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SOVIET GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE

While the Communist Party supplies the command center and nervous system of the Soviet Union, the government structure furnishes the muscle of the Soviet state.

The legislature, the bicameral Supreme Soviet of the USSR elected every five years, is theoretically the supreme organ of the land. Its executive organ, the Presidium, technically is the head of state of the Soviet Union. Politburo member Andrey Gromyko currently chairs the Presidium. Similar "soviets" (councils) are elected in all the country's territorial-administrative units as well, and like the Supreme Soviet, theoretically name the executive committees and local executives who constitute the local government down to the village level.

The government structure itself follows the European ministerial pattern, with a Premier (Nikolay Ryzhkov) at the head. He chairs a Council of Ministers, which ordinarily has about 103 members based in Moscow. The government is highly centralized with an enormous bureaucracy. Furthermore, the USSR Council of Ministers has counterparts in each of the 15 union republics subordinated both to it and, to a lesser extent, to the individual republic Supreme Soviets or "legislatures." Republic-level premiers are ex-officio members of the Council as well.

In structure, each Council of Ministers at the USSR and republic level is headed by a Premier. The various ministries themselves, however, are of three categories: all-union, union-republic, and republic ministries. All-union ministries deal with nation-wide matters, are located in Moscow, and directly supervise local divisions throughout the country; examples are defense, railways, civil aviation, and the like. Union-republic ministries have a central ministry in Moscow and subordinate ministries in the republics, supervising such activities as agriculture and light industry which are nationwide but may vary from area to area. Republic ministries report only to their respective republic governments and usually handle issues of local significance (tea growing in Georgia, for example).

Security and public order fall under the purview of the all-union Committee for State Security (KGB) (with ministerial status) and the union-republic Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD). The KGB is headed by a full member of the Party Politburo (Viktor Chebrikov). It is responsible for VIP protection and communications, as well as for guarding against foreign espionage and domestic security threats. It also controls the para-military border guards and has special internal security troops under its command. The MVD directs the regular police and militia, the urban firefighting force and has uniformed troops of its own. It also operates the forced labor camps and colonies whose inmates number more than four million, and the vast civil registry system which keeps tabs on the life of the population.

FACT SHEET

USSR Economic Status

Third Quarter 1985

Gross National Product

Soviet GNP rose an estimated 2.5 percent last year to reach \$2.0 trillion, roughly one-half the US level. With improved performance in agriculture, GNP may grow about 3 percent this year. Accordingly, GNP growth will have averaged 3 percent per year during 1982-85, following a 1.3-percent average in 1979-81.

Industrial Production Recovers from Harsh Winter

Soviet statistics show recovery from a first quarter slump when industrial output rose only 2 percent compared to first quarter 1984. At midyear, output was up 3.5 percent and accelerated further to post a 3.7-percent rise for January-September compared with the first nine months of 1984.

Problems in the Energy Sector

Oil output is running at 11.9 million barrels per day, nearly 4 percent below 1984 levels. The coal industry is showing marginal improvement after a seven-year slump. Total energy output continues to grow, however, because of the rapid rise in natural gas output (up 10 percent so far this year).

Improved Agricultural Performance

USDA estimates the 1985 harvest at 190 million metric tons (mmt), 20 mmt more than last year and one of the best Soviet harvests since the 237-mmt record in 1978. The boost in output means a sizable drop in import requirements for the marketing year (MY) which ends in June 1986 and appreciable hard-currency savings as a result. Imports in MY1984/85 hit a record 53 mmt.

External Position Strong Despite Trade Problems

The decline in oil production resulted in a 28-percent drop in exports to the Developed West during the first quarter. At midyear exports to the West were down 20 percent compared with midyear 1984 results. The USSR entered 1985 from a strong financial base, however, with assets at Western banks nearly equalling its net debt of \$10 billion at the end of 1984.

Gorbachev Bullish on Economic Prospects

Last month Gorbachev unveiled ambitious targets for the 1986-90 five-year plan. Implicit average annual growth rates of nearly 5 percent for national income and industrial production (roughly equivalent to 4 percent for GNP) track fairly evenly with a long-term consumer program outlined earlier in October. All of this growth is premised on equally ambitious targets for increased labor productivity.

**MEETINGS of PRESIDENT REAGAN
and GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV**

U.S.-SOVIET SUMMITS, 1943-1979

Every President since Franklin D. Roosevelt has participated in at least one meeting with the Soviet Premier or First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. All such meetings through 1960 also included British and sometimes French leaders, except for the Eisenhower-Khrushchev meeting in 1959. Following the Paris summit of 1960 which ended prematurely because of the U-2 incident, all the meetings have been on a bilateral basis, although the occasion for the Helsinki summit of 1975 was a multilateral gathering. Ten of the 14 meetings have occurred during the months of May, June, or July.

Tehran (Roosevelt, Stalin, Churchill),
November-December 1943

The discussion centered on military matters, such as planning for the cross channel invasion (Operation OVERLORD) and the invasion of southern France. The three powers also agreed to try to get Turkey to join the war and to split Finland away from the Axis. There was general discussion about several political questions, such as a future world organization and postwar policy toward Germany. On certain contentious issues, such as the Polish question, decisions were postponed, which assured the conference an air of great cordiality.

Yalta (Roosevelt, Stalin, Churchill),
February 1945

The three leaders discussed the future of Poland and Eastern Europe, the nature of Security Council voting in the United Nations, the status of postwar Germany, and the conditions for Soviet entry into the Pacific War. In a Declaration on Liberated Europe, the Allies pledged to work toward the establishment of representative governments in the nations liberated from Axis domination through free elections. In a secret agreement, the Soviet Union promised to enter the Pacific War two to three months after Germany's surrender in return for certain Far Eastern concessions.



Potsdam (Truman, Stalin, Churchill-Attlee),
July 1945

Except for the military details of the Soviet entry into the Pacific War, the conference dealt with political questions, primarily the occupation of Germany and the question of German reparations. The three powers created a Council of Foreign Ministers to work on peace treaties with the Axis powers. In a declaration issued on July 26, they also demanded that Japan surrender unconditionally or be destroyed. During the conference, Truman learned of the successful test of the atomic bomb and informed Stalin in general terms.

Geneva (Eisenhower, Bulganin and Khrushchev, Eden, Faure),
July 1955

At this conference Eisenhower advanced a proposal (the "Open Skies" proposal) calling for an exchange of military blueprints with the Soviet Union and allowing aerial reconnaissance of each other's military installations. The participants also discussed disarmament, German reunification, and the need for greater East-West contacts through travel and the exchange of information.

Washington-Camp David (Eisenhower, Khrushchev),
September 1959

During Khrushchev's visit to the United States, arranged mainly by Eisenhower to acquaint the Soviet leader with the American way of life, the two leaders engaged in substantive talks for two days at Camp David. They agreed to expand exchanges and to remove the Soviet deadline for a Berlin settlement, but on other issues, such as disarmament and the reunification of Germany, no progress was made.

Paris (Eisenhower, Khrushchev, Macmillan, De Gaulle),
May 1960

The four leaders were planning to discuss Germany and Berlin, disarmament, nuclear testing, and the general state of East-West relations. On the second day of the conference, before any of the issues could be considered, Khrushchev demanded that Eisenhower apologize for the U-2 intelligence overflight of the Soviet Union in May. When Eisenhower refused, Khrushchev left the conference.

Vienna (Kennedy, Khrushchev), June 1961

The status of Berlin was the major subject of discussion, but the conflict in Laos and the general question of disarmament were also on the agenda. Khrushchev's truculence on Berlin surprised and sobered Kennedy, but some progress was made when the two leaders agreed that further discussions on Laos should be continued at the Foreign Minister level.

Glassboro (Johnson, Kosygin), June 1967

Hastily arranged and only agreed on after considerable haggling over a suitable location, the meeting at Glassboro, New Jersey was appended to Kosygin's visit to the United Nations where he had come to support the Arab nations' proposals for ending the Middle East conflict that had erupted earlier that month. In addition to the Middle East, disarmament and the Vietnam war were also discussed. Nothing came of a Soviet offer during the conference to serve as an intermediary with the North Vietnamese to negotiate a halt to the U.S. bombing of North Vietnam.

Moscow (Nixon and Brezhnev), May 1972

At this meeting Nixon and Brezhnev signed the ABM Treaty and the SALT I Interim Agreement, both of which had been in negotiation for many months. Also concluded at Moscow were agreements on public health, environmental cooperation, incidents at sea, exchanges in science, technology, education and culture, and a Declaration of Basic Principles of Mutual Relations.

Washington (Nixon and Brezhnev), June 1973

Nixon and Brezhnev discussed the maintenance and strengthening of international peace and a number of international and bilateral questions. The two leaders signed Agreements on the Prevention of Nuclear War and on the Basic Principles of Negotiations on the Further Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. Other agreements signed at the summit dealt with scientific cooperation, agriculture, trade, and other bilateral issues. The joint communique expressed "deep satisfaction" with the conclusion during the preceding January of the Paris Agreement on Vietnam. President Nixon stated at Brezhnev's departure that the meeting had "built on the strong foundation that we laid a year ago."

Moscow (Nixon and Brezhnev), June-July 1974

The President and the General Secretary discussed arms control and several international and bilateral issues. The two leaders signed a protocol which further limited each side to one ABM site apiece instead of the two allowed in the 1972 ABM Treaty. The two also signed a Threshold Test Ban Treaty. The governments signed several other instruments dealing with scientific cooperation, cultural exchanges, and other bilateral matters. The communiqué "reaffirmed their agreement to hold such meetings regularly and when considered necessary for the discussion and solution of urgent questions."

Vladivostok (Ford, Brezhnev), November 1974

At the Vladivostok meeting, which followed visits by President Ford to Japan and Korea, discussions focused on strategic arms limitations but included a number of bilateral and international issues, including the Middle East. Ford and Brezhnev in the SALT II negotiations reached agreement in principle on some of the basic elements subsequently incorporated in the 1979 treaty. They issued a joint statement on strategic offensive arms (the Vladivostok agreement) and a joint communique calling for continuing efforts at arms limitation and the development of economic cooperation.

Helsinki (Ford, Brezhnev), July-August 1975

During two meetings at Helsinki, where both were attending the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Ford and Brezhnev attempted unsuccessfully to reach further agreement on strategic arms limitations. In an exchange with reporters after their July 30 meeting, both called it "businesslike" and "friendly."

Vienna (Carter, Brezhnev), June 1979

The SALT II Treaty was signed at the Vienna summit. Carter and Brezhnev also discussed other arms control issues including the continuation of the SALT process, the Middle East, Afghanistan, and several other international, bilateral, and trade issues. The two leaders signed several related agreements, and issued a joint statement of principles and basic guidelines for subsequent negotiations on the limitation of strategic arms.

Office of the Historian
September 1985

This report was prepared primarily for the internal use of the Department of State.

A Foundation for Enduring Peace



United States Department of State
Bureau of Public Affairs
Washington, D.C.

Following is an address by President Reagan before the UN General Assembly at the commemoration of the 40th anniversary of the United Nations, New York City, October 24, 1985.

Forty years ago, the world awoke daring to believe hatred's unyielding grip had finally been broken—daring to believe the torch of peace would be protected in liberty's firm grasp.

Forty years ago, the world yearned to dream again innocent dreams, to believe in ideals with innocent trust. Dreams of trust are worthy, but in these 40 years too many dreams have been shattered; too many promises have been broken; too many lives have been lost. The painful truth is that the use of violence to take, to exercise, and to preserve power remains a persistent reality in much of the world.

The vision of the UN Charter—to spare succeeding generations this scourge of war—remains real. It still stirs our souls and warms our hearts. But it also demands of us a realism that is rockhard, clear eyed, steady, and sure—a realism that understands the nations of the United Nations are not united.

I come before you this morning preoccupied with peace, with ensuring that the differences between some of us not be permitted to degenerate into open conflict. And I come offering for my own country a new commitment, a fresh start.

On this UN anniversary, we acknowledge its successes: the decisive action during the Korean war; negotia-

tion of the Non-Proliferation Treaty; strong support for decolonization; and the laudable achievements by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. Nor must we close our eyes to this organization's disappointments: its failure to deal with real security issues, the total inversion of morality in the infamous Zionism-is-racism resolution, the politicization of too many agencies, the misuse of too many resources.

The United Nations is a political institution, and politics requires compromise. We recognize that. But let us remember: from those first days one guiding star was supposed to light our path toward the UN vision of peace and progress—the star of freedom.

What kind of people will we be 40 years from today? May we answer—free people, worthy of freedom, and firm in the conviction that freedom is not the sole prerogative of a chosen few, but the universal right of all God's children. This is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights set forth in 1948. And this is the affirming flame the United States has held high to a watching world. We champion freedom not only because it is practical and beneficial but because it is morally right and just.

Free people, whose governments rest upon the consent of the governed, do not wage war on their neighbors. Free people, blessed by economic opportunity and protected by laws that respect the dignity of the individual, are not driven toward the domination of others.

We readily acknowledge that the United States is far from perfect. Yet

we have endeavored earnestly to carry out our responsibilities to the Charter these past 40 years, and we take national pride in our contributions to peace. We take pride in 40 years of helping to avert a new world war and pride in our alliances that protect and preserve us and our friends from aggression. We take pride in the Camp David agreements and our efforts for peace in the Middle East rooted in Resolutions 242 and 338; in supporting Pakistan, target of outside intimidation; in assisting El Salvador's struggle to carry forward its democratic revolution; in answering the appeal of our Caribbean friends in Grenada; in seeing Grenada's representative here today, voting the will of its own people. And we take pride in our proposals to reduce the weapons of war.

We submit this history as evidence of our sincerity of purpose. But today it is more important to speak to you about what my country proposes to do, in these closing years of the 20th century, to bring about a safer, a more peaceful, a more civilized world.

U.S.-Soviet Differences

Let us begin with candor—with words that rest on plain and simple facts. The differences between America and the Soviet Union are deep and abiding. The United States is a democratic nation. Here the people rule. We build no walls to keep them in, nor organize any system of police to keep them mute. We occupy no country. The only land abroad we occupy is beneath the graves where

our heroes rest. What is called the West is a voluntary association of free nations, all of whom fiercely value their independence and their sovereignty. And as deeply as we cherish our beliefs, we do not seek to compel others to share them.

When we enjoy these vast freedoms as we do, it is difficult for us to understand the restrictions of dictatorships which seek to control each institution and every facet of people's lives, the expression of their beliefs, their movements, and their contacts with the outside world. It is difficult for us to understand the ideological premise that force is an acceptable way to expand a political system.

We Americans do not accept that any government has the right to command and order the lives of its people, that any nation has a historic right to use force to export its ideology. This belief—regarding the nature of man and the limitations of government—is at the core of our deep and abiding differences with the Soviet Union, differences that put us into natural conflict—and competition—with one another.

We would welcome enthusiastically a true competition of ideas, welcome a competition of economic strength and scientific and artistic creativity, and, yes, welcome a competition for the good will of the world's people. But we cannot accommodate ourselves to the use of force and subversion to consolidate and expand the reach of totalitarianism.

When Mr. Gorbachev and I meet in Geneva next month, I look to a fresh start in the relationship of our two nations. We can and should meet in the spirit that we can deal with our differences peacefully. That is what we expect.

The only way to resolve differences is to understand them. We must have candid and complete discussions of where dangers exist and where peace is being disrupted. Make no mistake: our policy of open and vigorous competition rests on a realistic view of the world. Therefore, at Geneva, we must review the reasons for the current level of mistrust.

For example, in 1972 the international community negotiated in good faith a ban on biological and toxin weapons; in 1975 we negotiated the Helsinki accords on human rights and freedoms; and during the decade just past, the United States and the Soviet Union negotiated several agreements on strategic weapons. And yet we feel it will be necessary at Geneva to discuss with the Soviet Union what we believe are violations of a number of the provisions in all of these agreements. Indeed,

this is why it is important that we have this opportunity to air our differences through face-to-face meetings—to let frank talk substitute for anger and tension.

The United States has never sought treaties merely to paper over differences. We continue to believe that a nuclear war is one that cannot be won and must never be fought. And that is why we have sought, for nearly 10 years, still seek, and will discuss in Geneva radical, equitable, verifiable reductions in these vast arsenals of offensive nuclear weapons.

At the beginning of the latest round of the ongoing negotiations in Geneva, the Soviet Union presented a specific proposal involving numerical values. We are studying the Soviet counterproposal carefully. I believe that within their proposal there are seeds which we should nurture, and in the coming weeks we will seek to establish a genuine process of give-and-take.

The United States is also seeking to discuss with the Soviet Union in Geneva the vital relationship between offensive and defensive systems, including the possibility of moving toward a more stable and secure world in which defenses play a growing role. The ballistic missile is the most awesome, threatening, and destructive weapon in the history of man. Thus, I welcome the interest of the new Soviet leadership in the reduction of offensive strategic forces. Ultimately, we must remove this menace—once and for all—from the face of the earth.

Until that day, the United States seeks to escape the prison of mutual terror by research and testing that could, in time, enable us to neutralize the threat of these ballistic missiles and, ultimately, render them obsolete. How is Moscow threatened if the capitals of other nations are protected? We do not ask that the Soviet leaders—whose country has suffered so much from war—leave their people defenseless against foreign attack. Why then do they insist that we remain undefended? Who is threatened if Western research—and Soviet research that is itself well-advanced—should develop a non-nuclear system which would threaten not human beings but only ballistic missiles?

Surely, the world will sleep more secure when these missiles have been rendered useless, militarily and politically, when the sword of Damocles that has hung over our planet for too many decades is lifted by Western and Russian scientists working to shield their cities and their citizens and one day shut down space as an avenue of weapons of mass destruction.

If we are destined by history to compete, militarily, to keep the peace, then let us compete in systems that defend our societies rather than weapons which can destroy us both and much of God's creation along with us. Some 18 years ago, then-Premier Aleksei Kosygin was asked about a moratorium on the development of an antimissile defense system. The official Soviet news agency, TASS, reported he replied with these words:

I believe that defensive systems, which prevent attack, are not the cause of the arms race, but constitute a factor preventing the death of people. . . . Maybe an antimissile system is more expensive than an offensive system, but it is designed not to kill people but to preserve human lives.

The Search for Real Peace

Preserving lives—no peace is more fundamental than that. Great obstacles lie ahead, but they should not deter us. Peace is God's commandment. Peace is the holy shadow cast by men treading on the path of virtue.

But just as we all know what peace is, we certainly know what peace is *not*.

- Peace based on repression cannot be true peace and is secure only when individuals are free to direct their own governments.

- Peace based on partition cannot be true peace. Put simply: nothing can justify the continuing and permanent division of the European Continent. Walls of partition and distrust must give way to greater communication for an open world. Before leaving for Geneva, I shall make new proposals to achieve this goal.

- Peace based on mutual fear cannot be true peace because staking our future on a precarious balance of terror is not good enough. The world needs a balance of safety.

- And, finally, a peace based on averting our eyes from trouble cannot be true peace. The consequences of conflict are every bit as tragic when the destruction is contained within one country.

Real peace is what we seek, and that is why today the United States is presenting an initiative that addresses what will be a central issue in Geneva—the issue of regional conflicts in Africa, Asia, and Central America.

Our own position is clear: as the oldest nation of the New World, as the first anticolonial power, the United States rejoiced when decolonization gave birth to so many new nations after World War II. We have always supported the right of the people of each

nation to define their own destiny. We have given \$300 billion since 1945 to help people of other countries. And we've tried to help friendly governments defend against aggression, subversion, and terror.

We have noted with great interest similar expressions of peaceful intent by leaders of the Soviet Union. I am not here to challenge the good faith of what they say. But isn't it important for us to weigh the record, as well?

- In Afghanistan, there are 118,000 Soviet troops prosecuting war against the Afghan people;

- In Cambodia, 140,000 Soviet-backed Vietnamese soldiers wage a war of occupation;

- In Ethiopia, 1,700 Soviet advisers are involved in military planning and support operations along with 2,500 Cuban combat troops;

- In Angola—1,200 Soviet military advisers involved in planning and supervising combat operations, along with 35,000 Cuban troops;

- In Nicaragua—some 8,000 Soviet-bloc and Cuban personnel, including about 3,500 military and secret police personnel.

