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Withdrawer

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FOIA

F06-114/1

Box Number 1

YARHI-MILO

105

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
5778	MEMO	DRAFT LETTER RE INF [2] R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1	1	ND	B1
5779	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #5778 [3] R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1	1	ND	B1
5782	LETTER	DRAFT REPLY TO ANDROPOV LETTER [4-12] R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1	9	ND	B1
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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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J. F. MATHCOCK
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UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED PORTION

MEMORANDUM 1. If we want to beef up the INF portion and make it potentially more attractive, the following might be considered:

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

--A cautious reference could be made to the Walk-in-the-Woods formula. This could be done, for example, in the second full paragraph on page 6, beginning "You asked how I would envision..." Following the first two sentences, he might say something like, "The informal discussions our negotiators had last year contain some useful ideas. Should we look at them again to see whether they might provide a key to a solution?" (This would replace the portion beginning, "Can you accept this?" and ending, "...to a successful conclusion.")

--The reply could be restructured to take up the INF issues first, thus giving them pride of place, with the points on regional issues and confidence discussed later. The disadvantage of this is that it weakens our point about the implicit overall linkage of problem solving with Soviet behavior overall.

2. If we want to make a stronger pitch for the zero option, the following might be considered:

--The sentence at the end of p. 5 beginning "Now I had hoped..." could be replaced with: "Obviously the best way to achieve parity is to eliminate this class of weapons altogether. Could you not take another look at our proposal along these lines? I believe it is fully consistent with Soviet and Warsaw Pact security interests."

--This could be further strengthened by adding (provided of course that we would welcome proposals for INF-START trade offs): "Since the intermediate range missiles in Europe are not unrelated to the problem of strategic missiles, are there possibilities for adjusting our positions regarding strategic weapons which would make it easier to agree to eliminate the medium-range missiles in Europe?"

3. If we wish to soften the reference to Soviet interference in third areas, we could:

--Revise the last para on p 2 to read along the following lines, replacing the sentence "Can you say the same?" and those that follow with: "If all national leaders could say the same, we would be on our way to a safer world, for the use of military force to settle disputes stimulates apprehensions which motivate and fuel the arms race." Then, the portion at the top of page 3 beginning, "I think we must find a way..." could become a separate paragraph.

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NLRR 806-114/1 45778

BY CW NARA DATE 11/27/07

DRAFT LETTER--SOME VARIANT APPROACHES

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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DECLASSIFIED/REF/EXCSD
MLRR Feb-114/1 2577A
BY CN NARA DATE 11/07/07

NLRR F06 714/1 #5782

BY CW NARA DATE 11/27/07 DRAFT REPLY TO ANDROPOV LETTER

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for your letter which was conveyed to me on August 5. I have of course given it my most serious attention and welcome the assurances of your commitment to finding solutions to the problems that confront us. I can see that we both recognize the awesome responsibility history has placed on our shoulders to guide the two most powerful countries in the world in this difficult and dangerous period.

Ego building; bestows status.

I agree with you that, if we are to make progress in our joint endeavor, we cannot bypass important issues merely because they are difficult. I also agree that our attention must be directed above all to the central issue of consolidating security in the world.

Agrees with as much as we can.

In my view, this central issue has three key aspects: first, the vital need for the world to move toward the principle of settling international disputes by peaceful means, without the use or threat of force; second, the urgent need to reduce stocks of weaponry, particularly the most destructive and destabilizing types; and third, the necessity of creating a sufficient level of trust and confidence between us to permit us to reach the first two objectives.

Reinterprets a phrase A. used to fit our agenda

Now it is obviously impossible for us to solve all the many problems in our relationship at the same time. But it also seems to me that we will find it most difficult to solve individual problems, even the most critical ones, in total isolation. To be successful, I believe we must find a way to make steady progress in all three areas simultaneously. Permit me to make a few observations on each in total candor.

States linkage so as to keep all points on our agenda viable.

On the first, I am delighted that you endorse the principles of the United Nations Charter and that you feel that every people and every country should be master of its fate. I am delighted because I do too, and indeed feel very strongly about this principle, which is absolutely essential for a peaceful world. Since we agree on the principle, the problem must be that we interpret it in different ways, because we do have problems here, and very serious ones at that.

A bit of irony here, but A. deserves it.

This is in fact the problem

You have asked me to try to understand Moscow's view of some of the critical issues, and I can assure you that I do try. Could I ask in return that you take a look at the world as it appears from Washington? As Commander-in-Chief, I have not a single military unit on combat status. [Can you say the same? And if you cannot, don't you realize that, whatever the reasons, others may perceive the situation as

Note possible alternate language, which makes the point in a less personal way. ("Variant approaches" -> ques)

threatening? Since it is precisely the apprehensions generated by lack of restraint that motivate and fuel the arms race,] I think that we must find a way either to discuss these problems frankly, or at the very least, to give greater weight to the attitudes of the other party when making fateful decisions. In the end, it really makes no difference whether we reduce these problems by specific understandings or by simply acting so that they are reduced. The essential point is that they must be reduced if we are to give the other important items on our agenda a fair chance of success.

