WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EUROPEAN AND SOVIET AFFAIRS DIRECTORATE, NSC : RECORDS

Withdrawer SMF 4/25/2005

File Folder PRESS BOOK-MEETINGS OF REAGAN AND GORBACHEV, GENEVA, NOVEMBER 1985 ~~(4)~~ 5

FOIA 1995-039/1

Box Number ~~91101~~ Box 9

3

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions	
8795	BI	BIO	1	10/28/1985	B1	B3
8797	BI	BIO	1	10/29/1985	B1	B3
8798	BI	BIO	1	10/30/1985	B1	B3
8799	BI	BIO	1	4/10/1985	B1	B3
8800	BI	BIO	1	4/11/1985	B1	B3
8801	BI	BIO	1	8/8/1985	B1	B3
8802	BI	BIO	1	10/30/1985	B1	B3
8803	BI	BIO	1	9/4/1985	B1	B3
8804	BI	BIO	1	10/30/1985	B1	B3
8805	BI	BIO	1	11/8/1985	B1	B3
8806	BI	BIO	1	4/16/1985	B1	B3
8807	BI	BIO	1	9/4/1985	B1	B3
8809	BI	BIO	1	10/30/1985	B1	B3
8811	BI	BIO	1	2/15/1985	B1	B3
8812	BI	BIO	1	10/29/1985	B1	B3

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

SOVIET STRATEGIC DEFENSE PROGRAMS

SUMMARY

In the late 1960s, given the state of defensive technology at the time, the United States came to believe that deterrence could best be assured if each side were able to maintain the ability to threaten retaliation against any attack and thereby impose on an aggressor costs that were clearly beyond any potential gains. That concept called for a reduction by both the Soviet Union and the United States in their strategic defensive forces, the maintenance of a balance between the two sides' offensive nuclear forces, and negotiated nuclear arms reductions which would maintain the balance at progressively lower levels.

In accordance with those principles, the United States exercised great restraint in offensive nuclear arms and at the same time dramatically lowered its defensive forces. Thus, we removed most of our defenses against Soviet bombers; decided to maintain a severely limited civil defense program; ratified the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, which placed strict limits on U.S. and Soviet defenses against ballistic missiles; and then deactivated the one ABM site which we were allowed under that Treaty. The basic idea that stability and deterrence would be maintained if each side had roughly equal capability to retaliate against attack also served as the foundation for the U.S. approach to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) process of the 1970s.

The Soviet Union, however, failed to show the type of restraint, in both strategic offensive and defensive forces, that the United States hoped for when the SALT process began. The USSR has consistently refused to accept meaningful and verifiable negotiated reductions in offensive nuclear arsenals. Since the late 1960s, the Soviets have greatly expanded and modernized their offensive nuclear forces and invested an approximately equal sum in strategic defenses. The USSR has an extensive, multifaceted operational strategic defensive network which dwarfs that of the United States as well as an active research and development program in both traditional and advanced defenses against ballistic missiles. Soviet noncompliance with arms control agreements in both the offensive and defensive areas, including the ABM Treaty, is a cause of very serious concern. The aggregate of current Soviet ABM and ABM-related activities suggest that the USSR may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory — precisely what the ABM Treaty was designed to prevent.

Soviet offensive and defensive force developments pose a serious challenge to the West. If left unchecked and unanswered, they would undermine our ability to retaliate effectively in case of Soviet attack. The situation would be even more severe if the Soviet Union were to have a monopoly on advanced defenses against ballistic missiles in addition to its sizable offensive and defensive forces. In that case, the USSR might come to believe that it could launch a nuclear attack against the United States or our allies without fear of effective retaliation. At the very least, it might see a realistic chance of successful nuclear blackmail.

Important recent Soviet activities in strategic defenses include:

- Upgrading and expansion of the world's only operational Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) system around Moscow;
- Construction of the Krasnoyarsk ballistic missile detection and tracking radar that violates the 1972 ABM Treaty;
- Extensive research into advanced technologies for defense against ballistic missiles including laser weapons, particle beam weapons, and kinetic energy weapons;
- Maintenance of the world's only operational antisatellite (ASAT) system;
- Modernization of their strategic air defense forces; and
- Improvements in their passive defenses by maintaining deep bunkers and blast shelters for key personnel, and enhancing the survivability of some offensive systems through mobility and hardening.

SOVIET ABM/SPACE DEFENSE PROGRAM



POTENTIAL CAPABILITY OF THE MOSCOW ABM SYSTEM *

COMPARISON OF FORCES DEDICATED TO STRATEGIC DEFENSE



955-4

U.S. ASAT POLICY

Background: For 25 years, the U.S. has used satellites for a variety of purposes, including support of national defense and arms control: launch-detection satellites provide early warning of ballistic missile attack; communication and navigation satellites support command and control of U.S. and allied military forces; and other satellites aid in verifying Soviet compliance with arms control agreements. The U.S. is party to and has had a lead role in negotiating several major international agreements that govern space activities, including the UN Charter, Outer Space Treaty, Limited Test Ban Treaty, and Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. At U.S. initiative, bilateral talks with the Soviet Union on antisatellite (ASAT) arms control were held in 1978-79. The talks revealed major problems between the two sides. Subsequently, the U.S. supported formation of an ad hoc committee to discuss space arms control issues focused on verification and definitional problems in the 40-nation Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.

U.S. policy: The United States has been endeavoring in good faith to determine possible constraints on anti-satellite weapons that would meet the Congressionally-mandated criteria of verifiability and consistency with our national security interests. A number of serious problems, including definitional and verification difficulties, plus the need to counter existing and prospective Soviet satellites that can aid in targeting U.S. and Allied forces and the need to deter Soviet use of the operational Soviet antisatellite system, contribute to the conclusion that a comprehensive ban on development, testing, deployment and use of anti-satellite weapons cannot meet these criteria. We will continue to study other possible ASAT limitations to see whether less sweeping limitations can be found that are consistent with the national security interests of the U.S. In the meantime, testing of the U.S. ASAT is necessary to avert clear and irrevocable harm to the national security. The U.S. believes that such testing can be an incentive for the Soviet Union to reach agreement on a wide range of issues.

Space arms control issues: Problems in negotiating space arms control include:

- Definition. Defining ASAT weapons for arms control agreement purposes is difficult because weapons systems used for other purposes have inherent capability for space use. Moreover, civilian space systems may be difficult to distinguish from weapons. For example many systems not designed to be ASAT weapons, such as boosters used to launch civilian space vehicles, have inherent (or residual) ASAT capabilities.

- Verification. Verification problems for ASAT systems are heightened because satellites serving U.S. and Allied security interests are few in number, so that even small-scale cheating could pose a disproportionate risk. One difficult verification problem is that a ban on all ASAT systems would require elimination of the current Soviet ASAT interceptor systems, but the U.S. has found no satisfactory means to verify effectively Soviet compliance.

- Soviet military space threat. The Soviets have since 1972 had the world's only operational ASAT interceptor system. The interceptor is relatively small and is launched by a missile booster used for other missions. It threatens U.S. low-altitude satellites. Other current and projected Soviet space systems are designed to support Soviet forces in conflict by providing targeting intelligence for attacks on U.S. and allied forces. In order to deter threats to U.S. and allied space systems and to have the ability to counter Soviet targeting satellites, the U.S. has been developing the Miniature Vehicle (MV) System, launched from an F-15 aircraft.

- Breakout. If an agreement ceased to remain in force--for example through sudden abrogation--one nation, if prepared, could gain a unilateral advantage and a head start in deploying a weapon that had been banned: this action is called breakout. The importance of the critical U.S. satellites, which are limited in number, could create an incentive for the Soviets to maintain a breakout capability.

Soviet ASAT arms control activities: The Soviet Union has proposed a ban on development (including scientific research), testing and deployment of what they call "space-strike" arms. Its proposal would completely block the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) research, but would place no limitations upon ground-based ABM systems like the Soviets' own Moscow ABM system or on the extensive Soviet directed energy research -- e.g. the test laser at Shary Shagan (which the Soviets claim is directed at space weapons development).

The Soviets' proposed ban on space-strike arms would cover ASAT weapons. Although it would entail elimination of the Soviets' own operational ASAT system, it does not address fundamental difficulties we would have in verifying such elimination. Nor does it acknowledge or address the potential of using ICBM's or ABM interceptors for ASAT purposes.

Space arms control prospects: The problems of space arms control cited above have hindered efforts to develop effective ASAT arms control measures. Problems of verification tend to be greater the more comprehensive the limitation. Less sweeping options under study would seek to limit specific types of weapons systems. There is a premium on finding ways to limit those ASAT systems that create the most difficult challenges to the survivability of our satellites. We are seeking limits that are effectively verifiable and allow us to protect U.S. and allied forces from being threatened by Soviet satellites, such as targeting satellites. Other options under study would regulate certain potentially threatening activities in space. The active search for space arms control proposals that are equitable, verifiable, and compatible with U.S. security and that of our Allies is continuing.

In the meantime, the U.S. is actively seeking to discuss these issues in detail with the Soviets in the bilateral Nuclear and Space Talks (NST) in Geneva. In the Defense and Space Negotiations Group, the search for equitable and verifiable agreements that serve the interests of both sides goes on. The U.S. is also actively participating in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on Outer Space Arms Control, established at the Conference on Disarmament along lines suggested by the U.S. While there are formidable difficulties in this area, the door is not closed to effective ASAT arms control measures. Finally, since offensive weapons such as strategic ballistic missiles are the most serious existing threats, and since they must use space to reach their target, a major priority for any arms control agreement, whether concerning space or earth, must be to reduce such offensive weapons radically. This is our objective in thez Geneva NST negotiations.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE

Background: On January 17, 1984, the U.S., Canada and 33 European states, including NATO, Warsaw Pact, neutral and nonaligned countries, convened in Stockholm for the first stage of the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE). It was mandated by the Madrid meeting (1980-83) of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which reviewed the implementation of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act. Its purpose is to agree on measures that would reduce the proximate causes of war: misunderstanding and miscalculation. CDE's Madrid mandate requires the measures to be militarily significant, politically binding, and provided with adequate forms of verification.

Western Proposal: One week after the conference opened, the 16 NATO participants proposed several specific measures designed to make the European military environment more open, predictable, and stable:

- An Exchange of Military Information would require that participants inform each other annually about the structure of their ground- and land-based air forces in Europe, giving unit designation, normal peacetime location, and force composition.

- An Exchange of Forecasts of Activities Notifiable in Advance would call for an annual exchange of forecasts of military exercises, including the name, place, timing, purpose, and countries participating, along with the size and type of forces involved.

- Notification of Military Activities would call for notification 45 days in advance of out-of-garrison land activities of units at division level or above and notification of certain mobilization and amphibious exercises. Alert activities would be notifiable as they begin.

- Observation of Certain Military Activities would require states to invite observers from all other states to all notified activities.

- Compliance and Verification would allow participating states to request an inspection of activities that have not been notified in compliance with negotiated agreements and would require states not to interfere with other states' "national technical means" of verification -- for example, photographic reconnaissance satellites.

- After progress on these measures, a further measure to enhance Means of Communication would encourage participating states to develop better means and procedures for communications.

How Measures Would Work: These measures could be implemented with a minimum of interference with normal, non-threatening military activity. Measure 1 would establish a baseline of information. At the same time, under measure 2, a state would advise other participants of military activities it has planned for the next calendar year.

Measure 3 notifications would then provide specific detail on a notifiable event, closer in time to the event. A state with aggressive intent would raise an alarm against itself if it announced an exercise it had not forecast; the alarm would sound even louder if the state also failed to notify the event 45 days in advance.

The observers called for in measure 4 would verify that activities are conducted as advertised. There might, however, be occasions where a state detects a military activity that it thinks should have been notified. Under measure 5, those suspicions could be alleviated or confirmed by asking for an inspection. Finally, the communications arrangements of measure 6 could be used to seek further information on a potentially destabilizing event.

Significance of Western Proposals: These measures by themselves would not prevent war, nor could they prevent a state from using force for political intimidation. They would, however, make confrontation less likely and they could raise the political cost of using force to intimidate. Having established a pattern of routine activities, if a deviation were to occur, there would be time to clarify the situation before political tensions escalated, or to take counteraction against a real threat.

Soviet Objections: The USSR has tried to use the CDE to portray Moscow as the defender of peace, and the U.S. and some of its allies as aggressive. It also has sought to exploit differences between the U.S. and European countries. This approach prevented the CDE from quickly getting down to business. Moscow has criticized information and verification provisions of the Western proposals as "legalized espionage." In fact, they are not designed to expose important Soviet military secrets. Forecasts and notifications will involve only out-of-garrison ground activities, not sensitive military installations. Observers would visit areas only where those activities are taking place.

Soviet Proposal: The Soviets have offered six alternative proposals: a treaty on the non-use of force; a non-first-use of nuclear weapons pledge; creation of nuclear weapons-free zones; a freeze and reduction of military budgets; a chemical weapons ban in Europe; and expansion of the confidence-building measures of the Helsinki Final Act.

Western Reaction: The West accepts the principle of non-use of force, except for defense, as embodied in the UN Charter, the Helsinki Final Act, and the NATO charter. Moreover, in June 1984, President Reagan offered to have the U.S. enter into discussions with the Soviets on reaffirming this principle if this would lead them to negotiate meaningful confidence-building measures as proposed by the West. Efforts to negotiate a Europe-only chemical weapons ban would undercut the negotiations in the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, where we have proposed a global and comprehensive ban on chemical weapons. Moreover, a Europe-only ban could be easily circumvented by maintenance of chemical weapons outside of the European zone.

The UN tries annually to study military budgets, but the Warsaw Pact, not the West, blocks this effort. Nonetheless, the Soviets' own proposals call for Helsinki-type confidence-building measures that could prove similar to proposals offered by the West and neutral and nonaligned countries at the conference. When the Soviet Union decides that its interests lie in a cooperative approach, the CDE can make its contribution toward improving European security.

CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES (CBMs)

Background: Confidence-building measures (CBMs) are agreements designed to enhance mutual understanding, knowledge, and communications between East and West. The overall purpose of CBMs is to reduce the possibility of conflict -- especially nuclear conflict -- through accident, miscalculation, or failure of communications. CBMs also may help to inhibit opportunities for surprise attack or political intimidation, thus reinforcing stability in time of calm as well as crisis. Overall, CBMs complement the U.S. effort to establish a more stable and secure military balance at lower levels through negotiated arms reductions.

CBMs in the 1960s and 1970s:

The U.S. and Soviet Union have a long history of negotiating CBMs. Bilateral U.S.-Soviet agreements include: the establishment in 1963 of a Direct Communications Link ("Hotline") at the head-of-state level between Washington and Moscow; the 1971 "Accidents Measures" Agreement intended to prevent the accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons; the 1972 Incidents at Sea Agreement that enjoins both sides from engaging in provocative acts at sea that could increase the danger of war; and the 1973 Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War requiring that each side refrain from acts that could lead to a military confrontation with the other and/or a third country. In addition, in the 1975 Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) -- the Helsinki accords -- the U.S., Canada, and 33 European states (including NATO, Warsaw Pact, and neutral countries) agreed to multilateral CBMs, the most important of which provides for prior notification of, and (voluntary) invitation of observers to, military maneuvers involving more than 25,000 troops in the CSCE area.