All of these conflicts—some of them under way for a decade—originate in local disputes, but they share a common characteristic: they are the consequence of an ideology imposed from without, dividing nations and creating regimes that are, almost from the day they take power, at war with their own people. And in each case Marxism-Leninism's war with the people becomes war with their neighbors.

These wars are exacting a staggering human toll and threaten to spill across national boundaries and trigger dangerous confrontations. Where is it more appropriate than right here at the United Nations to call attention to Article 2 of our Charter which instructs members to refrain "... from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state. . . ."

During the past decade these wars played a large role in building suspicions and tensions in my country over the purpose of Soviet policy. This gives us an extra reason to address them seriously today.

U.S. Proposal for a Regional Peace Process

Last year I proposed from this podium that the United States and Soviet Union hold discussions on some of these issues,

and we have done so. But I believe these problems need more than talk. For that reason, we are proposing, and are fully committed to support, a regional peace process that seeks progress on three levels.

- First, we believe the starting point must be a process of negotiation among the warring parties in each country I've mentioned—which, in the case of Afghanistan, includes the Soviet Union. The form of these talks may and should vary, but negotiations—and an improvement of internal political conditions—are essential to achieving an end to violence, the withdrawal of foreign troops, and national reconciliation.

- There is a second level: once negotiations take hold and the parties directly involved are making real progress, representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union should sit down together. It is not for us to impose any solutions in this separate set of talks. Such solutions would not last. But the issue we should address is how best to support the ongoing talks among the warring parties. In some cases, it might well be appropriate to consider guarantees for any agreements already reached. But in every case the primary task is to promote this goal: verified elimination of the foreign military presence and restraint on the flow of outside arms.

- And, finally, if these first two steps are successful, we could move on to the third—welcoming each country back into the world economy so its citizens can share in the dynamic growth that other developing countries—countries that are at peace—enjoy. Despite past differences with these regimes, the United States would respond generously to their democratic reconciliation with their own people, their respect for human rights, and their return to the family of free nations. Of course, until such time as these negotiations result in definitive progress, America's support for struggling democratic resistance forces must not and shall not cease.

This plan is bold. It is realistic. It is not a substitute for existing peacemaking efforts; it complements them. We are not trying to solve every conflict in every region of the globe, and we recognize that each conflict has its own character. Naturally, other regional problems will require different approaches. But we believe that the recurrent pattern of conflict that we see in these five cases ought to be broken as soon as possible.

We must begin somewhere, so let us begin where there is great need and great hope. This will be a clear step forward to help people choose their future more freely. Moreover, this is an extraordinary opportunity for the Soviet side to make a contribution to regional peace which, in turn, can promote future dialogue and negotiations on other critical issues.

The Need for Individual Freedom and Human Rights

With hard work and imagination, there is no limit to what, working together, our nations can achieve. Gaining a peaceful resolution of these conflicts will open whole new vistas of peace and progress—the discovery that the promise of the future lies not in measures of military defense, or the control of weapons, but in the expansion of individual freedom and human rights.

Only when the human spirit can worship, create, and build, only when people are given a personal stake in determining their own destiny and benefiting from their own risks do societies become prosperous, progressive, dynamic, and free.

We need only open our eyes to the economic evidence all around us. Nations that deny their people opportunity—in Eastern Europe, Indochina, southern Africa, and Latin America—without exception are dropping further behind in the race for the future. But where we see enlightened leaders who understand that economic freedom and personal incentive are key to development, we see economies striding forward—Singapore, Taiwan, and South Korea; India, Botswana, and China. These are among the current and emerging success stories because they have the courage to give economic incentives a chance.

Let us all heed the simple eloquence in Andrei Sakharov's Nobel Peace Prize message:

International trust, mutual understanding, disarmament and international security are inconceivable without an open society with freedom of information, freedom of conscience, the right to publish and the right to travel and choose the country in which one wishes to live.

At the core, this is an eternal truth. Freedom works. That is the promise of the open world and awaits only our collective grasp. Forty years ago, hope came alive again for a world that hungered for hope. I believe fervently that hope is still alive.

The American Commitment to the World

The United States has spoken with candor and conviction today, but that does not lessen these strong feelings held by every American: it's in the nature of Americans to hate war and its destructiveness. We would rather wage our struggle to rebuild and renew, not to tear down. We would rather fight against hunger, disease, and catastrophe. We would rather engage our adversaries in the battle of ideals and ideas for the future.

These principles emerge from the innate openness and good character of our people—and from our long struggle and sacrifice for our liberties and the liberties of others. Americans always yearn for peace. They have a passion for life. They carry in their hearts a deep capacity for reconciliation.

Last year at this General Assembly, I indicated there was every reason for the United States and the Soviet Union to shorten the distance between us. In Geneva—the first meeting between our heads of government in more than 6 years—Mr. Gorbachev and I will have that opportunity.

So, yes, let us go to Geneva with both sides committed to dialogue. Let both sides go committed to a world with fewer nuclear weapons—and some day with none. Let both sides go committed to walk together on a safer path into the 21st century and to lay the foundation for enduring peace.

It is time, indeed, to do more than just talk of a better world. It is time to act. And we will act when nations cease to try to impose their ways upon others. And we will act when they realize that we, for whom the achievement of

freedom has come dear, will do what we must to preserve it from assault.

America is committed to the world, because so much of the world is inside America. After all, only a few miles from this very room is our Statue of Liberty, past which life began anew for millions—where the peoples from nearly every country in this hall joined to build these United States.

The blood of each nation courses through the American vein and feeds the spirit that compels us to involve ourselves in the fate of this good earth. It is the same spirit that warms our heart in concern to help ease the desperate hunger that grips proud people on the African Continent.

It is the internationalist spirit that came together last month when our neighbor, Mexico, was struck suddenly by an earthquake. Even as the Mexican nation moved vigorously into action, there were heartwarming offers by other nations offering to help and glimpses of people working together without concern for national self-interest or gain.

And if there was any meaning to salvage out of that tragedy, it was found one day in a huge mound of rubble that was once the Juarez Hospital in Mexico City. A week after that terrible event and as another day of despair unfolded, a team of workers heard a faint sound coming somewhere from the heart of the crushed concrete and twisted steel. Hoping beyond hope, they quickly burrowed toward it. As the late afternoon light faded, and, racing against time, they found what they had heard, and the first of three baby girls—newborn infants—emerged to the safety of the rescue team. And let me tell you the scene through the eyes of one who was there.

Everyone was so quiet when they lowered that little baby down in a basket covered with blankets. The baby didn't make a sound, either. But the minute they put her in the Red Cross ambulance, everybody just got up and cheered.

Well, amidst all that hopelessness and debris came a timely—and timeless—lesson for us all. We witnessed the miracle of life.

It is on this that I believe our nations can make a renewed commitment. The miracle of life is given by One greater than ourselves. But, once given, each life is ours to nurture and preserve—to foster not only for today's world but for a better one to come.

There is no purpose more noble than for us to sustain and celebrate life in a turbulent world. And that is what we must do now. We have no higher duty, no greater cause as humans. Life—and the preservation of freedom to live it in dignity—is what we are on this earth to do.

Everything we work to achieve must seek that end so that some day our prime ministers, our premiers, our presidents, and our general secretaries will talk not of war and peace but only of peace.

We've had 40 years to begin. Let us not waste one more moment to give back to the world all that we can in return for this miracle of life. ■

Published by the United States Department of State • Bureau of Public Affairs
Office of Public Communication • Editorial Division • Washington, D.C. • October 1985
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Robert C. McFarlane

U.S.-Soviet Relations in the Late 20th Century



United States Department of State
Bureau of Public Affairs
Washington, D.C.

Following is an address by Robert C. McFarlane, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, at the Channel City Club and Women's Forum luncheon, Santa Barbara, California, August 19, 1985.

Before long President Reagan will meet in Geneva with the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Mr. Gorbachev. The meeting comes at a historic moment if measured by the enormity of change that has taken place in the West and the apparent potential for change in the East. In the past 4 years here in the United States, and more broadly in the West, we have experienced a political, economic, and social renewal of historic proportion. Four years ago we seemed paralyzed by the moral and institutional aftermath of Vietnam and Watergate; our economic problems seemed beyond our comprehension with solutions nowhere in sight; the military balance had shifted dramatically against us, and its effects were reflected in growing Soviet influence from Angola to Ethiopia to Indochina, Afghanistan, and Nicaragua. Our alliances were severely shaken and leaders from London to Paris to Moscow were asking whether the United States had lost its way and whether we could regain our ability to play a positive role of leadership in international affairs.

Today, the picture is dramatically different. President Reagan has set our economy solidly on the road to recovery; our foundation of strength is being restored; Soviet expansion has been checked and even rolled back on a tiny island in the Caribbean. In sum, America has regained its moorings, it is leading, and peace is more secure.

On the Soviet side of the ledger, the picture is less clear, but surely the possibility for a more promising future exists. A new Soviet leader is in place—a man unencumbered by the vicissitudes

of primary elections and campaigns and, therefore, a man who may endure through the turn of the century.

Here in the United States—a nation of optimists led by the greatest optimist in our history—we hope for the best. We are sobered by the knowledge that seldom has our optimism been vindicated. And yet it endures. But as we set out on what we hope will be a more promising period, we should proceed forthrightly, honestly stating both our purposes and our misgivings, hiding neither our hopes nor our fears.

This is a time of considerable flux and introspection in the Kremlin. They deserve to know from whence we are coming if they are to reach coherent decisions. Perhaps by stating some of our frustrations we can shape their thinking. That is my purpose today.

Soviet-American Rivalry

It's often said that the rivalry between the United States and Soviet Union is close to immutable and that our job is not to end it but merely to keep it under control. Some say that since 1945 there's been only one way to end it and that it's too terrible to contemplate. But for many others the inevitability of competition is not caused simply by the gruesome facts of the nuclear age. It has much deeper, older, and—as some see it—even more ineradicable causes. For some, de Tocqueville's famous predictions of 150 years ago have taken on a folkloric, if not intellectual legitimacy.

Anyone who works on the concrete issues dividing these countries knows that practical policy decisions are never made on the assumption that a fundamental change in Soviet-American relations is anywhere in sight. To the contrary, we have to take competition as a given and do the best that we can. But this should not become an excuse for not thinking about what is at the heart

of our disagreements. I have studied, reflected, and worked on international affairs for many years, and no one has ever convinced me that there is some law of nature requiring two populous and powerful nations halfway around the world from each other to be locked in permanent hostility. If they are hostile, it's probably for reasons other than their "two-ness," their "populousness," their "powerful-ness," or their distance from each other.

I think the real sources of conflict are things that can—and do—change. If there is a military rivalry between two great countries, it's caused less by the arms themselves than by the way the two sides think about military security. If there is a geopolitical rivalry, it's not caused by the facts of geography but by the way the two sides define their political security and their other interests. If there is a clash of ideas—well, not even ideologies are permanent. Some political ideologies are a source of near boundless energy and creativity, but others are true prisons, confining not only those who believe in them but many who don't. Nothing can hinder human energy and creativity like a bad idea. But, as I have said, it is our good fortune that ideas are not immortal. They are subject to what is sometimes called "reality therapy"—the test of time and experience. Sometimes, with any luck, they can be cast off. Mental prison walls do come down. As rare as it seems in this century of institutionalized fanaticisms, people do change their minds.

We know from the statements of Soviet leaders that these days many existing policies are getting especially close scrutiny. Certainly the test of time and experience has been a very harsh one. General Secretary Gorbachev himself recently called for "a fresh look at all the shortcomings, negative phenomena, all sorts of blunders." He made

clear that reevaluation has been long deferred. In the future, in his words:

... more order will be required, more scientific inquiry, more major, important decisions, and so forth. Overall it will require immense mobilization of creative forces, and the ability to restructure and conduct matters in the country in a new way, not only in the economy but also in the social sphere, in that of culture, ideology, in all spheres.

These seem like hopeful words, but perhaps you will agree that those of us in the West, on the outside, have a hard time knowing how to interpret them. We cannot know whether a process of comprehensive change is underway or not. In the past, the appearance of change has been no more than a mask behind which systemic rigidities endure. Each new leader—however strongly he might favor change—has found that having risen by following the rules of the system, he becomes captive to it. If such a process is beginning, it will be difficult to discern, we may or may not be able to make a contribution to it, and we cannot predict its outcome. But inasmuch as it does greatly affect us, it is certainly appropriate for us to suggest the kinds of questions that we will be asking about it—the questions whose answers will make a large difference in our own policy. I assume that Soviet officials would also like to know our thinking as to what kinds of change would do the most to make Soviet-American relations more stable. We sometimes hear the Soviet complaint that they don't know what we're after, so let us be clear.

Military Issues

Let me begin with military issues. I have said that the wheels of military rivalry are not set in motion by arms themselves but by the thinking that governs the arms, by the political doctrines, decisions, and interests that are reflected in the organization, shape, and size of a military machine. In recent years many Soviet decisions have been quite troubling to us, suggesting an outlook on security issues that is very different from our own. By this I don't mean simply that Soviet military spending is so high—although it is. But that isn't what concerns me here. I want to call your attention to something different—to decisions that resume or initiate competition in an area where there hadn't been any at all.

Take the case of chemical weapons. In this century, these weapons have created a revulsion and horror in Western publics second only to nuclear weapons. It was a horror, moreover, that our governments were able to act on quite successfully. The Geneva Protocol of 1925 was for many years one of the most widely supported and observed

arms control agreements on record. As a result, our own capabilities, stocks, and training experienced a long decline. We haven't produced chemical weapons in 15 years. Unfortunately, this was not paralleled on the Soviet side, whose major effort became impossible to ignore. For this reason we have now proposed to modernize our own chemical weapons program. We'd rather not do this, and Congress also would rather not, and we've tried to head it off. In April 1984 President Reagan sent Vice President Bush to Geneva with proposals to negotiate a complete ban on chemical weapons, but since then the talks have not made progress.

This record suggests a specific question: what has the Soviet side gained from reviving this competition? Particularly now, as chemical weapons are being made (cheaply) and used (lethally) by small countries, isn't it imperative that we find effective, verifiable controls?

I wish this were an isolated case. But we see the same pattern in the issue that dominated Soviet-American arms control talks, as well as public controversy, during the President's first term—medium-range nuclear missiles. Again, a bit of history may be useful. You may know that over many years the United States scaled back its medium-range missile capabilities in Europe; the Soviets did not. During the 1950s and 1960s many plans were developed within the Western alliance to counter the Soviet edge, but they were abandoned one after another for a series of different reasons. A sense of urgency about the problem began to subside with the emergence of detente in the late 1960s. And the specific military worry created by a large Soviet missile advantage was softened over time; the Soviet Union seemed to be letting its large medium-range missiles grow old. But then an odd thing happened. The Soviets began instead to *add* to their force, introducing the SS-20, one of the most formidable weapons ever fielded by the East. To make a long story short, the result was a NATO decision that, after all, these new Soviet deployments had to be answered. In 1983, after 2 fruitless years of trying to negotiate a solution to the INF problem—that stands for intermediate-range nuclear forces—the West began to put its own missiles in place.

INF isn't in the headlines much these days, and there may be an analytical advantage in this. We now have a little distance on this sequence of events and a responsibility to judge them critically. What happened? An East-West dispute took shape on an issue that some thought had gone away. Two questions come to mind that I still find hard to answer: what can the Soviet

Union imagine that it got out of reigniting this competition? What did it get out of several years of one-sided negotiating positions, premised on an expectation of Western disunity?

Finally, let me take up the military question that is in the headlines—the relation between offensive and defensive strategic systems. As you may know, in 1972 the United States and Soviet Union agreed that neither side should build a defense against ballistic missiles. The Soviet Union has since built and maintained the defensive system around its capital allowed by the agreement; the United States has not. Both sides have pursued research, as the treaty permits; the Soviet research effort has been extremely large.

Now, while keeping strictly within the limits of the ABM [Anti-Ballistic Missile] Treaty, President Reagan has proposed the Strategic Defense Initiative to reinvestigate the feasibility of defenses. Two reasons above all others produced this decision:

First, the past decade's enormous Soviet offensive buildup, which has put the survivability of our forces in question, and

Second, the President's desire to see whether the fragility of the nuclear balance can be reduced by moving us away from a morally unsatisfactory doctrine on nuclear retaliation.

As the President has said many times, this is one of the most hopeful possibilities of our time. We believe it could contribute to both sides' security, especially if we make progress in the Geneva arms talks. We have hoped in these talks to explore each side's thinking on how to strengthen strategic stability. But what has been the Soviet response? Soviet public statements, with which many of you will be familiar, simply propose something we believe is non-negotiable and nonverifiable—a ban on research even as they pursue the largest research program on earth. And in a masterpiece of *chutzpah*, they insist repeatedly that ours is a program designed to acquire a first-strike capability.

In short, we're having a lot of trouble establishing a real dialogue. And bearing in mind the other examples I've cited, we have to face some disturbing questions. Will the Soviet Union start to approach this matter as a potentially cooperative one or approach everything on a zero-sum basis? The other instances—chemical and INF—suggest that these all-or-nothing tactics don't serve the Soviet Union well.

Obviously, a great deal hangs on the answers to these questions. The President has committed himself to meet the Soviet Union halfway in developing responsible solutions to outstanding problems. I can restate that commit-

ment today. But without some change in the Soviet approach to security issues—in fact, in the thinking that underlies—I fear that even incremental improvements will be extremely hard to reach. And they will be much less likely to gather momentum, to build on each other.

International Political Issues

The issues of Soviet-American rivalry, of course, go beyond military matters. There is the critical question of how each side defines its interests in the world. Many in the West are looking for signs of change in the Soviet Union's thinking on international political issues. Some students of the problem argue that it is now what they call a "mature" power; that it is not guided by Lenin's old dictum "the worse, the better"; that it is not so deeply driven by an ideological animus against the West; and that it need not leap at every opportunity to hamstring American policy for its own sake.

These would obviously be important changes. How should we decide whether they are true? Obviously, by practical measures. As these matters come to be discussed in Moscow, the Soviet leadership should know that we have practical measures like Afghanistan, Cuba, and Libya in mind.

Take Afghanistan. Today, 120,000 Soviet soldiers there are waging the most brutal war now underway on the face of the earth. For what? It's not so easy to say. Some in the West believe that the Soviet Union instigated the 1978 communist coup that preceded the 1979 invasion. As you may know, Soviet officials and commentators always dissociate themselves from this and explain that they had nothing to do with it. We can't know, but we can ask questions about Soviet policy to clarify its objectives. If the Soviets truly propose to dissociate themselves from it, to indicate that they have no interest in fomenting such events, then why are 120,000 troops in Afghanistan protecting the small number of people who made that coup from the opposition of the Afghan people? Soviet officials say that they need a friendly Afghanistan on their border. We can perhaps understand this desire, but how is friendship to be built? Our proposition to the Soviet leadership is that their present policy is only increasing the Afghan people's hatred. Does the Soviet side have a nonmilitary strategy for dealing with that problem? If so, they will find us ready to help put it in place.

Or take Libya. There are few if any governments today whose policy as a whole could be better described as "the worse, the better." Col. Qadhafi is an heir to that tradition of seeking to pro-

voke or benefit from trouble and instability. That being the case, Americans have to ask some serious questions about Soviet support for him. A small example will suffice: with all the problems of terrorism in that part of the world, what good is served by providing Soviet submarines to Qadhafi? Or, given the war in the Persian Gulf, which seems to drag on endlessly, what good is served by giving missiles to Col. Qadhafi, which then find their way to Iran and finally land in downtown Baghdad, the capital of a country that has a friendship treaty with the Soviet Union? Is this what friendship treaties mean? Americans are entitled to ask with utmost seriousness: if Soviet policy is not "the worse, the better," then shouldn't the Soviet Union's relationship with Col. Qadhafi be very different?

