practical steps."

This thrust is consistent with Gromyko's recent comments on the prospects for a summit, which also implied that a change in U.S. policy is necessary. I consider this an obvious but not surprising attempt to position the Soviets as the aggrieved party. The main implication for our own public statements is to continue the same cautious, non-committal line we have followed up to now in commenting on the prospects for a summit meeting.

Attachment

Tab I Letter to President from Andropov

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR FD-714/1 #5787

BY CW NARA DATE 11/27/07

His Excellency
Ronald Wilson Reagan
President of the United States of America
Washington, D.C.

June 22, 1983

Dear Mr. President,

I thank you for congratulating me on my election as
Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Availing myself of this opportunity I would like to
reaffirm the unbending commitment of the Soviet leadership
and the people of the Soviet Union to the cause of peace,
the elimination of the nuclear threat, and the development
of relations based on mutual benefit and equality with
all nations, including the United States of America.

We shall welcome practical steps of your government
in this direction.

Sincerely,

Y. ANDROPOV

DECLASSIFIED / (RELEASED)
Authority: NLSF 99-051 #145
BY: CTD, NARA, Date: 5/31/02

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Его Превосходительству
Рональду Уилсону Рейгану,
Президенту Соединенных Штатов Америки
Вашингтон, О.К.

Уважаемый господин президент,

Благодарю Вас за поздравление в связи с избранием меня
Председателем Президиума Верховного Совета СССР.

Пользуясь этим случаем, хотел бы подтвердить неуклонную
приверженность советского руководства и народа Советского
Союза делу мира, устранению ядерной угрозы, развитию взаимо-
выгодных, равноправных отношений со всеми странами, в том
числе с Соединенными Штатами Америки.

Мы будем приветствовать практические шаги вашего прави-
тельства в этом направлении.

С уважением,

Ю.АНДРОПОВ

22 июня 1983 года

DECLASSIFIED / (RELEASED)
Authority NLSF99-051 #166
BY CAS, NARA, Date 5/31/02

6/17/83
u e

Dear Mr. President:

Please accept my congratulations upon your election as Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

As you assume your new duties, I hope that together we can find ways to promote peace by reducing the levels of armaments and moving toward the elimination of force and threats of force in settling international disputes. You will have my full cooperation in moving toward these goals on a basis of equality, reciprocity, and respect for the rights and interests of all.

Sincerely,

His Excellency
Yuri Vladimirovich Andropov
Chairman, Presidium of the Supreme
Soviet of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics
Moscow

DECLASSIFIED (RE/EA/SE/)
White House Guidelines, August 29, 1997
By CAS NARA, Date 5/21/02

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

SENSITIVE

ACTION

June 25, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: JACK E. MATLOCK *gm*

SUBJECT: US-Soviet Cultural Exchanges

Charles Wick sent you a memorandum (Tab A) concerning the issue of reciprocity in US-Soviet Cultural Exchanges and the need to develop a draft agreement and negotiating strategy.

At Tab I is a memorandum from you to Secretary Shultz which forwards the Wick memorandum and requests that the Secretary brief the Director on the results of his recent 60-minute meeting with the President. Also, at Tab II is a memorandum from you to the Director, informing him that you forwarded his memorandum to Secretary Shultz, who will discuss the issue of exchanges with him shortly.

PD
Paula Dobriansky concurs.

Recommendation

That you sign the memoranda at Tabs I and II to Secretary Shultz and Director Wick, respectively.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

- Tab I Memorandum for SecState
- Tab A Memorandum from Director Wick
- Tab II Memorandum for Director, USIA

WHITE HOUSE
DECLASSIFIED
Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
By *CAS* NARA, Date *10/7/02*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
The Secretary of State

SUBJECT: US-Soviet Cultural Exchanges (U)

At Tab A is a memorandum from Charlie Wick regarding the issue of US-Soviet Cultural Exchanges and the need to develop a draft agreement and negotiating strategy. I suggest that you brief Charlie on your recent 60-minute meeting with the President and his approval in principle of the desirability of negotiating a US-Soviet Cultural Agreement.

William P. Clark

Attachment

Tab A Memorandum from Director, USIA

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 21, 1997
By CS NARA, Date 10/7/02

SECRET
Declassify on: OADR

SENSITIVE

**United States
Information
Agency**

Washington, D.C. 20547

Director

SYSTEM II

90791



~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

June 22, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable
Judge William P. Clark, Jr.

FROM: Charles Z. Wick *[Signature]*

SUBJECT: Reciprocity in US-Soviet Cultural Exchanges

Following up on the memo George Shultz and I sent to the President on "Promoting Political Change in the USSR" (Tab A), I would like to draw your attention to the attached telegrams from Moscow and Leningrad (Tabs B, C, and D).

In brief, they reflect the fact that American performers are confined to appearing in official U.S. residences in the Soviet Union, while Soviet performers can appear anywhere in the U.S.

I had hoped that the issue of exchanges with the Soviet Union, as outlined in the memo cited above, might be raised at our SPG meeting on June 8. The problem of imbalance and lack of strict reciprocity in exchanges with the Soviets will continue to persist until we deal with the issue. I look forward to your response on this matter.

Attachments

- A. Memorandum: "Promoting Political Change in the USSR"
- B. Moscow 6276 (LOU)
- C. Moscow 6700 (LOU)
- D. Leningrad 1354 (LOU)

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

(CONFIDENTIAL UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT A)

Classified by: Charles Z. Wick
Office Symbol: D
Declassify (or downgrade) on:
"Originating Agency
Determination Required"

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997

By CWS NARA, Date 10/7/02

MEMORANDUM FOR:

From:

SUBJECT:

NSDD-75 set as a basic task political change within the USSR radio broadcasting, our most imp penetration and promotion of dem exchanges activities and the exh that we should reverse a pattern instead expanding those which ca promoting change in the Soviet official framework for handling reciprocity to prevent the Sovi advantage from their activities of our access to the Soviet per

This paper recommends an a official framework which would level of reciprocity and ideol Union by the United States.

