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Directorate, NSC: Records

Folder Title: Press Book-Meeting of Reagan and General Gorbachev in Geneva, November 1986 (Jack Matlock) (6)
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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EUROPEAN AND SOVIET AFFAIRS DIRECTORATE, NSC
: RECORDS

Withdrawer

SMF 4/25/2005

File Folder PRESS BOOK-MEETINGS OF REAGAN AND
GORBACHEV, GENEVA, NOVEMBER 1985 (4) 6

FOIA

1995-039/1

Box Number 24101 Box 9

3

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
8795	BI	BIO	1	10/28/1985	B1 B3
8797	BI	BIO	1	10/29/1985	B1 B3
8798	BI	BIO	1	10/30/1985	B1 B3
8799	BI	BIO	1	4/10/1985	B1 B3
8800	BI	BIO	1	4/11/1985	B1 B3
8801	BI	BIO	1	8/8/1985	B1 B3
8802	BI	BIO	1	10/30/1985	B1 B3
8803	BI	BIO	1	9/4/1985	B1 B3
8804	BI	BIO	1	10/30/1985	B1 B3
8805	BI	BIO	1	11/8/1985	B1 B3
8806	BI	BIO	1	4/16/1985	B1 B3
8807	BI	BIO	1	9/4/1985	B1 B3
8809	BI	BIO	1	10/30/1985	B1 B3
8811	BI	BIO	1	2/15/1985	B1 B3
8812	BI	BIO	1	10/29/1985	B1 B3

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

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FOIA

1995-039/1

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
8814	BI	BIO	1	6/11/1985	B1 B3
8840	BI	BIO	1	6/11/1985	B1 B3

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
8817	BI	BIO	1	9/11/1985	B1 B3
8818	BI	BIO	1	7/29/1985	B1 B3
8820	BI	BIO	1	3/26/1985	B1 B3
8822	BI	BIO	1	5/15/1985	B1 B3
8823	BI	BIO	1	11/8/1985	B1 B3
8824	BI	BIO	1	10/30/1985	B1 B3
8825	BI	BIO	1	11/8/1985	B1 B3
8826	BI	BIO	1	11/8/1985	B1 B3
8827	BI	BIO	1	11/8/1985	B1 B3
8828	BI	BIO	1	10/28/1985	B1 B3
8829	BI	BIO	1	3/26/1985	B1 B3
8842	BI	BIO	1	3/26/1985	B1 B3
8830	BI	BIO	1	3/27/1985	B1 B3
8831	BI	BIO	1	2/13/1985	B1 B3
8832	BI	BIO	1	2/12/1985	B1 B3

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8806	BI BIO	1	4/16/1985	B1 B3

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8807	BI BIO	1	9/4/1985	B1 B3
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8809	BI BIO	1	10/30/1985	B1 B3

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8811	BI BIO	1	2/15/1985	B1 B3

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8812	BI BIO	1	10/29/1985	B1 B3

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8814	BI BIO	1	6/11/1985	B1 B3

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8840	BI BIO	1	6/11/1985	B1 B3

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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8817	BI BIO	1	9/11/1985	B1 B3

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8818	BI BIO	1	7/29/1985	B1 B3

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8820	BI BIO	1	3/26/1985	B1 B3

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8822	BI BIO	1	5/15/1985	B1 B3

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8824	BI BIO	1	10/30/1985	B1 B3

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8826	BI BIO	1	11/8/1985	B1 B3

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8827	BI BIO	1	11/8/1985	B1 B3

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8828	BI BIO	1	10/28/1985	B1 B3

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8829	BI BIO	1	3/26/1985	B1 B3
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8842	BI BIO	1	3/26/1985	B1 B3

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8830	BI BIO	1	3/27/1985	B1 B3

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NATO HEADS OF GOVERNMENT & FOREIGN MINISTERS

BELGIUM	
Head of Govt	Wilfried Martens
Foreign Minister	Leo Tindemans
CANADA	
Head of Govt	Brian Mulroney
Foreign Minister	Charles Joseph Clark
DENMARK	
Head of Govt	Poul Schluter
Foreign Minister	Uffe Ellemann-Jensen
FRANCE	
Head of Govt	Laurent Fabius
Foreign Minister	Roland Dumas
FED REP. OF GERMANY	
Head of Govt	Helmut Kohl
Foreign Minister	Hans-Dietrich Genscher
GREECE	
Head of Govt	Andreas Papandreou
Foreign Minister	Karolos Papoulias
ICELAND	
Head of Govt	Steingrimur Hermannsson
Foreign Minister	Geir Hallgrimsson
ITALY	
Head of Govt	Bettino Craxi
Foreign Minister	Giulio Andreotti
LUXEMBOURG	
Head of Govt	Jacques Santer
Foreign Minister	Jacques Poos
NETHERLANDS	
Head of Govt	Ruud Lubbers
Foreign Minister	Hans van den Broek
NORWAY	
Head of Govt	Kare Willoch
Foreign Minister	Svenn Stray
PORTUGAL	
Head of Govt	Anibal Antonio Cavaco Silva
Foreign Minister	Pedro Pires de Miranda
SPAIN	
Head of Govt	Felipe Gonzalez Marquez
Foreign Minister	Francisco Fernandez-Ordonez
TURKEY	
Head of Govt	Turgut Ozal
Foreign Minister	Vahit Halefoglul
UNITED KINGDOM	
Head of Govt	Margaret Thatcher
Foreign Minister	Sir Geoffrey Howe

THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE

Origin of the Alliance

Founded by North Atlantic Treaty signed by twelve members in Washington, April 4, 1949. Greece and Turkey joined February in 1951; the Federal Republic of Germany in May 1955; Spain in May 1982.

Principal Officers

Secretary General, Lord Peter Carrington (UK)
Deputy Secretary General, Ambassador Eric Da Rin (Italy)

Major NATO Commanders

Supreme Allied Commander Europe, General Bernard W. Rogers (US)
Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic, Admiral Wesley McDonald (US)
Allied Commander-in-chief, Channel, Admiral N.J.S. Hunt (UK)

Political Consultations

The principal forum for political consultations is the North Atlantic Council (NAC), composed of Permanent Representatives (Ambassadors) and the Secretary General. It meets at least weekly on a wide range of subjects. Foreign Ministers join their Permanent Representatives twice yearly for ministerial meetings of the Council. The next NAC ministerial is scheduled for December 12 - 13.

Defense Consultations

Defense matters are dealt with in the Defense Planning Committee, composed of representatives of all NATO nations except France. Like the Council, it meets regularly at ambassadorial level and assembles twice a year at the level of defense ministers.

Military Organization

The NATO Military Committee is the highest military authority in the Alliance. It is composed of the Chiefs-of-Staff of all member nations except for France. Iceland is represented by a civilian. It meets at least twice a year.

Alliance Consultative Activities: The President's Meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev

In preparation for President Reagan's meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev, we have held extensive consultations with our Allies. Both President Reagan and Secretary Shultz have written Allied leaders, Ambassador Nitze briefed the North Atlantic Council in early October, and Secretary Shultz participated in a special session of the North Atlantic Council on October 15.

Richard Schifter

U.S.-Soviet Quality of Life: A Comparison

United States Department of State
Bureau of Public Affairs
Washington, D.C.

Following is an address by Ambassador Richard Schifter, head of the U.S. delegation, before the Ottawa Human Rights Experts' Meeting of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), Ottawa, Canada, May 22, 1985.

Ever since this conference began, we have returned, from time to time, to a discussion of what is perceived to be the distinction between political and civil rights on one hand and economic and social rights on the other hand. I shall, therefore, at the outset of this statement, set forth the thoughts of the U.S. delegation on this issue.

Rights of the Individual

Those of us who trace our views of government to the writings of the English and French thinkers of the 18th-century Enlightenment subscribe to the proposition that government derives its mandate from the consent of the governed, such consent being expressed in free elections. The government, thus, reflects the will of the majority. In this context of majority rule, the philosophers on the subject defined certain rights of the individual which are so basic that no government may deprive him of them, irrespective of the size of the popular majority by which it was installed in office. These rights of the individual are what we understand principally under the term "human rights." They define and clarify the fundamental relationship between the individual and his government, and they consist, essentially, of limitations on the powers of government. Like the biblical "Thou shall not," the beginning phrase of the

first amendment to the U.S. Constitution, the beginning phrase of our Bill of Rights, is "Congress shall make no law"—a phrase followed by the subjects on which Congress shall make no law, such as abridgment of freedom of speech or the press.

When we use the term "right," we think of a claim which can be enforced in the courts. The rights guaranteed in the U.S. Constitution, which in CSCE terminology are referred to as political and civil rights, are rights which every citizen can call upon the courts to protect.

We view what are here referred to as economic and social rights as belonging in an essentially different category. They are, as we see it, the goals of government policy in domestic affairs. Government, as we see it, should foster policies which will have the effect of encouraging economic development so as to provide jobs under decent working conditions for all those who want to work at income levels which allow for an adequate standard of living. These goals should be attained in a setting which allows freedom of choice of his work to everyone. For those who are unable to find jobs we provide unemployment compensation and, if that is unavailable, other forms of social assistance. The economic system which is now in place in our country is fully in keeping with the relevant articles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

The U.S. delegation, in selecting issues for discussion at this conference, decided deliberately to limit itself to problems which, though of great concern

to the American public, would not require systemic changes in the Soviet Union to effect correction. Every one of the problems we have raised so far about conditions in countries which describe themselves as Marxist-Leninist could be eliminated while staying within the system.

It so happens, therefore, that the Soviet human rights problems of greatest concern to the American public are the problems which could be most easily solved by the Soviet Union. They concern, as we have pointed out, the incarceration of persons guilty only of giving expression to their thoughts, the persecution of religious believers, the commitment of sane persons to institutions for the mentally ill, cultural repression, and discrimination against certain people on the grounds of ancestry. The Soviet State could, as I have said, correct these problems without effecting fundamental structural change.

We had not intended to engage in discussions of economic and social conditions in the Soviet Union, both because the American public is not as deeply aware of or concerned about them and because correction of any shortcomings which we would have to point out would, indeed, require systemic change in the Soviet Union. We see such changes occurring gradually in some other countries which had initially adopted the Soviet economic model. However, we did not think this meeting to be an appropriate forum for a discussion of such issues. Nevertheless, as the Soviet delegation has clearly insisted that we engage in a discussion of social and economic issues, let me say that we are prepared to join in that debate. To begin with, I shall respond in detail to the concerns expressed by the Soviet delegation as to social and economic problems in the United States.

U.S. Social and Economic Problems

Unemployment. First of all, let me discuss the problem of unemployment in the United States. Our present unemployment rate is 7.3%. It reached a peak of 10.5% in 1932 and has declined significantly since then. Millions of new jobs have been created in recent years, offering new opportunities to the unemployed as well as to persons newly entering the job market. While we agree that an unemployment rate of 7.3% is still too high and further efforts need to be made to reduce the unemployment level, we believe that any person analyzing our unemployment rate should note the following:

- About two percentage points are attributable to so-called frictional unemployment, i.e., persons in transit from one job to another.

- A significant number of the job opportunities which are available in the United States at any one time go unfilled because no one in the locality in which the jobs are available is interested in doing the kind of work available at the wages which are being offered; as we don't have a system under which people can be compelled to work, unfilled jobs thus exist side by side with unemployment.

