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REGIONAL ISSUES

PROMINENT HUMAN RIGHTS CASES

The preeminent representative of the Soviet human rights movement, Andrei Sakharov, remains isolated in Gorkiy with his wife, Yelena Bonner. Despite Western outcry, the Soviets have permitted no family, friends, or independent observers to visit Sakharov to determine his condition. Former Helsinki monitor Anatoliy Shcharanskiy has now been imprisoned for more than eight years and is currently held in Labor Camp 35 near Perm; he still has six years to serve. The founder of the Soviet Helsinki Monitor movement, Yuriy Orlov, remains in exile in Yakutia.

The crackdown on Jewish cultural activists and Hebrew teachers begun in July 1984 has swelled the ranks of Jewish prisoners in the Soviet Union. Among those now imprisoned are Iosif Begun, Zakhar Zunshine, Yuriy Edelshtein, Iosif Berenshtein, and Aleksandr Kholmianskiy. Among the hundreds of Christians imprisoned in the USSR for their religious activities, the names of Vladimir Khailo, Dina Shvedsova, Vasyl Kobrin, Iosif Terelya, Father Svarinskas, Father Tamkevicius, Father Gleb Yakunin, Pastor Nikolai Goretoi, Viktor Val'ter, Viktoras Petkus, and Balys Gajauskas stand out. Muslims, such as Abuzakar Rahimov, and Hare Krishnas, including Vladimir Kustrya, are two of the many other religions that have suffered.

Soviet psychiatrist Anatoliy Koryagin remains near death in a Soviet prison as a result of his efforts to expose Soviet abuse of psychiatry. Unofficial peace group members Aleksandr Shatravka and Vladimir Brodskiy are in prison for their peace activities. Sergei Khodorovich, former administrator of the Russian Social (Solzhenitsyn) Fund, remains imprisoned, as does Valeriy Senderov, one of the founders of an independent trade union in the USSR.

Mart Niklus and Enn Tarto are both serving long sentences for their activities in defense of the Estonian national and human rights movements. Vytautas Skuodis (AKA Ben Scott) is a U.S. citizen of Lithuanian heritage imprisoned in Lithuania for his national and human rights activities. Mykola Horbal, a former Ukrainian Helsinki Monitor, has recently had his sentence extended in a Soviet labor camp. And Yuriy Shukhevich, first arrested at 14 because his father was the commander of the WWII Ukrainian Insurgent Army, has now spent 33 years of his life in prison.

THE PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE ON REGIONAL CONFLICT: A SUMMARY

The Initiative

President Reagan's initiative aims at achieving peace and internal reconciliation, ending foreign military involvement, and fostering economic reconstruction in five of the most pressing international conflicts of the day: the wars in Afghanistan, Cambodia, Nicaragua, Angola, and Ethiopia. As the President said in his October 24 speech to the United Nations, "the recurrent pattern of conflict that we see in these five cases ought to be broken as soon as possible."

The President's plan sets forth a comprehensive and flexible framework for cooperation toward these goals among the warring parties themselves, between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, and among other interested parties. The plan, which would complement and bolster existing peace-making efforts, involves action at three levels:

-- The starting point is a process of negotiation among the warring parties themselves. "The form of these talks may and should vary," the President explained, "but negotiations -- and an improvement of internal political conditions -- are essential to achieving an end to violence, the withdrawal of foreign troops and national reconciliation."

-- The second level involves joint U.S. and Soviet talks about how best to support the ongoing talks among the warring parties, when those negotiations make genuine progress. "In every case," the President said, "the primary task is to promote this goal: verified elimination of the foreign military presence and restraint on the flow of outside arms".

-- The third level entails an international effort to welcome these countries back into the world economy. "Despite past differences," the President pledged, "the United States would respond generously to their democratic reconciliation with their own people, their respect for human rights, and their return to the family of free nations."

This plan puts the primary responsibility on the warring parties themselves to reach accommodation; as the President points out, it is not for the United States or the Soviet Union to impose solutions. Yet it also provides a framework for the Soviet Union to cooperate with the United States in helping to bring peace to these five countries. "Let us begin where there is great need and great hope," the President stated. "This will be a clear step forward to help people choose their future more freely. Moreover, this is an extraordinary opportunity for the Soviet side to make a contribution to regional peace which in turn can promote future dialogue and negotiations on other critical issues."

The Five Conflicts

The five wars cited by the President lie at the core of international tensions. Although all originate in local disputes, they share common characteristics. As the President stated:

-- "They are the consequence of an ideology imposed from without, dividing nations and creating regimes that are, almost from the day they take power, at war with their own people."

-- "These wars are exacting a staggering human toll and threaten to spill across international boundaries and trigger dangerous confrontations."

-- "These wars played a large role in building suspicions and tensions...over the purpose of Soviet policy."

The unpopular Soviet-style régimes in each of the five cases have often been imposed by direct military intervention or kept in power by Soviet military aid. The policies of these regimes have given rise to indigenous opposition seeking to liberalize or overthrow them. The President has made clear that our sympathies are with those who resist Soviet expansionism, fight for freedom, and seek genuine self-determination. "Until such time as these negotiations result in definitive progress," the President affirmed, "America's support for struggling democratic resistance forces must not and shall not cease."

If these problems cannot be resolved through negotiations and by Soviet restraint, they will only worsen. The President's proposal is meant to provide a means by which to pursue political rather than military solutions to these problems.

"This plan is bold," the President stated, "and it is realistic. It is not a substitute for existing peace-making efforts; it complements them. We are not trying to solve every conflict in every region of the globe, and we recognize that each conflict has its own character. Naturally, other regional problems will require different approaches."

"With hard work and imagination," the President concluded, "there is no limit to what, working together, our nations can achieve. Gaining a peaceful resolution of these conflicts will open whole new vistas for peace and progress."

CENTRAL AMERICA

Until the mid-1970's, Soviet involvement in Latin America was concentrated in Cuba. Since that time the USSR has become heavily involved in Central America. Soviet assistance to Cuba (over 4 billion dollars per year the last several years) in effect finances Havana's support of violent, radical forces in the region. While portraying a limited economic commitment to Nicaragua as evidence of restraint, the Soviets and their allies since 1981 have provided the Sandinistas arms sales and grants on the order of \$400-500 million. Direct and substantial Soviet military aid to the Sandinistas began in 1984 including T-55 tanks, MI-24 HIND D attack helicopters, and SA-7 surface-to-air missiles. This aid has created an enormous Central American military imbalance and promoted tension in the region. There are also approximately 150 Soviet military and civilian advisors in Nicaragua as well as 3,000-3,500 Cuban military/security personnel and several thousand militarily trained civilians.

The primary U.S. objective in Central America is to support the institutionalization of democracy. The trend in Central America is toward open, pluralistic democracies. Honduras, Guatemala, and Costa Rica will hold elections in the next few months; El Salvador continues democratic reforms under the Duarte Government. Nicaragua's suspension of civil liberties on October 15 is recent evidence that the Sandinistas continue to go against the trend.

U.S. objectives in Nicaragua are to get the Sandinistas to: end support for subversion in neighboring countries; reduce Nicaragua's military inventories and troop levels to levels that restore equilibrium in the region; sever Nicaraguan military and security ties to the Soviet Bloc and Cuba; and implement Sandinista promises on democracy. The United States supports a comprehensive and verifiable implementation of the September 1983 Contadora Document of Objectives which addresses these four objectives. The Soviet Union does not have an official position on Contadora beyond vague expressions of support. (Contadora negotiations resumed October 8 with the aim of reaching agreement within 45 negotiating days.)

We are aware of Sandinista interest in acquiring jet combat aircraft, and have warned the Soviets and Cubans that acquisition of such aircraft by Managua would be unacceptable to the United States. Soviet support for Salvadoran insurgents is also a matter of deep concern. We have advised Moscow that Soviet interference in Central America and the Caribbean carries a heavy cost in overall relations with the U.S. As part of a U.S. initiative to exchange views on regional conflicts, U.S. and Soviet experts discussed Central America and the Caribbean in Washington October 31-November 1.

Afghanistan

September 1985

Background: The current situation in Afghanistan is a direct outgrowth of the Soviet invasion of December 1979, when the Soviet Union sent troops into the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, executed Marxist Prime Minister Hafizullah Amin, and installed the puppet regime of Babrak Karmal. The Democratic Republic of Afghanistan was established following the April 1978 Marxist coup d'etat that overthrew and killed then President Mohammad Daoud and named Noor Mohammad Taraki president and prime minister. In turn, Taraki was killed by Amin in September 1979.

Opposition to the Marxist government developed almost immediately after the April 1978 coup. Since the 1979 Soviet invasion, the resistance has spread throughout the entire country and continues today in the form of a nationwide insurgency against the Soviets and the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. The Soviets, with approximately 115,000 troops in the country and with a dispirited Afghan army that has dwindled to less than half its former strength of 90,000 men, have failed in their attempts to suppress the Afghan resistance or to establish the authority of the Karmal government. This stalemate continues to frustrate Soviet efforts to complete the conquest of the country.

Afghan resistance: In May 1985, the seven major resistance groups--the mujahidin or "holy warriors"--came together in a loose alliance with a rotating spokesman. Although united in their desire to rid their country of the Soviets, the seven groups have long been divided by ideologies and personalities, and progress in breathing life into the new entity has been slow. Nevertheless, they have formed a military committee as well as a consultative council. They may also be on the way to setting up a political affairs committee that, among other things, will sponsor the opening of alliance offices around the world. The morale of the Afghan freedom fighters remains high. They are better armed, trained, and led and therefore more effective than ever before. There is evidence of greater military cooperation against the Soviets and their Afghan surrogates, who are experiencing mounting losses of supply convoys, Soviet helicopters, and fixed-wing aircraft.

Faced with more effective opposition on the one hand, and a weak and ineffective Afghan army on the other, the Soviets have relied increasingly on their own troops. Their brutal tactics include saturation bombings, willful destruction of crops and livestock, and reprisals against noncombatants as a means of wearing down civilian support for the resistance.

Afghan refugees: The 2-2.5 million Afghan refugees in Pakistan constitute the world's largest refugee population. Including some 1.5 million Afghans in Iran, about half of them refugees, the estimated number of Afghans in exile now is more than 3.5 million--about 20% of

the Afghan population in 1979. Since the international relief effort began in 1980, the US Government has contributed more than \$420 million for the Afghans in Pakistan. In September 1985, the US Agency for International Development established a mission in Islamabad to administer an additional program of humanitarian assistance to help Afghans inside their country.

UN efforts: Since January 1980, the UN General Assembly has approved overwhelmingly six resolutions calling for a negotiated political settlement based on four principles: (1) complete withdrawal of Soviet troops; (2) restoration of an independent and nonaligned Afghanistan; (3) self-determination for the Afghan people; and (4) return of the refugees with safety and honor. To achieve these goals, the UN Secretary General, through a personal representative, has been conducting an indirect negotiating process that seeks a political settlement. Negotiations began in Geneva in June 1982; the fifth round ended in August 1985. The talks include the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and Pakistan, with the Soviets unofficially involved. Pakistan refuses to negotiate directly with the Kabul government, and UN Under Secretary Diego Cordovez shuttles between the two delegations during negotiations. Although all parties want the UN process to continue, agreement on the key issue of Soviet withdrawal seems as distant as ever, and prospects for a political settlement are not promising.

Soviet position: The Soviets justify their presence in Afghanistan with the claim that a limited contingent of Soviet troops was invited into Afghanistan by a friendly government. This assertion ignores the execution of the head of that government, Hafizullah Amin, by the invading Soviets and the installation of Babrak Karmal in his place. The Soviets insist that withdrawal of their forces is a bilateral matter between them and the Kabul regime, to take place only with Kabul's agreement--an unlikely event because the regime could not survive without the Soviet military presence. The Soviet and Kabul regime position is that outside interference (the US, among others, is named as a major source) must cease before a political settlement can be achieved. They maintain that the countrywide insurgency results from outside interference rather than widespread internal opposition to the Karmal government and Soviet occupation. The Soviets stress the need for international guarantees of noninterference but not withdrawal of their forces--asking the outside world, in effect, to secure the end of Afghan resistance as a precondition to Soviet withdrawal.

US position: The US strongly opposes the continuing Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, and the issue remains a major irritant in East-West relations. Although we view Soviet withdrawal as the key, we believe that a settlement also must provide for the three other principles contained in the UN Afghanistan resolutions. Such an agreement could include appropriate international guarantees of the stability of a settlement. The US supports the UN indirect negotiating effort to achieve these goals.

EASTERN EUROPE

Following World War II, a string of Soviet-dominated Communist governments were put into place throughout Eastern Europe. In 1948, Tito's Yugoslavia broke from Moscow to follow a path of non-alignment between East and West. In 1961, tiny Albania severed relations with Moscow to follow a fiercely independent, neo-Stalinist path. To prevent similar defections, the Soviet Union resorted to brutal force to crush popular movements in Hungary in 1956 and in Czechoslovakia in 1968. In 1981, the "Solidarity" trade union movement was suppressed in Poland through the imposition of martial law. East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria are members of the Soviet-dominated Warsaw Pact alliance. These nations are also members of CEMA, the Moscow-led regional economic grouping.

Notwithstanding the Soviet Union's military and political control over the region (except for Yugoslavia and Albania), Eastern Europe is not monolithic. Each country has its own distinct culture and history. Nationalism is a potent force, overshadowing the waning influence of communist ideology. The trends in this area are toward somewhat greater economic, social and even political diversity. Romania, for example, often acts as a maverick on foreign policy issues. Hungary has pursued liberalizing economic reforms.

In its approach to the region, the United States seeks to advance its overall interests through recognition of the diversity of each nation's situation. We differentiate between these countries and the Soviet Union. We also differentiate among individual East European countries to the degree that they distinguish themselves from Soviet policies, whether through adoption of distinct and more independent foreign policies; greater political and economic exchange with the non-communist world; greater tolerance of emigration and respect for human rights; encouragement of a more flexible climate for political expression and economic change; or, experimentation with economic decentralization.

The United States accepts no permanent division between the peoples of Europe. We share with the peoples of Eastern Europe their basic aspirations for freedom, prosperity and peace. Overall, we seek to maintain a prudent balance among our political, security, human rights and trade interests.

U.S. relations with the non-Warsaw Pact states in Eastern Europe are a special case. The U.S. maintains a well-developed, productive relationship with non-aligned Yugoslavia, based on our support for that country's unity, independence and territorial integrity. Although we have had no relations with Albania since 1939, the U.S. is prepared to respond should Albania express an interest in resuming relations.

MIDDLE EAST

The United States is committed to work to resolve the Arab-Israeli dispute. Our strategy is to help the regional parties move to direct negotiations.

We are engaged in a process in the Middle East, looking toward the initiation of direct negotiations between Israel and a credible Arab interlocutor. If the process is to be successful, it will involve difficult decisions and political risks by all parties. Progress is therefore going to be incremental, but progress is being achieved.

For the first time there is agreement among key players in the region -- Jordan, Egypt, Israel and the Palestinians -- that negotiation between the parties is the only way to achieve a settlement. For years, the Arab side had insisted that the outcome of these negotiations would have to be assured before they could begin. They now are focusing on getting to the negotiating table to discuss those issues.

The discussions which have been under way since Jordan's King Hussein visited Washington last Spring have revolved around how to bring about these negotiations, how to make arrangements that will take the parties promptly and reliably to direct negotiations. We continue to hope that all parties in the dispute, including Syria, will recognize the opportunities inherent in the current peace process and elect to participate.

While Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze publicly (in his UNGA speech September 24) affirmed Soviet support for Israel's right to exist, the Soviets have generally allied themselves with the "rejectionist" forces in the region. Using arms supplies as their main source of influence, the Soviets generally assume the role of spoiler.

We have said on many occasions that, if the Soviet Union demonstrates a willingness to play a constructive role in the Middle East peace process, we would welcome that development. So far we have seen no evidence that the Soviets are prepared to play such a role.

The renewed climate of violence obviously further complicates resolution of the difficult issues involved in the Arab-Israeli dispute. The cycle of violence in the region must be broken. We will not allow the peace process to be derailed by violence.

EAST ASIA

The United States provides leadership, but does not attempt to dominate the East Asian and Pacific region which is of increasing importance in our global perspective. One-fifth of global trade is conducted in the region and it is the U.S.' largest trading partner with nearly one-third of our global trade in 1984. We also have a huge trade deficit with the region--\$65 billion in 1984.

Vice President Bush visited China, Hong Kong and the Trust Territories of the Pacific in mid-October. In China he discussed global, regional and bilateral issues with senior Chinese leaders, continuing the high level exchanges of leaders over the past two years. In addition, he explored U.S. economic cooperation with China.

In one of a series of regional discussions with Soviet Foreign Ministry officials, Assistant Secretary Paul Wolfowitz led a small delegation to Moscow in September to discuss East Asian and Pacific issues. While Soviet positions were predictable, the exchange provided an opportunity to talk about the full range of regional issues.

The Soviets have expanded their activity in the region. Since 1965 Soviet ground forces east of the Urals have expanded from 150,000 to almost half a million. The Soviet Pacific Fleet is its largest, containing roughly one-third of all its submarines, one fourth of its principal surface combatants and one-third of its naval aircraft. The eastern-most military districts have more than 3,000 combat aircraft and in the last three years the number of SS-20 intermediate range missiles in Asia has more than doubled.

General Secretary Gorbachev signalled upon taking office that one of his highest priorities was China. While relations have improved, they have followed a predictable course: progress on economic and trade issues, but only slight improvement in political relations in view of continuing differences over Cambodia, Afghanistan and border issues.

The Soviets appear to be responding to longstanding North Korean efforts to warm their relationship. A visit by First Deputy Prime Minister and Politburo member Aliyev, the first-ever port call by Soviet combatants, and delivery of MIG-23s highlight the closer ties over the past six months. We continue to support North and South Korean discussions on a wide variety of subjects.

In Cambodia, Vietnam's intransigence, underwritten by massive Soviet aid, continues to block a political settlement. The U.S. continues to support efforts by the ASEAN states to achieve a negotiated settlement based on the complete withdrawal of Vietnamese forces and free elections under international auspices.

BILATERAL ISSUES

SOVIET POLICIES IN AFRICA

While the Soviets perceive their interests in Africa as important, they are clearly subordinate to interests in the Middle East and East Asia. The Soviets continue to wield significant influence in Ethiopia and Angola, where the governments depend on substantial amounts of Soviet military aid and Cuban troops, but their influence in Mozambique has lessened relative to that of the West in recent months. The Soviets continue to cultivate relations with other African countries, including Zimbabwe in southern Africa and Ghana and Burkina Faso (Upper Volta) in West Africa. In South Africa, the Soviets maintain ties to the African National Congress but have not made dramatic moves to take advantage of the civil unrest there.

The principal Soviet regional objectives are to counter Western influence, gain military access to the area (air and port facilities), exploit the political instability in the region and further their economic interests (trade and fishing agreements). The Soviets seek to achieve their goals through arms sales, the provision of military aid and advisors, and deployments of Cuban troops. Soviet unwillingness or inability to play a constructive role in Africa is illustrated by their general failure to provide significant economic assistance in Africa. Even in Ethiopia, Soviet economic aid of approximately \$7 million compares with U.S. assistance of \$240 million in FY 85, and is in marked contrast to the nearly \$4 billion in Soviet military aid provided to Ethiopia since 1977.

In seeking to counter Soviet influence, throughout the continent but particularly in Southern Africa, we have attempted to reduce cross-border violence, encourage diplomatic resolution of problems, and direct the attention of the region's leaders to their countries' economic problems. This policy stands in clear contrast to Soviet reliance on military assistance to maintain their regional influence.

The Soviets have attempted to thwart US diplomatic efforts in southern Africa through pressures and threats, but have not openly opposed the process since African front-line states support it. The increased violence and the dangers of greater outside intervention have led both Angola and South Africa to express renewed interest in negotiations, a process in which we remain the sole credible mediator.

US-USSR CULTURAL EXCHANGES

The first intergovernmental exchanges agreement between the US and the Soviet Union was signed in 1958. The USIA American National Exhibition provided the setting for the famous 1959 Nixon-Khrushchev "kitchen debate." US-Soviet scientific and technical exchanges were expanded in the mid-seventies by the signature of nearly a dozen bilateral cooperative agreements in scientific and technological fields, such as medicine, environmental protection, energy, and housing and other construction.

In response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the imposition of martial law in Poland, and the shooting down of the KAL airliner, the U.S. allowed some of these agreements to expire. As President Reagan stated in a speech to a 1984 Smithsonian symposium on US-Soviet exchanges, "When Soviet actions threaten the peace or violate a solemn agreement or trample on standards fundamental to the civilized world, we cannot and will not be silent. . . . To do so would betray our deepest values."