Problem and Opportunity

Vladimir Bukovsky has wr/ when he visited the US Nation the one at which Khrushchev kitchen. But, we have had r since 1979. We have allowe aspects of the exchanges ag the past three years we hav created.

One of the main advant they opened great fields o where we had a clear advar provided the means to obt: growing Soviet effort to institutions and individu

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 100-714/1 #5793

BY: CN NARA DATE 11/27/07

Armand Hammer in partnership with Jerry Weintraub recently established an organization to bring Soviet cultural and other attractions to the US, with no known guarantee of reciprocity. We are also aware the Soviets are working with some other impresarios or individuals on possible performing arts tours, including a visit by the Moscow Circus this fall. The ready access that Soviet propagandists have to US media without reciprocity is well known. The Soviets arranged a series of Soviet film weeks at the prestigious Smithsonian Institution last fall.

Under current circumstances we have no ready means of enforcing reciprocity in such endeavors. The present visa law does not permit us to refuse visas for that purpose. The result is that, according to the FBI, there is an increasing percentage of KGB agents in the groups the Soviets are unilaterally sending to the U.S. We can better control this problem with a better handle on visa issuance. We are seeking changes to visa procedures that would permit us greater latitude in refusing visas for policy reasons. That could facilitate control over visits by obvious propagandists, but it would still be a clumsy weapon, poorly suited to dealing with highly visible cultural visits. We should, nevertheless, use our anticipated new ability to refuse visas as leverage to get a more satisfactory overall official exchanges framework permitting us to compete more effectively in the ideological conflict in which we are engaged.

Our previous exchanges agreements with the Soviet Union basically repeated the form and content of the first, concluded in 1958, and were never altogether satisfactory. In approaching a new official agreement we would review the old agreements and our current interests to determine what our negotiating targets should be without regard for what we may perceive as Soviet negotiating requirements. (We would, of course, prepare an estimate of Soviet positions as part of the preparations for negotiations.)

In developing our negotiating targets, our aim will be to improve our penetration of Soviet society. During the negotiations on a new overall framework for exchanges, we would concentrate on the following specific areas in which the U.S. has the clear advantage or in which, through enforcement of strict reciprocity, we need to offset a current advantage held by the Soviets:

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~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

-3-

USIA Thematic Exhibits -- Our exhibits, when in the USSR, provide the U.S. Government its best opportunity to acquaint millions of people in all walks of life throughout the Soviet Union with the many aspects of American life: our democratic system, our foreign and domestic policies and our hopes and aspirations for peace and prosperity for all peoples of the world. As a communication medium, in contrast to radio broadcasting, our exhibits bring the Soviet people into a two-way face-to-face dialogue with our American Russian-speaking guides who staff the exhibits. The Agency's exhibits had such overwhelming ideological impact that the exchange of thematic exhibits under the previous official exchanges agreements became anathema to the Soviet authorities. Thus, it is clear that if the U.S. Government once again is to take advantage of this most effective ideological weapon against the Soviet Union, it will be able to do so only by adopting the same negotiating position we used during previous negotiations -- no USIA thematic exhibits, no official exchanges agreement.

Radio and TV -- Currently, Soviet propagandists have easy access to US media without reciprocity. We will insist on greatly improved access to Soviet nation-wide electronic media to reach the largest possible audience with our message. For example, we have in mind setting an annual minimum for US and Soviet appearances on political discussion programs on each other's television.

Publications -- The US has always enjoyed a clear advantage in the popularity and appeal of our Russian-language America Illustrated magazine in the Soviet Union compared with its Soviet counterpart in the U.S., Soviet Life. In fact, the note you sent Charlie with the "special introductory offer" for Soviet Life (mailer attached at tab A) illustrates how they have to push their product. Our magazine goes like hot cakes in the Soviet Union. Under a new agreement we would seek to negotiate a higher level of distribution of our magazine inside the USSR.

Educational and Academic Exchanges -- With these exchanges we reach elite audiences, build long-term contacts inside institutions producing future Soviet leaders and help build and maintain the base of US expertise on the Soviet Union.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

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~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

-4-

Performing Arts -- Performing groups presenting the finest of American theater, dance and music in modern, classical and popular genre can provide large numbers of Soviet citizens with a view of the exciting possibilities of free cultural development, a process denied by their system.

American and Soviet Films -- The Soviets have been able to put on film weeks in a number of major American cities, but we have received no reciprocity for this. Under a new exchanges agreement we would insist on reciprocal film weeks in the Soviet Union.

Access to Soviet Elites -- Soviet officials, propagandists and academics have almost unlimited access to our institutions, for which we will insist on reciprocity under the framework of a new agreement.

Should you decide to seek to negotiate a new framework for exchanges along the above lines, we will find the Soviets receptive in certain respects, although there will be a long fight on specifics. Soviet authorities believe that they derive political benefits from agreements with us. Ironically, they also know that official agreements serve a very practical purpose -- in their rigidly planned bureaucratic society official agreements make it easier to obtain the necessary budgets to finance the concrete expenditures encountered by the Soviet ministries and organizations engaged in exchanges-type activities in the US and the USSR.

A decision to move toward a new bilateral exchanges agreement with the Soviet Union will encounter some opposition as well as considerable support domestically. We will want to make the point to our public and the Congress that a new agreement enforcing reciprocity is to our great advantage (there is a strong constituency on the Hill for the exchanges.) In general, we believe that our Allies will welcome such a decision as further evidence of our willingness to deal seriously with the Soviet leadership. We will, of course, want to consult with the Allies before announcing any decision, to ensure that they fully understand our reasons and that they understand it is not a move to initiate a rapprochement with the USSR.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

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~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

-5-

If you agree with our view of the importance of building a new framework for conducting exchanges and enforcing reciprocity, USIA will develop, in cooperation with the Department of State and other interested agencies, a draft agreement and negotiating strategy. When that process is completed, we would then propose to you appropriate timing for an approach to the Soviets on opening negotiations.

