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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

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Date: 11/8/99

Box ~~92~~ **RAC Box 1**

Schroek - F96-076-2

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. Cable	Cable #010201Z Jul 87, 2 p. R F96-076/2 #14 9/29/00	7/1/87	P1/F1
2. Cable	Cable #070147Z Jul 87, 2 p. R " #15 "	7/7/87	P1/F1
3. Cable	Cable #081553Z Jul 87, 4 p. R " #16 11/21/00	7/8/87	P1/F1
4. Cable	Cable #090807Z Jul 87, 1 p. R F96-076/2 #17 9/29/00	7/9/87	P1/F1
5. Cable	Cable #271909Z Jul 87, 4 p. R " #18 "	7/27/87	P1/F1
6. Cable	Cable #141437Z Aug 87, 2 p. R " #19 "	8/14/87	P1/F1
7. Cable	Cable #272230Z Aug 87, 1 p. R " #20 "	8/27/87	P1/F1
8. Cable	Cable #032257Z Sep 87, 2 p. R " #21 "	9/3/87	P1/F1
9. Cable	Cable #101858Z Sep 87, 2 p. R " #22 "	9/10/87	P1/F1
10. Cable	Cable #201852Z Nov 87, 4 p. R " #23 "	11/20/87	P1/F1
11. Cable	Cable #042215Z Nov 87, 1 p. D " #24 "	11/4/87	P1/F1
12. Cable (part of email)	Cable #031900Z Dec 87, 7 p. R " #25 11/21/00	11/3/87	P1/F1
13. Cable (part of Email)	Cable #011305Z Nov 88, 3 p. R F96-076/2 #26	11/13/88	P1/F1

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].
- C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

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F96-076/2 #14

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
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PAGE 01 OF 02

AN001641

NSC: BEMIS COBB WAC ERMA LEDSKY OAKL RODM ROSS SOMM STK
<DIST>SIT: EOB VAX NSJHO

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<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~ <OSRI> RUEHC # <DTG> 010201Z JUL 87
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE 9822
INFO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 7290
RUSBKB/AMEMBASSY KABUL IMMEDIATE 3404

<SUBJ>SUBJECT: VORONTSOV-KAMPELMAN EXCHANGE ON AFGHANISTAN:
- BRIEFING THE GOP

~~SECRET~~ STATE 202334
NODIS

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, XD, UR, US

SUBJECT: VORONTSOV-KAMPELMAN EXCHANGE ON AFGHANISTAN:
- BRIEFING THE GOP

REF: A) STATE 198498, B) ISLAMABAD 13821

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT).
2. WHEN THEY MEET JULY 2, AMBASSADOR SHOULD SHARE WITH FOREIGN MINISTER THE SUBSTANCE OF A BRIEF EXCHANGE ON AFGHANISTAN BETWEEN AMBASSADOR KAMPELMAN AND SOVIET FIRST DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER VORONTSOV ON JUNE 20, IN GENEVA.
3. TOWARD THE END OF A MORE EXTENSIVE DISCUSSION ON U. S.-SOVIET RELATIONS AND ARMS CONTROL ISSUES, KAMPELMAN RAISED AFGHANISTAN, EXPRESSING SKEPTICISM ABOUT SOVIET BONA FIDES IN SEEKING A SETTLEMENT. VORONTSOV OBJECTED, SAYING THAT THE SOVIETS WERE SERIOUS ABOUT SEEKING A SETTLEMENT. THE USSR, ELABORATED VORONTSOV, NOW ACCEPTED THAT THE PDPA WOULD HAVE TO PLAY A MINORITY NOT/NOT MAJORITY ROLE IN A COALITION GOVERNMENT. VORONTSOV RAISED THE ISSUE OF ZAHIR SHAH, SAYING THAT MOSCOW HAD "TALKED" TO ZAHIR, WHO HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT THE U. S. WAS NOT INTERESTED IN HIS PLAYING A ROLE IN A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT AND WAS THEREFORE BACKING AWAY. KAMPELMAN REJOINED THAT THE MAJOR OBSTACLE TO A SETTLEMENT AT GENEVA WAS THE WITHDRAWAL TIMETABLE AND THAT THE DRA/SOVIET OFFER OF 18 MONTHS WAS NOT ACCEPTABLE TO ANYONE. VORONTSOV STATED THAT THE "OFFICIAL" SOVIET POSITION CURRENTLY WAS 18 MONTHS. IN RESPONSE TO KAMPELMAN'S QUESTION AS TO HOW FAR DOWN THAT TIME PERIOD COULD GO, VORONTSOV SAID THAT IN HIS PERSONAL OPINION A 12-MONTH TIMETABLE MIGHT BE REACHED. VORONTSOV NOTED THAT THE USSR HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT THE U. S. WOULD FIND ACCEPTABLE AN 11-MONTH TIMETABLE.
4. AMBASSADOR MAY POINT OUT THAT THE USG HAS NEVER SUGGESTED THAT AN 11-MONTH TIMETABLE, OR ANY TIMETABLE OTHER THAN THAT REQUIRED BY LOGISTICS, WOULD BE FOUND ACCEPTABLE. DURING SECRETARY SHULTZ' APRIL 14 EXCHANGE ON AFGHANISTAN WITH SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE, THE SECRETARY SAID THE U. S. REGARDED THE SOVIET 18-MONTH OFFER AS FAR TOO LONG. HE SAID HE "HOPED THE SOVIETS WOULD CONSIDER FURTHER THEIR NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND 18-MONTH WITHDRAWAL POSITIONS." THE SECRETARY ADDED THAT HE HAD HEARD A REPORT THAT THE SOVIETS MIGHT BE WILLING TO WITHDRAW THEIR FORCES IN ELEVEN RATHER THAN 18 MONTHS

AND ASKED SHEVARDNADZE WHETHER THERE WAS ANYTHING TO THAT REPORT. SHEVARDNADZE RESPONDED THAT HE KNEW NOTHING OF THE REPORT BUT "PERHAPS THE U. S. HAD SOME IDEAS." THE SECRETARY MADE NO FURTHER COMMENT ON THE TIMETABLE ISSUE.

5. AMBASSADOR SHOULD NOTE THAT USG WOULD APPRECIATE GOP VIEWS ON VORONTSOV'S REMARKS INCLUDING, IN PARTICULAR, GOP THOUGHTS ON WHETHER AND, IF SO, HOW THE U. S. AND/OR GOP COULD RESPOND TO SOME OF THE POINTS RAISED. THE USG AND GOP MAY WISH TO CORRECT ANY MISTAKEN IMPRESSION THE EX-KING MAY HAVE BEEN GIVEN ABOUT U. S. AND/OR GOP ATTITUDES. WE AND THE GOP SHOULD CONSIDER HOW TO ELICIT

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PAGE 02 OF 02

AN00164:

A MORE DEFINITE SOVIET EXPRESSION OF THEIR VIEWS ON A
COALITION/INTERIM REGIME AND THE TIMETABLE WITHOUT,
HOWEVER, COMPROMISING OUR OWN POSITIONS.

6. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.
SHULTZ

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 2334 <TOR> 870701112128 MSG000173445687

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PAGE 01 OF 02

AN003633

NSC: BEMIS CHLD COBB WAC DANZ ERMA KELL LEDSKY OAKL ROOM ROSS STK
<DIST>PRT: SIT
SIT: EOB VAX NSJHO

EXDIS

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <OSRI> RUEHDT <DTG> 070147Z JUL 87
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0376
INFO RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE 4345
RUSBKB/AMEMBASSY KABUL IMMEDIATE 1427
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 9334
RUFHGV/USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 7035

EXDIS

<SUBJ>SUBJECT: SYG'S JULY 2 MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR OKUN:
-- ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ AFGHANISTAN
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ A L USUN NEW YORK 01934

EXDIS

EXDIS
GENEVA PLEASE PASS DAS SMITH AT OPENING OF BUSINESS JULY 7
E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, AF, UR
SUBJECT: SYG'S JULY 2 MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR OKUN:
-- AFGHANISTAN
1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
>BEGIN SUMMARY>
2. SUMMARY. SYG PEREZ DE CUELLAR TOLD AMBASSADOR OKUN
THAT DURING HIS MOSCOW VISIT GORBACHEV HAD MADE CLEAR TO
HIM SOVIET DETERMINATION TO WITHDRAW FROM AFGHANISTAN
AND ACCEPTANCE OF THE CONCEPT OF AFGHAN NEUTRALITY.
GORBACHEV, HOWEVER, GAVE NO INDICATION OF A DEFINITIVE
TIMETABLE FOR WITHDRAWAL AND SUGGESTED IT WAS RELATED TO
AGREEMENT ON "NATIONAL RECONCILIATION." IN DISCUSSIONS
ON AFGHANISTAN, AS WELL AS OTHER ISSUES, GORBACHEV
STATED SOVIET CASE EFFECTIVELY AND WAS WELL AWARE OF
DETAILS. END SUMMARY.
>END SUMMARY>

EXDIS

3. AMBASSADOR OKUN MET WITH SYG PEREZ DE CUELLAR JULY 2
TO OBTAIN READOUT OF SYG'S CONVERSATIONS WITH SOVIET
LEADERSHIP IN MOSCOW EARLIER SAME WEEK. SYG'S EXCHANGES
WITH SOVIETS ON CAMBODIA, IRAN-IRAQ AND INTERNATIONAL
CONFERENCE ON MIDDLE EAST BEING REPORTED SEPTELS. THIS
MESSAGE DEALS WITH AFGHANISTAN.
4. SOVIET INTENTIONS: THE SYG SAID THAT GORBACHEV HAD
DELIVERED TO HIM A VERY STRONG STATEMENT OF SOVIET
DETERMINATION TO WITHDRAW FROM AFGHANISTAN. THE SYG
BELIEVED THAT GORBACHEV'S ACCEPTANCE OF THE CONCEPT OF A
NEUTRAL AFGHANISTAN WAS SUCH AN IMPORTANT POINT THAT HE
DECIDED TO REPEAT IT IN HIS MOSCOW PRESS CONFERENCE.
GORBACHEV HIMSELF LATER WENT PUBLIC WITH IT.
5. NATIONAL RECONCILIATION: IN RESPONSE TO AMBASSADOR
OKUN'S QUERY, THE SYG SAID THAT GORBACHEV DID NOT
MENTION THE FORMER KING BY NAME, BUT INDICATED THAT HE
WAS OPEN TO ANY FORMULA FOR NATIONAL RECONCILIATION.
THE SYG HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT THE CONCEPT OF ALLOWING
THE FORMER KING TO HEAD A PROVISIONAL OR TRANSITIONAL
GOVERNMENT WAS VERY MUCH ON THE MINDS OF THE SOVIETS.
6. WITHDRAWAL TIMETABLE: THE SYG SUGGESTED TO
AMBASSADOR OKUN THAT THE GENEVA PROXIMITY TALKS

THEMSELVES WERE CLOSE TO BEING TRAPPED IN A VICIOUS
CIRCLE. IN THEIR TWO AND A-HALF HOUR CONVERSATION WITH
HIM ON THIS SUBJECT, THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP APPEARED TO
BE ARGUING THAT SOME DEGREE OF "NATIONAL RECONCILIATION"
WAS NECESSARY BEFORE THEY WOULD AGREE ON A DEFINITIVE
WITHDRAWAL TIMETABLE.
7. PEREZ DE CUELLAR TOLD THE SOVIETS THAT AGREEMENT ON
A WITHDRAWAL TIMETABLE WOULD TRIGGER NATIONAL
RECONCILIATION AND THAT A "DECISIVE MEETING" ON THIS
SUBJECT WAS NECESSARY. HE ALSO TOLD THEM THAT WHILE THE
UN-SPONSORED TALKS COULD NOT IGNORE THE LINK BETWEEN

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PAGE 02 OF 02

AN003633

RECONCILIATION AND WITHDRAWAL, THEY HAD TO FOCUS ON OBTAINING A CLEAR TIMETABLE. GORBACHEV DID NOT REJECT THE NEED FOR PROGRESS AT GENEVA, BUT HE ALSO DID NOT RESPOND TO THE SYG'S POINT ON THE NEED TO REACH AGREEMENT ON A TIMETABLE. SHEVARDNADZE, HOWEVER, IN A SEPARATE CONVERSATION WITH THE SYG, INDICATED THAT THE SOVIETS WERE PREPARED TO CONSIDER HIS RECOMMENDATION WITH REGARD TO A TIMETABLE.

8. OVERALL ATMOSPHERICS: THE SYG SAID HE WAS IMPRESSED BY GORBACHEV'S OSTENSIBLE DETERMINATION TO FIND A WAY OUT OF AFGHANISTAN. GORBACHEV WAS A LIVELY INTERLOCUTOR, VERY MUCH AWARE OF THE DETAILS OF THE ISSUES HE WAS DISCUSSING AND FORCEFUL IN HIS PRESENTATION OF THEM. GORBACHEV WAS ALSO VERY MUCH TAKEN WITH HIS GLASNOST AND ECONOMIC RESTRUCTURING, BOTH OF WHICH HE REGARDS AS HAVING INTERNATIONAL AS WELL AS DOMESTIC ASPECTS.

9. KABUL AND MOSCOW MINIMIZES CONSIDERED.
OKUN

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 1934 <TOR> 870707085439 MSG000173955279

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PAGE 01 OF 04

AN005319

NSC: COBB WAC ERMA LEDSKY OAKL RODM SOMM
<DIST>SIT: EOB VAX

<PREC> PRIORITY <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~ <OSRI> RUFHGV <DTG> 081553Z JUL 87
FM USDEL NST GENEVA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO RUFHNA/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY
RUDORRA/USNMR SHAPE PRIORITY
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

<SUBJ>SUBJECT: INF: SUMMARY REPORT OF JULY 7 LIMITED
COMPOSITION MEETING

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 NST GENEVA 07413
EXDIS

MILITARY ADDRESSEE HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
FROM INF/GLITMAN
FOR ACDA/DIRECTOR ADELMAN; SHAPE FOR GEN. GALVIN AND
POLAD

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PARM, INF, NST

SUBJECT: INF: SUMMARY REPORT OF JULY 7 LIMITED
COMPOSITION MEETING

1. THIS IS INF-1174. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. BEGIN SUMMARY. U.S. SIDE PRESENTED A "STOCK-TAKING" ASSESSMENT EMPHASIZING THAT THE RECENT SLOWDOWN IN THE NEGOTIATIONS RESULTS FROM SOVIET UNWILLINGNESS TO MOVE IN GENEVA ON THE CORE ISSUES OF THE TREATY. U.S. SIDE POINTED, ESPECIALLY, TO LACK OF SOVIET MOVEMENT ON THE BASIC REDUCTIONS AND LIMITATIONS PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN JDT ARTICLES IV (LRINF) AND VI (SRINF) AND TO THE SOVIET SIDE'S RECENT RAISING OF NEW PROBLEM AREAS IN VERIFICATION. U.S. SIDE CONTRASTED SOVIET PERFORMANCE WITH CONCERTED U.S. EFFORTS, FORMAL AND INFORMAL, TECHNICAL AND SUBSTANTIVE, AT THE AMBASSADORIAL LEVEL AND IN WORKING GROUPS, TO ESTABLISH COMMON GROUND AND RESOLVE THE KEY ISSUES.
3. SOVIET SIDE CLAIMED THAT ITS DRAFT TREATY OF APRIL 27, AS WELL AS ITS PROTOCOL ON DESTRUCTION AND ITS MOU, REPRESENTED SIGNIFICANT COMPROMISE MOVEMENT ON THE SOVIET PART. THESE TEXTS HAD TAKEN THE U.S. MATERIALS FULLY INTO ACCOUNT; THE SOVIET SIDE HAD EXPECTED SIMILAR CONCESSIONS FROM THE U.S. SIDE. THE INFORMAL U.S. SUGGESTIONS ON PHASING OF REDUCTIONS DID NOT REPRESENT ANY CHANGE IN THE U.S. APPROACH, SINCE THEY WOULD NOT LEAD TO U.S. REDUCTIONS FROM THE OUTSET. THE U.S. APPROACH TO SHORTER-RANGE SYSTEMS COINCIDES WITH THE SOVIET PROPOSAL TO ELIMINATE SUCH SYSTEMS IN EUROPE, BUT WOULD NOT RESULT IN AN EQUAL OUTCOME BECAUSE OF U.S. INSISTENCE ON RETAINING THE FRG SYSTEMS.
4. SOVIET SIDE CLAIMED THAT THE U.S. PHRASE, "OF THE PARTIES", IN ARTICLE II DEFINITION OF MISSILE OPERATING BASE (MOB), CREATED A POTENTIAL LOOPHOLE, AND SPENT MOST OF THE MEETING ASKING REPEATEDLY THE FOLLOWING THREE QUESTIONS: A) WOULD U.S. MOBS CONTAIN NON-U.S. STRUCTURES OR FACILITIES? B) WOULD U.S. DEPLOYMENT AREAS CONTAIN NON-U.S. STRUCTURES OR FACILITIES? C) MAY

U.S. MISSILES AND LAUNCHERS BE LOCATED IN NON-U.S. STRUCTURES OR FACILITIES? U.S. SIDE PROVIDED CLARIFICATION ON THE U.S. POSITIONS REGARDING THESE QUESTIONS AND REPEATEDLY ASKED -- WITHOUT GETTING A CLEAR REPLY -- IF THE QUESTIONS INDICATED A SOVIET DESIRE TO INSPECT ANY SUCH NON-U.S. FACILITIES. SOVIET RESPONSES WERE EVASIVE. END SUMMARY.