In that same speech, however, the President also called for a reinvigoration of a number of exchange agreements based on the principle of strict reciprocity, and also announced our readiness to begin negotiations with the Soviets on a new General Exchanges Agreement. These agreements provide the foundation for contacts, exchanges, and cooperation between the peoples of the the U.S. and the Soviet Union, and, as the President indicated, "Civilized people everywhere have a stake in keeping contacts, communication, and creativity as broad, deep, and free as possible."

More than a year later, we are near to finalizing a new General Exchanges Agreement which will reestablish formal educational and cultural exchanges between our two countries. The new agreement will provide for all of the programs in the previous agreement including, among others, circulating exhibits in Soviet cities on American themes and staffed by Russian-speaking American guides. Also included is distribution in the Soviet Union of America Illustrated, a highly professional USIA publication on life in the United States which is extraordinarily popular with Soviet citizens. The agreement also will provide for exchanges of students, professors, and academic researchers, as well as of performing arts groups and creative artists.

The President has repeatedly encouraged more people-to-people contacts between American and Soviet citizens. The Administration believes that the best way to promote these contacts is for governments not to stand in the way. The United States is committed to a free flow of people, information, publications, and broadcasting across international borders.

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY AGREEMENTS

Between 1972 and 1974 bilateral cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union was expanded by executing eleven cooperative exchange agreements in various fields of science and technology. This framework of agreements led to a significant increase in scientific exchanges which reached a peak of several thousands of scientists and technologists traveling between the two countries annually in the mid-seventies.

The eleven science and technology agreements were: Science and Technology (1972); Environmental Protection (1972); Medical Science and Public Health (1972); Space (1972); Agriculture (1973); World Oceans (1973); Transportation (1973); Atomic Energy (1973); Artificial Heart Research and Development (1974); Energy (1974); and Housing (1974).

In response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the imposition of martial law in Poland, and the shooting down of the KAL airliner, agreements in Science and Technology, Space, Transportation, and Energy were permitted to expire. The others continue in force at this time. As President Reagan stated in a speech to a 1984 Smithsonian symposium on US-Soviet exchanges, "When Soviet actions threaten the peace or violate a solemn agreement or trample on standards fundamental to the civilized world, we cannot and will not be silent. . . . To do so would betray our deepest values."

In June, 1984, the President called for reinvigoration of science and technology agreements in environmental protection, housing, agriculture, and health. In response, there have been recent efforts to develop new cooperative programs in these fields. This last summer, Agriculture Secretary Block's visit to the Soviet Union gave impetus to cooperative agriculture programs. In September, Housing Secretary Pierce met in Moscow with his Soviet counterpart to establish new housing and construction projects running through 1989. And in November, EPA Administrator Lee Thomas is in Moscow to establish new US-Soviet environmental projects in environmental cooperation.

U.S. objectives in scientific exchanges with the Soviet Union are to provide a better understanding of the capabilities of Soviet science, an opportunity to conduct joint research in areas where the Soviets are more advanced or have unique research facilities or resources, and a chance for Americans to communicate their views directly to an influential segment of the Soviet scientific community.

All science and technology agreements with the Soviets must be carefully balanced to insure there is scientific gain for the U.S. side. Scientific and technological cooperation at all levels must also be structured to insure there is no loss of critical technology. There exist a variety of interagency groups that review all exchange projects to insure there are sufficient safeguards against undesirable technology transfer.

US-USSR Civil Aviation

Pan Am, the only U.S. carrier which has operated scheduled service between the United States and the U.S.S.R., suspended its operations to the Soviet Union in October 1978. Pan Am gave as its reasons for suspension low load factors, low yields, high station costs, lack of access to traffic between the U.S.S.R. and third countries, and the hardships of doing business in the Soviet Union. Those hardships included the prohibition of direct ticket sales for local currency, inadequate offices, difficulty in making ground arrangements for tour groups (controlled by Intourist), and a wide variety of other pressures for traffic originating in the U.S.S.R. to fly Aeroflot (the Soviet flag carrier) rather than a U.S. flag carrier. In October 1981, Pan Am closed its Moscow office.

Aeroflot services to the United States have been suspended since January 5, 1982, when the Civil Aeronautics Board withdrew its operating privileges after President Reagan decided for foreign policy reasons that Aeroflot should not be permitted to operate to and from the United States. The decision was made in response to Soviet involvement in the imposition of martial law in Poland and the repression of the Polish people.

Aeroflot was permitted to continue to sell air transportation in the U.S. on an interline basis, that is, in conjunction with other airlines, which would connect with Aeroflot's service at a point outside the U.S. On September 12, 1983, the U.S. Government, in response to the Soviet attack on Korean Air Lines Flight 007, suspended all remaining commercial aviation links with the U.S.S.R.

A Memorandum of Understanding among Japan, the US, and the U.S.S.R. was signed July 29, 1985, to improve air safety in the North Pacific region. The core of this agreement is an arrangement to set up a new communication network between Anchorage, Tokyo, and Khabarovsk area control centers for use when a civil aircraft assigned to a North Pacific route is in trouble.

The agreement was brought into force on October 8 of this year. The three sides must still work out the technical details of the communication network and procedures. One meeting on these procedures was held in Moscow recently. We expect to hold additional meetings in the near future.

U.S. and Soviet delegations met in Washington October 15-18, 1985 to begin negotiations aimed at reestablishing bilateral air services. A major concern of the U.S. Government is that a new or revised civil aviation agreement would have to contain conditions which would allow a U.S. airline a reasonable opportunity for financially successful operations in the Soviet market. That concern was not adequately met during the negotiations and they ended inconclusively. No further negotiations are scheduled at this time.

US-USSR BILATERAL ISSUES - GRAIN

Sales of US grain to the USSR are governed by the Long Term Agreement (LTA), which was renegotiated in 1983 for a period of five years. During each agreement year running from October 1 through September 30, the US guarantees to supply and the USSR to purchase a minimum of 9 million metric tons (MMT) of grain. This minimum is made up of at least 4 MMT of corn and 4 MMT of wheat. The remaining ton may be composed of any combination of wheat and/or corn, or one-half MMT of soybeans. The Soviets may buy up to 12 MMT of grain without further consultations. Should they want to purchase more than 12 MMT, and US supplies are judged adequate, USDA may offer them an additional amount. They were offered an additional 10 and 15 MMT respectively in the first two years of the current LTA.

In the first year of the LTA, the Soviets purchased 14,485 MMT of grain, composed of 7,593 MMT of wheat, 6,476 MMT of corn, and 416 MMT of soybeans. In the second year of the agreement, they bought a record 18,675 MMT, but this included no soybeans, 15,750 MMT of corn, and only 2,887 MMT of wheat. Therefore, they failed to fulfill their LTA wheat purchase minimum by 1.1 MMT.

While the Soviets have complained about grain quality, their primary reason for not buying US wheat is price. Through a combination of factors, such as the US Government loan price setting the lower limit of US prices, and increased production around the world, US grain prices are now considerably higher than those of our major competitors. From the Soviet point of view, the situation has been exacerbated by the US Export Enhancement Program (EEP), which was begun in June, and has been used to combat subsidized agricultural exports by the EEC. This program targets countries, primarily in the Mediterranean and North African areas, which buy mostly subsidized EEC grain. In refusing to include the Soviets in the EEP, we have pointed out that they fail to meet our criteria for the program. These include the principles that EEP sales should be in addition to customary sales to the target country (additionality), and that we not displace exports by non-subsidizing countries.

The Soviets complain that as our best customer, they should be included in the EEP, or that we should at least offer wheat at less than the current US market price. We have told the Soviets that subsidized sales to them would be contrary to our international economic policy of discouraging subsidies and trade barriers. We have further pointed out the importance we place on each side's fulfilling its responsibilities under the LTA, and that if the situation were reversed, with grain being in short supply, we would nevertheless provide the levels guaranteed by the agreement. At our October grain consultations, we reiterated to the Soviets that we expect them to fulfill the conditions of the LTA. Thus far in the third agreement year they have purchased 2.7 MMT of corn and .9 MMT of wheat.

EXCHANGE OF CONSULATES - KIEV AND NEW YORK

At the 1974 Summit meeting, we and the Soviets agreed to open new consulates in Kiev and New York. Arrangements to do so were suspended in 1980, but, in keeping with the President's desire to expand contacts between our two peoples we reached agreement in the summer of 1983 to move forward again toward opening in Kiev and New York. Forward progress was then stalled by the Soviets, who tied the consulate openings to the resumption of Aeroflot service. Although we never linked the two issues, we were reluctant to discuss civil aviation until we had reached agreement on Northern Pacific Air Safety Measures (NOPAC).

Any agreement which would permit Aeroflot to resume air service would have to contain a balance of concessions for US air carriers serving the Soviet Union. We would also need to finalize procedures for implementing NOPAC before we could agree to a resumption of bilateral air service.

We continue to believe that establishing new Consulates in Kiev and New York would be a practical step to increase contacts between our two peoples and useful to both sides.

East-West Trade

The state of U.S.-Soviet economic relations has reflected, to a considerable extent, the state of overall U.S.-Soviet relations. During the 1970's the U.S. business community tended to view the Soviet Union with its vast needs as an enormous potential market. For their part the Soviets felt that large U.S. companies might be particularly effective in tackling priority Soviet industrial projects. These high hopes faded following Soviet refusal to comply with the terms of the 1974 Jackson Vanik amendment (which links Most Favored Nation Tariff treatment and government backed credits to free emigration), the subsequent increases in Soviet human rights abuses and the 1979 invasion of Afghanistan.

U.S. agricultural exports to the Soviet Union set a record high of 18.6 million metric tons during the 1984-1985 year of our long term grain agreement. These agricultural exports are responsible for the large U.S. export surplus with the USSR. In 1984 the U.S. exported \$3.3 billion to the USSR, while importing \$556 million. Nevertheless, U.S. exports of manufactured goods have declined in comparison to levels of the 1970s and were about \$400 million in 1984. The principal reasons for this have been USG reservations about providing support for large scale Soviet energy development projects, the absence of a government to government dialogue on trade issues, and the high value of the U.S. dollar. An additional problem has arisen as a result of Soviet failure to honor their wheat purchase obligation in 1984-85 under our grain agreement.

During 1985, we have resumed our dialogue with the Soviets on economic issues. In June 1984 we renewed our agreement on economic, industrial and technical cooperation which, among other things, provides U.S. companies with a basis to maintain offices in Moscow. In May 1985 we had the first meeting of the U.S.-Soviet Joint Commercial Commission since 1978. At the meeting, both sides sought to find ways to encourage expanded non-strategic trade. The Soviets pledged to provide U.S. firms with the same access to information and bids on projects as is given to the firms from other Western countries. The U.S. side agreed to resume trade promotion activities in the USSR, sought to reassure the Soviets on the question of contract sanctity and agreed to try and obtain the removal of a 34 year old ban on the import of certain Soviet fur skins.

Although the resumption of a government to government dialogue has produced an improved atmosphere in our trading relationship, major problems remain. The Soviets complain that the US does not grant MFN to their exports to the U.S. We have told them that, given the Jackson-Vanik amendment to the 1974 Trade Act, we see little prospect that MFN could be granted, barring a significant change in Soviet human rights and emigration policies. They also criticize U.S. export controls, particularly foreign policy controls, and charge that an imposition of these controls raises doubts as to whether U.S. firms can be counted on to honor contract commitments.

SECURITY AND ARMS
CONTROL

FACT SHEET

U.S.-Soviet Trade

General

Trade with the Soviet Union has never accounted for more than about one percent of total United States trade in any one year. As a result of U.S. sanctions imposed in response to Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and Poland, U.S.-Soviet trade declined significantly between 1980 and 1983. However, in 1984 U.S.-Soviet trade sharply rebounded, as a result of large Soviet grain purchases. U.S.-U.S.S.R. trade has consistently produced a surplus for the United States. The peak surplus of \$3.3 billion was recorded in 1979; the 1984 surplus \$2.7 billion.

U.S. Exports to Soviet Union

Since 1972, U.S. sales to the Soviet Union have been dominated by agriculture, with manufactured goods exports playing only a secondary role. As a result of wide swings in U.S. sales of grain, total U.S. exports to the Soviet Union have fluctuated significantly in recent years. In 1984, U.S. exports to the U.S.S.R. were \$3.3 billion. Last year the United States sold \$2.8 billion of agricultural products to the U.S.S.R., accounting for 86 percent of total U.S. exports to the Soviet Union in that year. As a result of record Soviet purchases of U.S. corn, export figures for 1985 are likely to be even higher. At the same time, U.S. export of manufactured goods has declined from a 1979 high of \$660 million to \$401 million in 1984.

U.S. Imports from the Soviet Union

U.S. imports from the U.S.S.R. reached a record \$600 million in 1984, but this trade constitutes about only 0.2 percent of global U.S. imports (and 2.8 percent of total Soviet exports to the Industrialized West). Primary U.S. manufactures imports from the U.S.S.R. include petroleum products, inorganic chemical elements, silver and platinum group metals, and manufactured fertilizers.

Recent U.S.-Soviet Trade (Millions of Dollars)

| Description | 1979 | 1980 | 1981 | 1982 | 1983 | 1984 | 1985* |
|---------------------|--------|------|------|------|------|------|-------|
| <u>U.S. Exports</u> | \$3608 | 1513 | 2340 | 2587 | 2003 | 3284 | 1669 |
| --of which: | | | | | | | |
| Agricultural | 2853 | 1047 | 1665 | 1850 | 1457 | 2817 | 1404 |
| Manufactured | 660 | 426 | 560 | 601 | 497 | 401 | 265 |
| <u>U.S. Imports</u> | 352 | 485 | 377 | 247 | 374 | 600 | 262 |
| --of which: | | | | | | | |
| Manufactured | 285 | 349 | 210 | 205 | 262 | 351 | 155 |

*--to June 1985

Arms Control, Strategic Stability, and Global Security



United States Department of State
Bureau of Public Affairs
Washington, D.C.

Following is an address by Secretary Shultz before the North Atlantic Assembly, San Francisco, California, October 14, 1985.

My talk this morning is about our relations with the Soviet Union, a central issue for the Western democracies. But before I start on that, I want to say something about terrorism, because terrorism is the war we're fighting right now.

Terrorists and the regimes that support them aim to shatter our ideals and our principles, undermine our democratic life, and pull down civilization itself. We've learned some lessons in the few days just past. The event isn't over, but still while it's fresh in our minds, let me tell you three points that stand out in my own mind.

- First, it tells us something about terrorists—that they're animals, cowardly animals. These are not guerrillas. These are not fighters for some liberation movement. They select the helpless to torture and murder. They lack the guts to do battle, just as they lack the guts to seek justice and peace by negotiation. That's the first lesson. [Applause]

- It tells us that we must take action. If free peoples do not move against the terrorists, no one will stop them. We must have the courage to act without violence, if possible, but recognizing that violence sometimes cannot be avoided. If our dedication to that principle paralyzes us, all our principles will be in jeopardy. That's a little more sobering lesson, so I notice you didn't

clap. But it's an important lesson. We have to be ready to act.

- And, third, it tells us that the democracies must stand together in our own cause. Our nations are the founders and the defenders of the rule of law. The terrorists know and seek to turn that against us. They insist that we be rigorous in granting due process to the enemies of the rule of law, and, as they do, they seek to instill fear—the fear that anyone who captures and brings to justice a terrorist becomes a target of terrorism.

We must stand for the rule of law, but we must not let fear turn it into a key to the jailhouse door. If we of the democracies stand together against this scourge, we will defeat it, and our ideals and values will thrive and be safe. I think we are now starting to do that.

Arms Control

I have a lengthy statement here that deals principally with the arms control matters being discussed in Geneva right now. I know it is too long, but it is an effort to pull together in one place where we are and they are, so we can see just what the issues are. So I ask you to bear with me and take it as a compliment, as you run out of patience, that we have thought, the President has thought, that this audience was the appropriate one to lay out in a rather painstaking way just what this is all about as we see it.

For 40 years, the Western democracies have wrestled with the problem of relations with the Soviet Union. As

legislators, you know firsthand that democracies love peace and really do not like spending money on defense. But you also know how precious freedom and democracy are and, therefore, how important it is that we defend the values that we hold dear. We democracies know that freedom has enemies in this world. But we also know that the purpose of our defensive strength is peace. Therefore, we all conduct foreign policies whose aim is a more positive and constructive relationship between East and West.

Nearly 2 years ago, President Reagan offered the Soviet Union a challenge to begin building a more constructive relationship. He said:

Our challenge is peaceful. It will bring out the best in us. It also calls for the best from the Soviet Union . . . If the Soviet Government wants peace, then there will be peace.

Since that time, we have made a start. The Geneva and other arms control negotiations are underway. We have initiated a process for discussing ways to defuse regional tensions and manage our competition peacefully. We have urged the Soviet Union to take practical steps to fulfill its international commitments on human rights. We have advanced ideas for expanding contact and interchange between our two societies, to fashion the network of bilateral ties that is a necessary feature of any productive relationship between two countries. These are steps forward, but much more needs to be done. One of President Reagan's major goals when he meets next month with General Secretary Gorbachev is to discuss this entire

agenda, giving new impetus to all of these efforts.

Arms control, of course, is a key part of this agenda. It has been a focal point of our alliance deliberations for many years. Allied unity and support are a key to the success of our endeavors with the Soviet Union. And, indeed, Europe's security is one of the principal objectives at stake.

In Geneva today, American and Soviet negotiators are in the middle of a new round of talks. An American proposal for radical reductions in offensive nuclear arms has been on the table for some time. The Soviet Union has recently come forward with—and extensively publicized—a new counterproposal.

Let me review for you today where we stand, the United States and the Soviet Union, on the main issues in arms control.

Our Objectives in Arms Control

Let us start at the beginning. What is it we are trying to accomplish?

The purpose of arms control negotiations is not agreement for its own sake. A bad agreement could do harm. Loopholes could be a source of new mistrust; the structure of limitations could leave one side with special advantages that only leave the other less secure; loose limits could only legitimize an intensifying arms race in areas left open by the agreement. Saving money on weapons expenditure is, of course, a worthwhile goal, but it is not sufficient or even the main issue.

What we really want, in short, are measures that enhance security and reduce the risk of war. Arms control is not just a technical exercise; it has to be embedded in a policy and in an environment that reduce our real dangers and make the world safer. The rivalry between East and West is not the result of personalities or simple misunderstandings. It is grounded in fundamental moral differences about justice and freedom; it is reflected in political differences over a range of international problems. Weapons are the symptom of this struggle, not its cause. Arms reduction can help reduce tensions; yet expansionist Soviet behavior can so fuel insecurity and mistrust that, at the very least, the arms control process is undermined. Do not forget that it was Soviet geopolitical challenges—like intervention in Angola, Ethiopia, and most particularly Afghanistan—that derailed detente and the SALT II [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks] Treaty in the 1970s.

Preventing a war means addressing not only these political conflicts but also the military postures of the two sides.

In the nuclear age, even more than in the past, force structure can shape not only how a conflict might be fought but, more importantly, whether or not a conflict would break out at all. President Reagan's program to rebuild our military strength is addressed to this problem.

The concept of strategic stability is a fundamental one. At various periods in history, war was prevented by a balance of power. The balance was not always stable, but much of the time it worked, deterring attack by denying the attacker his confidence in victory and posing the risk of counterattack. In the age of the ICBM—the intercontinental ballistic missile with thermonuclear warheads—security has had to rest largely on the threat of retaliation, since there has been no defense against these missiles. This form of deterrence—the mutual threat of mass destruction—is what Churchill called the balance of terror.

Is this balance stable? Will it remain stable in the face of the steady Soviet buildup of weaponry with first-strike potential? Or is the balance in danger of breaking down in crisis conditions? This is one of the central issues—if not *the* central issue—in arms control today. We cannot afford—as we have been tempted in the past—to assume that the balance is automatically stable. We have come to recognize that the vulnerability of a country's retaliatory forces, in a crisis, could put a premium on striking first, or preemptively, and thus magnify the dangers. Or it could call into question America's commitment to effectively support its allies against Soviet conventional attack.

This is why one of the key tests by which we judge arms control proposals is whether they will enhance strategic stability. The military balance that results from an agreement should be one that reduces the incentive for a first strike. It should enhance deterrence by ensuring that no first strike can succeed, that no one can be tempted by illusions of "victory." A stable environment reduces the incentive to build new weapons and enhances the incentive to reduce the level of arms. It defuses the tension and danger of any crisis that may occur. Thus an emphasis on strategic stability goes to the heart of reducing the danger of the outbreak of war.

We must also remember that the forces of history have cast the United States in the role of the most powerful member of an alliance of democracies. Any agreement we reach with the Soviet Union must enhance our allies' security as well as our own. Since 1945,

Soviet military power has cast its shadow over both Europe and Asia; this is a reality, as is the relentless buildup of Warsaw Pact forces, both nuclear and conventional. The Western concept of security, which has kept the peace in Europe for 40 years, is that of a close and permanent link between Western Europe and the United States. The American pledge to underwrite the defense of Europe is given concrete expression in the presence of American forces and American weapons in Europe, which make it a certainty that any Soviet attack on Europe engages us. Thus our strategic forces defend Europe as much as they defend the United States. This is what deters war, and it has worked. Arms control must enhance, not weaken, this dimension of deterrence.