Recommendation:

That you authorize us to develop a draft exchanges agreement and negotiating strategy.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

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PAGE 01

027536 ICA462
19/12482

027536 ICA462

ACTION OFFICE EU-03
INFO TCO-01 DSO-02 DIS-01 PGMD-02 PDC-04 PGMG-01 PGF-02
PGMR-01 PGMP-02 PPF-01 ECA-00 BVB-01 BBGA-01 BBCX-01
BVBE-01 BVBU-02 BVG-01 PPMI-02 PFFE-01 /038 A2 2

R 191244Z MAY 83
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC 4237
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6759
INFO RUHFLG/AMCONSUL Leningrad 2242
BT
~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~ MOSCOW 06276

EU FOR DILLEN, P/RSE

STATE FOR EUR/SOEX

E.O. 12356: N/A

SUBJECT: MINCULT: PERSONNEL SHIFTS AND LOCAL RELATIONS

1. SUMMARY: IN TWO RECENT CONVERSATIONS WITH MINCULT REPS, WE HAVE BEEN TOLD OF MAJOR PERSONNEL SHIFT OF INDIVIDUALS WHO HAVE RESPONSIBILITY FOR WESTERN RELATIONS WITHIN MINCULT'S FOREIGN SECTION. IN ADDITION, [REDACTED] END SUMMARY.

2. AT A RECENT SPASO HOUSE EVENT, MINCULT AMERICAN DESK OFFICER VLADIMIR I. LITVINOV COVLY TOLD US THAT WE HAD SENT INVITATIONS TO THREE MINCULT OFFICIALS WHO NO LONGER WORKED AT THE MINISTRY. WHEN PRESSED, HE TOLD US THAT VASILYI F. KUKHARSKII, DEPUTY MINISTER (MUSIC) WAS ILL AND WOULD NO DOUBT SOON RETIRE; SERGEI S. IVAN'KO, CHIEF OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS SECTION, HAD RECEIVED A PROMOTION AND WAS NOW DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF NOVOSTI, AND THAT IVAN'KO'S DEPUTY, IVAN I. BODYUL, HAD LEFT TO TAKE UP A POSITION IN HUNGARY. LITVINOV COMPLAINED THAT ALL HAD BEEN INVOLVED IN THINGS AMERICAN, BUT NOW HE AND HIS BOSS, ALLA BUTROVA, (WHO WAS IN LENINGRAD FOR A COUPLE OF WEEKS) WERE THE ONLY ONES LEFT. HE KNEW OF NO IMMEDIATE APPOINTMENTS AND HE WAS LEFT, HE SAID, ATTENDING ALL OF THE MEETINGS. WHEN QUERIED ABOUT THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THESE CHANGES, LITVINOV SAID THAT IF THERE WERE POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE TO THE MOVES, NO ONE HAD TOLD HIM. DETAILS OF SOLUH/KIPNIS FOLLOW SEPTTEL.

3. LITVINOV THEN WENT ON TO DISCUSS SOME OF THE REQUESTS THAT THE MINISTRY HAD RECEIVED FROM AMERICAN IMPRESSARIOS, BUT INDICATED THAT NO DECISIONS HAD BEEN MADE ON THEIR FEASIBILITY. THE GILELS CONCERT HAD COME OFF VERY WELL, BUT HE WAS A SPECIAL CASE. NOW THAT THE QUESTION CONCERNED THE MOSCOW CIRCUS FOR THIS FALL OR POSSIBLE LARGE GROUPS FOR THE OLYMPIC ARTS FESTIVAL, [REDACTED]

LITVINOV OPINED THAT IT WOULD ALL BE SO MUCH EASIER IF THERE WERE A NEW AGREEMENT, BUT SAID HE THOUGHT THAT WAS A LONG WAY OFF.

4. LITVINOV TOLD US THAT THE MINISTRY HAD RECEIVED AN URGENT TELEX FROM JERRY WEINTRAUB ASKING THEM TO FACILITATE A VISA, BUT SINCE THEY DIDN'T KNOW WHY HE WANTED TO COME, THEY ASKED FOR CLARIFICATION. EMBOFF REMARKED THAT MINCULT AND WEINTRAUB HAD BEEN NEGOTIATING A DEAL FOR THE MOSCOW CIRCUS AND DIDN'T IT SEEM REASONABLE THAT THIS WAS THE SUBJECT. LITVINOV SAID THAT IT PROBABLY WAS, BUT THEY NEEDED CONFORMATION BEFORE SUPPORTING A VISA.

5. SOLUH/KIPNIS CONCERT: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] P
[REDACTED] POST HAD STRESSED THAT CONGEN LENINGRAD HAD HAD LITTLE SUCCESS IN GETTING HELP IN THE PAST. EMBOFF INDICATED THE IRONY OF THE CURRENT SITUATION WHERE THE "UPRAVLENIE KULTURY" IN LENINGRAD HAD SECURED A HARPSICHORD FOR THE CONGEN'S RESIDENCE, ARRANGED MEETINGS AT THE CONSERVATORY, AND AT THE MUSEUM OF OLD INSTRUMENTS, WHILE IN MOSCOW, OUTSIDE OF ONE MEETING, THE EMBASSY HAD ARRANGED EVERYTHING ON ITS OWN. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] LITVINOV SAID THAT THE PROBLEMS AT THE GLINKA MUSEUM HAD CAUSED HIM PERSONAL EMBARRASSMENT BECAUSE HE HAD SET UP THE ARRANGEMENTS. HE SAID THAT THE GLINKA MANAGEMENT HAD BEEN EXCITED ABOUT THE CONCERT, AND WERE SURE THAT THEY COULD RESCHEDULE ANOTHER CONCERT SLATED AT THE SAME TIME, BUT FOUND OUT THEY COULDN'T. HE SHRUGGED HIS SHOULDERS, WHEN WE REMINDED HIM THAT WE HAD FOUND THE HARPSICHORD AND AGREED TO THE LOAN WITH THE MUSICIAN HIMSELF. NONETHELESS, LITVINOV ASSURED US THAT AS FAR AS HE COULD HE WAS PREPARED TO COOPERATE WITH US [REDACTED] AND MEETINGS WITH MINCULT INSTITUTIONS. BUT, HE REPEATED, [REDACTED] ZIMMERMANN