GLITMAN'S OPENING REMARKS

5. GLITMAN LED WITH A STOCKTAKING OVERVIEW. HE

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PAGE 02 OF 04

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REFERRED TO THE COMMENTS OF THE SOVIET MFA SPOKESMAN ABOUT A SLOWDOWN IN GENEVA, AND SAID THAT SLOWDOWN COULD BE TRACED TO SOVIET UNWILLINGNESS TO ENGAGE WITH THE U.S. ON THE TREATY'S CORE ISSUES. HE POINTED, IN PARTICULAR, TO JDT ARTICLES IV (LRINF REDUCTIONS) AND VI (SRINF REDUCTIONS). IN BOTH AREAS THE U.S. HAD EXERTED CONSIDERABLE EFFORT. SEVERAL WEEKS AGO IT HAD MADE INFORMAL SUGGESTIONS TO ADDRESS SOVIET CONCERN THAT THE U.S. REDUCE IN EUROPE FROM THE OUTSET ALONG WITH THE U.S. CONCERN THAT EQUALITY AT A MILITARILY VIABLE LEVEL BE REACHED PRIOR TO THE END OF REDUCTIONS. THE U.S. SIDE ALSO SOUGHT TO ENGAGE THE SOVIET SIDE IN EXPLORING ALTERNATIVE WAYS OF RESOLVING THE ISSUE AND HAS SUGGESTED WAYS OF CONDENSING AND SIMPLIFYING ARTICLE IV, BUT THERE HAS BEEN NO SOVIET RESPONSE, FORMAL OR INFORMAL, TECHNICAL OR SUBSTANTIVE, AND THE SOVIET SIDE HAS IN EFFECT REFUSED TO MOVE BEYOND ITS FORMAL POSITION TABLED OVER TWO MONTHS AGO.

6. REGARDING SHORTER RANGE MISSILES. THE U.S. HAD RESPONDED CONSTRUCTIVELY AND POSITIVELY TO A SOVIET SECRET SECTION 02 OF 03 NST GENEVA 07413

EXDIS

MILITARY ADDRESSEE HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FROM INF/GLITMAN

FOR ACDA/DIRECTOR ADELMAN; SHAPE FOR GEN. GALVIN AND POLAD

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PARM, INF, NST

SUBJECT: INF: SUMMARY REPORT OF JULY 7 LIMITED SUGGESTION, YET HAD RECEIVED NOTHING IN RETURN. THE SOVIETS ARE HESITATING TO TAKE YES FOR AN ANSWER.

7. IN JDT ARTICLES II-VIII MORE THAN 40 POINTS REMAINED UNRESOLVED, ABOUT HALF OF WHICH WERE RELATED TO ARTICLES IV AND VI. THE MOST EXPEDITIOUS WAY TO RESOLVE THESE POINTS WOULD BE TO AGREE NOW TO GLOBAL ELIMINATION OF U.S. AND SOVIET INTERMEDIATE AND SHORTER-RANGE MISSILE SYSTEMS.

8. WITH OR WITHOUT SUCH AN AGREEMENT, HOWEVER. CURRENT WORK AND PROGRESS IN GENEVA DEPENDS NOW ON SOVIET CONTRIBUTIONS TO ARTICLES IV AND VI. PROGRESS CANNOT BE ACHIEVED WHEN ONLY ONE SIDE IS WILLING TO EXPLORE AND SHOW INITIATIVE. IT IS A TRAVESTY OF THE TRUE STATE OF AFFAIRS IN GENEVA FOR THE SIDE NOT ENGAGING ON THE CORE ISSUES TO PUBLICLY COMPLAIN ABOUT A SLOWDOWN.

9. IN THE VERIFICATION AREA. THE SOVIET SIDE APPEARED TO BE RAISING NEW PROBLEMS. IN ITS NEW DRAFT OF ARTICLE XII (INSPECTIONS) AND ITS MOU, IT SEEKS TO REQUIRE UNILATERAL INSPECTION OF STORAGE FACILITIES FOR U.S. WARHEADS. IT ALSO SEEKS UNILATERAL INSPECTION RIGHTS AT

VAGUELY-DEFINED U.S. MILITARY BASES WORLDWIDE.

10. IN CONTRAST, THE U.S. HAS BEEN NEGOTIATING IN GOOD FAITH AND HAS BEEN WILLING TO EXPLORE ALTERNATIVES. IN SUM. THE SOVIET SIDE HAS RECENTLY BACKTRACKED IN SOME AREAS AND HAS FAILED EITHER TO RESPOND CONSTRUCTIVELY, OR RESPOND AT ALL, TO U.S. EFFORTS, FORMAL AND INFORMAL, TECHNICAL AND SUBSTANTIVE, TO MOVE THE TALKS ALONG IN THE CORE AREAS.

MEDVEDEV RESPONSE

11. MEDVEDEV REPLIED THAT THE SOVIET DRAFT TREATY OF APRIL 27 IN ITSELF REFLECTED VERY SIGNIFICANT COMPROMISE MOVEMENT ON THE PART OF THE SOVIET SIDE. THAT DRAFT HAD TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT A FULL RANGE OF U.S. POSITIONS AS CONTAINED IN THE U.S. DRAFT TREATY. THE SOVIET APPROACH TO OPERATIONAL-TACTICAL SYSTEMS ALSO REFLECTED SOVIET COMPROMISE TO ACCOMMODATE THE U.S. DESIRE TO ACHIEVE AGREEMENT ON THESE SYSTEMS IN THE CONTEXT OF AN

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PAGE 03 OF 04

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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE MISSILE TREATY. THE SOVIET DRAFT PROTOCOL ON DESTRUCTION AND MOU WERE ALSO COMPROMISE TEXTS. THESE COMPROMISE SOVIET DOCUMENTS HAD BEEN PRESENTED WITH THE EXPECTATION OF SIMILAR CONCESSIONS ON THE PART OF THE U.S. SIDE, BUT THE SOVIET SIDE HAD BEEN DISAPPOINTED IN THAT EXPECTATION.

12. THE INFORMAL U.S. SUGGESTIONS ON THE PHASING OF REDUCTIONS HAD BEEN CAREFULLY EXAMINED AND FOUND NOT TO ALTER THE FORMAL U.S. APPROACH. THEY WOULD NOT LEAD TO U.S. REDUCTIONS FROM THE OUTSET OR TO ELIMINATION OF SYSTEMS ON BOTH SIDES. THE U.S. APPROACH TO OPERATIONAL-TACTICAL MISSILES COINCIDED, IN REGARD TO EUROPE, WITH THE SOVIET PROPOSAL, BUT DID NOT PROVIDE FOR AN EQUAL OUTCOME BECAUSE THE U.S. INSISTED ON RETENTION OF WARHEADS FOR FRG MISSILES. IT IS THE U.S., THEREFORE, THAT HAS BEEN OBSTRUCTING PROGRESS.

13. GLITMAN RESPONDED THAT THE U.S. POSITION ON THE FRG PERSHING WAS WELL-KNOWN. THE U.S. SIDE CONSIDERS IT UNTIMELY FOR THE SOVIETS TO RAISE THIS ISSUE AT SUCH A LATE STAGE; IT IS UNACCEPTABLE TO BRING NON-U.S. SYSTEMS INTO THESE NEGOTIATIONS; AND SOVIET SECURITY WOULD BE MORE THAN EQUALLY PROVIDED FOR UNDER THE U.S. APPROACH. MEDVEDEV REPLIED THAT SECURITY IS A REALM IN WHICH IT IS NEVER TOO LATE, EVEN IN THE ELEVENTH HOUR, TO RAISE A SERIOUS CONCERN.

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 NST GENEVA 07413

EXDIS

MILITARY ADDRESSEE HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FROM INF/GLITMAN

FOR ACDA/DIRECTOR ADELMAN; SHAPE FOR GEN. GALVIN AND POLAD

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PARM, INF, NST

SUBJECT: INF: SUMMARY REPORT OF JULY 7 LIMITED Q'S AND A'S: FACILITIES "OF THE PARTIES"

14. MEDVEDEV THEN RAISED AN ISSUE, DISCUSSED AT LENGTH IN THE PREVIOUS DAY'S MEETING OF THE REDUCTIONS AND LIMITATIONS WORKING GROUP, CONCERNING THE ARTICLE II DEFINITION OF AN MOB. HE SAID THE SOVIET SIDE WAS

CONCERNED THAT THE U.S. USE IN THAT DEFINITION OF THE PHRASE, "OF THE PARTIES", CREATED A POTENTIAL LOOPHOLE. HE TOOK UP THE REMAINDER OF THE MEETING REPEATEDLY ASKING THREE QUESTIONS THAT HE SAID RESULTED FROM THAT CONCERN: A) WOULD U.S. MISSILE OPERATING BASES CONTAIN NON-U.S. STRUCTURES OR FACILITIES? B) WOULD U.S. DEPLOYMENT AREAS CONTAIN NON-U.S. STRUCTURES OR FACILITIES? C) MAY U.S. MISSILES AND LAUNCHERS BE LOCATED IN NON-U.S. STRUCTURES OR FACILITIES? MEDVEDEV ADDED THAT THE SOVIET CONCERN IN THIS MATTER PERTAINED AS WELL TO PORTIONS OF ARTICLE XII (INSPECTIONS) WHERE THE U.S. PHRASE, "OF THE PARTIES", WAS ALSO USED.

15. THE U.S. SIDE PROVIDED CLARIFICATIONS ON THE U.S. POSITIONS RELATED TO MEDVEDEV'S QUESTIONS AND PRESSED MEDVEDEV TO STATE WHETHER OR NOT HIS QUESTIONS INDICATED SOVIET DESIRE TO INSPECT NON-U.S. STRUCTURES OR FACILITIES. MEDVEDEV'S RESPONSES WERE NOT DEFINITIVE: HE DID NOT MAKE CLEAR WHETHER THE SOVIET SIDE SOUGHT ASSURANCE THAT U.S. MISSILES WOULD NOT BE LOCATED IN NON-U.S. STRUCTURES OR FACILITIES, OR WHETHER THE REAL SOVIET OBJECTIVE WAS THE RIGHT TO INSPECT SUCH NON-U.S. OPERATED STRUCTURES AND FACILITIES.

16. SIDES AGREED TO REFER THESE QUESTIONS TO THE APPROPRIATE WORKING GROUPS. GLITMAN CONCLUDED BY REMINDING THE SOVIET SIDE OF HOW MUCH EASIER OUR WORK WOULD BE IF THE SIDES WERE TO AGREE NOW TO QUICKLY ELIMINATE ALL U.S. AND SOVIET INTERMEDIATE AND

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PAGE 04 OF 04

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SHORTER-RANGE MISSILE SYSTEMS.

17. MOSCOW MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. KAMPELMAN

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 03 <SSN> 7413 <TOR> 870709014905 MSG000174102545
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FM AMEMBASSY USSR
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DEPT PLEASE PASS INFO PRIORITY KABUL, ISLAMABAD, NEW DELHI,
BONN, LONDON, PARIS, USNATO, BEIJING, USUN NEW YORK
~~SECRET~~ USSR 00011

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, AF, UR, US

EXDIS

SUBJECT: VORONTSOV ON AFGHANISTAN
DEPT PLEASE PASS INFO PRIORITY KABUL, ISLAMABAD, NEW DELHI,
BONN, LONDON, PARIS, USNATO, BEIJING, USUN NEW YORK

1. ~~SECRET~~ -- ENTIRE TEXT.

2. IN A JULY 8 MEETING WITH THE AMBASSADOR, DEPUTY FOREIGN
MINISTER VORONTSOV ADDRESSED AFGHANISTAN IN A LOW-KEY AND
NON-CONFRONTATIONAL MANNER. NOTING THAT WASHINGTON DID NOT
APPEAR TO UNDERSTAND FULLY THE SOVIET APPROACH, HE SAID THE
SOVIETS NEEDED TO EXPLAIN THEIR POSITION BETTER AND SUGGESTED
THE SIDES GET TOGETHER AT A FUTURE TIME FOR SUCH AN EXCHANGE.

3. ACCORDING TO VORONTSOV, THE ESSENCE OF THE SOVIET APPROACH
WAS TO FIND AN ACCEPTABLE INTERIM ARRANGEMENT. THE U. S. WANTED
A SOVIET WITHDRAWAL WITHIN A COUPLE OF MONTHS. BUT THE AFGHANS
WOULD SLAUGHTER EACH OTHER IF THE SOVIETS WERE TO DO SO; THE
DEAD WOULD NUMBER IN THE THOUSANDS, PERHAPS THE HUNDREDS OF
THOUSANDS. THE SOVIETS INSTEAD SOUGHT AN INTERIM ARRANGEMENT
PROVIDING FOR A COALITION GOVERNMENT TO SUPERVISE THE PROCESS
OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AMONG ALL AFGHAN ELEMENTS WHILE
SOVIET FORCES WERE WITHDRAWING. A FINAL SETTLEMENT WOULD BE
STRUCK BY THE AFGHANS AFTER COMPLETION OF THE SOVIET
WITHDRAWAL.

EXDIS

4. VORONTSOV SAID THE SOVIETS NEEDED TO PURSUE THIS WITH US
AND PAKISTAN. IN RESPONSE TO THE AMBASSADOR'S QUESTION AS TO
WHETHER HE WAS CONSIDERING GOING TO WASHINGTON, VORONTSOV
REPLIED THAT THE FOREIGN MINISTERS COULD FIRST DISCUSS THE
SUBJECT, AND PERHAPS AGREE TO RENEW TALKS AT THE VORONTSOV-
ARMACOST LEVEL.

5. KABUL MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. COMBS

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<TO>TO AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 0000

<SUBJ>SUBJECT: ~~AFGHANISTAN: ARMACOST-CORDOVEZ CONSULTATIONS~~

<TEXT>

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PASS TO ARMACOST PARTY/TOPOL 030037

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR

TAGS: PREL, XD, US

SUBJECT: AFGHANISTAN: ARMACOST-CORDOVEZ CONSULTATIONS

1. ~~1ST~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

~BEGIN SUMMARY~

2. BEGIN SUMMARY: IN A 90 MINUTE MEETING, JULY 23, CORDOVEZ OUTLINED WHAT HE VIEWS AS NEXT STEPS IN THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS. THE FIRST STEP IS TO GET THE GOP "BOTTOM LINE" ON AN ACCEPTABLE TIMEFRAME; THIS WOULD SERVE AS A CATALYST IN PROMOTING RECONCILIATION. THE SECOND STEP IS AN "ALL-AFGHAN" MEETING TO BE CONVENED BY ZAHIR SHAH OUTSIDE PAKISTAN/AFGHANISTAN, AND TO INCLUDE REPRESENTATIVES FROM THE SEVEN POLITICAL PARTIES, THE PDPA, AND THE EMIGRE COMMUNITY. THE AFGHANS WOULD SORT OUT AMONG THEMSELVES THE COMPOSITION OF AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT, AFTER WHICH A LOYA JIRGA WOULD BE CALLED TO ENDORSE THE AGREED-UPON FORMULA. THIS WOULD BE FOLLOWED BY A FINAL ROUND AT GENEVA TO CONCLUDE AND SIGN THE UN-NEGOTIATED INSTRUMENTS.