We have other criteria for judging arms control proposals:

- An arms control agreement, to strengthen stability, should be based on equality, leaving both sides with equal or essentially equivalent levels of forces.

- An agreement should emphasize strategically significant reductions. Past agreements only codified existing levels or rechanneled the competition. It is time, now, to reverse the pattern of constant buildup; it is time to begin radical reductions.

- An arms control agreement must be verifiable. The Soviets' selective record of compliance with previous agreements unfortunately makes this indispensable. Radical reductions, in fact, can increase the incentive to cheat, since a balance at lower levels can more easily be tipped.

The U.S. Proposal

The United States has serious proposals now on the table at Geneva. We have been criticized for our restraint in the public relations field. But our proposals were not made for propaganda; they were made to make progress toward these central objectives. Our proposals cover reductions in strategic offensive forces; reduction or elimination of U.S. and Soviet intermediate-range nuclear forces; and a serious dialogue on defensive weapons and the relationship between offense and defense. These issues are being discussed now in the Geneva negotiations in three separate but inter-related forums.

Strategic Arms Reduction. First, in the talks on strategic arms reduction, the United States has proposed radical reductions down to 5,000 ballistic-missile warheads on each side. This represents a cut of nearly 50% from the current

Soviet level. We have proposed substantial reductions in the number and destructive power of ballistic missiles, and limits on heavy bombers, on the cruise missiles they carry.

The strategic forces of the United States and the Soviet Union are very different. The great majority of Soviet warheads and destructive power are concentrated on their large, land-based ICBMs. We have a more balanced approach, with as much emphasis on submarine-based missiles and bombers as on ICBMs. The Soviet force is designed for preemption, ours for retaliation. These differences greatly complicate the achievement of an equitable agreement. We are prepared to explore tradeoffs between areas of relative advantage—such as our advantage in bombers versus their advantage in ICBMs—to establish an overall balance.

Our proposal is comprehensive, but its core is a recognition that reductions should focus on the most destabilizing systems. Weapons like large, fixed, land-based ICBMs with multiple warheads, capable of destroying missile silos—these are the most powerful strategic weapons, the most rapid, the most provocative, the most capable of carrying out a preemptive strike, the most likely to tempt a hair-trigger response in a crisis.

The Soviets have over 300 heavy ICBMs; we at present have none. (Our first deployments of MX, a smaller missile but roughly comparable because of its accuracy, will begin late next year.) With their accuracy, destructive power, and multiple warheads, the Soviet weapons are capable of destroying virtually the entire land-based portion of our retaliatory force. For nearly a decade this category of weapons has been, for us, one of the central issues of arms control. One of the odd features of the current debate is that the Soviets would have us believe that this central issue has disappeared. It is as if the threat from these powerful weapons, which already exist in the hundreds, is somehow less important than research into new categories of systems which do not exist, will not exist for many years at best, and will not come into being at all unless research is successful in meeting stringent criteria we ourselves have set.

Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces.

The second negotiation in Geneva is about intermediate-range nuclear forces or INF. This negotiation is taking place because in 1977 the Soviet Union began deploying SS-20 intermediate-range missiles in the western U.S.S.R., aimed at our European allies, and in the Soviet Far East, aimed at our friends and

allies in East Asia. Today, there are 441 operational launchers deployed; with three warheads on a missile, that makes over 1,300 modern nuclear warheads aimed at the cities and defense facilities of our friends and allies.

In response—and, I repeat, in response—the Atlantic alliance decided in 1979 that it had no choice but to deploy weapons of its own in this category, as a deterrent, while seeking to negotiate with the Soviet Union on a formula for mutual restraint. The Soviets agreed to talk but have not negotiated on the basis of mutuality. They insisted on their right to a monopoly of longer range INF missiles; they waged an unprecedented campaign of political warfare to intimidate our allies into retreating from the NATO decision of 1979. Our allies—governments and legislatures—stood firm; NATO Pershing II ballistic missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles began to be deployed in several allied countries in 1983—6 years after the SS-20 deployment began.

The United States proposed at Geneva that we agree to eliminate both sides' longer range land-based INF missiles on a global basis—eliminate. The Soviets refused. Then we proposed that both sides reduce to the lowest possible equal number of warheads. The Soviets still refuse. Our position is based on the principle of equality between the United States and the Soviet Union. And limits must be applied globally, since the SS-20 is a mobile missile and it is not our objective simply to shift the SS-20 threat from Europe to Asia.

The threat of the SS-20 goes to the heart of our commitment to our allies. These are weapons aimed at Europe—although they could be aimed at America. Their purpose is to “decouple,” that is, to separate you from us by intimidating you. The alliance's response is a united response, and a unifying response, in that it symbolizes once again that our destinies are tied together. The principle of collective security is thus confirmed and reinforced. Europe is safer, because deterrence is strengthened.

Defense and Space Arms. The third area of negotiation is that of defense and space arms. But the core issue is the same: the stability of deterrence.

The SALT I accords of 1972 limited antiballistic missile systems and were also a partial first step toward limiting offensive weapons. We continue to comply with them, provided the Soviet Union corrects its noncompliance and negotiates seriously in Geneva. We must remember, however, that those accords

of 13 years ago, and the hopes they engendered, were founded on certain assumptions. Developments since then have called those assumptions into question.

First of all, when the ABM [Anti-Ballistic Missile] Treaty was signed, it was assumed that offensive weaponry would be reduced by further negotiations. In fact, offensive weapons proliferated. Each side now—and particularly the Soviet side—has vastly higher numbers than in 1972—vastly higher. We see the Soviet heavy ICBMs with a first-strike potential. On both sides we see offensive weapons of astonishing accuracy and with multiple warheads. The Soviets are developing two new varieties of ICBMs whose mobility makes them harder to identify and count. If we fail to respond to these trends, at some point in the future they could undermine the military balance on which deterrence is based.

Second, in the ABM Treaty we also assumed that we had set up critical barriers that would prevent any breakout, that is, any sudden and significant expansion of ABM systems in violation of the treaty. In fact, while the United States has dismantled even the one ABM complex that was permitted, the Soviets have taken full advantage of the deployments allowed by the treaty. And some Soviet activities are clear violations, such as the large radar at Krasnoyarsk, which raises a question of whether the Soviets might be planning a nationwide ABM system, negating the treaty entirely.

But technological advance, which helps create these new problems, also offers other possibilities. Methods of defense against ballistic missiles, which were relatively rudimentary in 1972, now offer new hope as a possible counter to the growing offensive threat. What if it were possible, even in this age of ballistic missiles, to block an attack, rather than simply suffer the attack and then retaliate? What if the balance of power could rest more on a mutual sense of security and less on a mutual threat of annihilation? Thus the President's Strategic Defense Initiative (or SDI), a research program to explore promising new technologies. Effective strategic defenses, able to intercept and destroy missiles before they reach their targets, would strengthen security. Even if far less than 100% perfect, such a defensive system would vastly complicate any aggressor's first-strike planning and frustrate any temptation to consider launching an attack.

In an age of anxieties about nuclear weapons, this should provide enormous hope for the future. As former Soviet

Premier Kosygin once eloquently stated, an antiballistic missile system "is intended not for killing people but for saving human lives."

The last few decades' emphasis on offensive strategies reflected the state of technology, not a law of nature. Mutual vulnerability was a fact of life, not a positive virtue. A new strategic equilibrium based on defensive technologies and sharply reduced offensive deployments on both sides could be the most stable and secure arrangement of all. It cannot be fully achieved without negotiations, and, therefore, we have sought the fullest dialogue on this subject with the Soviet Union—as well as with our allies. In fact, General Abrahamson, director of our SDI office [Lt. Gen. James Abrahamson, Director of the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization], traveled to Geneva to take part in a briefing of the Soviet negotiators on our program, its potential and its prospects.

Our research program is and will continue to be consistent with the ABM Treaty. The treaty can be variously interpreted as to what kinds of development and testing are permitted, particularly with respect to future systems and components based on new physical principles. The treaty's text, the agreed statements accompanying it, the negotiating record, and official statements made since that time are subject to differing interpretations.

Because of the great potential contribution that SDI could make to our security, and because of our interest in a rigorous implementation of the ABM Treaty by both sides, we have devoted much attention to the question of how to interpret the treaty. It is our view, based on a careful analysis of the treaty text and the negotiating record, that a broader interpretation of our authority is fully justified. This is, however, a moot point; our SDI research program has been structured and, as the President has reaffirmed last Friday, will continue to be conducted in accordance with a restrictive interpretation of the treaty's obligations. Furthermore, any SDI deployment would be the subject of consultations with our allies and to discussion and negotiation, as appropriate, with the Soviets in accordance with the terms of the ABM Treaty.

Our policy thus reflects:

- The President's commitment to explore thoroughly the potential contribution of strategic defenses to peace and stability and his vision of a "balance of safety" replacing the "balance of terror."

- Our commitment to pursue the program as currently structured, which

is consistent with a restrictive interpretation of our obligations under the ABM Treaty.

- Our judgment that the SDI program, provided that it is consistently funded at the levels required, will be adequate to answer the question of whether a cost-effective and survivable defense against ballistic missiles is feasible.

In sharp contrast to Soviet behavior, our policy of restraint with respect to the conduct of the SDI program demonstrates by deeds U.S. seriousness and sincerity in seeking a more stable international environment.

The American proposals in Geneva are a comprehensive blueprint for reducing nuclear weapons, for strengthening deterrence, and for making the world safer. They are paralleled by other proposals in other forums:

- To strengthen safeguards and controls against the proliferation of nuclear weapons capabilities;
- To ban chemical weapons and to prevent chemical weapons proliferation;
- To stabilize the conventional military balance in Europe, by mutual and balanced reductions of forces, and by measures to reduce the risk of war by surprise attack, accident, or miscalculation, which would give concrete form to a reaffirmation of the principle of non-use of force.

This is President Reagan's arms control agenda—the most comprehensive arms control agenda of any president in our history.

The Soviet Counterproposal

Now we have, at long last, a Soviet counterproposal in Geneva. It could be a step forward and thus, in and of itself, represents a success for our alliance policies. The very fact that the Soviets have offered a new proposal is directly due to the patience, strength, and unity of the Western democracies. We have maintained our principles and our standards, and these, in turn, are carrying us farther than sceptics had believed possible.

Remember that for over a year in 1983 and 1984, the Soviets boycotted any negotiation of these issues. That effort to intimidate the alliance failed, just as their earlier efforts to block INF deployments failed. Continued alliance firmness and unity eventually brought the Soviets back to the negotiating table earlier this year. In these new talks, the Soviets stated in the most general terms that they agreed with us on the importance of offensive reductions. But they gave no specifics. Rather, they have

devoted their greatest effort to propaganda against SDI and held everything hostage to getting their way on SDI.

Two weeks ago, the Soviets did begin to offer specific and detailed ideas about deep cuts in offensive forces. We welcome this. While some of their ideas may indicate progress, altogether the new Soviet position, however, remains deeply flawed and self-serving. It would have a particularly dangerous impact on the security of our allies. Let me touch on the highlights.

The Soviet proposal is a combination of various bans, freezes, limitations, and reductions of some, but not all, offensive forces. Overall, the Soviets propose a reduction by 50% of each side's "delivery vehicles which can reach the territory of the other side." It's their definition.

The hooker is their definition of what they consider "relevant" systems—systems which can strike the territory of the other side. Under their definition American systems in Europe pointed toward the U.S.S.R. are constrained, while Soviet missiles and aircraft aimed at Europe are not. It would imply no necessary reduction of the SS-20 threat (which, incidentally, can reach Alaska) but calls for a unilateral withdrawal of the U.S. counter to that threat. I can think of nothing that would more smack of a U.S.-Soviet deal at Europe's expense, and we won't do that.

This one-sided definition is a step backward. It is the Soviet position of 1969, which the United States and its allies could not accept then or at any time since. It is not reflected in the SALT I accords or in SALT II or in the distinction between strategic and INF systems that was the basis of the Geneva negotiations from 1981 to 1983.

The Soviets also propose to limit what they call "nuclear charges" (that is, warheads and bombs) on strategic forces to 6,000. Of these 6,000 weapons no more than 60% could be on any one component (that is, ICBMs, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, or aircraft). This would limit the number of Soviet ICBM warheads to 3,600—but there is no commitment to reduce their most destabilizing heavy ICBMs, the SS-18s. Thus the Soviet proposal does not directly address the main problem of strategic stability. With deep reductions in U.S. systems, it would add to NATO's vulnerability and increase the significance of the Soviet advantage in hard-target-killer ICBMs.

The Soviets also propose to ban or severely limit all "new" nuclear delivery systems, defining as "new" those systems not tested as of an agreed date. Assuming the agreed date would not be in the past, such a ban would preclude

our Midgetman missile—which was recommended, as you remember, by the Scowcroft commission and which would add to stability—D-5 Trident submarine missile, and Stealth bomber. Oddly enough, it would allow the two new ICBMs (the SS-X-24 and the SS-25), the new submarine-launched ballistic missile, and the new Blackjack bomber they are now testing or deploying. It's a hell of a deal.

The Soviet position on INF is not totally clear. But to the extent that they now agree that an acceptable INF accord could be concluded separately—no longer held hostage to SDI and other issues—we would regard it as constructive. And implicit in their new position may be a grudging acceptance of the presence of some U.S. INF missiles in Europe defending our allies.

However, they propose a stop to all further deployments in Europe of intermediate-range nuclear forces. This would halt NATO's INF deployment at about 200 warheads—while they have about seven times as many SS-20 warheads already deployed. And it would permit unlimited new SS-20 deployments against our allies and friends in Asia.

The Soviets also ask to be "compensated" in these negotiations for the British and French strategic nuclear deterrents. This is not only part of their effort to undercut NATO's decision of 1979; it is also an effort to undercut support for British and French nuclear forces. Yet those forces represent those countries' determination to maintain their independence and their control over their own destiny in the face of the nuclear danger. Those independent forces contribute to deterrence and to Europe's security. Of course, in the context of deep U.S. and Soviet reductions, British and French forces could become a relatively larger part of the picture. And both countries have made clear that in that context they would consider discussions of their forces.

The Soviet proposal tabled in Geneva, finally, indicates that all limitations on offensive forces are contingent on banning SDI—banning not only its testing and deployment but also "scientific research." This is rather sweeping. Indeed, it flies in the face of the ABM Treaty, which puts no limits on research.

The problem is that, just as with SS-20s, the Soviets have not yet given

up their efforts to keep a unilateral advantage. They want to stop our program while they continue their own program in the same field. Behind the curtain that encloses Soviet society, free from the scrutiny or open debate we have in the West, a major Soviet strategic defense program has proceeded for decades. In the past 20 years, the Soviets have spent about as much on strategic defense—missile defense, civil defense, and air defense—as they have spent on strategic offense. They deploy the world's only operational ABM system and are continuing to modernize it. Their propaganda about the so-called militarization of space rings rather hollow when one considers that they have the world's most active military space program; last year they conducted about 100 space launches and nearly 80% of them were military in nature, while the United States had only about 20 total space launches. The Soviets also have the world's only extensively tested and fully operational antisatellite system. And their own research efforts into SDI technologies—high-energy lasers, particle-beam weapons, radio frequency weapons, and kinetic energy weapons—long antedate our own. Indeed, some of the Soviet scientists most active in signing declarations against our SDI program are themselves the men leading the Soviet military research in the same technologies.

I said it at the United Nations, and I will say it again: the Soviet leaders know full well their own programs in these fields. Their propaganda against American programs is blatantly one-sided and not to be taken seriously.

Aside from the central issues of the Geneva nuclear and space talks, the Soviets have taken constructive positions in some fields and less constructive positions in others.

In the struggle against nuclear proliferation, for example, they and we have worked together well. We welcome Mr. Gorbachev's expression of interest in working with us to check the spread of chemical weapons.

Their proposed moratorium on nuclear testing, however, was aimed more at invidiously publicizing the Hiroshima anniversary than at serious arms control. Let us remember that in 1962, after the Soviets had unilaterally broken an earlier joint moratorium on nuclear tests, President Kennedy said: "We know now enough about broken

negotiations, secret preparations, and the advantages gained from a long test series never to offer again an un-inspected moratorium." We have stressed over and over again the crucial importance of improving verification, whether with respect to the threshold test ban or any other more ambitious effort. We have on the table some precise and practical ways to move forward on verification. For example, we have proposed that they send experts to our nuclear test site to measure the yield of a nuclear test in order to provide better calibration of their instruments and thus more accurate verification.

The Soviets are also practitioners of vague, superficially attractive proposals like non-use of force, no-first-use of nuclear weapons, or nuclear-free zones. The problem with such ideas is that they are a kind of escapism—evading the reality of the political problems that give rise to conflict. Peace will ultimately depend on solving the political problems, not on high-sounding declarations. We recall the basic principles of U.S.-Soviet relations in 1972 and the 1973 agreement on the prevention of nuclear war. These accords stated the right principles—particularly the need to forswear the perpetual quest for unilateral advantage. The problem was not the principles but the performance. Soviet calls for the non-use or threat of force look rather unimpressive against the background of events in Afghanistan or Poland.

Prospects

In sum, the new Soviet positions on arms control could be a step forward but do not meet the basic criteria of strengthened stability, equality, strategically significant reductions, and increased verifiability. But we approach this positively. We are now in a new phase of the negotiations in which, if the Soviets are serious, real progress can be made. The President has given our negotiators unprecedented authority to explore ways of bridging differences. Whether or not there is genuine progress before the time of the President's meeting with Mr. Gorbachev, we at least are now both getting down to business.

You hear from the Soviets a lot of talk about the "increasing danger of war." This is propaganda designed to intimidate. Deterrence has kept the peace,

certainly in the NATO area. With the restoration of Western strength in the last few years, the world is really more stable and secure than it has been in a long time. It is when the West is weak that the world is a more dangerous place.

So we will pursue arms reductions, with seriousness and dedication, but also with realism.

We have a complex task. As the President has put it: "We must both defend freedom and preserve the peace. We must stand true to our principles and our friends while preventing a holocaust."

There is no escape from this dual responsibility. The world we seek is a world of both peace and freedom. Such

a world is attainable if the democracies are true to themselves and steadfast of purpose. ■

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U.S. Arms Control Initiatives

Strategic Weapons

U.S. proposed to the Soviets deep reductions in strategic nuclear arsenals including: over one-third reduction in ballistic missile nuclear warheads; 50% reductions in ballistic missiles; reductions in bombers and their weapons and other measures of nuclear capabilities; and flexibility to explore tradeoffs between areas of U.S. and Soviet advantage.

Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF)

U.S. proposed to the Soviets the complete elimination of all land-based intermediate range nuclear missiles, or, as interim step, reduction of their warheads to the lowest possible equal U.S.-Soviet number on a global basis.

Defense and Space Issues

U.S. offered to discuss defenses (whether based on earth or in space), including existing Soviet defense and offense-defense relationship. U.S. seeks discussions on cooperative transition to a more defense reliant world.

Chemical Weapons

The U.S. proposed a draft treaty to completely ban chemical weapons coupled with requirements for effective inspection to ensure no cheating.

Confidence Building Measures (CBMs)

U.S. proposed to the Soviets measures to improve communications, and reduce the risk of war by accident or misunderstanding, including hotline improvements (already agreed), direct military-to-military communications, crisis management steps, proposals for CBM's on strategic exercises and notification of missile launches.

Conference on Confidence - and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE)

U.S. and Allies proposed measures to reduce the risk of war by misunderstanding or surprise attack in Europe at the CDE, which is in itself a Western initiative.

Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR)

U.S. and Allies proposed reductions to equal levels of conventional forces in central Europe, and associated measures.

Nuclear Testing

U.S. made unilateral and unconditional offer to Soviets to visit a U.S. nuclear test site and bring equipment to measure a nuclear test so that we can increase confidence necessary for effective nuclear testing limitations.

Geneva Nuclear and Space Arms Talks

-- March 12, 1985, U.S. and Soviet Union resumed negotiations. The negotiations are divided into three groups: strategic offensive nuclear arms; intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF); and defense and space arms issues. Ambassador Max M. Kampelman heads the U.S. delegation and serves as the negotiator on defense and space arms. Ambassador John G. Tower is the negotiator on strategic nuclear arms, and Ambassador Maynard W. Glitman the negotiator on intermediate-range nuclear arms. Ambassadors Paul H. Nitze and Edward L. Rowny serve in Washington as special advisers to the President and Secretary of State on arms control matters.