Makes clear that mutual restraint could be implicit.

Regarding the second facet of consolidating world security, reducing armaments, I fully concur that the two sets of negotiations in Geneva, on strategic arms and intermediate-range nuclear weapons affecting Europe, are central and require our most serious attention. I, too, believe that agreements ^{are} possible, and as far as I am concerned, the sooner the better.

By listing START first, subtly downplays INF importance. Order could be reversed if we wish.

Change to plural includes START in judgment.

stresses that we are not waiting for deployments to deal.

I appreciated your explanation of the Soviet position in the INF negotiations in Geneva. I can fully understand that your offer to reduce SS-20 deployments was not an easy one. It is rarely easy to give up something one has. But I think we must view the situation in a broader historical context if we are to find a solution that preserves the security of

back-handed credit in response to A's specific appeal

both sides and yet allows us to lower the level of nuclear arms. Throughout most of the 1970's, our Allies and we felt--and prominent Soviet leaders agreed in numerous public statements-- that there was a rough military balance in Europe. But then, in ~~1979~~¹⁹⁷⁷ the Soviet Union started deploying a new class of nuclear weapons with much greater range and overall capability than had existed in Europe. This obviously threatened the balance and led to the December, 1979, NATO decision.

Note date change.

The reason I recount these well-known facts is to explain why the current Soviet proposal does not satisfy our concerns. Of course it is encouraging that you recognize that you need many fewer SS-20's than you have deployed, but a monopoly of a weapons system is a monopoly, whether the numbers are small or large, and that is a feature which we cannot accept. You mentioned the British and French systems, and I understand the point you make. But I really believe that it is not a relevant point. First of all, the British and French weapons in question are not in the same category as the SS-20, and in addition, the French systems are not committed to the defense of NATO. Now these considerations might conceivably be viewed as secondary if the British and French systems constituted a realistic threat to the Soviet Union. Yet how could you possibly consider them a threat, given the tremendous nuclear arsenal

I implies that Sov's recognize their build-up was excessive.

These arguments should be carefully vetted, particularly underlined phrase.

which you possess (and ICBM's which can be targeted on Britain and France)? I simply cannot understand why you feel you must have a "counterbalance" to them, when your central systems exceed their size by many, many times.

The deployment of American Pershing II's and cruise missiles in Europe, ^{in December - if we fail to reach an agreement which} ~~if this should unfortunately prove necessary,~~ ^{makes it unnecessary -} also should not be viewed as a threat to the Soviet Union.

Their only function would be to balance Soviet systems potentially threatening to Europe, and to ensure that no one in the future could doubt that the security of Western Europe and North America are one and the same. Once again, try to see our point of view. What would be the Soviet reaction if we deployed a new, highly threatening weapon against its allies, and then insisted that you should not balance this with something comparable?

In sum, we must insist that any agreement embody a parity of U.S. and Soviet weapons in this category. I cannot understand why this should be incompatible with the security of the Warsaw Pact. If it is a defensive alliance, this could not be. So we also consider our proposal honest and just, aimed only at balance, not superiority. [Now I had hoped that we could agree to eliminate this class of weapons altogether, and I still think we should as soon as we can,

See possible variant wording

but if this is impossible, we will settle for whatever level you choose, and the lower the better.]

Also, the sooner the better. You said in your letter that "so long as the United States has not begun deploying missiles in Europe, an agreement is still possible." Well, I think an agreement should be possible right now and I certainly hope that we will have one before December, but if it takes longer, then we must keep trying. And I can assure you that NATO in the future will not hesitate to remove deployed weapons if this should be required by a mutually acceptable agreement.

Establishes that we are not putting a time limit on and would not understand a Soviet attempt to do so.

You asked how I would envision an agreement in practical terms. This is difficult to answer before we agree on basic principles, and parity of U.S. and Soviet systems is one of the most basic for us. [Can you accept this? If you can, this should permit us to narrow the gap in our respective positions by the time our delegations resume their negotiations in Geneva, and I would hope would permit rapid progress to a successful conclusion.]

See possible variant wording

As for the third aspect of consolidating world security, improving confidence and trust, there are many matters which require our attention. The successful conclusion of the Madrid conference should be helpful, but only if we all

reference to
Shchegolev
and other
promised
releases

ensure that the decisions made there, and the understandings
connected with it, are faithfully implemented. Mr.
Chairman, I cannot exaggerate the importance of clarifying
any misunderstandings which arise regarding the
implementation of prior agreements. For nothing is so
destructive of confidence as a perception by one party to an
agreement that its provisions are being disregarded by the
other. I am sure you will understand that it is in our
mutual interest if we call your government's attention to
matters in this area which give us concern; I expect you to
do the same if any doubts arise on your side. At the
moment, I would ask that, in particular, you look into the
demarche Secretary Shultz made to your Charge on July 29,
since this involves matters of great importance to us.