Reagan Administration Efforts

President Reagan stated in 1982 that he would offer new initiatives to engage the Soviet Union in a dialogue about mutual restraint and arms limitations, hoping to reduce the risk of war and the burden of armaments and to lower the barriers that divide East and West. That year the U.S. proposed new bilateral CBMs to the Soviets for discussion at the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) in Geneva, including: prior notification of all launches of land-based inter-continental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles; expanded exchange of data on strategic nuclear forces; and advance notice of major military exercises involving strategic forces. The U.S. also proposed an expanded exchange of data on intermediate-range nuclear forces and prior notification of all launches of ballistic missiles of the type under negotiation in the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) talks.

In 1983 and 1984, the U.S. made additional suggestions for improving bilateral communications with the Soviet Union and reducing further the risk of accidental war. Among these were proposals to: add a high-speed facsimile capability to the "Hotline" to provide for the transmission of full texts and graphics that could be vital to averting or resolving a crisis; establish a Joint Military Communications Link as a government-to-government channel to complement the "Hotline"; improve diplomatic communications capabilities, facilitate communications in the event of nuclear incidents involving unknown or unauthorized parties; and institute periodic consultations on regional issues at the policy level. Moreover, at the Conference on Security and Confidence-building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, the U.S. and its allies proposed a package of concrete CBMs that would provide for mandatory invitations to observe various military activities--to include on-site inspection--and improved communications among Conference participants.

Speaking to the European Parliament in May, 1985, President Reagan reiterated his commitment to practical steps toward reducing East-West tensions--for example, by instituting regular, high-level contacts between Soviet and U.S. military leaders and by exchanging information on defense budgets and plans.

A Continuing Commitment:

U.S. initiatives have met with some success. In July, 1984, the U.S. and Soviet Union agreed to upgrade the "Hotline" with a facsimile capability. An agreement on the transfer of U.S. equipment for the upgrade to the Soviets was signed in September, 1985. In July, 1985, the two sides signed a Common Understanding to the "Accidents Measures" Agreement clarifying their obligations to consult in the event of a nuclear incident involving unknown or unauthorized parties and high-level exchanges on regional issues are taking place.

The Soviet Union, however, has turned down or failed to respond to numerous other proposals by the U.S. and its allies for new or enhanced CBMs. Instead, the Soviets have made proposals that generally rely on simple declarations of intent, and that are unverifiable and not designed to enhance stability.

The U.S. believes that despite differences with the Soviet Union, our nations have a shared interest in reducing the risk of armed conflict that might result from accident, miscalculation, or misunderstanding. The U.S. continues to seek to build upon existing CBMs and to begin a serious dialogue with the Soviet Union on possible new approaches to reduce such risks.

CHEMICAL WEAPONS

U.S. Objectives

Our primary objective is to achieve an effective and verifiable global ban on all such weapons. We have sought to bring to an end the use of chemical, biological and toxin weapons and maintain a credible and effective CW deterrent and retaliatory capability until the objective of a ban is achieved.

Use and Proliferation

There is overwhelming evidence that the Soviets and their clients have used toxin and chemical weapons in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan, and that Iraq has used chemical weapons in the Gulf War. Use of these weapons is in direct violation of treaty obligations and customary international law.

We are also concerned with the dangerous spread of CW. In 1963, we estimated only 5 countries had them; now we estimate 16 do. The way to end use of these weapons and to prevent their further spread is to conclude an effective and verifiable global ban on them.

Arms Control Efforts

In April 1984, the United States presented a draft treaty at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva for a complete and verifiable ban on the production, testing, transfer or use of chemical weapons. The Soviet Union has stated its support in principle for a global CW ban, but has failed to negotiate seriously on critical verification issues. The Soviets have repeatedly called for steps, such as CW-free zones or a CW nonproliferation accord, that would address neither the Soviet Union's own massive CW stockpiles nor use by countries possessing CW.

We would like to see progress on CW issues and constructive Soviet participation in the CD. We remain ready to discuss different specifics of basic treaty provisions, provided we achieve at least the same level of confidence in compliance as in our proposal.

Modernization

Since 1969, the U.S. has unilaterally frozen production of CWs. The Soviet Union has during that period continued to expand and modernize its CW stockpile. In the absence of an effective and verifiable ban, the U.S. is seeking to produce safer, more modern CWs to offset the existing Soviet chemical and biological weapons capability, and to provide incentives for the Soviets to negotiate seriously for a ban.

NATO-WARSAW PACT FORCE COMPARISON



NOTE: WARSAW PACT DIVISIONS NORMALLY CONSIST OF FEWER PERSONNEL THAN MANY NATO DIVISIONS BUT CONTAIN MORE TANKS AND ARTILLERY, THEREBY OBTAINING SIMILAR COMBAT POWER

*RAPIDLY DEPLOYABLE FORCES—INCLUDE THOSE U.S. FORCES WHOSE EQUIPMENT IS STORED IN EUROPE AND HIGH-READINESS SOVIET FORCES LOCATED IN THE BALTIC, BELORUSSIAN, CARPATHIAN, ODESSA, KIEV AND NORTH CAUCASUS MILITARY DISTRICTS

**FULLY REINFORCED FORCES—INCLUDE NORTH AMERICAN REINFORCEMENTS AND ALL WARSAW PACT FORCES LOCATED WEST OF THE URAL MOUNTAINS

MUTUAL AND BALANCED FORCE REDUCTION (MBFR) TALKS

Background

MBFR negotiations, involving 12 members of NATO and the 7 Warsaw Pact member states, began in Vienna in 1973 with a focus on the reduction of NATO and Warsaw Pact conventional forces in Central Europe. The primary U.S. and Allied objective is to enhance stability and security in Central Europe through asymmetrical reduction of ground forces to parity at lower levels, with common collective ceilings on each side's military manpower.

While the sides have reached some agreement on reductions to parity at common collective ceilings of 700,000 for ground forces and 900,000 for air and ground forces combined, major differences remain as on the data and verification issues. The East claims that approximate parity already exists and has thus resisted Western calls for asymmetrical reductions. Eastern figures for their forces, however, are some 170,000 short of Western estimates, and the East has refused to discuss in any detail the reasons for this data discrepancy. Similarly, the East's position on the verification issue still falls far short of Western requirements for effective verification measures and their early implementation.

Western proposal

In 1982, the West proposed a draft MBFR treaty embodying a comprehensive proposal for staged reductions to parity along with a package of associated measures providing for cooperative verification. It also required full agreement prior to treaty signature on figures for all forces in order to resolve the data discrepancy. In April 1984, in order to break the impasse in the talks caused by the data issue, the West modified its requirement for full data agreement and proposed instead a data exchange prior to treaty signature on only the ground combat and combat support forces of the sides to fall within an acceptable range of Western estimates. The flexibility on data was offered in exchange for enhanced verification measures.

Eastern proposal

On February 14, 1985, the East tabled a "model" treaty which essentially put into legally binding form previous Eastern proposals from 1983 calling for initial reductions of 13,000 U.S. and 20,000 Soviet ground forces and for a subsequent freeze on all forces for two years. This proposal thus offers little that is new and does not address the central issues of data and verification nor respond to the offer of flexibility in the West's April 1984 proposal.

The West has asked a number of questions about the details of the East's February 1985 proposal, which the Soviets have failed to answer. The West is fully committed to moving the talks forward, and seeks an outcome equitable to both sides to enhance security in Europe.

gist

A quick reference aid on U.S. foreign relations
Not a comprehensive policy statement
Bureau of Public Affairs • Department of State

US Nuclear Export and Nonproliferation Policy July 1985

Background: Halting the spread of nuclear weapons and guiding nuclear development exclusively toward peaceful ends have been central concerns of successive US administrations since 1945. We have been willing to share our developments in the civil uses of nuclear energy, in exchange for international commitments limiting the application of nuclear technology to peaceful purposes.

On July 16, 1981, President Reagan outlined his Administration's approach to international nuclear cooperation and reaffirmed the US commitment to nuclear nonproliferation. He stated the US will:

- Seek to prevent the spread of nuclear explosives to additional countries as a fundamental national security and foreign policy objective;

- Strive to reduce the motivation for acquiring nuclear explosives by improving regional and global stability and promoting understanding of the legitimate security concerns of other states;

- Continue to support adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) by countries that have not accepted those treaties;

- View a violation of those treaties or an international safeguards agreement as having profound consequences for international order and US bilateral relations and view any nuclear explosion by a non-nuclear-weapons state with grave concern;

- Strongly support and work with other nations to strengthen the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and its safeguards system;

- Work with other nations to combat the risks of proliferation;

- Continue to inhibit the transfer of sensitive nuclear material, equipment, and technology, particularly where the danger of proliferation demands, and to seek agreement requiring IAEA safeguards on all nuclear activities in non-nuclear-weapons states as a condition for any new nuclear supply commitment.

Security concerns and nuclear proliferation: Denial of sensitive nuclear materials and technology can delay the spread of nuclear explosives; only political decisions can prevent their spread. Therefore, a basic objective of US policy is to address the local and regional security concerns that may impel a government to seek to develop or acquire nuclear explosives.

Place of nuclear exports in US nonproliferation policy: US ability to influence the direction of world nuclear development is related to the size of our role in international nuclear cooperation. In his

statement of July 16, 1981, the President announced the US would not inhibit reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel or breeder reactor development in countries with advanced nuclear power programs where it did not constitute a proliferation risk. We have offered to work out procedures with Japan and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) for advance long-term US consent to retransfers, reprocessing, and use of nuclear material in the context of new or amended agreements for cooperation that would be subject to congressional review.

Such procedures would also provide for US approval of such activities in the future when it is determined that they meet the necessary criteria. Approvals would be valid only as long as the conditions stated in the agreement continue to be met. They would also be contingent upon strong commitments by these countries to nonproliferation efforts and to effective controls over plutonium.

We are also prepared to provide advance consent to other countries, such as was done in new agreements with Sweden and Norway, for the transfer of US-origin spent nuclear fuel to the UK and France for reprocessing. The Administration will maintain its case-by-case approach to US consent in more proliferation-sensitive regions.

Supplier restraint in transfers of sensitive exports: The US continues to play a major role in consultations with other supplier countries in order to maintain a common line of restraint in the export of sensitive nuclear technology. Guidelines for nuclear supply have been tightened, and efforts are continuing to keep the guidelines current with the development of nuclear technology.

NPT and the role of IAEA: More than 125 countries have joined the NPT, making it the most widely adhered-to arms control treaty in history. Under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, non-nuclear weapons states seeking US nuclear cooperation or exports must accept IAEA safeguards on all their peaceful nuclear activities. The states that are party to the NPT meet that condition. President Reagan has reaffirmed that support for the NPT and the Treaty of Tlatelolco remain prime elements of our nonproliferation policy and has called for all suppliers to require comprehensive IAEA safeguards as a condition for significant new nuclear supply commitments. IAEA safeguards serve as a deterrent to diversion of nuclear material for use in nuclear explosive devices and as evidence to its neighbors that a country is not seeking such devices. The IAEA safeguards thus provide a system of ensuring that nuclear materials and equipment are used only for peaceful purposes.

Preparations are underway for a third NPT review conference scheduled for September 1985. The US will work with other parties toward a reaffirmation of the treaty's vital contribution to global security and the need for still wider adherence.

Harriet Culley, Editor (202) 632-1208

NUCLEAR TESTING

While the U.S. believes that the most direct path toward achieving the elimination of nuclear weapons is through equitable, verifiable reductions, we also believe that verifiable limitations on nuclear testing can play a useful role. Our priority goal is to enhance the means of verification of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET). We also have serious concerns about Soviet violations of the Limited Test Ban Treaty and possible violations of the TTBT. We have several times previously offered to discuss with the Soviets how we could improve the verification provisions of the TTBT and the PNET which they thus far rejected. Furthermore, President Reagan in his speech to the UNGA in September 1984 proposed that the U.S. and the Soviet Union find a way for Soviet experts to come to the U.S. nuclear test site and for ours to go to theirs to measure the yields of nuclear weapons tests.

As a demonstration of our seriousness, the President in July 1985 extended an unconditional invitation to the Soviet Union for its experts to visit the U.S. test site -- and to bring any equipment they deem necessary -- to measure the yield of a U.S. nuclear test. This practical approach aims to set in motion a process that could increase confidence and cooperation between our nations regarding limitations on nuclear weapons testing.

Thus far the Soviets have rejected these U.S. proposals and instead have suggested a moratorium on testing, effective August 6, 1985 and extending through January 1, 1986. This proposal is, of course, not a new approach.

History has shown that such moratoria proposals by the Soviets are self-serving, lock in areas of Soviet advantage and, therefore, are largely propagandistic. In light of this experience and in view of Soviet noncompliance with arms control agreements, including the LTBT and likely the TTBT, an uninspected moratorium on nuclear tests would not in any way address our very real and far reaching national security and compliance concerns. Clearly, confidence needs to be enhanced significantly in this area before further steps can be taken. Moreover, given the scope and scale of Soviet modernization programs and U.S. restraint, U.S. testing is necessary to ensure the continued credibility and effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear deterrent.

Our verification concerns are real and serious. The measurement of the yield of independent nuclear explosions to a very difficult and highly technical subject, and is subject to substantial uncertainty. The Soviets themselves have expressed concerns about U.S. tests, and we have offered them a practical way to help resolve them.

Comprehensive Test Ban

From 1977 through 1980, the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union sought to negotiate a Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB), but failed to reach agreement on several major issues, including verification.

Because of serious concerns about the national security implications of a CTB in current circumstances, including problems related to verification, compliance, and deterrence, the U.S. has not resumed the trilateral CTB talks since they recessed in 1980. In the existing environment, the security of the United States and our Allies depends on a credible U.S. nuclear deterrent, and nuclear testing plays an important role in ensuring this deterrent. Furthermore, verification of a comprehensive test ban, and especially any moratorium, remains a major problem. Expert testimony before Congress has indicated that, in the context of the verification procedures discussed (but not agreed) in the CTB trilateral negotiations, there would still be uncertainty about our ability to detect and identify a potentially significant level of clandestine testing.

A Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) remains a long-term U.S. goal, in the context of deep and verifiable arms reductions, improved verification capabilities, expanded confidence building measures, and a secure and credible deterrent capability. At this time the U.S. is not prepared to resume negotiations toward a CTB.

The danger of failing to provide for effective means of verification was underscored by the fate of an international testing moratorium which was unilaterally implemented by the US, UK, and USSR from 1959 to 1961. During that time, the Soviet Union began preparing clandestinely for the largest series of nuclear explosions ever conducted. On August 1961, the Soviet Union unilaterally announced that it would resume testing, and, on the following day, began the first of 40 atmospheric tests conducted over a two-month period. Commenting on the Soviet breach of faith, President Kennedy remarked, "Now we know enough about broken negotiations, secret preparations, and long test series never again to offer an uninspected moratorium."

gist

A quick reference aid on U.S. foreign relations
Not a comprehensive policy statement
Bureau of Public Affairs • Department of State

US and NATO Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Reductions
November 1984

Background: For more than 35 years the NATO alliance has preserved the peace in Europe. Because NATO faces massive Soviet conventional and nuclear forces, the alliance must have the capability to defend itself and deter possible aggression. It must have credible conventional and nuclear forces. At the same time, the allies are committed to maintaining NATO's stockpile of nuclear weapons at the lowest possible level needed for an effective deterrent.