-- Ground work for opening negotiations, which Soviets broke off in late 1983, laid during President Reagan's meeting with former Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in Washington September 1984. Later diplomatic contacts paved way for agreement to begin negotiations on "the whole range of questions" concerning nuclear offensive arms, and defense and space issues.

-- Secretary Shultz and Minister Gromyko met in Geneva January 7-8, 1985, issued joint statement that new negotiations would address "a complex of questions concerning space and nuclear arms -- both strategic and intermediate-range -- with these questions considered and resolved in their inter-relationship." Agreed objectives of negotiations: to work out effective agreements "aimed at preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on earth," at limiting and reducing nuclear arms, and at strengthening strategic stability.

-- First Round March 12 - April 23; Round 2 - May 30 - July 16; Round 3 - September 25 - November 7, 1985.

STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TALKS

Background

Between 1969 and 1979, the United States and the Soviet Union engaged in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). Although that process yielded some benefits, it failed to meet the hope of the early 1970s. Specifically, SALT II allowed for growth in some elements of nuclear arsenals, inequalities with respect to certain types of weapons systems, and ambiguities in verification provisions. For these reasons, the U.S., after extensive interagency review, adopted a new approach to what were called the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START). That approach emphasized achieving significant reductions in the most important elements of strategic capability, equality of similar forces, promoting greater stability by reducing the incentives for a first strike, and ensuring effective verification of any agreement signed.

U.S. Proposal

In June 1982, the United States and Soviet Union opened Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) in Geneva. The initial U.S. proposal called for a two-phased approach including:

- reductions in ballistic missile warheads by about one-third - to 5,000 for each side. No more than one-half the remaining warheads to be on land-based systems;
- reductions in deployed ballistic missiles of about 50% - to 850 for each side;
- substantial reductions in ballistic missile destructive capability (throw-weight); and
- limitations on heavy bombers and cruise missiles that could be carried by bombers.

After several rounds of negotiations, the United States modified its proposal to take account of expressed Soviet concerns and the recommendations of the President's Special Commission on Strategic Forces (Scowcroft Commission). In March 1983, the United States dropped its proposal that no more than one-half the warheads be on ICBMs. In June 1983, the United States relaxed its proposal for limits of 850 ballistic missiles, and made other modifications to its position. These were incorporated into a draft treaty which the United States presented to the Soviets in Geneva in July, 1983. In October 1983, after close consultations with the Congress, the United

States added to its position the proposal for a mutual, guaranteed "build-down" of strategic forces. The build-down proposal was designed to channel modernization of strategic forces toward more stabilizing systems, and to ensure regular annual reductions of strategic ballistic missile warheads and heavy bombers. At the same time, the United States expressed willingness to explore with the Soviets trade-offs between areas of U.S. and Soviet advantage.

Soviet Position

In START, the Soviets proposed reductions of 25% in strategic nuclear delivery vehicles to 1800 for both sides. They also proposed a combined limit on "nuclear charges" (missile warheads and bomber weapons), a ban on all ground-and-sea-launched cruise missiles and a ban, later modified to a limit, on air-launched cruise missiles with a range in excess of 600 kilometers.

The U.S. proposal would have substantially reduced or limited the most important elements of strategic forces in a stabilizing manner, while permitting necessary modernization and establishing a basis for future reductions. The Soviet proposal was designed to allow the Soviets to preserve their advantages in important elements in the strategic balance: it provided for some reductions in strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, but would have permitted growth in the number of ballistic missile warheads and would not have strengthened strategic stability.

At the end of Round V of START in December 1983, the Soviet Union refused to set a date for resumption of talks, citing "a change in the strategic situation" due to the beginning of limited NATO INF missile deployments in Europe.

New Geneva Negotiations

The U.S. position in the new negotiations in Geneva built upon the U.S. position of fall 1983, and incorporated new flexibility. Our objective remains the same: to strengthen stability through substantial, equitable and verifiable reductions in offensive nuclear forces, focussing on the most destabilizing elements, e.g. ballistic missiles, their warheads and destructive capacity. Specifically, the U.S. approach featured:

- one-third reductions to 5,000 ballistic missile warheads; about 50% reductions in ballistic missiles;
- limits on heavy bombers and ALCMs below SALT II levels;
- flexibility to explore trade-offs between areas of U.S. and Soviet advantage which take into account differences in each side's force structure.

Soviet Proposal

During the first round of negotiations (March - April 1985), the Soviets proposed nothing new, and posed as a precondition for progress in the strategic arms area the resolution of the space arms issue -- on their terms. They publicly proposed a vaguely worded call for a moratorium, and even backtracked from several of their previous proposals, including with respect to ALCM limits by calling for a ban on all cruise missiles with a range over 600 KM. In the second round (May-July), the Soviets were somewhat less polemical, although they did not offer a concrete proposal of their own. They surfaced some concepts which could involve possible reductions in existing strategic offensive nuclear arsenals. However, the methods of aggregation proposed in these concepts seems designed to favor preservation of the Soviet Union's primary area of advantage, that is, prompt, hard target kill capability, the most worrisome element in the current strategic equation. Efforts by the U.S. delegation to elicit Soviet answers to our questions about these concepts, with regard to issues such as numbers, ceilings and rates of possible reduction were essentially unanswered.

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES (INF)

Background

History. The Soviet Union has long deployed missiles on its territory with sufficient range to strike targets in Europe but not the United States. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, the USSR deployed SS-4 and SS-5 missiles targeted against Europe. Some 575 were in place by mid-1977. In contrast, NATO in the early 1960s deployed fewer numbers of roughly equivalent missiles--the Thor and Jupiter--in the United Kingdom, Italy and Turkey. NATO unilaterally withdrew and retired these systems in the 1960s, giving the Soviets a virtual monopoly in this type of missile. The Soviet lead was tolerable when the imbalance in these intermediate-range systems was offset by superior U.S. strategic forces, which provided an adequate deterrent to Soviet aggression or intimidation.

Two critical developments--Soviet achievement of strategic parity with the U.S. and the deployment of the SS-20--came together in the 1970s to alter the situation.

The SS-20. The SS-20 deployments which began in 1977, at the rate of about one a week, represented a qualitative as well as quantitative change in the European security situation. The SS-20 is more accurate than the SS-4 and SS-5. It can strike targets throughout Europe, the Middle East, North Africa and much of Asia and the Pacific. It is mobile and can be redeployed quickly to any part of the USSR. Finally, the SS-20 carries three independently targetable warheads, as opposed to the single warhead of the earlier missiles, and its launchers are capable of firing two, three or more rounds of missiles. As of March 1985, the total force of Soviet SS-20s is 414.

NATO "Dual Track" Decision. As the Soviet SS-20 missile force grew, and with no NATO missiles deployed in Europe which could reach the USSR, European members of NATO raised the concern that Moscow might come to believe--however mistakenly--that U.S. strategic forces could be decoupled from the defense of Europe and stressed the need for a NATO response.

This led to intensive alliance-wide consultations, culminating in the NATO "dual-track" decision of December 1979. One "track" was to redress the imbalance in intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) through deployment in Western Europe, starting in 1983, of 108 Pershing II ballistic missiles and 464 ground-launched cruise missiles over the next five years. Meanwhile, on the other track, the United States would negotiate with the Soviets to restore an INF balance at the lowest possible level.

Negotiations. Formal talks with the Soviet Union began in November 1981, at which time the U.S. proposed to ban or eliminate all U.S. and Soviet LRINF systems, including the Soviet SS-20, SS-4, and SS-5, and U.S. Pershing II and GLCM. Even though the Soviets deployed SS-20 missiles throughout the negotiations, on November 23, 1983, the Soviets walked out of the INF talks, protesting votes in the parliaments of Great Britain, Italy and West Germany that reaffirmed the dual-track decision and the subsequent arrival of U.S. longer-range INF missiles in Europe. On March 12, 1985, the U.S. and Soviet Union began a new set of arms control negotiations in Geneva which include intermediate-range forces.

U.S. Position. The U.S. approach to the INF negotiations is based on five principles: 1) equality of rights and limits; 2) an agreement must include U.S. and Soviet systems only; 3) limitations must be applied on a global scale, with no transfer of the threat from Europe to Asia; 4) NATO's conventional defense capability must not be weakened; and 5) any agreement must be effectively verifiable.

The U.S. Zero-Zero Option Proposal which would eliminate all U.S. and Soviet longer-range INF missiles, the Interim Agreement Proposal that would result in equal global limits on LRINF missile warheads between 0-572, and the President's September 1983 Initiatives are based on those criteria.

Soviet Approach. The Soviets initially refused to negotiate, posing the condition that NATO must first renounce the modernization track. The Soviets then proposed a bilateral "moratorium" on deployment of intermediate-range nuclear forces in Europe that NATO rejected for three reasons: it would have codified the Soviet advantage in INF; would not have halted the SS-20 buildup in the eastern USSR, and by preventing NATO's deployment, a moratorium would have removed any incentive the Soviets had to negotiate genuine reductions.

Only after Moscow recognized that NATO was determined to proceed with deployments in the absence of negotiated limitations did the Soviets agree to INF negotiations. Moscow proposed at the outset that "NATO"--by which the Soviets meant the U.S., United Kingdom and France--and the USSR each reduce to 300 "medium range" missiles and aircraft in or "intended for use" in Europe.

The effect of this Soviet proposal--and all the variations of it that followed--would have been to prevent the deployment of

a single U.S. Pershing II or cruise missile, while allowing the Soviets to retain a formidable arsenal of SS-20s in Europe and to continue their buildup of SS-20s in Asia. It also would have removed from Europe hundreds of U.S. aircraft capable of carrying both nuclear and conventional weapons, essential to NATO's conventional deterrent.

In addition, Soviet insistence on compensation for the independent strategic nuclear forces of Britain and France is an assertion of the right to match the forces of all other nuclear states combined and thus to codify nuclear superiority over each of them. Moreover, British and French nuclear forces are those nations' strategic deterrents. They are not available for the defense of other European members of NATO in the same way as U.S. forces and they are small compared to the size of the Soviet arsenal.

Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's April 1985 public announcement of a unilateral freeze of the number of SS-20s already in place in Europe would still leave the USSR with an advantage in longer-range INF missile warheads of more than eight-to-one. Moreover, it would leave unconstrained the SS-20 force in the Far East, a force which, due to the missile's range and mobility, is capable of reaching targets in Europe in addition to threatening U.S. friends and allies in Asia.

STRATEGIC DEFENSES: U.S. OBJECTIVES IN NEGOTIATIONS

In the Nuclear and Space Talks at Geneva, the U.S. is seeking not only to discuss deep, equitable and verifiable reductions in offensive nuclear weapons, but also to explore how we and the Soviets might manage a transition over the long term from today's strategic situation, in which deterrence rests on the threat of nuclear retaliation, to one in which greater reliance is placed on defenses that threaten no one. The U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative is a research program, in full compliance with the ABM Treaty and other international obligations, designed to determine whether advanced technologies could permit eventual deployment of effective strategic defenses.

In the Defense and Space portion of the Geneva negotiations, the U.S. is endeavoring now to engage the Soviets in discussions that can lay the groundwork for a jointly managed transition. We seek, for example, to explain to the Soviets our views of the relationship between offensive and defensive forces, the potential contributions of defense to mutual security, and how emerging defensive technologies could contribute to deterrence. We are also expressing our concerns about Soviet actions which are eroding the ABM Treaty, and about Soviet noncompliance with this and other treaties.

The Soviets have said that they would not be willing to agree at Geneva to reductions in offensive systems unless we would also agree to a ban on SDI. The U.S. believes the Soviet position ignores ongoing Soviet research into strategic defenses and is inconsistent with the January, 1985 agreement between Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Gromyko. The January statement called for addressing the negotiating issues "in their inter-relationship" but did not condition agreement in one group on agreement in others. If the U.S. and the Soviet Union can arrive at an agreement in one or more areas that benefit both sides -- e.g., offensive arms reductions -- there is no reason why we should not both begin immediately to derive those benefits.

If SDI research should indicate in future years that defensive technologies are feasible -- that they are effective against ballistic missiles, survivable and cost effective -- we would consult with our allies about the potential next steps. We would then discuss and negotiate, as appropriate, with the Soviet Union pursuant to the terms of the ABM Treaty on how deterrence might be strengthened through the phased introduction of defensive systems into the force structures of both sides.

ASSESSING THE SOVIET ARMS CONTROL COUNTERPROPOSAL

The U.S. welcomes the fact that the Soviets have finally put forward a counterproposal at the Geneva Arms Control Talks that seems to accept the principle of deep reductions. Unfortunately, the Soviet proposal is flawed and self-serving. It does not meet the key criteria the U.S. uses to measure arms control proposals, for example:

-- The Soviet counterproposal will not promote strategic stability since there is no assurance the Soviets would reduce their first strike capability by cutting the SS-18's that threaten U.S. ICBM's. Indeed, this capability could increase.

-- Proposed U.S. and Soviet reductions are unbalanced. The Soviets would retain major advantages in weapons, throw-weight and delivery vehicles.

-- The Soviets insist on limiting U.S. systems that defend our allies in NATO and Asia without limiting their comparable systems that threaten our friends and allies.

-- The Soviets seemingly intend to prevent U.S. force modernization (which is important to maintaining the credibility of our deterrent posture) while allowing their own programs to proceed.

-- Key elements of the counterproposal are not verifiable -- a major problem given the history of Soviet noncompliance with existing agreements.

-- The Soviets continue to demand a halt to the U.S. SDI research program in spite of the fact that they themselves have been deeply involved for years in strategic defense programs, including advanced research. This is an unacceptable precondition that remains a serious obstacle to progress in the talks.

By contrast, the U.S. has sound proposals on the table in Geneva that would sharply reduce offensive forces in an equitable way. U.S. negotiators have considerable flexibility to seek deep, stable, and verifiable reductions.

The U.S. intends to work with the Soviets to seek a mutually acceptable agreement that meets our fundamental concerns. If the Soviets prove as serious and flexible as the U.S., meaningful progress can be achieved.

The Soviet Arms Control Counterproposal



United States Department of State
Bureau of Public Affairs
Washington, D.C.

Following is an address by Ambassador Paul H. Nitze, Special Adviser to the President and Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters, before the American Defense Preparedness Association, Washington, D.C., October 24, 1985.

Three weeks ago, at the nuclear and space arms control talks in Geneva, the Soviet Union presented a counterproposal in response to the detailed proposal for offensive arms reductions introduced by the United States last March. Since then, our negotiators in Geneva have been exploring the details of this counterproposal to the extent that Soviet negotiators have been willing or able to provide them. Although there are questions yet to be answered regarding the counterproposal, we have been able to reach initial conclusions. I will review those conclusions with you today.

Description

The counterproposal consists of various bans and freezes, as well as limitations on, and reductions of, offensive forces. The Soviets propose a reduction of 50% of each side's "strategic delivery systems," that is, strategic missile launchers and aircraft, as they define such a category of systems. The remaining forces would also have to take account of the Soviet-proposed bans and freezes.

The 50% reduction as such does not apply to warheads. The Soviets propose

a ceiling of 6,000 on what they call "nuclear charges" on the delivery systems remaining after their proposed reductions, bans, and freezes have taken effect. They further propose that no more than 60% of the thus-permitted "charges" be on any one component, that is, on ICBMs, SLBMs, or "delivery aircraft." This would limit their permitted ICBM RVs to 3,600. Each side would have freedom to structure its permitted forces as it sees fit within the constraints of this "60%" rule.

Among the Soviet-proposed bans is a ban on all long-range cruise missiles, including ALCMs, SLCMs, and GLCMs

(in the past they have interpreted "long range" to cover those cruise missiles with a range greater than 600 kilometers).

Further, the Soviets propose to ban or severely limit all "new" nuclear delivery systems, defining as new types those systems not tested as of an agreed date. Assuming the agreed date would not be in the past, such a ban could include Midgetman, D-5, and the advanced technology bomber, while it would exclude their SS-X-24, SS-25, and SS-NX-23, and the Blackjack bomber.

In the INF area, the Soviets propose to stop all further deployments in Europe of what they call "medium-range" missile systems. This would halt our LRINF missile deployment at a point where there is a significant imbalance between U.S. and Soviet LRINF missile warheads, with the Soviets retaining many times the number of such warheads as the United States.

The Soviets propose that the sides refrain from deploying any nuclear arms to states where none now exist and refrain from building up stockpiles, or replacing nuclear arms with new weapons, in countries where such weapons are already deployed. This is aimed directly at prohibiting deployment of LRINF missiles in the Netherlands, stopping further deployment in the other basing countries, and precluding the modernization envisaged in NATO's

Acronyms

ABM—Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty
ALCM—air-launched cruise missile
GLCM—ground-launched cruise missile
ICBM—intercontinental ballistic missile
INF—intermediate-range nuclear forces
LRINF—longer range INF
RV—reentry vehicle
SALT—strategic arms limitation talks
SDI—Strategic Defense Initiative
SLBM—submarine-launched ballistic missile
SLCM—sea-launched cruise missile
SRAM—short-range attack missile
START—strategic arms reduction talks

Montebello decision regarding the reduction and modernization of NATO's tactical nuclear weapons.

On the defensive side, the Soviet negotiators have proposed the banning of development, "including scientific research," testing, and deployment of "space strike arms." As a first step, they propose a suspension of all work on "space strike arms." This proposal appears to be in contradiction with General Secretary Gorbachev's indication that fundamental research and laboratory research are permissible and will continue on both sides.

The Soviet-proposed ban on "space strike" arms does not appear, as previously, to be an absolute precondition to detailed negotiation on the START and INF issues. The Soviets indicate, however, that "agreement" on other subjects (except possibly for some interim INF agreement) would be contingent on "agreement" to a ban on "space strike" arms.

Assessment

One of the principal problems with the Soviet counterproposal is hidden in their definition of "strategic delivery systems." That definition would include those systems, and only those systems, that, by virtue of their location, can "strike the territory of the other side."

This definition goes back to the Soviet position of 15 years ago. Neither we nor our NATO allies could accept it then or at any time since then. It was not reflected in SALT I or in SALT II or in the distinction between START systems and INF systems which was the basis of the 1981-83 Geneva negotiations. We and our allies have always successfully and justifiably maintained the distinction between systems of intercontinental range—i.e., ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers—on the one hand, and intermediate-range systems—i.e., INF missiles and aircraft—on the other.

The effect of the Soviet definition would be to include within "strategic" limits three categories of U.S. systems while excluding comparable Soviet systems. The first of these is U.S. longer range INF missiles in Europe. The deployment by the United States of LRINF missile systems was mandated by the 1979 NATO decision that, in the absence of an equitable arms control agreement, there would be no other way to counter the growing threat presented by the deployment of Soviet SS-20s and similar systems. Since the Soviets claim

the SS-20 cannot strike the United States from its bases, application of the Soviet definition would entail no reduction in the SS-20 threat to European NATO but would entail a radical and unilateral reduction of the NATO counter to that threat.

Second, the Soviet definition would include as "strategic" U.S. dual-capable aircraft located both in Europe and Asia. All of our attack aircraft in Europe and Asia (except for our A-10s) are dual capable; their primary role is to contribute to a conventional defense of threatened allies although they also are capable of carrying nuclear weapons.

Finally, the Soviet definition would include all the attack aircraft on 14 U.S. aircraft carriers, one of which is still under construction. The deployment area of those carriers is not limited to any particular region. The primary role of the aircraft on them is conventional; their nuclear role is secondary. By including these carrier-based aircraft, the Soviet definition includes U.S. systems which are not at any given time in a position to strike Soviet territory but which could, in theory, be moved to such a position. The Soviets do not include in their definition some 2,000 Soviet "medium-range" missiles and aircraft, although those systems can also, in theory, be moved so that they could strike not only all NATO targets in Europe but U.S. territory as well.

The Soviets say that by their count the 50% reductions in delivery vehicles would leave the United States with 1,680 delivery vehicles, as they would define and limit such systems, while leaving the U.S.S.R. with 1,250. They arrive at that computation by asserting that we have 2,215 ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers; 209 "medium-range" missiles; 380 "medium-range" aircraft in Europe and Asia; and 560 carrier-based aircraft for a total of 3,364 "relevant systems," according to their definition of what is relevant. The Soviets say that they have 2,504 such "relevant systems," which include only their ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers. A 50% reduction in "relevant" delivery systems on both sides would thus leave the United States with 1,680 delivery vehicles while the Soviets would be left with 1,250.

The Soviet inclusion of U.S. LRINF missile and aircraft systems and carrier-

based aircraft and the failure to include comparable Soviet systems make the apparent U.S. advantage of 430 "strategic delivery systems" wholly illusory. The inclusion of 1,149 U.S. LRINF missiles and aircraft is more than offset by the exclusion of approximately 2,000 comparable Soviet systems, as well as nearly 300 Backfire bombers.