Finally, take Cuba. The price tag of Soviet support for Cuba is calculated by our experts at something like \$5 billion a year. As a benchmark of sorts, that's about as much as we provide to Egypt and Israel combined—and together their population is five times that of Cuba. This must be, in other words, a massively important commitment of Soviet policy. But what is it a commitment to? To us, frankly, it seems that the principal benefit is in the offensive purposes to which Cuba—Cuban troops, Cuban advisers, Cuban bases—can be put.

The record of Cuban policy in the past 10 years is an extraordinary one, and it is all the more extraordinary because it did not have to be this way. For the first 10 years or so after the missile crisis of 1962, Cuba was not a major irritant in Soviet-American relations. Now it is. Its military personnel are in the thick of wars on two continents and, despite international pressures from many directions, show no signs of returning home. The pattern is something like what I sketched in talking about chemical weapons or missiles in Europe. The Soviet Union has reignited a source of conflict. Has it benefited by doing so? We hope this question is being asked in Moscow.

There should be no doubt about the ability of the United States to deal with these difficulties when they are placed in our way. That's not the issue. Naturally, we have to pay more attention to the security of Pakistan than we did some years ago, but we can do it. Similarly, we now have to pay more attention to the security of El Salvador than we used to, but we can manage that too. And we don't look the other way at the problems that Libya creates for neighboring countries, among them some good friends of the United States.

The question that remains, however, concerns the broader impact of all this on Soviet-American relations and whether this is the impact that the

Soviet side wants. It certainly sends us loud messages that can't be ignored about the motivations of Soviet policy. It makes improvements in other areas more difficult. It all but guarantees that any small steps forward that we may be able to take will be isolated, hard to preserve, and perhaps devalued in advance by both sides.

None of this, I might add, is much changed by hearing from the Soviet side of their responsibility to help other "socialist" countries. For us, of course, that comes down to helping other governments oppress their people. We believe that Soviet-style socialism has brought hardship to and restricted the potential of many great nations. That is our deeply held view. No doubt the Soviet leadership disagrees, but let's not leave the matter there. I hope they will at least ponder a different question: that is, whether such Soviet involvements can be justified even in your own terms. Here in the West, for example, we remember General Secretary Andropov's comments about the difference between building socialism and merely proclaiming it. We hope that such skepticism can be a source of doubt about whether the Soviet policies I've been describing have really served your interests.

Human Rights and Democracy

So far, I have dealt with the political-military issues that trouble our relations. They almost always dominate the agenda of problems between us. They are what our negotiators focus on. There are many more issues I could touch on—from Poland to nuclear proliferation. But, as important as all these are, they are not the area in which the most momentous changes could take place. Frankly, the most durable and far-reaching kind of improvement in Soviet-American relations—and probably in the Soviet Union's relations with almost every country of the world—would be created by events inside the Soviet Union.

When Americans raise the issue of human rights with Soviet officials, they know what to expect. It is the Soviet position that we are treading on "internal matters." The Soviet side by now is also quite accustomed to what we usually say in return—that many of these matters involve commitments made in the Helsinki Final Act. We're talking about obligations that the Soviet Union freely assumed.

This is an important point: treaties signed have to be taken seriously. But it's not the main reason Americans take an interest in human rights and democracy. And the reason isn't just that we believe in morality in politics or that our hearts go out to Soviet Jews who wish

to emigrate and can't. No, it's that real progress in that direction would have a fundamental effect on the international system, on the way we do business with each other.

When President Reagan was in China in April 1984, he gave a speech that must surely rank as one of the most candid ever made by a leader visiting a country with a different political system. He put his message simply: "Trust the people." For us, the meaning of a phrase like that is obvious, but many of the ideologies of the 20th century rest on suspicion of the people, on the conviction that they cannot handle their own affairs. Since that's the case, let me say briefly what trusting the people means in practical terms. Let's leave aside sentiment and turn to some specifics. What can the people do if they are trusted?

First, only the people can revolutionize agricultural productivity. All other approaches are hopelessly irrelevant. Over 20 years ago, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union accused the Chinese party of believing that "if a people walks in rope sandals and eats watery soup out of a common bowl—that is communism." No such sarcastic accusation could be made today. In the past 7 years, agricultural productivity in China has actually doubled. And Prime Minister Gandhi, during his recent visit here, spoke to us of the gains made in Indian agriculture through increased incentives. Today, India is a net exporter of grain. How? The people have done it.

Second, only the people can lead the scientific-technological revolution. They are leading it in those countries enjoying the most rapid economic growth

today. No Ministry of Central Planning can lead it. In the United States the watchword of change in the structure of our economy is decentralization—the spectacular growth of new companies offering new products in a field like information technology. In the speech in China that I just quoted, President Reagan said, "Make no mistake: those who ignore this vital truth will condemn their countries to fall farther and farther behind . . ."

Finally, only the people can invigorate national culture. I mean culture in both the low- and the high-brow sense. I mean, as it happens, both entertainment and enlightenment. I mean arts and letters, music and films. Only the people can build national self-esteem and self-expression out of malaise. No Ministry of Culture can do it.

Now every people will perform these tasks in its own way. Cultures come out differently. For all the changes underway, China remains distinctly Chinese and recognizably socialist. But, in every case, to succeed at the tasks I've mentioned, the people have the same basic needs. They need to make more of their own decisions; they need to act on their own brainstormings; they need to be able to learn from each other; they need to know the basic facts of their own economic and social life. They need to shake off an institutionalized secrecy that the rest of the world finds absurd and self-defeating. They need to know simple things, like the size of last year's wheat harvest, and big things, like what's going on in the world at large. They need to be able to leave, if they want. If they are denied all these, they cannot do very much at all.

To the Soviet leadership, I would say that these things are not our romantic ideals. Rather, they are the practical requirements of some of your own goals—and of our goals as well, for they are the key to transforming East-West relations.

Conclusion

In conclusion, let me return to the practical perspective with which I began: we don't plan policy in the expectation of transforming East-West relations. We seek incremental improvements, and we don't dismiss their value. The Soviet leadership should know that President Reagan is ready—patiently, methodically—to take small steps forward, and that we will respond in proportion to what we see from them.

But at this time of questioning in the Soviet Union, it seems to me that we should ask more of ourselves and of the Soviet side as well. We should recognize that those who seek only small improvements often end up with none. We know cosmetic improvements when we see them and know the meaning and the value of major change. We should ask those questions and insist on the answers that point the way. ■

Published by the United States Department of State • Bureau of Public Affairs
Office of Public Communication • Editorial Division • Washington, D.C. • August 1985
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THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary

FOR RELEASE AT 9:00 P.M. (EDT)
TUESDAY, OCTOBER 22, 1985

INTERVIEW OF THE PRESIDENT BY
J. N. PARIMOO, WASHINGTON CORRESPONDENT FOR
THE TIMES OF INDIA

October 21, 1985

Q: Good afternoon, Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, hello there. Pleased to see you.

Q: I thank you, sir. I believe you are making some certification to Congress on Pakistan. Is it your judgment that Pakistan doesn't have the bomb?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, we have no evidence that they do -- and this is required. But we are -- we're very hopeful that South Asian countries will forego nuclear weapons -- all of the countries there. And yet at the same time, we want to be of assistance with regard to legitimate energy needs, and that is a source of energy, but should not be a cover-up for bombs and the making of nuclear weapons. As a matter of fact, we're going to try our best to see if we at the level of the Soviet Union and ourselves cannot do something about curbing those and I would like to think that they might one day eliminate them all.

Q: Mr. Gandhi, the Prime Minister, has suggested in Newsweek in an interview that this Symington Amendment waiver need not be extended. Is there any way -- why should it be extended any further? You know, there's a waiver -- it's the waiver of the Symington Amendment --

THE PRESIDENT: I don't --

Q: -- which allows sale of arms to Pakistan. See, because otherwise -- that's a law -- Symington law, which will not allow sale of arms to Pakistan because of this ex-nuclear weapons waiver. But you have granted the waiver that, and that waiver will expire in September in '87. He says it need not be extended. Why should it be extended?

THE PRESIDENT: We hope by that time that we definitely know that there are no nuclear weapons -- not going to be any, because that's what we've tried to, as I say, to impress on both the major countries there -- and on all of South Asia or, for that matter, the rest of the world.

Q: Are you coming to India, sir?

THE PRESIDENT: What?

Q: You accepted an invitation to India, to come visit India? You will be -- will you and Mrs. Reagan be visiting?

THE PRESIDENT: If we can work out a schedule to do that, we would like it very much.

Q: India is the largest democracy of --

THE PRESIDENT: My only experience in your country was one in which I wasn't even aware of it. I was on a flight from Taiwan to London, England, on my way home from some tours that I'd had over there in the Far East, and it seems like long before dawn, early in the morning, the plane dropped down in New Delhi for refueling --

Q: Oh, is that right?

THE PRESIDENT: -- and I was sound asleep -- (laughter) -- so at least I slept a few moments in India. But no, we'd like that very much.

Q: We'll be very happy to see you there. You already visited China once --

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

Q: -- but you did not visit India, so it's time that you also visited India. India is the largest democracy of the world.

THE PRESIDENT: I know. We'd like that very much.

Q: And you are the leader of that democratic world.

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you. Good to see you.

Q: Thank you, sir.

THE PRESIDENT: Looking forward to seeing your Prime Minister in the next couple of days.

Q: Yes. He's concerned -- he's really concerned about this -- Pakistan's program. He has been --

THE PRESIDENT: Well, we'll have a good talk about it.

Q: Thank you, sir.

THE PRESIDENT: You bet.

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RESPONSES BY THE PRESIDENT TO
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY THE TIMES OF INDIA

Q: Mr. President, in the Post-War era, no two leaders came to the summit with so much political support at home and with such charisma. We in India look upon the next month's meeting between you and Mr. Gorbachev as a unique opportunity for disarmament and durable peace. Do you share that view?

THE PRESIDENT: I believe that our meeting offers a unique opportunity to set U.S.-Soviet relations on a more constructive course for years to come. I have no illusions. I understand well the difficulties involved. But I feel an obligation to make a sincere effort at least to narrow some of the profound differences between us. If we can make any progress toward that goal, I believe that all peoples throughout the world will benefit. General Secretary Gorbachev and I will surely discuss our respective ideas of how best to bring about deep reductions in arms levels. If the Soviets are ready for the give-and-take that an arms agreement will require, they'll find us ready as well.

I think it is also important to remember that arms, whether nuclear or conventional, do not come to exist for no reason. They exist because nations have very real differences among themselves and suspicions about each other's intentions. Thus a frank discussion of our concerns about Soviet behavior, particularly its attempts to expand its influence by force and subversion, is an important part of our effort to focus on the sources of world tension, not just the symptoms.

To establish the foundation for a truly more constructive relationship, I want to talk with General Secretary Gorbachev not only about arms control but also about regional tensions, about our bilateral relationship and about the obligation of both our nations to respect human rights. All of these issues are as important to us as the question of nuclear arms. I will go to Geneva ready to make whatever progress the Soviets will allow toward resolving them.

May I add that I am aware the people of India and of many other nations sometimes feel that they have no control over what the big powers do in matters that affect all mankind. I want to do my part to dispel this impression. I am very aware of the way people around the globe will be watching our decisions in Geneva and I can assure them that I will have their concerns in mind when I sit down at the table with General Secretary Gorbachev. I only hope that the General Secretary will come to our talks with a similar attitude.

And in my speech to the United Nations General Assembly this week, I will be spelling out in more detail just how I believe we can make real progress toward easing the world tensions that are of concern to us all.

Q: Important as it is, arms control by itself cannot resolve the geopolitical rivalries of the two superpowers. Would the summit agenda next month include a discussion on some more abiding ways of resolving these differences?

THE PRESIDENT: I think you are right in viewing arms control in this broader context. As anyone who has studied the differences between the western democracies and the communist system realizes, we have fundamentally different views of the world and fundamentally different ways of behaving in it. My hope would be to find ways with Mr. Gorbachev to ensure that our differences continue to be peaceful.

In some other areas, serious discussions may permit the bridging of differences. In those areas, if the Soviets are willing, we can make immediate progress. This progress may lead in turn to agreements in other, more contentious areas.

I hope that Mr. Gorbachev and I can reinforce the intensive regional dialogue that we and the Soviets have had since the beginning of this year. As you know, our regional experts have already met to discuss Afghanistan, the Middle East, Africa and East Asia. Later this month in Washington, we'll have talks on Central America and the Caribbean.

Although these talks haven't resulted in any solutions to problems in those parts of the world, they have been useful for two reasons. First, by clarifying our respective positions on regional issues, we lessen the chance of miscalculations or misunderstandings between us. Second, these talks give us an opportunity to make clear what we, our allies and our friends consider important.

Q. Regional conflicts in South Asia, the Middle East, South Africa, Central America and Southeast Asia could escalate into a world war. Even if an arms control agreement were to be reached at Geneva, these regional conflicts would continue to threaten world peace. Would you not like to propose next month some restraint on the political conduct of superpowers to defuse these regional conflicts?

THE PRESIDENT: Our regional exchanges with the Soviets have covered and will continue to cover these points. Let me suggest briefly how the Soviets can advance the cause of peace in one of these regions, your very own.

In Afghanistan, we are witnessing a brutal war simply because the Afghan people are determined to resist an attempt by outsiders to impose a government on them. It's clear that the Afghan spirit of independence cannot be crushed, that continued war will only mean more bloodshed and that only a political solution is possible. The Soviets claim that they too believe in a negotiated settlement. I will be asking General Secretary Gorbachev in Geneva whether, if that is so, he is willing to address the crucial issue: withdrawal of the more than 100,000 Soviet troops in Afghanistan and the restoration of that country's independence and non-alignment.

I know the Soviet Union has concerns about the countries on its border but Afghanistan poses no threat to Soviet security. We Americans also have neighbors, and neighbors that do not always agree with us. However, look at our borders with Canada and Mexico. They stretch for thousands of miles, and not an inch of them is defended. Bear in mind, too, that both of these countries have very independent political systems and foreign policies, and in fact Mexico is one of the leaders of the non-aligned movement. The way to solve regional problems is through dialogue and negotiations, not invasion and occupation.

Q. Former President Nixon has suggested that one of the ways to reduce world tensions is for the two superpowers to stop supplying sophisticated arms to poor developing countries. Do you agree with this view and would you like to propose a moratorium on such arms supplies at the next summit?

THE PRESIDENT: To my mind, poor nations are entitled to security just as rich nations are. That ought to be obvious. The hard question is, what really promotes their security? To answer that, we need a more sophisticated approach than simply trying to cut off military sales and assistance. That has its place in an overall strategy, but it doesn't seem like quite the right place to start. Instead, I think we have to look at the underlying conflicts and ask how to ease them, and to build confidence among neighboring states that have known only hostility and mistrust. If such a process takes root, outside states may well be able to help it along in various ways, perhaps by limiting arms supplies, perhaps by providing assurances of some sort or by helping the parties to integrate themselves more successfully into the world economy. Perhaps simply by offering what the diplomats call "good offices."

Start with the real sources of conflict, and see how they can most realistically be overcome -- that's our approach. I might add that it hasn't been everyone's approach. Over the past ten years, a growing source of instability and war in the developing world has been the imposition of new regimes -- Marxist-Leninist ones -- that are, almost from the day they take over, at war with their own people. And then, before very long, at war with their neighbors. This is a problem that simply has to be addressed, a pattern that has to be broken if we are to avoid the further spread of conflict. The Soviet Union, as we see it, is too often

supporting, and sometimes directing, these wars. In such cases, the flow of arms from outside is a major concern, and we want to do something about it. I'll speak on this subject this week at the United Nations. And, of course, with General Secretary Gorbachev when I meet him in Geneva.

Q: In view of the danger of proliferation and the graver risk of miniaturization of nuclear weapons, which could bring such weapons within the reach of terrorists, would you not like to put some more determined restraint on countries that have an advanced nuclear weapons making program?

THE PRESIDENT: Our concern about the proliferation of nuclear weapons is a matter of public record. We have been working with a number of countries, including the Soviet Union, to control access to both weapons and technology, in good part because of the kind of concerns you mention. It really is a grave threat, both proliferation and miniaturization, and restraining proliferation is a big part of our effort to reduce the threat of nuclear war or nuclear accident or incident.

We recognize that a country's sense of insecurity may lead it to look for a nuclear option. Yet, if one pauses to think, one has to agree that possession of nuclear weapons actually adds to the insecurity. We hope that the countries of South Asia will set an example by foregoing nuclear weapons.

At the same time, we have always supported the legitimate energy needs of developing countries. The United States has shared its know-how with many nations around the world, starting with the "Atoms for Peace" program in the 1950's. However, we strongly believe that energy programs must not provide a cover for the development of nuclear weapons.

Q: Recently the Soviet Union also came in for attack from the terrorists: one of its diplomats was killed in the Middle East. Countries like the United States and India have been facing the problem of international terrorism. Would you not like to bring this up and make a joint declaration from the summit pronouncing terrorism and abetment of terrorism an international crime?

THE PRESIDENT: We have condemned the kidnapping of Soviet diplomats in Beirut. The murder of one of the Soviets was an abhorrent act and we have expressed our regret to the Soviet Union. In turn, we note with satisfaction their condemnation of the Achille Lauro terrorists. We hope that this is a sign that their own recent experiences may have made them aware that terrorism knows no international boundaries and lead them to reassess their policy of support for terrorist organizations and states.

India for its part has suffered the terrible loss of a great national leader, Madame Gandhi. The U.S. also has suffered terribly from terrorism and is determined to combat it vigorously. We would be pleased if the Soviets would join us in a common effort to stamp out terrorism. Unfortunately, we believe some of their policies actually encourage terrorism.

Q: Mr. President, it is believed that your stand on the Strategic Defense Initiative, which has come to be known as the star wars system of defense, is crucial to the success of the summit next month. What is SDI, and why does the United States have to change from deterrence to defense?

THE PRESIDENT: For at least the past 30 years, deterrence has rested on the threat of offensive nuclear retaliation; the United States and the Soviet Union have been hostage to each other's nuclear forces. Our retaliatory deterrent has enabled us to live in peace with freedom.

However, the ability to deter rests on an equitable and stable strategic balance. That balance is now being increasingly threatened by the continuing Soviet buildup in offensive nuclear forces, a buildup which began in the early 70's, as well as deep Soviet involvement in strategic defense. Our Strategic Defense Initiative is a prudent response to these Soviet programs. It is a research program, being conducted in conformity with our treaty obligations, which seeks to establish whether in the future deterrence could be based increasingly on defensive systems which threaten no one, rather than on the threat of offensive retaliation.

I began this intensified research effort on March 23, 1983, when I proposed that we explore the possibility of countering the awesome Soviet missile threat with defensive systems that could intercept and destroy missiles before they strike their targets. Such a defense-oriented world would not be to any single nation's advantage, but would benefit all. And, the research and testing of SDI would move us toward our ultimate goal of eliminating nuclear weapons altogether from the face of the earth.

By necessity, this is a very long-term goal. For years to come, we will have to continue to base deterrence on the threat of nuclear retaliation. But there is no reason why we should not begin now to seek a safer, more stable world.

Q: Does SDI violate any U.S. treaty obligations? Specifically, does it violate Article Five of the ABM Treaty of 1972 which prohibits not only deployment but also development of space-based anti-ballistic missiles?

THE PRESIDENT: I have directed that the SDI research program be conducted in a manner fully consistent with all U.S. treaty obligations, including the ABM Treaty. We are and intend to remain in full compliance with the ABM Treaty and to seek Soviet compliance as well.

Q: Sir, you have said that "New technologies are now at hand which make possible a truly effective non-nuclear defense" and for that reason you have launched the SDI. Do you believe that the USA will continue to have a lasting lead in these technologies? Don't you think that the Soviet Union will catch up as it did in the case of the MIRV technology which was a U.S. monopoly in the sixties?

THE PRESIDENT: It is not a question of the Soviet Union catching up with U.S. technologies. For over two decades, the Soviet Union has pursued an intensive research program in many of the same basic technological areas that our research program will address. For example, more than 10,000 Soviet scientists and engineers are engaged in their advanced laser research program. A comprehensive report on Soviet strategic defense programs has just been released by our State and Defense Departments.