- We do not have an anti-parasitism law; some persons prefer to draw unemployment insurance payments or welfare benefits rather than take jobs which they deem unsuitable.

- The percentage of our adult population looking for work in the productive sector of the economy is enlarged by the fact that we have significantly fewer people than the Soviet Union in our military forces, in our police forces, and, for that matter, in prison or performing forced labor; specifically, though the Soviet population is only 12% greater than that of the United States, its military forces are almost 200% greater, its police forces more than 100% greater, and its prison population, including forced labor, over 1,100% greater than the corresponding figures in the United States.

I have made these points only to explain what the 7.3% figure means, not to suggest that it can and should be ignored. Our government is committed to the proposition that everyone who wants to work should have an opportunity to do so. Government policy is dedicated to the stimulation of economic growth, to the creation of more jobs, to the raising of standards of living, to the reduction of poverty. In a country such as ours, there is often disagreement as to what might be the best policy to effect economic growth. Different political groupings advocate different solutions to the problems we face. But there is an overwhelming consensus that unemployment must be reduced and that it should be reduced within our present economic framework.

When we compare our economic model to alternate approaches, we must note that, to some extent, unemployment in our country is a consequence of our ideas of individual freedom. We do not assign people to jobs or prosecute them for parasitism if they fail to take an available job. As I have noted, there are people in our country who pass up job opportunities because they don't like the jobs that are being offered or consider the wage offers too low. There are

others who are unemployed and might be able to get a job of their liking and at a satisfactory wage at a substantial distance from their home, but they are loathe to move.

Much of the latter kind of unemployment is created by the fact that the economy adapts itself to market conditions. Uneconomic enterprises are thus compelled to close, sometimes causing serious dislocation in the communities dependent on them. In the long run, such adjustments enable the economy to adapt itself to change and to increase its overall productivity. But in the short run, it creates serious hardships for the people directly and adversely affected. To deal with these hardships and to bridge the periods of difficulty is a continuing challenge to our Federal, State, and local governments. We recognize it for the problem it is and seek to deal with it. For reasons which I shall state later, the overwhelming majority of our people are not at all attracted to the solution to this problem which the Soviet Union offers.

There is one other point that needs to be made with regard to the issue of employment. We need to emphasize the role which a free labor movement has played in the United States in strengthening the role of the worker, achieving increases in wages and improvements in working conditions. "The existence of a free labor movement, accountable only to its members and not under the control of employers or governments, is, we believe, essential to the protection of the interests of working people. It has succeeded in the United States in setting standards not only for its own members but for unorganized workers as well. As I noted yesterday, workers in certain states which profess to have been founded for the benefit of the working people are deprived of the ability to assert their interests through the operation of free and independent labor unions.

Homelessness. The distinguished Soviet representative has raised the issue of homelessness in the United States. We recognize the existence of homelessness in our society. This is a complex and difficult problem for us, in large part because in recent years our laws have not allowed us to incarcerate or commit to mental institutions persons who insist on living on the sidewalks of our cities as long as they are not threats to themselves or society. Many of these people refuse to make use of the wide range of accommodations available to them. In some societies they would be charged with vagrancy, parasitism, or forced into mental institutions. In our

cities they remain on the streets, quite understandably causing many visitors to wonder whether there is, in fact, no housing available for them.

The fact is that our Federal Government and our State governments have spent and continue to spend hundreds of millions of dollars to provide shelter for the homeless. Those who cannot be self-sufficient, such as the elderly, are given priority in assistance programs. Furthermore, the tradition of voluntarism in the United States has resulted in the creation of a great number of nonprofit groups which have specialized in helping those in need of what our laws call safe and sanitary housing. Particular efforts have been made to assist the elderly.

I should also make it clear that there are quite a number of people in our country who live in housing which we deem substandard. We are interested in improving such housing, though we know that what is substandard in the United States may be standard in countries which are among our severest critics.

Discrimination. We readily concede that persons were for a long time discriminated against in our country on the grounds of their ancestry, and we recognize that government at all levels shares culpability with regard to this problem. However, beginning 40 years ago, policies on the subject of race began to change in our country and have changed at an ever-accelerating pace. Over this period the Federal Government as well as State and local governments have succeeded in stamping out all officially sanctioned forms of discrimination based on ancestry. Beyond that, laws have been enacted that require the private sector to conform to fundamental principles of nondiscrimination.

What I have just said does not mean that we can overnight overcome the results of generations of discrimination and disadvantage. I have not carefully checked all the statistics which our distinguished Soviet colleague has recited, but they may very well be correct. What is important to note is the change in the figures in recent years, as groups of our population which were previously discriminated against have seen the barriers fall and have used the opportunities which have been afforded them.

Nothing that I have said is designed to suggest that we have eliminated racial and ethnic antagonisms within our population. They do exist, and government is not able to change that fact. But here, too, we have witnessed change. Through the activities of various institutions—including, particularly, religious

organizations—younger people have increasingly been imbued with a commitment to human brotherhood. We, therefore, have reason to believe that over time these antagonisms will continue to diminish.

My remarks about nondiscrimination generally apply to Indians as well. But our Indian people have a special problem, which they share with indigenous peoples elsewhere in the world—indigenous peoples whose culture and economies differ markedly from those of the surrounding society. Many of our Indian reservation residents are only a few generations removed from a hunting and fishing culture. They have found it much more difficult to fit into industrial society than do the descendants of families engaged in agriculture.

The unusually large unemployment rate on Indian reservations is related to this problem. It is, let me emphasize, the unemployment rate not of Indian people but for Indian reservations. Indian people who have decided to leave the reservations can find and have found jobs elsewhere in the country. But there is no doubt that Indian reservations have found it difficult to attract industry and thereby create job opportunities for Indian people at reasonable wage levels in their home communities. It happens to be a problem with which our government has concerned itself and continues to concern itself. I readily concede that the problem has not been solved. In fact, I have personally worked and written on this subject.

I shall complete this discussion of discrimination by noting again that the United States has served as a magnet for immigrants of all races to achieve a higher standard of life for themselves and for their children. The fact that a majority of recent immigrants to the United States are nonwhites from non-European areas and that they have integrated into our society at a truly amazing speed is clear evidence of the strength of the well-recognized American acceptance of a variety of ethnic groups into our social and economic system.

The Role of Women. Much has also been said here as to the role of women in the United States. As to the point made concerning the Equal Rights Amendment, let me note again that the courts of the United States have construed the 5th and 14th amendments to the U.S. Constitution so as to require legal equality between the sexes.

Admittedly, what is required by law takes time to be translated into reality in day-to-day life. The entry of women into our economic life on a basis of pari-

ty occurred only quite recently, after 1970. It has, however, progressed at amazing speed. To cite one item of statistics that comes to mind, in 1970, 2% of all law school students were women. Today they are 50%.

But new entries do not come in at the very top. That is why we find average women's wages to be below the average earned by men. It was 60% in 1980; it is 64% today and is expected to continue to rise as the years go by. Here, too, we do not suggest that we have reached our goal of full actual rather than purely legal equality, but we are clearly on our way toward that goal.

Soviet Economic Progress Since the October Revolution

As I said earlier, we had not intended to engage here in a debate on the respective advantages of the U.S. and Soviet models, but as the Soviet Union has initiated this discussion, we want to make it clear that we are not inclined to shrink from it. Let me say also that we recognize that the Soviet Union started to industrialize later than we did and that the Soviet Union suffered devastation during World Wars I and II. But let us also remember that we recalled earlier in this session that the war in Europe ended 40 years ago. How far has the Soviet Union been able to travel in this period on the way to its economic goals?

In the early 1960s, Nikita Khrushchev predicted that the Soviet Union would surpass the United States in living standards by 1980. Yet studies of comparative per capita consumption conducted by University of Virginia professor Gertrude Schroeder and others show that today, 25 years after Khrushchev spoke and 67 years after the October Revolution, the Soviet standard of living remains barely one-third of the U.S. level. These same studies show that Soviet living standards are much lower than in any developed Western country.

The average Soviet citizen, in fact, lives less well than someone living at the official U.S. poverty line. An American family living at that level, for example, lives on an income which is 41% of the U.S. average. About 15.2% of our population lives at or below that level. By comparison, as indicated, the average Soviet citizen lives at about one-third of the U.S. average, which gives us some idea of the percentage of the Soviet population which lives below the U.S. poverty line. As suggested earlier by our distinguished Spanish colleague, equally

dramatic comparisons can be made between the average Soviet citizen and the average unemployed worker in the West. In the recession year of 1982, for example—the worst since World War II—the median per capita income for unemployed workers in the United States was about \$5,000. The average income of a family with an unemployed worker was \$20,000. We do not deny that such an income in many cases reflected a substantial decline in living standards. But a Soviet family living on the equivalent of \$20,000 a year would be quite well off, even after we have adjusted for differences in the cost of basic needs.

In making these comparisons, I do not mean to suggest that the Soviet Union has made no economic progress since the October Revolution. But the limited success the Soviet economy has enjoyed in the past was dependent on constant additions to the labor force and on the availability of plentiful and inexpensive resources. Now that the Soviet Union has used up its surplus labor pool and its resources are more costly, its growth rates have plummeted. The Soviet Union, in fact, is no longer closing the gap between itself and the developed West. The per capita consumption comparisons I cited earlier have remained constant over the last decade. Given low Soviet labor productivity, the gap can reasonably be expected to widen in the future.

Shortcomings of the Soviet Economic System

Consumer Shortages and Corruption.

The Soviet economy today is characterized by pervasive shortages of consumer goods and the widespread corruption these shortages generate. These features, moreover, are not temporary problems which will solve themselves through continued progress over time. Rather, they are problems endemic to the Soviet system of centralized economic planning. This system, based on the notion that a small group of planners can efficiently allocate resources for an entire economy, has created instead an economy of bottlenecks, shortages, and waste.

In the Soviet Union, unlike anywhere in the developed West, the most basic consumer goods are in continuous short supply and rationing remains a common fact of Soviet life. The situation has been so bad in some localities in recent years that food riots have reportedly occurred. In 1981, *Izvestia* reported the introduction of rationing in 12 major Soviet cities, including Irkutsk, Kazan, Tbilisi, Vologda, and Naberezhnye

Chelny (now called Brezhnev). We have learned that meat and butter have both been formally rationed in the closed city of Sverdlovsk and its surrounding villages for several years. Presumably, the same is true of many other areas closed to foreign visitors.

The long lines of people lining up for scarce items on Soviet city streets have become famous throughout the world. The production and distribution system is so capricious that it is impossible to tell what will be available from one day to the next. This is why Soviet housewives frequently join lines without inquiring what is for sale. They simply assume they had better get whatever it is while it's available. This is also one important cause of Soviet productivity problems, since working people are typically obliged to take unauthorized absences from their jobs to chase after scarce necessities. These endless shortages force the average Soviet family to spend 2 hours shopping every day just to obtain the basic necessities of life.

The endless waiting is bad enough, but the Soviet consumer often finds that the product waiting for him at the front of the line is hardly worth the wait. The quality, variety, and design of the consumer goods available in the Soviet Union are, in fact, notoriously poor by both Western and East European standards, and retail trade and personal service facilities are scarce, primitive, and inefficient.