3. CORDOVEZ ATTACHED CONSIDERABLE SIGNIFICANCE TO NAJIB'S STATEMENT THAT HE WOULD BE WILLING TO "SACRIFICE HIS POST FOR THE INTEREST OF THE PEOPLE." HE BELIEVES THAT THIS INDICATES EVERYTHING IS "NEGOTIABLE" AND EXPRESSED HIS BELIEF THAT THE SOVIETS ARE WILLING TO ACCEPT A TRANSITIONAL REGIME AND "ANY ROLE" FOR ZAHIR SHAH. CORDOVEZ SAID HE HAS ASKED TO SEE YAQUB AND ABDUL WAKIL. END SUMMARY.

~END SUMMARY~

4. UN UNDER SECRETARY GENERAL DIEGO CORDOVEZ MET FOR 90 MINUTES JULY 23 WITH UNDER SECRETARY ARMACOST. CORDOVEZ WAS ACCOMPANIED BY UN SECRETARIAT OFFICIAL GIANDOMENICO PICCO; IN ADDITION TO ARMACOST, THE US SIDE INCLUDED NEA DAS PECK, P STAFF STEINFELD, AND AFGHANISTAN DESK OFFICER MILLIKAN (NOTETAKER).

5. VORONTSOV MEETING: IN RESPONSE TO CORDOVEZ'S QUERY ABOUT THE TIMING OF AN ARMACOST-VORONTSOV MEETING, ARMACOST NOTED HE HAD PROPOSED AUGUST 4-5 FOR A MEETING. HOWEVER, VORONTSOV HAD TOLD AMBASSADOR MATLOCK IN MOSCOW THAT HE INTENDS TO RETURN TO GENEVA IN THE NEXT FEW WEEKS IN CONNECTION WITH START NEGOTIATIONS. IN A SEPARATE MESSAGE TO ARMACOST, VORONTSOV HAD INDICATED THAT THE AUGUST 4-5 TIMING MIGHT NOT WORK FOR HIM; IF THIS PROVED TO BE THE CASE, HE WOULD PROPOSE AN ALTERNATIVE DATE.

6. CORDOVEZ'S PLANS: ARMACOST ASKED WHETHER CORDOVEZ'S TRAVEL PLANS HAD FIRMED UP. CORDOVEZ REPLIED IN THE NEGATIVE AND SPECULATED THAT PERHAPS NAJIB'S MOSCOW TRIP HAD SOMETHING TO DO WITH IT, IN WHICH CASE, THE SOVIETS/DRA MIGHT NEED SOME TIME TO SORT THINGS OUT. HE

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ASSERTED THAT NAJIB/GORBACHEV STATEMENTS FOLLOWING NAJIB'S VISIT SEEMED TO INDICATE THAT GORBACHEV HAD DISCUSSED WITH NAJIB THE IDEAS RAISED BY CORDOVEZ AND THE UNSYG DURING THEIR JUNE TRIP. HE CITED THE TASS STATEMENT REFERRING TO DISCUSSION OF "ADDITIONAL STEPS AND MEASURES IN THE INTERESTS OF THE FASTEST POSSIBLE NORMALIZATION OF THE SITUATION AROUND AFGHANISTAN" AS PERHAPS INDICATIVE THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD BE WILLING TO MOVE ON THE WITHDRAWAL TIMEFRAME IN PARALLEL WITH DISCUSSION OF RECONCILIATION. CORDOVEZ INDICATED HE HAS ASKED TO SEE BOTH YAQUB AND ABDUL WAKIL.

7. HAMMER VISIT: ARMACOST BRIEFED CORDOVEZ ON ARMAND HAMMER'S LATEST VISIT TO MOSCOW. HAMMER HAD BEEN STRUCK BY VORONTSOV'S VOLUNTARY ACKNOWLEDGEMENT THAT THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND IS NOT GOING WELL FOR THE SOVIETS. HAMMER SAID THE SOVIETS HAD QUERIED HIM WHETHER, IN A FORMULA INVOLVING THE EX-KING, ABDUL WALI WOULD BE PROPOSED AS PRIME MINISTER. CORDOVEZ NOTED IN JEST THAT, IN A CONTEST BETWEEN ABDUL WALI AND NAJIB FOR ANY OFFICE, NAJIB WOULD RECEIVE 90 PER CENT OF THE VOTES.

8. NAJIB'S CONSTITUTION/COALITION PROPOSAL: ARMACOST ASSERTED THAT THE SUBSTANCE OF NAJIB'S LATEST PROPOSALS WERE DISAPPOINTING BECAUSE THEY REVEALED A CONTINUING UNWILLINGNESS TO CONFRONT THE MAIN ISSUE. THE DIVISION OF PORTFOLIOS CLEARLY INDICATES THAT THE PDPA IS TO RETAIN A DOMINANT ROLE, AS DOES CODIFICATION OF THE PDPA AS THE "GUARANTOR" OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION IN THE DRAFT CONSTITUTION. CORDOVEZ AGREED AND SAID HE HAD TOLD DOST AS MUCH, ADDING THAT NEGOTIATIONS ON THE DIVISION OF PORTFOLIOS AND DISCUSSION OF RECONCILIATION COULD NOT CONTINUE TO BE CONDUCTED THROUGH THE AFGHAN NEWSPAPERS. HE TOLD DOST THAT A MEETING WHERE THESE ISSUES COULD BE HASHED OUT NEEDED TO BE ARRANGED. CORDOVEZ STRESSED THAT THE IMPORTANT ELEMENT ARISING FROM NAJIB'S VISIT TO MOSCOW WAS HIS RESPONSE TO A QUESTION IN WHICH HE ASSERTED HE WOULD BE WILLING TO "SACRIFICE HIS POST (AND HIS LIFE) FOR THE INTERESTS OF THE PEOPLE." CORDOVEZ SAID THIS OF COURSE NEEDED TO BE TESTED, BUT EXPRESSED HIS BELIEF THAT THIS INDICATES THAT "EVERYTHING IS NEGOTIABLE", INCLUDING A DOMINANT ROLE FOR THE PDPA.

9. ARMACOST NOTED THAT IN DENIAU'S LENGTHY MEETING WITH VORONTSOV, THE LATTER HAD ASSERTED THAT THE SOVIETS WERE PREPARED TO CONTEMPLATE NEUTRALITY (A LA AUSTRIA) BUT THAT THE REGIME WOULD HAVE TO BE "FRIENDLY" TO THE USSR. THE "GUARANTEE" OF FRIENDLINESS WOULD BE THE CONTINUED EXISTENCE OF THE PDPA. HOWEVER, WHEN PRESSED BY DENIAU, VORONTSOV REFUSED TO CLARIFY WHETHER THIS MEANT THE PDPA SHOULD HAVE THE LEADING ROLE IN ANY GOVERNMENT OR WHETHER IT SIMPLY MEANT THE PDPA HAD TO EXIST.

10. GENEVA TALKS: CORDOVEZ SAID THAT THE NEXT GENEVA ROUND NEEDED TO BE PLAYED CAREFULLY. HE ALLEGED THAT THE GOP'S PERFORMANCE AT THE LAST ROUND HAD UNDERMINED THEIR CREDIBILITY WITH THE SOVIETS. HE FURTHER ALLEGED THAT PAKISTAN'S REPEATED AND PUBLIC COMPLAINTS ABOUT THE INTERRUPTED GOP-SOVIET DIALOGUE WOULD MERELY DELAY RATHER THAN EXPEDITE A VORONTSOV VISIT, PARTICULARLY WHEN THEY CHARACTERIZED THE VISIT AS INTENDED TO DISCUSS NATIONAL RECONCILIATION. CORDOVEZ INDICATED THAT BEFORE CALLING ANOTHER ROUND, HE WANTED TO HAVE INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS WITH THE GOP TO DETERMINE THEIR "BOTTOM LINE" ON A

TIMEFRAME. THIS WAS NECESSARY BECAUSE, HE ALLEGED, THE GOP HAD INDICATED AT THE OIC MEETING IN KUWAIT THAT THEY WOULD ACCEPT A 12 MONTH TIMEFRAME, BUT THEN SUBSEQUENTLY BACKED OFF FROM IT.

11. ARMACOST NOTED THAT IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO GET A "BOTTOM LINE" ANSWER ON A TIMEFRAME DIVORCED FROM PROGRESS ON NATIONAL RECONCILIATION BECAUSE THE LENGTH OF THE TIMEFRAME HAD BECOME DEPENDENT ON THE CHARACTER/COMPOSITION OF A NATIONAL RECONCILIATION GOVERNMENT. CORDOVEZ RESPONDED THAT THIS BROUGHT US BACK TO THE CHICKEN AND EGG SITUATION AND REITERATED THE IMPORTANCE OF MOVING ON "BOTH TRACKS". HE EXPRESSED A WILLINGNESS TO TRAVEL "INCOGNITO" TO PAKISTAN AND GET ZIA'S APPROVAL FOR A 12 MONTH TIMEFRAME.

12. ARMACOST MADE CLEAR THAT, AS A POTENTIAL GUARANTOR, THE USG WOULD NOT BE WILLING TO ACCEPT A 12 MONTH TIMEFRAME WITH NAJIB IN PLACE IN KABUL. THIS WAS "UNSALEABLE" ON THE HILL AND TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE TO THIS ADMINISTRATION. IF THERE WERE AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT IN PLACE ACCEPTABLE TO THE REFUGEES AND RESISTANCE, THE TIMETABLE WOULD BE VIEWED IN THAT CONTEXT.

13. NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND NEXT STEPS: CORDOVEZ SUGGESTED THAT WHAT IS NEEDED IS AN ALL-AFGHAN MEETING TO INCLUDE THE PDPA, REPRESENTATIVES FROM THE SEVEN RESISTANCE PARTIES, REPRESENTATIVES FROM THE DIASPORA AND THE KING. HE SAID THE MEETING SHOULD BE CONVENED BY THE EX-KING, ALTHOUGH HE WONDERED WHETHER ZAHIR WOULD BE ABLE TO CHAIR THE MEETING DUE TO HIS "LIMITED INTELLECTUAL ABILITIES" AND WEAK PERSONALITY. HE SAID PERHAPS THE MEETING COULD BE CHAIRED BY A GROUP OF "NOTABLES". IT WOULD HAVE TO BE MADE CLEAR FROM THE START THAT NO ONE SHOULD GO EXPECTING TO BE GIVEN A LEAD POSITION. THE AFGHANS COULD THEN SORT OUT AMONG THEMSELVES, WITH CORDOVEZ PLAYING THE ROLE OF ADVISOR/ASSISTANT, THE COMPOSITION OF AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT. UPON AGREEMENT BY THE PARTIES, A LOYA JIRGA COULD BE HELD TO PUT THE "STAMP OF APPROVAL" ON THE GOVERNMENT. THIS COULD THEN BE FOLLOWED BY A FINAL ROUND AT GENEVA WHEN THE INSTRUMENTS WOULD BE SIGNED.

14. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION, HE ASSERTED THAT THE PDPA WOULD BE REPRESENTED BY A GROUP OF RESPONSIBLE PARCHAMI AND KHALQIS -- "NOT NAJIB." CORDOVEZ ASKED WHETHER THE SEVEN RESISTANCE LEADERS WOULD AGREE TO SUCH A CONCEPT AND WHETHER THEY WOULD AGREE TO MEET WITH HIM. HE SAID THAT HE HAD RECEIVED MESSAGES FROM INDIVIDUALS CLAIMING TO BE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PARTIES REQUESTING AN OPPORTUNITY TO MEET WITH HIM. CORDOVEZ CLAIMED NOT TO KNOW WHO THESE PEOPLE WERE AND WOULD NOT SAY WHICH PARTIES THEY REPRESENTED. THE CONDITION, HOWEVER, WAS THAT THEY MEET WITHOUT THE PRESENCE OF GOP REPRESENTATIVES. ARMACOST NOTED HE WOULD BE MEETING WITH ALL SEVEN PARTY LEADERS AND WOULD TRY TO DETERMINE WHETHER THEY WOULD BE WILLING IN PRINCIPLE TO MEET WITH CORDOVEZ. CORDOVEZ ADDED THAT SUCH A MEETING WOULD HAVE TO OCCUR OUTSIDE OF PAKISTAN, ALTHOUGH IT WAS NOTED THAT THE LIKELIHOOD OF ALL SEVEN LEADERS LEAVING PAKISTAN DURING THE FIGHTING SEASON IS NOT HIGH.

15. TRANSITIONAL REGIME: CORDOVEZ CLAIMED THAT HE BELIEVED ALL PARTIES, INCLUDING THE SOVIETS, WOULD ACCEPT A TRANSITIONAL REGIME. SUCH A REGIME WOULD HAVE THREE

PRINCIPLE DUTIES: A) ISSUANCE OF A DECLARATION OF NEUTRALITY; B) ESTABLISHMENT OF A NEW CONSTITUTION WHICH OUTLINED A PROCESS FOR DETERMINING A FOLLOW-ON GOVERNMENT; AND C) ESTABLISHMENT OF A PROGRAM FOR ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RECONSTRUCTION.

16. ZAHIR SHAH: CORDOVEZ ASSERTED THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD ACCEPT "ANY ROLE" FOR THE EX-KING AND REITERATED HIS NOW WELL-KNOWN THEME THAT THE GOP SHOULD ENCOURAGE ZAHIR TO GO TO PAKISTAN TO "TOUCH BASE" WITH THE REFUGEES. HE ASSERTED THAT THIS WOULD BE A GOOD INDICATOR WHETHER THE EX-KING COULD CONVENE AND CONDUCT THE ALL-AFGHAN MEETING HE HAD OUTLINED. ARMACOST SAID HE WOULD EXPLORE WITH THE GOP BOTH THE QUESTION OF THE EX-KING'S RETURN AS WELL AS THE CONCEPT OF AN ALL-AFGHAN MEETING. CORDOVEZ INDICATED THAT THEY (PRESUMABLY PICCO) WOULD BE MEETING AGAIN WITH THE EX-KING TO GET A BETTER IDEA ABOUT WHAT HE IS WILLING TO DO AND WHEN HE IS WILLING TO DO IT. ARMACOST NOTED THAT WE OURSELVES HAD MADE CONTACT WITH THE EX-KING TO SET THE RECORD STRAIGHT ABOUT THE USG POSITION REGARDING A ROLE FOR ZAHIR IN A FUTURE GOVERNMENT. ARMACOST ADDED THAT TOO MUCH TALK BY THE SOVIETS OF A ROLE FOR ZAHIR WAS NOT USEFUL OR HELPFUL, IF THE EX-KING WERE TO PLAY A CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE IN AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT. CORDOVEZ AGREED.

17. NUCLEAR ISSUE: CORDOVEZ ASKED HOW CONCERNS ABOUT PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM MIGHT AFFECT THE AID PACKAGE, NOTING HE HAD HOPED THIS ISSUE WOULD BE SETTLED BY OCTOBER 1. ARMACOST DESCRIBED THE PERVEZ CASE AS AN "UNWELCOME DEVELOPMENT" AND OUTLINED THE STIPULATIONS OF THE SOLARZ AND SYMINGTON AMENDMENTS. HE NOTED WE DID NOT KNOW AT THIS STAGE HOW OR WHETHER THE NUCLEAR ISSUE WOULD AFFECT THE SECURITY ASSISTANCE PACKAGE. ARMACOST EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT WE COULD GET THROUGH TO THE AUGUST RECESS WITHOUT CONGRESSIONAL ACTION BEING TAKEN. THIS WOULD GIVE THE GOP TIME TO TAKE SOME MEASURES WHICH COULD ALLAY CONGRESSIONAL CONCERNS.