If the United States were to retain equality in the number of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles with the Soviets, our LRINF and medium-range aircraft systems would have to be cut radically to 430, which would be 60% below present levels and only 20% of comparable Soviet delivery vehicles. On the other hand, if the United States were to retain its LRINF and medium-range aircraft systems at current levels, the United States could retain less than one-half of the Soviets' 1,250 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles.

The inclusion of U.S. LRINF missile warheads and carrier-based and medium-range aircraft weapons, and exclusion of comparable Soviet weapons, under a common 6,000-weapon ceiling as defined in the Soviet proposal would guarantee U.S. inferiority in the number and power of strategic ballistic missile and LRINF missile warheads while maintaining Soviet first-strike capability.

There are, though, interesting new elements in the Soviet proposal. For the first time the Soviets are proposing a 1,250 limit on their strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, approximately 50% below their current level. The proposed 6,000 limit on weapons is far lower than the 10,000-12,000 weapons their previous position implied they would seek to permit. The proposed 6,000 limit is about 40% below our estimate of the current Soviet level.

In its impact, the Soviet counterproposal would, however, actually decrease rather than enhance stability.

First, the combination of modernization constraints, which would asymmetrically affect U.S. forces, and the lack of restrictions on Soviet heavy ICBMs would guarantee Soviet retention of a great advantage in missile throw-weight. That advantage is now approximately 3 to 1.

Second, even though the proposed maximum of 60% of all weapons permitted in one component of the force would limit Soviet ICBM RVs to 3,600, the Soviets could keep a large number of prompt, hard target-kill-capable

warheads on heavy missiles such as the SS-18s and potential modernizations to them, as well as on SS-19s. Indeed, under the Soviet proposal they could retain all 308 SS-18 ICBMs. Thus Soviet prompt counterforce attack capabilities would grow against a reduced number of U.S. hardened facilities.

Third, the U.S. heavy bomber force would be penalized. Bombs and SRAMs would be counted as equivalent to ballistic missile RVs, despite the fact that massive Soviet air defenses make defense penetration less certain for bombers than for ballistic missiles and despite the lower readiness rates of bombers compared to ballistic missiles.

Fourth, the proposed ban on long-range cruise missiles would terminate the U.S. ALCM program and thus degrade the retaliatory effectiveness of U.S. heavy bombers in future years—again in the face of unconstrained Soviet air defenses. It would also terminate the U.S. SLCM program. In contrast, the Soviets would be free to retain their shorter range ALCMs and SLCMs, which are capable of attacking many targets in Western Europe and along the U.S. coasts.

Fifth, movement toward more stabilizing forces requires flexibility in modernization. While the U.S. B-1 bomber and MX missile programs could probably go forward because they have already been flight tested, the proposed ban on new types of offensive nuclear arms could preclude the D-5 SLBM, the advanced technology bomber, and more survivable ICBMs, including the new small ICBM, Midgetman. In contrast, new Soviet systems—including the SS-X-24, SS-25, SS-NX-23, and Blackjack bomber could proceed since they have already been flight tested.

Finally, the proposed ban on “space strike arms” would halt the U.S. SDI research program. Because of the potential benefit for strategic stability of this research, as well as the unverifiability of research limits, the President has stated that we cannot agree to such a provision.

In sum, although the Soviet counterproposal for the first time envisages significant reductions in Soviet forces, there are major shortcomings, the adoption of which would unacceptably degrade U.S. capabilities, decrease stability, and undermine deterrence.

There are some positive elements of Gorbachev's statements in Paris which we will continue to explore in Geneva.

- Gorbachev seems to acknowledge that at least some U.S. LRINF missile systems might remain in Europe, although the Soviets have not explained how they would preclude double counting of these systems, both as “strategic”—and thus aggravating an unfavorable balance in ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers—and as INF systems counting against SS-20s. Gorbachev's acknowledgment that some U.S. LRINF missiles might remain in Europe reflects the failure of the earlier Soviet effort to prevent NATO's response to SS-20 deployments and vindicates NATO's unity behind the dual-track decision.

- While in Paris, Gorbachev said that a Soviet-American agreement may be possible on medium-range systems—to use his phrase—“without the direct link with the problem of space and strategic armaments.” The United States intends to pursue, at the table in Geneva, this aspect of Gorbachev's position.

- Also while in Paris, Gorbachev acknowledged that the independent nuclear forces of France and the United Kingdom are not appropriate topics for the U.S.-Soviet talks in Geneva. Of course, Paris and London will decide themselves whether or not to enter negotiations with Moscow over their independent, strategic nuclear capabilities, but it is clear that the United States cannot and will not negotiate with the Soviets on that topic.

Conclusion

It is important to keep the Soviet counterproposal in proper perspective. We should not forget that it was the Soviets who walked out of the START and INF negotiations in 1983 and that that caused an interruption of more than a year in negotiations. Further, once the negotiations resumed, it was the Soviets who refused to engage in detailed discussions of offensive arms reductions, insisting that the United States first agree to abandon its SDI research program. The United States, in contrast, immediately put on the negotiating table a series of far-reaching arms reduction proposals. These call for equitable, verifiable, and strategically significant cuts in strategic ballistic missiles to 5,000 warheads on each side, and strict limits on heavy bombers and the ALCMs they carry; for reductions to the lowest possible equal

global level, or preferably the complete elimination, of U.S. and Soviet LRINF missiles; and for the reversal of the erosion of the ABM Treaty.

We welcome the fact that the Soviets finally have put forward a specific counterproposal. We welcome, as well, the fact that they have indicated for the first time a willingness to accept deep cuts in strategic nuclear forces. However, the details of their counterproposal, as they have presented them, would have the effect of:

- Blocking our strategic defense program, while their large program could proceed;

- Halting U.S. strategic modernization—a modernization in response to the Soviet buildup of the last decade—and locking in current Soviet advantages;

- Producing a clearly one-sided result in the nuclear force balance by including U.S. systems that directly defend our allies while excluding Soviet systems that threaten them; and

- Forcing us to choose between systems that defend our allies and systems that defend us while maintaining, and in some senses increasing, the Soviet threat to both the allies and the United States.

In his preparations for his November meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev, President Reagan is focusing on ways to add momentum to serious give-and-take on the issues facing us in Geneva. The President will not, however, ever agree to sacrifice our basic objectives and principles. We are realistic and realize that the complex issues which affect the basic security of both sides are not likely to be resolved in the short term. No one should expect that the November meeting will produce a comprehensive arms control agreement. But with hard work we can hope to define more clearly a new and potentially fruitful basis on which hard negotiations can proceed. ■

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

October 31, 1985

STATEMENT OF THE PRESIDENT
ARMS CONTROL PROPOSAL

The Briefing Room

3:00 P.M. EST

THE PRESIDENT: I have instructed our negotiators in Geneva at the nuclear and space talks to present a new United States proposal designed to advance the prospects for achieving real reductions in nuclear arms, enhancing stability, and addressing the legitimate concerns of the United States and our allies as well as of the Soviet Union.

I have also asked our negotiators to seek Soviet agreement to extend this round of the negotiations into next week so that our negotiating team can make a full presentation of our proposal and have a real give-and-take with the Soviets on its details.

Finally, I have written to the leaders of allied nations and have transmitted a personal letter to General Secretary Gorbachev on this subject.

History has shown that progress is more surely made through confidential negotiations. Therefore, I'm not going into any details about our proposal. Suffice to say that our proposal is serious, it is detailed, and it addresses all three areas of the negotiations. It builds upon the very concrete reductions proposals which our negotiators had tabled earlier as well as the Soviet counter-proposal.

The Soviet counter-proposal was first presented to me by Foreign Minister Shevardnadze at our White House meeting in September, following which it was tabled at Geneva by the Soviet negotiators. Since that time, our arms control experts have analyzed the Soviet counter-proposal extremely carefully. This analysis now completed, I have met with my senior advisors, decided on our response, and have instructed our negotiators to make this move.

During our careful review, we measured the Soviet counter-proposal against our concrete proposals for deep, equitable, and verifiable reductions which we already had on the table, and against the criteria which we have long held for attaining effective arms control agreements. We have made clear that, measured against these criteria, the Soviet counter-proposal unfortunately fell significantly short in several key areas.

At the same time, as I indicated in my address to the United Nations General Assembly last week, the counter-proposal also had certain positive seeds which we wish to nurture.


Our new proposal builds upon these positive elements and calls for very significant balanced reductions of comparable nuclear systems, particularly those that are the most destabilizing. It's my hope that our new proposal will enable both of our nations to start moving away from ever-larger arsenals of offensive forces. At the same time, we seek in Geneva to undertake with the Soviets a serious examination of the important relationship between offensive and defensive forces, and how people everywhere can benefit from exploring the potential of non-nuclear defenses which threaten no one.

I'm pleased that we seem to have made a successful start on this long process. The Soviet response to our earlier proposals and the new proposal which we're making are important milestones in moving these negotiations forward.

Additionally, I hope we can achieve progress in the other key areas of the broad agenda which Mr. Gorbachev and I will discuss in Geneva -- human rights, regional issues, and bilateral matters.

Strengthening the peace and building a more constructive, long-term U.S.-Soviet relationship requires that we move ahead in all of these areas. I believe progress is, indeed, possible if the Soviet leadership is willing to match our own commitment to a better relationship.

U.S. START PROPOSAL AND THE STRATEGIC BALANCE FALL 1985 *




* U.S. FIGURE INCLUDES 263 OPERATIONAL B-52s.

U.S.S.R. FIGURE INCLUDES BEAR, BISON, AND BACKFIRE BOMBERS

* Prior to new U.S. proposal of Oct. 31, 1985


COMPARISON OF FORCES DEDICATED TO STRATEGIC DEFENSE



COMPARISON OF U.S. AND SOVIET LONGER-RANGE INF WEAPONS

HOW TODAY'S LRINF IMBALANCE DEVELOPED

AND SOVIET PUBLIC DESCRIPTIONS OF US-USSR FORCE POSTURE



* THIS DECISION CALLED FOR LRINF DEPLOYMENTS AT END OF 1983 UNLESS AN ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENT WERE REACHED WHICH MADE THEM UNNECESSARY

**Current Strategic Balance:
Operational Strategic Nuclear Forces as of September 1985**

| | US | Soviets |
|---------------------------------------|--|---|
| ICBMs | 30 Titan II 450 Minuteman II 550 Minuteman III <hr/> 1030 | 520 SS-11 60 SS-13 150 SS-17 308 SS-18 360 SS-19 <hr/> 1398 |
| SLBMs* | 288 Poseidon (C-3) 312 Trident (C-4) <hr/> 600 | 42 SS-N-5 304 SS-N-6 292 SS-N-8 12 SS-N-17 224 SS-N-18 80 SS-N-20 <hr/> 954 |
| Bombers | 167 B-52G 96 B-52H <hr/> 263 | 140 Bear 40 Bison 300 Backfire <hr/> 480 |
| Total Delivery Vehicles | 1893 | 2832 |
| Ballistic Missile Warheads | 7500 | 8900 |
| Ballistic Missile Throw-Weight | 4.4 million pounds | 11.9 million pounds |

*Totals do not include SS-NX-23 missiles or new Trident submarine

Building an Interim Framework for Mutual Restraint

June 10, 1985



United States Department of State
Bureau of Public Affairs
Washington, D.C.

Following are President Reagan's statement, message to Congress, and unclassified fact sheet of June 10, 1985, concerning building an interim framework of mutual restraint with regard to strategic arms.

PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT

In 1982, on the eve of the strategic arms reduction talks (START), I decided that the United States would not undercut the expired SALT I [strategic arms limitation talks] agreement or the unratified SALT II agreement as long as the Soviet Union exercised equal restraint. Despite my serious reservations about the inequities of the SALT I agreement and the serious flaws of the SALT II agreement, I took this action in order to foster an atmosphere of mutual restraint conducive to serious negotiation as we entered START.

Since then, the United States has not taken any actions which would undercut existing arms control agreements. The United States has fully kept its part of the bargain. However, the Soviets have not. They have failed to comply with several provisions of SALT II, and we have serious concerns regarding their compliance with the provisions of other accords.

The pattern of Soviet violations, if left uncorrected, undercuts the integrity and viability of arms control as an instrument to assist in ensuring a secure and stable future world. The United States will continue to pursue vigorously with the Soviet Union the resolution of

our concerns over Soviet noncompliance. We cannot impose upon ourselves a double standard that amounts to unilateral treaty compliance.

We remain determined to pursue a productive dialogue with the Soviet Union aimed at reducing the risk of war through the adoption of meaningful measures which improve security, stability, and predictability. Therefore, I have reached the judgment that, despite the Soviet record over the last years, it remains in our interest to establish an interim framework of truly mutual restraint on strategic offensive arms as we pursue with renewed vigor our goal of real reductions in the size of existing nuclear arsenals in the ongoing negotiations in Geneva. Obtaining such reductions remains my highest priority.

The United States cannot establish such a framework alone. It will require the Soviet Union to take the positive, concrete steps to correct its non-compliance, resolve our other compliance concerns, and reverse its unparalleled and unwarranted military buildup. So far, the Soviet Union has not chosen to move in this direction. However, in the interest of ensuring that every opportunity to establish the secure, stable future we seek is fully explored, I am prepared to go the extra mile in seeking an interim framework of truly mutual restraint.

Therefore, to provide the Soviets the opportunity to join us in establishing such a framework which could support ongoing negotiations, I have decided that the United States will continue to

refrain from undercutting existing strategic arms agreements to the extent that the Soviet Union exercises comparable restraint and provided that the Soviet Union actively pursues arms reduction agreements in the currently ongoing nuclear and space talks in Geneva.

As an integral part of this policy, we will also take those steps required to assure the national security of the United States and our allies which were made necessary by Soviet noncompliance. Appropriate and proportionate responses to Soviet noncompliance are called for to ensure our security, to provide incentives to the Soviets to correct their noncompliance, and to make it clear to Moscow that violations of arms control obligations entail real costs.

Certain Soviet violations are, by their very nature, irreversible. Such is the case with respect to the Soviet Union's flight testing and steps toward deployment of the SS-X-25 missile, a second new type of ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile] prohibited by the unratified SALT II agreement. Since the noncompliance associated with the development of this missile cannot be corrected by the Soviet Union, the United States reserves the right to respond in a proportionate manner at the appropriate time. The Midgetman small ICBM program is particularly relevant in this regard.

Other Soviet activities involving noncompliance may be reversible and can be corrected by Soviet action. In these instances, we will provide the Soviet Union additional time to take such required corrective action. As we monitor Soviet actions for evidence of the positive, concrete steps needed on their part to correct these activities, I have directed the Department of Defense to conduct a comprehensive assessment aimed at identifying specific actions which the United States could take to augment as necessary the U.S. strategic modernization program as a proportionate response to, and as a hedge against the military consequences of, those Soviet violations of existing arms agreements which the Soviets fail to correct.

To provide adequate time for the Soviets to demonstrate by their actions a commitment to join us in an interim framework of true mutual restraint, we will plan to deactivate and dismantle according to agreed procedures an existing Poseidon SSBN [nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine] as the seventh U.S. Ohio-class submarine puts to sea later this year. However, the United States will keep open all programmatic options for handling such

milestones as they occur in the future. As these later milestones are reached, I will assess the overall situation in light of Soviet actions correcting their noncompliance and promoting progress in Geneva and make a final determination of the U.S. course of action on a case-by-case basis.

I firmly believe that if we are to put the arms reduction process on a firm and lasting foundation, and obtain real reductions, our focus must remain on making best use of the promise provided by the currently ongoing negotiations in Geneva. Our policy, involving the establishment of an interim framework for truly mutual restraint and proportionate U.S. response to uncorrected Soviet noncompliance, is specifically designed to go the extra mile in giving the Soviet Union the opportunity to join us in this endeavor.

My hope is that if the Soviets will do so, we will be able jointly to make progress in framing equitable and verifiable agreements involving real reductions in the size of existing nuclear arsenals in the Geneva negotiations. Such an achievement would not only provide the best and most permanent constraint on the growth of nuclear arsenals, but it would take a major step toward reducing the size of these arsenals and creating a safer future for all nations.

MESSAGE TO CONGRESS

To the Congress of the United States:

The attached classified report responds to a requirement in the FY-85 Department of Defense Authorization Act (Section 1110 of P.L. 98-525) requesting a report that:

(A) describes the implications of the *United States Ship Alaska's* sea trials, both with and without the concurrent dismantling of older launchers of missiles with multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles, for the current United States no-undercut policy on strategic arms and United States security interests more generally;

(B) assesses possible Soviet political, military, and negotiating responses to the termination of the United States no-undercut policy;

(C) reviews and assesses Soviet activities with respect to existing strategic offensive arms agreements; and

(D) makes recommendations regarding the future of United States interim restraint policy.

In accordance with our prior interim restraint policy, the United States has scrupulously lived within the SALT I and II agreements governing strategic offensive arms. The United States has fully kept its part of the bargain. By contrast, we have found and reported to the Congress that the

Soviet Union has violated major arms control obligations, as fully documented in comprehensive reports to the Congress on this subject in January 1984 and February 1985. Multiple Soviet violations of the SALT II Treaty and of other agreements were fundamental considerations in assessing a future United States interim restraint policy.

The basic United States strategic goals remain unchanged. In the years ahead, the United States objective is a radical reduction in the levels and the power of existing and planned offensive nuclear arms, as well as on stabilization of the relationship between nuclear offensive and defensive arms, whether on earth or in space.

I firmly believe that if we are to put the arms reduction process on a firm and lasting foundation, our focus must remain on making best use of the promise provided by the current negotiations in Geneva. The policy outlined in my report, involving the establishment of an interim framework for truly mutual restraint and proportionate United States responses to uncorrected Soviet noncompliance, is specifically designed to go the extra mile in giving the Soviet Union the opportunity to join us in this vital endeavor.

I believe that this policy, addressed in the classified report and the unclassified fact sheet, both recognizes the recent views of the Congress and serves as a basis for bipartisan support.

RONALD REAGAN

FACT SHEET

Building an Interim Framework for Mutual Restraint

Introduction. In response to legislation in the FY 1985 Department of Defense Authorization Act, the President today submitted a classified report to the Congress on building an interim framework of mutual restraint with regard to strategic arms. The following is an unclassified fact sheet based on the President's report.

Background of Our Current Policy. In 1982, on the eve of the strategic arms reduction talks, the President decided that the United States would not undercut the expired SALT I agreement or the unratified SALT II agreement as long as the Soviet Union exercised equal restraint. Despite serious reservations about the inequities of the SALT I agreement and the serious flaws of the SALT II agreement, the United States took this action in order to foster an atmosphere of mutual restraint on strategic forces conducive to serious negotiation as we entered START. Our assumptions in taking this action were threefold.

- First, we believed then, and continue to believe now, that mutual verifiable constraints on nuclear arsenals are important, especially as we try to

move toward the goal of greatly reducing and eventually eliminating the nuclear threat, which the SALT agreements did not do. We saw the START negotiations as the path to the equitable and verifiable deep reductions in the size of nuclear arsenals that we seek. The United States was prepared to and has offered the Soviet Union the elements for such agreements in Geneva. However, we recognized that negotiating sound agreements takes time. Therefore, the United States made the commitment not to undercut existing agreements as long as the Soviet Union exercised equal restraint as an *interim* policy to provide what we hoped would be a framework of mutual restraint as we pursued agreements that would put the arms control process on a better, more sound, long-term foundation and bring real reductions.

- Second, at the time, we hoped that the leaders of the Soviet Union would, indeed, show equal restraint.

- Third, we judged that this policy of interim restraint would not adversely affect our national security interests, provided that, with the Administration and the Congress working together, the United States undertook those steps necessary to counter the strategic advantages the Soviet Union had been building over the previous decade.

Unfortunately, in certain key respects, these assumptions have not stood the test of time.

U.S. Compliance. In accordance with U.S. interim restraint policy, the United States has not taken any actions which would undercut existing agreements. In fact, we have scrupulously lived within the SALT I and II agreements governing strategic offensive arms. For example, we have fully dismantled eight Polaris missile-carrying submarines as new Trident missile-carrying submarines have been deployed. In short, the United States has fully kept its part of the bargain.

Soviet Noncompliance. As detailed in two comprehensive presidential reports to the Congress, in January 1984 and February 1985, the Soviet Union has repeatedly violated its arms control obligations. While the Soviets have observed some provisions of existing arms control agreements, they have violated important elements of those agreements and associated political commitments.

- **SALT II.** With respect to the unratified SALT II agreement, these violations include the testing and deployment of a second new ICBM, the SS-X-25, and the encryption of telemetry during

missile testing which impedes verification of agreements by national technical means. The Soviet Union has also probably violated this agreement regarding the prohibition on deploying SS-16 ICBMs. Serious concerns also remain unresolved with respect to other issues (e.g., the RV [reentry vehicle]-to-throw-weight ratio of the SS-X-25 demonstrated during testing).