Makes our
complaints
more acceptable
by inviting
Soviets to
do same if they
think they
have grounds

PL-5 up-
grade and
phased-
array
radar

In accord with the last paragraph of your letter, I shall
request Secretary Shultz to be in touch with Ambassador
Dobrynin to receive in complete confidence any
communications you have for me. I would also expect, of
course, to convey my thoughts by Ambassador Hartman and
would appreciate your designating an appropriate official to
deal with him as the need arises. In addition, we may find
that occasionally it will be useful to arrange more direct
contact, and I want you to know that I would make myself
available to Ambassador Dobrynin for this purpose, with the

Establishes that
we want
reciprocity in
flow of
communi-
cations

natural assumption that you would be similarly available to Ambassador Hartman.

Respectfully,

Note: A final paragraph or P.S. could be added saying that he hopes A. will give thoughtful consideration of his views and that we can begin to find solutions to these most difficult issues.

Aug. 7, 1983

12

DRAFT REPLY TO ANDROPOV LETTER

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for your letter which was conveyed to me on August 5. I have of course given it my most serious attention and welcome the assurances of your commitment to finding solutions to the problems that confront us. I can see that we both recognize the awesome responsibility history has placed on our shoulders to guide the two most powerful countries in the world in this difficult and dangerous period.

I agree with you that, if we are to make progress in our joint endeavor, we cannot bypass important issues merely because they are difficult. I also agree that our attention must be directed above all to the central issue of consolidating security in the world.

In my view, this central issue has three key aspects: first, the vital need for the world to move toward the principle of settling international disputes by peaceful means, without the use or threat of force; second, the urgent need to reduce stocks of weaponry, particularly the most destructive and destabilizing types; and third, the necessity of creating a sufficient level of trust and confidence between us to permit us to reach the first two objectives.

TRANSLATION

13

Dear Mr. President:

Thank you for your personal letter, which was conveyed to me on July 21. I have considered its contents with all seriousness.

I take note with satisfaction the assurances that the U.S. Government shares a devotion to the cause of peace and the elimination of the nuclear threat and strives to build relations with other countries on the basis of mutual benefit and equal rights. The most important thing now, it seems to me, is to attempt to embody these principles in practical issues, to seek and find solutions to existing problems in the spirit of peace and cooperation. I agree with you, Mr. President, that we are obliged to remember the responsibility for maintaining peace and international security which rests on our two countries and their leaders.

Of course, in the present complex situation, it is difficult to count on simple solutions. But I think that if we were to try simply to avoid the most important and difficult issues, we would hardly be able to achieve the results to which, as I understand, we both would like to aspire.

In other words, we must concentrate on the central questions of consolidating security in the world. It is good that, judging by everything, it will be possible to bring the Madrid Conference to a successful conclusion. This shows that, with a desire, it is possible to find a balance of interests and to reach practical agreements. If good will is present, it would seem possible to reach similar results also at the negotiations in Vienna. It seems to me that the obstacles there are not so great.

But the important thing of course is to begin to move forward on issues of limiting and reducing nuclear arms. It is a particularly urgent necessity to prevent a nuclear arms race in Europe, the results of which would be extremely serious. If we can achieve that, I believe that the peoples of our countries and of many other countries will be grateful to us.

We believe that a just, mutually acceptable agreement in Geneva, an agreement on the basis of equality, is still possible. In trying to reach an agreement there, we have already gone very far and have taken decisions which were most difficult for us. After all, the Soviet Union is in fact agreeing (contingent upon reaching parity in appropriate categories of aircraft) to reduce to almost a third the medium-range missiles it has in the European zone. And to reduce them without a reciprocal reduction of missiles on the part of the West. Is this understood and appreciated to a proper degree in Washington? In this regard we want nothing more than a counterbalance to the means which the

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British and French possess. Is this not a honest and moderate position?

I will tell you, Mr. President, the same thing I told Chancellor Kohl when I met him in Moscow: we believe that we must take advantage of the opportunity, while it exists, to reach a genuinely honest agreement which takes into account the legitimate interests of both the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries so that, instead of increasing medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe, they are significantly, very significantly, reduced. That would permit an enormous improvement of the situation in Europe and in the whole world.

⑧ So long as the United States has not begun deploying its missiles in Europe, an agreement is still possible. Moreover, it is our conviction, based on a calculation of basic security factors, that there is room for flexibility on both sides. Insofar as you, too, would like movement in the negotiations--as I infer from your letter--I would be pleased to hear how you envision this in practical terms.

⑦ I want to add that we would consider it quite possible to have mutual constructive steps for ending the arms race in other directions as well--for example, as regards strategic nuclear weapons and the use of space--but only on the basis of equality and genuine respect for each other's interests.

Mr. President, you propose a discussion of the situation in various geographic regions and mention certain ones. What is there to be said? We have adequate grounds for expressing our assessment of U.S. policy in the areas you mention and others. But at this time I want to emphasize only one thing: every people, every country, wherever they may be located, should be masters of their fate. They should be given the possibility to live as they wish, and no one has the right to interfere in their internal affairs. In our policy we proceed and continue to proceed from this unshakeable principle which is embodied in the U.N. Charter signed by our countries. If the United States is guided by this principle, then our countries would be able to cooperate on that basis at great benefit to ourselves and to others.