The purpose of US nuclear forces is to deter war. The US nuclear arsenal is designed to provide a strong, militarily effective, and survivable deterrent force, also at the lowest possible level. The US has made proposals to negotiate substantial, equitable, and verifiable reductions in the US and Soviet nuclear arsenals. The US has also reduced the number and megatonnage (yield) of nuclear weapons in its arsenal. Over the years, the number of weapons in the US stockpile has fluctuated, but the number and yield today are sustantially lower than they were 20 years ago, and they are expected to remain well below the peak level of the 1960s.

In contrast, the Soviet Union has consistently increased the size of its nuclear stockpile. The number and total yield of its weapons have exceeded those of the US for some time.

Reductions in the NATO nuclear stockpile: In December 1979, faced with a major and continuing Soviet buildup in intermediate-range land-based nuclear forces (INF), the NATO allies agreed to deploy 572 ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) and Pershing II ballistic missiles beginning in 1983 and, at the same time, to negotiate with the Soviet Union to try to establish an INF balance at the lowest possible level. The 1979 "dual track" decision also called for the removal of 1,000 warheads from the NATO nuclear stockpile and, in addition, stipulated that for each GLCM and Pershing II deployed, one nuclear weapon already in the NATO arsenal would be withdrawn.

The withdrawal of 1,000 warheads was completed in 1980. In addition, NATO agreed to study the alliance's defense needs further to determine whether additional nuclear weapons could be removed without undermining NATO's ability to deter war. This study laid the groundwork for the October 1983 decision in which NATO defense ministers meeting at Montebello, Canada, agreed to withdraw an additional 1,400 warheads from Europe.

Thus, when these latest withdrawals are completed, five nuclear weapons will have been withdrawn from the NATO nuclear stockpile for every GLCM or Pershing II deployed and, as a result of the 1979 dual-track and 1983 Montebello decisions, NATO will have cut its

nuclear arsenal by about one-third, to its lowest level in 20 years. In contrast, the Soviet buildup in intermediate-range and shorter range nuclear weapons continues unabated.

Reductions in the US nuclear stockpile: The number of weapons in the US nuclear stockpile was about one-third higher in 1967 than it is today. Moreover, its total detonation energy, measured in megatons (millions of tons), has declined even more dramatically because the US has withdrawn many large, high-yield weapons. Total US megatonnage today is only one-quarter of what it was in 1960.

Most weapons in the US stockpile were built during the 1960s, and they are now becoming obsolete. It is necessary to modernize our forces in order to improve the safety and security of the weapons and to ensure the continued viability of our nuclear deterrent. Greater safety, survivability, and effectiveness are the goals of our nuclear force modernization program. In some cases, we can achieve those aims with fewer--but more modern--weapons than those we now have. As new weapons are produced, old ones will be disassembled. The US nuclear arsenal will thus remain below the peak level of the 1960s.

Arms control efforts: As an integral part of our national security policy, the US seeks effective and verifiable arms control agreements. Our principal objective is to establish a stable nuclear balance at substantially lower levels of weaponry. We have made proposals for significant reductions in nuclear arsenals to the Soviet Union. We have negotiated flexibly and in good faith and are ready to do so again. We are prepared to engage the Soviet Union in far-reaching discussions for verifiable and substantial reductions in nuclear forces. Such reductions would be in the interests of both sides and would strengthen the foundation of international stability and peace.

STATUS OF U.S. WEAPON STOCKPILE OVER TIME

INVENTORY



MEGATONNAGE



Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems

In the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems the United States and the Soviet Union agree that each may have only two ABM deployment areas,[1] so restricted and so located that they cannot provide a nationwide ABM defense or become the basis for developing one. Each country thus leaves unchallenged the penetration capability of the other's retaliatory missile forces.

The treaty permits each side to have one limited ABM system to protect its capital and another to protect an ICBM launch area. The two sites defended must be at least 1,300 kilometers apart, to prevent the creation of any effective regional defense zone or the beginnings of a nationwide system.

Precise quantitative and qualitative limits are imposed on the ABM systems that may be deployed. At each site there may be no more than 100 interceptor missiles and 100 launchers. Agreement on the number and characteristics of radars to be permitted had required extensive and complex technical negotiations, and the provisions governing these important components of ABM systems are spelled out in very specific detail in the treaty and further clarified in the "Agreed Statements" accompanying it.

Both parties agreed to limit qualitative improvement of their ABM technology, e.g., not to develop, test, or deploy ABM launchers capable of launching more than one interceptor missile at a time or modify existing launchers to give them this capability, and systems for rapid reload of launchers are similarly barred. These provisions, the Agreed Statements clarify, also ban interceptor missiles with more than one independently guided warhead.

There had been some concern over the possibility that surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) intended for defense against aircraft might be improved, along with their supporting radars, to the point where they could effectively be used against ICBMs and SLBMs, and the treaty prohibits this. While further deployment of radars intended to give early warning of strategic ballistic missile attack is not prohibited, they must be located along the territorial boundaries of each country

[1]Subsequently reduced to one area (see section on ABM Protocol).

and oriented outward, so that they do not contribute to an effective ABM defense of points in the interior.

Further, to decrease the pressures of technological change and its unsettling impact on the strategic balance, both sides agree to prohibit development, testing, or deployment of sea-based, air-based, or space-based ABM systems and their components, along with mobile land-based ABM systems. Should future technology bring forth new ABM systems "based on other physical principles" than those employed in current systems, it was agreed that limiting such systems would be discussed, in accordance with the treaty's provisions for consultation and amendment.

The treaty also provides for a U.S.-Soviet Standing Consultative Commission to promote its objectives and implementation. The commission was established during the first negotiating session of SALT II, by a Memorandum of Understanding dated December 21, 1972. Since then both the United States and the Soviet Union have raised a number of questions in the Commission relating to each side's compliance with the SALT I agreements. In each case raised by the United States, the Soviet activity in question has either ceased or additional information has allayed U.S. concern.

Article XIV of the treaty calls for review of the treaty 5 years after its entry into force, and at 5-year intervals thereafter. The first such review was conducted by the Standing Consultative Commission at its special session in the fall of 1977. At this session, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed that the treaty had operated effectively during its first 5 years, that it had continued to serve national security interests, and that it did not need to be amended at that time.

Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems

Signed at Moscow May 26, 1972
Ratification advised by U.S. Senate August 3, 1972
Ratified by U.S. President September 30, 1972
Proclaimed by U.S. President October 3, 1972
Instruments of ratification exchanged October 3, 1972
Entered into force October 3, 1972

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Proceeding from the premise that nuclear war would have devastating consequences for all mankind,

Considering that effective measures to limit anti-ballistic missile systems would be a substantial factor in curbing the race in strategic offensive arms and would lead to a decrease in the risk of outbreak of war involving nuclear weapons,

Proceeding from the premise that the limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems, as well as certain agreed measures with respect to the limitation of strategic offensive arms, would contribute to the creation of more favorable conditions for further negotiations on limiting strategic arms,

Mindful of their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to take effective measures toward reductions in strategic arms, nuclear disarmament, and general and complete disarmament,

Desiring to contribute to the relaxation of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

1. Each party undertakes to limit anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems and to adopt other measures in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty.

2. Each Party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems for a defense of the territory of its country and not to provide a base for such a defense, and not to deploy ABM systems for defense of an individual region except as provided for in Article III of this Treaty.

Article II

1. For the purpose of this Treaty an ABM system is a system to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, currently consisting of:

(a) ABM interceptor missiles, which are interceptor missiles constructed and deployed for an ABM role, or of a type tested in an ABM mode;

(b) ABM launchers, which are launchers constructed and deployed for launching ABM interceptor missiles; and

(c) ABM radars, which are radars constructed and deployed for an ABM role, or of a type tested in an ABM mode.

2. The ABM system components listed in paragraph 1 of this Article include those which are:

(a) operational;
(b) under construction;
(c) undergoing testing;
(d) undergoing overhaul, repair or conversion; or
(e) mothballed.

Article III

Each Party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems or their components except that:

(a) within one ABM system deployment area having a radius of one hundred and fifty kilometers and centered on the Party's national capital, a Party may deploy: (1) no more than one hundred ABM launchers and no more than one hundred ABM interceptor missiles at launch sites, and (2) ABM radars within no more than six ABM radar complexes, the area of each complex being circular and having a diameter of no more than three kilometers; and

(b) within one ABM system deployment area having a radius of one hundred and fifty kilometers and containing ICBM silo launchers, a Party may deploy: (1) no more than one hundred ABM launchers and no more than one hundred ABM interceptor missiles at launch sites, (2) two large phased-array ABM radars comparable in potential to corresponding ABM radars operational or under construction on the date of signature of the Treaty in an ABM system deployment area containing ICBM silo launchers, and (3) no more than eighteen ABM radars each having a potential less than the potential of the smaller of the above-mentioned two large phased-array ABM radars.

Article IV

The limitations provided for in Article III shall not apply to ABM systems or their components used for development or testing, and located within current or additionally agreed test ranges. Each Party may have no more than a total of fifteen ABM launchers at test ranges.

Article V

1. Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based.

2. Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM launchers for launching more than one ABM interceptor missile at a time from each launcher, not to modify deployed launchers to provide them with such a capability, not to develop, test, or deploy automatic or semi-automatic or other similar systems for rapid reload of ABM launchers.

Article VI

To enhance assurance of the effectiveness of the limitations on ABM systems and their components provided by the Treaty, each Party undertakes:

(a) not to give missiles, launchers, or radars, other than ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars, capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, and not to test them in an ABM mode; and

(b) not to deploy in the future radars for early warning of strategic ballistic missile attack except at locations along the periphery of its national territory and oriented outward.

Article VII

Subject to the provisions of this Treaty, modernization and replacement of ABM systems or their components may be carried out.

Article VIII

ABM systems or their components in excess of the numbers or outside the areas specified in this Treaty, as well as ABM systems or their components prohibited by this Treaty, shall be destroyed or dismantled under agreed procedures within the shortest possible agreed period of time.

Article IX

To assure the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty, each Party undertakes not to transfer to other States, and not to deploy outside its national territory, ABM systems or their components limited by this Treaty.

Article X

Each Party undertakes not to assume any international obligations which would conflict with this Treaty.

Article XI

The Parties undertake to continue active negotiations for limitations on strategic offensive arms.

Article XII

1. For the purpose of providing assurance of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each Party shall use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law.

2. Each Party undertakes not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other Party operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article.

3. Each Party undertakes not to use deliberate concealment measures which impede verification by national technical means of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty. This obligation shall not require changes in current construction, assembly, conversion, or overhaul practices.

Article XIII

1. To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Treaty, the Parties shall establish promptly a Standing Consultative Commission, within the framework of which they will:

(a) consider questions concerning compliance with the obligations assumed and related situations which may be considered ambiguous;

(b) provide on a voluntary basis such information as either Party considers necessary to assure confidence in compliance with the obligations assumed;

(c) consider questions involving unintended interference with national technical means of verification;

(d) consider possible changes in the strategic situation which have a bearing on the provisions of this Treaty;

(e) agree upon procedures and dates for destruction or dismantling of ABM systems or their components in cases provided for by the provisions of this Treaty;

(f) consider, as appropriate, possible proposals for further increasing the viability of this Treaty; including proposals for amendments in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty;

(g) consider, as appropriate, proposals for further measures aimed at limiting strategic arms.

2. The Parties through consultation shall establish, and may amend as appropriate, Regulations for the Standing Consultative Commission governing procedures, composition and other relevant matters.

Article XIV

1. Each Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. Agreed amendments shall enter into force in accordance with the procedures governing the entry into force of this Treaty.

2. Five years after entry into force of this Treaty, and at five-year intervals thereafter, the Parties shall together conduct a review of this Treaty.

Article XV

1. This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration.

2. Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of its decision to the other Party six months prior to withdrawal from the Treaty. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

Article XVI

1. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each Party. The Treaty shall enter into force on the day of the exchange of instruments of ratification.

2. This Treaty shall be registered pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

DONE at Moscow on May 26, 1972, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

RICHARD NIXON

President of the United States of America

FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

L. I. BREZHNEV

General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU

Agreed Statements, Common Understandings, and Unilateral Statements Regarding the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missiles

1. Agreed Statements

The document set forth below was agreed upon and initialed by the Heads of the Delegations on May 26, 1972 (letter designations added);

AGREED STATEMENTS REGARDING THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE LIMITATION OF ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE SYTEMS

[A]

The Parties understand that, in addition to the ABM radars which may be deployed in accordance with subparagraph (a) of Article III of the Treaty, those non-phased-array ABM radars operational on the date of signature of the Treaty within the ABM system deployment area for defense of the national capital may be retained.

[B]

The Parties understand that the potential (the product of mean emitted power in watts and antenna area in square meters) of the smaller of the two large phased-array ABM radars referred to in subparagraph (b) of Article III of the Treaty is considered for purposes of the Treaty to be three million.

[C]

The Parties understand that the center of the ABM system deployment area centered on the national capital and the center of the ABM system deployment area containing ICBM silo launchers for each Party shall be separated by no less than thirteen hundred kilometers.

[D]

In order to insure fulfillment of the obligation not to deploy ABM systems and their components except as provided in Article III of the Treaty, the Parties agree that in the event ABM systems based on other physical principles and including components capable of substituting for ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars are created in the future, specific limitations on such systems and their components would be subject to discussion in accordance with Article XIII and agreement in accordance with Article XIV of the Treaty.

[E]

The Parties understand that Article V of the Treaty includes obligations not to develop, test or deploy ABM interceptor missiles for the delivery by each ABM interceptor missile of more than one independently guided warhead.

[F]

The Parties agree not to deploy phased-array radars having a potential (the product of mean emitted power in watts and antenna area in square meters) exceeding three million, except as provided for in Articles III, IV and VI of the Treaty, or except for the purposes of tracking objects in outer space or for use as national technical means of verification.

[G]

The Parties understand that Article IX of the Treaty includes the obligation of the US and the USSR not to provide to other States technical descriptions or blue prints specially worked out for the construction of ABM systems and their components limited by the Treaty.

2. Common Understandings

Common understanding of the Parties on the following matters was reached during the negotiations:

A. Location of ICBM Defenses

The U.S. Delegation made the following statement on May 26, 1972:

Article III of the ABM Treaty provides for each side one ABM system deployment area centered on its national capital and one ABM system deployment area containing ICBM silo launchers. The two sides have registered agreement on the following statement: "The Parties understand that the center of the ABM system deployment area centered on the national capital and the center of the ABM system deployment area containing ICBM silo launchers for each Party shall be separated by no less than thirteen hundred kilometers." In this connection, the U.S. side notes that its ABM system deployment area for defense of ICBM silo launchers, located west of the Mississippi River, will be centered in the Grand Forks ICBM silo launcher deployment area. (See Agreed Statement [C].)

B. ABM Test Ranges

The U.S. Delegation made the following statement on April 26, 1972:

Article IV of the ABM Treaty provides that "the limitations provided for in Article III shall not apply to ABM systems or their components used for development or testing, and located within current or additionally agreed test ranges." We believe it would be useful to assure that there is no misunderstanding as to current ABM test ranges. It is our understanding that ABM test ranges encompass the area within which ABM components are located for test purposes. The current U.S. ABM test ranges are at White Sands, New Mexico, and at Kwajalein Atoll, and the current Soviet ABM test range is near Sary Shagan in Kazakhstan. We consider that non-phased array radars of types used for range safety or instrumentation purposes may be located outside of ABM test ranges. We interpret the reference in Article IV to "additionally agreed test

ranges" to mean that ABM components will not be located at any other test ranges without prior agreement between our Governments that there will be such additional ABM test ranges.