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INCOMING
TELEGRAM

UNITED STATES
INFORMATION AGENCY

PAGE 01

038790 ICA454
27/1414Z

ACTION OFFICE PDC-04
INFO TCO-01 DSO-02 DIS-01 PGMD-02 PGM-01 EU-03 PGMR-01
/015 A2 2

R 271408Z MAY 83
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC 4282
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7054
RUFH LG/AMCONSUL Leningrad 2346
BT

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USIA FOR EU (DILLEN), P/RSE, P/DC (CARSTONES)

STATE FOR EUR/SOV, EUR/SOV/SOEX

E. O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: UR, OEXC, SCUL

SUBJECT: VISIT OF FLUTIST JOHN SOLUM AND HARPSICHORDIST
SCORES GIVEN THEM BY DENISOV.

6. NEXT STOP WAS MAYKAPAR'S APARTMENT FOR TALK ABOUT HARPSICHORDS AND THE STATUS OF BAROQUE MUSIC IN THE U. S. S. R. OVER TEA KIPNIS AND SOLUM ASKED MAYKAPAR NUMEROUS QUESTIONS ABOUT EARLY MUSIC IN THE SOVIET UNION FOR AN ARTICLE THEY WILL SUBMIT TO THE OXFORD UNIVERSITY JOURNAL "EARLY MUSIC." THOUGH THERE ARE VERY FEW GOOD HARPSICHORDISTS IN THE U. S. S. R. AND RELATIVELY LITTLE MATERIAL TRANSLATED INTO RUSSIAN, MAYKAPAR HAS MADE GREAT EFFORTS TO KEEP CURRENT WITH THE LITERATURE, AND KIPNIS HAS PROMISED TO SEND HIM SOME MATERIAL THROUGH P AND C. THE DAY CLOSED WITH A RELAXING DINNER AT THE CAO'S RESIDENCE.

7. COMMENT: IN ADDITION TO BEING EXCELLENT MUSICIANS, BOTH KIPNIS AND SOLUM MADE A STRONG PERSONAL IMPRESSION ON THEIR SOVIET COLLEAGUES. THEY RELATED EASILY AND WERE ABLE TO DISCUSS ANY NUMBER OF PROFESSIONAL ISSUES IN A LOW KEY INFORMAL WAY. SOLUM CLEARLY CAPTIVATED THE FLUTE STUDENTS WITH HIS "LOOSE-LIPPED" AMERICAN STYLE AND APPROACH TO MUSIC, WHILE KIPNIS AND SOVIET HARPSICHORDIST ALEXANDER MAYKAPAR IMMEDIATELY ESTABLISHED A COMMON LANGUAGE AND HAD A LIVELY EXCHANGE THROUGHOUT KIPNIS' STAY IN MOSCOW. END COMMENT. HARTMAN
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UNITED STATES
INFORMATION AGENCY

TELEGRAM

12

PAGE 01

038791 ICA453
27/1413Z

038791 ICA453

ACTION OFFICE PDC-04
INFO TCO-01 DSO-02 DIS-01 PGMD-02 PGM-01 EU-03 PGMR-01
/B15 A1 5

R 271400Z MAY 83
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC 4281
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7053
RUFHGL/AMCONSUL Leningrad 2345
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CAS 6/23/12

USIA FOR EU (LILLEN), P/RSE, P/DC (CARSTONES)

STATE FOR EUR/SOV, EUR/SOV/SOEX

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: UR, OEXC, SCUL

SUBJECT: VISIT OF FLUTIST JOHN SOLUM AND HARPSICHORDIST
IGOR KIPNIS TO THE U.S.S.R. -- MAY 12-15

REF: MOSCOW 6276

1. SUMMARY: FLUTIST JOHN SOLUM AND HARPSICHORDIST
IGOR KIPNIS GAVE AN EXCELLENT PERFORMANCE AT SPASO
HOUSE AND, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] (SEE REFTEL, PARA. 5),
MANAGED TO PACK A GOOD DEAL OF PROFESSIONAL CONTACT
INTO THEIR SHORT STAY. THEIR PROGRAM INCLUDED A VISIT
TO THE CONSERVATORY, [REDACTED], AND
TALKS WITH COMPOSERS, MUSICIANS, AND STUDENTS, BOTH
FOLLOWING THE SPASO HOUSE CONCERT AND THE FOLLOWING
DAY. SOLUM AND KIPNIS WERE GIVEN MUSIC BY SOVIET
COMPOSERS EDISON DENISOV AND VYECHESLAV ARTEMEV AND
PROMISED IN THEIR TURN TO SEND MATERIAL TO THE U.S.S.R.
THEY WILL ALSO SUBMIT A SHORT ARTICLE TO THE OXFORD
UNIVERSITY JOURNAL "EARLY MUSIC". IN ADDITION SOLUM
LEFT A NUMBER OF RECORDS FOR THE GOSTELRADIO COLLEC-
TION. IN SHORT THEY WERE MOST GENEROUS WITH THEIR
TIME AND EAGER TO MAKE CONTACT WITH THEIR SOVIET
COUNTERPARTS. END SUMMARY.

2. AFTER ARRIVING IN MOSCOW VIA THE NIGHT TRAIN
FROM Leningrad, SOLUM AND KIPNIS SPENT THE MORNING
OF MAY 12 AT THE CONSERVATORY, WHERE THEY MET WITH
THE CHAIRMAN OF THE WIND DEPARTMENT, R. P. TEREKHIN,
AND ONE OF THE FOREMOST FLUTE INSTRUCTORS IN THE SOVIET
UNION YURIY N. DOLZHNIKOV. SOLUM ALSO LISTENED TO
SEVERAL FLUTE STUDENTS, AMONG THEM LEONID LEBEDEV,
THE 18-YEAR-OLD WINNER OF THE RECENT ALL-UNION FLUTE
COMPETITION. ALTHOUGH THE HARPSICHORD INSTRUCTOR
WAS NOT AVAILABLE, KIPNIS DID MEET BRIEFLY WITH ONE
HARPSICHORD STUDENT. SOLUM LEFT MUSIC SCORES AND
RECORDS FOR BOTH DOLZHNIKOV AND THE CONSERVATORY
LIBRARY.