As one might expect, the chronic shortage of basic consumer goods has fostered the creation of an enormous black market in scarce items. This, in turn, has led to widespread official corruption as persons with administrative control over scarce commodities divert them for personal gain. Corruption exists in all societies, but in the Soviet Union it is a pervasive and normal part of life. Stealing from the state is so common that the Soviet people have come to take it for granted. Anecdotes about corruption and bribery have become a staple of Soviet humor.

The leaders of the Soviet Union are aware of the problem, of course. It has been frequently raised at party plenums, and the Soviet media are replete with stories of corruption, bribery, and the executions of those unfortunate enough to be selected as examples of equal justice under law. What the Soviet leadership seemingly fails to realize or simply will not face is that an economy of shortages inevitably breeds corruption. Some estimate that as much as 25% of the Soviet gross national product (GNP) is diverted to the black market every year.

It must be emphasized once again that the chronic shortages and widespread corruption which characterize contemporary Soviet life are fundamental features of the Soviet economic system. They reflect the systemic inflexibility of a centralized economic planning system which breeds bottlenecks and inefficiencies.

The Soviet consumer is further disadvantaged by the Soviet preference for spending on defense and heavy industry at the expense of the consumer sector. Soviet per capita spending for defense, for example, is, in relative terms, at least twice as high as in any developed Western country. Though we have heard a great many reminders from some of our colleagues here of the importance of the right to life and appeals for an end to the arms race, let us remember that in the 1970s the Soviet Union was the only runner in that arms race, continuing its buildup while the United States was, in effect, engaging in unilateral arms reduction. Today, the Soviet Union spends at least 14% of its GNP on defense, compared to only 7% for the United States. Given the Soviet Union's systemic economic problems and its emphasis on heavy industry and weapons procurement, it is little wonder that Soviet authorities and press commentators chronically complain about the evils of "consumerism" and against the excessive accumulation of material goods.

Effects of Agricultural Collectivization. The Soviet system of collectivized agriculture also contributes to the harshness of Soviet life. Much of the problem in food supply stems from the collectivized nature of Soviet agriculture. As is well known, the forced collectivization of agriculture in the early 1930s divested Soviet farmers of their land. What is not so well known is that the forcible confiscation of grain supplies that accompanied it resulted in a widespread famine that killed as many as 6 million in the Ukraine alone. Collectivization not only killed 6 million people but it permanently crippled Soviet agriculture.

The Soviet Union—in prerevolutionary days the world's largest grain exporter—is now the world's largest grain importer. Twenty percent of the Soviet work force works in agriculture, compared to 3% in the United States. Yet the Soviet Union often has had to import up to 25% of its grain. American farmers, who own their own land, are 10 times more productive than their Soviet counterparts. Each year, approximately 20% of the grain, fruit, and vegetable

harvest and as much as 50% of the Soviet potato crop perishes because of the poor storage, transportation, and distribution system.

Soviet farmers have not lost their ability to grow crops. They just lack the incentive to do so on a *kolkhoz* [collective farm]. By contrast, even though private plots, which are farmed by individuals in the early morning and late evening hours, occupy only 4% of the Soviet Union's arable land, they produce 25% of the Soviet Union's total crop output.

Housing Shortages and Deficiencies. Housing in the Soviet Union is in as short supply as most consumer goods. At least 20% of all urban families must share kitchen and toilet facilities with other families. Another 5% live in factory dormitories. Young married couples are typically forced to live with their parents and must wait years for housing of their own.

The housing that does exist is extremely cramped, more so than in any other developed country in the world. The average Soviet citizen has 14 square meters of living space, for example, compared to the 49 square meters available to the average American. This means that there are approximately two people for every room in the Soviet Union, compared with two rooms for every person in the United States. Soviet statistics reveal that in 1983, 32% of all urban housing had no hot water, 23% was without gas, 19% without indoor baths, 12% without central heating, 11% without sewage facilities, and 9% without water.

The housing situation is much worse in the countryside and contains many features reminiscent of the 19th century—or even the 18th. There, for the most part, heating is with fireplaces, food is cooked on wood stoves, out-houses provide the toilet facilities, and water frequently is from a well.

Although there has been much new housing built in the Soviet Union in recent years, almost all of it consists of poorly constructed high-rise apartment buildings, which are even more poorly maintained. At the current rate of construction, the per capita space available to Soviet citizens will begin to approach the Western standard in approximately 150 years. Soviet housing woes should come as no surprise, given the fact that the Soviet Union spends less than one-fifth as much on housing as the United States and well under half of what is spent in Spain and Japan.

Status of Soviet Women. Women in the Soviet Union usually occupy the lowest status and lowest paying jobs in

Soviet society. One-third of all working Soviet women, for example, are employed as agricultural laborers. By contrast, only 1.5% of American women are so employed.

Soviet authorities often point to the liberal maternity benefits accorded to Soviet women. Yet the Soviet Union is currently suffering from a severe labor shortage brought on by declining birth rates. This reduction in birth rates, in turn, is due to the extraordinarily high abortion rate. Many women have a history of five or more abortions. The fact is that the low Soviet standard of living compels women to work to supplement the family income. Maternity benefits, with extra mouths to feed and bodies to clothe, are, in many instances, simply not enough to encourage a family to let a child be born.

Unlike Soviet men, the working day of a Soviet woman does not end as she leaves the field or the factory. Soviet women are expected to do the cooking and the housework and the waiting in line.

In the West, women have effectively banded together to fight discrimination and sexism, but Soviet women have no access to effective political power. In its entire history, only one woman has ever served on the Politburo; none serves there now. Fewer than 5% of Central Committee members are female. Interestingly, only one-fourth of Communist Party members are female.

Medical Care and Health Problems. Soviet authorities are often fond of pointing out that health care in the Soviet Union is free. As with so much that is free or subsidized in the Soviet Union, however, you often get what you pay for. Although there are plenty of beds in Soviet hospitals, the people who lie in them frequently receive substandard care. One-third of them, for example, develop postoperative infections due to unsanitary conditions. Most of the doctors who care for them, moreover, are poorly trained by Western standards. Medicine is not a high-prestige occupation in the Soviet Union, and doctors are among the lowest paid workers in Soviet society. Significantly, 70% of these low-paid physicians are women.

Soviet medicine is not immune to the same shortages that afflict the rest of Soviet society. Medical equipment and many medicines are in extremely short supply. One-third of all Soviet hospitals, for example, do not have adequate facilities for blood transfusions. Basic items such as bandages, aspirin, and syringes are often difficult to find. Food rations are so small that patients must supplement their diet with food from home. In Novosibirsk, for example,

which is home to many leading Soviet academic institutes and where one would expect supplies to be significantly better than normal, only 11% of the 216 standard drugs to be prescribed for specific illnesses are actually available. These shortages are not surprising in light of the fact that Soviet per capita expenditures on health care are less than one-third the U.S. level.

Although the problems in the Soviet health care delivery system are serious, they are not the most serious medical problem facing the Soviet Union today. Dramatically, over the course of the past two decades a significant deterioration has occurred in the overall health status of the Soviet population. Recent studies show that there has been an increase in Soviet death and morbidity rates over the past 20 years. The life expectancy of Soviet males has decreased during that period by a little over 4 years, from 66 in the mid-1960s to just under 62 years today. In the United States during the same period, male life expectancy increased from 66 to 71 years. Infant mortality in the Soviet Union has increased from 26.2 per 1,000 live births in 1971 to about 40 per 1,000 today. U.S. infant mortality during the same period has decreased from 24.7 per 1,000 to 10.7.

The Soviet figure for infant mortality is necessarily an estimate since Soviet authorities stopped publishing infant mortality statistics after 1974 when the rate had risen to 31.9 per 1,000. This rate was already much higher than in any developed Western country. The Soviet Union also has stopped publishing life expectancy figures. The reason why this has been done is obvious enough. The decrease in male life expectancy and the increase in infant mortality in the Soviet Union are historic events. Never before has a developed, industrialized nation suffered a decline in these demographic indicators in time of peace.

The reasons for this decline are even more disturbing for anyone tempted to look to the Soviet Union as a model for social and economic development. Factors such as poor health care, increased smoking, and frequently unregulated industrial pollution are important, but perhaps the most important contributor is alcohol. This would appear to be the view of Soviet authorities themselves.

The Soviet Union leads the world in the per capita consumption of hard liquor. Much of it is consumed in the form of home-brewed moonshine known as *samogon*. Alcohol consumption in the Soviet Union has more than doubled over the past 25 years. The death rate from alcohol poisoning in the Soviet Union is 88 times the U.S. rate, and

alcohol and its effects may be the leading cause of death among Soviet males.

Alcohol abuse in the Soviet Union is not simply a male problem. Alcohol abuse is the third leading cause of illness among Soviet women and is a key factor in both the alarming rise in birth defects and the increased infant mortality rate. By 1980 the net social cost of alcohol abuse in decreased labor productivity in the Soviet Union amounted to a staggering 8%–9% of the total national income.

Much of the heavy drinking in the Soviet Union occurs in the work place. Professor R. Lirmyan of the Soviet Academy of the U.S.S.R. Ministry of Internal Affairs, writing in a 1982 issue of *Moloday Kommunist*, reported that 37% of the male work force is chronically drunk. Not surprisingly, drunkenness is the leading cause of industrial accidents.

A poll cited in a March 1984 edition of a Soviet journal, *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, revealed that half the Soviet population regards drunkenness as the number one social problem in the Soviet Union.

Seventy-four percent said they were alarmed over the extent of public drunkenness. These statistics make clear that the Soviet Union now suffers from an alcohol abuse problem of epidemic proportions, serious enough to cause a significant rise in the national death rate.

As I remarked earlier, even the Soviet leadership concurs with this assessment. Vitaliy Fedorchuk, the Soviet Minister for Internal Affairs, interviewed in the August 29, 1984, issue of *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, candidly acknowledged that Soviet mortality and sickness rates have been on the increase, and he specifically cited alcohol abuse as the cause.

We note with interest that the Soviet authorities only last week announced yet another campaign against the abuse of alcohol. Production is to be cut back, the drinking age raised, and penalties against the manufacture of home brew increased. While it is possible that these measures may meet with some limited success, we note that similar campaigns have always failed in the past. Our suspicion is that alcohol

abuse in the Soviet Union will remain an alarmingly serious problem until the Soviet leadership begins to come to grips with the profound social malaise that gave rise to the problem in the first place. In saying this, I do not mean to deny that there are drug and alcohol abuse problems in the United States and in other countries which deserve our serious attention. But I am suggesting that in the Soviet Union we are dealing with a problem of an entirely different order of magnitude.

Egalitarianism in the Soviet Union

I have been talking at length here about some serious difficulties in the Soviet social and economic system. But there is one more problem I would like to discuss. As we know, Marxist-Leninist ideology claims to be based on the notion of egalitarianism. This, we are told, is what the great October Revolution was all about. One would, therefore, expect that whatever problems the Soviet Union might have, the Soviet authorities would ensure that no class or group or individuals would ever be accorded privileges not available to other members of Soviet society.

But the truth is that certain groups in Soviet society (the party, the military officer corps, the diplomatic corps, the scientific-technical intelligentsia, the cultural and sports establishments) have deliberately shielded themselves from the social and economic hardships faced by the rest of the population. A privileged 5% of the Soviet population, known as the *Nomenklatura*, has access to special "closed" stores that are specially stocked with foreign goods not available in regular stores, as well as bountiful supplies of Soviet goods that are in short supply elsewhere. The average Soviet citizen is forbidden from entering these stores, which are unmarked and have opaque windows to prevent the curious from looking in. Housing space is allocated by state authorities on the basis of social status. Many leading Soviet organizations have their own housing facilities, which are of good standard and centrally located.