If we do not respond to Soviet strategic defense efforts, Soviet programs in both offense and defense could seriously threaten our ability to deter attack.

Q: The first nation to achieve both defensive and offensive capabilities might well be tempted to launch a devastating nuclear first strike. Since decision taking in the Soviet political system is secret and highly centralized, as distinct from the open system of governance in the USA, the USSR could well be that nation. By advocating SDI, therefore, Sir, are you not promoting the first strike capabilities of the Soviet Union?

THE PRESIDENT: If the Soviet Union were to achieve overwhelming superiority in both offensive and defensive systems, it could come to believe that it could launch a nuclear attack against the U.S. or its Allies, without fear of effective retaliation. That is why the U.S. is concerned over the massive Soviet investment in both offensive and defensive systems.

SDI is, in part, a response to the danger from these Soviet military programs. It is aimed precisely at strengthening deterrence and stability by reducing the danger that the Soviets might be tempted to think in terms of a nuclear "first strike".

Q: Mr. President, do you share the apprehension that SDI would give a new dimension to the arms race by taking nuclear weapons into outer space and that this could heighten tensions at the decision-making levels of both the superpowers, making the world more unstable and insecure?

THE PRESIDENT: No, I'm certain the impact of SDI will be quite the opposite. Given the hope it offers the world, it will ease tensions, not increase them.

Q: Some strategists have suggested that while the USA moves close to actual deployment of a defensive space weapons system the Soviet Union would be under an increasingly desperate temptation to strike while it still has a chance. For that reason, would you not like to launch a joint superpower initiative for research in defensive space weapons so that the fears and suspicions raised by SDI are obviated?

THE PRESIDENT: As I said earlier, we are seeking agreement in Geneva on ways to strengthen deterrence through the introduction of defensive systems into the force structures of both sides, if the technologies which we are both investigating prove feasible and cost effective. Our negotiators at Geneva are prepared to discuss how such a transition could be carried out in a stable manner. And I want very much to explain personally to General Secretary Gorbachev how important it is for him not to let this chance to set arms control on a more hopeful course pass by.

Q: What is the Soviet Union doing in the field of strategic defense? Do you think that the Soviet opposition to SDI is merely pre-summit posturing similar to their opposition to cruise missile deployment in Western Europe?

THE PRESIDENT: Posturing is a good word. Although they have been treating strategic defenses as if they were solely an American invention, the Soviets, over the past 20 years, have spent roughly as much for strategic defense as they have for their massive offensive buildup. During this time, it has been the Soviets who have built the world's most extensive network of civil defenses and the most widespread air defense system, who have deployed the world's only operational ABM and anti-satellite systems, and who have devoted extensive resources to investigating many of the very same technologies we are now examining in our SDI research. Some of these Soviet efforts, such as their construction of a large phased-array radar in Central Siberia, are in clear violation of the 1972 ABM Treaty. Others are questionable under the Treaty.

In light of all this, Soviet criticism of SDI is more than a little hypocritical. It is quite clear that the Soviets are intent on undermining the U.S. SDI program, while minimizing any constraints on their own ongoing strategic defense activities. For our part, we believe that it is important that our two countries get down to a serious, no-nonsense dialogue about the questions of how we might together enable our mutual interest in strategic defenses to lead to a more stable balance.

Q: All the ills of the world are not due to Russia. If there were no Russia, the problems of poverty and underdevelopment of most of the world would still be there. Next month the two strongest leaders of the world are meeting in Geneva. Is this not an opportunity to cry halt to the deployment and development of all new nuclear weapons and to divert the resources thus saved to improve the lot of the poorest countries of the world?

THE PRESIDENT: I certainly would like to see a world in which there are no nuclear weapons and plentiful resources devoted to the eradication of world poverty. I suspect that I won't see such an ideal world during my lifetime: but I will do all I can to help this dream come true. If General Secretary Gorbachev and I can address some of our differences frankly, we will perhaps have taken one small step towards this goal, and no one should underestimate the importance of that.

Although the Soviet Union is not the source of all the troubles of the developing world, we do think that the Soviet government has too often supported forces intent on imposing their rule by violence. This not only creates untold suffering and halts economic and social development, but often introduces an East-West element in the disputes when there should be none.

These practices must stop if we are to create a safer and better world. All nations are entitled to work out their destinies free from force and violence, particularly that coming from other countries.

Let me suggest, then, one immediate way that the peoples of the West and the Soviet Union can help the poorer nations: by keeping the competition of ideas peaceful. Let there be competition by example -- no subversion of free governments, no invasion, no occupation, no injection of foreign troops to support factions in internal disputes. Developing habits of solving problems peacefully would benefit all. We already are observing those principles, because they are the only ones consistent with our vision of the future.

Perhaps I can close by saying a word about that vision as it applies to the developing nations. As you know, the United States has contributed billions of dollars to economic and social development in all regions of the globe. Most of this aid has gone to nations that won their independence during the past few decades. Hundreds of thousands of Third World students, many of them from India, have received American university educations. Both the U.S. Government and private American donors are contributing great sums today to famine relief in especially needy countries.

But, to be frank, aid levels aren't the heart of the matter. The future of the developing nations, both economic and political, really depends on the resolution of a broader issue -- that is, whether those institutions of freedom are created that are the best, and in the long-term the only, source of economic growth and guarantee of individual dignity. India's great victory in the past forty years has been to protect those institutions through good times and bad. The benefits you win from them are probably only just beginning. They are the basis of so much of the cultural vigor, and economic dynamism, that we see in your country now. Free institutions, however, aren't just a freak of history, something that only a few peoples can ever hope to enjoy. There's no reason they can't take deeper root throughout the Third World. If they do -- well, almost anything will be possible.

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

October 30, 1985

INTERVIEW OF THE PRESIDENT
BY BBC

October 29, 1985

The Oval Office

2:35 P.M. EST

Q Mr. President, you are meeting with Mr. Gorbachev -- it's only three weeks away now. Everyone regards it as crucial. What do you hope personally to get out of the summit with Mr. Gorbachev?

THE PRESIDENT: I think that the most that we could get out is if we could eliminate some of the paranoia, if we could reduce the hostility, the suspicion that keeps our two countries particularly -- but basically should we say the Warsaw Bloc and the West -- at odds with each other. And while I know everyone is looking toward and emphasizing a reduction in arms, this is vital and important, but I see reduction in arms as a result, not a cause. If we can reduce those suspicions between our two countries, the reduction of arms will easily follow because we will have reduced the feeling that we need them.

Q Mr. Shultz is off to Moscow on Saturday to do the groundwork for this summit fully aware, as he himself admits, that there are major differences between the United States and Russia. Apart from the paranoia which you talked about, what are those differences as you see them?

THE PRESIDENT: Oh, my heavens. The -- here are two systems so diametrically opposed that -- I'm no linguist but I have been told that in the Russian language there isn't even a word for freedom. And two nations everyone is referring to as the "superpowers" obviously are competitive and our philosophies and our ideas on the world -- and that probably cannot be corrected, but we can have a peaceful competition. We have to live in the world together. There is no sense in believing that we must go on with the threat of a nuclear war hanging over the world because of our disagreements.

We don't like their system. They don't like ours. But we're not out to change theirs. I do feel sometimes they are out to change ours. But if we could get along. They have a system of totalitarian government and rule of their people. We have one in which we believe the people rule the government. And there isn't any reason why we can't coexist in the world -- where there are legitimate areas of competition, compete. But do it in a manner that recognizes that neither one of us should be a threat to the other.

MORE

Q When Mr. Shultz talks to Mr. Gorbachev and Mr. Shevardnadze, what will be the topics of discussion? Will it be trying to find some groundwork, for example, on arms control and reduction?

THE PRESIDENT: No, I would think that probably the main point in their meeting ahead of the meeting -- ahead of the major meeting is to establish an agenda. In other words, Secretary Shultz would tell them the things that we feel are important to be discussed. Minister Shevardnadze will probably have a list of things that are on their agenda so that we can plan and neither one of us be caught by surprise at the summit with hearing -- having a subject come up that hadn't even been considered. So I think that this is probably the main useful purpose that will be served by their getting together.

Q Is there any chance at all that the discussions Mr. Shultz has in Moscow might be -- might enable you to produce an initiative before you go to Geneva?

THE PRESIDENT: Right now, we are in the position of studying what we call a counterproposal. In Geneva, where our arms control delegations are meeting and have been meeting for a long time, we have had a proposal for a reduction of nuclear weapons.

Now, for the first time, the Soviet Union has made a counterproposal. We have put that in the hands of our people in Geneva now for them to look at; we ourselves are studying it. There are some elements in there that are -- well, we've called them "seeds to nurture" -- the things that we look at and say, "yes, these could very easily be acceptable."

At the same time in their proposal, there are some things that we believe are so disadvantageous to us that they should be negotiated and some changes made. And with all of this going on, I'm not in a position to say now at what point will we make our reply to their counteroffer and state where we are or where we differ and so forth, and then that should be the area in which negotiations would take place.

Now, whether that doesn't happen prior to the summit meeting or whether our team in Geneva tables it before they adjourn for their recess that is coming up, that I can't answer; that still remains to be seen.

Q But I must tell you, Mr. President, that Mrs. Thatcher has already told the leader of the opposition -- and she said this today in the House of Commons -- that you were going to come up with an initiative before Geneva. Have you been talking to her?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, we're -- I'm personally hopeful of that, also. So she's right, that that is what we're striving to do.

Q Now, can we look at some of the things which obviously are going to affect Geneva, but particularly I'd like to talk to you about the Strategic Defense Initiative and how important that is going to be. Can anything be achieved in Geneva without some understanding from both sides in this area?

THE PRESIDENT: Probably not. But I think there can be an understanding when they hear what we have in mind. I believe that this is something that is probably one of the most momentive things in a century. We have a team that, within the terms of the ABM Treaty, is researching to see if there is a defensive weapon -- the possibility of a defensive weapon that could intercept missiles before they reach their target, instead of having a deterrent to war, as we have now, which is both sides with massive weapons of destruction -- nuclear missiles -- and the only thing deterring war is the threat we represent to each other of killing millions and millions of citizens on both sides.

Now, if we can come up with a defensive weapon, then we reach -- and we know that we have it, that it is there, that it is practical, that it will work -- then my idea is that we go to the world; we go to our allies; we go to the Soviet Union and we say, look, we are not going to just start deploying this at the same time we maintain a nuclear arsenal. We think this weapon -- this defensive weapon -- we would like to make available and let's have the world have this for their own protection so that we can all eliminate our nuclear arsenals. And the only reason, then, for having the defensive weapon would be, because since everyone in the world knows how to make one -- a nuclear weapon -- we would all be protected in case some madman, some day down along the line, secretly sets out to produce some with the idea of blackmailing the world and the world wouldn't be blackmailed because we would be -- all be sitting here with that defense.

I've likened it to what happened when -- in 1925 after World War I, all the nations got together and outlawed poison gas, but everybody kept their gasmasks. So, we would have a world with some nuclear gasmasks and we could sleep at night without thinking that someone could bring this great menace of the nuclear threat against us.

Q When you say, Mr. President, you'd go to the world once you had proved -- satisfactory to yourself that here was a weapon which would actually work. If you go to the world, would you include Russia in that?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. I think that -- what could be safer than -- today, everything is offensive weapons. It's the only weapon I know of that's ever been developed in history that has not brought about a defense against it. But, what would be safer than if the two great superpowers -- the two that have the great arsenals -- both of us sat there with defensive weapons that insured our safety against the nuclear weapons and both of us eliminated our nuclear missiles.

Q But the Russians, presumably, would have to make their own SDI. You wouldn't offer it to them, would you, off the shelf?

THE PRESIDENT: Why not? I think this is something to be discussed at the summit as to what kind of an agreement we could make about -- in the event. I would like to say to the Soviet Union, we know you've been researching for this same thing longer than we have. We wish you well. There couldn't be anything better than if both of us came up with it. But if only one of us does, then why don't we, instead of using it as an offensive means of having a first strike against anyone else in the world, why don't we use it to ensure that there won't be any nuclear strikes?

Q Are you saying then, Mr. President, that the United States, if it were well down the road towards a proper SDI program, would be prepared to share its technology with Soviet Russia, provided, of course, there were arms reductions and so on on both sides?

THE PRESIDENT: That's right. There would have to be the reductions of offensive weapons. In other words, we would switch to defense instead of offense.

Q That, of course, is quite a long way away --

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

Q -- this idealistic world of yours, if I may say so.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Although we're optimistic. We've had some good breakthroughs in our research so far.

Q It's going well, is it?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

Q And is the research going so well as to suggest to you that a defensive weapon of this kind is really practical now?

THE PRESIDENT: As a matter of fact, very leading scientists who are involved in this have said that -- that they can foresee us achieving this weapon.

Q Will it take long?

THE PRESIDENT: Oh, I think we're talking a matter of years.

Q Let us say, though, that -- this isn't going to come about, as you say, for a matter of years. And Mr. Gorbachev, as we all know, is very worried about SDI. Would you be prepared to negotiate on SDI at Geneva?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, negotiate in the sense of coming to an agreement, which we are bound by in the future for whenever that weapon happens -- bound to this matter of worldwide sharing.

Q I wonder if you'd be kind enough to clear up one point on the SDI, and it's this. Mr. Gorbachev, I think, accepts the idea that you could do nothing about research because it's not really verifiable. Testing, on the other hand, worries him. Now, does testing, in your view, come within the ABM Treaty?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I believe it does. I think that we're well within it and within a strict adherence to the treaty, although you could have a more liberal interpretation of the treaty that I believe is justified. But rather than have any debate or argument about that, we are staying within the strict limits of the treaty.

Q Do you think the SDI is likely to be a stumbling block at Geneva, bearing in mind what Mr. Gorbachev thinks about it, these reservations?

THE PRESIDENT: I think it should be the other way around. I think it should be one of the most helpful things in erasing some of that paranoia I mentioned, or that hostility or suspicions between us.

Q You have a horror of nuclear weapons, and that's why you say that SDI is a good thing. If we had SDI worldwide, would there still be nuclear weapons available?

THE PRESIDENT: I wouldn't see any need for them at all. I wouldn't know why a nation would strap itself to invest in them. But, as I say, there is always the possibility of a madman coming along, and, as I say, you can't eliminate the knowledge about building those weapons, who might seize upon them. We've had an experience in our lifetime of a madman in the world who caused great tragedy worldwide. And so I would think that this -- this would be our gas mask.

Q Mr. President, can we turn now to some of the things you said in your U.N. speech? One of the central themes you brought up there concerned those areas of regional conflict, such as Afghanistan, in which the Soviets have a hand. Are you going to bring these up with Mr. Gorbachev? And, if so, do you expect him to respond positively?

THE PRESIDENT: I would think that this is very much a part of trying to rid the world of the suspicions. They claim that they fear that we of the Western world threaten them, that somehow we're lying here in wait for a day when we can eliminate their method of government and so forth. There is no evidence to sustain that. If you look back to the end of World War II, our country, for example, absolutely undamaged -- we hadn't had our industries destroyed through bombings and so forth -- and we were the only nation with the bomb, the nuclear weapon. We could have dictated to the world. We didn't. We set out to help even our erstwhile enemies recover. And today those erstwhile enemies are our staunchest allies with -- in the NATO Alliance.

They, on the other hand, have created -- Well, they've gone through the biggest military buildup in the history of man, and it is basically offensive. Now, we, therefore, claim we've got some right to believe that we are threatened. Not the other way around.

Now, to eliminate that suspicion or that fear, if they really want to live in a peaceful world and be friends and associate with the rest of the world, then, we need more than words. And the deeds could be the stopping of their attempt to -- either themselves or through proxies and through subversion -- to force their system on other countries throughout the world. And that could be one of the greatest proofs there is, that --

Q Do you think you were being a bit optimistic in your U.N. speech? You proposed the idea that these areas of regional conflict should be discussed. But, of course, you took them much further than that. What you actually said, they should be discussed up to the point when they're just eliminated. Now, do you think you're being optimistic when you recognize the fact that the fellow sitting opposite you is Mr. Gorbachev and he's tied up in these things.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. But, on the other hand, he has some practical problems in his own country, some problems of how long can they sustain an economy that provides for their people under the terrific cost of building up and pursuing this expansionist policy and this great military buildup.

Q His economic problems.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. And if we can show him that he can resolve those economic problems with no danger to themselves,

convince him that we represent no threat, then I could see us -- as I've said before, we don't like each other's systems, maybe we don't like each other. But we're the only two nations that can probably cause a world war. We're also the only two nations that can prevent one.

Q Will you want to talk to him about human rights? You've probably heard that Mrs. Yelena Bonner has just been granted a visa --

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

Q -- to come to the West so she can get medical treatment, but she'll have to go back to Russia, of course. Do you see that as a propaganda move by the Russians? Or is it a step along the road?

THE PRESIDENT: I would like to feel it's a step along the road. And there needs to be more.

I don't think, however, that the human rights thing is -- should be a kind of a public discussion and accusing fingers being pointed at each other and their claim that this is an internal matter with them. But I think it should be explained and -- that some of these violations -- Well, first of all is the violation of the Helsinki Pact. This was one of the main reasons why we are signatories to that Pact is this agreement about not separating families and so forth, allowing people freedom to choose.

What they have to understand is that in some of the major areas where we could seek agreement, we have a better chance in our type of society of getting the approval that we need from our Congress, from our people of some of these agreements if these issues, these human rights problems are not standing in the way. And maybe I can point that out.

Q Mr. President, there have been fears expressed in Europe that arms control will be pushed right down the agenda at Geneva in favor of issues like regional conflict and human rights, which we've been discussing. Can you give an assurance that that is not the case?

THE PRESIDENT: I certainly can, as far as I'm concerned.

That is -- but, as I've said, that follows another thing. The effort is to arrive at an understanding about our ability to live in the world together and at peace, and the other -- that can follow. Someone -- if I can only remember the quote correctly the other day said, "Nations aren't suspicious of each other because of their arms. They are armed because they are suspicious."

Q There is a feeling, Mr. President, that Mr. Gorbachev has seized the initiative in Europe. European leaders have undoubtedly been impressed by his performance. Mrs. Thatcher, as you know, said that he is someone she can do business with. What do you think about it?

THE PRESIDENT: I don't know him as yet, but he seems to have shown more of an interest in the people -- the man in the street -- than other Soviet leaders have. He has expressed great concern about the economic problems and the improvements that he feels that should be made there. And he is younger and more energetic than some of the more recent leaders have been. And I just -- I'm optimistic by nature, but I have to be optimistic that he is looking at the entire picture.

On the other hand, I don't think we should believe that he is not dedicated to the principles of their system, to communism and so forth. If he wasn't, he wouldn't be where he is.

Q Do you think he is, in terms of youth -- energy if you like -- intelligence, and obviously a powerful grasp of public relations -- do you think he is a pretty formidable Russian leader to deal with compared with his predecessors?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I don't know. On the public relations thing, he did far better with some of our own press than he did with the French press on his recent visit when he was there. I just -- I can't judge him on that. Sometimes public relations is made by -- or are made by those reporting, not by those doing.

Q Can I take one or two other areas with you, Mr. President? The first is terrorism. We know how you handled the Achille Lauro affair, but does that carry the risk of alienating friendly governments? Egypt, if you remember, wasn't too pleased.

THE PRESIDENT: I know, and yet we felt that there wasn't -- we had no choice in the matter if we were going to prevent those terrorists from suddenly, as so many in past had, disappearing into the rabbit warrens that bounded the Middle East -- Lebanon and so forth -- and therefore they would escape being brought to justice. They had murdered a man, a helpless individual.

We felt we had to do it. But I'm pleased to say, now, that I think the flurry is over and that both Egypt and Italy want to continue the warm relationship that we've had. And, so, that has worked out all right.

Q Mr. President, would you do it again, even if it meant, say, violating international law?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, it actually didn't violate international law. Well --

Q But, say, could in the future?

THE PRESIDENT: It could, I suppose. This is hard to -- it's a hypothetical question.

Q But terrorism is always with us.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. And I think that you just have to say -- you'd have to judge each case on its own as to the need to bring terrorists to justice; the need to convince them that terrorism is not going to be successful, it is not going to make governments, like your own or our own, change their policies out of fear of terrorism. If that ever happens, then the world has gone back to anarchy.