Mr. President, it is not my aim to raise many issues in this letter, but to select those which I consider central. I shall welcome a concrete, businesslike and candid exchange of opinions with you on these and other questions. I agree that the exchange be confidential when the interests of the matter so dictate. For my part I would propose to do this through the Soviet Ambassador in Washington and a person whom you would designate.

Respectfully,

(Signed) Andropov

Yu. Andropov

(NOTE: following is handwritten)

P.S. I sincerely hope, Mr. President, that you will give serious consideration to the thoughts I have expressed and that you will be able to respond to them in a constructive spirit.

BRIEFING OUTLINE

14

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
I. INTRODUCTION

An attempt to describe how the Soviet leaders view the world and the implications of this for U.S.-Soviet relations. There is often a tendency to assume that the Soviets view the world as we would if we were sitting in Moscow. This is emphatically not the case, and today we shall try to explain some of the more important characteristics of Soviet thinking. John Lenczowski will discuss the nature of the Soviet system, Paula Dobriansky will take a look at how the Soviets view their international position and assess the threats to it, and Jack Matlock will describe the psychology of the Soviet leaders and discuss some implications for U.S. policy.

2:30
2:30

II. NATURE OF THE SOVIET SYSTEM (Lenczowski)

III. SOVIET THREAT ASSESSMENT (Dobriansky)

IV. PSYCHOLOGY OF SOVIET LEADERS (Matlock)

A. Some widespread characteristics

- Communist ideology, Russian traditions and the imperatives of ruling a highly bureaucratized, multinational empire are fused in the thinking of the leadership.
- The legitimacy of the rulers rests entirely on the ideology; they must cling to it even if they do not fully believe it. *But they can interpret almost any specific action as consistent with the ideal.*
- Their first priority is preserving their system; their second is expanding their power, so long as it does not conflict with the first.
- Legitimacy and status are extremely important to them and comprise an important foreign policy objective. This contributes to an acute sense of saving face. *Lying -*
- Their attitude is fundamentally totalitarian: citizens are viewed as property of the state, allies as puppets (or else they are not really allies).
- They take a long-term view and do not accept defeats as permanent. A defeat in one area is viewed as a challenge to find other means to achieve the same objective.

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- 17
- They are persistent bargainers, adept at exploiting time pressures on the other side, but willing to strike deals rapidly if they feel compelled to.
 - They are often prisoners of their own ideological proclivities and thus misjudge the effect of their actions on others.
 - They are much more preoccupied with the United States than we are with them. *In respect of Washington*

B. Soviet view of Reagan Administration

- Soviets cautiously welcomed the President's election because they were fed up with Carter and thought a Republican president might return to the Nixon-Ford policies.
- When they realized in early 1981 that there would be no return to "detente," they played with the idea of "waiting out" the Reagan Administration, in the hope that it would only last four years.
- They have been surprised and impressed by the President's ability to get his defense programs through, keep unity in the alliance, and get the economy moving again. At the same time, they have experienced a series of foreign policy defeats and growing economic difficulties at home.
- There are signs now that they are reassessing their foreign policy. They may feel overextended, and in need of some reduction of tension to allow more attention to domestic problems. They seem convinced that the President is likely to be reelected, and if so must be asking themselves whether it might not be better to deal with him before rather than after his reelection.
- Given their preoccupation with U.S.-Soviet relations, they may well exaggerate the political benefits to the President in dealing with them. This could lead them to overplay their hand.

IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR US POLICY

- A. The struggle is long-term. There are no quick fixes. This means that we must devise a strategy which can be sustained for a decade or, probably, more.

B. Two broad options in theory:

1. Unrelenting pressure on the Soviets; and
2. Negotiation of specific differences on basis of strength, with follow-up to keep gains permanent rather than temporary.

Only the second seems sustainable in a democratic society, but it requires a recognition that agreements are only stages in the struggle, not the end of it.

A

NATURE OF SOVIET SYSTEM, FOREIGN POLICY DETERMINANTS AND STRATEGY

- I. The USSR as a Communist Power
- A. Distinction between a communist power and a traditional imperialist great power: limited versus necessarily unlimited objectives.
- B. Various influences encourage us to believe that USSR is no longer communist:
 1. Wishful thinking.
 2. Mirror imaging.
 3. Soviet disinformation.
- C. Inescapable fact: USSR must be communist because of the role of ideology in the system.
 1. Ideology as source of legitimacy.
 2. Ideology as key to internal security system: Emperor's New Clothes.
 3. A key index that this is so is to observe that ideology defines basic structure of society.
- D. Ideology and Foreign Policy.
 1. Ideology serves as frame of reference to view the world.
 2. Ideology defines international reality as struggle between two social systems: capitalism and socialism, a struggle inevitably to be won by socialism.
 3. Therefore ideology determines friends and enemies -- it sets an international standard of behavior.
 4. Ideology presents a discrete set of strategies and tactics of revolutionary behavior.
 5. Ideology sets a standard of measurement of correlation of forces: strategic decisions to advance or retreat are made on the basis of "scientific" assessments of the correlation of forces. Ideological strength or weakness is the key criterion.
 6. Ideology serves as a weapon of political influence: an instrument of subversion and deception.
 7. Foreign ideologies (and therefore any competing version of the truth) are the principal threats to the Soviet system.