3. THAT AFTERNOON, KIPNIS REHEARSED WITH SOVIET
HARPSICHORDIST ALEXANDER MAYKAPAR, WHO SAVED THE
DAY FOR US IN MANY WAYS. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] HE ALSO VOLUNTEERED TO TURN
PAGES FOR KIPNIS, AND THEN REARRANGED HIS SCHEDULE
SO THAT KIPNIS COULD REHEARSE EARLIER THAN ORIGINALLY
PLANNED. THE REHEARSAL ITSELF WAS AN EXCELLENT EXAMPLE
OF CULTURAL EXCHANGE AS KIPNIS AND MAYKAPAR EXCHANGED
NOTES ON FINGERING, TECHNIQUE, AND ALL MANNER OF HARP-

SICHORD ARCANA.

4. THE NEXT DAY WAS DEVOTED TO SETTING UP, REHEARSING,
AND THEN A MARVELOUS CONCERT IN THE CHANDELIER ROOM
AT SPASO HOUSE, WHERE BOTH ATMOSPHERE AND ACOUSTICS
COMPLEMENTED THE VIRTUOSO PLAYING OF THE TWO AMERICANS.
AFTER THE CONCERT BOTH MUSICIANS TALKED AT LENGTH
WITH SOVIET COMPOSERS AND MUSICIANS WHO ATTENDED
THE CONCERTS. THE CONSERVATORY FLUTE STUDENTS ALSO
HOMED IN ON SOLUM. OFFICIAL ATTENDANCE WAS LIGHT, AND
APPARENTLY AT LEAST ONE INVITEE WAS DISCOURAGED FROM
ATTENDING, BUT THE AUDIENCE OF 100 OR SO GUESTS WAS
MOST APPRECIATIVE. DAVE BRUBECK'S "BIUELAGRO A LA
TURK" REARRANGED FOR FLUTE AND HARPSICHORD BROUGHT THE
HOUSE DOWN.

5. ON MAY 14 KIPNIS AND SOLUM, ACCOMPANIED BY ACAO,
VISITED COMPOSER EDISON DENISOV. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] DENISOV DISCUSSED SEVERAL OF HIS COMPOSITIONS
WITH KIPNIS, WHILE SOLUM HELD COURT FOR THREE
ENTHUSIASTIC FLUTE STUDENTS INCLUDING DENISOV'S OWN
SON, WHO IS ALSO IN DOLZHNIKOV'S CLASS. SOLUM
LISTENED TO THEM PLAY, PLAYED A BIT HIMSELF, MADE A
FEW SUGGESTIONS, AND THEN ANSWERED A BARRAGE OF QUES-
TIONS ON EVERYTHING FROM HIS PEDAGOGICAL APPROACH TO
HIS CONCERT REPERTOIRE. THE STUDENTS WERE CLEARLY
INTERESTED IN MODERN FLUTE MUSIC, OF WHICH THERE IS
APPARENTLY PRECIOUS LITTLE IN THE U.S.S.R., AND WERE
OVERJOYED WHEN SOLUM PROMISED TO SEND MUSIC AND RECORDS.
THE GATHERING WAS SO WARM AND CONGENIAL THAT ACCOM-
PANYING EMBASSY ALMOST HAD TO TEAR KIPNIS AND SOLUM AWAY
FROM THEIR HOSTS. BOTH KIPNIS AND SOLUM DEPARTED WITH
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TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01

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#42849 ICA886

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ACTION OFFICE PDC-04

INFO TCO-01 DSO-02 DIS-01 PGMD-02 EU-03 /013 A1 15

R 010905Z JUN 83

FM AMCONSUL LENINGRAD

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0178

RUEHIA.USIA WASHDC 0240

INFO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0329

BT

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE LENINGRAD 01354~~

6/27/02

E. O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: SCUL, UR, US

SUBJECT: VISIT OF JOHN SOLUM AND IGOR KIPNIS TO LENINGRAD

1. SUMMARY. ~~THE LENINGRAD VISIT OF SOLUM AND KIPNIS WAS HIGH SUCCESSFUL~~ IT ENABLED US TO ESTABLISH NEW CONTACTS IN THE MUSICAL WORLD AND SHOW OFF TWO SUPERB ARTISTS TO A SELECT GROUP OF SOVIET OFFICIALS AND MUSICIANS. END SUMMARY.

2. WHAT HAD INITIALLY BEEN A PROJECT ~~TURNED OUT TO BE ONE OF THE PAST YEAR'S MOST SUCCESSFUL EVENTS. ESPECIALLY UNUSUAL WAS THE DEGREE OF COOPERATION WE RECEIVED FROM THE MINISTRY OF CULTURE'S LENINGRAD ARM, THE UPRAVLENIYE KUL'TURY, WHICH, AFTER PRELIMINARY FOOTDRAGGING, PRODUCED A HARPSICHORD AND VISITS TO THE CONSERVATORY AND TO THE OLD INSTRUMENTS MUSEUM, WHICH HAS BEEN CLOSED FOR REPAIR. WHILE THEY WERE HERE, SOLUM AND KIPNIS NOT ONLY GAVE A SUPERB CONCERT, BUT SPENT A FRUITFUL MORNING AT THE RIMSKIY-KORSAKOV CONSERVATORY AND HAD VALUABLE VISITS AT TWO ESPECIALLY INTERESTING MUSICAL MUSEUMS.~~