So, you would have to judge that against how much you would be violating international law to achieve your goal.

Q But if it was necessary, I take it you would.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

Q And you would pursue terrorism as hard as you can, as often as you can?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. It's been very frustrating for a number of the things that have happened and I've been taken to task by members of the press that I talked, but I didn't take action. But, just look at the nature of some of those terrorist acts. The terrorist blows himself up with all the innocent people that he also kills at the same time. So, there's no way you're going to punish him. You now seek to find, well, who does he belong to? What group brought this about? Well, there the difficulty is almost insurmountable. But also, even if you do get some intelligence that indicates it's a certain group, they're in some foreign city and you say, well, how do we punish them without blowing up a neighborhood and killing as many innocent people as they did? And this has been our problem up until this last time when we had a very clear-cut case.

Q Mr. President, this may be a difficult question for you to answer, but what would you most like to be remembered for by history?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, five years ago when we came here, the United States had allowed its defenses to decline. The United States economy -- I remember attending my first economic summit in Ottawa, Canada and that was just in the spring of the year -- my first year here -- and I remember our friends and allies -- the heads of state of the other summit nations there -- beseeching me to stop exporting our inflation and our recession to their countries in this world of international trade and all -- that we were exporting bad economic situations to the rest of the world.

The Soviet Union -- again, as I say, through surrogates or on their own -- there was Afghanistan, there was Ethiopia, South Yemen, Angola, Nicaragua, and they had forced governments of their choosing into all of those countries.

Well, it's been five years now. We have the greatest recovery, economic recovery that we've ever had in our history. It is not we who are exporting inflation anymore. Inflation is down from those double-digit figures, well, for the last five months it's only been 2 1/2 percent, and none of our trading partners can match that. Our interest rates are down. We have created almost 9 million new jobs over these five years with our economic recovery.

And in the world abroad, the Soviet Union has not stepped in or created a government of its kind in any new country in these five years. It's not moved under one additional inch of territory, and I just like to feel that maybe some of the things we did here -- the American people, their spirit was down, they had heard talks prior to our arrival that maybe we should give up our high expectations that never again could we look toward the future as we had in the past, lower our expectations and so forth.

Today we have a volunteer military, we exceed our enlistment quota every year. We have the highest level of education in the military, in this volunteer military that we've ever had in our history, even in wartime drafts. The American people have rallied, and with a spirit of voluntarism, voluntarily stepping into problems that once they just let go by and thought somebody in the government would take care of them. And as I say, the economy -- last year some 600,000 new businesses were incorporated in our country.

I would like to be remembered not for doing all those things -- I didn't do them; the American people did them. All I did was help get government out of their way and restore our belief in the power of the people and that government must be limited in its powers and limited in its actions. And that part I helped in -- I'd like to be remembered for that.

Q One final question, Mr. President, it's about your health. How do you feel, and what do the doctors say?

THE PRESIDENT: (Laughs.) The doctor said that I've had a 100 percent recovery. I'm riding horses regularly now, as I've always done, and I'm doing my exercises in the gym every day at the end of the day.

I have a little gymnasium upstairs and some weights and so forth, and I'm doing all those things. And I've just never felt better.

Q Well, it's a pleasure that -- you look remarkably fit. It's been a pleasure to talk to you. Thank you.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, my pleasure, and I thank you.

END

3:05 P.M. EST

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

Monday, November 4, 1985

INTERVIEW OF THE PRESIDENT
BY SOVIET NEWS ORGANIZATIONS

October 31, 1985

The Oval Office

2:05 P.M. EST

THE PRESIDENT: May I welcome you all -- it's a pleasure here. And I appreciate very much the opportunity to be able to speak, in a sense, to the people of your country. I've always believed that a lot of the ills of the world would disappear if people talked more to each other instead of about each other. So I look forward to this meeting and welcome your questions.

Q Mr. President, we appreciate greatly this opportunity to ask you personally questions after you kindly answered our written questions. We hope that they will be instructive and -- well, facilitate success for your forthcoming meeting with our leader.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I'm looking forward to that meeting. I'm hopeful and optimistic that maybe we can make some concrete achievements there.

Q We are planning to ask our questions in Russian. I don't think -- I think you don't mind.

THE PRESIDENT: No.

Q Mr. President, we have become acquainted with the answers which you furnished to our written questions. They basically reflect the old U.S. proposals. They have been evaluated -- which have been evaluated by the Soviet side as being unbalanced and one-sided in favor of the U.S. side. And you have not answered concerning the new Soviet proposal. And this reply to the new Soviet proposal is what is of greatest interest before the meeting in Geneva.

THE PRESIDENT: When this interview is over, later this afternoon at 3:00 p.m., I will be making a statement to our own press -- well, to all the press -- to the effect that we have been studying the Soviet proposal and tomorrow in Geneva, our team at the disarmament conference will be presenting our reply which will be a proposal that reflects the thinking of the original proposal that we had, but also of this latest. Indeed, it will show that we are accepting some of the figures that were in this counter-proposal by the Secretary General.

There are some points in which we have offered compromises between some figures of theirs and some of ours. But that will all be -- all those figures will be available tomorrow, and I will simply be stating today that we have -- that that is going to take place tomorrow in Geneva. But it is a detailed counter-proposal that -- to a counter-proposal, as is proper in negotiations, that will reflect, as I say, the acceptance on our part of some of this latest proposal as well as compromises with earlier figures that we'd proposed.

MORE

Q I would like to have another question for you, Mr. President. According to a survey taken by The Washington Post and ABC on Tuesday it was found that 74 percent of the American people as compared to 20 percent said that they would like the U.S. and the Soviet Union to reduce their nuclear arsenals and not to have the U.S. develop space weapons. This seems to be the choice which the American people have made. It seems clear that without stopping the development of weapons in space there can be no reduction of nuclear weapons. This is the position of the Soviet side. So how then will you react, Mr. President, to this opinion expressed by the American public?

THE PRESIDENT: For one thing, it is based on a misconception. The use of the term "Star Wars" came about when one political figure in America used that to describe what it is we are researching and studying, and then our press picked it up and it has been world-wide. We're not talking about Star Wars at all. We are talking about seeing if there isn't a defensive weapon that does not kill people, but that simply makes it impossible for nuclear missiles, once fired out of their silos, to reach their objective -- to intercept those weapons.

Now it is also true that, to show that this is a misconception on the part of the people when you use the wrong terms, not too long ago there was a survey taken, a poll of our people, and they asked them about Star Wars. And similar to the reaction in this poll, only about 30 percent of the people in our country favored it, and the rest didn't. But in the same poll they then described, as I have tried to describe, what it is we are researching -- a strategic defensive shield that doesn't kill people, but would allow us one day -- all of us -- to reduce -- get rid of nuclear weapons. And over 90 percent of the American people favored our going forward with such a program.

Now this is one of the things that we will discuss. We are for, and have for several years now, been advocating a reduction in the number of nuclear weapons. It is uncivilized on the part of all of us to be sitting here with the only deterrent to war -- offensive nuclear weapons that in such numbers that both of us could threaten the other with the death and the annihilation of millions and millions of each other's people.

And so that is the deterrent that is supposed to keep us from firing these missiles at each other. Wouldn't it make a lot more sense if we could find -- that as there has been in history for every weapon a defensive weapon. Weapon isn't the term to use for what we are researching. We are researching for something that could make it, as I say, virtually impossible for these missiles to reach their targets. And if we find such a thing, my proposal is that we make it available to all the world. We don't just keep it for our own advantage.

Q Mr. President, with the situation as it stands today in the international arena, attempts to create such a space shield will inevitably lead to suspicion on the other side that the country creating such a space shield will be in a position to make a first strike. This is a type of statement whose truth is agreed to by many people. Now, it's apparent that the American people have indicated their choice, that if it comes down to a choice between the creation of such a space system and the decrease in nuclear arms, they prefer a decrease in nuclear arms. So, it seems to be a realistic evaluation on the part of the American people. And I would like to ask how the American government would react to the feelings of the American people in this regard.

THE PRESIDENT: In the first place, yes, if someone was developing such a defensive system and going to couple it with their own nuclear weapons -- offensive weapons -- yes, that could put them in a position where they might be more likely to dare a first strike. But your country, your government has been working on this same kind of a plan beginning years before we ever started working on it, which, I think, would indicate that maybe we should be a little suspicious that they want it for themselves.

But I have said, and am prepared to say at the summit, that if such a weapon is possible, and our research reveals that, then, our move would be to say to all the world, "Here, it is available." We won't put this weapon -- or this system in place, this defensive system, until we do away with our nuclear missiles, our offensive missiles. But we will make it available to other countries, including the Soviet Union, to do the same thing.

Now, just what -- whichever one of us comes up first with that defensive system, the Soviet Union or us or anyone else -- what a picture if we say no one will claim a monopoly on it. And we make that offer now. It will be available for the Soviet Union, as well as ourselves.

And if the Soviet Union and the United States both say we will eliminate our offensive weapons, we will put in this defensive thing in case some place in the world a madman some day tries to create these weapons again -- nuclear weapons -- because, remember, we all know how to make them now. So, you can't do away with that information. But we would all be safe knowing that if such a madman project is ever attempted there isn't any of us that couldn't defend ourselves against it.

So, I can assure you now we are not going to try and monopolize this, if such a weapon is developed, for a first-strike capability.

Q Mr. President, I would like to ask you about some of the matters which concern mutual suspicion and distrust. And you indicated at your speech at the United Nations that the U.S. does not extend -- does not have troops in other countries -- but there are -- has not occupied other countries. But there are 550,000 troops -- military personnel outside of the United States. In 32 countries, there are 1,500 military bases. So, one can see in this way which country it is that has become surrounded. And you have agreed that the Soviet Union has the right to look-out for the interest of its security. And it is inevitable that the Soviet Union must worry about these bases which have -- which are around it.

The Soviet Union, in turn, has not done the same. So, how do you in this respect anticipate to create this balance of security which you have spoken about?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I can't respond to your exact numbers there that you've given. I don't have them right at my fingertips as to what they are. But we're talking about two different things -- we're talking about occupying a country with foreign troops, such as we see the Soviet Union doing in Afghanistan, and there are other places, too -- Angola, South Yemen, Ethiopia.

Yes, we have troops in bases. The bulk of those would be in the NATO forces -- the alliance in Europe along the NATO line -- there in response to even superior numbers of Warsaw pact troops that are aligned against them. And the United States, as one of the members of the alliance, contributes troops to that NATO force.

The same is true in Korea in which, at the invitation of the South Korean government, we have troops to help them there because of the demilitarized zone and the threatening nature of North Korea, which attacked them without warning. And that was not an American war, even though we provided the most of the men. That war was fought under the flag of the United Nations. The United Nations found North Korea guilty of aggression in violation of the Charter of the U.N. And, finally, South Korea was defended and the North Koreans were defeated. But they still have maintained a sizeable, threatening offensive force.

Other places -- we have bases in the far Pacific; we've had them for many years in the Philippines. We lease those -- those are bases we rent. In fact, we even have a base that is leased on Cuba that was there long before there was a Castro in Cuba -- a naval base. But this, I think, is a far cry from occupying other countries, including the nations in the Warsaw pact. They never were allowed the self-determination that was agreed to in the Yalta Treaty -- the end of World War II.

So, I think my statement still goes -- that there is a difference in occupation and a difference in having bases where they are there in a noncombat situation, and many where they are requested by the parent country.

Q If there's a referendum and the Cuban people decide that the base at Guantanamo should be evacuated, would it be evacuated?

THE PRESIDENT: No, because the lease for that was made many years ago and it still has many years to run, and we're perfectly legal in our right to be there. It is fenced off. There is no contact with the people or the main island of Cuba at all.

Q Mr. President, you have mentioned Afghanistan. I would like to say that in Afghanistan Soviet troops are there at the invitation of the Afghan government to defend the Afghan revolution against the incursions of forces from abroad that are funded and supported by the United States.

In the United Nations, and in your written replies to our questions, you have indicated that the United States has not attempted to use force, but has fostered the process of democracy by peaceful means. How does this reply fit in with the use of force by the United States in many countries abroad, beginning with Vietnam, where seven million tons of weapons were dropped -- seven million tons more than were in the Second World War, and, also, Grenada? I ask this not to dwell on the past, but simply to clarify this issue.

THE PRESIDENT: And it can be clarified, yes.

First, of all, with regard to Afghanistan, the government which invited the Soviet troops in didn't have any choice because the government was put there by the Soviet Union and put there with the force of arms to guarantee. And, in fact, the man who was the head of that government is the second choice. The first one wasn't satisfactory to the Soviet Union and they came in with armed forces and threw him out and installed their second choice, who continues to be the governor.

Now, there are no outside forces fighting in there. But, as a matter of fact, I think there are some things that, if they were more widely known, would shock everyone worldwide. For example, one of the weapons being used against the people of Afghanistan consists of toys -- dolls, little toy trucks, things that are appealing to children. They're scattered in the air. But when the children pick them up, their hands are blown off. They are what we call booby-traps. They're like land mines. This is hardly consistent with the kind of armed warfare that has occurred between nations.

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Vietnam? Yes, when Vietnam -- or let's say, French Indochina -- was given up as a colony, an international forum in Geneva, meeting in Geneva, established a North Vietnam and a South Vietnam. The North Vietnam was already governed by a communist group and had a government in place during the Japanese occupation of French Indochina. South Vietnam had to start and create a government.

We were invited into -- with instructors, to help them establish something they had never had before, which was a military. And our instructors went in in civilian clothes. Their families went with them. And they started with a country that didn't have any military schools or things of this kind to create an armed force for the government of South Vietnam.

They were harrassed by terrorists from the very beginning. Finally, it was necessary to send the families home. Schools were being bombed. There was even a practice of rolling bombs down the aisles of movie theaters and killing countless people that were simply enjoying a movie. And finally, changes were made that our people were allowed to arm themselves for their own protection.

And then, it is true, that President Kennedy sent in a unit of troops to provide protection. This grew into the war of Vietnam. At no time did the allied force -- and it was allied. There were more in there than just American troops. -- At no time did we try for victory. Maybe that's what was wrong. We simply tried to maintain a demilitarized zone between North and South Vietnam. And we know the result that has occurred now.

And it is all one state of Vietnam. It was conquered in violation of a treaty that was signed in Paris between North and South Vietnam. We left South Vietnam, and North Vietnam swept down, conquered the country, as I say, in violation of a treaty.

But this is true of almost any of the other places that you mentioned. We -- I've talked so long I've forgotten some of the other examples that you used.

Q Grenada.

THE PRESIDENT: What?

Q Grenada.

THE PRESIDENT: Grenada. Ah. We had some several hundred young American medical students there. Our intelligence revealed that they were threatened as potential hostages and the government of Grenada requested help, military help, not only from the United States, but from the other Commonwealth nations -- island nations in the Caribbean -- from Jamaica, from Dominica, a number of these others. They in turn relayed the request to us because they did not have armed forces in sufficient strength.

And, yes, we landed. And we found warehouses filled with weapons, and they were of Soviet manufacture. We found hundreds of Cubans there. There was a brief engagement. We freed the island. And in a very short time, our troops came home, after rescuing our students, rescuing the island. There are no American troops there now. Grenada has set up a democracy and is ruling itself by virtue of an election that was held shortly thereafter among the people, and of which we played no part.

And there is the contrast: The Soviet troops have been in Afghanistan for six years now, fighting all that time. We did what we were asked to do -- the request of the government of Grenada -- and came home.

Q Mr. President, with relation to the ABM Treaty, which was signed in 1972, Article V of that treaty indicates, and I quote, "that each side will not develop a test or deploy anti-ballistic missile components or systems which are sea-based, air-based, space-based or mobile land-based. Now, some administration representatives say that the Treaty is such that it permits all of these things -- the development, the testing, and deployment of ABM systems. Such an interpretation of that treaty certainly cannot help achieve agreement.

What is the true position of the American administration with regard to the interpretation of this treaty? Will the U.S. abide by the Treaty or not? And certainly the results of your meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev will depend a great deal on that fact.

THE PRESIDENT: There are two varying interpretations of the treaty. There is an additional clause in the treaty that would seem to be more liberal than that paragraph 5 -- or clause 5. The other hand, we have made it plain that we are going to stay within a strict definition of the treaty. And what we are doing with regard to research -- and that would include testing -- is within the treaty.

Now, with regard to deployment, as I said earlier, no, we are doing what is within the treaty and which the Soviet Union has already been doing for quite some time, same kind of research and development. But, when it comes to deployment, I don't know what the Soviet Union was going to do when and if their research developed such a weapon, or still if it does. But I do know what we're going to do and I have stated it already. We would not deploy -- my -- it is not my purpose for deployment -- until we sit down with the other nations of the world, and those that have nuclear arsenals, and see if we cannot come to an agreement on which there will be deployment only if there is elimination of the nuclear weapons.

Now, you might say if we're going to eliminate the nuclear weapons, then why do we need the defense? Well, I repeat what I said earlier. We all know how to make them -- the weapons, so it is possible that some day a madman could arise in the world -- we were both allies in a war that came about because of such a madman -- and therefore, it would be like, in Geneva after World War I when the nations all got together and said no more poison gas, but we all kept our gasmasks. Well, this weapon, if such can be developed, would be today's gasmask. But we would want it for everyone and the terms for getting it, and the terms for our own deployment would be the elimination of the offensive weapons -- a switch to maintain trust and peace between us of having defense systems that gave us security, not the threat of annihilation -- that one or the other of us would annihilate the other with nuclear weapons.

So, we will not be violating this treaty at any time, because, as I say, it is not our purpose to go forward with deployment if and when such a weapon proved practical.

Q Mr. President, we've about run out of time unless you had something in conclusion you wanted to state.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I -- we haven't covered -- I guess I've filibustered on too many of these questions here with lengthy answers. I know you have more questions there. I'm sorry that we haven't time for them.

But I would just like to say that the Soviet Union and the United States -- well, not the Soviet Union, let us say Russia and the United States have been allies in two wars. The Soviet Union and the United States, allies in one, the last and greatest war, World War II. Americans and Russians died side by side, fighting the same enemy.

There are Americans buried on Soviet soil. And it just seems to me -- and what I look forward to in this meeting with the General Secretary -- is that people don't start wars, governments do. And I have a little thing here that I copied out of an article the other day and the author of the article uttered a very great truth. "Nations do not distrust each other because they are armed. They arm themselves because they distrust each other." Well, I hope that in the summit maybe we can find ways that we can prove by deed -- not just words, but by deeds -- that there is no need for distrust between us. And then we can stop punishing our people by using our wherewithal to build these arsenals of weapons instead of doing more things for the comfort of the people.

Q Thank you very much, Mr. President, and --

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.

(end of formal interview)

(start of informal comments)

Q -- it's a pity, sir, too, that there can't be enough time to have your answers for all our questions --

THE PRESIDENT: Well, all right. Okay.

Q Thank you, Mr. President.

Q Unfortunately, Mr. President, we cannot discuss with you the history of questions which we just asked already because we have sometimes a very different attitude of that. But no time.

Q As you know, the world is sort of different.

THE PRESIDENT: I was waiting for a question that would allow me to point out that, under the detente that we had for a few years, during which we signed the SALT I and the SALT II Treaties, the Soviet Union added over 7,000 warheads to its arsenal. And we have fewer than we had in 1969. And 3,800 of those were added to the arsenal after the signing of SALT II. So --

Q But --

Q But still you have more warheads --

THE PRESIDENT: No, we don't.

Q -- Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT: Oh, no we don't.

Q Yes, you have -- well, to 12,000 --

Q You know, it's an interesting phenomenon because in '79, after seven years of very severe -- I would say the -- researching in -- SALT II, the -- President Carter and other specialists told that there was a parity in strategic and military. And then you came to the power and they said -- you said it sounded that the Soviet Union is much ahead. Then, recently, in September, you said almost the same, though the Joint Chiefs of Staffs told this year that there is a parity. What is the contradiction?