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II. Soviet Strategy

- A. Because USSR is prisoner of the ideology, its lies, and its predictions, it is compelled to try to fulfill those predictions. This means:
1. Creating false appearances -- therefore a strategy of deception.
 2. Creating new realities, by exporting revolution.
- B. The principal means of Soviet expansionism is "ideological struggle".
1. To win men's minds.
 2. To deceive those who cannot be won.
 3. Therefore propaganda, subversion and disinformation are the key features of Soviet foreign policy.
 4. Suppression of the truth is the ultimate objective -- self-censorship by Soviet adversaries is prelude to political uniformity.
 5. A principal effort: to define the acceptable vocabulary of international political debate -- both words and issues.
- C. Military power is the principal adjunct to this.
1. It can forcibly create the new reality.
 2. It can serve to intimidate and accelerate the process of ideological subversion.
- D. Struggle between two systems as a protracted conflict.
1. Soviet control over the time frame of the conflict enables them to control timing of attack and choice of battlefield while permitting possibility of strategic retreat.
 2. Proper understanding of time permits strategy of attrition -- nibble at edges of Free World, never risk final showdown.
 3. Strategy of indirect attack:
 - A deceptive means of escaping culpability.
 - Use of proxies, front groups, agents of influence, etc.
 4. Strategy of monopoly of offensive.

5. Strategy of psychological conditioning:

- War-zone, peace zone.
- Demarcation of scrimmage line.
- Soviets have conditioned us to believe that peace zone is inviolable but war zone is not.
- Therefore Soviets have developed a no-lose strategy: they have nothing to lose by continually trying to cross the scrimmage line.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 17, 1983

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT
AND BUDGET
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
THE UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE TO THE
UNITED NATIONS
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
DIRECTOR, UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY

SUBJECT: NSDD 75 on "U.S. Relations with the USSR" (S)

The President has approved National Security Decision Directive on "U.S. Relations with the USSR". A copy is attached for your information. This is a sensitive document; distribution should be made only on a need-to-know basis. (S)

FOR THE PRESIDENT:



William P. Clark

Attachment
NSDD-75

cc The Director of ACDA
The United States Trade Representative

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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SENSITIVE

January 17, 1983

National Security Decision
Directive Number 75

U.S. RELATIONS WITH THE USSR (S)

U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union will consist of three elements: external resistance to Soviet imperialism; internal pressure on the USSR to weaken the sources of Soviet imperialism; and negotiations to eliminate, on the basis of strict reciprocity, outstanding disagreements. Specifically, U.S. tasks are:

1. To contain and over time reverse Soviet expansionism by competing effectively on a sustained basis with the Soviet Union in all international arenas -- particularly in the overall military balance and in geographical regions of priority concern to the United States. This will remain the primary focus of U.S. policy toward the USSR.
2. To promote, within the narrow limits available to us, the process of change in the Soviet Union toward a more pluralistic political and economic system in which the power of the privileged ruling elite is gradually reduced. The U.S. recognizes that Soviet aggressiveness has deep roots in the internal system, and that relations with the USSR should therefore take into account whether or not they help to strengthen this system and its capacity to engage in aggression.
3. To engage the Soviet Union in negotiations to attempt to reach agreements which protect and enhance U.S. interests and which are consistent with the principle of strict reciprocity and mutual interest. This is important when the Soviet Union is in the midst of a process of political succession. (S)

In order to implement this threefold strategy, the U.S. must convey clearly to Moscow that unacceptable behavior will incur costs that would outweigh any gains. At the same time, the U.S. must make clear to the Soviets that genuine restraint in their behavior would create the possibility of an East-West relationship that might bring important benefits for the Soviet Union. It is particularly important that this message be conveyed clearly during the succession period, since this may be a particularly opportune time for external forces to affect the policies of Brezhnev's successors. (S)

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Shaping the Soviet Environment: Arenas of Engagement

Implementation of U.S. policy must focus on shaping the environment in which Soviet decisions are made both in a wide variety of functional and geopolitical arenas and in the U.S.-Soviet bilateral relationship. (S)

A. Functional

1. Military Strategy: The U.S. must modernize its military forces -- both nuclear and conventional -- so that Soviet leaders perceive that the U.S. is determined never to accept a second place or a deteriorating military posture. Soviet calculations of possible war outcomes under any contingency must always result in outcomes so unfavorable to the USSR that there would be no incentive for Soviet leaders to initiate an attack. The future strength of U.S. military capabilities must be assured. U.S. military technology advances must be exploited, while controls over transfer of military related/dual-use technology, products, and services must be tightened. (S)