On May 5, 1972, the Soviet Delegation stated that there was a common understanding on what ABM test ranges were, that the use of the types of non-ABM radars for range safety or instrumentation was not limited under the Treaty, that the reference in Article IV to "additionally agreed" test ranges was sufficiently clear, and that national means permitted identifying current test ranges.

C. Mobile ABM Systems

On January 29, 1972, the U.S. Delegation made the following statement:

Article V(1) of the Joint Draft Text of the ABM Treaty includes an undertaking not to develop, test, or deploy mobile land-based ABM systems and their components. On May 5, 1971, the U.S. side indicated that, in its view, a prohibition on deployment of mobile ABM systems and components would rule out the deployment of ABM launchers and radars which were not permanent fixed types. At that time, we asked for the Soviet view of this interpretation. Does the Soviet side agree with the U.S. side's interpretation put forward on May 5, 1971?

On April 13, 1972, the Soviet Delegation said there is a general common understanding on this matter.

D. Standing Consultative Commission

Ambassador Smith made the following statement on May 22, 1972:

The United States proposes that the sides agree that, with regard to initial implementation of the ABM Treaty's Article XIII on the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) and of the consultation Articles to the Interim Agreement on offensive arms and the Accidents Agreement,[1] agreement establishing the SCC will be worked out early in the follow-on SALT negotiations; until that is completed, the following arrangements will prevail: when SALT is in session, any consultation desired by either side under these Articles can be carried out by the two SALT Delegations; when SALT is not in session, *ad hoc* arrangements for any desired consultations under these Articles may be made through diplomatic channels.

Minister Semenov replied that, on an *ad referendum* basis, he could agree that the U.S. statement corresponded to the Soviet understanding.

E. Standstill

On May 6, 1972, Minister Semenov made the following statement:

In an effort to accommodate the wishes of the U.S. side, the Soviet Delegation is prepared to proceed on the basis that the two sides will in fact observe the obligations of both the Interim Agreement and the ABM Treaty beginning from the date of signature of these two documents.

In reply, the U.S Delegation made the following statement on May 20, 1972:

---

[1]See Article 7 of Agreement to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, signed Sept. 30, 1971.

The U.S. agrees in principle with the Soviet statement made on May 6 concerning observance of obligations beginning from date of signature but we would like to make clear our understanding that this means that, pending ratification and acceptance, neither side would take any action prohibited by the agreements after they had entered into force. This understanding would continue to apply in the absence of notification by either signatory of its intention not to proceed with ratification or approval.

The Soviet Delegation indicated agreement with the U.S. statement.

3. Unilateral Statements

The following noteworthy unilateral statements were made during the negotiations by the United States Delegation:

A. Withdrawal from the ABM Treaty

On May 9, 1972, Ambassador Smith made the following statement:

The U.S. Delegation has stressed the importance the U.S. Government attaches to achieving agreement on more complete limitations on strategic offensive arms, following agreement on an ABM Treaty and on an Interim Agreement on certain measures with respect to the limitation of strategic offensive arms. The U.S. Delegation believes that an objective of the follow-on negotiations should be to constrain and reduce on a long-term basis threats to the survivability of our respective strategic retaliatory forces. The USSR Delegation has also indicated that the objectives of SALT would remain unfulfilled without the achievement of an agreement providing for more complete limitations on strategic offensive arms. Both sides recognize that the initial agreements would be steps toward the achievement of more complete limitations on strategic arms. If an agreement providing for more complete strategic offensive arms limitations were not achieved within five years, U.S. supreme interests could be jeopardized. Should that occur, it would constitute a basis for withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. The U.S. does not wish to see such a situation occur, nor do we believe that the USSR does. It is because we wish to prevent such a situation that we emphasize the importance the U.S. Government attaches to achievement of more complete limitations on strategic offensive arms. The U.S. Executive will inform the Congress, in connection with Congressional consideration of the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement, of this statement of the U.S. position.

B. Tested in ABM Mode

On April 7, 1972, the U.S. Delegation made the following statement:

Article II of the Joint Text Draft uses the term "tested in an ABM mode," in defining ABM components, and Article VI includes certain obligations concerning such testing. We believe that the sides should have a common understanding of this phrase. First, we would note that the testing provisions of the ABM Treaty are intended to apply to testing which occurs after the date of signature of the Treaty, and not to any testing which may have occurred in the past. Next, we would amplify the remarks we have made on this subject during the previous Helsinki phase by setting forth the objectives which govern the U.S. view on the subject, namely, while prohibiting testing of non-ABM components for ABM purposes: not to prevent testing of ABM components, and not to prevent testing of non-ABM components for

non-ABM purposes. To clarify our interpretation of "tested in an ABM mode," we note that we would consider a launcher, missile or radar to be "tested in an ABM mode" if, for example, any of the following events occur: (1) a launcher is used to launch an ABM interceptor missile, (2) an interceptor missile is flight tested against a target vehicle which has a flight trajectory with characteristics of a strategic ballistic missile flight trajectory, or is flight tested in conjunction with the test of an ABM interceptor missile or an ABM radar at the same test range, or is flight tested to an altitude inconsistent with interception of targets against which air defenses are deployed, (3) a radar makes measurements on a cooperative target vehicle of the kind referred to in item (2) above during the reentry portion of its trajectory or makes measurements in conjunction with the test of an ABM interceptor missile or an ABM radar at the same test range. Radars used for purposes such as range safety or instrumentation would be exempt from application of these criteria.

C. No-Transfer Article of ABM Treaty

On April 18, 1972, the U.S. Delegation made the following statement:

In regard to this Article [IX], I have a brief and I believe self-explanatory statement to make. The U.S. side wishes to make clear that the provisions of this Article do not set a precedent for whatever provision may be considered for a Treaty on Limiting Strategic Offensive Arms. The question of transfer of strategic offensive arms is a far more complex issue, which may require a different solution.

D. No Increase in Defense of Early Warning Radars

On July 28, 1970, the U.S. Delegation made the following statement:

Since Hen House radars [Soviet ballistic missile early warning radars] can detect and track ballistic missile warheads at great distances, they have a significant ABM potential. Accordingly, the U.S. would regard any increase in the defenses of such radars by surface-to-air missiles as inconsistent with an agreement.

List of Acronyms

ABM	—anti-ballistic missile
ALCM	—air-launched cruise missile
ASAT	—anti-satellite
BMD	—ballistic missile defense
C^3I	—command, control, communications, and intelligence
CONUS	—continental United States
DEW	—directed-energy weapon
DSAT	—defensive satellite
GLCM	—ground-launched cruise missile
ICBM	—intercontinental ballistic missile
IR	—infrared
IRBM	—intermediate-range ballistic missile
KEW	—kinetic-energy weapon
KKV	—kinetic-kill vehicle
LWIR	—long-wave infrared
MaRV	—maneuverable reentry vehicle
MIRV	—multiple independently targeted reentry vehicle
MILSAT	—military satellite
MPS	—multiple protective shelters, once to be used for basing MX
MWIR	—medium-wave infrared
MX	—experimental missile, newest addition to U.S. ICBM arsenal, also called "Peacekeeper"
PBV	—post-boost vehicle
RV	—reentry vehicle
SDI	—Strategic Defense Initiative
SDIO	—Strategic Defense Initiative Organization
SLBM	—submarine-launched ballistic missile
SLCM	—sea-launched cruise missile
SWIR	—short-wave infrared
UV	—ultraviolet

Glossary

This glossary has been designed to provide a reference to the acronyms, words, and phrases associated with the strategic arms limitation negotiations and to clarify concepts and answer questions which arise in this context. It is intended for quick reference only, not as a basis for adjudicating definitional problems that might arise in negotiation or in final treaty or agreement language. This glossary was released by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in April 1979.

Aggregate. The SALT II agreement provides for several "aggregate" numerical limits on various categories of strategic offensive arms. The term "aggregate" refers principally to the overall aggregate of ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, heavy bombers, and ASBM's. The SALT II agreement places an initial ceiling of 2,400 on this aggregate with reductions to 2,250 beginning in early 1981 to be finished by the end of that year. There are also aggregate sublimits of 1,320 on MIRV'ed ICBM launchers, MIRV'ed SLBM launchers, MIRV'ed ASBM's, and heavy bombers equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 km; 1,200 on MIRV'ed ICBM launchers, MIRV'ed SLBM launchers, and MIRV'ed ASBM's; and 820 on MIRV'ed ICBM launchers through 1985. See also *Quantitative Limitation.*

Air-Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM). A cruise missile designed to be launched from an aircraft. See also *Cruise Missile (CM), Cruise Missile Carrier (CMC), and Cruise Missile Range.*

Air-to-Surface Ballistic Missile (ASBM). A ballistic missile launched from an airplane against a target on the Earth's surface. For the purpose of SALT II, an ASBM is considered to be such a missile capable of a range in excess of 600 km. when carried by an aircraft. See also *Ballistic Missile.*

Air-to-Surface Ballistic Missile (ASBM) Carrier. An airborne carrier for launching a ballistic missile capable of a range in excess of 600 km against a target on the Earth's surface. Bombers equipped for ASBM's are considered to be heavy bombers which themselves are not counted in the aggregate limits imposed by the treaty (unless they are also equipped with gravity bombs or long-range ALCM's), although each ASBM is so counted. See also *Air-to-Surface Ballistic Missile (ASBM), Ballistic Missile, and Bomber.*

Air-to-Surface Missile (ASM). A missile launched from an airborne carrier against a target on the Earth's surface. See also *Air-Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) and Air-to-Surface Ballistic Missile (ASBM).*

Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. Formally entitled the "Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems," this treaty is one of the two agreements signed at Moscow on May 26, 1972, known collectively as the SALT I agreements. The ABM Treaty entered into force on October 3, 1972, and is of unlimited duration. The original ABM Treaty limited each side to two ABM deployment areas (one national capital area and one ICBM silo launcher area) with restrictions on the deployment of ABM launchers and interceptors (100 of each per area) and ABM radars at these areas. A protocol to the treaty signed in 1974 further restricted each side to only one ABM deployment area.

Backfire. The NATO designation of a modern Soviet two-engine, swing-wing bomber. It is currently being deployed to operational units for use in a theater or naval strike role as a replacement for older Soviet medium bombers. Backfire has characteristics which fall between the characteristics generally attributed to existing heavy bombers and those of medium bombers. Under certain flight conditions, the Backfire is assessed to have an intercontinental capability.

Ballistic Missile. Any missile designed to follow the trajectory that results when it is acted upon predominantly by gravity and aerodynamic drag after thrust is terminated. Ballistic missiles typically operate outside the atmosphere for a substantial portion of their flight path and are unpowered during most of the flight. See also *Air-to-Surface Ballistic Missile (ASBM), Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM), and Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM).*

Bomber. An aircraft designed to deliver bombs or missiles. See also *Air-to-Surface Ballistic Missile (ASBM) Carrier, Cruise Missile Carrier (CMC), and Heavy Bomber.*

Circular Error Probable (CEP). A measure of the delivery accuracy of a weapon system. It is the radius of a circle around a target of such size that a weapon aimed at the target has a 50% probability of falling within the circle.

Cooperative Measures. Measures taken by one side in order to enhance the other side's ability to verify compliance with the provisions of the agreement. Such measures can be voluntary or negotiated.

Cruise Missile (CM). A guided missile which uses aerodynamic lift to offset gravity and propulsion to counteract drag. Thus, a cruise missile is very much like an unmanned airplane. A cruise missile's flight path remains within the Earth's atmosphere. See also *Air-Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM), Cruise Missile Carrier (CMC), Cruise Missile Range, Ground-Launched Cruise Missile (GLCM), and Sea-Launched Cruise Missile (SLCM).*

Cruise Missile Carrier (CMC). An aircraft equipped for launching a cruise missile. The limitations of SALT II apply to those CMC's equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 km. See also *Air-Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM), Bomber, and Heavy Bomber.*

Cruise Missile Range. SALT II provides that the range capability of a cruise missile is the maximum distance which can be covered by the missile in its standard design mode flying until fuel exhaustion, determined by projecting its flight path onto the Earth's sphere from the point of launch to the point of impact. Thus, range capability is, in effect, defined in terms of the odometer distance traveled by the cruise missile. See also *Cruise Missile (CM).*

Data Base. As an adjunct to SALT II, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. have agreed on a Memorandum of Understanding Regarding the Establishment of a Data Base on the Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms which lists, for each side, the numbers of strategic offensive arms by category subject to the limitations provided for in the treaty. This data base will be periodically updated in the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC).

Deliberate Concealment. SALT II provides that verification of compliance with the provisions of the agreement shall be by national technical means (NTM). The sides have agreed not to use deliberate concealment measures which impede verification by NTM of compliance with the provisions of the agreement. Deliberate concealment measures are measures carried out deliberately to hinder or deliberately to impede verification of compliance with the provisions of the treaty. Deliberate concealment measures could include, for example, cam-

ouflage, use of coverings, or deliberate denial of telemetric information, such as through the use of telemetry encryption, whenever such measures impede verification of compliance with the provisions of the agreement. See also *Encryption, Interference, National Technical Means of Verification (NTM), and Telemetry.*

Development. Development is the first stage in the process of producing a particular weapon system. Subsequent stages include testing (or flight-testing), production, and deployment.

Encryption. Encryption is encoding communications for the purpose of concealing information. In SALT II, this term has been applied to a practice whereby a side alters the manner by which it transmits telemetry from a weapon being tested rendering the information deliberately undecipherable. See also *Deliberate Concealment and Telemetry.*

Fixed Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) Launcher. There are two categories of ICBM launchers—fixed and mobile. Fixed ICBM launchers have traditionally been referred to as either "soft," whereby the missile and most of its launch equipment remain above ground, or "hard," whereby the missile and most of its launch equipment are contained in a hardened underground silo. In both cases the launcher—the equipment which launches the missile—is in a fixed location. See also *Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) Silo Launcher and Launcher.*

Flight-Test. For the purposes of SALT II, a flight-test of a missile is an actual launch of the missile (as distinct from a static test) conducted for any purpose, including for development of the missile, for demonstration of its capabilities, and for training of crews. See also *Launch and Test Range.*

Fractional Orbital Bombardment System (FOBS). A missile that achieves an orbital trajectory but fires a set of retrorockets before the completion of one revolution in order to slow down, reenter the atmosphere, and release the warhead it carries into a ballistic trajectory toward its target. While a normal ICBM follows an arching, elliptical path to target, and is highly visible to defending radars, a weapon in low orbit (e.g., 100 miles altitude) can make a sharp descent to Earth, cutting radar warning time substantially. A FOBS path accordingly would consist of a launch into low orbit, a partial circle to the Earth target, and a rapid descent.