- **Other Accords.** Additionally, the pattern of Soviet noncompliance with existing agreements extends well beyond SALT II. The Soviet Union is engaged in the construction of a large phased-array radar in central Siberia in violation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. When added to other Soviet ABM-related activities, including concurrent testing of air defense and ABM components and the development of mobile ABM components, there is serious cause for concern about Soviet preparations for a prohibited territorial ABM defense. Such a development would have profound implications for the vital East-West balance. The Soviet Union has also engaged in significant violations of both the Geneva Protocol on chemical weapons and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. We also judge that it has violated both the Limited Test Ban Treaty and the terms of the Helsinki Final Act. It is also likely that the Soviets have violated the nuclear testing yield limit of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty.

- **SALT I.** Even with respect to SALT I, where we have found the Soviets have complied with the letter of the agreement, we have concerns about their compliance with the spirit of the agreement. For example, after dismantling *Yankee*-class nuclear ballistic missile carrying submarines to comply with SALT I constraints, they have already converted one such submarine into a submarine longer than the original and carrying modern, long-range, sea-launched cruise missiles. While not a violation of the letter of SALT I, the resulting submarine constitutes a threat to U.S. and allied security similar to the original *Yankee*-class submarine.

Implications of Soviet Noncompliance. These are very crucial issues, as effective arms control requires seriousness about compliance. The pattern of Soviet violations increasingly affects our national security and raises uncertainty about the forces the United States will require in the future. Just as significant as the military consequences of the violations themselves, this pattern of Soviet noncompliance raises fundamen-

tal concerns about the integrity of the arms control process, concerns that—if not corrected—undercut the integrity and viability of arms control as an instrument to assist in ensuring a secure and stable future world.

The U.S. Response to Date. The United States has consistently employed all appropriate diplomatic channels, including the U.S./Soviet Standing Consultative Commission (SCC), strongly to press the Soviet Union to explain and/or cease those activities which are of concern to us. In doing so, we have made it absolutely clear that we expect the Soviet Union to take positive steps to correct their noncompliance and to resolve our compliance concerns in order to maintain the integrity of existing agreements and to establish the positive environment necessary for the successful negotiation of new agreements.

Unfortunately, despite long and repeated U.S. efforts to resolve these issues, the Soviet Union has neither provided satisfactory explanations nor undertaken corrective action. Instead, Soviet violations have continued and expanded as the Soviets have continued to build their strategic forces. Consequently, the Soviet Union has not been, and is not now, exercising the equal restraint upon which our interim restraint policy has been conditioned. Such Soviet behavior is fundamentally inimical to the future of arms control and to the security of this country and that of our allies.

U.S. Proportionate Response in the Future. The United States will continue to pursue vigorously with the Soviet Union the resolution of our concerns over Soviet noncompliance. In this effort, we cannot impose upon ourselves a double standard that amounts to unilateral treaty compliance and, in effect, unilateral disarmament. As a minimum, in the case of irreversible Soviet violations, we must make appropriate and proportionate responses that deny the military benefits of these violations to the Soviet Union. In the case of Soviet violations that the Soviets can correct, we should develop and keep available comparable proportionate responses that provide incentives to the Soviets to take positive steps to correct the situation and which provide a needed hedge against the military consequences of Soviet violations should the Soviet Union fail to take the necessary corrective actions.

In this context, the United States will develop and, as needed, implement appropriate and proportionate responses to Soviet noncompliance as necessary to ensure the security of the United States

and its allies and to provide real incentives to the Soviet Union to take the positive, concrete steps required to resolve our concerns.

Need for the U.S. Strategic Force Modernization Program. To ensure our fundamental national security and as a baseline for further U.S. action, the integrity and continuity of the U.S. strategic modernization program must be maintained. If the modernization of the ICBM leg of our strategic triad is not fully implemented, as called for in our comprehensive strategic modernization program and recommended by the Scowcroft commission, we will have to reassess all aspects of our plans to meet our basic national security needs.

Fundamental U.S. Goals. While recognizing the seriousness of the problems cited above, we must not lose sight of basic U.S. goals which remain unchanged. During the next 10 years, the U.S. objective is a radical reduction in the levels and the power of existing and planned offensive nuclear arms, as well as the stabilization of the relationship between nuclear offensive and defensive arms, whether on earth or in space. We are even now looking forward to a period of transition to a more stable world, with greatly reduced levels of nuclear arms and an enhanced ability to deter war based upon the increasing contribution of non-nuclear defenses against offensive nuclear arms. A world free of the threat of military aggression and free of nuclear arms is an ultimate objective on which we, the Soviet Union, and all other nations can agree.

The Importance of Ongoing Negotiations. The best path to achieving these goals would be an agreement based on the far-reaching nuclear arms reduction proposal we have tabled at the strategic arms reduction talks in Geneva. The best approach to moving rapidly to a safer, more stable, and more secure world would surely be for both sides to make sharp reductions in their strategic offensive arsenals and, in particular, to eliminate large numbers of the most destabilizing weapons—strategic ballistic missiles—by agreeing to a verifiable aggregate ceiling of 5,000 warheads on the land-based and sea-based ballistic missiles of both sides.

Unfortunately, the Soviet Union through the years has shown little real interest in restraining the growth of its nuclear arms—let alone in achieving meaningful reductions or in making progress toward a verifiable, equitable accord which requires such real reduc-

tions. To the contrary, in spite of the seriousness and flexibility demonstrated by our negotiators in Geneva in the new negotiations begun this year, the Soviet Union has actually regressed from negotiating positions it had previously taken and has adopted a largely intransigent posture which severely impedes progress. We, nevertheless, remain determined to pursue a productive dialogue with the Soviet Union aimed at reducing the risk of war through the adoption of meaningful measures which improve security, stability, and predictability.

Establishing an Interim Framework for Mutual Restraint. It remains in the interest of the United States to establish an interim framework of truly mutual restraint on strategic offensive arms as we pursue with renewed vigor our goal of real reductions in the size of existing nuclear arsenals through the ongoing negotiations in Geneva. The United States cannot establish such a framework alone. It will require the Soviet Union to take the positive, concrete steps called for above to correct their noncompliance, resolve our other compliance concerns, and reverse or substantially reduce their unparalleled and unwarranted military buildup. So far, the Soviet Union has not chosen to move in this direction. However, in the interest of ensuring that every opportunity to establish the secure, stable future we seek is fully explored, the President is prepared to go the extra mile in the direction of trying to establish an interim framework of true, mutual restraint.

Continued Restraint. Therefore, to provide the Soviet Union the opportunity to join us in establishing an interim framework of truly mutual restraint which would support ongoing negotiations, the President has decided that the United States will continue to refrain from undercutting existing strategic arms agreements to the extent that the Soviet Union exercises comparable restraint and provided that the Soviet Union actively pursues arms reductions agreements in the nuclear and space talks in Geneva. The United States will constantly review the implications of this interim policy on the long-term security interests of the United States and its allies. In doing so, we will consider Soviet actions to resolve our concerns with the pattern of Soviet noncompliance, continued growth in the strategic force structure of the Soviet Union, and Soviet seriousness in the ongoing negotiations.

Proportionate Response. As an integral part of the implementation of this policy, we must also take those steps required to assure the national security of the United States and our allies made necessary by Soviet noncompliance. Appropriate and proportionate responses to Soviet noncompliance are called for to make it clear to Moscow that violations of arms control arrangements entail real costs. Therefore, the United States will develop appropriate and proportionate responses, and it will take those actions necessary in response to, and as a hedge against the military consequences of, uncorrected Soviet violations of existing arms control agreements.

Responding to Irreversible Soviet Violations. Certain Soviet violations are, by their very nature, irreversible. Such is the case with respect to the Soviet Union's flight testing and steps toward deployment of the SS-X-25 missile, a second new type of ICBM prohibited by the unratified SALT II agreement. Since the noncompliance associated with the development of this missile cannot, at this point, be corrected by the Soviet Union, the United States, therefore, reserves the right to respond appropriately, and the United States will do so in a proportionate manner at the appropriate time. The Midgetman small ICBM program is particularly relevant in this regard.

Responding to Reversible Soviet Activities. Other Soviet activities involving noncompliance may be reversible and can be corrected by Soviet action. In these instances, we will go the extra mile and provide the Soviet Union additional time to take such required corrective action. As we monitor Soviet behavior for evidence of the positive, concrete steps needed on their part to correct these activities, the Department of Defense will conduct a comprehensive assessment aimed at identifying specific actions which the United States could take to accelerate or augment as necessary the U.S. strategic modernization program in proportionate response to, and as a hedge against the military consequences of, those Soviet violations of existing arms agreements which the Soviets fail to correct.

In addition to the development of appropriate and proportionate U.S. military responses in the face of uncorrected Soviet noncompliance, this review will also consider the consequences of continued Soviet force growth as indicated in the most recent National Intelligence Estimate on this

subject, the alterations to the ICBM portion of the U.S. strategic modernization program which have resulted from recent congressional action, and the issue of how the second 50 Peacekeeper missiles should appropriately be based. Soviet behavior during rounds II and III of the nuclear and space talks will also be taken fully into account.

Criteria for Response Options. In this context, as potential U.S. future actions are assessed, certain criteria will be used. The options will be designed as proportionate responses to specific instances of uncorrected Soviet noncompliance, hedging against the military consequences of such Soviet noncompliance. They need not necessarily be equivalent types of actions. Rather, these options will attempt to deny the Soviets the potential benefits of their noncompliance and, to the extent possible, provide incentives to the Soviets to correct their noncompliant activity. In all cases, the primary focus will remain upon options that underwrite deterrence, enhance stability, and can be directly tied to the specific requirements of our national security. In this regard, the U.S. goal is not, per se, to build additional forces but to use these options to ensure our security in the face of uncorrected Soviet noncompliance and to provide incentives to the Soviets to correct their noncompliance and join us in establishing a meaningful interim framework of mutual restraint.

Timing of the Department of Defense Review. The results of this review will be provided for the President's con-

sideration by November 15, 1985. This will provide sufficient time for the President to consider U.S. options with respect to our policy as we approach the date at which the unratified SALT II Treaty would have expired on December 31, 1985, and subsequent milestones that would occur under a "no undercut" policy. It also provides sufficient time to consider U.S. programmatic options in direct response to instances of uncorrected Soviet noncompliance, as needed, in submitting the FY 1987 defense program to the Congress in early 1986.

Seventh Trident SSBN. To provide adequate time for the Soviets to demonstrate by their actions a commitment to join us in an interim framework of true mutual restraint, the President has also directed that the Department of Defense should plan to deactivate and disassemble according to agreed procedures an existing Poseidon SSBN as the seventh U.S. *Ohio*-class submarine, the *USS Alaska*, puts to sea later this year. However, as a part of its report, the Department of Defense will review and evaluate the range of options available to the United States for handling similar milestones, including the sea trials of additional *Ohio*-class submarines and the deployment of the 121st U.S. ALCM [air-launched cruise missile]-carrying heavy bomber, in the future. The United States will keep open all future programmatic options for handling such milestones as they occur. As these later milestones are reached, the President will assess the overall situation and make a final deter-

mination of the U.S. course of action on a case-by-case basis in light of the overall situation and Soviet actions in meeting the conditions cited above.

Summary of Why This Course Was Chosen. The President firmly believes that if we are to put the arms reduction process on a firm, lasting foundation, our focus must remain on making best use of the promise provided by the ongoing negotiations in Geneva. The policy outlined above, involving the establishment of an interim framework for truly mutual restraint and proportionate U.S. response to uncorrected Soviet noncompliance, is specifically designed to go the extra mile in giving the Soviet Union the opportunity to join us in this endeavor. Our hope is that if the Soviets will do so, we will jointly be able to make progress in framing equitable and verifiable agreements involving real reductions in the size of existing nuclear arsenals in the ongoing Geneva negotiations. Such an achievement would not only provide the best and most permanent constraint on the growth of nuclear arsenals, but it would take a major step in the process of reducing the size of these arsenals and in moving us toward a more secure and stable world. ■

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Soviet Noncompliance With Arms Control Agreements

October 1985

Background: In response to requests by Congress, President Reagan submitted reports in January 1984 and February 1985 on Soviet noncompliance with arms control agreements. They document the grounds for serious US concern regarding the Soviet Union's observance of the agreements. In the February 1985 report the President stated: "In order for arms control to have meaning and credibly contribute to national security and to global or regional stability, it is essential that all parties to agreements fully comply with them."

Following are the key findings of the President's 1985 report:

Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and Geneva Protocol: The Soviet Union has maintained an offensive biological warfare program and capability in violation of the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. In addition, the Soviet Union has been involved in the production, transfer, and use of mycotoxins for hostile purposes in Laos, Cambodia, and Afghanistan in violation of the 1972 Convention as well as the Geneva Protocol of 1925.

Limited Test Ban Treaty: The Soviet Union's underground nuclear test practices have resulted in the venting into the atmosphere of radioactive matter and caused such matter to be present outside the Soviet Union's territorial limits in violation of the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963. The Soviet Union has failed to take the precautions necessary to minimize environmental contamination by radioactive substances.

Threshold Test Ban Treaty: The Soviet Union has likely violated the Threshold Test Ban Treaty of 1974 by conducting underground nuclear tests with yields exceeding its 150 kiloton limit. Although this treaty has not been ratified, both parties are obligated under customary international law to abide by its terms because neither party has indicated an intention not to ratify. Further, each country has stated it would observe the kiloton limit.

Helsinki Final Act: During the Polish crisis in 1981, the Soviet Union violated the 1975 Helsinki Final Act when it conducted a military maneuver exceeding 25,000 ground troops without providing the prior notification or other information required.

SALT II Treaty: The Soviet Union has been encrypting telemetry (radio signal) information from missile tests in a way that violates the SALT II Treaty. The treaty bans deliberate concealment measures that impede verification by the other party's national technical means. Although the US has stated its intention not to ratify SALT II, both parties in 1981 made political commitments not to undercut the treaty. Soviet encryption practices violate this commitment.

SALT II Treaty: By testing the SS-X-25 ICBM, the Soviet Union has violated the SALT II Treaty provision that permits only one new type of ICBM. The Soviets have declared the SS-X-24 to be their allowed one new type of ICBM. Even if one accepts the Soviet argument that the SS-X-25 is not a prohibited new type of ICBM, the missile would violate the treaty provision prohibiting the testing of an existing ICBM with a single re-entry vehicle whose weight is less than 50% of the ICBM's throw-weight. This provision was intended to prohibit the possibility that single-warhead ICBMs could quickly be converted to multiple-warhead systems.

SALT II Treaty: Although the evidence is somewhat ambiguous and a definitive conclusion cannot be reached, the available evidence indicates that the Soviet Union probably has violated the SALT II Treaty's ban on deployment of the SS-16 ICBM.

ABM Treaty: A large phased-array radar under construction by the Soviet Union at Krasnoyarsk in central Siberia, in its associated siting, orientation, and capability, violates the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. To preclude construction of radars that could be used for a territorial ABM defense, the treaty limits deployment of ballistic missile early warning radars, including large phased-array radars used for that purpose, to locations along the periphery of the national territory of each party and requires that they be oriented outward. The Krasnoyarsk radar meets neither of these requirements.

ABM Treaty: This construction and other Soviet activities suggest that the Soviet Union may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory, which would entirely negate the ABM Treaty. Other activities include development of components of a new ABM system that apparently could be deployed in a mobile mode, and probable testing of components of surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) in an ABM mode. Mobile ABM components are banned by the ABM Treaty; SAMs are permitted to counter aircraft, but they may not be given the capability to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory and they may not be tested in an ABM mode.

US action: The Soviet Union thus far has failed to provide satisfactory explanations or undertaken corrective actions sufficient to alleviate US concerns. Nevertheless, the President decided early in June to continue our policy not to undercut existing strategic arms agreements to the extent the Soviets exercise comparable restraint. He stated his determination that we go the extra mile--to try to establish a framework of mutual, interim restraint to support our ongoing effort in Geneva to reach agreement on reducing nuclear arms. We will constantly review our policy in light of Soviet conduct, including correction of violations, continued growth in Soviet strategic forces, and Soviet seriousness in the negotiations. The President has directed the Defense Department to identify specific actions the US could take to augment as necessary our strategic modernization program in proportionate response to, and as a hedge against the military consequences of, uncorrected Soviet violations.

Soviet Noncompliance With Arms Control Agreements

February 1, 1985



United States Department of State
Bureau of Public Affairs
Washington, D.C.

Following are the texts of President Reagan's message to the Congress and his unclassified report on Soviet noncompliance with arms control agreements.

MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS, FEB. 1, 1985

During 1984, at the request of the Congress, I forwarded two reports to the Congress on arms control compliance. The first, forwarded last January, was an in-depth analysis of seven specific issues of violations or probable violations by the Soviet Union of arms control obligations and commitments. The second report, forwarded in October, was an advisory study prepared independently by the General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament. These reports indicate that there is cause for serious concern regarding the Soviet Union's conduct with respect to observance of arms control agreements.

In the FY-1985 Defense Authorization Act and the Conference Report on that Act, the Congress called for additional classified and unclassified reports regarding a wide range of questions concerning the Soviet Union's compliance with arms control commitments. The Administration is responding to these requests by providing both classified and unclassified reports which update the seven issues initially analyzed in the January 1984 report, and analyze a number of additional issues.

In this unclassified report the United States Government reaffirms the conclusions of its January 1984 report that the USSR has violated the Helsinki Final Act, the Geneva Protocol on Chemical Weapons, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, and two pro-

visions of SALT II [strategic arms limitation talks]: telemetry encryption and ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile] modernization. The United States Government also reaffirms its previous conclusions that the USSR has probably violated the SS-16 deployment prohibition of SALT II and is likely to have violated the nuclear testing yield limit of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty. In addition, the United States Government has determined that the USSR has violated the ABM [Anti-Ballistic Missile] Treaty (through the siting, orientation, and capability of the Krasnoyarsk Radar), violated the Limited Test Ban Treaty, and violated the SALT II provision prohibiting more than one new type of ICBM, and probably violated the ABM Treaty restriction on concurrent testing of SAM [surface-to-air missiles] and ABM components. Evidence regarding the USSR's compliance with the ABM Treaty provision on component mobility was determined to be ambiguous. In addition, the United States Government is concerned about Soviet preparations for a prohibited territorial ABM defense. Further, the USSR was determined to be currently in compliance with those provisions of the SALT I Interim Agreement and its implementing procedures that deal with reuse of dismantled ICBM sites and with the reconfiguration of dismantled ballistic missile launching submarines.

Beyond the issues that are treated in the unclassified report released today, there are other compliance issues that will not be publicly disclosed at this time but which remain under review. As we continue to work on these issues, we will brief and consult with the Congress in detail and will, to the maximum extent possible, keep the public informed on our findings.

In order for arms control to have meaning and credibly contribute to national security and to global or regional stability, it is

essential that all parties to agreements fully comply with them. Strict compliance with all provisions of arms control agreements is fundamental, and this Administration will not accept anything less. To do so would undermine the arms control process and damage the chances for establishing a more constructive U.S.-Soviet relationship.

As I stated last January, Soviet non-compliance is a serious matter. It calls into question important security benefits from arms control, and could create new security risks. It undermines the confidence essential to an effective arms control process in the future. With regard to the issues analyzed in the January 1984 report, the Soviet Union has thus far not provided satisfactory explanations nor undertaken corrective actions sufficient to alleviate our concerns. The United States Government has vigorously pressed, and will continue to press, these compliance issues with the Soviet Union through diplomatic channels.

Our approach in pursuing these issues with the Soviet Union is to ensure that both the letter and intent of treaty obligations and commitments will be fulfilled. To this end the Administration is: analyzing further issues of possible non-compliance; as noted above, seeking from the Soviet Union through diplomatic channels explanations, clarifications, and, where necessary, corrective actions; reporting on such issues to the Congress; and taking into account in our defense modernization plans the security implications of arms control violations. At the same time, the United States is continuing to carry out its own obligations and commitments under relevant agreements. Our objectives in the new negotiations which begin in March are to reverse the erosion of the ABM Treaty and to seek equitable, effectively verifiable arms control agreements which will result in real reductions and enhanced stability. While all of these steps can help, however, it is fundamentally important that the Soviet Union take a constructive attitude toward full compliance with all arms control obligations and commitments.

The Administration and the Congress have a shared interest in supporting the arms control process. For this reason, increased understanding of Soviet violations or probable violations, and a strong Congressional consensus on the importance of compliance to achieving effective arms control, will strengthen our efforts both in the new negotiations and in seeking corrective actions from the Soviet Union.

I look forward to continued close consultation with the Congress as we seek to make progress in resolving compliance issues and in negotiating sound arms control agreements.

Sincerely,

RONALD REAGAN

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT, FEB. 1, 1985

SOVIET NONCOMPLIANCE WITH ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS

INTRODUCTION

In January 1984, the President, in response to Congressional requests, reported to the Congress on several issues involving violations or probable violations by the Soviet Union of existing arms control agreements, including: the Geneva Protocol on Chemical Weapons, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, the Helsinki Final Act, the ABM Treaty, SALT II, and the Threshold Test Ban Treaty.