THE PRESIDENT: No, there really isn't. Somebody might say that with the sense of that we have sufficient for a deterrent, that, in other words, we would have enough to make it uncomfortable if someone attacked us. But, no, your arsenal does out-count ours by a great number.

MORE

Q People say that -- (inaudible.) (Laughter.) The
generals -- your generals say that they wouldn't --

Q Okay.

Q -- switch, you know, with our generals, your arsenal.

Q I would like to tell you also that those stories about
dolls in Afghanistan. I was in Afghanistan there a little bit --

MR. SPEAKES: He's -- maybe we'll have another opportunity --

Q Yes, we hope so.

MR. SPEAKES: And he's got to go down and tell the General
Secretary, through our press, what he's going to do.

Q Thank you very much, Mr. President, and we wish you
certainly success and good achievements in your meeting with Mr.
Gorbachev. We hope for this.

Q Thank you very much, Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.

END

2:47 P.M. EST

RESPONSES TO PREVIOUSLY SUBMITTED
WRITTEN QUESTIONS

QUESTION ONE

Q: The forthcoming meeting between General Secretary Gorbachev and you, Mr. President, is for obvious reasons looked upon as an event of special importance. Both sides have stated their intention to make an effort to improve relations between our two countries, to better the overall international situation. The Soviet Union has, over a period of time, put forward a whole set of concrete proposals and has unilaterally taken steps in various areas directly aimed at achieving this goal. What is the U.S. for its part going to do?

THE PRESIDENT: I fully agree that my meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev has special significance, and I am personally looking forward to it very much. I sincerely hope that we will be able to put relations between our two countries on a safer and more secure course. I, for my part, will certainly do all I can to make that possible.

We of course study every Soviet proposal carefully and when we find them promising we are happy to say so. If, on the other hand, we find them one-sided in their effect, we explain why we feel as we do. At the same time we, too, have made concrete proposals -- dozens of them -- which also cover every sphere of our relationship, from the elimination of chemical weapons and resolution of regional conflicts to the expansion of contacts and exchanges, and we hope these receive the same careful attention that we give to Soviet proposals.

Let me give you a few examples. One thing that has created enormous tension in U.S.-Soviet relations over the last few years has been attempts to settle problems around the world by using military force. The resort to arms, whether it be in Afghanistan, Cambodia, or in Africa, has contributed nothing to the prospects for peace or the resolution of indigenous problems, and has only brought additional suffering to the peoples of these regions. This is also dangerous, and we need to find a way to stop attempts to solve problems by force. So I have proposed that both our countries encourage parties to these conflicts to lay down their arms and negotiate solutions -- and if they are willing to do that our countries should find a way to agree to support a peaceful solution and refrain from providing military support to the warring parties. And if peace can be achieved, the United States will contribute generously to an international effort to restore war-ravaged economies -- just as we did after the second world war, contributing to the recovery of friends and erstwhile foes alike, and as we have done on countless other occasions.

Both of our governments agree that our nuclear arsenals are much too large. We are both committed to radical arms reductions. So the United States has made concrete proposals for such reductions: to bring ballistic missile warheads down to 5,000 on each side, and to eliminate a whole category of intermediate-range missiles from our arsenals altogether. These have not been "take-it-or-leave-it" proposals. We are prepared to negotiate, since we know that negotiation is necessary if we are to reach a solution under which neither side feels threatened. We are willing to eliminate our advantages if you will agree to eliminate yours. The important thing is to begin reducing these terrible weapons in a way that both sides will feel secure, and to continue that process until we have eliminated them altogether.

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Events of the past ten to fifteen years have greatly increased mistrust between our countries. If we are to solve the key problems in our relationship, we have to do something to restore confidence in dealing with each other. This requires better communication, more contact, and close attention to make sure that both parties fulfill agreements reached. That is why we have made literally 40 to 50 proposals to improve our working relationship, expand communication and build confidence. For example, we have proposed an agreement to cooperate on the peaceful use of space. The Apollo-Soyuz joint mission was a great success in 1975, and we should try to renew that sort of cooperation. We have also made several proposals for more direct contact by our military people. If they talked to each other more, they might find that at least some of their fears are unfounded. But most of all, ordinary people in both countries should have more contact, particularly our young people. The future, after all, belongs to them. I'd like to see us sending thousands of students to each other's country every year, to get to know each other, to learn from each other and -- most of all -- to come to understand that, even with our different philosophies, we can and must live in peace.

Obviously we are not going to solve all the differences between us at one meeting, but we would like to take some concrete steps forward. Above all, I hope that our meeting will give momentum to a genuine process of problem solving, and that we can agree on a course to take us toward a safer world for all - and growing cooperation between our countries.

QUESTION TWO

Q: The Soviet Union stands for peaceful coexistence with countries which have different social systems, including the U.S. In some of your statements, the point has been made that in spite of differences between our countries, it is necessary to avoid a military confrontation. In other words, we must learn how to live in peace. Thus, both sides recognize the fact that the issue of arms limitation and reduction is and will be determining in these relations. The special responsibility of the U.S. and U.S.S.R. for the fate of the world is an objective fact. What in your opinion can be achieved in the area of security in your meeting with Gorbachev?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, first of all, I would say that we think all countries should live together in peace, whether they have the same or different social systems. Even if social systems are similar, this shouldn't give a country the right to use force against another.

But you are absolutely right when you say that we must learn to live in peace. As I have said many times, a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. And this means that our countries must not fight any type of war.

You are also right when you say that our countries bear a special responsibility before the world. This is the case not only because we possess enormous nuclear arsenals, but because as great powers, whether we like it or not, our example and actions affect all those around us.

Our relations involve not only negotiating new agreements, but abiding by past agreements as well. Often we are accused by your country of interfering in your "internal" affairs on such questions as human rights, but this is a case in point. Ten years ago we both became participants in the Helsinki Accords and committed ourselves to certain standards of conduct. We are living up to those commitments and expect others to do so also. Soviet-American relations affect as well regional conflicts, political relations among our friends and allies, and many other areas.

The fact that our countries have the largest and most destructive nuclear arsenals obliges us not only to make sure they are never used, but to lead the world toward the elimination of these awesome weapons.

I think that my meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev can start us on the road toward the goal our countries have set: the radical reduction of nuclear weapons and steps to achieve their complete elimination. We can do this by finding concrete ways to overcome roadblocks in the negotiating process and thus give a real impetus to our negotiators. Of course, we will also have to deal with other problems, because it will be very hard to make great progress in arms control unless we can also act to lower tensions, reduce the use and threat of force, and build confidence in our ability to deal constructively with each other.

QUESTION THREE

Q: As is well known, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. reached an understanding last January in Geneva that the top priority of the new negotiations must be the prevention of the arms race in space. But now, the American delegation in Geneva is trying to limit the discussion to consideration of the question of nuclear arms and is refusing to talk about the prevention of the arms race in space. How should we interpret this American position?

THE PRESIDENT: You have misstated the January agreement. Actually, our Foreign Ministers agreed to "work out effective agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on earth, at limiting and reducing nuclear arms, and at strengthening strategic stability." Further, they agreed that the "subject of negotiations will be a complex of questions concerning space and nuclear arms--both strategic and medium range--with all these questions considered and resolved in their interrelationship."

Since your question reflects a misunderstanding of the United States position, let me review it for you:

First, we believe that the most threatening weapons facing mankind today are nuclear weapons of mass destruction. These are offensive weapons, and they exist today--in numbers that are much too high. Our most urgent task therefore is to begin to reduce them radically and to create conditions so that they can eventually be eliminated. Since most of these weapons pass through space to reach their targets, reducing them is as important to prevent an arms race in space as it is to terminate an arms race on earth.

As I noted earlier, we have made concrete, specific proposals to achieve this. Recently, your government finally made some counterproposals, and we will be responding in a genuine spirit of give-and-take in an effort to move toward practical solutions both countries can agree on.

Second, we believe that offensive and defensive systems are closely interrelated, and that these issues should be treated, as our Foreign Ministers agreed, as interrelated. Our proposals are fully consistent with this understanding. We are seeking right now with Soviet negotiators in Geneva a thorough discussion of how a balance of offensive and defensive systems could be achieved, and how -- if scientists are able to develop effective defenses in the future -- we might both use them to protect our countries and allies without threatening the other. And if we ever succeed in eliminating nuclear weapons, countries are going to require a defense against them, in case some madman gets his hands on some and tries to blackmail other countries.

Specifically, we have proposed:

--On strategic nuclear arms, a reduction of each side's nuclear forces down to 5,000 warheads on ballistic missiles. That would be a very dramatic lowering of force levels, in a way that would greatly enhance strategic stability. We have also offered to negotiate strict limits on other kinds of weapons. Because our force structures are different, and because the Soviet Union has complained about having to reconfigure its forces, we have offered to seek agreements which would balance these differing areas of American and Soviet strength.

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--On intermediate-range nuclear forces, we believe the best course is to eliminate that entire category of forces, which includes the 441 SS-20 missiles the Soviet Union has deployed, and our Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles. If this is not immediately acceptable, we have also offered an interim agreement which would establish an equal number of warheads on U.S. and Soviet missiles in this category, at the lowest possible level.

--In the area of space and defense, we are seeking to discuss with Soviet negotiators the possibility that new technology might allow both sides to carry out a transition to greater reliance on defensive weapons, rather than basing security on offensive nuclear forces.

So that there would be no misunderstandings about our research program on new defensive systems which is being carried out in full compliance with the ABM Treaty, I sent the director of our Strategic Defense research program to Geneva to brief Soviet negotiators. Unfortunately, we have not had a comparable description of your research in this area, which we know is long-standing and quite extensive.

Frankly, I have difficulty understanding why some people have misunderstood and misinterpreted our position. The research we are conducting in the United States regarding strategic defense is in precisely the same areas as the research being conducted in the Soviet Union. There are only two differences: first the Soviet Union has been conducting research in many of these areas longer than we have, and is ahead in some. Second, we are openly discussing our program, because our political system requires open debate before such decisions are made. But these differences in approaches to policy decisions should not lead to erroneous conclusions. Both sides are involved in similar research, and there is nothing wrong in that.

However, this does make it rather hard for us to understand why we should be accused of all sorts of aggressive intentions when we are doing nothing more than you are. The important thing is for us to discuss these issues candidly.

In sum, what we are seeking is a balanced, fair, verifiable agreement -- or series of agreements -- that will permit us to do what was agreed in Geneva in January: to terminate the arms race on earth and prevent it in space. The United States has no "tricks" up its sleeve, and we have no desire to threaten the Soviet Union in any way. Frankly, if the Soviet Union would take a comparable attitude, we would be able to make very rapid progress toward an agreement.

QUESTION FOUR

Q: Mr. President, officials of your Administration claim that the U.S., in its international relations, stands for the forces of democracy. How can one reconcile statements of this kind with the actual deeds of the U.S.? If you take any current example, it seems that when a particular country wants to exercise its right to independent development -- whether it be in the Middle East, in Southern Africa, in Central America in Asia -- it is the U.S. in particular, which supports those who stand against the majority of the people, against legitimate governments.

THE PRESIDENT: Your assertion about U.S. actions is totally unfounded. From your question, one might think that the United States was engaged in a war in some other country and in so doing had set itself against the majority of the people who want self determination. I can assure you that this is not the case. I am proud, as are all Americans, that not a single American soldier is in combat anywhere in the world. If every country could say the same, we would truly live in a world of less tension and danger.

Yes, we are very supportive of democracy. It is the basis of our political system and our whole philosophy. Our nation was not founded on the basis of one ethnic group or culture, as are many other countries, but on the basis of the democratic ideal. For example we believe that governments are legitimate only if they are created by the people, and that they are subordinate to the people, who select in free elections those who govern them. But democracy is more than elections in which all who wish can compete. In our view there are many things that even properly elected governments have no right to do. No American government can restrict freedom of speech, or of religion, and no American government can tell its people where they must live or whether they can leave the country or not. These and the other individual freedoms enshrined in our Constitution are the most precious gift our forefathers bequeathed us and we will defend them so long as we exist as a nation.

Now this doesn't mean that we think we are perfect. Of course we are not. We have spent over 200 years trying to live up to our ideals and correct faults in our society, and we're still at it. It also doesn't mean that we think we have a right to impose our system on others. We don't, because we believe that every nation should have the right to determine its own way of life. But when we see other nations threatened from the outside by forces which would destroy their liberties and impose the rule of a minority by force of arms, we will help them resist that whenever we can. We would not be true to our democratic ideals if we did not.

We respond with force only as a last resort, and only when we or our Allies are the victims of aggression. For example, in World War II, we took a full and vigorous part in the successful fight against Hitlerism, even though our country was not invaded by the Nazis. We still remember our wartime alliance and the heroism the peoples of the Soviet Union displayed in that struggle. And we also remember that we never used our position as one of the victors to add territory or to attempt to dominate others. Rather we helped rebuild the devastated countries, friends and erstwhile foes alike, and helped foster democracy where there was once totalitarianism. Have we not all benefitted from the fact that Japan and the Federal Republic of Germany are today flourishing democracies, and strong pillars of a stable and humane world order? Well, the German and Japanese people deserve the most credit for this, but we believe we helped along the way.

MORE

In the areas you mention, we are heartened by trends we see, although there are still many troubling areas. In the southern part of Africa, Angola is torn by civil war, yet we have determined not to supply arms to either side, and to urge a peaceful settlement. In South Africa, the system of apartheid is repugnant to all Americans, but here as well we seek a peaceful solution and for many years we have refused to supply arms or police equipment to the South African Government. In Latin America, great progress in the transition from authoritarian to democratic societies has been made, and now on that continent there exist only four countries that do not have democratically elected governments. Since 1979 seven Latin American countries have made major strides from authoritarian to democratic systems. Over the years, we have been a leading voice for decolonization and have used our influence with our closest friends and allies to hasten this process. We are gratified by the nearly completed process of decolonization, and take pride in our role.

I should emphasize that our aim has been to encourage the process of democratization through peaceful means. And not just the American government, but the American people as a whole have supported this process with actions and deeds.

American society has long been characterized by its spirit of volunteerism and by its compassion for the less fortunate. At home, we are proud of our record of support for those who cannot manage for themselves. It is not simply that the government, but the American people, through a host of voluntary organizations, who bring help to the needy--the victims of floods and fires, the old, the infirm and the handicapped. Americans have been no less generous in giving to other peoples. I remember the efforts of Herbert Hoover in organizing the American Relief effort to feed Soviet victims of famine in the 1920's, and these efforts continue to this day, whether it be food for the victims of famine in Ethiopia, or of earthquakes in Mexico.

QUESTION FIVE

Q: The Soviet Union has unilaterally taken a series of major steps. It has pledged not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. It has undertaken a moratorium on any kind of nuclear tests. It has stopped deployment of intermediate-range missiles in the European part of its territory and has even reduced their number. Why hasn't the U.S. done anything comparable?

THE PRESIDENT: Actually, we have frequently taken steps intended to lower tension and to show our good will, though these were rarely reciprocated. Immediately after World War II, when we were the only country with nuclear weapons, we proposed giving them up altogether to an international authority, so that no country would have such destructive power at its disposal. What a pity that this idea was not accepted!

Not only did we not use our nuclear monopoly against others, we signalled our peaceful intent by demobilizing our armed forces in an extraordinarily rapid way. At the end of the war in 1945, we had 12 million men under arms, but by the beginning of 1948 we had reduced our forces to one-tenth of that number, 1.2 million. Since the 1960's we have unilaterally cut back our own nuclear arsenal: we now have considerably fewer weapons than in 1969, and only one third of the destructive power which we had at that time.

The United States and the NATO allies have repeatedly said that we will never use our arms, conventional or nuclear, unless we are attacked.

Let me add something that might not be widely known in the Soviet Union. In agreement with the NATO countries, the United States since 1979 has removed from Europe well over 1,000 nuclear warheads. When all of our withdrawals have been completed, the total number of warheads withdrawn will be over 2,400. That's a withdrawal of about 5 nuclear weapons for every intermediate-range missile we plan to deploy. It will bring our nuclear forces in Europe to the lowest level in some twenty years. We have seen no comparable Soviet restraint.

If the Soviet Union is now reducing its intermediate range missiles in Europe, that's a long overdue step. The Soviet Union has now deployed 441 SS-20 missiles, each with three warheads--that is 1323 warheads. I don't have to remind you that this Soviet deployment began when NATO had no comparable systems in Europe. We first attempted to negotiate an end to these systems, but when we could not reach agreement, NATO proceeded with a limited response which will take place gradually. Today, the Soviet Union commands an advantage in warheads of 7 to 1 on missiles already deployed. Our position remains as it has always been, that it would be better to negotiate an end to all of these types of missiles. But even if our hopes for an agreement are disappointed and NATO has to go to full deployment, this will only be a maximum of 572 single-warhead missiles.

Moreover, President Carter cancelled both the enhanced-radiation warhead and the B-1 bomber in 1978, and the Soviet Union made no corresponding move. In fact, when asked what the Soviet Union would reduce in response, one of your officials said, "We are not philanthropists." In 1977 and 1978 the United States also tried to negotiate a ban on developing anti-satellite weapons. The Soviet Union refused a ban, and proceeded to develop and test an anti-satellite weapon. Having already established an operational anti-satellite system, the Soviet Union now proposes a "freeze" before the U.S. can test its own system. Obviously, that sort of "freeze" does not look very fair to us; if the shoe were on the other foot, it wouldn't look very fair to you either.

The issues between our two countries are of such importance that the positions of each government should be communicated accurately to the people of both countries. In this process, the media of both countries have an important role to play. We should not attempt to "score points" against each other. And the media should not distort our positions. We are committed to examining every Soviet proposal with care, seeking to find areas of agreement. It is important that the Soviet government do the same in regard to our proposals.

The important thing is that we both deal seriously with each other's proposals, and make a genuine effort to bridge our differences in a way which serves the interests of both countries and the world as a whole. It is in this spirit that I will be approaching my meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev.



THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

November 7, 1985

INTERVIEW OF THE PRESIDENT
BY
THE WIRE SERVICES

November 6, 1985

The Oval Office

11:35 A.M. EST

Q Secretary Shultz did give rather a bleak news conference in Moscow and seemed to have struck out, coming back empty-handed. That may or may not be true. Maybe you're getting private information otherwise. But is it so, and do you think that the Soviets are being very hardline? And what are your maximum and minimum goals for this summit? What do you really think you can get out of it?

THE PRESIDENT: Oh, I haven't -- Helen, I haven't tried to pin it down to success or failure or terms of that kind. We're going there to try and basically eliminate if we can, or certainly reduce the distrust between our two countries. We have to live in the world together. And it is that distrust that causes the problems and causes the situation with regard to arms negotiations.

As I cited to our Russian friends when they were in here the other day that statement -- it isn't mine, I wish it were, but a statement that I read in the press the other day that summed it up so succinctly; and that is that nations do not distrust each other because they're armed, they are armed because they distrust each other.

Q Well, do you think you can get anywhere near a semblance of an arms agreement? Will you negotiate Star Wars at all? Any aspects?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I will be presenting the same thing that I told those others. My concept of the Strategic Defense System has been one that, if and when we finally achieve what our goal is, and that is a weapon that is effective against incoming missiles -- not a weapon, a system that's effective against incoming weapons -- missiles -- then rather than add to the distrust in the world and appear to be seeking the potential for a first strike by rushing to implement, my concept has always been that we sit down with the other nuclear powers, with our allies and our adversaries, and see if we cannot use that weapon to bring about the elimination of -- or that defensive system for the elimination of nuclear weapons.

And that, certainly, I will discuss there and try to impress upon them how firmly we believe in this. I don't think the negotiation of facts and figures about which weapon and how many and numbers and so forth

MORE

in weaponry should take place at the summit. I think that belongs where we have already put it, and that is with the arms control negotiators that are already in Geneva. That's their kind of figuring that should go on. We shouldn't be doing that with all of the things we have to discuss at the other -- at the summit meeting.

At that meeting, there are a number of things -- some of them I hinted at in the speech in the U.N.; regional situation -- in other words, try to, as I say, eliminate the distrust that exists between us.

Q Well, that's the maximum goal then?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, because the other things would automatically follow.