18. UNHCR VISIT TO KABUL: ARMACOST REITERATED OUR CONCERNS ABOUT THE UNHCR VISIT. HE SAID THAT WHILE TODAY'S DISCUSSION HAD BEEN BASED ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE SOVIETS ARE SERIOUS, THIS WAS NOT YET A DEMONSTRABLE FACT. ONE COULD EQUALLY ARGUE THAT THE SOVIETS ARE INTENT ON CONSOLIDATING THE PDPA POSITION. THE DRA IS VERY ACTIVE ON THE INTERNATIONAL FRONT; THEY ARE LOBBYING HARD TO REDUCE THE UNGA VOTE. THE UNHCR VISIT WOULD ONLY ENCOURAGE THEIR INTRANSIGENCE; THEY WERE ALREADY ATTEMPTING TO EXPLOIT THE VISIT FOR POLITICAL PURPOSES.

19. CORDOVEZ RESPONDED THAT THE DRA IS ACCREDITED TO THE UN; THE UNHCR HAS A LEGAL OBLIGATION TO PROTECT REFUGEES -- IF THEY EXIST. THE REGIME CLAIMS THERE ARE 60,000 PLUS REFUGEES WHO HAVE RETURNED AND THE UNHCR HAS TO ESTABLISH WHETHER A) SUCH REFUGEES IN FACT EXIST AND 2) WHETHER THEY ARE IN NEED OF ASSISTANCE. THE POINT WAS MADE THAT THE REGIME COULD BRIBE 60,000 AFGHANS TO SAY THEY ARE REFUGEES. CORDOVEZ STUCK TO THE LINE THAT THE UNHCR HAS A MANDATE AND IS REQUIRED TO INVESTIGATE. HE NOTED THAT IT WOULD ONLY BE A TECHNICAL TEAM AND THAT THE VISIT WOULD NO MORE CONFER LEGITIMACY ON THE DRA THAN HIS OWN VISITS TO KABUL. HE CLAIMED TO HAVE TOLD HOCKE THAT THE TEAM SHOULD NOT DISCUSS INSTRUMENT THREE OF THE GENEVA ACCORDS. SHULTZ

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PAGE 01 OF 02

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Agreement

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FM AMEMBASSY USSR
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0163

SUBJ>SUBJECT: SOVIET VIEWS ON AFGHANISTAN AFTER NAJIB'S VISIT
~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 USSR 00128
DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS INFO IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY KABUL, AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD, AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI, AMEMBASSY LONDON, AMEMBASSY PARIS E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGC: PREL, US, UR, AF
SUBJECT: SOVIET VIEWS ON AFGHANISTAN AFTER NAJIB'S VISIT

1. (S-ENTIRE TEXT)

<BEGIN SUMMARY>

2. SUMMARY: IN MEETING WITH EMOFFS ON AUGUST 5, SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIALS DESCRIBED THE SHORT, WORKING VISIT OF POPA LEADER NAJIB, JULY 19-21 AS PRIMARILY AN OPPORTUNITY TO REVIEW AT THE SIX-MONTH POINT THE RESULTS AND PROSPECTS OF THE DRA'S POLICY OF "NATIONAL RECONCILIATION." THE SOVIETS PROFESS TO BELIEVE THAT THE REGIME HAS SUCCESSFULLY REACHED AGREEMENTS OR ACCOMMODATIONS WITH A VARIETY OF GROUPS, SOME LINKED TO THE RESISTANCE ALLIANCE AND SOME WITHOUT ANY KNOWN POLITICAL AFFILIATION. SOVIET OFFICIALS EXPRESSED UNCERTAINTY ABOUT THE PDPA'S FUTURE ROLE IN A MULTI-PARTY AFGHANISTAN. (NAJIB, IN CONTRAST, WAS ANXIOUS ABOUT THE GUIDING ROLE OF THE PDPA IN HIS MOSCOW PRESS CONFERENCE). THE SOVIETS STRESSED NAJIB'S WILLINGNESS TO HAVE A DIALOGUE WITH THE OPPOSITION, WILLINGNESS TO SHARE POWER, AND TO WORK OUT A ROLE FOR ZAHIR SHAH. RECENT BOMBINGS IN PAKISTAN, IN THE SOVIET VIEW, SHOULD SERVE TO INCREASE ISLAMABAD'S INTEREST IN A NEGOTIATED POLITICAL SOLUTION. GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS REQUIRED GREATER PAK FLEXIBILITY AND WOULD RESUME ONCE CORDOVEZ HAD VISITED THE AREA. THE SOVIETS INDICATED AFGHANISTAN SHOULD GET MORE PRESS ATTENTION IN THE SOVIET UNION. END SUMMARY

<END SUMMARY>

NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND ZONES OF PEACE

3. EMOFFS MET WITH SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTRY MIDDLE EAST DEPARTMENT COUNSELOR PHILIP SIDORSKIY AUGUST 5 TO DISCUSS RECENT VISIT OF PDPA LEADER NAJIB AND CURRENT SOVIET ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN. SIDORSKIY SAID NAJIB'S SHORT, WORKING VISIT EXAMINED THE RESULTS OF THE CEASE-FIRE WHICH NAJIB HAD ANNOUNCED IN JANUARY AND PARTICULARLY THE RESULTS AND PROSPECTS OF THE FIRST SIX MONTHS WHICH WAS, ON THE WHOLE, POSITIVE. THERE HAD BEEN SOME DIFFICULTIES, BUT THE POLICY WAS FINDING EVER GROWING RESONANCE AMONG THE AFGHAN PEOPLE. THE PROCESS OF RETURN OF THE REFUGEES WAS CONTINUING, ALBEIT NOT ON THE SCALE WHICH THE SOVIETS AND DRA WOULD LIKE TO SEE.

4. SIDORSKIY DISCUSSED GREAT ATTENTION ON A SERIES OF AGREEMENTS WHICH THE DRA HAD REACHED WITH LOCAL GROUPS ESTABLISHING "ZONES OF PEACE." ESTABLISHMENT OF SEVERAL NEW "ZONES OF PEACE" WAS ANNOUNCED AT THE AUGUST 4 FOREIGN MINISTRY PRESS BRIEFING BY GERASIMOV. THESE AGREEMENTS OR PROTOCOLS REDUCED TO WRITTEN PROVISIONS OR GROUPINGS WHICH DEFINE THE ROLE OF THESE GROUPS IN SPECIFIC REGIONS AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO THE DRA AUTHORITIES. ACCORDING TO SIDORSKIY, THESE WERE EFFECTIVE AGREEMENTS WHICH HAD

BEEN ACHIEVED BOTH WITH GROUPS HAVING TIES TO THE RESISTANCE ALLIANCE AND WITH GROUPS THAT HAD NO POLITICAL AFFILIATION OR IDEOLOGICAL PREDISPOSITION. THE LATTER, HE SUGGESTED, WERE MOST INTERESTED IN LOCAL AUTONOMY.

THE NEW CONSTITUTION AND A MULTI-PARTY AFGHANISTAN

5. NAJIB ALSO APPARENTLY HAD DETAILED DISCUSSIONS WITH SOVIET LEADERS ABOUT THE PROPOSED NEW "AFGHAN CONSTITUTION." SIDORSKIY ARGUED THAT THIS WAS AN IMPORTANT SUBJECT AS AFGHANISTAN HAD BEEN WITHOUT A REAL CONSTITUTION SINCE 1978. THE PROCESS OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION POSED MANY DIFFICULT QUESTIONS WHICH A CONSTITUTION COULD HELP RESOLVE. SIDORSKIY SPECIFICALLY POINTED TO THE

DIFFICULTY OF DEFINING THE PDPA'S FUTURE ROLE IN AFGHANISTAN. HE NOTED THAT THE PROPOSED CONSTITUTION PERMITS OTHER PARTIES TO ORGANIZE AND CONDUCT POLITICAL ACTIVITY WITH THE PDPA IN AN "ORGANIZING" ROLE, BUT HE ADMITTED THAT IT WAS VERY HARD TO SAY HOW A REAL MULTI-PARTY SYSTEM IN AFGHANISTAN WOULD FUNCTION. HE STRESSED THAT THE CONSTITUTION WAS A DRAFT AND THAT CHANGES WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY BE MADE. (NAJIB EXHIBITED MUCH GREATER CONFIDENCE ABOUT THE "GUIDING" ROLE OF THE PDPA AT HIS MFA PRESS CONFERENCE ON JULY 21).

6. THE IMPORTANT THING NAJIB WAS READY TO CONDUCT A DIALOGUE WITH THE OPPOSITION ABOUT THE ORGANIZATION OF THE STATE AND GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS. NAJIB WAS READY TO SHARE POWER WITH OPPOSITION GROUPS, INCLUDING ELEMENTS OF THE ALLIANCE. HE HAD, IN HIS MOSCOW PRESS CONFERENCE, SPECIFIED A NUMBER OF SPECIFIC POSTS, UP TO AND INCLUDING PRIME MINISTER, WHICH COULD BE FILLED BY OPPOSITION PARTIES. UNFORTUNATELY THE FUNDAMENTALISTS SHOWED NO READINESS FOR DIALOGUE. THE RETURN OF THE KING

7. EMOFFS ASKED WHETHER NAJIB HAD EXPRESSED ANY OPINION ON THE ROLE OF THE EX-KING. SIDORSKIY REPLIED THAT NAJIB WAS READY FOR TALKS WITH ZAHIR SHAH, BUT ONLY UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS. IF THE KING WISHED TO RETURN AS MONARCH WITH FULL POWERS THERE WAS NO BASIS FOR DISCUSSION. IF, ON THE OTHER HAND, HE WAS WILLING TO PLAY A ROLE, EVEN A BIG ROLE, IN THE PROCESS OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION, THEN FURTHER DISCUSSIONS WERE POSSIBLE. THE SOVIETS AND NAJIB BELIEVED THE KING MIGHT BE ABLE TO HELP FIND A COMMON LANGUAGE BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES, SOMETHING WHICH HAD BEEN LACKING UP TO THIS POINT.

TIMING OF THE NEXT GENEVA ROUND

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 03-USSR 00128

8. SIDORSKIY DENIED THAT THE RECENT GORBACHEV INTERVIEW WITH INDONESIAN JOURNALISTS (WHICH MADE NO MENTION OF NEUTRALITY, ZAHIR SHAH, OR THE UN TALKS IN GENEVA) REPRESENTED A RETREAT FROM THE EARLIER SOVIET POSITION OUTLINED BY THE GENERAL SECRETARY IN HIS MAY INTERVIEW WITH L'UNITA. THERE WAS NO HARDENING OR EVEN APPRECIABLE CHANGE. THE QUESTION OF WITHDRAWAL, HE INSISTED, WAS ALREADY RESOLVED. ONCE OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE HAD ENDED AND APPROPRIATE GUARANTEES OF ITS NON-RESUMPTION HAD BEEN WORKED OUT IN THE GENEVA TALKS, THE TROOPS WOULD BEGIN TO LEAVE. IF PAKISTAN HAD BEEN WILLING A FEW MONTHS AGO TO MAKE THIS FINAL MOVE, SOVIET WITHDRAWAL WOULD HAVE BEEN ALREADY WELL UNDERWAY.

9. EMOFFS POINTED OUT THAT DRA APPEARED TO BE UNENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT RECONVENING THE GENEVA TALKS. SIDORSKIY TOOK EXCEPTION, ARGUING THAT NAJIB HAD INDICATED WILLINGNESS TO CONTINUE THE TALK. BUT THAT MORE "FLEXIBILITY" WAS NEEDED FROM PAKISTAN IF THERE WERE TO BE ANY PROSPECT OF FORWARD MOVEMENT. IN PARTICULAR SIDORSKIY FOCUSED ON THE QUESTION OF THE WITHDRAWAL TIMETABLE. PAKISTAN STATEMENTS THAT THERE WOULD BE A "TECHNICAL TIMETABLE" OF WITHDRAWAL WERE UNREALISTIC. THIS WAS A PROBLEM WHICH HAD A

POLITICO-MILITARY DIMENSION AS WELL. IT COULD NOT MERELY BE REDUCED TO PURELY TECHNICAL OR LOGISTICAL TERMS.

10. WHEN PUSHED BY EMOFFS FOR HIS JUDGMENT AS TO WHEN THE TALKS IN GENEVA MIGHT RECONVENE, SIDORSKIY SAID THAT IT WAS DIFFICULT TO SAY. PRESUMABLY THE NEXT ROUND WOULD TAKE PLACE AFTER CORDOVEZ HAD VISITED THE REGION AND PARTICULARLY KABUL. CORDOVEZ HAD WANTED TO DO THIS DURING THE SUMMER AND SIDORSKIY WAS NOT SURE WHY IT HAD NOT HAPPENED. WHEN EMOFFS SUGGESTED THAT IT APPEARED THAT KABUL WAS NOT PREPARED TO RECEIVE CORDOVEZ WHEN HE WANTED TO VISIT EARLIER, SIDORSKIY QUICKLY DENIED THAT KABUL'S RELUCTANCE HAD ANY POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE, LINKING IT INSTEAD TO THE ILLNESS OF THE DRA FOREIGN MINISTER. IN THIS CONTEXT, HE CONFIRMED THAT NAJIB HAD NOT RETURNED TO KABUL DIRECTLY FROM MOSCOW AND SAID THAT HE WAS "ON VACATION" IN THE SOVIET UNION. (BEGIN FYI. AT A PRESS CONFERENCE ON AUGUST 7, MFA SPOKESMAN CONFIRMED THAT NAJIB WAS "RESTING" AT A RESORT IN THE SOVIET UNION, WHICH HAD AROUSED CURIOSITY IN THE WESTERN PRESS CORPS IN MOSCOW AS TO WHY NAJIB WOULD CHOOSE TO VACATION AT A TIME WHEN AFGHANISTAN'S SECURITY SEEMED TO BE DETERIORATING. ON AUGUST 11, THE SOVIET PRESS ANNOUNCED THAT NAJIB HAD RETURNED TO KABUL. BABRAK KARMAH WAS ALSO IN THE SOVIET UNION.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
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PAGE 02 OF 02

AN000012

FOR AN INDEFINITE PERIOD, ACCORDING TO NAJIB, AND WAS RECEIVING MEDICAL TREATMENT. END FYI). SIDORSKIY ARGUED VIGOROUSLY THAT THE NAJIB VISIT DEMONSTRATED THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO HARDENING IN THE SOVIET-DRA POSITION, BUT ON THE CONTRARY, THAT PROGRESS WOULD BE EASIER IF THE PAKISTANIS SHOWED GREATER WILLINGNESS TO REACH AGREEMENT.

PAKISTAN TERROR BOMBINGS

11. WHEN EMOFFS ARGUED THAT THE RECENT WAVE OF TERROR BOMBINGS IN PAKISTAN COMPLICATED PURSUIT OF A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, SIDORSKIY WAS DISMISSIVE. HE ARGUED THAT THE CURRENT PROBLEMS IN PAKISTAN SERVED TO INCREASE ISLAMABAD'S INTEREST IN A NEGOTIATED POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. THE BOMBINGS, HE SAID, WERE NOT TIED TO THE DRA. RATHER THEY WERE RELATED TO NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING, ETHNO-RELIGIOUS DIFFERENCES, AND THE AFGHAN RESISTANCE. THE TRIBES IN THE NORTHWEST HAD ALWAYS LIVED VIOLENTLY AND SOUGHT AUTONOMY. THE BOMBINGS IN KARACHI WERE A RESULT OF ETHNIC TENSIONS AND NOT LINKED TO AFGHANISTAN. ALTHOUGH PAKISTAN HAD ACCUSED "US" (THE SOVIET UNION AND THE DRA) OF RESPONSIBILITY, IN REALITY IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE ENORMOUS ARMS TRAFFIC IN THE AREA MADE IT POSSIBLE FOR ALMOST ANY GROUP TO PERPETRATE SUCH ACTS. (NOTE: WE SUBSEQUENTLY LEARNED FROM THE PAKISTANI DCM THAT THE PAKS RECENTLY MET WITH ROGACHEV, HAVING NOT BEEN RECEIVED AT THIS LEVEL IN MFA FOR SEVERAL MONTHS. THE SOVIETS GAVE THE PAKS A SIMILAR ANALYSIS OF TERROR BOMBINGS AND SUGGESTED THAT THIS WAS EXACTLY WHY PAKISTAN SHOULD BE INTERESTED IN REMOVING OBSTACLES TO A SETTLEMENT. ROGACHEV REPORTEDLY ADDED THAT THE U.S. WAS CREATING DIFFICULTIES IN SETTING UP TALKS ON AFGHANISTAN AT THE ARMACOST-VORONTOV LEVEL. WHEN EMOFFS RAISED THE SCHEDULING OF AN ARMACOST-VORONTOV MEETING, SIDORSKIY SUGGESTED THAT ISSUE WAS NOT RIPE FOR U.S.-SOVIET TALKS AT THAT LEVEL. END NOTE).