In that report the President stated:

If the concept of arms control is to have meaning and credibility as a contribution to global or regional stability, it is essential that all parties to agreements comply with them. Because I seek genuine arms control, I am committed to ensuring that existing agreements are observed.

The President further noted that:

Soviet noncompliance is a serious matter. It calls into question important security benefits from arms control, and could create new security risks. It undermines the confidence essential to an effective arms control process in the future. It increases doubts about the reliability of the USSR as a negotiating partner, and thus damages the chances for establishing a more constructive U.S.-Soviet relationship.

The current unclassified report provides updated information on the seven issues previously reported and additionally reviews six other compliance issues that have been intensively studied since the January 1984 report was completed, for a total of thirteen issues. The six new cases involve questions of Soviet compliance with provisions of the SALT I Interim Agreement, the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT), and the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty.

- With regard to the SALT I Interim Agreement, this report examines the evidence on two issues: (1) whether the USSR has made prohibited use of remaining facilities at dismantled former ICBM sites; (2) whether the USSR has reconfigured dismantled ballistic missile submarines in a manner prohibited by Treaty or Protocol provisions.

- With regard to the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT), this report examines whether the USSR vented nuclear debris from underground nuclear tests beyond its territorial limits in contravention of the LTBT.

- With regard to the ABM Treaty, this report examines whether the USSR has: concurrently tested SAM and ABM components; developed, tested, or deployed mobile ABM components; and/or has provided a base for territorial defense.

In this report the United States Government reaffirms the conclusions of its January 1984 report that the USSR has violated the Helsinki Final Act, the Geneva Protocol on Chemical Weapons, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, and two provisions of SALT II: telemetry encryption and ICBM modernization. The United States Government also reaffirms its previous conclusions that the USSR has probably violated the SS-16 deployment prohibition of SALT II and is likely to have violated the nuclear testing yield limit of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty. In addition, the United States Government has determined that the USSR has violated the ABM Treaty through the siting, orientation, and capability of the Krasnoyarsk Radar and the Limited Test Ban Treaty; by testing the SS-X-25 ICBM in addition to the SS-X-24 ICBM, violated the SALT II "new types" provision limiting each party to one new type ICBM; and probably violated the prohibition against concurrent testing of SAM and ABM components. Moreover, the Soviet Union's ABM and ABM-related actions suggest that the USSR may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory. Evidence regarding the USSR's compliance with the ABM Treaty provision on component mobility was determined to be ambiguous, and the USSR was determined to be currently in compliance with provisions of the SALT I Interim Agreement and its implementing procedures that deal with re-use of dismantled ICBM sites and the reconfiguration of dismantled ballistic missile launching submarines.

In addition to the issues regarding Soviet compliance with arms control agreements which are addressed in this unclassified report, there are other compliance matters currently under review which cannot be publicly disclosed at this time and which we intend to brief to the Congress on a classified basis in the near future.

In examining the issues in this unclassified report, as well as in the classified report to follow, we have focused on questions of Soviet non-compliance. Questions of Soviet non-compliance have not arisen with regard to several other provisions of these agreements, nor with certain other treaties, such as the Antarctic Treaty, the Outer Space Treaty, the Non-Proliferation

Treaty, the Seabed Arms Control Treaty, the Environmental Modification Convention, and others.

The issues we have analyzed raise very serious concerns. The United States Government firmly believes that in order for arms control to have meaning and credibly contribute to national security and to global and regional stability, it is essential that all parties to agreements fully comply with them. Strict compliance with all provisions of arms control agreements is fundamental, and the United States Government will not accept anything less: to do so would undermine the arms control process and damage the chances for establishing a more constructive U.S.-Soviet relationship.

THE FINDINGS

Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and 1925 Geneva Protocol

1. Chemical, Biological, and Toxin Weapons

- **Treaty Status:** The 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (the BWC) and the 1925 Geneva Protocol are multilateral treaties to which both the United States and the Soviet Union are parties. Soviet actions not in accord with these treaties and customary international law relating to the 1925 Geneva Protocol are violations of legal obligations.

- **Obligations:** The BWC bans the development, production, stockpiling, or possession, and transfer of: microbial or other biological agents or toxins except for a small quantity for prophylactic, protective, or other peaceful purposes. It also bans weapons, equipment, and means of delivery of agents or toxins. The 1925 Geneva Protocol and related rules of customary international law prohibit the first use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous, or other gases and of all analogous liquids, materials, or devices; and prohibits use of bacteriological methods of warfare.

- **Issues:** The January 1984 compliance report addressed whether the Soviets are in violation of provisions that ban the development, production, transfer, possession, and use of biological and toxin weapons. Soviet compliance was reexamined for this report.

- **Finding:** The U.S. Government judges that evidence during 1984 confirm and strengthen the conclusion of the January 1984 report that the Soviet Union has maintained an offensive biological warfare program and capability in violation of its legal obligation under

the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention of 1972.

Although there have been no confirmed chemical and toxin attacks in Kampuchea, Laos, or Afghanistan in 1984, there is no basis for amending the January 1984 conclusion that the Soviet Union has been involved in the production, transfer, and use of trichothecene mycotoxins for hostile purposes in Laos, Kampuchea, and Afghanistan in violation of its legal obligation under international law as codified in the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention of 1972.

Limited Test Ban Treaty

2. Underground Nuclear Test Venting

- **Treaty Status:** The Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water (Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT)) is a multilateral treaty that entered into force for the United States and the Soviet Union in 1963. Soviet actions not in accord with this treaty are violations of a legal obligation.

- **Obligations:** The LTBT specifically prohibits nuclear explosions in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water. It also prohibits nuclear explosions in any other environment "if such explosion causes radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the State under whose jurisdiction or control such explosion is conducted."

- **Issue:** The U.S. examined whether the USSR's underground nuclear tests have caused radioactive debris to be present outside of its territorial limits.

- **Finding:** The U.S. Government judges that the Soviet Union's underground nuclear test practices have resulted in the venting of radioactive matter and caused radioactive matter to be present outside the Soviet Union's territorial limits in violations of its legal obligation to the Limited Test Ban Treaty. The Soviet Union has failed to take the precautions necessary to minimize the contamination of man's environment by radioactive substances despite U.S. request for corrective action.

Threshold Test Ban Treaty

3. Nuclear Testing and the 150 Kiloton Limit

- **Treaty Status:** The Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) was signed in 1974. The Treaty has not been ratified but neither party has indicated an intention not to ratify. Therefore, both parties are subject to the obligation under

customary international law to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of the TTBT. Soviet actions that would defeat the object and purpose of the TTBT are therefore violations of their legal obligation. The United States is seeking to negotiate improved verification measures for the Treaty. Both Parties have separately stated they would observe the 150 kiloton threshold of the TTBT.

- **Obligation:** The Treaty prohibits any underground nuclear weapon test having a yield exceeding 150 kilotons at any place under the jurisdiction or control of the Parties, beginning March 31, 1976. In view of the technical uncertainties associated with estimating the precise yield of nuclear weapons tests, the sides agreed that one or two slight unintended breaches per year would not be considered a violation.

- **Issue:** The January 1984 report examined whether the Soviets have conducted nuclear tests in excess of 150 kilotons. This issue was reexamined for this report.

- **Finding:** The U.S. Government judges that, while ambiguities in the pattern of Soviet testing and verification uncertainties continued in 1984, evidence available through the year confirms the January 1984 finding that Soviet nuclear testing activities for a number of tests constitute a likely violation of legal obligations under the Threshold Test Ban Treaty of 1974, which banned underground nuclear tests with yields exceeding 150 kilotons. These Soviet actions continue despite U.S. requests for corrective measures.

Helsinki Final Act

4. Helsinki Final Act Notification of Military Exercises

- **Legal Status:** The Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe was signed in Helsinki in 1975. This document represents a political commitment and was signed by the United States and the Soviet Union, along with many other States. Soviet actions not in accord with that document are violations of their political commitment.

- **Obligation:** All signatory States of the Helsinki Final Act are committed to give prior notification of, and other details concerning, major military maneuvers, defined as those involving more than 25,000 ground troops.

- **Issues:** The January 1984 compliance report examined whether notification of the Soviet military exercise Zapad-81 was inadequate and therefore a violation of the Soviet

Union's political commitment under the Helsinki Final Act. The USSR's compliance with its notification commitment was reexamined for this report.

• **Finding:** The U.S. Government previously judged that the Soviet Union violated its political commitment to observe the prior-notification provisions of Basket I of the Helsinki Final Act, which requires notification and other information concerning exercises exceeding 25,000 ground troops. A major Warsaw Pact maneuver (Zapad-81), exceeding the 25,000 troop limit, was conducted in 1981 at a time great pressure was being put on Poland, and the Soviet Union did not provide the pre-notification or other information required. The judgment that the Soviet Union did not observe the prior notification provisions of the Helsinki Final Act is confirmed.

While the USSR and Warsaw Pact states have generally taken an approach to the confidence-building measures of the Final Act which minimizes the information they provide, Soviet compliance with the exercise-notification provisions was much improved in 1983. However, during 1984, the USSR returned to a minimalist stance, providing only the bare minimum required under the Final Act.

SALT I Interim Agreement

• **Treaty Status:** The SALT I Interim Agreement entered into force for the United States and the Soviet Union in 1972. Dismantling procedures implementing the Interim Agreement were concluded in 1974. The Interim Agreement, by its own terms, was of limited duration and expired as a legally binding document in 1977. The applicability of the Interim Agreement to the actions of both parties has, however, been extended by the parties by a series of mutual political commitments, including the President's May 31, 1982 statement that the United States would refrain from actions which would undercut existing strategic arms agreements so long as the Soviet Union shows equal restraint. The Soviets have told us they would abide by the SALT I Interim Agreement and SALT II. Any actions by the USSR inconsistent with this commitment are violations of its political commitment with respect to the Interim Agreement and its implementing procedures.

Two issues were analyzed for this report: Soviet activities at dismantled ICBM sites, and reconfiguration of a Yankee-Class ballistic missile submarine.

5. Mobile Missile Base Construction at Dismantled SS-7 ICBM Sites

• **Obligation:** The SALT I Interim Agreement and its procedures prohibit the parties from using facilities remaining at dismantled or destroyed ICBM sites for storage, support, or launch of ICBMs. Any Soviet actions inconsistent with this commitment are violations of a political commitment with respect to the Interim Agreement and its implementing procedures.

• **Issue:** The U.S. examined whether the USSR has used former ICBM sites in a manner inconsistent with its political commitment under the Interim Agreement and its implementing procedures.

• **Finding:** The U.S. Government judges that Soviet activity apparently related to SS-X-25 ICBM deployments at two former SS-7 bases does not at present violate the agreed implementing procedures of the SALT I Interim Agreement. However, ongoing activities raise concerns about compliance for the future, since use of "remaining facilities" to support ICBMs at deactivated SS-7 sites would be in violation of Soviet commitments. The U.S. will continue to monitor developments closely.

6. Reconfiguration of Yankee-Class Ballistic Missile Submarines

• **Obligations:** The SALT I Interim Agreement and its procedures require that submarines limited by the Agreement be dismantled or be reconfigured into submarines without ballistic missile capabilities. Any Soviet actions inconsistent with this obligation are violations of a political commitment.

• **Issue:** The U.S. examined whether the USSR's reconfiguration of a submarine to increase its length, and for use as a platform for modern long-range cruise missiles, is consistent with its political commitments under the Interim Agreement and its implementing procedures.

• **Finding:** The U.S. Government judges that the Soviet Union's conversion of a dismantled SSBN into a submarine longer than the original, and carrying modern, long-range cruise missiles is not a violation of its political commitment under the SALT I Interim Agreement, but constitutes a threat to U.S. and Allied security similar to the original Yankee-Class submarine.

SALT II Treaty

• **Treaty Status:** SALT II was signed in June 1979 and has not been ratified. In 1981 the United States made

clear to the Soviet Union its intention not to ratify the SALT II Treaty. Prior to this clarification of our position in 1981, both nations were obligated under customary international law not to take actions which would defeat the object and purpose of the signed, but unratified, Treaty. Such Soviet actions prior to 1981 are violations of legal obligations. Since 1981, the United States has observed a political commitment to refrain from actions that undercut the SALT II Treaty so long as the Soviet Union does likewise. The Soviets have told us they also would abide by these provisions. Soviet actions inconsistent with this commitment are violations of their political commitment with respect to the SALT II Treaty.

Three SALT II issues are included in this unclassified report: encryption of telemetry, SS-X-25 ICBM, and SS-16 ICBM deployment.

7. Encryption of Ballistic Missile Telemetry

• **Obligation:** The provisions of SALT II ban deliberate concealment measures that impede verification by national technical means. The Treaty permits each party to use various methods of transmitting telemetric information during testing, including encryption, but bans deliberate denial of telemetry, such as through encryption, whenever such denial impedes verification.

• **Issue:** The January 1984 compliance report examined whether the Soviet Union has engaged in encryption of missile test telemetry (radio signals) so as to impede verification. This issue was reexamined for this report.

• **Finding:** The U.S. Government reaffirms the conclusion in the January 1984 report that Soviet encryption practices constitute a violation of a legal obligation under SALT II prior to 1981 and a violation of their political commitment since 1982. The nature and extent of such encryption of telemetry on new ballistic missiles, despite U.S. request for corrective action, continues to be an example of deliberately impeding verification of compliance in violation of this Soviet political commitment.

8. The SS-X-25 ICBM

• **Obligation:** In an attempt to constrain the modernization and the proliferation of new, more capable types of ICBMs, the provisions of SALT II permit each side to "flight test and deploy" just one new type of "light" ICBM. A new type is defined as one that differs from an existing type by more than 5 percent in length, largest diameter,

launch-weight, and throw-weight or differs in number of stages or propellant type. In addition, it was agreed that no single re-entry vehicle ICBM of an existing type with a post-boost vehicle would be flight-tested or deployed whose reentry vehicle weight is less than 50 percent of the throw-weight of that ICBM. This latter provision was intended to prohibit the possibility that single warhead ICBMs could quickly be converted to MIRVed [multiple independently-targetable reentry vehicle] systems.

• **Issues:** The Soviets declared the SS-X-24 to be their allowed one new type ICBM. The January 1984 report examined the issues: whether the Soviets have tested a second new type of ICBM (the SS-X-25) which is prohibited; whether the reentry vehicle (RV) on that missile, if it is not a new type, is in compliance with the provision that for existing types of single RV missiles, the weight of the RV be equal to at least 50 percent of total throw-weight; and whether encryption of SS-X-25 flight test telemetry impedes verification. The U.S. reexamined these issues for this report.

• **Finding:**

a. **Second New Type:** The U.S. Government judges that the SS-X-25 is a prohibited second "new" type of ICBM and that its testing, in addition to the SS-X-24 ICBM, thereby is a violation of the Soviet Union's political commitment to observe the "new" type provision of the SALT II Treaty. Despite U.S. requests, no corrective action has been taken.

b. **RV-to-Throw-Weight Ratio:** The U.S. Government reaffirms the conclusion of the January 1984 report regarding the SS-X-25 RV-to-throw-weight ratio. That is, if we were to accept the Soviet argument that the SS-X-25 is not a prohibited new type of ICBM, it would be a violation of their political commitment to observe the SALT II provision which prohibits the testing of such an existing ICBM with a single reentry vehicle whose weight is less than 50 percent of the throw-weight of the ICBM.

c. **Encryption:** The U.S. Government reaffirms its judgment made in the January 1984 report regarding telemetry encryption during tests of the SS-X-25. Encryption during tests of this missile is illustrative of the deliberate impeding of verification of compliance in violation of a legal obligation prior to 1981, and of the USSR's political commitment subsequent to 1981.

9. SS-16 Deployment

• **Obligation:** The Soviet Union agreed in SALT II not to produce, test, or deploy ICBMs of the SS-16 type and, in particular, not to produce the SS-16 third stage or the reentry vehicle of that missile.

• **Issue:** The January 1984 report examined the evidence regarding whether the Soviets have deployed the SS-16 ICBM in spite of the ban on its deployment. The U.S. reexamined this issue for this report.

• **Finding:** The U.S. Government reaffirms the judgment made in the January 1984 report. While the evidence is somewhat ambiguous and we cannot reach a definitive conclusion, the available evidence indicates that the activities at Plesetsk are a probable violation of the USSR's legal obligation not to defeat the object and purpose of SALT II prior to 1981 when the Treaty was pending ratification, and a probable violation of a political commitment subsequent to 1981.

ABM Treaty

• **Treaty Status:** The 1972 ABM Treaty and its Protocol ban deployment of ABM systems except that each party is permitted to deploy one ABM system around the national capital area or, alternatively, at a single ICBM deployment area. The ABM Treaty is in force and is of indefinite duration. Soviet actions not in accord with the ABM Treaty are, therefore, violations of a legal obligation.

Four ABM issues are included in this unclassified report: the Krasnoyarsk Radar, mobile land-based ABM systems or components, concurrent testing of ABM and SAM components, and ABM territorial defense.

10. The Krasnoyarsk Radar

• **Obligation:** In an effort to preclude creation of a base for territorial ABM defense, the ABM Treaty limits the deployment of ballistic missile early warning radars, including large phased-array radars used for that purpose, to locations along the periphery of the national territory of each party and requires that they be oriented outward. The Treaty permits deployment (without regard to location or orientation) of large phased-array radars for purposes of tracking objects in outer space or for use as national technical means of verification of compliance with arms control agreements.

• **Issue:** The January 1984 report examined the evidence regarding the construction of a large phased-array radar near Krasnoyarsk in central Siberia. It was concluded that this radar was almost certainly a violation of the ABM Treaty. The U.S. reexamined this issue for this report.

• **Finding:** The U.S. Government judges, on the basis of evidence which continued to be available through 1984, that the new large phased-array radar under construction at Krasnoyarsk constitutes a violation of legal obligations under the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972 in that in its associated siting, orientation, and capability, it is prohibited by this Treaty. Continuing construction, and the absence of credible alternative explanations, have reinforced our assessment of its purpose. Despite U.S. requests, no corrective action has been taken.

11. Mobility of New ABM System

• **Obligation:** The ABM Treaty prohibits the development, testing, or deployment of mobile land-based ABM systems or components.

• **Issue:** The U.S. examined whether the Soviet Union has developed a mobile land-based ABM system, or components for such a system, in violation of its legal obligation under the ABM Treaty.

• **Finding:** The U.S. Government judges that Soviet actions with respect to ABM component mobility are ambiguous, but the USSR's development of components of a new ABM system, which apparently are designed to be deployable at sites requiring relatively little or no preparation, represent a potential violation of its legal obligation under the ABM Treaty. This and other ABM-related Soviet actions suggest that the USSR may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory.

12. Concurrent Testing of ABM and SAM Components

• **Obligation:** The ABM Treaty and its Protocol limit the parties to one ABM deployment area. In addition to the ABM systems and components at that one deployment area, the parties may have ABM systems and components for development and testing purposes so long as they are located at agreed test ranges. The Treaty also prohibits giving components, other than ABM system components, the capability "to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory" and prohibits the parties from testing them in "an ABM mode." The parties agreed

that the concurrent testing of SAM and ABM system components is prohibited.

- **Issue:** The U.S. examined whether the Soviet Union has concurrently tested SAM and ABM system components in contravention of this legal obligation.

- **Finding:** The U.S. Government judges that evidence of Soviet actions with respect to concurrent operations is insufficient to assess fully compliance with Soviet obligations under the ABM Treaty, although the Soviet Union has conducted tests that have involved air defense radars in ABM-related activities. The number of incidents of concurrent operation of SAM and ABM components indicate the USSR probably has violated the prohibition on testing SAM components in an ABM mode. In

several cases this may be highly probable. This and other such Soviet activities suggest that the USSR may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory.

13. ABM Territorial Defense

- **Obligation:** The Treaty allows each party a single operational site, explicitly permits modernization and replacement of ABM systems or their components, and explicitly recognizes the existence of ABM test ranges for the development and testing of ABM components. The ABM Treaty prohibits, however, the deployment of an ABM system for defense of the national territory of the parties and prohibits the parties from providing a base for such a defense.

- **Issue:** The U.S. examined whether Soviet ABM and related activities provide a base for a territorial defense.

- **Finding:** The U.S. Government judges that the aggregates of the Soviet Union's ABM and ABM-related actions suggest that the USSR may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory. ■

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The Strategic Defense Initiative

June 1985



United States Department of State
Bureau of Public Affairs
Washington, D.C.

In his speech of March 23, 1983, President Reagan presented his vision of a future in which nations could live secure in the knowledge that their national security did not rest upon the threat of nuclear retaliation but rather on the ability to defend against potential attacks. The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) research program is designed to determine whether and, if so, how advanced defensive technologies could contribute to the realization of this vision.