The Fourth Directorate of the Ministry of Health runs a closed system of hospitals, clinics, and dispensaries for

the *Nomenklatura*, providing far better services than those available to the general population. The Soviet ruling oligarchy also has access to such special benefits as foreign travel, automobiles, admission to the best schools, country houses, access to cultural events, and paid vacations in choice resorts, which are not available to the average citizen. Even the center lanes of certain roads are closed off for their exclusive personal use. To quote from George Orwell's *Animal Farm*: "All animals are equal, but some are more equal than others."

Conclusion

In an earlier intervention, the distinguished Soviet representative suggested that we were reluctant to discuss social and economic issues in this forum. I hope I have succeeded in dispelling this impression. Despite our many problems, we believe that we in the West, with our pluralistic, mixed-market economies, have gone further toward meeting basic human social and economic aspirations than has the system now in place in the Soviet Union.

More than 35 years ago, there was published a collection of essays authored by prominent former communists or fellow travelers, including Ignazio Silone, Andre Gide, Richard Wright, and Arthur Koestler. The book was entitled *The God That Failed*. Each of these prominent writers explained in his own words why he had concluded that the price in terms of personal freedom was not worth paying to attain the promised goal of a future paradise. The decades that passed have demonstrated that the image of paradise off in the distance was only a mirage. ■

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THE WHITE HOUSE

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INTERVIEW OF THE PRESIDENT
BY
FOREIGN BROADCASTERS

The East Room

2:30 P.M. EST

Q Mr. President, thank you very much for receiving us at the White House, just a week before your meeting with Mikhail Gorbachev.

I'm Claude Smadja, from the Suisse Television. Let me introduce my colleagues -- Martin Bell, from the BBC; Giuseppe Lugato, from RAI; Dieter Kronzucker, from ZDF; and Jacques Abouchar, from AN-2.

Mr. President, one week before the summit in Geneva, the prospects seem quite bleak. Do you still expect to strike a deal in Geneva and, in fact, are you going to strike a deal in Geneva?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I'm not as pessimistic as that. I understand, of course, that it's not going to be easy. There's a long history of meetings between our two countries and, many times, without much result. But I'm going to make every effort to try and reduce the mistrust and suspicion that seems to exist between our -- well, not only our two nations, but sort of the East and the West.

And I believe there are possibilities. We're going to try to deal in some four areas. Arms control, of course, is one. The regional disputes that are going on in the world and where the major powers are involved. Bilateral issues of a number of kind that are between us probably would be the easiest thing that we'll face in those meetings. And we'll just carry on, see what we can do.

Q Mr. President, I wonder, on arms control, are you going with a set negotiating position -- some counter-proposals to Mr. Gorbachev's proposals -- and is your team of advisors finally united behind you?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, we are united. And I think that there's been some distortion as to whether we weren't. We -- in our government here, I solicit and encourage varying opinions and ideas. I think it helps to make a decision when I hear all viewpoints.

But I don't envision this meeting as being one where we will get down to specific numbers and so forth. We have a team of negotiators, each side, in Geneva that have been negotiating on the possibility of nuclear arms reductions for some time.

MORE

We have had a proposal on the table in those talks for a considerable period of time, and finally the Soviet Union came back with a counter-proposal. And we have now offered a counter to that. We found encouragement in their counter-proposal. There were numbers that we could agree with.

And, so, the proposal that we've made in response is one that kind of compromises between our original proposal and theirs, accepting some of their figures -- in fact, some of the main figures on basic numbers and so forth -- and, then, our view on some of the complex issues about the mix of weapons and so forth. And to me, this is legitimate negotiations.

But I would think that what we should be dealing with at the summit is, as I said earlier, the elimination of suspicion and mistrust to the point that we could turn the specific numbers over to those other negotiators, but that they could have a signal from both sides, from their government and ours from us, have a knowledge that we want them to continue and to arrive at an agreement.

Q Mr. President, over the last few days and even now here, you continue to sound optimistic about the summit in Geneva, though we know now that there will be no substantial agreement, there will be no arms agenda, and even probably there would be no joint communique. Now, what would it be -- just a get-acquaintance meeting? And in this case, even the atmosphere, I think, it's a bit strange, considering the last occurrences. So, what's the reason of your optimism?

THE PRESIDENT: Oh, no, I don't think this is just a get-acquainted meeting, important though that may be. But I think there are many areas for agreement here. And as I say, I'm not pessimistic about them.

Look at the one situation that has both of us continuing to build these arsenals of weapons. The Soviet Union claims that they fear that we mean harm to them, that somehow we're nursing a plan of invading them or attempting to change their system. On the other hand, we believe, and I think with some evidence, that their policy has been expansionist. That's evidenced by Afghanistan, Ethiopia, South Yemen, Angola. And I think that if we sit and face each other and lay our cards on the table as to the fact that they don't like us or our system and we don't like theirs. But we're not going to try to change theirs. And they better not try to change ours.

But we have to live in the world together. And we're the only two countries that probably could start World War III.

We're also the two countries that could prevent World War III from happening. And I think that a little common sense should make us find out that we can continue to be competitive in the world, but in a peaceful way and without the threat of annihilation hanging over the world as it does now.

Q Mr. President, scientific results show up to now that your space defense shield is not as impenetrable as originally thought. Does this make SDI more of a bargaining chip? Could you compromise on this system?

THE PRESIDENT: Not compromise in the sense of giving up on the research. Now, the truth of the matter is there've been some breakthroughs that have a number of scientists quite optimistic about this research and since this research is all going on within the bounds of the ABM Treaty, we're going to continue, because I think if -- it would be the greatest thing in this century if we could come up with the idea that, at last, there is a defensive measure -- a system against nuclear missiles. This -- nuclear missiles -- these are the only weapons in the history of man that have not given birth, so far, to a defense against them. But, this, as I say, would be the greatest thing for peace -- if we could switch from a setup today in which peace is maintained on the basis that we can destroy each other, totally offensive weapons, each with a great arsenal and the threat that, well, if one starts, the other will retaliate. Doesn't it make much more sense if we could come up with a defensive system and then sit down with all the nuclear powers in the world and say, look, let us get to less of an offensive nature and let us take up the idea of assurance -- reassurance for ourselves on a basis of defensive systems, not offensive weapons.

And, so, this isn't a bargaining chip in that sense -- of being willing to trade off the research and stop what we're doing in order to get X number of missiles eliminated. We'll continue with that. Then, as I've said many times, I think if the research -- and when the research -- would show that such a weapon is practical, then before deployment, I think we sit down together and decide how we use this to bring about the elimination of nuclear weapons -- offensive weapons -- and to make the world safer.

Q Mr. President, you have described Mr. Gorbachev as a formidable opponent. Did his Paris meeting with the French president give you a new light on the Soviet leader personality and did that change your approach of the summit --

THE PRESIDENT: No, but some of our own people, now, have met with Mr. Gorbachev. Unfortunately, President Mitterrand couldn't be at the U.N. meeting where I managed to meet with our -- the heads of state of our other economic summit allies. And so I heard second hand, however, from some of them who had had an opportunity and then from Margaret Thatcher and then, as I say, our own people who've met with him. I recognize all they say.

On the other hand, I just told our people this morning that there will be another first in these meetings. It'll be the first time we've ever had someone on our side of the table who's older than the fellow on the other side of the table. So maybe I can help this young man with some fatherly advice.

Q Mr. President, you have set regional conflict high on the agenda. What will be your approach to Mr. Gorbachev on this regional conflict? The substance of your talk will be enough is enough? Will it be kind of fist-on-the-table approach to Mr. Gorbachev?

THE PRESIDENT: I believe, if we're going to eliminate or reduce the tensions or the mistrust between us, it's going to have to be by deeds rather than words. And I enunciated what I believe about the regional things in my speech to the United Nations, that here are these conflicts, people are being killed, such as is going on in Afghanistan. And it is true that there is a government in Afghanistan that is on the side of the Soviet Union. It also is true that the Soviet Union installed that government there. It was not chosen by the people of Afghanistan.

Now, my thought is that if we can take these up as examples of the expansionism that I mentioned and see if we together -- these two great powers together cannot withdraw foreign forces and then help and perhaps get international custodial forces while they settle peacefully the dispute within each one of these regions.

This is what we've been trying to do in Nicaragua, where, again, the Soviet Union is -- no question -- they're involved with advisors, trainers and great amounts of weaponry, more than any Central American country needs for its own defense. So you have to believe that they, too, are looking toward spreading beyond their borders this totalitarianism.

But we have urged the Contras and the Sandinista government of Nicaragua to come together, lay down their weapons, declare a truce and come together, and then we suggested there the Church

overall supervise or mediate while they seek to settle their differences without further bloodshed. So far the Contras have agreed. The Sandinista government is the -- and so is the church -- the Sandinista government has said no.

But this is the type of thing that we think should be the answer to these regional problems, not only out of humanitarianism and a desire to see people be able to live peacefully in their countries, but because those regional conflicts run the risk of spreading and leading to confrontation between major powers.

Q Mr. President, Mrs. Thatcher described you tonight -- last night -- as our champion -- that is, you're going in to bat at Geneva for the Europeans as well as the Americans. Is that so and what can you do for us?

THE PRESIDENT: I think the world is pretty much divided right now -- certainly Europe and our own hemisphere here between East and West, and the NATO Alliance -- that NATO line does seem to be a dividing line between that and the Warsaw Pact, and there is no way that I could go there and deal with the subjects before us without having in mind the best interests of our allies also because in the event of catastrophe they are there on the front line -- they would be the first to feel that. So, yes, I expect to have their interests very much in mind.

Q Sir, this is in a way a follow-up on Martin Bell's question. I should say that the Europeans have a great nostalgia of detente and what do you -- what's your message to them at the eve of Geneva and what's your vision of a new detente? Limits also?

THE PRESIDENT: If it is a real detente, if it is based on the elimination or reduction of the suspicions that now exist -- but in the past, under the guise of detente, we saw the Soviet Union engage in the greatest military buildup in world history at the same time that we were supposed to be talking as if we had friendly relations and had achieved some kind of a detente. And what was really finally going on was an arms race because when they achieved an imbalance so great that we felt our own security was threatened, we had to get into the arms race.

I've often told of a cartoon that appeared in one of our papers when we started our refurbishing of our military power. And it was a cartoon of two Soviet generals, and one was saying to the other, "I liked the arms race better when we were the only ones in it." And I know that Mr. Brezhnev at one point, to his own people, publically made the statement that through detente they had gained enough that they would soon shortly be able to

have their way and work their will throughout the world. Well, that isn't really detente.

Q Mr. President, if SDI is not negotiable at the moment, so there might be no compromise also on ballistic missiles, could you envision an understanding with Mr. Gorbachev in the area of theater nuclear weapons already in Geneva?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, this is -- yes, as you say, this is already in Geneva. And this is definitely one of the topics we will take up there at the summit. As you know, our original proposal was -- we were willing to cancel all of them. The Soviets were sitting with SS-20s in great numbers, multiple-warhead missiles targeted on Europe. And Europe had asked us before my arrival here -- had asked my predecessor for weapons to counter those. And the agreement was made that we would. And I inherited the job when I got in here of providing those weapons. They had not yet been delivered.