AFGHANISTAN AND THE SOVIET PUBLIC

13. EMOFFS QUERIED SIDORSKIY ABOUT RECENT REPORTS THAT THE SOVIETS WERE CONDUCTING A PUBLIC OPINION POLL ON AFGHANISTAN AND THE AUGUST 5 PRAVDA ARTICLE ON DIFFICULTIES FACING RETURNING VETERANS. LATTER ALSO CALLED FOR MORE PUBLIC RECOGNITION OF SOVIET SACRIFICES IN THE WAR. SIDORSKIY DENIED ANY MFA INVOLVEMENT IN PUBLIC OPINION POLLING ON AFGHANISTAN MENTIONED IN REF A, BUT DID "WE NEED TO DO MORE WITH PUBLIC OPINION IN THE SOVIET UNION. WITH REGARD TO THE PRAVDA PIECE, HE NOTED THAT THERE HAD ONLY BEEN TWO OR THREE ARTICLES OF THIS SORT, BUT THERE SHOULD BE MANY MORE.

14. COMMENT: THE SOVIETS SEEM TO BELIEVE THAT "NATIONAL RECONCILIATION" IS VJNHEH INTERNATIONALLY. THE SOVIETS ALSO SEEM TO CALCULATE THAT THERE IS ENOUGH MOMENTUM IN THE NATIONAL RECONCILIATION PROCESS TO MAKE IT WORTH STALLING THE NEXT GENEVA ROUND, TO INCREASE PRESSURE ON PAKISTAN, AND THEN SHIFTING THE BLAME TO THE U.S. AND PAKISTAN FOR LACK OF MOVEMENT IN THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS. AT THE SAME TIME THERE IS SOME CLEAR UNCERTAINTY AMONG THE SOVIETS ABOUT WHERE THE NATIONAL RECONCILIATION PROCESS MIGHT ULTIMATELY LEAD AND PERHAPS EVEN SOME DIVERGENCE BETWEEN THE SOVIETS AND NAJIB ON THAT SCORE. THE SOVIETS, HOWEVER, DO NOT YET GIVE ANY EVIDENCE THAT THEY HAVE THOUGHT THROUGH HOW THEY CAN CONTINUE TO PURSUE THE NATIONAL RECONCILIATION POLICY IN A CONVINCING MANNER AND MANAGE THEIR

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AFGHAN ALLIES. END COMMENT.

MATLOCK

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<SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 03 <SSN> 0128 <TOR> 870814112503 HSG000177247503

<SECT>SECTION: 03 OF 03 <SSN> 0128 <TOR> 870814112541 HSG000177247540

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PAGE 01

AN007430

NSC: COBB WAC ERMA LEDSKY OAKL RODM
<DIST>SIT: EOB VAX

EXDIS

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~ <OSRI> RUEHDT <DTG> 272230Z AUG 87
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1003
INFO RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 4368
RUSBKB/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 1447
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 9428
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 7151

<SUBJ>SUBJECT: KABUL PROPOSES RESUMPTION OF UN PROXIMITY
-- TALKS ON AFGHANISTAN
~~SECRET~~ USUN NEW YORK 02480

EXDIS

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, AF, PK, UN
SUBJECT: KABUL PROPOSES RESUMPTION OF UN PROXIMITY
-- TALKS ON AFGHANISTAN

EXDIS

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. PROXIMITY TALKS: UN UNDERSECRETARY GENERAL CORDOVEZ INFORMED AMBASSADOR WALTERS ON AUGUST 26 THAT THE KABUL AUTHORITIES HAD PROPOSED HOLDING ANOTHER ROUND OF UN-SPONSORED PROXIMITY TALKS WITH PAKISTAN IN GENEVA SEPTEMBER 3-9, WITH A POSSIBILITY OF EXTENSION UNTIL SEPTEMBER 11. PAKISTANI UN MISSION COUNSELOR AYUB CONFIRMED TO USUN MISOFF AUGUST 27 THAT CORDOVEZ HAD CONVEYED THE DRA PROPOSAL TO PAKISTANI PERMREP SHAH NAWAZ EVENING AUGUST 26.

EXDIS

3. AYUB SAID THAT PAKISTANI UN MISSION CONSIDERED THE DRA PROPOSAL A PROPAGANDA PLOY. KABUL MUST KNOW THAT THE GOP WOULD HAVE GREAT DIFFICULTY PREPARING FOR TALKS ON SUCH SHORT NOTICE. FURTHERMORE, IF THIS LATEST ROUND TAKES PLACE BEFORE THE UNGA DEBATE ON PAKISTAN'S ANNUAL RESOLUTION ON AFGHANISTAN (NOW TENTATIVELY SLATED FOR MID-OCTOBER), SOVIET/DRA SIDE COULD USE THIS APPEARANCE OF MOVEMENT TOWARD A SETTLEMENT TO UNDERMINE SUPPORT FOR PAKISTAN'S RESOLUTION. THE PAKISTANI MISSION HAS CONVEYED THESE CONCERNS TO ISLAMABAD AND IS NOW AWAITING A RESPONSE. IN THE MEANTIME, PAKISTANIS DO NOT INTEND TO PUBLICIZE THE DRA PROPOSAL.

EXDIS

4. NATIONAL RECONCILIATION: CORDOVEZ ALSO REMARKED TO AMBASSADOR WALTERS THAT SOVIETS HAVE BEEN TAKING ISSUE WITH USG STATEMENTS THAT THEIR CONCEPT OF A GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION CONSISTS OF A COALITION BUILT AROUND NAJIB. SOVIETS CLAIMED THEY WERE INTERESTED ONLY IN ASSURING THE SAFETY AND SECURITY OF THE DRA AND ITS SUPPORTERS UNDER A NATIONAL RECONCILIATION GOVERNMENT.

5. COMMENT. WE AGREE WITH PAKISTANI UN MISSION VIEW THAT SOVIET/DRA SIDE STANDS TO REAP PROPAGANDA ADVANTAGE FROM WHATEVER RESPONSE PAKISTAN GIVES TO THE PROPOSAL FOR ANOTHER ROUND OF TALKS. SHOULD PAKISTAN REFUSE TO MEET, THEY WILL PORTRAY GOP AS INTRANSIGENT. ON THE OTHER HAND, IF TALKS ARE RESUMED, THEY WILL MAKE A MAJOR EFFORT TO PUBLICIZE THE TALKS AS EVIDENCE OF PROGRESS TOWARD A SETTLEMENT. THIS MAKES IT EVEN MORE IMPORTANT THAT U. S.

AND PAKISTAN MAKE ALL-OUT EFFORT TO FIRM UP SUPPORT FOR THE UNGA RESOLUTION ON AFGHANISTAN.

6. KABUL AND MOSCOW MINIMIZES CONSIDERED.
WALTERS

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 2480 <TOR> 870828022323 MSG000178424603

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NLS F96-076/2 #20

BY C/S NARA, DATE 9/29/00

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL SECRETARIAT

PAGE 02 OF 03

AN003203

THERE IS A NEED FOR A TWO STAGE PROCESS. SOMETHING IS BREWING ON THE FIRST STAGE. BUT NOT ENOUGH. SO HE FEELS A NEED TO "OPEN A DOOR TO A SECOND STAGE," IN ORDER MOVE THE FIRST STAGE TO COMPLETION.

6. LOYA JIRGA. CORDOVEZ SAID THE AFGHANS ARE THINKING OF CALLING A LOYA JIRGA INCLUDING SOME OF THE RESISTANCE COMMANDERS. ITS PURPOSE WOULD BE TO LEGITIMATE THE ROLE OF FORMER KING ZAHIR SHAH. THE JIRGA WOULD BE CONVENED BY THE ALLIANCE LEADERS. ACCORDING TO CORDOVEZ, ZAHIR SHAH FEELS HE MUST ACT, BUT NEEDS SOME EXPRESSION OF THE POPULAR WILL. (PICCO SAID THAT ZAHIR HAD NOT TALKED OF A LOYA JIRGA, AND ALTHOUGH CORDOVEZ CONTINUED TO USE THE TERM, IT IS CLEAR THAT HIS CONCEPT IS OF AN ASSEMBLY OF OPPOSITION FIGURES, NOT A FULL AFGHAN JIRGA). THE PAKISTANIS INSIST THAT ZAHIR NEEDS THE SUPPORT OF 5 OF THE RESISTANCE LEADERS IN ORDER TO PARTICIPATE IN AN ASSEMBLY, AND THE PAKS HESITATE TO USE THEIR LEVERAGE ON THE RESISTANCE UNTIL THE END GAME IS IN SIGHT. NOORANI TOLD CORDOVEZ THAT THE EARLIEST AN ASSEMBLY COULD BE HELD WOULD BE NOVEMBER.

7. STAGE TWO. CORDOVEZ SEES THE SECOND STAGE AS A NEGOTIATION IN WHICH THE PDPA (NOT THE DRA) PARTICIPATES WITH THE ALLIANCE AND THE EXILES, A TOTAL OF MAYBE 50 TO 60 PEOPLE. ZAHIR SHAH WOULD BE A "MEDIATOR" IN THIS NEGOTIATING ENVIRONMENT. KABUL WOULD SEND THE "ELDER STATESMEN" AS THE PDPA DELEGATION. CORDOVEZ WOULD SEEK TO HAVE AGREEMENT IN ADVANCE THAT:

A. THE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD START FROM SCRATCH WITH INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS DISCUSSIONS ON THE STRUCTURE AND POSITIONS TO BE AGREED TO; THERE WOULD BE NO POSITIONS RESERVED IN ADVANCE FOR ANY PARTY.

B. THE DECISIONS REACHED IN THE NEGOTIATING ROUND WOULD BE BINDING ON ALL PARTIES.

C. INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS WOULD BE ESTABLISHED FOR AN AGREED SHORT TIME PERIOD. NO MORE THAN TWO YEARS.

D. THERE WOULD BE A PEACEKEEPING FORCE BUT ALL ARRANGEMENTS FOR SUCH A FORCE WOULD BE NEGOTIATED WITH THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT.

8. INTERIM GOVERNMENT. CORDOVEZ DESCRIBED HIS VISION OF THE OBJECTIVES OF THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT WOULD BE:

A. TO TAKE OVER AND RUN THE GOVERNMENT IN KABUL

B. TO SET IN MOTION CONSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS

C. TO FORMULATE A DECLARATION OF NEUTRALITY WHICH

MIGHT OR MIGHT NOT BE ACTUALLY PROMULGATED BY THE INTERIM GOVT.

D. TO IDENTIFY THE NEEDS FOR ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE.

9. CORDOVEZ SAID HE NEEDS NOW THE SUPPORT OF THE GOP. THE AFGHANS HAVE TOLD HIM THEY WANT TO RETURN BUT THEY FEEL THE PAKISTANIS NEED PERSUADING. CORDOVEZ SAID HE

HAD TOLD NOORANI ABOUT HIS STAGE TWO PROPOSAL. AND HE KNOWS THAT THE "JIRGA" PROPOSAL HAS BEEN THOROUGHLY DISCUSSED IN PAKISTAN.

10. ARMACOST SUMMARIZED THE CORDOVEZ PLAN AND ASKED IF CORDOVEZ WAS CONFIDENT THAT ZAHIR SHAH WOULD PARTICIPATE. CORDOVEZ SAID THE FORMER KING HAD SAID HE WOULD DEVOTE THE REST OF HIS LIFE TO IT, BUT HE WOULD NOT GO (TO THE JIRGA OR ASSEMBLY) UNLESS IT IS "PREPARED" IN ADVANCE. CORDOVEZ SAID THAT IF THE ASSEMBLY CAN BE HELD IN NOVEMBER, THE NEGOTIATING SESSION COULD BE CONVENED IN JANUARY. HE HOPED IT WOULD BE CONVENED BY ZAHIR SHAH, BUT SOME SUGGEST THE UN BE THE CONVENOR. CORDOVEZ PREFERS THE FORMER, BUT APPEARED WILLING TO CONVENE A SESSION IF NEEDED.

11. CORDOVEZ SAID HE HAS DISCUSSED MANY OF HIS IDEAS WITH MOSCOW AND HAS NOT BEEN TURNED AWAY. HE PLANS TO EXPLORE THESE THOUGHTS INFORMALLY WITH THE PAKISTANIS AND THE AFGHANS IN GENEVA NEXT WEEK.

12. KABUL MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. WHITEHEAD

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PAGE 02 OF 02

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CORDOVEZ INSISTED HE WOULD NOT ACTUALLY TABLE THIS NUMBER. CORDOVEZ ALSO CLAIMED THAT THIS WAS TO BE COUCHED AS A "SUGGESTION" RATHER THAN A FORMAL PROPOSAL.

6. CORDOVEZ HAD ACQUIESCED TO THE DRA SUGGESTION TO MEET AGAIN PRIMARILY TO "KEEP THE PROCESS MOVING." PICCO AND SOMMEREYNS REAFFIRMED THEIR SENSE THAT THE KABUL REPRESENTATIVES HAD COME TO GENEVA ONLY UNDER HEAVY SOVIET PRESSURE (REF A). CORDOVEZ REPEATED THAT HE DID NOT PLAN TO TABLE HIS TWO-STAGE PLAN BECAUSE HE BELIEVED "THE TIMING WAS WRONG" AND THE SOVIETS ARE NOW COUNSELING HIM NOT TO RAISE IT IN GENEVA AT THIS ROUND, BUT TO DO SO AT THE APPROPRIATE TIME IN NEW YORK. FOLLOWING THE CONCLUSION OF THIS ROUND, CORDOVEZ PLANS TO RELEASE A SHORT FACTUAL STATEMENT TO THE PRESS ON THE TALKS.

7. DJEREJIAN INFORMED CORDOVEZ OF OUR GROWING SENSE THAT THE SOVIETS DRA ARE MERELY WORKING ON A PUBLIC DIPLOMACY TRACK, AND HAVE LITTLE INTENTION OF MOVING THE NEGOTIATIONS FORWARD SUBSTANTIVELY AT THIS TIME. CORDOVEZ AND HIS STAFF AGREED THAT THIS WAS THE BEST EXPLANATION FOR THE CURRENT STATE OF AFFAIRS.

8. ACCORDING TO CORDOVEZ' STAFF, EACH TIME A ROUND OF THE PROXIMITY TALKS IS HELD IN GENEVA, THE SOVIETS SEND AN AFGHANISTAN EXPERT FROM THEIR FOREIGN MINISTRY, NAMED KOZYREV TO GENEVA TO LIAISE WITH ~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 GENEVA 09560

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P FOR AMB ARMACOST. NEA FOR AMB. MURPHY, DEPT PLEASE PASS TO NSC

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: AF, UR, US, PREL

SUBJECT: CORDOVEZ READOUT ON GENEVA TALKS:

SEPTEMBER 10

THEM. THIS MAN SEEMS TO THEM TO OPERATE INDEPENDENTLY OF MFA MIDDLE EAST DEPARTMENT CHIEF YURIY ALEFSEYEV. DJEREJIAN'S PRIMARY INTERLOCUTER HERE ON AFGHANISTAN.