3. AS FOR THE CONCERT ITSELF, IT ATTRACTED A NUMBER OF PEOPLE WE DO NOT NORMALLY SEE FROM THE MUSICAL WORLD. THEY INCLUDED THE MANAGING DIRECTOR OF LENKONCERT, DIRECTOR OF THE THEATER AND MUSIC MUSEUM, A NUMBER OF SYMPHONY MUSICIANS (MAINLY FROM THE KIROV ORCHESTRA AS THE LENINGRAD PHILHARMONIC WAS ON TOUR), TWO ORCHESTRA CONDUCTORS AND A SPRINKLING OF OTHER MEMBERS OF THE INTELLIGENTSIA. THE PROGRAM WAS IDEALLY SUITED TO ITS AUDIENCE, INCLUDING WORKS BY BOTH SOVIET AND AMERICAN COMPOSERS AND A SELECTION WHICH SOLUM PERFORMED ON HIS COPY OF AN ANTIQUE WOODEN FLUTE, THE ORIGINAL OF WHICH IS IN THE MUSICAL INSTRUMENTS MUSEUM IN LENINGRAD. AN ESPECIALLY ARRANGED BRUBECK PIECE USED AS THEIR FINAL ENCORE BROUGHT THE PROGRAM TO AN EXCITING CLIMAX.

4. DURING THEIR 2 1/2 HOUR VISIT TO THE CONSERVATORY BOTH U.S. MUSICIANS HAD A CHANCE TO VISIT WITH THEIR SOVIET COUNTERPARTS AND COMPARE NOTES ON TEACHING METHODS. A NUMBER OF SOVIETS PROVED ANXIOUS TO EXCHANGE ADDRESSES AND MAINTAIN CONTACT IN THE FUTURE.

5. THE FIRST OF THE TWO MUSEUMS VISITED WAS THAT DEVOTED TO THE GREAT RUSSIAN BASSO FYODOR CHALYAPIN. IT WAS ESPECIALLY APPROPRIATE IN THAT KIPNIS' FATHER IS GENERALLY REGARDED TO HAVE BEEN THE BEST "BORIS" ASIDE FROM CHALYAPIN, WHO, OF COURSE HAD NO PEER. IGOR KIPNIS GAVE THE MUSEUM SEVERAL RECORDINGS BY HIS FATHHR, AND HE AND SOLUM WERE TREATED TO A LAVISH SPREAD WHILL LISTENING TO A NUMBER OF OLD CHALYAPIN RECORDS.

6. IT WAS AT THE MUSICAL INSTRUMENTS MUSEUM, HOWEVER, THAT THE MOST EXCITING EVENT TOOK PLACE. THAT WAS WHEN SOLUM PLAYED THE ORIGINAL OF THE FLUTE WHICH HE HAD PERFORMED ON THE PREVIOUS EVENING. THIS ORIGINAL IS

THE MOST VALUABLE FLUTE IN THE WORLD. ALTHOUGH IT WAS SLIGHTLY OUT OF PITCH, DUE TO A MINOR FAULTY ADJUSTMENT IN THE CORK BY THE MOUTHPIECE, SOLUM NEVERTHELESS PRODUCED A GORGEOUS SOUND FROM THE INSTRUMENT. THE DIRECTOR OF THE MUSEUM GAVE ALL MEMBERS OF THE PARTY AUTOGRAPHED COPIES OF HIS BOOK AND THE TWO AMERICANS LEFT WITH ADDRESSES AND PROMISES TO STAY CLOSELY IN TOUCH, ESPECIALLY WITH RAVDONIKAS, THE LEADING SOVIET FLUTE MAKER.

7. WE ARE SENDING, ON SOLUM'S REQUEST, COPIES OF ALL OF HIS RECORDS, AND THOSE OF KIPNIS AS WELL, TO THE LENINGRAD RADIO TV MUSICAL LIBRARY FOR THEIR POSSIBLE USE IN THE FUTURE. WE HAVE ALSO TRANSMITTED ON HIS BEHALF SCORES EDITED BY HIM TO THE FIRST FLUTE OF THE KIROV ORCHESTRA.

8. ONE MAY BE FORGIVEN FOR REGARDING MUSIC OF THE FLUTE AND HARPSICHORD AS NOT THE MOST EXCITING THIS MEDIUM FIELD HAS TO OFFER. THESE TWO TALENTED MUSICIANS NONE-THELESS SUCCEEDED IN STIRRING THE AUDIENCE -- SUBTLY BUT EFFECTIVELY. WE ARE GRATEFUL TO HAVE BEEN ABLE TO PROFIT FROM THEIR ARTISTRY. SHINN

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

74

~~SECRET~~SENSITIVEMEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE CHARLES Z. WICK
The Director, United States Information Agency

SUBJECT: US-Soviet Cultural Exchanges (U)

With regard to your memorandum of June 22 on reciprocity in US-Soviet Cultural Exchanges, I have forwarded it to George Shultz and asked that he discuss this matter with you shortly.

William P. Clark

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

SENSITIVEDECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By CA NARA, Date 5/31/02

75 C

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

June 27, 1983

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Andropov Reply to President's Congratulatory Message

Andropov's reply (Tab A) to the President's congratulatory message avoids the code words known to be offensive to us (such as "peaceful coexistence"). However, instead of speaking of working together, as the President did, he implies in his last sentence that the burden of proof is on us to take "practical steps."

This thrust is consistent with Gromyko's recent comments on the prospects for a summit, which also implied that a change in U.S. policy is necessary. I consider this an obvious but not surprising attempt to position the Soviets as the aggrieved party. The main implication for our own public statements is to continue the same cautious, non-committal line we have followed up to now in commenting on the prospects for a summit meeting.

At Tab I is a memorandum to the President incorporating these points.

RECOMMENDATION:OKNO

—

—

That you send the memo at Tab I to the President.

Attachments:

Tab I Memorandum to the President

Tab A Letter from Andropov to the President

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR Folio-114 #5788

BY RW NARA DATE 3/3/11

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON~~SECRET~~INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

SUBJECT: Andropov Reply to President's Congratulatory Message

Andropov's reply (Tab A) to your congratulatory message avoids the code words known to be offensive to us (such as "peaceful coexistence"). However, instead of speaking of working together, as you did in your message, he implies in his last sentence that the burden of proof is on us to take "practical steps."