We at no time ever were delivering an equal number of what the Soviet had. But we did propose zero-zero. And on that case, the Soviet met us halfway -- zero for us and they'd continue to have their SS-20s. But, yes, this -- we would like to see that, as we're negotiating in Geneva, as treated separately from the intercontinental ballistic missiles, the strategic weapons, to see if we could not eliminate those medium-range weapons that could target each other in a matter of just a few minutes.

Q -- so, you should be closer in this area?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I know that the Soviets have talked about such things as a nuclear-free zone in Europe. And we're willing to engage them and will in conversation on that kind of a subject.

Q Mr. President, in the past, you have referred to the Soviet Union as an "evil empire." Then, lately, you avoided the expression. Have you changed your opinion or do you still consider that Gorbachev -- USSR is still a totalitarian regime?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, it is a totalitarian regime. They don't see freedom for their people as our countries -- the democracies do. But as I've said before, we're not trying to change their system internally. What I think it's necessary to do is to let them know that the democratic world is not going to hold still for their expansionism into other parts of the world and to our own countries.

Yes, I used the term the "evil empire." There've been some things that have gone on that -- and, yet, I have a few quotes of my own that they have said; one in which they even called us "cannibals." So, I think both of us have stopped that language, thinking that we'll get farther at the meetings if we come together to try and eliminate the need for such talk.

Q Mr. President, the summit of Geneva will be the first in six years, and you will have about eight hours of discussion with Mr. Gorbachev, which is not so much. So, what kind of approach will you try on him? Will you try a kind of man-to-man approach to try to convince, to get your point?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. As a matter of fact, there are some meetings scheduled where it will just be one-on-one, the two of us. And I will do my utmost, with the evidence at hand, to prove to them that if he does nurse any suspicion that we mean him harm -- I think the presentation of some facts such as at the end of World War II, when we were the only nation whose industry and capacity had not been bombed to rubble, when we were the only ones with the nuclear weapon, we could have been pretty dictatorial, ourselves, in the world. But we weren't. We didn't do that -- and then point out to him how we see their expansionist policies and so forth, and see if we can't come together and recognize that this -- when I said deeds, this is how we can eliminate the suspicion.

I think the theme that I will take was cited by someone -- the line is not original with me -- who said that nations do not distrust each other because they are armed, they're armed because they distrust each other. So we'll see if we can't work on that last half.

Q Mr. President, this is obviously the most important meeting of your Presidency. You're up against a very formidable figure. I wonder, are you nervous at all?

THE PRESIDENT: Not really, no. Maybe -- (laughter) -- maybe I'm relying on past experience. Long before I ever thought I would be in public life in this way, for about twenty years, I did the negotiating for the union of which I was president for six of those twenty years -- our contract negotiations repeatedly with management. I'm the first President of the United States who was ever president of a labor union. And I think I know something about negotiating. And I intend to go at it in the same manner.

Q Mr. President, do you really want an agreement with the Soviets, and considering the situation and the differences, the gap between the two systems, what kind of an agreement do you want? On what basis? Naturally, this is in perspective, not only Geneva. Let's see Geneva as the starting point.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, an overall agreement that we do understand the positions that we're in as the two so-called superpowers, and that we have a great responsibility to maintain peace in the world and that it doesn't mean that we interfere with each other's internal policies at all, but that we agree to exist in the world and compete peacefully. And that's the overall tone I think that should come out of those -- of the summit.

But, as I say, it can't just be based on each of us making a promise and saying we feel that way. There have to be some things done, some deeds that really prove that we mean our words.

Q Mr. President, do you already have a forward copy of the new book of Mr. Gorbachev, "Time For Peace," which will come to the market this week?

THE PRESIDENT: No, I don't have that. I'll look forward to that.

Q Mr. President, do you intend to meet Mr. Gorbachev regularly, maybe on an annual base?

THE PRESIDENT: I think whether it's on an annual basis or back and forth and so forth, I think those are things to be settled at this summit. But I definitely think that a great measure of success would be if we came away from this meeting with a decision that we were going to continue meeting and discussing the problems between us.

Q Mr. President, it has been said that there will be no final communique. But will you bet, at least, on a set of guidelines to give a new impetus to arms talk?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I'm not a great fan of communiqes -- the sort of settling on a statement in advance. And I know we discussed this with them. I think that it would make far more sense if each one of us came forth and gave our own view of the meetings and what had been achieved, told frankly what had been accomplished and what hadn't. I have agreed with the heads of state of our NATO allies that on the day that we leave Geneva to come home, I'm going by way of Brussels and if they will be there, I'm going to give a briefing right then.

And then, when I arrive here that night, I am going to go directly from the plane to the Congress and before a Joint Session of our Congress and on television to the people of the United States, report on the meetings. And I think that's a better thing to do.

If there are things that we haven't been able to agree on, let's be willing to say it, but say we'll keep on trying. But not have a communique which all too often seems to want to gloss over the things that weren't accomplished.

Q So how will we know whether you have failed or succeeded? Will it be whether you have managed to set up another meeting?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I think it'll be on the basis of when I report, judgment of the outcome of the things that I will specify that were done or the things that were left undone, or the things that -- then, that we've agreed to go on talking about.

Q Sir, apparently, according to several reports, Mr. Shultz came back from Moscow with quite a bad impression of Mr. Gorbachev. Do you share that opinion?

THE PRESIDENT: Now, who did you say came away with the
--

Q Mr. Shultz --

THE PRESIDENT: Oh.

Q -- according to several reports --

THE PRESIDENT: No, he -- no, as a matter of fact he told me that they kind of went at it and that he was argumentative and interrupted at times. But then he said he, George Shultz, interrupted also and

found out that it wasn't resented, that it was that kind of a free-for-all discussion. And he said that he was -- he was very set in his ways and -- or I mean about his views on the aims of his country and so forth. And, well, we're very set on ours.

Q Mr. President, in the second debate with the then-candidate of the Democrats, Mr. Mondale, you said that even possibly you would share the results of the scientific research on SDI with the Russians in order to make the world safer. Do you still consider in doing that finally?

THE PRESIDENT: Maybe I didn't make it clear. That's what I meant in my earlier answer, that -- not just share the scientific research with them -- Let me give you my dream of what would happen. We have the weapon. We don't start deploying it. We get everybody together and we say, "Here, here it is. And here's how it works and what it'll do to incoming missiles." Now, we think that all of us, who have nuclear weapons, should agree that we're going to eliminate the nuclear weapons. But we will make available to everyone this weapon. I don't mean we'll give it to them. They're going to have to pay for it -- (laughter) -- but at cost. But we would make this defensive weapon available.

Now, some can say, "Well, if you're going to do away with the nuclear offensive weapons, then why does anyone need this?" Well, because we all know how to make it. And someday there may be a madman in the world, as there have been before, who would start in secretly to produce these weapons. But it's like when in Geneva in 1925 all the nations of the world after World War I got rid of poison gas. Everybody kept their gas masks. Well, the same thing -- this is kind of the gas mask thing. We could say, "Look, we'll never, any of us, have to fear that maybe some one of us cheating or maybe there is going to be that madman someday if we all have the ability to defend ourselves against nuclear missiles."

And I think this would be -- make far more sense than for us to say, "Oh, we found it. We'll go ahead and deploy it now while we still keep our other missiles.

Q And --

THE PRESIDENT: The world would have a right to expect that maybe we were thinking first -- first blow.

Q And if the Soviet don't share that view, what will happen?

THE PRESIDENT: I certainly don't believe that we could stand by and let them veto our use or implementation of a defensive weapon.

Q Mr. President, what's your feeling when some of your allies in France, but not only France are either reluctant or openly opposed to the SDI? What can you tell to them?

THE PRESIDENT: I think there was some misunderstanding about it and where we were going with it. And I know in the meetings up at New York, at the U.N. opening this time, there was a great change on the part of a number of them when I explained what our view of this was. And so I think that there is not that great opposition to it. And a number of the countries where they, as governments, did not want to become involved, for whatever reasons they had, but would not object to their own scientists, their own private business firms and so forth or industries getting involved and joining in with us in this research and development.

Q Mr. President, on behalf of my colleagues here, I would like to thank you very much for granting us this interview and sharing your views just a week before your summit meeting in Geneva with the Soviet leader. Thank you very much, Mr. President.

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THE PRESIDENT: Well, I'm greatly honored that you all wanted to do this, and thank you very much. I appreciate it.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END

3:00 P.M. EST

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

November 12, 1985

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS
ON THE UPCOMING GENEVA SUMMIT

The Briefing Room

10:40 A.M. EST

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'll just briefly review how we have gotten to where we are today -- the Soviet position, the U.S. position, what happened at Moscow, what we might -- what we anticipate might go on in Geneva.

You're all familiar with the Soviet offer. I might just emphasize a few of the points. The Soviets -- I think the point that has gotten the most publicity with respect to the Soviet offer is their purported offer of 50 percent reduction in strategic weapons. Of course, it isn't that at all. It is a 50 percent reduction in strategic nuclear delivery vehicles -- that is, launchers for arms, not the warheads.

Secondly, it is defined so it includes all those systems which by virtue of their location can purportedly strike the territory of the other side. That would include some -- it would include all our carrier-based air, even though it's dual-capable air. It would include our dual-capable aircraft in Europe. It would include our dual-capable aircraft in the Far East, as well as our INF missiles, both the P-2s and the GLCMs. It would exclude all the systems on their side which have comparable capabilities and which threaten our allies. The upshot would be a wholly uneven distribution between the two sides.

It is a move away from what was finally worked out in SALT I and SALT II and in the setting up of the 1981 negotiations on -- which divided the INF negotiations from the START negotiations, and the basis of that division was the shorter-range systems in one negotiation and those with inter-continental capabilities in the other.

The second main item of their proposal is a 66,000 ceiling on what they call nuclear charges. This includes not only re-entry vehicles, but also gravity bombs, short-range missiles which are necessary for defense -- for penetration against the air defenses that are unconstrained and of which the Soviets have a very large number indeed. It equates a gravity bomb with an SS-13 re-entry vehicle, which is really comparing golf balls with basketballs. It's an unfair kind of a way of doing it.

Well, they did -- there were certain constructive things in the Soviet proposal, including the idea of a separate INF agreement which would be separate from prior agreement on START or INF. We have picked up all those ideas in the U.S. proposal. I might say that the development of the U.S. proposal did take a considerable period of time, but by the -- in the final presidential decision, I guess none of the -- not all the proposals of anyone were finally adopted. But I think everyone who was

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involved in it, including those of us in State and those in the Pentagon and those in ACDA, were all nappy with the outcome of the U.S. proposal. It was a unified -- it had the unified support of the entire Executive Branch when finally adopted.

And that proposal does pick up on the 50 percent reduction. But it applies it to the right definition of SNDVs, of Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles. It picks up on the 6,000 ceiling on RVs, but applies that to the correct definition of those. It divides them -- it keeps the ballistic missile RVs in one aggregate of 4,500 and then has a separate aggregate of 1,500 for ALCMs carried by heavy bombers. But the total of those two -- the aggregate of those two numbers is 6,000, which is this number that the Soviets used.

Further, the Soviets had a sub-ceiling of 60 percent of those 6,000 on ICBM RVs, which gives them a figure of 3,600. Our March proposal had a ceiling of 2,500 on ICBM RVs. We went half the way to meet their suggestion, up to a 3,000 ceiling in our proposal.