Q Mr. President, if I could pursue the SDI a little bit more. Considering what you told the Soviet journalists when they were here last week, there seems to be some discrepancy between your comments to them and your comments today about what the conditions for deployment would be. Could you explain that to us now?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, because I have already explained that to our allies at the United Nations, and this was the first misunderstanding that I have seen about it. I went through the transcript of that interview, and I mentioned it three or four times through there in the transcript. And I think it was someone just jumped to a false conclusion when they suggested that I was giving a veto to the Soviets over this; that, in other words, if that thing that I've just described to you, that meeting took place and we couldn't get satisfaction, that I would say, "Well, then, we can't deploy this defensive system," I couldn't find any place where that was anything but an erroneous interpretation of what I'd been saying.

Obviously, if this took place, we had the weapon -- I keep using that term; it's a defensive system -- we had a defensive system and we could not get agreement on their part to eliminate the nuclear weapons, we would have done our best and, no, we would go ahead with deployment. But even though, as I say, that would then open us up to the charge of achieving the capacity for a first strike. We don't want that. We want to eliminate things of that kind. And that's why we -- frankly, I think that any nation offered this under those circumstances that I've described would see the value of going forward. Remember that the Soviet Union has already stated its wish that nuclear weapons could be done away with.

Q You say today that you would go ahead with deployment

if you had the system and there weren't international agreement on mutual deployment. The other day you said that you would go ahead -- that deployment would be only on condition of what you call disarmament. This misunderstanding, it seems to me, on whoever's part has caused a lot of confusion.

Does that disrupt your negotiations with Gorbachev, and what can he expect when you have said this to his journalists and now you are telling us something different?

THE PRESIDENT: No, I'm not telling something different. I'm saying that reading that transcript of what I told to the journalists -- someone has jumped to an erroneous conclusion. I don't find anything in there -- maybe it's because I have talked about this with so many individuals, as I've said, at the U.N. and all -- that maybe having more of an understanding of it, I see it more clearly than some others might.

But I have not -- and I have had others now that look at this transcript and they don't get that interpretation, that I'm giving anyone a veto over this defensive system.

Q May I ask you, Mr. President, it seems that in the recent weeks you are more -- you have been more flexible in the way you have talked about the SDI. You have not said that it could not be a bargaining chip, as you used to say it very often before. Is there -- are you more flexible? Do you want your message to be seen as more flexible? Is there room for compromise?

THE PRESIDENT: This is the point where flexibility, I think, is not involved. The demands that have been made on us already with regard to arms control are that we stop the research and any effort to create such a defensive system. And I have said that there is no way that we will give that up -- that this means too much to the world and to the cause of peace if it should be possible to have an effective defensive system.

In discussions here in the office I have likened it many times to the gas mask -- 1925, when all the nations of the world after World War I and the horror of poison gas in that war. When it was over all the nations got together in Geneva and ruled out the use of poison gas. But we all had gas masks, and no one did away with their gas masks. Well, this in a sense is how I see what this could be. The defense that would -- it would be so practical and sensible for any country, including the Soviet Union, to say, why go on building and maintaining and modernizing these horrible weapons of destruction

if there is something that can be implemented that makes them useless?

Q Mr. President, Secretary Shultz held a press conference in Iceland today on his way back to report to you and with him was a senior official -- not identified, but you can guess who it is -- who held a background briefing for reporters and he said that the impression that the American delegation got during the recent -- this weekend's talks in Moscow was that Mr. Gorbachev was concerned that U.S. policy was influenced by a small circle of anti-Soviet extremists. Now, if Mr. Gorbachev said that to you personally, how would you respond, Mr. President?

THE PRESIDENT: I would respond with the truth as clearly as I could enunciate it. This is one of the things that I talk about -- feel with regard to the distrust -- that the Soviet Union tends to be distrustful and suspicious that things that are presented to them are, perhaps, concealing some ulterior motive. And I want to discuss with him the record -- our own record, that if this were true -- that if the United States was guided by some desire to one day assault the Soviet Union, why didn't we do it when we were the most powerful military nation on Earth right after World War II. Our military was at its height; we had not had the great losses in the millions that the other nations had had that had been there longer, our industry was intact -- we hadn't been bombed to rubble as all the rest had, and we were the only ones with the ultimate weapon -- the nuclear weapon. We could have dictated the whole world and we didn't. We set out to help the whole world.

And the proof of it is, today, that our erstwhile enemies -- and there could never have been more hatred in the world than there was between the enemies of World War II and ourselves -- they are today our staunchest allies. And, yet, here is a former ally -- there are Americans buried in the soil of the Soviet Union that fought side-by-side against the same enemies -- and, so I think we can prove by the record that any fair-minded person would have to see that we did not have expansionism in mind. We never took an inch of territory as a result of the victory of World War II or of World War I, for that matter. And, on the other hand, to point out to him why we are concerned about them -- that

their expansionist policy is very evident. The gunfire hasn't stopped for a moment in Afghanistan. We could name all the other spots where they or their surrogate troops are in there. So, this is my hope, that I can convince him, if he's a reasonable man -- and there's every indication that he is -- would see that if we both want peace, there'll be peace.

Q Mr. President, your remark that you think Mr. Gorbachev is a reasonable man brings me to another question. I assume that you have been doing a lot of reading about Mr. Gorbachev, the man, and Gorbachev, the leader of the Soviet Union, and that perhaps you've even seen some video tapes of him in action. What sort of an opponent do you expect to face across that table at Geneva?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I would think that any Soviet leader, who reaches the office that he holds, would be a formidable opponent. If he does not subscribe to the party philosophy, he wouldn't be in that position.

Q Mr. President, this Yurchenko case is very puzzling, baffling to everyone.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

Q Is it baffling to you?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

Q And, also -- yes? Have you ordered the -- an investigation of the CIA handling? And have you gone even further to order an investigation of handling by any agency of defectors per se?

THE PRESIDENT: Right now, the Justice Department is investigating the INF and their --

Q Right.

THE PRESIDENT: -- or INS, I mean, and their handling of the Medvid incident down in New Orleans to see just what led to all of that.

I have to say that this -- coming as they do together -- these three particular incidents, you can't rule out the possibility that this might have been a deliberate ploy or maneuver. Here you have three separate individuals in three different parts of the world who defected and then recanted and, of their own free will, said they wanted to return to the Soviet Union. And in every one of the three incidents, we insisted on and did secure the last word -- the final meeting with each one of them -- to make sure that they understood completely that they were welcome here -- that we would provide safety and sanctuary for them here in the United States -- and in every incident, that was repudiated and we had to say that, of their own free will, as far as we could see --

Q So --

THE PRESIDENT: -- and for whatever reason, they wanted to go back.

Q So were we had by Yurchenko? Was he not a true defector? And is this a sort of a disinformation plant to disrupt --

THE PRESIDENT: Well, Helen, as I say, you can't -- there's no way

that you can prove that that isn't so. On the other hand, there's no way you can prove that it is. So you just have to accept that we did our best in view of their expressed desires, and then they did what other defectors before them have not done, and they -- oh, I think here and there, there's been one or two that went back. So you can't rule out personal desire, homesickness, whatever it might be.

I'm sure that, as has been suggested by someone discussing this, that people who go through that must be under quite some strain and it must be a traumatic experience to step forth from the land of your birth and denounce it and say you want to live someplace else, in another country. But there's no way to establish this.

Either they honestly did feel they wanted to defect and then changed their minds, or the possibility is there that this could have been a deliberate ploy.

Q It sounds like you're leaning toward the latter, that there has been something very systematic --

THE PRESIDENT: No, I just -- maybe I spent more time explaining why I didn't think you could rule that out but --

Q But you said at the outset that there seemed to be a deliberate --

THE PRESIDENT: No, no. I said there is this suspicion that has been voiced by more people than me --

Q But you don't agree with the --

THE PRESIDENT: -- and all I have to say is we just have to live with it because there's no way we can prove or disprove it.

Q Do you think that makes the information that he did give the CIA worthless or perhaps even -- you know, that it was misinformation?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, actually, the information that he provided was not anything new or sensational. It was pretty much information already known to the CIA.

Q Oh, really? So that would tend to support your thought, that perhaps this whole thing was cooked.

THE PRESIDENT: (Laughter.) If you want to take it that way. I'm not going to comment on that one way or the other.

Q Would you say you're perplexed by it?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. I think anyone is perplexed by this. I think it's awfully easy for any American to be perplexed by anyone that could live in the United States and would prefer to live in Russia.

Q Mr. President, if I may --

MR. SPEAKES: You'd better tell them one more time that there's no way to tell either way. You said it about four times, but the answer -- the questions keep coming back.

THE PRESIDENT: (Laughter.) Yes.

Q We got it. (Laughter.)

Q If I may come back to the --

MR. SPEAKES: I want to read the lead before you go --

Q -- to the summit preparation. What do you expect from the summit on the human rights issue? You have been very cautious on the human rights issue in the Soviet Union. Is it because you sense that there might be something positive coming out and you don't want to --

THE PRESIDENT: I have always felt that there are some subjects that should remain in confidence between the leaders discussing them. In this world of public life and politics,

if you try to negotiate on the front page -- some items -- you have almost put the other fellow in a corner where he can't give in because he would appear in the eyes of his own people as if he's taking orders from an outside government. And the greatest success that, I think, has been had in this particular area has been with predecessors of mine who have discussed these subjects privately and quietly with --

Q Are you encouraged by Yelena Bonner being allowed to have medical treatment in the West or do you think it's just something to diffuse the issue before the summit?

THE PRESIDENT: I don't know, but I welcome it. It's long overdue, and we're pleased to see it happen. But what I'm -- let me point out also, this does not mean that human rights will not be a subject for discussion. They will be very much so. They're very important to the people of our country and in their view of a relationship with the Soviet Union.

But I don't think that it is profitable to put things of this kind out in public where any change in policy would be viewed as a succumbing to another power.

Q Mr. President, talking of spies, some months ago -- I forget the date -- in one of your Saturday radio speeches, you said there were too many Soviet and East European diplomats in this country and too many spies among them.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

Q And you said, in effect or perhaps precisely, that you were going to cut these numbers down. Could you brief us on what has happened since then, sir?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, we're having discussions about that and reducing numbers. We recognize that when we do anything of this kind it's -- there's going to be retaliation. But what we're trying to do is to simply arrive at agreements that will be mutual and with regard to reductions of staff and numbers in each other's countries.

Q So when you say you're having discussions, you mean with the Soviet Union and East European countries --

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, this has --

Q -- or within this administration?

THE PRESIDENT: -- this has been done at a ministerial level.

Q Oh, I see.

MR. SPEAKES: If you could go quickly, we can get one more round, but you've got to do it quickly.

THE PRESIDENT: All right.

Q Is Weinberger trying to sabotage the summit? And are you trying to overthrow Qaddafi? (Laughter.)

THE PRESIDENT: (Laughter.) Oh, let me --

Q One at a time. (Laughter.)

THE PRESIDENT: Let me simply say no. Secretary Weinberger isn't trying to sabotage anything of the kind. He's been most helpful in all of the meetings

that we have had on this. And all of the talk that we unhappily read about feuds and so forth -- again, this is a distortion or misinterpretation of my desire for what I have always called Cabinet-type government, where I want all views to be frankly expressed, because I can then make the decision better if I have all those viewpoints. And the fact that we have debate and discussion in that regard, in that way, should not be construed as feuds and battles and so forth. I want all sides.

Q You want it -- it's okay in the public? It's okay in public and on the front page?

THE PRESIDENT: Not the way it's been portrayed on the front page. It has been portrayed --

Q You've been quoted.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, but it had been portrayed not in the spirit in which I just spoke of it. It has been portrayed as animus and anger and so forth. And it isn't that kind. It's the devil-advocate type of thing where I hear all sides.

Now with regard to Qaddafi, let's just say we don't have a very personal relationship.

Q What? Were you going to try to overthrow him indirectly?

THE PRESIDENT: No, we -- no comment on --

Q No comment on are you trying to overthrow him?

THE PRESIDENT: No. I never like to talk about anything that might be doing -- being done in the name of intelligence.

Q Mr. President, your health is vital to the long-range success of any progress that you make at the summit. Why won't you permit the release of the test results from your periodic examinations to reassure the public that there is no recurrence of the cancer?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, for heaven's sakes. First of all, that term "the recurrence of cancer" -- you've given me an opportunity to give an answer I've wanted to give for some time.

I'm deeply appreciative of the concern of people and the -- all the letters of condolence and good wishes and so forth that I have received. But I feel the people have been doing this under a little misapprehension. The whole thing has been portrayed as that I was the sufferer of cancer. I had cancer. And then an operation took place, and now I have had a good recovery. No, the truth of the matter was, I had a polyp. It is -- there are two kinds of polyps in the intestines, and one kind, if allowed to go on eventually becomes cancerous and then would spread.

I had a polyp removed. It is true that it, within itself, had begun to develop a few cancer cells, but it was still a self-contained polyp. The only way that type of polyp can be removed is by major surgery. So in reality the

only real illness that I suffered in any way and at any time was the incision. And my healing was not a healing of cancer, mine was a healing of a ten or twelve inch incision. So, I'm delighted to get this out and on the table before you.

Now, the -- yes, they gave me a schedule and they said we will want to do this down the line periodically and then it gets farther and farther apart as time goes on. It would mainly be an examination periodically to see if any further polyps of that kind -- if one could start, I suppose another could start. And, then, if so, you'd want to get rid of them.

The examinations that I have had are also spaced out -- like this last time -- are part of the kind of annual physical that I've had for many years and long before I came here. Where, once I used to go into the hospital for a few days and have all the whole physical done, well, now we do it in bits and parts. So this last one, mainly I went in and they simply examined the incision -- wanted to see how the healing was coming -- and then I had some x-rays of the lungs which had nothing to do with the operation, but that are a normal part of the just general physical that I have. Now, there will be another trip there coming up in the near future and that will be the first trip for a look at the intestines for the possibility of polyps.

And, so, when the doctors come out and when the doctors -- they say the same thing to me that has been said to you -- maybe I'll have them say it to you instead of me repeating it. When they stand there in front of me and say, "You've had 100 percent recovery. Everything is just fine. You're as healthy as you could possibly be," I go out and tell you that and you think I'm covering something up.

Q I just would suggest that, while I'm not suggesting we don't believe you, it would be reassuring to a lot of people to see the test results and know what's being done and how it's being done and --

THE PRESIDENT: Well, the test result, in cases of this kind, is simply to tell you what happened. For example, if they do the examination to see -- to check if there's another polyp. Well, the only test is they say to you -- (laughter) -- there wasn't one or there is one. And -- whichever way it comes out. So, it's a case of verbalizing -- there isn't any report to be given you that -- oh, incidentally, I also had the blood check taken this time also with the x-rays. But that was done here a few days before, not a Bethesda.

They take a little blood, see what it is and -- And that would be done -- this would have been done, now, even without any physical examination. They always do this prior to a trip abroad, make sure that they've -- they know what's there and in the event of an accident or anything, they know what could be needed.

Q -- Mr. President, we were talking about Qaddafi, but do you think the U.S. should give some aid to the rebels in Angola, as it is doing in Nicaragua or in Afghanistan?

THE PRESIDENT: We believe -- we were embarked on a plan of trying to negotiate the Cubans out of Angola and the independence of Namibia and this also involved that in that there would be a reconciliation between UNITA, the Savimbi forces and the present government, which, more or less, was installed by the presence of the Cuban troops.

Now, with the elimination of the Clark Amendment, we are still most supportive of that, that we believe a settlement in Angola should involve UNITA and the people of that country have a choice in making a decision as to the government they wanted to have. And so all of this is going forward.

Q So there is no -- you don't envision your covert aid to rebels in Angola, because of the Clark Amendment, as you mentioned, having been --

THE PRESIDENT: No, I think there are some areas where we could be of help to them.

Q I have no further questions, Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT: All right.

Q Well, how do you feel on your -- the anniversary of your reelection?

THE PRESIDENT: I feel just fine. I wish the Congress would have a sharp memory of it as they're discussing tax reform and some other things.

Q Do you have any particular goals for the next three years?

THE PRESIDENT: Oh, yes, and you know most of them. Tax reform, a program that will set us, even longer than three years, on a course for the elimination of the deficit, then the achievement of a balanced budget amendment, so that once and for all we'll be free of this. And I've had one tucked away in the back of my mind for a long time, that once we can do that, then I would like to see us start on the reduction of the national debt.

Q Well, then, would you veto the House version of the Gramm-Rudman as it stands now?

THE PRESIDENT: Now, you know, Helen, I never comment on whether I will or will not veto until it --

Q Except for tax increases.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, that's, a general -- that's a general thing. This is talking about a particular piece of legislation. I'm going to wait and see what it is.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

PRESS BOOK

JACK F. MATLOCK

Human Rights and U.S.-Soviet Relations



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Bureau of Public Affairs
Washington, D.C.

Following is an address by Michael H. Armacost, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, before the International Council of the World Conference on Soviet Jewry, Washington, D.C., September 9, 1985.

It is a great honor to be your speaker this evening. I bring you greetings from the Secretary of State who, along with all Americans, shares your deep concern about the plight of Soviet Jewry. I should like to address my remarks this evening to the human rights situation in the Soviet Union and the impact this has on U.S.-Soviet relations.

The State of U.S.-Soviet Relations

First, a comment about the state of U.S.-Soviet relations. The world is awash with commentary on the subject as preparations intensify for the November meeting between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev. The question leaders on both sides must address is whether the basis for a more durable U.S.-Soviet rapprochement can be established. A distinguished Harvard historian, Adam Ulam, has recently commented that: "What concretely upsets . . . Americans about the U.S.S.R. is what the Kremlin *does*, and what must be a continuing source of apprehension to the latter springs from what America *is*."

American hopes for detente in the 1970s foundered on Soviet efforts to achieve geopolitical advantage in Indochina, Angola, Ethiopia, and Afghanistan; to back anti-American forces in

Central America and the Caribbean; to quash attempts at liberalization in Poland; and to build military forces beyond any reasonable need for defense.

If there is to be real improvement in the relationship, these underlying difficulties must be addressed. For our part, we are determined to make such an effort. The task is great.

- A basis must be found for resolving through political means such regional issues as Afghanistan. It is not, after all, weapons themselves that cause wars but political actions.

- In coping with problems of arms competition, propagandistic offers of moratoria are not the answer. The test is whether we can achieve major, stabilizing reductions in offensive nuclear arms now, while examining whether in the future deterrence can rely more heavily on defense than on threats of mutual annihilation.

- In our bilateral relations the range of mutually beneficial contacts and exchanges must be expanded.

Moreover, there is the burden on our relations imposed by the way Soviet authorities treat their own people. We raise human rights questions with our Soviet counterparts not to score debating points, nor to achieve political advantage, but because of the kind of people we are. Freedom is fundamental in our society. Americans have always attempted to hold the torch of freedom alive not merely for themselves but for others around the world. It is to this subject that I would like to turn.

Deterioration of the Human Rights Situation

In recent years the Soviet human rights situation has deteriorated sharply. In 1980, Andrey Sakharov was exiled from Moscow and placed under house arrest, Jewish emigration was cut in half, and the KGB began moving even more freely against dissident activists.

The KGB, under Chairman Yuri Andropov, refined existing techniques of repression and developed more sophisticated but no less harsh measures.

- Many prominent dissidents were allowed or forced to emigrate.
- Others were arrested on criminal charges or confined in psychiatric hospitals.
- Induction of would-be Jewish emigrants into the military enabled authorities cynically to claim reasons of "state security" to deny them permission to leave the U.S.S.R.
- The criminal code was revised to make repression of dissidents less cumbersome and more brazen.
- Intimidation of Western journalists was stepped up to stop their reporting about dissidents.

Why was the repression intensified? Internal and external causes seem to have been at play. At home, Moscow faced serious problems—an inefficient economy, social malaise, troubles in the empire from Poland to Afghanistan, and, until recently, immobility in the leadership. Abroad, the Soviet regime faced more steadfast resistance by the West and in the Third World following its invasion of Afghanistan and crackdown in Poland.