This thrust is consistent with Gromyko's recent comments on the prospects for a summit, which also implied that a change in U.S. policy is necessary. I consider this an obvious but not surprising attempt to position the Soviets as the aggrieved party. The main implication for our own public statements is to continue the same cautious, non-committal line we have followed up to now in commenting on the prospects for a summit meeting.

Attachment:

Tab A Letter from Andropov

Prepared by
Jack F. Matlock

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR F06-114#5789
BY RW NARA DATE 3/3/11

00153197

Unofficial translation

His Excellency
Ronald Wilson Reagan
President of the United States of America
Washington, D.C.

June 22, 1983

Dear Mr. President,

I thank you for congratulating me on my election as
Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Availing myself of this opportunity I would like to
reaffirm the unbending commitment of the Soviet leadership
and the people of the Soviet Union to the cause of peace,
the elimination of the nuclear threat, and the development
of relations based on mutual benefit and equality with
all nations, including the United States of America.

We shall welcome practical steps of your government
in this direction.

Sincerely,

Y. ANDROPOV

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASABLE
Authority NLSF 99-051 #1165
BY CM, NARA, Date 5/31/02

78

Его Превосходительству
Рональду Уилсону Рейгану,
Президенту Соединенных Штатов Америки
Вашингтон, О.К.

Уважаемый господин президент,

Благодарю Вас за поздравление в связи с избранием меня
Председателем Президиума Верховного Совета СССР.

Пользуясь этим случаем, хотел бы подтвердить неуклонную
приверженность советского руководства и народа Советского
Союза делу мира, устранению ядерной угрозы, развитию взаимо-
выгодных, равноправных отношений со всеми странами, в том
числе с Соединенными Штатами Америки.

Мы будем приветствовать практические шаги вашего прави-
тельства в этом направлении.

С уважением,

Ю.АНДРОПОВ

22 июня 1983 года

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED
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BY СН, NARA, Date 5/31/8

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~~MEMORANDUM~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

June 28, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Soviet Calls for Normalization and Peaceful Coexistence

John's memo of June 9 calls attention to a very important point regarding the Soviet use of terms deceptively. I agree with him that we must make a more effective effort to make clear to the public what these terms mean to the Soviets.

However, I believe that the President should take on the task directly only when high-level, public Soviet statements contain highly deceptive terminology. Otherwise, it might appear to many as gratuitous hectoring. The report of Andropov's comments at the Harriman meeting was an appropriate occasion, but sufficient time has passed that it is unlikely that another question will be raised regarding it. Therefore, I believe we should wait for another occasion (which will doubtless arise) before engaging the President.

This is an important subject, however, which should be dealt with repeatedly and consistently at all levels of the Government. For example, we should encourage both White House and State Department press spokesmen to speak to the subject whenever appropriate. I also believe that this is an appropriate topic for VOA editorials: perhaps there should be a series on "What Words Mean," which would attempt over time to explain the whole set of deceptive political terms in the Soviet vocabulary. I can imagine, for example, an amusing and effective VOA editorial on "peaceful coexistence." It could start out by saying that the term sounds eminently reasonable--but wait--listen to how the Soviets define it. And the conclusion could be something like "That's what we call "cold war,"--and really, shouldn't we aim for something better in our relationship?"

RECOMMENDATIONS

- | <u>OK</u> | <u>NO</u> | |
|-----------|-----------|---|
| — | — | (1) That we work out with appropriate agencies and offices a comprehensive plan for enlightening the public, here and abroad, regarding deceptive Soviet terminology; and |
| — | — | (2) We wait for an appropriate specific occasion to involve the President directly in this effort. |

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

BY *KUS*
NIRRF 06-114#5790
NARA DATE 3/3/11
DECLASSIFIED

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 28, 1983

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Agreement for Danish Ambassador to the United States Eigil Jorgensen

Attached at Tab I is a proposal from State urging that we agree to accept Eigil Jorgensen as the new Ambassador from Denmark. I concur in their recommendation.

At Tab II is a memorandum from the NSC to State giving our formal assent.

RECOMMENDATIONOK NO

— —

That you approve our sending the memo at Tab II to State.

Attachments:

Tab I Memorandum from State/bio
Tab II NSC memorandum to State

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 20, 1997
By *CAS* NARA, Date *5/31/02*



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

S/S 8319671

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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June 27, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSE

State Room

Subject: Appointment of Eigil Jorgensen of Denmark
as Ambassador to the United States.

The Danish Government has inquired whether our Government agrees to the appointment of Eigil Jorgensen as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Denmark to the United States (Tab 2). A biography of Mr. Jorgensen is attached (Tab 1).

The Department believes from the information available that Jorgensen will make an excellent Ambassador to the United States and recommends that the President agree to the proposed appointment. If he concurs, the Department will inform the Government of Denmark.

for *Charles Hill*
Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

Attachments:

1. Biography.
2. Note dated June 22, 1983
from Danish Embassy.

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997

By CS NARA, Date 5/31/02

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
(UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF ATTACHMENTS)

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BIOGRAPHY - Eigil Jorgensen

Kingdom of Denmark

A career Foreign Service Officer who has served his country's government for 36 years, Eigil Jorgensen is regarded as the quintessential Danish diplomat. Since 1974 he has been Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, the senior career diplomat and second-ranking official of Denmark's Foreign Ministry. His foreign posts have included an assignment to the Danish Embassy in Washington in 1949 and subsequent positions with the Danish delegation to NATO in Paris (1956-59) and as Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany (1973). During his distinguished diplomatic career, Jorgensen has acquired a wide reputation for discretion and astute judgment.

Jorgensen's abilities have extended his influence beyond the diplomatic service and made him a valued confidant of Denmark's political leaders. From 1965 to 1973, he served as the principal foreign policy adviser in the Prime Minister's Office, with the title of Permanent Under Secretary. His long service in this position attests to the high regard in which he was held by prime ministers of various political parties.