Fractionation. The division of the payload of a missile into several warheads. The use of a MIRV payload is an example of fractionation. The term "fractionation limits" is used to describe the treaty limitations on the maximum number of reentry vehicles per missile. See also *Payload and Reentry Vehicle (RV).*

Functionally Related Observable Differences (FROD's). The means by which SALT II provides for distinguishing between those aircraft which are capable of performing certain SALT-limited functions and those which are not. FROD's are differences in the observable features of airplanes which specifically determine whether or not these airplanes can perform the mission of a heavy bomber, or whether or not they can perform the mission of a bomber equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 km, or whether or not they can perform the mission of a bomber equipped for ASBM's. See also *Heavy Bomber and Observable Differences (OD's).*

Ground-Launched Cruise Missile (GLCM). A cruise missile launched from ground installations or vehicles. See also *Cruise Missile (CM), Cruise Missile Range, and Protocol.*

Heavy (Ballistic) Missile. For the purposes of SALT II, ballistic missiles are divided into two categories according to their throw-weight and launch-weight—light and heavy. Heavy missiles (ICBM's, SLBM's, and ASBM's) are those missiles which have a launch-weight greater or a throw-weight greater than the launch-weight or throw-weight of the Soviet SS–19 ICBM.

Heavy Bomber. The term used in SALT II to describe those aircraft included in the aggregate limitations of the agreement. Heavy bombers consist of four categories of airplanes:

- Current types are the B–52 and B–1 for the U.S. and the TU–95 (Bear) and Myasishchev (Bison) for the Soviets;
- Future types of bombers which can carry out the mission of a heavy bomber in a manner similar or superior to that of the bombers listed above;
- Types of bombers equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 km; and
- Types of bombers equipped for ASBM's.

Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM). A land-based fixed or mobile rocket-propelled vehicle capable of delivering a warhead to intercontinental ranges. Once they are outside the atmosphere, ICBM's fly to a target on an elliptical trajectory. An ICBM consists of a booster, one or more reentry vehicles, possibly penetration aids, and, in the case of a MIRV'ed missile, a postboost vehicle. For the purposes of SALT II, an ICBM is considered to be a land-based ballistic missile capable of a range in excess of 5,500 km (about 3,000 nautical miles).

Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) Silo Launcher. An ICBM silo launcher, a "hard" fixed ICBM launcher, is an underground installation, constructed primarily of steel and concrete, housing an intercontinental ballistic missile and the equipment for launching it. See also *Fixed Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) Launcher and Launcher.*

Interference. The SALT II treaty provides that each party shall use national technical means (NTM) of verification at its disposal to provide assurance of compliance with the treaty. In this connection, each party has undertaken a commitment not to interfere with the NTM of the other party. This means that neither side can destroy or attempt to negate the functioning of the NTM of the other side (e.g., blinding of photoreconnaissance satellites). See also *Deliberate Concealment, National Technical Means of Verification (NTM), Telemetry, and Verification.*

Interim Agreement. Formally entitled the "Interim Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Certain Measures With Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms," this agreement comprises one of two agreements signed at Moscow on May 26, 1972, and known collectively as the SALT I agreements. The Interim Agreement entered into force on October 3, 1972, and formally expired on October 3, 1977. In September 1977, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. separately stated that they did not plan to take any action inconsistent with the provisions of the Interim Agreement pending conclusion of the SALT II negotiations.

Joint Statement of Principles. SALT II consists of three parts: a treaty which will last through 1985, a protocol which will last through 1981, and a Joint Statement of Principles and Basic Guidelines for Subsequent Negotiations on the Limitation of Strategic Arms. The joint statement of principles provides a general statement of objectives for negotiation in SALT III.

Launch. For the purposes of SALT II, a launch includes a flight of a missile for testing, training, or any other purpose. The term "launch" would not encompass so-called pop-up tests which are tests of the launcher and ejection mechanism. See also *Flight-Test and Launcher.*

Launch-Weight. The weight of the fully loaded missile itself at the time of launch. This would include the aggregate weight of all booster stages, the postboost vehicle (PBV), and the payload. See also *Heavy (Ballistic) Missile, Light (Ballistic) Missile, and Throw-Weight.*

Launcher. That equipment which launches a missile. ICBM launchers are land-based launchers which can be either fixed or mobile. SLBM launchers are the missile tubes on a ballistic missile submarine. An ASBM launcher is the carrier aircraft with associated equipment. Launchers for cruise missiles can be installed on aircraft, ships, or land-based vehicles or installations.

Light (Ballistic) Missile. For the purposes of SALT II, ballistic missiles are divided into two categories according to their throw-weight and launch-weight—light and heavy. The Soviet SS–19 ICBM is acknowledged by both sides as the heaviest of the existing light ICBM's on either side. See also *Heavy (Ballistic) Missile, Launch-Weight, and Throw-Weight.*

Mobile ICBM Launcher. Equipment which launches an ICBM and which can move or be moved from one location to another. Mobile ICBM launchers could include ICBM launchers on wheeled vehicles, launchers on vehicles which travel on rails, and launchers which are moved among launch-points which might themselves be "hard" or "soft."

Modernization. The process of modifying a weapon system such that its characteristics or components are altered in order to improve the performance capabilities for that weapon system. SALT II provides that, subject to provisions to the contrary, modernization and replacement of strategic offensive arms may be carried out. See also *Qualitative Limitation.*

Multiple Independently-Targetable Reentry Vehicle (MIRV). Multiple reentry vehicles carried by a ballistic missile, each of which can be directed to a separate and arbitrarily located target. A MIRV'ed missile employs a postboost vehicle (PBV) or other warhead-dispensing mechanism. The dispensing and targeting mechanism maneuvers to achieve successive desired positions and velocities to dispense each RV on a trajectory to attack the desired target, or the RV's might themselves maneuver toward their targets after they reenter the atmosphere. For the purposes of SALT II, MIRV'ed ICBM's, SLBM's, and ASBM's are defined as those which have been flight-tested with two or more independently-targetable reentry vehicles, regardless of whether or not they have also been flight-tested with a single reentry vehicle or with multiple reentry vehicles which are not independently targetable. See also *Payload and Postboost Vehicle (PBV).*

Multiple Reentry Vehicle (MRV). The reentry vehicle of a ballistic missile equipped with multiple warheads where the missile does not have the capability of independently targeting the reentry vehicles—as distinct from a missile equipped for MIRV's. See also *Multiple Independently-Targetable Reentry Vehicle (MIRV), Payload, and Reentry Vehicle (RV).*

National Technical Means of Verification (NTM). Assets which are under national control for monitoring compliance with the provisions of an agreement. NTM include photographic reconnaisance satellites, aircraft-based systems (such as radars and optical systems), as well as sea- and ground-based systems (such as radars and antennas for collecting telemetry). SALT II provides that the sides undertake not to interfere with the NTM of the other party nor to use deliberate concealment measures which impede verification by NTM of compliance with the provisions of the agreement. See also *Deliberate Concealment, Interference, Telemetry, and Verification.*

New Type of ICBM. The U.S. and the U.S.S.R. have agreed, for the period of SALT II, to limit each side to only one new type of ICBM. Specific technical criteria have been established to distinguish between new types of ICBM's and existing types of ICBM's. These criteria include such physical parameters as missile length, maximum diameter, throw-weight, launch-weight, and fuel type. See also *Launch-Weight, Modernization, and Throw-Weight.*

Noncircumvention. SALT II provides that each party undertakes not to circumvent the provisions of this treaty through any other state or states or in any other manner. This provision simply makes explicit the inherent obligation any state assumes when party to an international agreement not to circumvent the provisions of that agreement. This provision will not affect existing patterns of collaboration and cooperation with our allies, including cooperation in modernization of allied forces.

Observable Differences (OD's). Externally observable design features used to distinguish between those heavy bombers of current types which are capable of performing a particular SALT-limited function and those which are not. These differences need not be functionally related but must be a design feature which is externally observable. See also *Functionally Related Observable Differences (FROD's) and Heavy Bomber.*

Payload. Weapons and penetration aids carried by a delivery vehicle. In the case of a ballistic missile, the RV(s) and antiballistic missile penetration aids placed on ballistic trajectories by the main propulsion stages or the PBV; in the case of a bomber, those bombs, missiles, or penaids carried internally or attached to the wings or fuselage. See also *Multiple Independently-Targetable Reentry Vehicle (MIRV), Multiple Reentry Vehicles (MRV's), Penetration Aids (Penaids), Postboost Vehicle (PBV), and Reentry Vehicle.*

Penetration Aids (Penaids). Devices employed by offensive weapon systems, such as ballistic missiles and bombers, to increase the probability of penetrating enemy defenses. They are frequently designed to simulate or to mask an aircraft or ballistic missile warhead in order to mislead enemy radar and/or divert defensive antiaircraft or antimissile fire. See also *Payload.*

Postboost Vehicle (PBV). Often referred to as a "bus," the PBV is that part of a missile which carries the reentry vehicles, a guidance package, fuel, and thrust devices for altering the ballistic flight path so that the reentry vehicles can be dispensed sequentially toward different targets (MIRV's). Ballistic missiles with single RV's also might use a PBV to increase the accuracy of the RV by placing it more precisely into the desired trajectory. See also *Multiple Independently-Targetable Reentry Vehicle (MIRV), Payload, and Reentry Vehicle (RV).*

Production. Series manufacturing a particular strategic nuclear delivery system following its development and testing.

Protocol. The SALT II agreement consists of three parts: a treaty which

will last through 1985, a protocol which will last through 1981, and a Joint Statement of Principles and Basic Guidelines for Subsequent Negotiations on the Limitation of Strategic Arms. The protocol establishes temporary limitations on mobile ICBM launchers, ground- and sea-launched cruise missiles, and ASBM's.

Qualitative Limitation. Restrictions on capabilities of a weapon system as distinct from quantitative limits (e.g., on numbers of strategic delivery vehicles). In SALT II, such qualitative limitations include, *inter alia,* a prohibition on more than one new type of ICBM for each side, restrictions on missile launch-weight and throw-weight, and limitations on the number of reentry vehicles a missile may carry. See also *Fractionation, Launch-Weight, Modernization, and Throw-Weight.*

Quantitative Limitation. Numerical limits on the number of weapons systems in certain categories, as distinct from qualitative limits on weapons capabilities. For the purposes of SALT II, such limitations include the various aggregate limits. See also *Aggregate.*

Rapid Reload. The capability of a launcher to fire a second missile within a short period of time after an initial missile firing. See also *Launcher.*

Reentry Vehicle (RV). That portion of a ballistic missile which carries the nuclear warhead. It is called a reentry vehicle because it reenters the Earth's atmosphere in the terminal portion of the missile trajectory. See also *Multiple Independently-Targetable Reentry Vehicle (MIRV), Multiple Reentry Vehicle (MRV), Payload, and Postboost Vehicle (PBV).*

Sea-Launched Cruise Missile (SLCM). A cruise missile launched from a submarine or surface ship. See also *Cruise Missile (CM), Cruise Missile Range, and Protocol.*

Standing Consultative Commission (SCC). A permanent U.S.-Soviet commission first established in accordance with the provisions of the SALT I agreements. Its purpose is to promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of the various treaties and agreements achieved between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. in the SALT negotiations. The SCC meets at least twice a year. The commission deals with matters such as questions of compliance with the provisions of the treaties and agreements and the working out of procedures to implement the SALT agreements. The SCC will continue these functions with respect to SALT II.

Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). A series of negotiations between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. which began in November 1969. The negotiations seek to limit and reduce both offensive and defensive strategic arms. The first round of negotiations, known as SALT I, concluded in May 1972 and resulted in two agreements—the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. SALT II, begun in November 1972, includes a treaty, a protocol of shorter duration, and a Joint Statement of Principles and Basic Guidelines for Subsequent Negotiations on the Limitation of Strategic Arms.

Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM). A ballistic missile carried in and launched from a submarine. For the purposes of SALT II, SLBM launchers are launchers installed on any nuclear-powered submarine or launchers of modern ballistic missiles installed on any submarine, regardless of its type. "Modern" SLBM's are, for the U.S., missiles installed in all nuclear-powered submarines; for the U.S.S.R. missiles of the type installed in nuclear-powered submarines made operational since 1965; and for both parties, any SLBM first flight-tested since 1965 and installed in any submarine, regardless of its type. See also *Ballistic Missile.*

Telemetry. Telemetry refers to data, transmitted by radio to the personnel conducting a weapons test, which monitor the functions and performance during the course of the test. See also *Deliberate Concealment and Encryption.*

Test and Training Launcher. For the purposes of SALT II, these are launchers of ICBM's or SLBM's used only for test and training purposes. New test and training launchers may be constructed only at test ranges. Test and training launchers may be replicas or partial launchers without an actual launch capability, or they may be launchers used to launch missiles for test and training purposes. See also *Launcher and Test Range.*

Test Range. For the purposes of SALT II, an ICBM test range is a facility where ICBM's are flight-tested. The sides have agreed that such existing test ranges are located as follows: for the U.S., near Santa Maria, California, and at Cape Canaveral, Florida; and for the U.S.S.R. in the areas of Tyuratam and Plesetskaya. Any future additional test ranges will be specified by notification in the SCC. See also *Flight-Test, Launch, and Test and Training Launcher.*

Throw-Weight. Ballistic missile throw-weight is the useful weight which is placed on a trajectory toward the target by the boost or main propulsion stages of the missile. For the purposes of SALT II, throw-weight is defined as the sum of the weight of:

- The RV or RV's;
- Any PBV or similar device for releasing or targeting one or more RV's; and
- Any antiballistic missile penetration aids, including their release devices.

See also *Heavy (Ballistic) Missile, Launch-Weight, Light (Ballistic) Missile, and Postboost Vehicle.*

Verification. The process of determining, to the extent necessary to adequately safeguard national security, that the other side is complying with an agreement. This process of judging adequacy takes into account the monitoring capabilities of existing and future intelligence-collection systems and analysis techniques and the ability of the other side to evade detection if it should attempt to do so. This process also assesses the political and military significance of potential violations and the costs, risks, and gains to a side of cheating. It also takes into account the degree to which advantages conferred on the United States by a particular provision outweigh the disadvantages caused by problems of monitoring. See also *National Technical Means of Verification (NTM) and Standing Consultative Commission (SCC).*

Warhead. That part of a missile, projectile, torpedo, rocket, or other munition which contains either the nuclear or thermonuclear system, the high-explosive system, the chemical or biological agents, or the inert materials intended to inflict damage. See also *Payload and Reentry Vehicle (RV).*

Yield. The energy released in an explosion. The energy released in the detonation of a nuclear weapon is generally measured in terms of the kilotons (kt) or megatons (Mt) of TNT required to produce the same energy release.

FIRST LADY'S PROGRAM

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name
EUROPEAN AND SOVIET AFFAIRS DIRECTORATE, NSC : RECORDS

Withdrawer
SMF 4/25/2005

File Folder
PRESS BOOK-MEETINGS OF REAGAN AND GORBACHEV, GENEVA, NOVEMBER 1985 (4)

FOIA
1995-039/1

Box Number
91101

3

ID	*Document Type* *Document Description*	*No of pages*	*Doc Date*	*Restric-tions*
8795	BI BIO	1	10/28/1985	B1 B3

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BIOGRAPHY OF NANCY REAGAN

Nancy Davis Reagan was born on July 6, 1923, in New York City. Raised in Chicago, she graduated from Girls' Latin School and went on to Smith College, Northampton, Massachusetts. She majored in drama at Smith.

In her early career, Nancy Davis worked as an actress in stage, film and television productions. Her stage performances ranged from summer stock to road tours to Broadway. In 1949, she was signed to a seven-year contract by MGM. She married Ronald Reagan on March 4, 1952, and made eleven films in all, including three after her marriage. Her last film, at Columbia, in 1956, was "Hellcats of the Navy," in which she and her husband appeared together.