COMMENT

9. AT THE PRESENT STAGE, CORDOVEZ SEEMS TO BE MANEUVERING TO PUT THE LIMITED RESULTS OF THIS WEEK'S TALKS IN THE BEST POSSIBLE LIGHT. WHILE WE DO NOT DISCOUNT THE POSSIBILITY (EXPRESSED IN REF B) THAT HE IS PLAYING, WITTINGLY OR NOT, INTO SOVIET HANDS BY CONFRONTING THE PAKISTANIS WITH WHAT AMOUNTS TO A TWELVE MONTH TIMEFRAME, CORDOVEZ DOES SEEM TO BE TAKING INTO ACCOUNT PAKISTANI OBJECTIONS TO HIS ACTUALLY TABLING SUCH A PROPOSAL. REMAINING HIS

OPTIMISTIC SELF. CORDOVEZ TOLD DJEREJIAN THAT HE DID NOT EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY THAT SOVIET TROOP WITHDRAWAL COULD BEGIN BY SPRING OR SUMMER OF 1988, WITH A GENEVA AGREEMENT IN PLACE.

END COMMENT

10. WE RECOMMEND DEPARTMENT PASS THIS CABLE TO EMBASSIES MOSCOW, KABUL AND USUN.
PETRONE

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 02 <SSN> 9560 <TOR> 870910223937 MSG00017962077
<SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02 <SSN> 9560 <TOR> 870910223952 MSG000179620791

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SECRET: CONFIDENTIAL

ZEMICH BRUNNEN KOLLEKTOR ~~SECRET~~ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <RT> 21 52Z NOV 87

START: 10/11/87
END: 10/11/87
SUBJECT: AFGHANISTAN
CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL

Confidential

CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: AFGHANISTAN

DECLASSIFIED
NLS F96-076/2 #23

BY GAS MAR. DATE 9/29/00

~~SECRET~~ (EAT) (EAT)

1. SECRET - (EAT) (EAT)
SUBJECT: AFGHANISTAN
CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL

1. SECRET - (EAT) (EAT)
"CONFIDENTIAL"

2. AFGHANISTAN. SECRETARY ATTACHED WAGNER NOV 10 ON HIS
RECOGNITION IS AGREES WITH WAGNER NOV 16 AND 17.
HIGHLIGHTS INCLUDED: WAGNER SAID ADMITS WOULD TALK
FORWARDLY TALKING AT NEXT (END LAST, HE SAID) DENIES
THAT IS FUNDAMENTAL IN PARTIALLY JAWABY. HE AGREED THAT
SECRETARY WOULD NOT BE HAVE CONTINGENT ON AGREEMENT ON
INTERNAL ARRANGEMENTS, AND HIGHLIGHTED THAT WITHDRAWAL WOULD BE
COMPLETED IN 1989. WAGNER THING CORROVAK IDEAS WORTH
TESTING, BUT DOES NOT WANT TO BE DEEPLY INVOLVED IN WORKING
OUT THE FINAL ARRANGEMENTS IN AFGHANISTAN. WAGNER
BELIEVES THAT DANCE SHOW HAS A SPECIAL ROLE TO PLAY AS A
IMPLEMENTATION OF INTERNAL ARRANGEMENTS AND CONVENOR OF A
LOVE STORY. WAGNER AGREES TO NEUTRALITY FOR
AFGHANISTAN ON THE SOUTHERN MODEL, AND IS VERY INTERESTED
ON A SUBSTANTIAL TRADE WEEPING FORCE TO OVERSEE THE
WITHDRAWAL. WAGNER ALSO EXPRESSED UNDERSTANDING OF
THE NEED FOR THE END OF THE WITHDRAWAL. WAGNER
SUGGESTS LANGUAGE FOR A US-USSR JOINT STATEMENT ON
AFGHANISTAN FOLLOWING THE WAGNER. END SUMMARY.

3. UNFINISHED SECRETARY ATTACHED WAGNER FACILITIES BREAKDOWN
WAGNER GOVERNOR IN ON HIS DISCUSSION IN SPEECH WITH
LOVE WAGNER FOREIGN MINISTER WAGNER CONCERNING
WAGNER. WAGNER AND WAGNER ARE IN, JETTER BY
WAGNER. WAGNER WAGNER DINNER CONVERSATION WAGNER
WAGNER AND ON WAGNER AND A HALF SESSION ON AFGHANISTAN ON
TUESDAY.

4. ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS: WAGNER SHOULD BRING WAGNER AND
WAGNER ON THE BASIS OF WAGNER REPORT, NOT BEING ON BASIS
OF FULLER WAGNER OF WAGNER WAGNER BEING RELATED
WAGNER.

5. WITHDRAWAL.
WAGNER WAGNER WAGNER WAGNER'S STATEMENT TO THE
SECRETARY THAT THE US IS HAS HAVE A FIRM DECISION TO
WITHDRAW. HE SAID THAT A SATISFACTORY TIMETABLE WOULD BE
DEVELOPED AT THE NEXT WAGNER WAGNER WAGNER WOULD
BE THE LAST. WAGNER WAGNER WAGNER WAGNER THAT THE NEXT
WAGNER WAGNER WAGNER. WAGNER WAGNER WAGNER AND

10. 20-1-1988. ARABCAST OFFICE FOR AN EARLIER MEETING
SAID THE 21-1-88 ARABCAST, PROMISING THAT VORONTSOV WOULD
BE IN WASH THIS WEEK WITH SYDNOROV, BUT VORONTSOV SAID
THEY WERE NOT THROUGH YET.

10. ARABCAST WANTS TO LET THE ARABISTS TO DISCOURAGE THE PDPA
FROM BRINGING AHEAD WITH THE ARABY JIBBS THIS MONTH.
VORONTSOV SAID THAT THE NEW CONSTITUTION IS CLEARLY A
"BYPASS" MECHANISM AND WILL NOT CONCERN THE ARAB.

11. ARABCAST IS WITHDRAWAL.
ARABCAST TALK VORONTSOV THAT THE CONSENSUS AGREEMENTS EXPECT
THE US AND ARABISTS TO MAKE DECISIONS WHICH HAVE AN
IMMEDIATE EFFECT ON THE RESISTANCE, WHILE SOVIET
WITHDRAWALS TAKE PLACE OVER TIME. FOR THIS REASON, WE
WANT VORONTSOV TO POINT TO THE WITHDRAWAL. VORONTSOV
INDICATED, VOLUNTARILY AS "ILLUSTRATIVE" FIGURE OF 50
THOUSAND WITHDRAWALS AN EARLY, FOUR PERIOD. HE SAID
THAT THE CONCEPT WAS ALREADY IN THE ARAB ACCORDS.
VORONTSOV CLEARLY OFFERED TO ACCEPT THE PRINCIPLE THAT IT
WOULD BE NECESSARY TO DEMONSTRATE SOVIET WMA FIDES BY
WITHDRAWING FROM TUNES DAILY, BUT HUNDREDS AND DAT-S WERE
NOT WITHDRAWN.

12. ARABCAST JOINT STATEMENT.
ARABCAST TALK SAID A COPY OF THE VORONTSOV DRAFT TEXT
OF A JOINT ARAB STATEMENT, AND INVITED ARABISTS
TO COMMENT. HE SAID HE HAD TOLD VORONTSOV THAT THE ONLY
POINT THAT HE WOULD WANT WOULD BE TO SHOW THAT A DECISION
HAD BEEN MADE ON WHICH TO WITHDRAW. VORONTSOV'S TEXT IS:
THE CONSENSUS AGREEMENTS UNDERSTAND THE URGENT NEED FOR URGENT
MOVING INTO THE AFGHANISTAN PROBLEM AS SOON AS POSSIBLE
IN THE INTEREST OF PEACE AND STABILITY IN AFGHANISTAN AND
THE REGION ON THE BASIS OF A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT,
NON-INTERFERENCE FROM WITHOUT AND THE WITHDRAWAL OF
TROOPS, AND THROUGHOUT WITH SUPPORT FOR THE EFFORTS OF
THE JOINT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE U.S. SECRETARY GENERAL
R. APPROVED TO SETTLE THE CONDITIONS SURROUNDING THE
AFGHANISTAN SITUATION.

13. VORONTSOV HAS REQUESTED ARABCAST ON THE RUJANIAN
LACK OF RESPONSE TO THE OVERSIGHTS LAST SUMMER AND THEIR
FAILURE TO PUT FORWARD ALTERNATIVE PLANS PROPOSAL.
ARABCAST SAID THAT WHETHER THE ARAB NOW THE US HAS ANY
INTEREST IN DISCOURAGING THE RESISTANCE TO TAKE DECISIONS
THAT WOULD PROMPTLY BRING WITHDRAWALS BY THE SOVIET
GOVERNMENT LAST SUMMER'S PROPOSALS WERE NOT. VORONTSOV
SAID THAT THE ARAB NEEDS TO CHANGE ITS RATIONALITY FROM
THAT OF A TALKING PARTY TO THAT OF THE PARTICIPANT ARAB
MANY. IT WILL NOT BE LONG.

14. COMMENTS.
ARABCAST TALK SAID THAT HE CAME AWAY FROM THE VORONTSOV
MEETING BELIEVING THAT THE ARABISTS WERE SERIOUS ABOUT
WITHDRAWAL. THEY MAY HAVE DECIDED TO LET SAJID HAVE HIS
WAY ON THE BASIS THAT HE CAN AT LEAST HOLD SAJID. THE
ARABISTS WERE TO GAINING SAJID, AND WERE INTERESTED
WITH THE NOTION OF A BRICKLAYERING PITCH. ARABCAST
DISCUSSED THE ARABIST THAT LINE HE WILL NOT WORK WITH
THE ARAB ARABIST THAT LINE THE PAKISTANI, THE ARAB MAY
WANT TO GIVE US SUGGESTIONS ON WHICH DIRECTION THEY WOULD
LIKE US TO GO, WHAT ISSUES TO RAISE. IN ANY EVENT, WE
WANT THAT THE ARAB WILL NOT PUT THESE THREATS ON THE
TABLETS AND THEN NOT TO DECIDE. ARABCAST SAID HE

WOULD REPORT THIS CONVERSATION URGENTLY TO ISLAMABAD AND
GET BACK TO ARMACOST SOON WITH A REACTION.
15. KABUL AND MOSCOW MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. SHULTZ

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01<SSN> 2843<TOR> 871121024047 MSG000185769647
<TOR>871121024707

RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 11-12 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

F96-076/2 #25

LOT

12/21/00

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

3-Dec-1987 19:37 EST

MEMORANDUM FOR:

LEDSKY
HERBST
RODMAN

Optimist

FROM: VMS MAIL user ERMARTH
(ERMARTH@VAXC@MRGATE)

SUBJECT: FYI

VERY GOOD CABLE ON AFGHANISTAN FROM MOSCOW. BEST STATEMENT
OF THE OPTIMIST CASE I HAVE SEEN.

<PREC> IMMEDIATE<CLAS> ~~SECRET~~<DTG> 031900Z DEC 87

<ORIG>FM AMEMBASSY USSR

<SUBJ>SUBJECT: THE SOVIETS IN AFGHANISTAN: STRUGGLING WITH THE TARBABY

<TEXT>

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 04 USSR 00603

SECSTATE PLEASE PASS AMEMBASSY KABUL IMMEDIATE, AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
IMMEDIATE

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR

TAGS: KPRP, PREL, US, UR, AF, XD

SUBJECT: THE SOVIETS IN AFGHANISTAN: STRUGGLING WITH THE TARBABY

1. (S-ENTIRE TEXT)

~BEGIN SUMMARY~

SUMMARY

2. SOVIET CONFIDENCE ABOUT THE NATIONAL RECONCILIATION PROCESS AND
THE PDPA HAS BEEN ERODING THROUGHOUT THE FALL. THE FAILURE SO FAR
OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION, AND THE APPARENT EFFORTS BY NAJIB AND
THE PDPA TO CREATE FACTS WHICH COMPLICATE MOSCOW'S WITHDRAWAL MAY
HAVE COMBINED TO LESSEN SOVIET INTEREST IN INTERIM GOVERNMENTAL
ARRANGEMENTS AND TO FOCUS ATTENTION ON A SHORT TIMETABLE TO BEGIN
ON A SPECIFIC DATE.

3. THE PUBLIC SOVIET LINE ON AFGHANISTAN HAS TAKEN SOME CONFUSING
TURNS. THIS SUGGESTS AN INTERNAL DEBATE OVER HOW TO MANAGE
DISENGAGEMENT. THERE HAVE BEEN CONFLICTING SIGNALS OVER THE LENGTH
OF THE SOVIET TIMETABLE FOR WITHDRAWAL, VORONTSOV'S WILLINGNESS TO
GO ISLAMABAD FOR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE PAKISTANIS, AND THE FUTURE
ROLE OF THE PDPA. GREATER GLASNOST' IN THE SOVIET PRESS ABOUT THE
"SACRIFICES" AND "HEROISM" OF SOVIET TROOPS FULFILLING THEIR
INTERNATIONALIST DUTIES MAY HAVE, IRONICALLY, HELPED TO INCREASE
WEARINESS WITH THE WAR.

4. SOME SOVIETS HAVE SUGGESTED THAT SUCCESSES IN ARMS CONTROL

NEGOTIATIONS MAY HELP CREATE CONDITIONS FOR AN AFGHAN SETTLEMENT. THESE SOVIETS UNDERSTAND THAT REAL MOVEMENT ON AFGHANISTAN WILL EASE INF RATIFICATION AND SMOOTH THE WAY FOR FURTHER AGREEMENTS ON STRATEGIC WEAPONS. THERE IS ALSO A SENSE THAT ANY SETTLEMENT WILL REQUIRE DIFFICULT DECISIONS IN WASHINGTON THAT ONLY PRESIDENT REAGAN IS CAPABLE OF CARRYING OUT.

5. ALL OF THIS HAS LED TO AN AIR OF HOPEFULNESS AMONG SOME SOVIET EXPERTS. GREATER REALISM AND INCREASED DESIRE TO RESOLVE THE PROBLEM, HOWEVER, DO NOT OBTAIN THE NECESSITY FOR MOSCOW TO BITE THE BULLET AND BEGIN THE TROOP WITHDRAWAL PROCESS. UP UNTIL NOW, THE SOVIETS HAVE SOUGHT CREDIT BY ASSERTING THAT A "POLITICAL DECISION TO WITHDRAW HAS BEEN TAKEN." THEY HAVE BEEN RELUCTANT, HOWEVER, TO RUN REAL RISKS. KEY TESTS OF SOVIET SERIOUSNESS WILL BE THE ACTUAL TABLING OF A SHORT TIMETABLE IN GENEVA AND THE DECISION TO SEND VORONTSOV TO ISLAMABAD. TO A CERTAIN DEGREE THE SOVIETS HAVE BOXED THEMSELVES IN. THEIR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY HAS GAINED THEM NOTHING IN THE UN AND LITTLE IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY OTHER THAN RAISED EXPECTATIONS. THEIR EFFORTS HAVE BEEN CLEARLY DESTABILIZING IN KABUL. AS THE MILITARY SITUATION DETERIORATES IN AFGHANISTAN, WE BELIEVE THAT THE SOVIETS RECOGNIZE THEY MAY BE APPROACHING A CRUCIAL TURNING POINT, WHICH IF MISSED, WILL LEAD TO A PROLONGATION OF THEIR INVOLVEMENT WITH THE AFGHAN TARBABY.

END SUMMARY

~END SUMMARY~

A LOSS OF CONFIDENCE?

6. JULY MARKED THE HIGHWATER MARK OF SOVIET CONFIDENCE IN THE NATIONAL RECONCILIATION PROCESS IN AFGHANISTAN. DURING JULY, NAJIBULLAH (THEN GOING BY NAJIB) VISITED MOSCOW AND USED HIS PRESENCE TO:

-- FLOG THE NATIONAL RECONCILIATION POLICY AND OFFER TO SHARE MINISTERIAL PORTFOLIOS WITH THE OPPOSITION;
-- EXTEND THE CEASEFIRE ANNOUNCED IN JANUARY 1987 BY SIX MONTHS;
AND

-- SHOWCASE THE NEW DRAFT CONSTITUTION WHICH WOULD CREATE A NEW POLITICAL STRUCTURE FOR AFGHANISTAN.

THE SOVIETS PUT GREAT PUBLIC AND PRIVATE EMPHASIS ON THESE EFFORTS.