In Europe, the Soviets must be faced with a reinvigorated NATO. In the Far East we must ensure that the Soviets cannot count on a secure flank in a global war. Worldwide, U.S. general purpose forces must be strong and flexible enough to affect Soviet calculations in a wide variety of contingencies. In the Third World, Moscow must know that areas of interest to the U.S. cannot be attacked or threatened without risk of serious U.S. military countermeasures. (S)

2. Economic Policy: U.S. policy on economic relations with the USSR must serve strategic and foreign policy goals as well as economic interests. In this context, U.S. objectives are:

- Above all, to ensure that East-West economic relations do not facilitate the Soviet military buildup. This requires prevention of the transfer of technology and equipment that would make a substantial contribution directly or indirectly to Soviet military power.
- To avoid subsidizing the Soviet economy or unduly easing the burden of Soviet resource allocation decisions, so as not to dilute pressures for structural change in the Soviet system.
- To seek to minimize the potential for Soviet exercise of reverse leverage on Western countries based on trade, energy supply, and financial relationships.
- To permit mutual beneficial trade -- without Western subsidization or the creation of Western dependence -- with the USSR in non-strategic areas, such as grains. (S)

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The U.S. must exercise strong leadership with its Allies and others to develop a common understanding of the strategic implications of East-West trade, building upon the agreement announced November 13, 1982 (see NSDD 66). This approach should involve efforts to reach agreements with the Allies on specific measures, such as: (a) no incremental deliveries of Soviet gas beyond the amounts contracted for from the first strand of the Siberian pipeline; (b) the addition of critical technologies and equipment to the COCOM list, the harmonization of national licensing procedures for COCOM, and the substantial improvement of the coordination and effectiveness of international enforcement efforts; (c) controls on advanced technology and equipment beyond the expanded COCOM list, including equipment in the oil and gas sector; (d) further restraints on officially-backed credits such as higher down payments, shortened maturities and an established framework to monitor this process; and (e) the strengthening of the role of the OECD and NATO in East-West trade analysis and policy. ~~(S)~~

In the longer term, if Soviet behavior should worsen, e.g., an invasion of Poland, we would need to consider extreme measures. Should Soviet behavior improve, carefully calibrated positive economic signals, including a broadening of government-to-government economic contacts, could be considered as a means of demonstrating to the Soviets the benefits that real restraint in their conduct might bring. Such steps could not, however, alter the basic direction of U.S. policy. ~~(S)~~

3. Political Action: U.S. policy must have an ideological thrust which clearly affirms the superiority of U.S. and Western values of individual dignity and freedom, a free press, free trade unions, free enterprise, and political democracy over the repressive features of Soviet Communism. We need to review and significantly strengthen U.S. instruments of political action including: (a) The President's London initiative to support democratic forces; (b) USG efforts to highlight Soviet human rights violations; and (c) U.S. radio broadcasting policy. The U.S. should:

- Expose at all available fora the double standards employed by the Soviet Union in dealing with difficulties within its own domain and the outside ("capitalist") world (e.g., treatment of labor, policies toward ethnic minorities, use of chemical weapons, etc.).
- Prevent the Soviet propaganda machine from seizing the semantic high-ground in the battle of ideas through the appropriation of such terms as "peace." ~~(S)~~

B. Geopolitical

1. The Industrial Democracies: An effective response to the Soviet challenge requires close partnership among the industrial democracies, including stronger and more effective collective defense arrangements. The U.S. must provide strong leadership

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and conduct effective consultations to build consensus and cushion the impact of intra-alliance disagreements. While Allied support of U.S. overall strategy is essential, the U.S. may on occasion be forced to act to protect vital interests without Allied support and even in the face of Allied opposition; even in this event, however, U.S. should consult to the maximum extent possible with its Allies. (S)

2. The Third World: The U.S. must rebuild the credibility of its commitment to resist Soviet encroachment on U.S. interests and those of its Allies and friends, and to support effectively those Third World states that are willing to resist Soviet pressures or oppose Soviet initiatives hostile to the United States, or are special targets of Soviet policy. The U.S. effort in the Third World must involve an important role for security assistance and foreign military sales, as well as readiness to use U.S. military forces where necessary to protect vital interests and support endangered Allies and friends. U.S. policy must also involve diplomatic initiatives to promote resolution of regional crises vulnerable to Soviet exploitation, and an appropriate mixture of economic assistance programs and private sector initiatives for Third World countries. (S)

3. The Soviet Empire: There are a number of important weaknesses and vulnerabilities within the Soviet empire which the U.S. should exploit. U.S. policies should seek wherever possible to encourage Soviet allies to distance themselves from Moscow in foreign policy and to move toward democratization domestically. (S)

(a) Eastern Europe: The primary U.S. objective in Eastern Europe is to loosen Moscow's hold on the region while promoting the cause of human rights in individual East European countries. The U.S. can advance this objective by carefully discriminating in favor of countries that show relative independence from the USSR in their foreign policy, or show a greater degree of internal liberalization. U.S. policies must also make clear that East European countries which reverse movements of liberalization, or drift away from an independent stance in foreign policy, will incur significant costs in their relations with the U.S. (S)