Shortly after her husband became Governor of California in 1967, Mrs. Reagan began visiting wounded Vietnam veterans and became active in projects concerning POW's and servicemen missing in action in Vietnam. During the war, she wrote a syndicated column, donating her salary to the National League of Families of American Prisoners and Missing in Action in Southeast Asia.

While First Lady of California, she made regular visits to hospitals and homes for older citizens, and schools for physically and emotionally handicapped children. During one of these hospital visits in 1967, she observed participants in the Foster Grandparent Program and became its champion. This unique program brings together senior citizens who need to be productive with handicapped children who need extra time, love and attention. As First Lady, Mrs. Reagan continues to work to expand the program on the national level and to promote private funding in local communities. She has co-authored a book with Jane Wilkie, To Love a Child, and a song by the same title was written and dedicated to her by Hal David and Joe Raposo. Frank Sinatra recorded the song and all proceeds from the book and record sales are going to the Foster Grandparent Program.

Mrs. Reagan's special project is fighting drug and alcohol abuse among youth. To place a national spotlight on the problem, she has traveled over 70,000 miles and gone to 47 cities in 27 states and 3 foreign countries in conjunction with her campaign to fight school age drug and alcohol abuse. She has appeared on television talk shows, taped public service announcements, written guest articles, and visited prevention programs and rehabilitation centers across the country, talking with young people and their parents. She appeared on NBC's "Diff'rent Strokes" in an episode about drug abuse, co-hosted a special edition of "Good Morning America" on ABC which was devoted exclusively to the subject, and

narrated a PBS special called "The Chemical People" to encourage communities to organize against drug abuse. In April 1985, she expanded her drug awareness campaign to an international level by inviting first ladies from around the world to attend a two-day briefing in Washington, D.C., and Atlanta, Georgia, on the subject of youth drug abuse. During the 40th Anniversary of The United Nations, Mrs. Reagan hosted 30 First Ladies for a second international drug conference.

As First Lady, Mrs. Reagan is serving as Honorary Chairman of numerous organizations, including the President's Committee on the Arts and the Humanities; the Wolf Trap Foundation Board of Trustees; the National Trust for Historic Preservation; the Cystic Fibrosis Foundation; the National Republican Women's Club; and is Honorary President of the Girl Scouts of the U.S.A.

In each Annual Gallup Poll since 1981, the American public has voted Mrs. Reagan one of the ten most admired women in the world. In 1981, 1982, and 1983, she was named one of the ten most admired women in the world by readers of Good Housekeeping magazine, and in 1984, she ranked number one in that poll. She has received numerous awards for her leadership role in the fight against drug abuse, including recognition from the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Lions Club International, and from drug treatment programs such as Phoenix House and Second Genesis. In 1983, she received an Honorary Doctor of Laws degree from Pepperdine University for her commitment to public service.

She is the only daughter of Dr. Loyal Davis and Mrs. Edith Davis of Chicago and Phoenix. Her father, who died August 19, 1982, was Professor Emeritus at Northwestern University after serving as Professor of Surgery there for more than 30 years. She has a brother, Dr. Richard Davis, who resides in Philadelphia with his wife and two children.

The Reagans have four children, all of whom are married. Patti is pursuing an acting career in California. Ron is affiliated with ABC-TV in Los Angeles and is a free-lance writer. Maureen is a special consultant at The Republican National Committee and is the United States Commissioner on The Status of Women at The United Nations. Michael hosts a radio talk show in Los Angeles and is the director of a fundraising corporation. The Reagans have two grandchildren, Cameron and Ashley Marie, offspring of Michael Reagan.

# # #

THE WHITE HOUSE

OFFICE OF THE FIRST LADY'S PRESS SECRETARY

FOR GUIDANCE PURPOSES ONLY — October 16, 1985

SUMMARY OF MRS. REAGAN'S SEPARATE SCHEDULE
IN GENEVA, SWITZERLAND

NOTE: Mrs. Reagan has no schedule independent from the President's except for the following 3 days. Times are approximate and subject to change.

MONDAY, NOVEMBER 18, 1985 - Geneva

2:15 p.m. Mrs. Reagan will attend a tea hosted by Mrs. Kurt Furgler, wife of the president of Switzerland, following the arrival ceremony at Le Reposoir.

TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 19, 1985 - Lausanne, Saint Prex, Geneva

11:15 a.m. Mrs. Reagan will visit La Picholette Farm Drug Program in Lausanne, Switzerland. She will tour the farm and participate in a rap session with residents of the program.

12:30 p.m. Mrs. Reagan will take a boat ride on Lake Geneva from Lausanne to the village of Saint Prex. She will be accompanied by American children and will have a box lunch picnic on board.

1:10 p.m. Upon disembarking at Saint Prex, Mrs. Reagan will be greeted by Swiss school children, tour the village and listen to a Swiss alp horn band.

2:30 p.m. Mrs. Reagan will arrive back in Geneva.

4:00 p.m. Mrs. Reagan will greet Mrs. Gorbachev upon her arrival at Maison de Saussure to attend a tea.

WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 20, 1985 - Geneva

10:40 a.m. Mrs. Reagan will visit College du Leman, an international primary school, where she will hear a musical performance by the students. Afterward she will tape television and radio messages on behalf of the UNICEF worldwide vaccination campaign.

11:45 a.m. Mrs. Reagan will visit the U.S. Mission where she will make brief remarks to the staff and view the "United Peace" sculpture commissioned in her honor.

FOR GUIDANCE PURPOSES ONLY -

WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 20, 1985 (cont'd.)

12:00 noon Mrs. Reagan will make remarks at a groundbreaking ceremony for a new museum at the International Red Cross.

4:00 p.m. Mrs. Reagan will arrive at the Soviet Mission to attend a tea hosted by Mrs. Gorbachev.

NOTE: It is anticipated that coverage of the above events will be by TIGHT POOL. Press interested in covering Mrs. Reagan's separate schedule should contact the First Lady's Press Office for further details.

NATO

Belgium

- International boundary
- Province boundary
- ★ National capital
- ⊙ Province capital
- Railroad
- Expressway
- Road
- Canal

Base 800030 (A01911) 6-85

Brussels



3755 6-80 STATE(GE)

background notes

Belgium

United States Department of State
Bureau of Public Affairs

November 1985

(Special Edition)



Official Name: Kingdom of Belgium

PROFILE

People

Nationality: *Noun and adjective*—Belgian(s). **Population** (1982 est.): 9.9 million. **Annual growth rate:** 0.25%. **Linguistic Groups:** Dutch 57%, French 33%, legally bilingual (Brussels) 10%, German 0.7%. **Religion:** Roman Catholic 75%. **Education:** *Years compulsory*—to age 16. *Literacy*—98%. **Health:** *Infant mortality rate* (1985)—10/1,000. *Life expectancy* (1985)—73.6 yrs. **Work force** (4 million): *Agriculture*—3%. *Industry and commerce*—33%. *Services and transportation*—36%. *Public service*—21%. *Unemployment*—14%.

Geography

Area: 30,540 sq. km. (11,800 sq. mi.); about the size of Maryland. **Cities:** *Capital*—Brussels (pop. 1 million). *Other cities*—Antwerp (463,000), Ghent (234,000), Liege (211,000). **Terrain:** Varies from coastal plains in northwest, through gently rolling countryside in the center, to the Ardennes Mountains in the southeast. **Climate:** Cool, temperate, and rainy, without extreme temperature.

Government

Type: Parliamentary democracy under a constitutional monarch. **Independence:** 1830. **Constitution:** 1980 (revised).

Branches: *Executive*—king (chief of state), prime minister (head of government), Council of Ministers (Cabinet). *Legislative*—bicameral Parliament (Senate and House of Representatives); Flemish Community Assembly with the Flemish Executive for Regional and Cultural Affairs; Walloon Regional Assembly and Executive for Walloon; Regional Affairs; and Francophone Community Assembly and Executive for Francophone Cultural Affairs. *Judicial*—Court of Cassation.

Subdivisions: 3 regions (Flanders, Wallonia, Brussels); 2 cultural communities (Francophone, Flemish, plus a special status for the German-speaking community); 9 provinces; 589 communes.

Political parties: Flemish Social Christians (CVP), Francophone Social Christians (PSC), Francophone Socialists (PS), Flemish Socialists (SP), Flemish Liberal (PVV), Francophone Liberal (PRL), Volksunie (VU), Francophone Democratic Front (FDF), Flemish Ecologists (AGALEV), Walloon Rally (RW), Francophone Ecologists (ECOLO), Communist Party (PCB). **Suffrage:** Universal over 18; compulsory voting.

Central government budget (1984): Approx. $31.2 billion.

Flag: Three vertical bands—black, yellow, and red from left to right.

Economy

GNP (1984): $77 billion. **Annual growth rate** (1984): 2%. **Per capita income** (1984): $7,803. **Avg. inflation rate** (last 3 yrs.): 6%.

Natural resource: Coal.

Agriculture (2.3% of GNP): *Products*—livestock, poultry, grain, sugarbeets, flax, tobacco, potatoes, other vegetables, fruits.

Industry (31% of GNP): *Types*—machinery, iron and steel, coal, textiles, chemicals, glass.

Trade (1984): *Exports*—$46 billion: machinery (22%), chemicals (12%), food and livestock (10%), iron and steel (9%). *Imports*—$46.9 billion: machinery (22%), fuels (20%), chemical products (8%), food (13%). *Major trade partners*—FRG, France, the Netherlands.

Official exchange rate (Dec. 1984): About 57.8 Belgian francs = US$1.

Economic aid budgeted: $497 million.

Membership in International Organizations

UN, NATO, European Communities (EC), Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union (BLEU), Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), INTELSAT, Council of Europe, Western European Union, Belgium-Netherlands-Luxembourg Economic Union (Benelux).


NORTH SEA
NETHERLANDS
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
FRANCE
FRANCE
LUXEMBOURG
LUXEMBOURG
BELGIUM
International boundary
National capital
Railroad
Road
International airport
0 25 50 Kilometers
0 25 50 Miles
Maas
Rhine
Scheldt
Lys
Leie
Meuse
Sambre
Our
's Hertogenbosch
Bergen op Zoom
Breda
Vlissingen
Breskens
Zeebrugge
Oostende
Brugge
Nieuwpoort
Dunkerque
Eindhoven
Turnhout
Sint-Niklaas
Antwerp
Lier
Mechelen
Gent
Torhout
Roeselare
Aalst
Kortrijk
Ieper
BRUSSELS
Leuven
Hasselt
Maastricht
Roermond
Düsseldorf
Mönchen-Gladbach
Aachen
Düren
Halle
Hazebrouck
Roubaix
Lille
Tournai
Liege
Verviers
Namur
Huy
Malmédy
Mons
La Louvière
Charleroi
Valenciennes
Arras
Dinant
Marche-en-Famenne
Bastogne
Charleville
Sedan
Arlon
3
4
5
6
51
50

GEOGRAPHY

Belgium is one of the smallest countries in Europe, covering an area of 30,540 square kilometers (11,800 sq. mi.); the distance between its two farthest points is only 280 kilometers (175-mi.). The country can be described roughly as a wedge, with a 488-kilometer (280-mi.) frontier with the Netherlands at the northern edge and a 608-kilometer (380 mi.) frontier with France on its southern side. The western edge is a 64-kilometer (40-mi.) North Sea coastline. On the east is a 160-kilometer (100-mi.) border with the Federal Republic of Germany and, to the south, about the same with Luxembourg.

The north and west constitute a great fertile maritime plain, scarcely above sea level. South of Brussels, central Belgium is a rolling country of pleasant hills and valleys, rising gradually eastward. Still further south and to the east, the hills give way to the mountainous Ardennes Forest, the river valleys of which have been invasion routes in wars dating back to the Middle Ages but which are now popular tourist and vacation spots.

The climate is cool, temperate, and rainy; summer temperatures average 16°C (60°F). Temperatures rarely reach −12°C or 32°C (10°F or 90°F).

PEOPLE

At the crossroads of Europe, Belgium has witnessed a constant ebb and flow of different peoples and cultures over its long history. It comprises cultural elements of Celtic, Roman, German, French, Dutch, Spanish, and Austrian origins.

Today, Belgians are divided linguistically into Dutch speakers, called Flemings, and French speakers, called Walloons, with a nominally bilingual population in Brussels. About 65,000 German speakers live in the east. About 903,000 foreigners reside in Belgium as well. Population density is the second highest in Europe, after the Netherlands.

Belgium's artistic tradition is founded in the works of its masters—Rubens, Breughel, Bosch, Memling, Van Eyck—whose works are displayed in museums and churches throughout the country. The cities of Brussels, Antwerp, Bruges, Ghent, Liege, and Louvain are famous for their architecture as well as their art. Belgium's modern artists, such as Ensor, Permeke, the surrealists Magritte and Delvaux, and many others are outstanding representatives of 20th century art.

Belgium is an international center for the performing arts. Its renowned Palais des Beaux Arts in Brussels offers a wide range of dance and music programs each season. The Theatre Royal de la Monnaie is home of the noted "20th Century Ballet" troupe of Maurice Bejart. The Festival of Flanders and the Festival of Wallonia are world famous, as is Belgium's highly respected international music competition, the Queen Elizabeth Contest. Founded in 1951, it offers financial support and encouragement to talented young musicians and composers. Every 2 years, the Brussels-based Europalia organization presents a different European country in a series of prestigious cultural events including art forms and other aspects of traditional society (Greece was featured in 1982).

The Belgian daily and weekly press is predominantly party oriented. Radio and television are state monopolies, but Belgium's geographic location allows cable television subscribers to receive up to 15 television stations in France, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom.

HISTORY

Belgium has existed essentially in its present form since 1830, when an uprising led to independence from the Netherlands. The country's name goes back to a Celtic tribe, the Belgae, whom Julius Caesar described in his commentaries as the most courageous tribe in all of Gaul. The Belgae were overwhelmed, however, by Caesar's legions around 50 B.C., and for 300 years the area was a Roman province. Some scholars believe that the southern part of Belgium was the northernmost area of true Roman cultural penetration, beyond which Latin never really took hold. The proto-Dutch language, spoken by the Frankish invaders, who swept through the Roman Empire in the 4th century A.D., took hold north of that line and some say is at the root of the linguistic division of modern Belgium.

Throughout most of the Middle Ages, Belgian history was characterized by quasi-independent trading and manufacturing towns that rose out of the rubble left by the Viking ravages of northern Europe—Ghent, Bruges, Antwerp, Liege, and others. After centuries of war and many accidents of dynastic succession, the area that had come to be known as the Lowlands—comprising the approximate modern territories of Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg—came into the possession of Charles V, the Holy Roman Emperor in the early 1500s.

The arrival of Protestantism polarized the Lowlands into two hostile camps. In the religious wars, the split became geographic and political as Protestants succeeded in establishing the United Provinces of the Netherlands in the north. The remaining Catholic territory is approximately equivalent to modern Belgium.

After two centuries of Spanish rule, the country passed as a consequence of the Treaty of Utrecht (1713) to the Austrian Hapsburgs. It was annexed to France by Napoleon in 1794. After his defeat in 1815, Belgium was awarded to the Netherlands. However, the inhabitants, after 15 years of chafing against Dutch administrative and economic reforms, revolted and declared the independent state of Belgium in 1830. A German prince was found to take the newly established throne with its progressive, almost republican constitution, and the state was successfully launched with Leopold I as the first king of the Belgians.