THE SUCCESSES OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION APPEARED FREQUENTLY IN THE PRESS AND THE CREATION OF ZONES OF PEACE WERE A REGULAR FEATURE OF FOREIGN MINISTRY PRESS BRIEFINGS. IN THE SOVIET VIEW, THE RECONCILIATION PROCESS WAS LINKED TO CREATION OF A COALITION REGIME WHICH WOULD ALLOW WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET TROOPS ON ACCEPTABLE TERMS.

7. FIRST DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER KOVALEV MADE THIS LINK IN A JULY 28 SPEECH TO SECRETARIES OF PARTY ORGANIZATIONS IN SOVIET EMBASSIES. IN HIS REMARKS, WHICH WERE SUBSEQUENTLY PUBLISHED IN THE VESTNIK OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY, KOVALEV SUGGESTED THE PROCESS WOULD LEAD TO CREATION OF A "POLITICAL POWER STRUCTURE" THAT WOULD NOT ALLOW THE COUNTRY TO BE DRAGGED BACK TO THE MIDDLE AGES, WOULD PREVENT A "BLOODBATH," AND SIMULTANEOUSLY CREATE CONDITIONS FOR WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET FORCES FROM AFGHANISTAN. DURING AUGUST AND EARLY SEPTEMBER, SOVIET OFFICIALS MADE SIMILAR REMARKS TO CONGRESSIONAL VISITORS AND STAFF. SOVIET MFA MIDDLE EAST

DEPARTMENT CHIEF ALEKSEYEV ALSO LAVISHED PRAISE ON NATIONAL RECONCILIATION DURING THE U.S.-SOVIET EXPERTS TALKS IN GENEVA IN SEPTEMBER.

TIMES OF TROUBLE

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 04 USSR 00603

8. THE MEAGER RESULTS OF THE GENEVA PROXIMITY TALKS WHICH WERE HELD AT THE SAME TIME AS THE EXPERTS TALKS GAVE THE SOVIETS REASON TO CONCLUDE THAT MANAGING THEIR DRA ALLIES WOULD BE MORE DIFFICULT THAN THEY HAD EXPECTED, HOWEVER. THE PROXIMITY TALKS WERE PRECEDED BY A SERIES OF SOVIET-AFGHAN CONSULTATIONS AND RUMORS THAT A TWELVE MONTH WITHDRAWAL TIMETABLE WOULD BE PROVIDED. THE FAILURE TO DO SO, AND THE EMBARRASSMENT OF A PALTRY TWO MONTH REDUCTION IN THE DRA OFFER, MAY HAVE MARKED THE BEGINNING OF THE "PINOCHIO" PHENOMENON: AFGHANISTAN, THE SOVIET PUPPET WAS BEGINNING TO WALK AND TALK WITHOUT STRINGS.

9. THIS WAS FOLLOWED QUICKLY BY NAJIBULLAH'S ASSUMPTION OF THE CHAIRMANSHIP OF THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL AND THE DECISION TO SCHEDULE THE RECENTLY COMPLETED LOYA JIRGA. THESE STEPS APPEAR TO HAVE TAKEN THE SOVIETS BY SURPRISE, AT LEAST WITH REGARD TO TIMING. EVEN WHILE NAJIB WAS PURGING THE PDPA AND TRYING TO ENFORCE THE NATIONAL RECONCILIATION LINE, HE WAS CREATING FACTS THAT MADE IT DIFFICULT FOR THE SOVIETS TO JETTISON HIM PERSONALLY. THESE STEPS ALSO PROVIDED REASSURANCE TO PDPA MEMBERS, MANY OF WHOM WERE UNNERVED BY CONTINUED SOVIET TALK OF WITHDRAWAL, THAT THEY WOULD CONTINUE TO PLAY THE BASIC ROLE IN ANY NATIONAL RECONCILIATION REGIME.

10. THE SOVIETS, UNHAPPY WITH SOME OF NAJIBULLAH'S STEPS, HAD NO CHOICE BUT TO PLAY ALONG SINCE THEY HAD NO INSTRUMENT OF PROVEN STRENGTH WITH WHOM TO REPLACE HIM. THE REQUIREMENTS OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY BEFORE THE UNGA VOTE ON THE AFGHANISTAN RESOLUTION ALSO COMPELLED THEM TO PLAY UP NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AS CONTRIBUTING TO A SUCCESSFUL UN NEGOTIATING PROCESS. THIS LED TO TRANSPARENT AND UNCONVINCING EFFORTS IN THE SOVIET PRESS TO DEPICT THE SEPTEMBER ROUND OF GENEVA PROXIMITY TALKS AS AN IMPORTANT STEP FORWARD.

11. THE DETERIORATION OF THE MILITARY SITUATION, COUPLED WITH THE FAILURE OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION TO SCORE ANY RECOGNIZABLE POLITICAL VICTORIES, DRAINED SOVIET CONFIDENCE THROUGHOUT THE FALL.

IT HAS BEEN REPLACED BY:

-- GREATER REALISM ABOUT THE DETERIORATING MILITARY SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN;

-- MORE OPENNESS ABOUT THE POLITICAL PROBLEMS FACING THE PDPA REGIME;

-- RECOGNITION OF THE FAILINGS OF THE REGIME TO UTILIZE TO BEST EFFECT SOVIET AID; AND

-- MORE FREQUENT STATEMENTS THAT THE REGIME'S TASKS AND GOALS, WHATEVER THEY MAY HAVE BEEN IN THE PAST, ARE NOT SOCIALIST BUT "NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC."

THIS LATTER DISTINCTION CREATES A POSSIBLE IDEOLOGICAL BASIS TO JUSTIFY A DECISION TO WITHDRAW.

ALONG A HARD ROAD

12. A GOOD EXAMPLE OF GREATER REALISM IN REPORTING ON THE MILITARY

SITUATION APPEARED IN IZVESTIA ON SEPTEMBER 18. THE REPORT QUOTES A SOVIET POLITICAL OFFICER AS SAYING "IF YOU JUDGE BY NEWSPAPER REPORTS, ESPECIALLY TELEVISION REPORTAGE, ON WHAT IS HAPPENING IN AFGHANISTAN, ESPECIALLY IN THE SOUTH, YOU GET THE IMPRESSION THAT COLUMNS OF PEOPLE RETURNING HOME FILL ALL THE ROADS LEADING INTO AFGHANISTAN, THAT THE NATIONAL RECONCILIATION POLICY HAS ALREADY LED TO A SITUATION WHERE YESTERDAY'S ENEMIES KISS EACH OTHER IN THE CITY SQUARES. BUT YOU GO TO QANDAHAR AND YOU'LL SEE HOW IT REALLY IS. THE CITY IS ONE BIG RUIN. THERE IS SHOOTING ALL THE TIME." THE AUTHOR CONCLUDES THAT IT WAS "NAIVE TO SUPPOSE THAT...IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE RAPIDLY TO ELIMINATE THE ACCUMULATED DIFFICULTIES AND CONTRADICTIONS." ALTHOUGH THE ARTICLE WENT ON TO DESCRIBE THE HEROIC EXPLOITS OF SOVIET BOYS, THE SUBLIMINAL POLITICAL MESSAGE ABOUT THE DIFFICULTIES OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION COULD NOT HAVE BEEN LOST ON CONCERNED SOVIET READERS.

13. AN EVEN MORE DRAMATIC ARTICLE BY KIM SELIKHOV IN THE OCTOBER 14 LITERATURNAYA GAZETA DREW A GOOD DEAL OF ATTENTION FROM SOVIETS. EVGENIY PRIMAKOV'S DEPUTY AT IMEMO, ALEKSANDR KISLOV, CITED IT TO AN EMBOFF AS AN EXAMPLE OF "GLASNOST'" IN FOREIGN POLICY AND PART OF THE "NEW REALISM" IN THE SOVIET UNION ABOUT AFGHANISTAN. THE SELIKHOV PIECE NOTES THAT "IT IS, OF COURSE, IMPOSSIBLE TO ENTERTAIN DELUSIONS FOLLOWING THE INITIAL SUCCESSES OF THE NATIONAL RECONCILIATION POLICY. THE PEOPLE ARE SPLIT." IN DESCRIBING THE "NEW STYLE OF WORK" ADOPTED BY PDPA LEADERS, SELIKHOV PROVIDES A LITANY OF CRITICISMS DIRECTED AT THE PARTY HIERARCHY BY AFGHAN CITIZENS. THE LIST, INCLUDING DEBAUCHERY, ALCOHOLISM, BRIBERY, FAVORITISM AND BUREAUCRATISM, WOULD HAVE A DISTURBINGLY FAMILIAR RING TO A SOVIET EAR. WHAT MAY HAVE BEEN UNFAMILIAR IS THE FRANK ADMISSION OF KHALQ AND PARCHAM FACTIONALISM. SELIKHOV WAS ALSO FRANK ABOUT THE MILITARY SITUATION. IN THE MIDST OF PASSAGES ABOUT THE HEROISM OF "SOVIET INTERNATIONALISTS" AND PROPOSALS FOR A MEMORIAL TO COMMEMORATE THEIR SACRIFICES, HE INFORMS HIS READERS THAT THE "DUSHMAN" ARE NOT "GANGS BUT A DISTINCTIVE, MOBILE, WELL-PAID ARMY WHICH KNOWS HOW TO CARRY OUT AUDACIOUS RAIDS AND OPERATIONS." HE ADDED THAT MOSCOW'S "COMPARATIVELY SMALL TROOP CONTINGENT" WAS FACING "AN ORGANIZED AND STRONG FOE."

14. A NOVEMBER 6 REVIEW OF THE OCTOBER PDPA PARTY CONGRESS IN THE JOURNAL NEW TIMES PROVIDED MORE CANDOR ON THE POLITICAL PROBLEMS FACING THE PDPA. THE AUTHOR FRANKLY NOTED THE NEED TO MAKE CONCESSIONS AND TO SEEK COMPROMISES WITH THE OPPOSITION HAD

S E C R E T SECTION 03 OF 04 USSR 00603

UNSETTLED MANY IN THE PDPA. IT HAD BEEN NECESSARY TO IMPOSE A LOYALTY OATH IN THE EFFORT TO COMBAT FACTIONALISM AND REPORTED THAT IF THE PDPA DID NOT GET ITS ACT TOGETHER, IT MIGHT BE SWEEPED FROM THE POLITICAL SCENE BY OTHER FORCES. THE NEW TIMES PIECE REPORTED A PDPA SLOGAN CALLING FOR "UNITY TODAY OR POLITICAL DEATH TOMMORROW."

15. NAJIBULLAH'S SELF-PROMOTING POLITICAL ACTIVITIES AND THE "NEW REALISM" ABOUT AFGHANISTAN MAY HAVE INCLINED THE SOVIETS TO ABANDON, AT LEAST FOR THE SHORT RUN, THE SEARCH FOR AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT. RATHER THAN SEEK A GRAND COMPROMISE AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL, WHICH MIGHT TIE THE SOVIETS DOWN IN AFGHANISTAN RATHER THAN ALLOW THEM TO WITHDRAW, THE SOVIET FOCUS TURNED ELSEWHERE. KISLOV TOLD AN EMBOFF IN MID-OCTOBER THAT A COALITION GOVERNMENT IN KABUL

WAS LESS IMPORTANT THAN "COALITION-BUILDING FROM BELOW." THE NEW TIMES ARTICLE SIMILARLY PINNED GREAT HOPES ON THE ABILITY TO WORK OUT LOCAL ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN THE REGIME AND OPPOSITION ELEMENTS. "THUS, FROM BELOW - WITH VILLAGES AND DISTRICTS - BEGINS THE FORMATION OF A COALITION GOVERNMENT." THIS LINE MAY HAVE FORMED THE BACKGROUND FOR THE DECISION, REFLECTED IN VORONTSOV'S CONVERSATION WITH UNDERSECRETARY ARMACOST IN GENEVA, TO DELINK AGREEMENT ON A TIMETABLE FROM INTERIM GOVERNMENTAL ARRANGEMENTS. THE TIMETABLE QUESTION: A REFLECTION OF INTERNAL DEBATE?

16. WE BELIEVE THAT, BY EARLY NOVEMBER, THE PROBLEMS OF MANAGING THE PDPA, THE APPARENT DECISION TO PUT OFF A SEARCH FOR INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS, THE DETERIORATING MILITARY SITUATION (REFLECTED IN A STREAM OF ARTICLES AND STATEMENTS ATTACKING U.S. AND BRITISH DELIVERY OF STINGERS AND BLOWPIPES TO THE RESISTANCE), AND CONTINUED PRESSURE BY THE U.S. AT HIGH LEVEL MEETINGS, LED THE SOVIETS TO REFOCUS THEIR EFFORTS ON THE WITHDRAWAL TIMETABLE. DURING THE SEVENTIETH ANNIVERSARY CELEBRATIONS GORBACHEV MET WITH NAJIBULLAH. TASS AND SOVIET TELEVISION SAID THEY DISCUSSED PROBLEMS WHICH WOULD HAVE TO BE SOLVED BY THE TWO SIDES. IT SEEMS CLEAR THAT TIMETABLE WAS THE MAJOR ISSUE. SHORTLY THEREAFTER, RUMORS ABOUNDED IN MOSCOW (AND ELSEWHERE) THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD ADOPT A TEN OR TWELVE MONTH TIMETABLE. GERASIMOV SAID IN MUNICH THAT SEVEN TO TWELVE MONTHS MIGHT BE ACCEPTABLE, BUT SUBSEQUENTLY DISOWNED HIS OWN REMARKS. AT THE SAME BRIEFING, HOWEVER, HE DREW ATTENTION TO EVGENIY PRIMAKOV'S "UNOFFICIAL" PROPOSAL ON THE "CAPITAL-TO-CAPITAL" TELEBRIDGE WHICH CALLED FOR A TWELVE MONTH SUSPENSION OF U.S. AID TO THE MUJAHIDIN ACCOMPANIED BY SOVIET TROOP WITHDRAWAL.

17. IN ADDITION TO THE CONFUSION OVER TIMETABLE, THERE HAVE BEEN OTHER MIXED SIGNALS. DEPUTY FM VORTONTSOV TOLD UNDERSECRETARY ARMACOST HE WAS PREPARED TO GO TO ISLAMABAD FOR TALKS WITH PAKISTAN. TWO DAYS LATER, GERASIMOV CAST DOUBT ON THIS BY READING A STIFF ATTACK ON PRESIDENT ZIA AND SUGGESTING THAT CURRENT CONDITIONS WERE NOT AUSPICIOUS FOR A VORONTSOV TRIP. SOVIET PUBLIC STATEMENTS HAVE BEEN INCONSISTENT ON THE FUTURE ROLE OF THE PDPA. SOME HAVE SUGGESTED THAT THE PDPA IS ONLY PROPOSING TO GIVE UP A "MONOPOLY ON POWER," BUT WILL CONTINUE TO EXERCISE THE LEADING ROLE AS THE "AUTHORITATIVE PARTY" IN AFGHAN POLITICS. OTHERS HAVE SAID THE PDPA WILL HAVE TO LEARN NEW SKILLS AS IT BECOMES ONE PARTY AMONG MANY. THE BACK AND FORTH SUGGESTS THERE IS CURRENTLY NO FIXED LINE; THE FLUX MAY REFLECT A DEBATE AMONG SOVIET LEADERS ABOUT HOW TO MANAGE A POSSIBLE DISENGAGEMENT. THE VARYING PUBLIC EXPRESSIONS MAY BE EFFORTS TO EITHER ANTICIPATE THE OUTCOME OR HELP MOVE THE DEBATE IN A GIVEN DIRECTION.

GLASNOST' AND THE WAR

18. PART AND PARCEL OF THE "NEW REALISM" AND THE UNCERTAIN PUBLIC LINE HAS BEEN THE EXTENSION OF "GLASNOST'," BEGINNING IN THE SPRING TO NEWSPAPER ARTICLES AND PUBLIC DISCUSSIONS THAT FOCUSED ON SOVIET VETERANS AND THE NEED TO RECOGNIZE THEIR SACRIFICES PUBLICLY. WHILE THIS MAY HAVE BEEN MOTIVATED BY A DESIRE TO PREPARE THE PUBLIC FOR A LONG HAUL, ITS GREATEST EFFECT MAY HAVE BEEN TO CREATE A SENSE OF WAR-WEARINESS IN THE SOVIET ELITE.