(b) Afghanistan: The U.S. objective is to keep maximum pressure on Moscow for withdrawal and to ensure that the Soviets' political, military, and other costs remain high while the occupation continues. (S)

(c) Cuba: The U.S. must take strong countermeasures to affect the political/military impact of Soviet arms deliveries to Cuba. The U.S. must also provide economic and military assistance to states in Central America and the Caribbean Basin threatened by Cuban destabilizing activities. Finally, the U.S. will seek to reduce the Cuban presence and influence in southern Africa by energetic leadership of the diplomatic effort to achieve a Cuban withdrawal from Angola, or failing that, by increasing the costs of Cuba's role in southern Africa. (S)

(d) Soviet Third World Alliances: U.S. policy will seek to limit the destabilizing activities of Soviet Third World allies and clients. It is a further objective to weaken and, where possible, undermine the existing links between them and the Soviet Union. U.S. policy will include active efforts to encourage democratic movements and forces to bring about political change inside these countries. ~~(S)~~

4. China: China continues to support U.S. efforts to strengthen the world's defenses against Soviet expansionism. The U.S. should over time seek to achieve enhanced strategic cooperation and policy coordination with China, and to reduce the possibility of a Sino-Soviet rapprochement. The U.S. will continue to pursue a policy of substantially liberalized technology transfer and sale of military equipment to China on a case-by-case basis within the parameters of the policy approved by the President in 1981, and defined further in 1982. ~~(S)~~

5. Yugoslavia: It is U.S. policy to support the independence, territorial integrity and national unity of Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia's current difficulties in paying its foreign debts have increased its vulnerability to Soviet pressures. The Yugoslav government, well aware of this vulnerability, would like to reduce its trade dependence on the Soviet Union. It is in our interest to prevent any deterioration in Yugoslavia's economic situation that might weaken its resolve to withstand Soviet pressure. ~~(S)~~

C. Bilateral Relationships

1. Arms Control: The U.S. will enter into arms control negotiations when they serve U.S. national security objectives. At the same time, U.S. policy recognizes that arms control agreements are not an end in themselves but are, in combination with U.S. and Allied efforts to maintain the military balance, an important means for enhancing national security and global stability. The U.S. should make clear to the Allies as well as to the USSR that U.S. ability to reach satisfactory results in arms control negotiations will inevitably be influenced by the international situation, the overall state of U.S.-Soviet relations, and the difficulties in defining areas of mutual agreement with an adversary which often seeks unilateral gains. U.S. arms control proposals will be consistent with necessary force modernization plans and will seek to achieve balanced, significant, and verifiable reductions to equal levels of comparable armaments. ~~(S)~~

2. Official Dialogue: The U.S. should insist that Moscow address the full range of U.S. concerns about Soviet internal behavior and human rights violations, and should continue to resist Soviet efforts to return to a U.S.-Soviet agenda focused primarily on arms control. U.S.-Soviet diplomatic contacts on regional issues can serve U.S. interests if they are used to keep pressure on Moscow for responsible behavior. Such contacts can

also be useful in driving home to Moscow that the costs of irresponsibility are high, and that the U.S. is prepared to work for pragmatic solutions of regional problems if Moscow is willing seriously to address U.S. concerns. At the same time, such contacts must be handled with care to avoid offering the Soviet Union a role in regional questions it would not otherwise secure. (S)

A continuing dialogue with the Soviets at Foreign Minister level facilitates necessary diplomatic communication with the Soviet leadership and helps to maintain Allied understanding and support for U.S. approach to East-West relations. A summit between President Reagan and his Soviet counterpart might promise similarly beneficial results. At the same time, unless it were carefully handled a summit could be seen as registering an improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations without the changes in Soviet behavior which we have insisted upon. It could therefore generate unrealizable expectations and further stimulate unilateral Allied initiatives toward Moscow. (S)

A summit would not necessarily involve signature of major new U.S.-Soviet agreements. Any summit meeting should achieve the maximum possible positive impact with U.S. Allies and the American public, while making clear to both audiences that improvement in Soviet-American relations depends on changes in Soviet conduct. A summit without such changes must not be understood to signal such improvement. (S)

3. U.S.-Soviet Cooperative Exchanges: The role of U.S.-Soviet cultural, educational, scientific and other cooperative exchanges should be seen in light of the U.S. intention to maintain a strong ideological component in relations with Moscow. The U.S. should not further dismantle the framework of exchanges; indeed those exchanges which could advance the U.S. objective of promoting positive evolutionary change within the Soviet system should be expanded. At the same time, the U.S. will insist on full reciprocity and encourage its Allies to do so as well. This recognizes that unless the U.S. has an effective official framework for handling exchanges, the Soviets will make separate arrangements with private U.S. sponsors, while denying reciprocal access to the Soviet Union. U.S. policy on exchanges must also take into account the necessity to prevent transfer of sensitive U.S. technology to the Soviet Union. (S)

Priorities in the U.S. Approach: Maximizing Restraining Leverage over Soviet Behavior