For 84 years, Belgium remained neutral in an era of intra-European wars until German troops overran the country during their attack on France in 1914. King Albert, the constitutional commander in chief of the armed forces, rallied what remained of his troops and, after linking up with the Franch Army, was able to hang onto a tiny corner of Flemish Belgium near the sea throughout the war. Some of the fiercest battles of World War I were found on these "Flanders' fields."

The interwar years saw an unprecedented blooming of Flemish culture in northern Belgium and a sharpening of the ethnic rivalry between the northern Dutch-speaking Flemings and the southern French-speaking Walloons. Partly as a result, in 1936 Belgium reverted to its former policy of neutrality, trying not to provide Nazi Germany with an excuse to invade. As in 1914, this failed, and Belgium was occupied by the Germans in 1940. While the cabinet and other political leaders established a government-in-exile in London, the King remained in Belgium for the entire war. The King's behavior under the German occupation was sufficiently controversial to force him, in 1951, to abdicate in favor of his son, the present King Baudouin.

Seats in Parliament

October 1985 Election

Party	Senate	Chamber
CVP	40	49
PSC	16	20
PS	31	35
SP	21	32
PVV	23	22
PRL	20	24
VU	17	16
RW/FDF	6	4
PCB	1	0
Ecologists	5	9
Other	1	4

GOVERNMENT

Belgium is a parliamentary democracy under a constitutional monarch. Although the king (chief of state) is technically the source of all executive authority, the Council of Ministers (Cabinet) actually makes all governmental decisions. The Council of Ministers, led by the prime minister (head of government), holds office as long as it retains the confidence of the Parliament. Parliamentary elections are held at least every 4 years. There is universal suffrage, with obligatory voting and a complicated system of proportional representation.

The bicameral Parliament consists of the Senate and the House of Representatives. Of the 181 senators, 50 are elected by provincial councils, 25 by fellow senators, and the remainder (106) by direct vote. Prince Albert, heir to the throne, is also a member of the Senate. Members of the House of Representatives (212), traditionally the dominant body, are all directly elected.

In 1970 and 1980, the constitution was amended to provide for creation of community and regional assemblies and executive boards. These assemblies are composed of the members of the House of Representatives and of the directly elected senators from each regional cultural entity. The Flemish Community Executive Board is composed of 9 ministers and headed by Gaston Geens (CVP). The Walloon Regional Executive Board is composed of 6 ministers and headed by Jean-Maurice Dehousse (PS). The Francophone Community Executive Board is composed of 3 ministers and headed by Phillippe Moureaux (PS). These boards are responsible only to their respective regional or community assemblies.

The Belgian judiciary is modeled on the French system. The highest court is the Court of Cassation, the chief justice of which is appointed by the king. The courts do not pass on the constitutionality of legislation, but advisory opinions on the major legislation are rendered by the Council of State, a special legal group.

Principal Government Officials

Chief of State—King Baudouin I
Prime Minister—Wilfried Martens (CVP)
Vice Prime Minister and Minister of Justice—Jean Gol (PRL)
Vice Prime Minister and Minister of Finance and Foreign Trade—Willy DeClercq (PVV)
Vice Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior and Public Service—Charles-Ferdinand Nothomb (PSC)

Other Ministers

Foreign Relations—Leo Tindemans (CVP)
Economic Affairs—Mark Eyskens (CVP)
Defense—Alfred Vreven (PVV)

Ambassador to the United States—Herman Dehennin
Ambassador to the United Nations—Ms. Edmonde Dever

POLITICAL CONDITIONS

The most significant, long-term factor in Belgian politics is the division of the Belgian people into two major language groups—Dutch-speakers and French-speakers. All major institutions are divided by language. Regional and linguistic rivalries and needs must be taken into account in all important national decisions.

In the short term, the most urgent political problem the Cabinet faces is implementing economic austerity measures while maintaining Belgium's record of labor-management tranquillity.

The most important medium-term political issue is deciding how much significant power should be transferred from the central government to the regions, as called for in the amended constitution of 1980. Although political agreement existed for the regionalization of Flemish and Walloon affairs, there remains considerable controversy over the future status of nominally bilingual Brussels. In the interests of preserving harmony, the coalition has decided to postpone further discussion of the contentious issue of the status of Brussels for several more years.

Political Parties

Belgium has the traditional range of political parties normally found in a European democracy, from communist through socialist and social-Christian to conservative (called liberal in Belgium). In Belgium, however, the three parties that represent the main ideological tendencies (socialist, social-Christian, liberal) have split along linguistic lines into entirely separate parties—Flemish socialists and Francophone socialists, for example. Several strictly linguistic parties also exist, as do two small but dynamic political movements of ecologists.

Traditionally, the Roman Catholic Church was the basis for the Social Christian parties (known as the CVP in Flanders and the PSC in Wallonia). In recent years, the Social Christians generally have promoted broad principles of social unity without overt reference to ecclesiastical ties. The two parties draw support for their moderate policies from all social classes, including members of the Catholic Trade Union Federation (CSC/ACV), Belgium's largest labor organization.

Although faithful to the rhetoric of traditional Marxist principles, the socialist parties in Belgium (the PS in Wallonia and the SP in Flanders) are pragmatic and moderate on most issues. Their followers have concentrated on social welfare and industrial democracy within the framework of Belgium's free enterprise economy. The parties are closely associated with the Belgian Federation of Labor (FGTB/ABVV), the country's second largest trade union organization.

The liberal parties (the PRL in Wallonia and the PVV in Flanders) promote free enterprise, individualism, and small business. Liberals favor reducing government spending and regulations and believe that the state should encourage private initiative. The liberals advocate moderate, gradual social reform and appeal mainly to the middle class, particularly small businesses, professionals, and shopkeepers.

The Volksunie (VU), a Flemish nationalist party, favors the transformation of Belgium into a federal state with autonomous Flemish and Walloon regions. The counterpart of the Volksunie in Wallonia is known as the Rassemblement Wallon (RW), which advocates an autonomous Walloon region. Related to the RW is the Democratic Front of Francophones (FDF), which defends the interests of the francophone majority in metropolitan Brussels.

The tiny Communist Party (PCB) attempts to steer a middle course between Moscow and the Eurocommunists but is not a significant political force on the national level.

In 1979 and 1980, three different Cabinets were needed to succeed in amending the constitution and to pass the 1980 Devolution Acts. At that moment, ethnic tensions eased somewhat while economic problems emerged, creating growing divisions between Social Christians and socialists in the Cabinet. In 1981, Prime Minister Martens had to resign because he failed to obtain sufficient support from the socialists or from within his own party for a package of austerity measures. Mark Eyskens, also CVP, took over as prime minister with an otherwise essentially unchanged Social Christian-socialist coalition. Eyskens also could not close the widening gap between Social Christians and socialists, and later in 1981, the inevitable clash over the survival of the Walloon steel industry brought down the Eyskens cabinet. In the ensuing general elections of November 1981, the two Social Christian parties suffered historic defeats.

However, the CVP remained the country's largest party and had no great trouble convincing the PSC and the two liberal parties to form a coalition which became the Martens V government. In its first years in office, the Martens V government concentrated on improving the competitive position of the Belgian economy and the situation of Belgian public finances. To be able to take rapid action, the Cabinet obtained "special powers" from Parliament. However, in 1983, there was a reemergence of ethnic tension over the Walloon steel industry problem and the question of transferring responsibility for the five "national" economic sectors—steel, coal, shipbuilding, glass, and textile—to the regional governments.

In October 1985, Prime Minister Martens' center-right coalition was given an enhanced mandate in parliamentary elections. Martens was expected to reform his government and continue to pursue policies of economic austerity and fiscal responsibility.

DEFENSE

As a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Belgium participates in the collective security efforts of the alliance, and its armed forces are included in NATO's integrated military structure. Belgium is host not only to NATO Headquarters, in Brussels, but also to the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Power Group (SHAPE), located near the southern town of Mons. As part of its commitment to NATO, Belgium has a corps headquarters, a division headquarters, and two brigades, with supporting elements, permanently stationed in the Federal Republic of Germany. In March 1985, Belgium reaffirmed its commitment to the alliance by agreeing to begin deployment of cruise missiles on Belgian soil.

According to the official yearbook on the public sector, career military personnel in the army, navy, and air force numbered 63,560 in 1980. In addition, for the same year, Parliament authorized the call-up of 51,000 conscripts for a period of 8–10 months of compulsory military service. Belgium's national defense budget for 1983 is projected at about $1.8 billion, representing 5.8% of the proposed central government budget for 1983.

ECONOMY

Belgium is a densely populated, highly industrialized country in the middle of one of the world's foremost industrial regions. It lies within 160 kilometers (100 mi.) of London, Paris, the Ruhr Valley, and most of the Netherlands.

Traditionally, Belgium has thrived on trade advantages derived from its highly skilled and productive work force. As a result, it is one of the most open economies in the world, importing raw materials and components to which it adds value and exporting about 57% of its gross national product (GNP) each year. In recent years, foreign demand for Belgium's traditional products has declined, and Belgium has entered the 1980s facing a difficult period of structural adjustment.

Belgium's modern industrial era began in the early 19th century with the development of a steel industry in the south, which spurred the industrial revolution on the European Continent. By the turn of the century, Belgium had been divided *de facto* into a heavily industrialized southern region populated by French-speaking factory workers and an agricultural northern region of Dutch-speaking small farmers. Gradually, however, new industries began to take hold in Flanders. After World War II, Flemish light manufacturing and chemical industries developed rapidly. By the mid-1970s, the economic center had shifted northward, leaving Wallonia with an aging steel industry, while world competition had become increasingly stiff.

Following years of deteriorating economic performance and neglected structural reform, the 1980–82 recession shook Belgium to the core. Unemployment mounted, and government revenues plummeted while "countercyclical" expenses increased. Foreign borrowing, first introduced as an aberration in 1979, mushroomed as the country

Travel Notes

Climate and clothing: Clothing and shoe needs in Belgium are about the same as for the Pacific Northwest. Raincoat, umbrella, and low-heeled, thick-soled walking shoes are necessary. Winters generally are less severe than in the US, with little snow.

Telecommunications: Telephone and telegraph services, domestic and international, are efficient. Direct-dial service between Brussels, the US, and most European capitals is available. Rates for local telephone service are significantly higher than in most US cities.

Transportation: Subways, streetcars, and buses provide good local transportation. Trains are fast and frequent. Roads are excellent. Limited access highways link most major cities in Belgium and provide rapid access to nearby centers such as Paris, Amsterdam, and the German Ruhr. Secondary roads are adequate. All automobiles driven in Belgium must be covered by unlimited third-party liability insurance against personal or property damage; this insurance must be issued by a company licensed to do business in Belgium.

Health: Belgium requires that at least one pharmacy be open in a given neighborhood at all times. The address of that pharmacy is posted on the door of all pharmacies in the neighborhood, and a list of open pharmacies is also published in newspapers. Public health standards are on a par with those in the U.S. Brussels has a modern sewerage and refuse disposal system and water purification facilities. Tapwater is potable.

Tourist attractions: Cities such as Bruges, Ghent, Liege, Antwerp, Louvain, and Brussels have their roots deep in the Middle Ages, and portions of these cities' centers still look much as they did centuries ago. Excellent museums abound, featuring works of renowned Flemish masters. Belgium's short North Sea coast has several popular resorts, and the Ardennes Forest claims some of the most beautiful scenery in Europe, with many hotels offering serenity and excellent cuisine.

Further Information

These titles are provided as a general indication of material published on this country. The Department of State does not endorse unofficial publications.

Cowie, Donald. *Belgium: The Land and the People.* Cranbury, N.J.: A.S. Barnes, 1977.

Debandt, Jean-Pierre. *CCH Business Guide to Belgium.* Chicago: Commerce Clearing House, 1978.

Friedlander, Max J. *Van Eyck to Breughel.* 3d ed. New York: Dutton, 1969 (paper).

Huggett, Frank E. *Modern Belgium.* New York: Praeger, 1969.

Loder, Dorothy. *The Land and People of Belgium.* Rev. ed. New York: Lippincott, 1977 (for young readers).

Mallinson, V. *Belgium.* London: Benn, 1969.

Riley, Raymond. *Belgium.* Studies in Industrial Geography.
Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1976.

Available from the Superintendent of Documents, U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402:

American University. *Area Handbook for Belgium, 1974.*

For information on economic trends, commercial development, production, trade regulations, and tariff rates, contact the International Trade Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, Washington, D.C. 20230 or any Commerce Department district office.

struggled to maintain its accustomed high standard of living. Every sector suffered except the consumers, who until 1982 continued spending at the expense of industrial competitiveness and profits. Government deficits climbed, and the national debt shot up from 50% to 70% of GNP. The foreign exchange portion of the debt rose from 2% to 12% of GNP during that period.

In this context, Prime Minister Martens' center-right coalition government formulated an economic recovery program to promote export-led growth by enhancing the competitiveness of Belgium's export industries. The Belgian franc was devalued 8.5% within the European monetary system in February 1982. The government also severed the link between inflation and wages and reduced the burden of corporate income taxation. Incentives were introduced to stimulate risk capital investment.

In addition, steps were taken to reduce the rate of government expenditures below the anticipated growth of government revenues. A partial price freeze was instituted to allow the devaluation to boost trade and corporate profitability rather than to dissipate through inflation. Together with the corporate tax cuts and other incentives, the price freeze was meant to encourage investment and, ultimately, the creation of new employment. Meanwhile, the decoupling of wages from inflation would lower real personal income, depress consumption including imports, and begin to redistribute national income from households to the production sector.

In 1983, the economic austerity program began to show progress, particularly in the export-oriented manufacturing sector. In 1984, industrial activity gained further momentum and exceeded an annual growth rate of 5%. Production in the steel and metalworking industry increased due to greater investments. The expansion of high-tech industry, particularly in Flanders, and the service sector continued at a steady pace. Residential construction also picked up owing to the running out of preferential value-added tax rates on construction. Real growth in GNP was approximately 2%, and by 1985, the government expects a surplus in both its trade and current accounts.

However, despite significant progress in those areas of the economy, conditions for the consumer have not changed dramatically. Average real wages have declined about 12% since 1982, and consumption is 1% below the level for that year. Unemployment leveled off in 1984 at 12.3%, but slight increases are expected before it begins to decline again. While conditions have not started to better for the average worker personally, there exists widespread acceptance that the austerity program will lead to better economic health as economic activity picks up during the rest of the decade.

Because about 75% of Belgium's trade is with its fellow European Communities (EC) countries, the Belgian economy is closely related to their economic performance. Belgium is seeking to diversify, expand, and consolidate trade relations with nontraditional trading partners, particularly with the Middle East, Eastern Europe, and China.

Foreign investment played an important part in Belgian economic growth in the 1960s. The Belgian Government encourages new investment from abroad as a means to promote employment. While new U.S. investment has declined in recent years, the total U.S. direct investment of 904 American companies operating in Belgium is estimated at $5.15 billion. The American Chamber of Commerce has calculated that U.S. companies provide about 1 of each 11 jobs in Belgium. Because of their strong export orientation, these jobs have been more resilient in the economic crisis than has employment geared to the domestic market.