Jorgensen has been open and friendly in his dealings with Americans. His previous service in Washington, and his 1956-59 assignment as Chief of the Foreign Ministry section responsible for trade policy relations with North America and Europe, have given him long experience in dealing with this country. His counterparts in the United States Embassy in Copenhagen have valued Jorgensen's insight and level-headedness.

Jorgensen was born February 26, 1921 and is the son of former Liberal politician and Minister of Education Jorgen Jorgensen. He comes from a heritage of classical European liberalism, and some observers have noted the strong influence on Jorgensen of his father's liberal ideas, including the values of the Danish folk high school movement. The elder Jorgensen was a consummate politician who took pains to instill his political finesse in his son. Jorgensen is married to the former Alice Saubrey. The couple has four children. He speaks fluent English.

A thorough search of U.S. Government sources reveals no grounds for objection.

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/1 #5791

BY CW NARA DATE 11/27/07

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DECL: OADR

DANISH EMBASSY
WASHINGTON, D. C.

June 22, 1983

Sir,

I have the honor to inform you that I have been reassigned for other duty in the Danish Foreign Service.

As my successor on the post which I have had the honor to hold for more than seven years here in Washington, the Danish Minister for Foreign Affairs intends to propose to Her Majesty to appoint Mr. Eigil Jørgensen as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the United States.

Mr. Jørgensen is at present Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

I beg to enclose an extract of the paragraph in

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR CHARLES HILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Danish Ambassador to the United States
(S/S 8319671)

The President has reviewed and concurs in the recommendation of the Department of State that the appointment of Eigil Jorgensen as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Denmark to the United States would be agreeable to the Government of the United States. You are requested to so inform the Government of Denmark.

Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 29, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

THROUGH: CHARLES P. TYSON

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Genscher Visit - July 11, 1983
2:00 p.m.

FRG Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher will brief the President on Monday, July 11, at 2:00 p.m., for 30 minutes. The subject is Chancellor Kohl's visit to Moscow.

At Tab I is the NSC memorandum to State requesting briefing papers and recommended participants.

RECOMMENDATION

OK NO

— — That you approve sending the memo at Tab I to the State Department.

Attachment:

Tab I Memorandum to State

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 29, 1997
By *CRS* NARA, Date *5/31/12*

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506~~CONFIDENTIAL~~MEMORANDUM FOR CHARLES HILL
Executive Secretary
Department of StateSUBJECT: Genscher Meeting with President
Monday, July 11, 1983

The President is scheduled to meet with FRG Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher on Monday, July 11, 1983, at 2:00 p.m., for 30 minutes. Genscher will brief the President on Chancellor Kohl's trip to Moscow.

Please provide briefing papers and recommended participants by Wednesday, July 6.

Any press release should be coordinated with Mort Allin, 456-2947.

Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADRDECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 29, 1997
By CRJ NARA, Date 5/31/02

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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June 29, 1983


Captain Albert M. Scara
Five 1st Avenue
Spring Lake, New Jersey 07762

Dear Captain Scara:

Thank you for your thoughtful letter of June 14, 1983. I read it and the material you sent with great interest and have taken the liberty of sending it to Mr. Richard Levine, the National Security Council staff member responsible for maritime affairs.

With best regards,

Sincerely yours,



Jack F. Matlock
Senior Director of European
and Soviet Affairs

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Captain Albert M. Scara
Five 1st Avenue
Spring Lake, N.J. 07762

June 14, 1983

Mr. Jack F. Matlock
Senior Specialist on Soviet Affairs
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20500

Subject: CDS PAYBACK

Dear Mr. Matlock:

I want to wish you good luck in your new job.

I wonder how loudly S. Gorshkoff is laughing at us as we are slowly destroying our Merchant Marine.

We need very badly a central coordinated maritime policy in this country.

After World War II, we had more than 4,000 ships. We now have about 470 and going down each week by 1.5 ships. The Russians started 30 years ago with 500 ships, and now have 2,500. The Russian Bear has, in fact, ~~has~~ developed a taste for salt water. Indeed, they are in control of the oceans, both commercially and militarily. As a seaman who has raised the American flag on many ships, I write this last sentence with great pain.

Let us not forget that the last war (Falklands) was won because the British were able to mobilize their Merchant Marine.

As you probably know, the Administration has formulated a scheme to allow U.S. flag shipowners/operators who received Construction Differential Subsidies (CDS) to build tankers and are currently restricted from trading between domestic ports to pay back their CDS and be allowed to enter the Jones Act domestic tanker trades.

The DOT proposed rule was prepared in a hurry. It was outdated the minute it was issued and is full of faulty assumptions and erroneous data, uncertain purpose, leading to wrong and, possibly, disastrous results.

Interestingly, it was signed by former Secretary of Transportation, Andrew Lewis, the day he left office.

Congressional leadership, not having the opportunity to consider the proposed changes, have objected to this rulemaking.

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Industry experts predict that this proposal will create severe dislocations in the domestic markets and will be disastrous to our domestic fleet, which currently is suffering of unprecedented underemployment.

This proposed rule seems to be giving an extraordinary bargain to one shipowner and to just a few foreign and domestic oil companies.

These parties could receive as much as one billion dollars worth of windfall profits.

I do not believe you would want to allow such unjust enrichment.

Please note that DOT did not consider our nation's interest, both from a commercial and military point of view. The military leadership objects to this ruling actively.

The ruling will cause permanent loss of about 3,000 jobs of mariners, elimination of up to 50 tankers (replacement value \$3 billion), and will have catastrophic effect on the entire U.S. Merchant Marine, our nation's shipyards, Government guarantees and our national economy.

I am attaching a few letters sent to Secretary Dole.

This is, without question, one of the worst "hit and run" cases I have seen in my entire life. A resigning Secretary washes down the drain 50 years of legislation on the day he leaves office.

Please support the actions of Deputy Secretary Paul Thayer by contacting the appropriate parties and help save a scandal waiting to happen, while you, at the same time, will save our Merchant Marine.

Please let me hear from you.

Sincerely,


Captain A.M. Scara

Attachment