Our proposal further included a ban on mobile missiles of all types. It included a ban on new types of heavy missiles. Those are missiles like the SS-18s. And it proposed no modification of the SS-18s. And it proposed a reduction of 50 percent in throw-weight on the level of the highest one of the two of us, that is, the Soviet aggregate of throw-weight, down to 50 percent of that, which would assure that the reductions be taken proportionately between the light missiles and the heavy missiles.

Now, let me turn for a moment to our proposals with respect to intermediate-range forces and their proposal. There, they were proposing that there be limits on intermediate-range systems -- they call them medium-range systems -- which would take full account, not only of our forward-based systems, but also of British and French strategic systems. The result would have been very substantial levels of SS-20s remaining on the Soviet side and zero, in the long run, on the U.S. side. It would have also had a freeze in the Far East.

Our proposal would not take account of -- it would treat the British and French systems as being outside of systems that the U.S. and the USSR can negotiate about, systems of independent sovereign countries. And it would equate our INF systems with theirs in Europe and would also call for proportionate

reductions in the Far East leading to an equal global ceiling on RVs and an equal ceiling on RVs in Europe.

And, then, beyond that, we propose various things with respect to verification which, I think, would very much, if accepted, improve the possibility of verifying an agreement. On defense in space, of course, they call for a complete ban on everything having to do with space-based systems, as they define them, including a ban on research directed toward such systems. We, of course, insist that we live within the terms of the ABM Treaty and fully conform to it, but that the Treaty does not even mention research. It clearly contemplated the continuation of research. And we, of course, can see no way in which we can verify research which the Soviet side would choose to keep secret.

They have an easier time, of course, because they can read in the media and they can get from the Congressional testimony, you know, what is authorized by the Congress. We can't get that on the Soviet side with respect to such things.

But we'd also proposed that -- we tried to develop an open laboratories arrangement under which there would be an exchange of scientists to the various laboratories and we could have confidence in what they were doing -- and then we could have as much confidence as possible as to what they were doing.

Well, that, I think, summarizes the main points of the positions of the two sides. In Geneva, we tried to make -- I mean, in Moscow, we tried to see whether we could reduce some of the differences between the two sides. And it wasn't really possible to make much progress in that regard. We tried to get them to consider language of a communique which would be objective with respect to this situation. They would not buy our language. And their language was wholly prejudiced in their favor; we couldn't buy theirs.

So, that with respect to the NST part of the negotiations, I think the best one can hope for is, as I've said on previous occasions, guidelines which would push the negotiating process in Geneva further toward the desirable outcomes. But I think the job of working these things out, not only in general principles but in details so we can be sure that it works right, has to be left to the negotiators in Geneva. And I think that's the President's view as well.

Of course, we look upon the negotiations -- the upcoming negotiation in Geneva to cover a much broader range than just the NST issue. There are other arms control issues which were discussed at Moscow and which will be discussed there, including, you know, an impetus to further progress in the negotiations in Stockholm on the CDE issues -- on the confidence-building measures -- and a statement with respect to renouncing -- or reaffirming

the nonuse of force in any kind, and also the CDE -- the CD negotiations on chemical warfare and MBFR negotiations and things of that kind. And, beyond that, of course, there are the bilateral negotiations and the bilateral issues and the regional issues. And, of course, then there's the human rights issue and this terrorism issue that my colleague will talk about -- for a minute about the human rights issues.

MR. DJEREJIAN: Do you want to take a few --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Oh, I thought I'd take the questions afterwards. I'll do it right now if you want.

MR. DJEREJIAN: -- do it right now.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Okay, fine.

Q Could I try one on you, sir? If you could wish Star Wars away -- I'm trying to determine how close the two sides are on strategic weapons. If Star Wars weren't the huge obstacle that it is, how close are the two sides with these counter and counterproposals -- counter and counter-counterproposals -- how close are they? Is there a basis for a -- successful negotiations?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not really, no. I think the differences on the offense part of the problem is just as great as it is with respect to the Star Wars part of the problem. You -- when you look at what their proposals are -- you know, the inclusion on -- with respect to our side of all these medium-range systems, and that they claim might be able to strike the territory -- the Soviet Union -- and none of theirs -- none of their comparable systems -- that's just not a nonstarter as far as we're concerned. And it's not -- it's a nonstarter as far as the Europeans are concerned and the Japanese.

And this also bears upon the INF problem. Certainly, the -- neither the British nor the French are going to tolerate an agreement which would treat their systems as something that we should give compensation for. They consider themselves to be sovereign countries. After all, they are amongst the five countries that were the original nuclear powers. They are the five countries that were the countries with the veto power in the -- when the U.N. was created. They think they're entitled to look upon their security as is the Soviet Union and as the United States. So, they're not about to agree to any such treatment.

Q Well, it seems to be the only ray of optimism in the -- among administration spokesmen in the last few days on the possibility of getting a guideline -- set of guidelines or some kind of impetus to the negotiators to get down to serious business. Are you still, today, as optimistic as you were a few days ago or as hopeful as you were a few days ago? And could you tell us whether you think those guidelines would amount to anything more than a reaffirmation of a commitment to deep cuts in offensive weapons and a willingness to live within the constraints of the ABM Treaty on defense?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I wasn't being optimistic the other day, I was being hopeful. And I'm still hopeful. And one of the reasons why I'm hopeful is that you look at the main problems that I just laid forth -- the problem of the treatment of forward base systems and the treatment of British and French systems. Both of those are positions which have -- are positions the Soviet Union have taken which were movements backward from where they were in 1983.

And in 1933, you know, at that time we were still on the basis of a clear separation between those systems of intercontinental range -- the ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers which were being handled by the START team and the medium-range and INF systems, which were handled by the INF teams. And all it takes for the Soviets to make -- get that problem to go away, is for them to return to the position that they were in in 1933.

And similarly, with respect to the compensation for the British and French, you remember that their last proposal in 1933 was one which called for equal reductions on both sides. Granted it ended up with a totally unfair position because it ended up with zero on our side and some 360 RVs on their side in Europe and a freeze in the Far East. But still it did not involve compensation for the British and French. Now if they would go back to a basis of giving up this idea of compensation for the British and French system then we could make progress, I think, in the INF system. So I think it is much easier for them to take the decisions which would lead to progress than it is for us, and I am hopeful that they will so do.

Q What about the guidelines?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: If they were to to that then one could easily work out guidelines.

Q The other day you drew a distinction between guidelines and a statement of principles at the end of the summit. Do you think there is any chance that the Soviets, when they actually get to Geneva as opposed to what they did in Moscow, will take a different view of that statement of principles and want one issued in fact at the end of the summit meeting?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's very hard for me to estimate exactly what the Soviets will do at any given time. I've seen them be adamant about a given position until one day they suddenly change that position. And I've seen them do that time and time again. So one can be hopeful that they will change positions that they have taken adamantly which are opposite to positions they have held adamantly up to a given point. Now whether they will or not, that's very hard to estimate. Sometimes they do and sometimes they don't make changes of that kind.

Q Could you talk for a minute about why you think a ban on mobiles is an improvement on our previous position and why mobile missiles shouldn't be viewed, as the Scowcroft Commission suggested, as a way away from the most destabilizing weapons and --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The Soviet proposal would have been our mobile -- our Midgetman mobile -- as being a new system not tested as of a given day. It would not have been their SS-24s and 25s -- one of which we consider -- both of which we consider to be new systems and one of which we consider to be in violation of the provisions of the SALT II agreement. The main point, however, is that it is becoming increasingly difficult to be sure that you can locate and count the number of mobiles on the Soviet side. They have got an enormous territory of -- you know, the Soviet Union is just bigger than the U.S. in area. But more importantly, they don't have the problem of an interface between the public and nuclear weapons, which we very definitely do have.

So the deployment of mobiles on our side must be restricted to very definite government control facilities. On their side that is not necessary at all.

Therefore, there are certain very definite advantages from banning mobiles.

Now, the -- it is not the intention to kill the Midgetman program. The Midgetman program is very much alive, and real progress has been made in the -- in working out the details of the specifications of the Midgetman program. In the Scowcroft report, the mobile -- mode of deployment of the Midgetman was only one of the deployment modes which was contemplated.

It is true that the Midgetman is much more expensive per reentry vehicle than, for instance the MX. It may be three or four times as expensive per RV. But if you look at it from the standpoint of the cost per survivable RV, it may well be cost effective from that viewpoint.

But still it isn't clear as to whether or not the full appropriations for this system will be approved in the future.

Q I'm not clear -- to follow up -- on why you couldn't make the same argument, that the mobiles actually are more stabilizing, if you can solve the verification problem, which we --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: If you --

Q -- apparently have with the 22-20s.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There are good arguments to be made in that regard and Sam Nunn and others are making those arguments strongly.

On balance, it seemed to us that the net decision was better the other way.

Q If there is no progress in arms control in Geneva, where is that going to leave us? Where would that leave the arms race? And what would happen then? What would the outlook be?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Indeed, what it has been for a long period of time. We've always been of the belief -- and I think it's indubitably so -- that the main basis for security and for deterrence is what one does unilaterally. What one can do through arms control, if one can get a worthwhile agreement is to increase the confidence that one can have in deterrence and to reduce the expenditure of resources which are necessary to maintain that degree of confidence.

Q In viewing the Russian back-peddling, in your analysis is that a negotiated ploy or is it more a fundamental change in the Soviet position regarding -- in line with the change of leadership at the top?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think it predates the change of leadership at the top. I believe this decision to change the basis of the negotiations was made prior to Mr. Gorbachev assuming power.

It was rather foreshadowed during the '83 negotiations. Some of the Soviet people on their negotiating team said that if you deploy these Pershing IIs and ground-launched cruise missiles, we will walk out of the negotiations. And then when we come back,

we will come back with an entirely different position under which we will demand compensation for all your forward-based systems as well as your missiles and the British and French systems.

Q Sir, the President has been trying to convince the Soviets that we seek no first-strike advantage in developing a defensive system in talking about the transition. Has the administration offered or considered some sort of proposal governing the pace of transition in order to convince them of that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Indeed, this -- the President and the rest of us have been saying consistently that we would welcome discussions today with respect to the transition, were the SDI research program to be successful in demonstrating that defensive systems, able to survive against a direct attack against them and cost-effective at the margin, were possible and feasible. If that were to be the result of the SDI program, how would one go about introducing these into the forces of both sides in a manner which would preserve and enhance deterrence at each stage of the transition period? How could this be done?

And, so, we've asked the Soviets to sit down and discuss these matters with us, beginning now. We can discuss them now, but you can't really negotiate in detail about them until one knows what the technologies are that would be used and what the components would be that one should limit and how they should be limited. That requires some degree of progress in the research field.

Q What is the next step on that? What is required to move that process along?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- would be Soviet agreement to sit down and discuss the matter with us. So far, they have been unwilling to so do.

Q Sir --

Q What are the prospects of a second summit?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think they certainly cannot be excluded. I should think they -- certainly I think our side would welcome it.

Q What did you pick up in Moscow in terms of Soviet readiness for a second summit?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They're not definitive on the matter.

Q Sir, the President said in the U.S. News interview that he would bring up the question of continued following the no-undercut policy in SALT. Do you expect that the summit might produce some reaffirmation of that? And how will he bring it up with Gorbachev?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I should think it was a matter of discussion in Moscow, which one could anticipate. It would also be a matter of discussion in Geneva. I think our position on it is clear. Theirs is somewhat different.