FOREIGN RELATIONS

The Concert of Nations sanctioned the creation of Belgium in 1830 on the condition that the country remain strictly neutral. Before each of the World Wars, Belgium tried to follow a policy of neutrality. Recognizing the need for a better means of preserving its independence, however, Belgium was among the founding members of the Atlantic alliance in 1949.

In 1945, abandoning its twice unsuccessful policy of neutrality, Belgium became one of 12 founding members of NATO in 1949. Brussels became the host city for NATO Headquarters when NATO left Paris in 1966. Brussels is also host to the administrative body of the EC and has become a magnet for many other international organizations and for many regional corporation headquarters of U.S.-based firms.

Belgium continues to be a strong proponent of NATO and of close cooperation with the United States within the alliance. At the same time, the Belgians, cognizant of their country's small size, advocate strengthening the economic and political integration of the European Communities. They see the country's political and economic welfare as being founded on the Atlantic alliance and on enhanced European unity.

Belgium seeks improved East-West relations through such means as the mutual and balanced force reductions and by further implementing the goals agreed to in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Belgium also strongly supports the United Nations.

U.S.-BELGIAN RELATIONS

The excellent relations between the United States and Belgium are based on a similarity of outlook and a common dedication to the security of the free world. Good will toward Americans continues as a result of the U.S. role during and after the two World Wars.

Belgium works closely with the United States bilaterally and multilaterally to further liberalize trade, economic and political cooperation, and assistance to developing countries.

Belgian Embassy and Consulates

Belgian Embassy

3330 Garfield Street, NW,
Washington, D.C. 20008
Tel. 202-333-6900

Consulates General

Michael Servais
Peachtree Center Cain Tower
229 Peachtree Street, NE
Atlanta, Georgia 30303
Tel. 404-659-2152

Jacques Laurent
333 N. Michigan Avenue, Room 2000
Chicago, Illinois 60601
Tel. 313-263-6624

Alfred Ameel
River Oaks
Bank & Trust Tower, Suite 314
2001 Kirby Drive
Houston, Texas 77019
Tel. 713-526-0242

Baron Yvo de Vleeschauwer van Brackel
50 Rockefeller Plaza, Room 1104
New York, New York 10020
Tel. 212-586-5110

Andre Adam
3921 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 600
Los Angeles, California 90010
Tel. 213-385-8116

Principal U.S. Officials

Ambassador—Geoffrey Swaebe
Deputy Chief of Mission—Ronald E. Woods
Political Counselor—William H. Marsh
Economic Counselor—Lange Schemerhorn
Commercial Counselor—Hendrik N. Smit
Administrative Counselor—Earl W. Bellinger
Public Affairs Counselor (USIA)—Christopher Snow
Defense Attache—William P. O'Bryan
Agricultural Attache—Roger S. Lowen
Director, Office of Federal Aviation Administration—Phillip M. Swatek
Consular Officer—Mildred Patterson
Consul General, Antwerp— George Rueckert
Permanent Representative to the U.S. Mission to NATO (USNATO)—Amb. David M. Abshire
Deputy Permanent Representative and Deputy Chief of Mission, USNATO—Stephen J. Ledogar
Ambassador to the U.S. Mission to the EC (USEC)—William Middendorf
Deputy Chief of Mission, USEC—Robert Brungart

The U.S. Embassy in Belgium is located at 27 Boulevard du Regent, 1000 Brussels (tel. 513-38-30). The U.S. Consulate General in Antwerp is located at Nationalestraat 5 (tel. 03-2321800); and the European Logistical Support Office (ELSO), at Noorderlaan 147, 2030 Antwerp (tel. 03-5424775).

The U.S. Mission to NATO is at NATO Headquarters, on the Autoroute de Zaventem, 1110 Brussels (tel. 241-44-00). The U.S. Mission to the EC is located at 40 Boulevard du Regent, 1000 Brussels (tel. 513-44-50).

Published by the United States Department of State • Bureau of Public Affairs • Office of Public Communication • Editorial Division • Washington, D.C. • November 1985
Editor: Juanita Adams

Department of State Publication 8087
Background Notes Series • This material is in the public domain and may be reproduced without permission; citation of this source would be appreciated.

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402

BELGIAN FRANC CONVERSION TABLE AT BF 52.8 = U.S. $

(Franc = 100 centimes)

FRANC TO U.S. DOLLARS		U.S. DOLLARS TO FRANC	
franc	U.S. $	U.S. $	franc
5.0	0.09	.10	5.28
10.0	0.19	.25	13.20
25.0	0.47	.50	26.40
40.0	0.76	.75	39.60
50.0	0.95	1.00	52.80
100	1.89	3.00	158.40
300	5.68	5.00	264.00
500	9.47	10.00	528.00
1,000	18.94	20.00	1,056.00
5,000	94.70	50.00	2,640.00
15,000	284.09	100.00	5,280.00
30,000	568.18	300.00	15,840.00
40,000	757.58	500.00	26,400.00

NOTE: ALL U.S. DOLLAR VALUES ARE ROUNDED TO NEAREST U.S. CENT. VALUE OF BELGIAN FRANC FLUCTUATES DAILY ACCORDING TO CURRENCY MARKET CONDITIONS.

November 4, 1985

SITE INFORMATION - BRUSSELS

CITY OF BRUSSELS - Capital and largest city of Belgium, Brussels is also the capital of Brabant Province. The city is located in central Belgium on the Senne River, near Antwerp. Brussels is internationally important as the headquarters of NATO and the European Economic Community. The name of the city is probably derived from Broekzelle, a Flemish word meaning "village of the marsh." The town developed from Gallic-Roman settlements in the marshes of the Senne Valley before the 7th century. By the 10th century, commerce and handicrafts were flourishing. Brussels has long been known for the production of fine lace and the weaving of tapestries. The buildings lining the Grand Place, the central square of the city, represent one of the finest groupings of late medieval architecture in Europe.

During its history, the city was ruled by the Austrian Habsburgs and the Spanish branch of the Habsburg family, the French and the Dutch. Brussels was the center of the revolution of Belgian independence and was made capital of the newly established Kingdom of Belgium in 1831.

NATO HEADQUARTERS CONFERENCE ROOM - This room is generally used for Ministerial and other meetings. Recent distinguished visitors who have addressed the North Atlantic Council in the conference room include:

-- Queen Elizabeth II - November 25, 1980

-- Portugese President Antonio Eanes - April 30, 1982

-- Grand Duke Jean of Luxembourg - October 14, 1982

-- Vice President George Bush - June 28, 1985

On the wall behind the Secretary General's seat hangs the NATO motto, "Animus in Consulendo Liber" -- the official translation for which is, "In discussion a free mind." Affixed to the inside of the conference room's horseshoe-shaped table is the NATO emblem which, according to a statement released when the emblem was chosen in 1953, symbolizes "A four-pointed star representing the compass that keeps us on the right road, the path of peace, and a circle representing the unity that binds together the now 16 countries of NATO."

Geoffrey Swaebe
Ambassador to Belgium

Geoffrey Swaebe serves as Ambassador to Belgium. In his prior assignment, he served as the United States Ambassador to the United Nations European Office in Geneva.

A prominent California businessman for the past 20 years, Mr. Swaebe was board chairman and president of the May Department Stores. He served as a director and on the executive committee of the First Charter Financial Corporation. He was a member of the Mayor's Advisory Council and of the Urban Redevelopment Commission, City of Los Angeles.

Mr. Swaebe was born March 23, 1911, in London, England. He served in the U.S. Army as a captain in the European theater in World War II.

David M. Abshire
U.S. Ambassador to NATO

David M. Abshire was appointed U.S. Permanent Representative on the Council of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, with rank of Ambassador, in July 1983.

Mr. Abshire has served as a member of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, the U.S. Board for International Broadcasting (1974–77), Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations (1970–73), Executive Director of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (founder 1962; 1962–70), and Director, Special Projects, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research (1960–62). He was Director and Vice Chairman of the Board of Youth for Understanding (1978–81) and a member of the Board of Advisors of the Naval War College (1975–77). Mr. Abshire has served on the National Park Foundation Board, is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, and director of the Tinker Foundation of New York. He is founder and co-editor of *The Washington Quarterly* and an author of several books.

From 1970 to 1973, Mr. Abshire was assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations.

Mr. Abshire was born April 11, 1926, in Chattanooga, Tennessee. He graduated (B.S.) in 1951 from the U.S. Military Academy and received a Ph.D. in 1959 from Georgetown University.

Ambassador J. William Middendorf II
U.S. Representative to the European Communities

Ambassador J. William Middendorf II was appointed U.S. Representative to the European Communities in July 1985. Before his appointment he had served as U.S. Permanent Representative to the Organization of American States since July 1981.

Previously, Mr. Middendorf has served as Ambassador to the Netherlands (1969–73) and as Secretary of the Navy (1974–77). His private experience in investment banking culminated in his own partnership (1962–69). Following his position as Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Middendorf became President and Chief Executive Officer of Financial Bankshares, Inc. He is also an author lecturer and serves on the Board of Directors of Georgetown University, the U.S. Olympic Committee, and numerous other organizations.

Mr. Middendorf has received the highest decorations from Egypt (from President Sadat for his efforts to clear the Suez Canal), Brazil, and the Departments of State, Defense, and Navy.

Mr. Middendorf was born September 22, 1924, in Baltimore, Maryland. He received a Bachelor of Naval Science in 1945 from Holy Cross College, a B.A. in 1947 from Harvard University, and an M.B.A. in 1954 from the New York University Graduate School of Business Administration.

U.S. Officials in Belgium

Brussels

AMB: Geoffrey Swaebe
DCM: Ronald E. Woods
POL: William H. Marsh
ECO: Lange Schermerhorn
COM: Hendrik N. Smit
ADM: Earl W. Bellinger
PAO: Christopher Snow

U.S. Mission to NATO

US PERM REP: Amb. David M. Abshire
DEP PERM REP/DCM: Stephen J. Ledogar
POL ADV: Robert H. Frowick
PUB AFF ADV: Victor B. Olason
ADM ADV: Col. Henry M. Reed III

U.S. Mission to the European Communities (USEC)

AMB: J. William Middendorf II
DCM: Robert R. Brungart
POL COUNS: Jack M. Seymour, Jr.
ECO COUNS: Karl K. Jonietz
PUB AFF COUNS: G. Alfred Kennedy

Permanent Representatives to the North Atlantic Council

Belgium	Juan Cassiers
Canada	Gordon Scott Smith
Denmark	Otto Borch
France	Gilles Curien
Fed Rep of Germany	Niels Hansen
Greece	Styliano Vassilikos
Iceland	Tomas Tomasson
Italy	Francesco Paolo Fulci
Luxembourg	Jean Wagner
Netherlands	Jakob G.N. de Hoop Scheffer
Norway	Eivinn Berg
Portugal	Antonio Vaz Pereira
Spain	No permanent representative
Turkey	Osman Olcay
United Kingdom	Sir John Alexander Graham

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name
EUROPEAN AND SOVIET AFFAIRS DIRECTORATE, NSC : RECORDS

Withdrawer
SMF 4/25/2005

File Folder
PRESS BOOK-MEETINGS OF REAGAN AND GORBACHEV, GENEVA, NOVEMBER 1985 (4)

FOIA
1995-039/1

Box Number
91101

3

ID	*Document Type* *Document Description*	*No of pages*	*Doc Date*	*Restric-tions*
8797	BI BIO	1	10/29/1985	B1 B3

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name
EUROPEAN AND SOVIET AFFAIRS DIRECTORATE, NSC : RECORDS

Withdrawer
SMF 4/25/2005

File Folder
PRESS BOOK-MEETINGS OF REAGAN AND GORBACHEV, GENEVA, NOVEMBER 1985 (4)

FOIA
1995-039/1

Box Number
91101

3

ID	*Document Type* *Document Description*	*No of pages*	*Doc Date*	*Restric-tions*
8798	BI BIO	1	10/30/1985	B1 B3

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name
EUROPEAN AND SOVIET AFFAIRS DIRECTORATE, NSC : RECORDS

Withdrawer
SMF 4/25/2005

File Folder
PRESS BOOK-MEETINGS OF REAGAN AND GORBACHEV, GENEVA, NOVEMBER 1985 (4)

FOIA
1995-039/1

Box Number
91101

3

ID	*Document Type* *Document Description*	*No of pages*	*Doc Date*	*Restric-tions*
8799	BI BIO	1	4/10/1985	B1 B3

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name
EUROPEAN AND SOVIET AFFAIRS DIRECTORATE, NSC : RECORDS

Withdrawer
SMF 4/25/2005

File Folder
PRESS BOOK-MEETINGS OF REAGAN AND GORBACHEV, GENEVA, NOVEMBER 1985 (4)

FOIA
1995-039/1

Box Number
91101

3

ID	*Document Type* *Document Description*	*No of pages*	*Doc Date*	*Restric-tions*
8800	BI BIO	1	4/11/1985	B1 B3

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name
EUROPEAN AND SOVIET AFFAIRS DIRECTORATE, NSC : RECORDS

Withdrawer
SMF 4/25/2005

File Folder
PRESS BOOK-MEETINGS OF REAGAN AND GORBACHEV, GENEVA, NOVEMBER 1985 (4)

FOIA
1995-039/1

Box Number
91101

3

ID	*Document Type* *Document Description*	*No of pages*	*Doc Date*	*Restric-tions*
8801	BI BIO	1	8/8/1985	B1 B3

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name
EUROPEAN AND SOVIET AFFAIRS DIRECTORATE, NSC : RECORDS

Withdrawer
SMF 4/25/2005

File Folder
PRESS BOOK-MEETINGS OF REAGAN AND GORBACHEV, GENEVA, NOVEMBER 1985 (4)

FOIA
1995-039/1

Box Number
91101

3

ID	*Document Type* *Document Description*	*No of pages*	*Doc Date*	*Restric-tions*
8802	BI BIO	1	10/30/1985	B1 B3

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name
EUROPEAN AND SOVIET AFFAIRS DIRECTORATE, NSC : RECORDS

Withdrawer
SMF 4/25/2005

File Folder
PRESS BOOK-MEETINGS OF REAGAN AND GORBACHEV, GENEVA, NOVEMBER 1985 (4)

FOIA
1995-039/1

Box Number
91101

3

ID	*Document Type* *Document Description*	*No of pages*	*Doc Date*	*Restric-tions*
8803	BI BIO	1	9/4/1985	B1 B3

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name
EUROPEAN AND SOVIET AFFAIRS DIRECTORATE, NSC : RECORDS

Withdrawer
SMF 4/25/2005

File Folder
PRESS BOOK-MEETINGS OF REAGAN AND GORBACHEV, GENEVA, NOVEMBER 1985 (4)

FOIA
1995-039/1

Box Number
91101

3

ID	*Document Type* *Document Description*	*No of pages*	*Doc Date*	*Restric-tions*
8804	BI BIO	1	10/30/1985	B1 B3

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name
EUROPEAN AND SOVIET AFFAIRS DIRECTORATE, NSC : RECORDS

Withdrawer
SMF 4/25/2005

File Folder
PRESS BOOK-MEETINGS OF REAGAN AND GORBACHEV, GENEVA, NOVEMBER 1985 (4)

FOIA
1995-039/1

Box Number
91101

3

ID	*Document Type* *Document Description*	*No of pages*	*Doc Date*	*Restric-tions*
8805	BI BIO	1	11/8/1985	B1 B3

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.