The Strategic Context

The U.S. SDI research program is wholly compatible with the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, is comparable to research permitted by the ABM Treaty which the Soviets have been conducting for many years, and is a prudent hedge against Soviet breakout from ABM Treaty limitations through the deployment of a territorial ballistic missile defense. These important facts deserve emphasis. However, the basic intent behind the Strategic Defense Initiative is best explained and understood in terms of the strategic environment we face for the balance of this century and into the next.

The Challenges We Face. Our nation and those nations allied with us face a number of challenges to our security. Each of these challenges imposes its own demands and presents its own opportunities. Preserving peace and freedom is, and always will be, our fundamental goal. The essential purpose of our military forces, and our nuclear

forces in particular, is to deter aggression and coercion based upon the threat of military aggression. The deterrence provided by U.S. and allied military forces has permitted us to enjoy peace and freedom. However, the nature of the military threat has changed and will continue to change in very fundamental ways in the next decade. Unless we adapt our response, deterrence will become much less stable and our susceptibility to coercion will increase dramatically.

Our Assumptions About Deterrence. For the past 20 years, we have based our assumptions on how deterrence can best be assured on the basic idea that if each side were able to maintain the ability to threaten retaliation against any attack and thereby impose on an aggressor costs that were clearly out of balance with any potential gains, this would suffice to prevent conflict. Our idea of what our forces had to hold at risk to deter aggression has changed over time. Nevertheless, our basic reliance on nuclear retaliation provided by offensive nuclear forces, as the essential means of deterring aggression, has not changed over this period.

This basic idea—that if each side maintained roughly equal forces and equal capability to retaliate against attack, stability and deterrence would be maintained—also served as the foundation for the U.S. approach to the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) process of the 1970s. At the time that process began, the United States con-

cluded that deterrence based on the capability of offensive retaliatory forces was not only sensible but necessary, since we believed at the time that neither side could develop the technology for defensive systems which could effectively deter the other side.

Today, however, the situation is fundamentally different. Scientific developments and several emerging technologies now do offer the possibility of defenses that did not exist and could hardly have been conceived earlier. The state of the art of defense has now progressed to the point where it is reasonable to investigate whether new technologies can yield options, especially non-nuclear options, which could permit us to turn to defense not only to enhance deterrence but to allow us to move to a more secure and more stable long-term basis for deterrence.

Of equal importance, the Soviet Union has failed to show the type of restraint, in both strategic offensive and defensive forces, that was hoped for when the SALT process began. The trends in the development of Soviet strategic offensive and defensive forces, as well as the growing pattern of Soviet deception and of noncompliance with existing agreements, if permitted to continue unchecked over the long term, will undermine the essential military balance and the mutuality of vulnerability on which deterrence theory has rested.

Soviet Offensive Improvements. The Soviet Union remains the principal threat to our security and that of our allies. As a part of its wide-ranging effort further to increase its military capabilities, the Soviet Union's improvement of its ballistic missile force, providing increased prompt, hard-target kill capability, has increasingly threatened the survivability of forces we have deployed to deter aggression. It has posed an especially immediate challenge to our land-based retaliatory forces and to the leadership structure that commands them. It equally threatens many critical fixed installations in the United States and in allied nations that support the nuclear retaliatory and conventional forces which provide our collective ability to deter conflict and aggression.

Improvement of Soviet Active Defenses. At the same time, the Soviet Union has continued to pursue strategic advantage through the development and improvement of active defenses. These active defenses provide the Soviet Union a steadily increasing capability to counter U.S. retaliatory forces and those of our allies, especially if our forces were to be degraded by a Soviet first

strike. Even today, Soviet active defenses are extensive. For example, the Soviet Union possesses the world's only currently deployed antiballistic missile system, deployed to protect Moscow. The Soviet Union is currently improving all elements of this system. It also has the world's only deployed antisatellite (ASAT) capability. It has an extensive air defense network, and it is aggressively improving the quality of its radars, interceptor aircraft, and surface-to-air missiles. It also has a very extensive network of ballistic missile early warning radars. All of these elements provide them an area of relative advantage in strategic defense today and, with logical evolutionary improvement, could provide the foundation of decisive advantage in the future.

Improvement in Soviet Passive Defenses. The Soviet Union is also spending significant resources on passive defensive measures aimed at improving the survivability of its own forces, military command structure, and national leadership. These efforts range from providing rail and road mobility for its latest generation of ICBMs [intercontinental ballistic missiles] to extensive hardening of various critical installations.

Soviet Research and Development on Advanced Defenses. For over two decades, the Soviet Union has pursued a wide range of strategic defensive efforts, integrating both active and passive elements. The resulting trends have shown steady improvement and expansion of Soviet defensive capability. Furthermore, current patterns of Soviet research and development, including a longstanding and intensive research program in many of the same basic technological areas which our SDI program will address, indicate that these trends will continue apace for the foreseeable future. If unanswered, continued Soviet defensive improvements will further erode the effectiveness of our own existing deterrent, based as it is now almost exclusively on the threat of nuclear retaliation by offensive forces. Therefore, this longstanding Soviet program of defensive improvements, in itself, poses a challenge to deterrence which we must address.

Soviet Noncompliance and Verification. Finally, the problem of Soviet noncompliance with arms control agreements in both the offensive and defensive areas, including the ABM Treaty, is a cause of very serious concern. Soviet activity in constructing either new phased-array radar near Krasnoyarsk, in central Siberia, has

very immediate and ominous consequences. When operational, this radar, due to its location, will increase the Soviet Union's capability to deploy a territorial ballistic missile defense. Recognizing that such radars would make such a contribution, the ABM Treaty expressly banned the construction of such radars at such locations as one of the primary mechanisms for ensuring the effectiveness of the treaty. The Soviet Union's activity with respect to this radar is in direct violation of the ABM Treaty.

Against the backdrop of this Soviet pattern of noncompliance with existing arms control agreements, the Soviet Union is also taking other actions which affect our ability to verify Soviet compliance. Some Soviet actions, like their increased use of encryption during testing, are directly aimed at degrading our ability to monitor treaty compliance. Other Soviet actions, too, contribute to the problems we face in monitoring Soviet compliance. For example, Soviet increases in the number of their mobile ballistic missiles, especially those armed with multiple, independently-targetable reentry vehicles, and other mobile systems, will make verification less and less certain. If we fail to respond to these trends, we could reach a point in the foreseeable future where we would have little confidence in our assessment of the state of the military balance or imbalance, with all that implies for our ability to control escalation during crises.

Responding to the Challenge

In response to this long-term pattern of Soviet offensive and defensive improvements, the United States is compelled to take certain actions designed both to maintain security and stability in the near term and to ensure these conditions in the future. We must act in three main areas.

Retaliatory Force Modernization. First, we must modernize our offensive nuclear retaliatory forces. This is necessary to reestablish and maintain the offensive balance in the near term and to create the strategic conditions that will permit us to pursue complementary actions in the areas of arms reduction negotiations and defensive research. For our part, in 1981 we embarked on our strategic modernization program aimed at reversing a long period of decline. This modernization program was specifically designed to preserve stable deterrence and, at the same time, to provide the incentives necessary to cause the Soviet Union to

join us in negotiating significant reductions in the nuclear arsenals of both sides.

In addition to the U.S. strategic modernization program, NATO is modernizing its longer range intermediate-range nuclear forces (LRINF). Our British and French allies also have underway important programs to improve their own national strategic nuclear retaliatory forces. The U.S. SDI research program does not negate the necessity of these U.S. and allied programs. Rather, the SDI research program depends upon our collective and national modernization efforts to maintain peace and freedom today as we explore options for future decision on how we might enhance security and stability over the longer term.

New Deterrent Options. However, over the long run, the trends set in motion by the pattern of Soviet activity, and the Soviets' persistence in that pattern of activity, suggest that continued long-term dependence on offensive forces may not provide a stable basis for deterrence. In fact, should these trends be permitted to continue and the Soviet investment in both offensive and defensive capability proceed unrestrained and unanswered, the resultant condition could destroy the theoretical and empirical foundation on which deterrence has rested for a generation.

Therefore, we must now also take steps to provide future options for ensuring deterrence and stability over the long term, and we must do so in a way that allows us both to negate the destabilizing growth of Soviet offensive forces and to channel longstanding Soviet propensities for defenses toward more stabilizing and mutually beneficial ends. The Strategic Defense Initiative is specifically aimed toward these goals. In the near term, the SDI program also responds directly to the ongoing and extensive Soviet antiballistic missile effort, including the existing Soviet deployments permitted under the ABM Treaty. The SDI research program provides a necessary and powerful deterrent to any near-term Soviet decision to expand rapidly its antiballistic missile capability beyond that contemplated by the ABM Treaty. This, in itself, is a critical task. However, the overriding, long-term importance of SDI is that it offers the possibility of reversing the dangerous military trends cited above by moving to a better, more stable basis for deterrence and by providing new and compelling incentives to the Soviet Union for seriously negotiating reductions in existing offensive nuclear arsenals.

The Soviet Union recognizes the potential of advanced defense concepts—especially those involving boost, postboost, and mid-course defenses—to change the strategic situation. In our investigation of the potential these systems offer, we do not seek superiority or to establish a unilateral advantage. However, if the promise of SDI technologies is proven, the destabilizing Soviet advantage can be redressed. And, in the process, deterrence will be strengthened significantly and placed on a foundation made more stable by reducing the role of ballistic missile weapons and by placing greater reliance on defenses which threaten no one.

Negotiation and Diplomacy. During the next 10 years, the U.S. objective is a radical reduction in the power of existing and planned offensive nuclear arms, as well as the stabilization of the relationship between nuclear offensive and defensive arms, whether on earth or in space. We are even now looking forward to a period of transition to a more stable world, with greatly reduced levels of nuclear arms and an enhanced ability to deter war based upon the increasing contribution of non-nuclear defenses against offensive nuclear arms. A world free of the threat of military aggression and free of nuclear arms is an ultimate objective to which we, the Soviet Union, and all other nations can agree.

To support these goals, we will continue to pursue vigorously the negotiation of equitable and verifiable agreements leading to significant reductions of existing nuclear arsenals. As we do so, we will continue to exercise flexibility concerning the mechanisms used to achieve reductions but will judge these mechanisms on their ability to enhance the security of the United States and our allies, to strengthen strategic stability, and to reduce the risk of war.

At the same time, the SDI research program is and will be conducted in full compliance with the ABM Treaty. If the research yields positive results, we will consult with our allies about the potential next steps. We would then consult and negotiate, as appropriate, with the Soviet Union, pursuant to the terms of the ABM Treaty, which provide for such consultations, on how deterrence might be strengthened through the phased introduction of defensive systems into the force structures of both sides. This commitment does not mean that we would give the Soviets a veto over the outcome anymore than the Soviets have a veto over our current strategic and intermediate-range programs. Our commitment in this regard reflects our recognition that, if our research yields appropriate results, we should seek to

move forward in a stable way. We have already begun the process of bilateral discussion in Geneva needed to lay the foundation for the stable integration of advanced defenses into the forces of both sides at such time as the state of the art and other considerations may make it desirable to do so.

The Soviet Union's View of SDI

As noted above, the U.S.S.R. has long had a vigorous research, development, and deployment program in defensive systems of all kinds. In fact, over the last two decades the Soviet Union has invested as much overall in its strategic defenses as it has in its massive strategic offensive buildup. As a result, today it enjoys certain important advantages in the area of active and passive defenses. The Soviet Union will certainly attempt to protect this massive, long-term investment.

Allied Views Concerning SDI

Our allies understand the military context in which the Strategic Defense Initiative was established and support the SDI research program. Our common understanding was reflected in the statement issued following President Reagan's meeting with Prime Minister Thatcher in December, to the effect that:

First, the U.S. and Western aim was not to achieve superiority but to maintain the balance, taking account of Soviet developments;

Second, that SDI-related deployment would, in view of treaty obligations, have to be a matter for negotiations;

Third, the overall aim is to enhance, and not to undermine, deterrence; and,

Fourth, East-West negotiations should aim to achieve security with reduced levels of offensive systems on both sides.

This common understanding is also reflected in other statements since then—for example, the principles suggested recently by the Federal Republic of Germany that:

- The existing NATO strategy of flexible response must remain fully valid for the alliance as long as there is no more effective alternative for preventing war; and,

- The alliance's political and strategic unity must be safeguarded. There must be no zones of different degrees of security in the alliance, and Europe's security must not be decoupled from that of North America.

SDI Key Points

Following are a dozen key points that capture the direction and scope of the program:

1. The aim of SDI is not to seek superiority but to maintain the strategic balance and thereby assure stable deterrence.

A central theme in Soviet propaganda is the charge that SDI is designed to secure military superiority for the United States. Put in the proper context of the strategic challenge that we and our allies face, our true goals become obvious and clear. Superiority is certainly not our purpose. Nor is the SDI program offensive in nature. The SDI program is a research program aimed at seeking better ways to ensure U.S. and allied security, using the increased contribution of defenses—defenses that threaten no one.

2. Research will last for some years. We intend to adhere strictly to ABM Treaty limitations and will insist that the Soviets do so as well.

We are conducting a broad-based research program in full compliance with the ABM Treaty and with no decision made to proceed beyond research. The SDI research program is a complex one that must be carried out on a broad front of technologies. It is not a program where all resource considerations are secondary to a schedule. Instead, it is a responsible, organized research program that is aggressively seeking cost-effective approaches for defending the United States and our allies against the threat of nuclear-armed and conventionally armed ballistic missiles of all ranges. We expect that the research will proceed so that initial development decisions could be made in the early 1990s.

3. We do not have any preconceived notions about the defensive options the research may generate. We will not proceed to development and deployment unless the research indicates that defenses meet strict criteria.

The United States is pursuing the broadly based SDI research program in an objective manner. We have no preconceived notions about the outcome of the research program. We do not anticipate that we will be in a position to approach any decision to proceed with development or deployment based on the results of this research for a number of years.

We have identified key criteria that will be applied to the results of this research whenever they become available.

Some options which could provide interim capabilities may be available earlier than others, and prudent planning demands that we maintain options against a range of contingencies. However, the primary thrust of the SDI research program is not to focus on generating options for the earliest development/deployment decision but options which best meet our identified criteria.

4. Within the SDI research program, we will judge defenses to be desirable only if they are survivable and cost effective at the margin.

Two areas of concern expressed about SDI are that deployment of defensive systems would harm crisis stability and that it would fuel a runaway proliferation of Soviet offensive arms. We have identified specific criteria to address these fears appropriately and directly.

Our survivability criterion responds to the first concern. If a defensive system were not adequately survivable, an adversary could very well have an incentive in a crisis to strike first at vulnerable elements of the defense. Application of this criterion will ensure that such a vulnerable system would not be deployed and, consequently, that the Soviets would have no incentive or prospect of overwhelming it.

Our cost-effectiveness criterion will ensure that any deployed defensive system would create a powerful incentive not to respond with additional offensive arms, since those arms would cost more than the additional defensive capability needed to defeat them. This is much more than an economic argument, although it is couched in economic terms. We intend to consider, in our evaluation of options generated by SDI research, the degree to which certain types of defensive systems, by their nature, encourage an adversary to try simply to overwhelm them with additional offensive capability while other systems can discourage such a counter effort. We seek defensive options which provide clear disincentives to attempts to counter them with additional offensive forces.

In addition, we are pressing to reduce offensive nuclear arms through the negotiation of equitable and verifiable agreements. This effort includes reductions in the number of warheads on ballistic missiles to equal levels significantly lower than exist today.

5. It is too early in our research program to speculate on the kinds of

defensive systems—whether ground-based or space-based and with what capabilities—that might prove feasible and desirable to develop and deploy.

Discussion of the various technologies under study is certainly needed to give concreteness to the understanding of the research program. However, speculation about various types of defensive systems that might be deployed is inappropriate at this time. The SDI is a broad-based research program investigating many technologies. We currently see real merit in the potential of advanced technologies providing for a layered defense, with the possibility of negating a ballistic missile at various points after launch. We feel that the possibility of a layered defense both enhances confidence in the overall system and compounds the problem of a potential aggressor in trying to defeat such a defense. However, the paths to such a defense are numerous.

Along the same lines, some have asked about the role of nuclear-related research in the context of our ultimate goal of non-nuclear defenses. While our current research program certainly emphasizes non-nuclear technologies, we will continue to explore the promising concepts which use nuclear energy to power devices which could destroy ballistic missiles at great distances. Further, it is useful to study these concepts to determine the feasibility and effectiveness of similar defensive systems that an adversary may develop for use against future U.S. surveillance and defensive or offensive systems.

6. The purpose of the defensive options we seek is clear—to find a means to destroy attacking ballistic missiles before they can reach any of their potential targets.

We ultimately seek a future in which nations can live in peace and freedom, secure in the knowledge that their national security does not rest upon the threat of nuclear retaliation. Therefore, the SDI research program will place its emphasis on options which provide the basis for eliminating the general threat posed by ballistic missiles. Thus, the goal of our research is not, and cannot be, simply to protect our retaliatory forces from attack.

If a future president elects to move toward a general defense against ballistic missiles, the technological options that we explore will certainly also increase the survivability of our retaliatory forces. This will require a stable concept and process to manage the transition to the future we seek. The

concept and process must be based upon a realistic treatment of not only U.S. but Soviet forces and out-year programs.

7. U.S. and allied security remains indivisible. The SDI program is designed to enhance allied security as well as U.S. security. We will continue to work closely with our allies to ensure that, as our research progresses, allied views are carefully considered.

This has been a fundamental part of U.S. policy since the inception of the Strategic Defense Initiative. We have made a serious commitment to consult, and such consultations will precede any steps taken relative to the SDI research program which may affect our allies.

8. If and when our research criteria are met, and following close consultation with our allies, we intend to consult and negotiate, as appropriate, with the Soviets pursuant to the terms of the ABM Treaty, which provide for such consultations, on how deterrence could be enhanced through a greater reliance by both sides on new defensive systems. This commitment should in no way be interpreted as according the Soviets a veto over possible future defensive deployments. And, in fact, we have already been trying to initiate a discussion of the offense-defense relationship and stability in the defense and space talks underway in Geneva to lay the foundation to support such future possible consultations.

If, at some future time, the United States, in close consultation with its allies, decides to proceed with deployment of defensive systems, we intend to utilize mechanisms for U.S.-Soviet consultations provided for in the ABM Treaty. Through such mechanisms, and taking full account of the Soviet Union's own expansive defensive system re-

search program, we will seek to proceed in a stable fashion with the Soviet Union.

9. It is our intention and our hope that, if new defensive technologies prove feasible, we (in close and continuing consultation with our allies) and the Soviets will jointly manage a transition to a more defense-reliant balance.

Soviet propagandists have accused the United States of reneging on commitments to prevent an arms race in space. This is clearly not true. What we envision is not an arms race; rather, it is just the opposite—a jointly managed approach designed to maintain, at all times, control over the mix of offensive and defensive systems of both sides and thereby increase the confidence of all nations in the effectiveness and stability of the evolving strategic balance.

10. SDI represents no change in our commitment to deterring war and enhancing stability.

Successful SDI research and development of defense options would not lead to abandonment of deterrence but rather to an enhancement of deterrence and an evolution in the weapons of deterrence through the contribution of defensive systems that threaten no one. *We would deter a potential aggressor by making it clear that we could deny him the gains he might otherwise hope to achieve rather than merely threatening him with costs large enough to outweigh those gains.*

U.S. policy supports the basic principle that our existing method of deterrence and NATO's existing strategy of flexible response remain fully valid, and must be fully supported, as long as there is no more effective alternative for preventing war. It is in clear recognition of this obvious fact that the United States continues to pursue so vigorously its own strategic modernization program and so strongly supports the efforts of its allies to sustain their own com-

mitments to maintain the forces, both nuclear and conventional, that provide today's deterrence.

11. For the foreseeable future, offensive nuclear forces and the prospect of nuclear retaliation will remain the key element of deterrence. Therefore, we must maintain modern, flexible, and credible strategic nuclear forces.

This point reflects the fact that we must simultaneously use a number of tools to achieve our goals today while looking for better ways to achieve our goals over the longer term. It expresses our basic rationale for sustaining the U.S. strategic modernization program and the rationale for the critically needed national modernization programs being conducted by the United Kingdom and France.

12. Our ultimate goal is to eliminate nuclear weapons entirely. By necessity, this is a very long-term goal, which requires, as we pursue our SDI research, equally energetic efforts to diminish the threat posed by conventional arms imbalances, both through conventional force improvements and the negotiation of arms reductions and confidence-building measures.

We fully recognize the contribution nuclear weapons make to deterring conventional aggression. We equally recognize the destructiveness of war by conventional and chemical means, and the need both to deter such conflict and to reduce the danger posed by the threat of aggression through such means. ■

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