Q Sir --

Q Sir, are you exchanging wording with the Soviets now through diplomatic channels on these guidelines or are there plans for specialists like yourself to sit down with the Soviet side in Geneva to do this next weekend or is it going to depend really on the President's meeting with Mr. Gorbachev to see if, in fact, there is a guideline for the issue?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, it was left at

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Moscow that through diplomatic channels work on these subjects would continue, so that there have been discussions in Moscow with Mr. Hartman and here through Mr. Dobrynin.

Q Were you saying --

Q Ambassador --

Q Could you elaborate a little bit on what your scenario is for the guideline? If the basic positions are so far apart, and you can report no progress to date, what kind of a statement could be issued that would yield the result you said you desire, which is to prod the negotiators to get on with it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We've still got some time before the meeting takes place and there will be discussions between the General Secretary and the President, so I can't go further than that.

Q But can you give us your scenario for that? How -- what kind of a statement would you envision that could accomplish the result you seek?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I can't give you that.

Q The Pentagon has just completed a report on SALT II violations and there's a new story today about a mobile ABM system the Soviets are installing perhaps. How will that be reflected or would it necessarily be reflected as question of Soviet violations in any guidelines?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, it's -- clearly, one of the points that we've insisted upon is that the erosion of the ABM Treaty should be reversed. In other words, those things which constitute violation to the ABM Treaty must be corrected before one can really have confidence in a -- in the ABM Treaty as being the principal document which will guide the behavior of both sides. And, on the offensive side, we've certainly offered to continue the interim restraint program is contingent upon appropriate Soviet behavior with respect to the offensive side of the matters, as defined in the SALT II Treaty.

Q I guess what I'm asking you is would you be satisfied in a reaffirmation and guidelines of the ABM Treaty without a Soviet willingness to admit that they've violated it in the past, since they say they're complying with it now?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: As I've made the point often, it's not enough to have agreements in principle. What counts, really, is what is -- how the implementation is carried out in detail.

Q You said that the U.S. position regarding the future of SALT II is clear. Could you explain what it is -- are we willing to go -- to extend the no-undercut policy and under what circumstances?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We were prepared to continue the no-undercut policy as was described before, and I forget exactly the precise words which were used before, but they certainly did make our performance contingent upon Soviet behavior with respect to the SALT II agreement.

Q But you don't see, I gather, any difference in the situation after December 31st when the treaty would have expired under its terms and the situation now?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's correct. I don't see any difference.

Q You said all agencies -- the Pentagon, State -- are now in tune, in concert, in support of the U.S. proposal. Does some sides have to swallow some fairly strong differences -- some fairly -- opposition to go along with this?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: As I said earlier, not everybody's positions were adopted in the President's final decision. Not all of mine either. But that doesn't mean that you had to swallow hard. I think all of us came to the conclusion that the President's decision was a wholly -- a right decision and that we could fully support the result.

MR. DJEREJIAN: One more question.

Q Shortly after the Moscow talks, a senior official said that he felt that the summit would not be a failure in large measure because the Soviets were unwilling to have a failure at the summit. Could you say what, realistically, the Soviets would consider the elements for a successful summit?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think that -- I agree with whoever it was that said that because I certainly got the impression that Mr. Gorbachev would like to see a success and not have a failure. And then you ask what would constitute a failure in his view. I think a non-continuation of the negotiations in Geneva would certainly be a failure.

If the negotiations continue in Geneva, in particular, if we can find some helpful language with respect to those negotiations, that would be one element which would make it not a failure. Similarly, if we could get some agreements on bilateral issues, on the regional issues, on terrorism, on human rights, so forth and so on -- all those things would be helpful.

Q Can you explain the difference between guidelines and principles?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes. Principles are statements -- general principles, similar to the ones that we worked out in 1972, on principles of relations, which had not -- had spelled out in no way the details of how they might be implemented on both sides. Just some generalities.

Guidelines would be -- would not purport to constitute an agreement. They would be guidelines to negotiators who would then try to work out not only the general principles, but also the details which would assure that in implementation, it would carry out what was the intent and understanding of those statements and general principles.

MR. DJEREJIAN: On that excellent definitional note, we will now pass on to our colleague who will discuss human rights.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me begin with a very obvious point -- the fundamental difference between the setting in which the arms control issue comes up and the setting in which the human rights issue come up is the following; that as my colleague has just pointed out, when we're dealing with arms control, we're looking for a true negotiation and what we're hoping for is some agreement that ultimately can be reduced to writing.

In the case of human rights, this is not what we expect. What we are talking about here is a presentation by the President of our concerns and then the hope that, thereafter, there will be some specific action from the Soviet side that will be reflective of their response to these concerns.

Such agreement as there was necessary to have on the subject we believe is contained in the Helsinki Accord. It's all there, we don't need anything further other than adherence or action by the Soviet Union in conformity with the promises made at Helsinki.

With regard to where we stand now, let me say that we have no indication from the Soviets that they have -- that they're prepared at this particular point to reach an understanding with us. They did, of course, and that is an important signal -- they did grant a visa to Ms. Bonner to leave the Soviet Union and they suggested that Ms. Bonner may, after her treatment, return. That is the only signal that we have had along these lines.

We do not expect necessarily that at Geneva a specific statement will be made or any set of specific statements will be made by the Soviets with regard to the issue of human rights that is -- in terms of what it is that we are looking for. They may surprise us,

but what is more likely, it would seem to me, would be that following Geneva, if they feel that Geneva justifies their taking certain steps in the human rights field, they will act in a certain way that might be responsive to the expressions of concern which the President will summarize at Geneva.

As far as the nature of the issues are concerned that will be taken up in this context, let me just say that we can distinguish between those matters that do not involve internal reform in the Soviet Union and those that do. In the first category are, obviously, increases in a number of exit visas that are authorized by Soviet leadership and also release of persons from prison, followed by their emigration from the country. That, in other words, does not involve any fundamental change in their administration of their country.

If there is movement on their side, perhaps that is in the near run the more likely movement on their part. We do hope -- and the President has expressed that in the past and will express that, undoubtedly, at Geneva as well -- we hope also for internal improvements in the Soviet Union, the opening up of society, because, as Secretary Shultz has on frequent occasions pointed out, a more open society is one that, indeed, is one that can be more trustworthy in international relations in terms of being a society that will be peaceful in its objectives.

I'll stop right here.

Q Has the President made a policy decision to give up publicly beating up the Russians on human rights and go for quiet diplomacy instead?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, let me put it to you this way --

Q -- repeat the question.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The question was whether the President has decided to, as the phrase was, stop beating up on the Soviet Union on human rights and go in for private diplomacy. Is that a correct summary? Okay.

The answer -- let me put it this way -- is that with regard to specific situations that

relate to improvements in regard to individuals or groups of individuals or highly specific, as I say, matters. Yes, the idea will be to see whether there is any opportunity of getting something from the Soviets through a sincere and earnest expression of our concerns to see whether we can get some positive action in response.

As far as our discussing the broad outlines of the problems of the Soviet Union poses, let me put it to you this way. The Soviet Union has since 1917 engaged in discussions of their concerns with regard to our system of government and we have over the years expressed our concern with their system of government.

Q Has there been any indication through diplomatic channels or elsewhere that Jackson-Vanik would be lifted if the Soviets permitted a large number of exit visas?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me point out that Jackson-Vanik in itself provides for that. In other words, what Jackson-Vanik calls for is that if the President, under certain circumstances, is indeed in the position of making a finding that there has been a response by the Soviet Union then most favored-nation status can be obtained.

Q Well, has that point been made to the Soviets?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They are totally aware of that.

Q I know they are aware of it, but has this been an element of the discussion between the United States and the Soviet Union in advance of the summit?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: If I had to guess on that, I would say no. It's self-evident.

Q Do you expect -- go ahead.

Q What about a one-shot response? In other words, if the Soviets, as a result of this summit, let out a few thousand Jews and a famous dissident, that's enough?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Probably not.

Q What do you mean, "probably not"? I mean, do you compromise and negotiate on human rights as you do on arms control?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, this is my point. Let me say that Secretary Shultz has made it rather clear that this is not the kind of thing on which we are going to be involved in highly specific tit-for-tat negotiations. It's going to be a matter of reviewing the total performance on the Soviet Union's part and then making a decision on that basis, not in any other way. So I would say that the answer to the question is, if they just engaged in one very simple limited activity without any fundamental change, no, the answer under those circumstances would be that that would not be, as we see it, in the spirit of Jackson-Vanik, and therefore it would not justify such a --

Q Any indication that they will release a famous dissident -- one or more -- before --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No indication.

Q Do you expect it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, we don't know. We really don't.

Q Will the issue of spouses be raised separately and is there any indication that that could be triggered separately or

dealt with?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It will be raised and that indeed might be, as I indicated before, one of the areas in which there could be movement.

Q Sir, on the Moscow trip when Secretary Shultz and others raised this issue, they noted afterwards that Gorbachev did not instantly dismiss it as an internal matter, but at least listened for awhile. Do you attach any significance to that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q What?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, that -- just that -- that there is a possibility under the circumstances of their responding, but just a possibility. There's been no commitment, no indication. On the other hand, let me put it this way -- the other side of that coin is that there's been no indication that they're going to dismiss this matter out of hand and not going to respond at all. We just don't know.

Q Sir, when you -- you are talking about a possible response, are you talking the long-term, after-Geneva or do you think that there's any chance at all of something dramatic happening in the next few days and of something substantive happening on human rights in Geneva?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Again, we don't know. It's the kind of thing that is not at this particular point in any way subject of a scenario that we are party to. What the Politburo decides under the circumstances we can't tell.

Q What is the agenda arrangement for human rights? Have they now agreed that there will be a discussion in which both sides present their cases in effect?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, you see, as I indicated at the outset, this is really a one-sided case. They do respond frequently by complaining about human rights conditions in the United States. But they -- and we know that this is not really a very sincere way of responding to the question. It's basically a matter of our laying out -- the President will be laying out our concerns, and we'll see what we hear from them on that subject.

Q Were you suggesting, when you mentioned Helsinki, that you would regard a commitment by them to the Helsinki Accords -- a recommitment -- progress on this --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, no. As a matter of fact, when we met in Ottawa, we made that particular point. The agreement is there. It's action that counts, not additional words.

Q Will the President lay out his concerns about human rights at the first meeting?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm not sure how the agenda is ultimately going to be arranged. But, you know, it's just two days. Within the two days, there's no question that it will be coming up.

Q You said that the Secretary of State wanted to judge the whole performance. But are there any incentives short of things like most-favored nation status that are anticipated or considered appropriate along the way somewhere to indicate some sort of good faith?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me perhaps clarify a point here. I was not suggesting the Secretary of State was thinking

of the Soviet Union turning itself into a multi-party democracy as our goal. That's not it. What I was saying is that just a single-shot move on their part is quite limited and narrow, and its scope is not what one would respond to.

But if there's some significant movement that would fall clearly under the Congressional intent in Jackson-Vanik, there would be a response on our part.

Q No, I'm just wondering, is it a question of all or nothing? Do they have to leap some sort of threshold or are there some smaller steps that can be taken along the way?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, let me say this: What the Secretary feels very strongly about is that we are not going to be

negotiating, as he put it, on the basis of, as I say, tit for tat, X number of people and we do this, Y number of people and we do that. No, that is what the Secretary suggested we are not going to be doing.