SOVIET PRESS STORIES ABOUT AFGHANISTAN MORE AND MORE FREQUENTLY NOTE THE IMPORTANCE OF CREATING CONDITIONS WHICH WILL ALLOW THE RETURN OF SOVIET FORCES. THE "BRING THE BOYS HOME" THEME WAS THE LEITMOTIF OF A RECENT EVENING DISCUSSION SPONSORED BY THE MAGAZINE OGNOK. IT WAS EXPRESSED BEST IN THE LACONIC COMMENT TO AN EMBOFF BY U.S.A. INSTITUTE MIDDLE EAST EXPERT ANDREY SHOUMIKHIN WHO SAID "WE HAVE DONE ENOUGH FOR AFGHANISTAN."

U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS: CREATING A CONTEXT FOR POLITICAL SETTLEMENT?

19. SOVIET REGIONAL EXPERTS LIKE SHOUMIKHIN, HIS COLLEAGUE VIKTOR KREMENIUK AT THE U.S.A. INSTITUTE, AND KISLOV AT IMEMO HAVE SUGGESTED, INDEPENDENTLY, THAT THE ACHIEVEMENT OF AN INF TREATY MIGHT HELP "UNBLOCK" THE PATH TO AN AFGHANISTAN SETTLEMENT. KISLOV MAINTAINED THAT ONLY ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS CAN CREATE THE ATMOSPHERE OF TRUST THAT WILL BE REQUIRED IF EACH SIDE IS TO MAKE THE HARD CHOICES WHICH A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT WILL REQUIRE. THESE SOVIET EXPERTS ALSO BELIEVE INF RATIFICATION WOULD BE AIDED IF THERE WAS MOVEMENT TOWARD A SETTLEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN.

20. WE BELIEVE THAT, FOR THE SOVIETS, THERE IS ANOTHER CONSIDERATION AS WELL. SOME OF THE REGIONAL EXPERTS HAVE EXPRESSED THE CONVICTION THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN WILL BE BETTER ABLE TO MAKE DECISIONS ON AID TO THE RESISTANCE, IN THE CONTEXT OF A SETTLEMENT, THAN ANY LIKELY SUCCESSOR. KREMENIUK WAS EMPHATIC ABOUT THIS IN A S E C R E T SECTION 04 OF 04 USSR 00603

DISCUSSION WITH AN EMBOFF THIS FALL. "REAGAN HAS ALREADY SHOWN THAT HE CAN TAKE TOUGH DECISIONS." FOR THAT REASON, KREMENIUK ARGUED THAT THE SOVIETS BELIEVED IT WAS IMPORTANT TO TRY AND GET THE SETTLEMENT PROCESS STARTED WHILE REAGAN WAS IN OFFICE. IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO SAY HOW WIDESPREAD THIS VIEW IS AMONG SOVIETS, BUT IT MAY PLAY A ROLE IN SOVIET THINKING ON HOW TO HANDLE THE AFGHANISTAN PROBLEM AT AND IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT.

21. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND, SOME SOVIET REGIONAL EXPERTS HAVE SAID THEY ARE MORE HOPEFUL THAT PROGRESS TOWARD A POLITICAL SOLUTION IS POSSIBLE THAN AT ANY TIME IN THE RECENT PAST. SHOUMIKHIN AND KREMENIUK SAID THIS TO AN EMBOFF ON NOVEMBER 23. THE HEIGHTENED DESIRE FOR A SOLUTION, HOWEVER, WILL REQUIRE THE SOVIETS TO DO SOMETHING THEY HAVE BEEN, HERETOFORE, INCAPABLE OF DOING -- BITING THE BULLET AND GETTING OUT. THIS WILL NOT BE POSSIBLE UNLESS THE SOVIETS SHOW AN UNCHARACTERISTIC WILLINGNESS TO RUN SERIOUS POLITICAL RISKS. WHETHER GORBACHEV IS PERSONALLY WILLING TO DO THIS WHEN HE IS WIDELY PERCEIVED TO HAVE BEEN WEAKENED BY THE YEL'TSIN AFFAIR IS HARD TO GUESS THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT MAY WELL PROVIDE AN OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE AN ASSESSMENT. BENCHMARKS

22. WHETHER THE SOVIETS ARE READY TO TRANSFORM THEIR DECLARATORY POLICY INTO A POLITICAL REALITY WILL BE RELATIVELY EASY TO MEASURE. KEY TESTS WILL BE THEIR ABILITY TO FOLLOW-UP ON VORONTSOV'S COMMENTS TO ARMACOST (NOW PERHAPS BUTTRESSED BY NAJIBULLAH'S PUBLIC COMMITMENT TO A TWELVE MONTH TERM) BY TABLING A REASONABLE TIMETABLE AT A GENEVA ROUND IN JANUARY OR FEBRUARY. THAT TIMETABLE WILL HAVE TO BE FRONTLOADED AND FREE OF HOOKERS OR CONTINGENCIES. VORONTSOV WILL ALSO HAVE TO MAKE GOOD ON HIS UNDERTAKING TO VISIT

ISLAMABAD FOR SERIOUS DISCUSSIONS WITH THE PAKISTANIS. IF THE SOVIETS DO NOT PRODUCE ON THESE TWO POINTS, THEN THEIR PROFESSIONS OF INTEREST IN A SETTLEMENT WILL NOT CARRY MUCH WEIGHT.

23. PAST SOVIET PERFORMANCE ON AFGHANISTAN JUSTIFIES SKEPTICISM ABOUT THEIR CURRENT DECLARATIONS OF INTENT. THERE HAVE BEEN MANY STRAWS IN THE WIND IN THE PAST WHICH CAME TO NOTHING. NONETHELESS, WE SHOULD NOT RULE OUT THE POSSIBILITY THE SOVIETS ARE BEING TRAPPED BY THEIR OWN RHETORIC. THE CACAPHONY OF STATEMENTS ON A TIMETABLE FOR WITHDRAWAL HAVE BOTH RAISED INTERNATIONAL EXPECTATIONS AND FURTHER DESTABILIZED THE PDPA. AS THE MILITARY SITUATION ON THE GROUND DETERIORATES, THE SOVIETS MAY FIND THEY ARE FACING THE WORST OF ALL POSSIBLE WORLDS -- CONTINUED HIGH INTERNATIONAL COSTS COMBINED WITH AN ALLY WHOSE REGIME IS CRUMBLING FROM WITHIN. THE IMPRESSION HERE IS THAT MANY KNOWLEDGABLE SOVIETS RECOGNIZE MOSCOW IS APPROACHING A MOMENT OF TRUTH. EITHER THE SOVIETS USE THE PERIOD BETWEEN THE SUMMITS TO MAKE SOME FUNDAMENTAL DECISIONS OR THEY FACE THE PROSPECT OF A PROLONGED WRESTLING MATCH WITH THE AFGHAN TARBABY.

JOYCE

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

1-Nov-1988 14:09 EDT

Approved for

MEMORANDUM FOR:

LEDSKY

FROM: VMS MAIL user WHSR
(WHSR@VAXE@)

SUBJECT:

Received: From VAXE(WHSR) by VAXC with Jnet id 1832
for LEDSKY@VAXC; Tue, 1 Nov 88 14:09 EDT
Date: Tue, 1-NOV-1988 15:09 EST
From: <WHSR@VAXE>
To: LEDSKY@VAXC

<DIST>
PRT: BATJER DONLEY SDO NEGROPONTE PERITO POWELL STEVENS
SIT: BENKO BURNS CHARLES LEDSKY NSSRT RODMAN

<PREC>
IMMEDIATE
<CLAS>
~~SECRET~~
<OSRI>
RUSBST
<DTG>
011305Z NOV 88

<ORIG>
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL

<TO>
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0465
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 2755
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 6271
RUFHLD/AMEMBASSY LONDON 3629
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 5762
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 8480
RUSBPW/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR 4167
RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 3014

<SUBJ>
SUBJECT: SOVIETS UP THE ANTE

<TEXT>
BT

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F96076/2 #26

BY CS, NARA, DATE 9/29/00

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 02661

EXDIS KHYBER

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MOPS, UR, AF

SUBJECT: SOVIETS UP THE ANTE

REF: A) KABUL 2653, B) KABUL 2566, C) ISLAMABAD 23377,

- D) ISLAMABAD 23381

1. S/- ENTIRE TEXT.

2. MOSCOW HAS EMBARKED ON AN ORCHESTRATED EFFORT TO HEIGHTEN MILITARY PRESSURE ON THE MUJAHIDIN AND PAKISTAN AS IT GROPEs TOWARD A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. THE DEPLOYMENT OF ADDITIONAL GROUND ATTACK AIRCRAFT (THE MIG-27), THE CROSS-BORDER USE OF THE BACKFIRE (WITH ITS STRATEGIC ATTRIBUTES AND NUCLEAR CAPABILITY), AND THE POSITIONING OF SCUD MISSILES WITHIN RANGE OF PAKISTAN ARE ALL INTENDED TO SIGNAL SOVIET INTENTION NOT TO ABANDON ITS INTERESTS IN AFGHANISTAN.

3. AT THE SAME TIME, NAJIB, IN HIS OCTOBER 29 SPEECH TO THE PARLIAMENT (AND PRESUMABLY SHARQ THIS WEEK IN NEW YORK), HAS PUT FORTH AN ILL-DEFINED POLITICAL INITIATIVE WHOSE ONLY CLEAR COMPONENT IS AN INVITATION TO THE OPPOSITION TO ENTER TALKS PLUS A CALL FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE TO ESTABLISH AFGHANISTAN'S NEUTRALITY AND DEMILITARIZATION (I.E., REMOVAL OF WEAPONS SUCH AS THE SCUD AND MIG-27 WHICH THE SOVIETS CLAIM TO HAVE DELIVERED TO THE AFGHANS).

4. MOSCOW HAS USED SUCH PLOYS BEFORE--NOTABLY AT THE END OF THE 1973 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR WHEN SCUDS WERE DELIVERED TO EGYPT (AND A SOVIET INTERVENTION THREAT WAS MADE) TO PREVENT ISRAELI ENCIRCLEMENT OF THE EGYPTIAN THIRD ARMY. AT THAT TIME, THE UNITED STATES PLACED ITS STRATEGIC FORCES ON ALERT AND ACCELERATED DELIVERIES TO ISRAEL. BUT THE END RESULT WAS A CEASEFIRE ENCOURAGED BY THE U.S. AND THE PREVENTION OF TOTAL HUMILIATION OF MOSCOW'S THEN CLIENT. PRESUMABLY, THE SOVIETS HOPE FOR SIMILAR RESULTS NOW.

5. WHILE MOSCOW MAY BELIEVE ITS ESCALATION WILL BE THE KEY TO OPEN THE DOOR TO A POLITICAL SOLUTION, IT MAY IN FACT SERVE TO LOCK IN THE SOVIETS. THE AFGHAN MUJAHIDIN WILL RESPOND TO INTIMIDATION WITH DEFIANCE RATHER THAN ACCOMMODATION. THE UNITED STATES HAS NOT FORGED THE LONG POLITICAL AND DIRECT MILITARY RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE MUJAHIDIN THAT EXIST WITH ISRAEL--THE RESULTS OF 1973 CANNOT BE REPLICATED HERE. ONCE HAVING ESCALATED ITS MILITARY INVOLVEMENT, MOSCOW WILL HAVE A HARD TIME BACKING DOWN WITHOUT ACHIEVING SOME CONCESSION APPEARING TO GUARANTEE THE PDPA'S POLITICAL FUTURE.

6. WHILE WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT MOSCOW HAS EXTREMELY POWERFUL REASONS TO REMOVE ITS FORCES BY FEBRUARY 15, THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE CURRENT DECISION TO ESCALATE MAY BE MAINTENANCE OF THE MILITARY CONFRONTATION FOR A LONGER PERIOD.

7. AT THE PRESENT TIME, WE ARE AGNOSTIC AS TO WHETHER

TROOP WITHDRAWALS WILL RESUME NOVEMBER 15. GIVEN THE PATTERN OF ESCALATION, WE WOULD EXPECT NOT. ON NOVEMBER 15, HOWEVER, THE SEMI-ANNUAL DEMOBILIZATION OF SOVIET TROOPS SHOULD BEGIN--SO THERE MAY BE SOME OUTFLOW OUT OF THE COUNTRY. BUT, WE PRESUME, BASED BOTH ON VORONTSOV'S THREATS AND PAST DECLARATIONS BY GENERAL GROMOV, THAT SOME INFLOW OF REPLACEMENT TROOPS WILL TAKE PLACE--IN QUANTITIES THAT WILL BE DIFFICULT TO ESTIMATE. ANY CLEAR NET WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS WILL PROBABLY NOT TAKE PLACE UNTIL MOSCOW DIGESTS THE RESULTS OF ITS CURRENT ESCALATION.

8. WHAT SHOULD BE DONE? PRESUMABLY THE DEPLOYMENT OF WEAPONS (THE SCUD) TO THREATEN PAKISTAN AND THE MOVEMENT SOUTH TO TURKMENISTAN OF THE BACKFIRE REQUIRES SOME TYPE OF RESPONSE IN KIND--PERHAPS MOVEMENT OF SOME OF OUR EBBING PERSIAN GULF FORCES TOWARD THE ARABIAN SEA. SECONDLY, THE ISSUE OF SOVIET ESCALATION--IN CONTRAST TO ITS PROMISE TO WITHDRAW--MUST BE MADE A FOCUS OF WORLD ATTENTION. DEMARCHES COULD BE MADE IN EUROPE, BEIJING AND AMONG THE NAM. PRESUMABLY OUR DECISION TO PUSH A CONSENSUS RESOLUTION AT THE UNGA COULD BE REVERSED.

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~~S E C R E T~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 KABUL 02661

EXDIS KHYBER

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MOPS, UR, AF

SUBJECT: SOVIETS UP THE ANTE

(THIS, OF COURSE, WOULD GIVE SHARQ AN OPPORTUNITY WHICH HE MAY COVET TO PUT HIS "REASONABLE" NEGOTIATING OFFER BEFORE THE UNGA IN AN ATTEMPT TO CAST THE MUJAHIDIN AS THE INTRANSIGENT PARTY.)

9. A CRITICAL QUESTION IS WHETHER THE MUJAHIDIN SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED OR DISCOURAGED BY THE GOP TO ENHANCE PRESSURE ON KABUL AND KANDAHAR. THE MUJAHIDIN CAN BE EXPECTED TO ACT WITHOUT ANY URGING. BUT IT SHOULD BE REMEMBERED THAT THE MUJAHIDIN DO NOT HAVE THE FIREPOWER NOR ACCURACY TO MAKE KABUL OR KANDAHAR INTO A DIEN BIEN PHU; THE OPPOSITE IS THE CASE--WITH SOVIET COMMITMENT OF ENHANCED AIRPOWER TO PREVENT MUJAHIDIN VICTORIES IN THE KEY TOWNS AND TO INFLICT HEAVY LOSSES, THE RISKS OF CONCENTRATION OF FORCES REST MAINLY ON THE MUJAHIDIN SIDE. RABBANI IS PROBABLY RIGHT THAT BOMBING WILL NOT SOFTEN THE MUJAHIDIN, BUT IT CAN CERTAINLY PREVENT THEM FROM ACHIEVING VICTORY. THIS, AS NAJIB POINTED OUT IN HIS OCTOBER 19 PLENUM ADDRESS, IS THE REGIME'S STRATEGY.

10. OUR OBJECTIVES REMAIN SOVIET DEPARTURE AND ELIMINATION OF THE INVASION'S POLITICAL CONSEQUENCE--PDPA RULE. OUR BEST TACTIC IS TO DISPLAY OUR RESOLVE (THROUGH OUR OWN MILITARY DISPOSITIONS) PLUS INCREASING THE POLITICAL COST TO MOSCOW OF ITS ESCALATION. GLASSMAN

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