The interrelated tasks of containing and reversing Soviet expansion and promoting evolutionary change within the Soviet Union itself cannot be accomplished quickly. The coming 5-10 years will be a period of considerable uncertainty in which the Soviets may test U.S. resolve by continuing the kind of aggressive international behavior which the U.S. finds unacceptable. (S)

The uncertainties will be exacerbated by the fact that the Soviet Union will be engaged in the unpredictable process of political succession to Brezhnev. The U.S. will not seek to adjust its policies to the Soviet internal conflict, but rather try to create incentives (positive and negative) for the new leadership to adopt policies less detrimental to U.S. interests. The U.S. will remain ready for improved U.S.-Soviet relations if the Soviet Union makes significant changes in policies of concern to it; the burden for any further deterioration in relations must fall squarely on Moscow. The U.S. must not yield to pressures to "take the first step." (S)

The existing and projected gap between finite U.S. resources and the level of capabilities needed to implement U.S. strategy makes it essential that the U.S.: (1) establish firm priorities for the use of limited U.S. resources where they will have the greatest restraining impact on the Soviet Union; and (2) mobilize the resources of Allies and friends which are willing to join the U.S. in containing the expansion of Soviet power. (S)

Underlying the full range of U.S. and Western policies must be a strong military capable of action across the entire spectrum of potential conflicts and guided by a well conceived political and military strategy. The heart of U.S. military strategy is to deter attack by the USSR and its allies against the U.S., its Allies, or other important countries, and to defeat such an attack should deterrence fail. Although unilateral U.S. efforts must lead the way in rebuilding Western military strength to counter the Soviet threat, the protection of Western interests will require increased U.S. cooperation with Allied and other states and greater utilization of their resources. This military strategy will be combined with a political strategy attaching high priority to the following objectives:

- Sustaining steady, long-term growth in U.S. defense spending and capabilities -- both nuclear and conventional. This is the most important way of conveying to the Soviets U.S. resolve and political staying-power.
- Creating a long-term Western consensus for dealing with the Soviet Union. This will require that the U.S. exercise strong leadership in developing policies to deal with the multifaceted Soviet threat to Western interests. It will require that the U.S. take Allied concerns into account, and also that U.S. Allies take into equal account U.S. concerns. In this connection, and in addition to pushing Allies to spend more on defense, the U.S. must make a serious effort to negotiate arms control agreements consistent with U.S. military strategy and necessary force modernization plans, and should seek to achieve balanced, significant and verifiable reductions to equal levels of comparable armaments. The U.S. must also develop, together with the Allies, a unified Western approach to East-West economic relations, implementing the agreement announced on November 13, 1982.

- Maintenance of a strategic relationship with China, and efforts to minimize opportunities for a Sino-Soviet rapprochement.
- Building and sustaining a major ideological/political offensive which, together with other efforts, will be designed to bring about evolutionary change of the Soviet system. This must be a long-term and sophisticated program, given the nature of the Soviet system.
- Effective opposition to Moscow's efforts to consolidate its position in Afghanistan. This will require that the U.S. continue efforts to promote Soviet withdrawal in the context of a negotiated settlement of the conflict. At the same time, the U.S. must keep pressure on Moscow for withdrawal and ensure that Soviet costs on the ground are high.
- Blocking the expansion of Soviet influence in the critical Middle East and Southwest Asia regions. This will require both continued efforts to seek a political solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict and to bolster U.S. relations with moderate states in the region, and a sustained U.S. defense commitment to deter Soviet military encroachments.
- Maintenance of international pressure on Moscow to permit a relaxation of the current repression in Poland and a longer-term increase in diversity and independence throughout Eastern Europe. This will require that the U.S. continue to impose costs on the Soviet Union for its behavior in Poland. It will also require that the U.S. maintain a U.S. policy of differentiation among East European countries.
- Neutralization and reduction of the threat to U.S. national security interests posed by the Soviet-Cuban relationship. This will require that the U.S. use a variety of instruments, including diplomatic efforts and U.S. security and economic assistance. The U.S. must also retain the option of using of its military forces to protect vital U.S. security interests against threats which may arise from the Soviet-Cuban connection. (S)

Articulating the U.S. Approach: Sustaining Public and Congressional Support

The policy outlined above is one for the long haul. It is unlikely to yield a rapid breakthrough in bilateral relations with the Soviet Union. In the absence of dramatic near-term victories in the U.S. effort to moderate Soviet behavior, pressure is likely to mount for change in U.S. policy. There will be appeals from important segments of domestic opinion for a more "normal" U.S.-Soviet relationship, particularly in a period of political transition in Moscow. (S)

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It is therefore essential that the American people understand and support U.S. policy. This will require that official U.S. statements and actions avoid generating unrealizable expectations for near-term progress in U.S.-Soviet relations. At the same time, the U.S. must demonstrate credibly that its policy is not a blueprint for an open-ended, sterile confrontation with Moscow, but a serious search for a stable and constructive long-term basis for U.S.-Soviet relations. (S)

Paul Ryan

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