What we are going to be doing is laying out our concerns, see whether we can get some sort of response from them, and then there might be responses on our part. It's not part of a -- essentially of a trade arrangement, a very specific one. It's much more global in terms of its impact.

Q Once we lay out our case, their likely response is going to be it's none of our business. How do we -- how do you propose to get beyond that --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: As was suggested, they have not taken that position in Moscow. They didn't.

Q The new five-year Soviet science and technology plan is starting in February. Is there going to be any trading, trade-offs, or anything in connection with that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, let me say that at this particular point, this is not something that has been arranged in any way. What will flow from understandings reached at Geneva, time will tell. As of now, there's nothing along these lines.

Q If the Soviets respond to the President's presentation with their own attack on our human rights policy, and particularly, if they include our handling of the defector, Yurchenko in that critique -- how do you suppose the President will respond to that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We have very easy answers to that. As a matter of fact, we had a rather comprehensive statement -- if you would like to see it, we distributed it as we delivered a rather detailed analysis of comparison between the Soviet Union and the United States on human rights in Ottawa. We -- it so happens that when the issue came up the other day, the Secretary referred to some of the data in that particular presentation.

Let me simply say this, that that would indicate -- that if they respond in that way, it will indicate lack of seriousness. We don't think they're going to go into this with lack of seriousness.

Q Would progress on human rights have a positive impact on other area associations?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: All right, let me try to answer it this way. If you -- take a look, for example, at the issue of arms control. If we cannot -- an arms control agreement will have to stand on its own two feet in terms of it being an agreement that protects our security interests. And, obviously, the Soviet Union will look at it that way, too.

Let me put it this way. Any concession in the human rights area to us, let's say, cannot be traded off for, let's say, the way I've put it at one point was, if they let Andrei Sakharov go, we cannot say we'll build ten MX missiles less. We cannot do it that way.

On the other hand -- and for that matter, if we -- they wouldn't give up a particular system of theirs if we say, okay, we won't bother you about Sakharov anymore. It's just not -- cannot be traded that way.

On the other hand, if you look at it this way, to the extent to which good faith and

trust in their good word is a factor in, first of all, Senate ratification and general acceptance of agreements by the American people. To that extent their serious breaches of the Helsinki Accords stand in the way of our accepting their word. Any movement on their part toward adherence might indeed suggest that perhaps there's more reason to accept their word on certain matters.

Q Earlier you suggested the President was going to make a -- you used the word "summarize" to describe the presentation that he will make. Will the President name any names as the U.S. sometimes does in these meetings with the Soviets? Will --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes --

Q -- be specific about cases or numbers? Or will he deal with a general summary

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me explain this. The idea that really needs to be kept in mind here is that we constantly present lists to them. And we are in the process of giving them some more lists. Gorbachev, I gather, referred to the fact that he has reviewed the list, so we don't need any more lists.

What the President will be doing will be making a presentation of the issue and will illustrate it with -- appropriately, sometimes with cases. I think it will be the kind of thing that comes very natural to him. But it isn't going to be a matter of using the limited time that's available to recite a long list of cases.

Q Will we get the list as well -- Is that available?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I would think so. I think the lists that -- we are are distributing, yes.

Q Is the divided American spouses list?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q Not --

Q Oh, this is not emigre lists?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We have emigre lists, too.

Q I mean, in other words, when you said Gorbachev said he reviewed the list --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That was divided spouses and divided families. Divided spouses and divided families --

Q Potential American citizens, not --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q Not refuse-niks to Israel?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

Q That's what the President will get --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I wanted to say that that issue -- the broader issue is going to be discussed as well.

Q But where will he give his illustrations? Mrs. McClellan will be his illustration or somebody in a gulag?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I really don't know at this particular point. I don't know. But, I tell you, it really

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isn't -- at least, if I may say so, it isn't material. The issue is going to be presented, and lots of lists have been presented over a period of time.

Q But, just to clarify, you weren't suggesting that he was going to limit his examples to cases of divided spouses now?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I'm not suggesting that at all, no, no.

Q So I was just going to ask -- you have also given them a list, have you not, of refuse-niks?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Oh, yes, yes. They have all of our lists.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END

11:27 A.M. EST

November 13, 1985

FACT SHEET

New U.S. Proposals for Nuclear Arms Reductions

On November 1, at President Reagan's instruction, U.S. negotiators at the Nuclear and Space Arms Talks (NST) in Geneva, presented a new set of proposals for significant, equitable, and verifiable nuclear arms reductions. This followed the presentation by the Soviet Union in late September of a counterproposal which was in response to the concrete reduction offers which the U.S. had put forward at the outset of the negotiations.

President Reagan has stressed that the U.S. has four main objectives in seeking an effective nuclear arms reduction agreement:

- deep cuts;
- no first-strike advantage;
- defensive research, because defense is much safer than offense; and
- no cheating.

This fact sheet summarizes these latest developments in the negotiations.

Soviet Counterproposal

U.S. officials previously described a number of elements in the Soviet counterproposal of late September which would be unacceptable to the U.S. and its Allies, and explained how the effects of that counterproposal would be inequitable and destabilizing.

For example, Soviet definition of strategic delivery vehicles would cover U.S. LRINF missiles and "medium-range" nuclear-capable aircraft in Europe, in Asia, and on all of our aircraft carriers, while about 2000 comparable Soviet nuclear delivery vehicles, as well as 300 Backfire bombers, would not be limited. In addition, the Soviets propose limits on "nuclear charges," defined to include gravity bombs and short-range bomber weapons, which must face unconstrained defenses. Given sizeable and unconstrained Soviet defenses against U.S. retaliatory bomber forces, and the fundamental

differences between bomber and missile forces, as well as other U.S.-Soviet asymmetries, the U.S. cannot accept a direct limit on gravity bombs and SRAMs carried by heavy bombers (as we do for missile warheads).

Nevertheless, the fact that the Soviets have accepted the principle of deep reductions is a welcome development if equitably applied. It underscores the strength of basic U.S. negotiating position, value of united Alliance, and soundness of strategy of pursuing this position in patient and determined manner.

The President is committed to exploring every opportunity to achieve equitable and verifiable reductions in existing nuclear arsenals. Accordingly, President directed that additional U.S. proposals be advanced, building on concrete reductions proposals made earlier by the U.S., and on positive elements of Soviet counterproposal. We thereby seek to establish genuine process of give-and-take.

Strategic Offensive Forces

Over three years ago, in May 1982, we proposed a cut of about one-half in the strategic ballistic missiles (both land- and sea-based) of the U.S. and USSR, and a cut of about one-third in the warheads on such missiles.

-- In response to the Soviet counterproposal, we could accept concept of 50% reduction in strategic offensive forces, but we:

- cannot apply this concept in unequal and destabilizing ways;
- cannot abandon support for Allies; and
- cannot renounce right to conduct SDI research, which is in full conformity with ABM Treaty.

-- Thus the new U.S. proposal builds on the 50% reduction concept in constructive and equitable way.

- Reductions to limit of 4500 on reentry vehicles (RVs) on ICBMs and SLBMs, about 50% below current levels
- Reduction to limit of 3000 on RVs carried by ICBMs, about 50% below the current Soviet level and roughly halfway between our earlier proposal for a limit of 2500 and their proposed limit of 3600

- 50% reduction in highest overall strategic ballistic missile throwweight of either side; in this case, from Soviet level of 11.9 million pounds (U.S. has 4.4 million pounds)

- Contingent upon acceptance of RV and throwweight limits, we would accept equal limit of 1500 on number of long-range ALCMs carried by U.S. and Soviet heavy bombers, about 50% below planned U.S. deployment levels.

-- U.S. cannot agree to one common limit on ballistic missile RVs and ALCMs. It is inequitable to place in a single category ballistic missile warheads, which arrive at their targets in minutes and face few defenses, and bomber weapons, which take hours to arrive on target and also face sizeable defenses.

-- But if Soviets were to accept proposed 4500 RVs limit along with proposed 1500 ALCMs limit, it would result in reduction to a total of 6000 ballistic missile RVs and ALCMs on each side.

-- With respect to strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (SNDVs), U.S. has proposed:

- reduction in strategic ballistic missiles to limit of 1250-1450, about 40-45% below the current higher Soviet level

- in this context, U.S. could accept further reduction of heavy bomber limits to 350 (compared to our earlier proposal of 400), about 40% below the current U.S. SALT-accountable level.

-- For reasons similar to those stated for RVs and ALCMs, U.S. cannot agree to Soviet proposal to include in a single aggregate strategic ballistic missiles and heavy bombers.

-- However, if agreement reached on range of 1250-1450 for ICBMs and SLBMs, and on heavy bomber limits of 350, would result in reduction to a total of strategic ballistic missiles and heavy bombers of between 1600 and 1800.

-- U.S. proposal also contains following elements:

- ban on all new heavy strategic ballistic missiles and the modernization of existing heavy missiles, due to their destabilizing character

- ban on all mobile ICBMs, because of inherent verification difficulties
- "build-down" as suggested means of implementing agreed reductions

Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces

-- Previous U.S. proposals remain on table. U.S. continues to prefer total elimination of entire class of U.S. and Soviet LRINF missiles.

-- We also have made following new proposal as interim step toward this goal:

- U.S. would cap LRINF missile launcher deployments in Europe at the number deployed on December 31, 1985 (140 PII and GLCM) in return for Soviet agreement to reduce SS-20 missile launchers within range of NATO Europe to same number

- There would be freedom to mix between systems deployed as of December 31, 1985, but mix would be subject for discussion. (Could agree on mix giving U.S. approximately equal number at around 420 to 450 LRINF missile warheads in NATO Europe, based on 4 warheads/GLCM launcher, 1 warhead/Pershing II launcher, and 3 warheads/SS-20 launcher)

- Soviets required to reduce SS-20 launchers in Asia (outside range of NATO Europe) by same proportion as reduction of launchers within range of NATO Europe

- End result would be equal global LRINF warhead limits

- Appropriate constraints also applied to SRINF missiles

Defense and Space

-- U.S. is making clear once again that we are committed to SDI research program as permitted by, and in compliance with ABM Treaty.

-- We seek Soviet commitment to explore with us now how cooperative transition could be accomplished, should new defensive technologies prove feasible.

-- Also proposing now that Soviets join us in "open laboratories" arrangement under which both sides would provide information on each other's strategic defense research programs, and provide opportunities for visiting associated research facilities and laboratories.

Verification and Compliance

-- U.S. continues to stress critical importance of agreeing on effective verification means so as to be able to assess with confidence compliance with provisions of all agreements resulting from the negotiations. Verification is more important now than it ever was before, given Soviet conduct related to arms control over the last six years.

-- U.S. continues to stress a need for the Soviets to take necessary steps to correct current instances of non-compliance with existing arms control agreements. Non-compliance is politically corrosive and militarily real.

-- Soviet actions since the signing of SALT II have impeded U.S. verification of Soviet compliance and politically damaged the foundations of strategic arms control. Restoring compliance is a critical step.

-- Soviet Union must alter current practices which obstruct U.S. verification of compliance.

-- One initial step is for Soviets to alter current encryption of telemetry and revert to practices with regard to telemetry in use at time of signing of SALT II. This is militarily important in its own right, but its political significance is even greater.