One way Soviet authorities reacted to these problems was to intensify control and repression at home and cut back contacts between their citizens and the outside world. Arrests of dissidents increased. All forms of emigration were reduced dramatically. Jewish emigration—which peaked in 1979 at over 51,000—had fallen by last year to below 900. A similar fate befell Germans and Armenians living in the U.S.S.R.

Soviet leaders sanctioned renewed manifestations of anti-Semitism. In cutting off the safety valve of Jewish emigration, Soviet authorities may have brought upon themselves a new upsurge of religious and national consciousness in one of the U.S.S.R.'s most assimilated minority communities.

They embarked on a campaign of arresting and convicting teachers of the Hebrew language and others in the forefront of this new awareness and identity. Since July 1984 at least 16 Jewish cultural activists, including 9 Hebrew teachers, have been arrested. Thirteen

have been convicted, several on crudely trumped-up criminal charges. Soviet authorities have planted drugs in the apartments of two of them, a pistol and ammunition in the apartment of a third. Yet another was convicted for stealing books he had borrowed from a synagogue library. Three were beaten following their arrests; one, Iosif Berenshtein, was virtually blinded.

Many Jews have also been fired from their jobs or had their apartments searched, phones disconnected, or mail seized. Soviet newspapers and television have branded Hebrew teachers and other Jewish cultural activists as "Zionist" subversives. Zionism has been equated with nazism. World War II Jewish leaders have been accused of helping the Nazis round up Jews for the death camps.

A notorious episode in this campaign was the recent stage-managed television recantation of convicted Moscow Hebrew teacher Dan Shapiro. Shapiro was given a suspended sentence after agreeing to condemn publicly the movement with which he had become so closely associated. Reportedly, he did so after threats to charge him with treason and sentence him to death. The choice that Dan Shapiro faced was an extreme form of the dilemma facing Soviet Jews today. How does one survive in an environment in which the authorities are not constrained by the rule of law?

Unofficial religious activity is currently the most vigorous form of dissent in the U.S.S.R., but it has been hit hard across the board. In addition to Jews, the Ukrainian Uniates, Lithuanian Roman Catholics, and unregistered Baptists and Pentecostals have come in for severe repression.

Nor has there been progress on the cases of major human rights figures such as Andrey Sakharov and his wife, Yelena Bonner, Anatoliy Shcharanskiy, and Yuriy Orlov. Dr. Sakharov, in forced and isolated exile in the closed city of Gorkiy, was apparently abducted from his apartment last spring after beginning another hunger strike, this time to resurface in a cynical yet sadly poignant KGB film showing him eating in a hospital bedroom. What his true condition is today we cannot say. Just last week Vasyl Stus, a leading member of the Ukrainian Helsinki Monitoring Group, died tragically in a Soviet labor camp.

We look for signs of progress on human rights, but the evidence is not encouraging. Monthly emigration figures this year have been up slightly one month and down the next—to be sure, all at a very low level. Whether these fluctuations represent anomalies or a deliberate tease is unclear.

In a slightly more positive vein, one of our long-time dual national cases was resolved this spring, and three long-standing cases involving the spouses of American citizens have also been resolved. While we welcome these gestures—however calculated or isolated—many more cases remain unresolved. Meanwhile, the arrest of Hebrew teachers, religious believers, and human rights activists persists.

Impact on Bilateral Relations

Why do we attach such importance to Soviet human rights performance? First, human rights abuses have major impact on American perceptions of the Soviet Union. When Americans hear that Soviet authorities have abducted an Andrey Sakharov from his home, planted drugs on Hebrew teachers, or treated their own citizens as captives in their own country, they wonder about the possibilities for constructive relations between our two governments. In this way, Soviet human rights abuses influence U.S. public opinion and circumscribe the flexibility of any U.S. administration to deal with the Soviet Union on a pragmatic basis.

Soviet leaders allege that expressions of our concern amount to interference in their internal affairs. They claim that human rights issues are not legitimate topics for dialogue between governments. Yet, the Soviet Union assumed solemn international obligations, such as the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, to respect specific human rights of their citizens. Violations of these obligations cannot but affect perceptions of Soviet willingness to abide by other accords and erode political confidence needed to make progress on a variety of issues.

At meetings of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), such as the recent one in Ottawa of human rights experts, we have pressed vigorously for Soviet compliance with the human rights provisions of the Final Act. We hope progress can be made soon in the Stockholm conference. A unique aspect of the Final Act is its recognition that respect for human rights is essential to development of security and cooperation in Europe. In pursuit of this commitment to balanced progress in the CSCE process, we are sending a distinguished delegation, led by former Deputy Secretary of State Walter Stoessel, to the Budapest Cultural Forum this autumn. There, and at the Human Contacts Experts Meeting in Bern, we will continue to press our concerns.

While we have not hesitated to speak out in international meetings, we have also consistently raised our concerns in confidential channels. We have made human rights a prominent part of our dialogue with Soviet leaders. We have detailed our specific concerns, including those about Soviet Jewry, and made clear their importance to the U.S.-Soviet relationship. We tell Soviet leaders that our relations cannot be put on a long-term, constructive basis without significant gains in this area.

On some occasions, we have presented the Soviets with representation lists of persons denied permission to leave the Soviet Union. One list names about 20 U.S.-Soviet dual nationals, another about 20 Soviet spouses of U.S. citizens, and still another over 100 Soviet families denied permission to join their loved ones in the United States. Many individuals on these lists are Soviet Jews. We also regularly present a list of over 3,400 Soviet Jewish families who have been refused permission to emigrate to Israel.

It is our hope that Soviet authorities are coming to recognize that human rights will remain central to the U.S.-Soviet agenda. We are not asking Soviet authorities to do the impossible but only to live up to their international obligations and loosen the screws of repression tightened so cruelly in recent years. We watch the patterns of Soviet Jewish emigration, as you do. We are prepared to respond as improvements occur. On this score, we appreciate your counsel and that of others interested in Soviet Jewry.

We do not expect miracles overnight. But Soviet leaders must surely be confident enough to be able to lessen repression and increase emigration without endangering the so-called "leading role of the Communist Party." We repeatedly make the point to Soviet leaders that this could benefit our relations.

Soviet officials hint that improvements in human rights, including Jewish emigration, can follow an upward swing in overall relations. There are those who believe that at times in the past better relations meant more emigration. Whether or not this was true, we reject the notion that improvements in human rights can come last. The reality is that Soviet abuses of human rights undermine the political confidence needed to improve relations, negotiate arms control agreements, and cooperatively lessen regional tensions.

Soviet leaders seek to create the impression that they are more serious than American leaders in seeking to improve relations. They aver that better relations depend on U.S. and Western political "will," not on changes in Soviet behavior. They are mistaken. Let us look at what the United States has tried to accomplish and what it seeks for the future.

Steps Toward Improved Relations

We will start with bilateral issues. Last year following the commencement of NATO missile deployments in Europe, the Soviets tried to freeze bilateral relations. Nevertheless, we persevered and ultimately signed modest accords on consular affairs and hotline modernization. This year there has been slightly more progress, mainly the conclusion of the North Pacific air safety agreement and visits of legislative delegations and Secretary [of Agriculture] Block. We look forward to better exchanges in these areas and to making progress in maritime boundary talks and peaceful space cooperation.

Finding ways to reduce regional tensions could have enormous benefit. Over the past year, teams of U.S. and Soviet experts have had talks on the Middle East, southern Africa, and Afghanistan and will hold them this week on East Asia. These talks have not yet, however, met our expectations.

A continuing exchange of views can help avoid misunderstandings. But specific steps are needed, too. For example, the Middle East remains a tense area that affects directly the interests of the Soviet Union and the United States. The Soviet Union seeks a greater role in the peace process, yet has offered nothing but procedural suggestions. One immediate step it can take is to lessen its unremittingly hostile propaganda directed against Israel. It should also call upon its friends in the PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization] to forswear violence.

Afghanistan may be the most pressing regional issue for the new Soviet leadership. Moscow's brutal occupation and continuing repression spur resistance, not acquiescence, from the brave Afghan people. Informed Soviets ought to realize by now that the hope of building communism in Afghanistan, even in the long term, is futile. In our view it should be possible to find a solution which protects the legitimate interests of all parties, the right of the Afghan people to live in peace under a government of their own choosing, and the Soviet interest in a secure southern

border. Soviet commitment to early troop withdrawals would be a good beginning and would promote progress in the UN negotiations on Afghanistan.

The arms control dialogue was revived earlier this year when the two sides agreed to commence nuclear and space arms talks in Geneva. The United States is prepared for concrete progress on arms control, based on an enduring and realistic foundation. The President is fully committed to achieving major, stabilizing reductions in nuclear arsenals. He has given our negotiators great flexibility to achieve this end.

We welcome General Secretary Gorbachev's expressed interest in achieving radical reductions, but we must also explore the potential of strategic defenses to strengthen deterrence. Our research in this field is vital to the long-term prospects for maintaining the peace. Soviet work on strategic defenses has long been greater than our own. The Soviets would gain from engaging us on how strategic defenses—if they prove feasible—might play a greater role in the future, to our mutual benefit.

We would like to believe the Soviet Union wants improved relations with the United States. For our part, we are taking steps that can lead to that end. In the months ahead, and at the meeting of President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev in Geneva this November, we hope political confidence can be developed that will lead to concrete progress in all areas—arms control, regional and bilateral issues, and human rights.

Human rights is an essential part of this process. We are willing to discuss our human rights concerns with the Soviets in an atmosphere free from rancor and recrimination. If the new leadership shows the foresight and the confidence to improve the human rights situation, important political confidence can be generated. Certainly, our willingness to improve trade and other aspects of our relationship would be enhanced. Let us hope that Soviet leaders will take advantage of this opportunity. Both our peoples and people everywhere will benefit if they do. ■

Published by the United States Department of State • Bureau of Public Affairs
Office of Public Communication • Editorial Division • Washington, D.C. • September 1985
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HUMAN RIGHTS

The human rights situation in the Soviet Union has been deteriorating since the late 1970's as Soviet authorities move to eliminate all forms of internal dissent. By late 1982 the Helsinki Monitors movement, created in the wake of Soviet signing of the Helsinki Final Act, had been effectively destroyed. Leading human rights activists such as Dr. Andrey Sakharov, Anatoliy Shcharanskiy and Yuriy Orlov had been imprisoned or forced into internal exile. Soviet authorities have also continued their efforts to repress religious believers and cultural minorities.

Since Gorbachev assumed power in March, the human rights picture has remained bleak. Arrests of Baptists, Pentecostals, Ukrainian and Lithuanian Catholics and other Christians remain high. Ten Pentecostals out of a community of 170 in the Siberian village of Chuguevka have been convicted since January. Every working person in the community has been fired and several families have been threatened with the loss of their children. The crackdown on the revival of Jewish cultural activism continues. Jewish emigration remains at its lowest level since the 1960's. Although news that three longterm refuseniks (waiting 12-15 years) were allowed to emigrate in August-October was positive, the numbers were too small to be encouraging.

Dr. Andrey Sakharov and his wife, Yelena Bonner, remain isolated, and conditions for human rights activists Anatoliy Shcharanskiy, Yuriy Orlov and Iosif Begun have deteriorated. Irina Grivnina, active in exposing psychiatric abuse, was promised exit permission in late October, probably an effort to influence Dutch opinion. Ukrainian Helsinki monitor Vasyl Stus died of emaciation in a labor camp in early September. Other prisoners have had their labor camp sentences extended under new legislation enabling authorities to resentence prisoners for alleged violations of labor camp rules. More than 150 separated spouse, dual national and divided family cases remain unresolved.

Judging from recent Gorbachev comments and a tough July article by KGB head Chebrikov, it appears that the new Soviet leadership intends to continue a hard line on internal dissent. Gorbachev, with the self-confident, vigorous image he has brought to Soviet leadership, seems determined that the USSR will not be put in a defensive position on human rights. The Soviets will now respond to our criticism of their human rights performance with aggressive attacks on economic and social conditions in the West. They seem determined to do this despite the fact that low Soviet living standards, declining life expectancy, cramped housing and rampant alcohol abuse make them extremely vulnerable on these issues. Whether Gorbachev will be willing to act pragmatically on meeting some of our human rights concerns, as he suggested he might be during his recent visit to France, remains to be seen.

CSCE Process: An Overview

September 1985

Background: The Helsinki Final Act, the product of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), was signed in Helsinki August 1, 1975, by the heads of government of the US, Canada, and 33 European states. From July 30 to August 1 in Helsinki, Secretary of State Shultz and the foreign ministers of the other 34 signatory states commemorated its 10th anniversary.

The original proposal for a European conference on security and cooperation came in 1954 from the USSR and its Warsaw Pact allies. The West rejected the initiative, arguing it would exclude the US from Europe, break up NATO, and perpetuate the division of Germany. As East-West tensions relaxed in the 1960s, the US and its Atlantic allies used the Soviet desire for a conference to encourage progress on matters of security, disarmament, economic cooperation, and human rights. In July 1973 the CSCE opened in Helsinki and, after 2 years of meetings, concluded its work with a final document--the Helsinki Final Act--that established standards and goals in those four fields.

The Final Act provides for periodic followup conferences to review results and decide on future activities. The first one of these was held in Belgrade (1977-78), the second in Madrid (1980-83), and the third will take place in Vienna, starting in November 1986.

Interim meetings of experts have been mandated by the two followup conferences. The Budapest Cultural Forum, from October 15 to November 25, 1985, will be the eighth experts' meeting to be held and the first one to deal exclusively with the cultural content of the Final Act. Earlier meetings covered peaceful settlement of disputes (Montreux, 1978; Athens 1984), cooperation in the Mediterranean (Valletta, 1979; Venice, 1984), science (Hamburg, 1979), and human rights (Ottawa, 1985). The Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE), which began in 1984, is being held in Stockholm. A ninth meeting, on human contacts, will take place in Bern in 1986, prior to the Vienna followup conference. These experts' meetings, as part of the CSCE process, review various issues and can make recommendations to the signatories.

Budapest Cultural Forum: The forum will be the first CSCE meeting held in a Warsaw Pact country. Signatories are to send leading figures from different fields of culture to discuss the interrelated problems of creation, dissemination, and cooperation. In addition to focusing on the barriers to free cultural activity within and across borders (such as censorship, impediments to travel and communication, and repression of cultural minorities), the forum will have an opportunity to consider practical proposals to reduce such restrictions and promote the sharing of cultural experiences among the people of Europe and North America.

Ottawa human rights meeting: The Ottawa Human Rights Experts' Meeting in May and June 1985 was the first CSCE meeting devoted entirely to discussion of respect for the human rights provisions of the Final Act. The US and the other Western democracies conducted an extensive, serious review of the Soviet record and that of other East European states. They also put forward a series of practical proposals aimed at improved adherence to these provisions. Although the East blocked any agreement, the proposals constitute a common Western human rights agenda that will figure in future CSCE meetings.

Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe: The CDE, mandated by the Madrid CSCE followup meeting, opened in Stockholm January 1984; round seven begins in September 1985. The CDE mandate calls for the conference to negotiate measures that are militarily significant, politically binding, verifiable, and applicable to the whole of Europe. The NATO countries have introduced a six-point proposal in Stockholm designed to address the causes of war--largely miscalculation and misinterpretation. In his May 8, 1985, speech to the European Parliament, President Reagan urged the conference to act promptly and agree on the concrete confidence-building measures proposed by the NATO countries. The US is willing to discuss Soviet interest in the principle of renunciation of force, if this would lead them to negotiate seriously on the specific measures to give effect to this principle.

Final Act 10th anniversary: On July 30, 1985, Secretary Shultz reaffirmed the US commitment to the goals of the Final Act and assessed the progress made in the CSCE process, including easier travel between countries by journalists and the reunification of some East European citizens with their families in the West.

He also noted the serious gap between hopes for what the Final Act would achieve and its actual results, such as the drastic reduction of Jewish emigration from the USSR, the persecution of groups established to monitor the compliance of governments with the Final Act, and the continued, forced exile of Andrei Sakharov.

In sum, the Secretary concluded, "Despite the real value of the Final Act as a standard of conduct, the most important promises of a decade ago have not been kept." He added, "My country and most other countries represented here remain committed to the goal of putting the program of the Final Act into practice in all of its provisions.... We must see progress in all areas. At next year's Vienna review conference, we will have a chance to measure that progress again."

EMIGRATION

During the 1970s, in an apparent effort to allow members of some disaffected groups to leave, promote detente, and win trade benefits from the West, the Soviet Union increased emigration in an unprecedented fashion, although the increase was limited primarily to three groups -- Jews, ethnic Germans, and Armenians. Emigration reached its peak in 1979, when over 62,000 Soviets emigrated (51,320 Jews). Since that time, the numbers have fallen drastically: to just over 2,000 (896 Jews) in 1984 and roughly 1200 (796 Jews) through September 1985.

Of particular interest to the United States are those Soviets who wish to join relatives in the U.S. We maintain three representation lists of Soviets denied permission to emigrate to the U.S.: American citizens, separated spouses, and divided families. These lists are presented periodically at high-level bilateral meetings.

There are 22 persons on our American citizens list. Notable cases include Abe Stolar, who has received exit permission but, understandably, will not leave until the Soviets grant exit visas to his entire family; Karo Chrovian, who left Cornell University in 1932 for a two-year engineering job in the Soviet Union and has now been trying to leave for over 50 years; and Vytautas Skuodis (AKA Ben Scott), who moved with his family in the 1930s to then independent Lithuania. Skuodis was sentenced to 12 years in 1980 for national and human rights work in Lithuania; the Soviets have routinely denied our requests for consular access to him. Another tragic case is that of Aaron Milman, who went to the USSR with his family in 1936. Although Aaron's father, Irving, finally managed to get back to the U.S. in 1977, Aaron and his family continue to be refused exit visas.

There are 23 cases on our list of American citizens separated from their Soviet spouses. Four cases have been successfully resolved this year, two within the last month. Anatoliy Michelson and his Soviet spouse, Galina Goltzman, have not seen each other for 29 years; Woodford McClellan and Irina McClellan have been separated for eleven. Sergey Petrov, who received a letter this year from President Reagan, has been separated since 1981 from his wife Virginia Johnson, and he was recently sentenced to 20 days in a labor camp. Amcit Elena Kusmenko has been permitted to visit her husband, Yuriy Balovlenkov only once, when he was on the first of two hunger strikes. Simon Levin and Tamara Tretyakova have been separated for seven years. He has not seen his son.

There are 136 families on our Divided Families list. One longtime case involves the sister of former Soviet Georgian human rights activist Valeriy Chalidze. Chalidze was a recent recipient of the MacArthur Award. In two other cases, Peter Jachno, a Korean War veteran, is separated from his wife and son in the Ukraine, and Alexander Kostomarov, a Baltimore resident who went on a prolonged hunger strike last fall, is separated from his wife and son in Leningrad.

SOVIET JEWRY

Jewish Emigration

Jewish emigration remains at the low level reached in 1984, when only 896 Jews emigrated (compared to 51,320 in the peak year of 1979). Figures through September 1985 (796) are equivalent to those through September 1984 (723). Barring a sudden Soviet change of heart at the end of the year, we expect 1985 figures to be at about the 1984 level. Three longterm refuseniks (waiting 12-15 years) were given exit visas during August-October; the numbers are too small to be encouraging, however. The Soviets often claim that all Jews who wish to leave have done so. We reject this claim, as we have hard information on over 3,000 families who have applied repeatedly to emigrate. Estimates of the number of Jews that would like to leave the Soviet Union range up to 440,000 (about 20% of all Soviet Jews).

Hebrew Teachers/Jewish Cultural Activists

Since July 1984 at least 16 Jewish cultural activists, including 9 Hebrew teachers, have been arrested in a campaign against the revival of Jewish culture in the USSR. The most recent arrest, that of Gorkiy Hebrew teacher Leonid Volvovskiy, occurred on June 24. To date, 14 of these men have been convicted, several on crudely trumped-up criminal charges specifically designed to discredit them. Two of the activists were savagely beaten following their arrests. One, Iosif Berenshtein, was almost completely blinded. We have also heard reports that Jewish activist Yuliy Edelshtein has been subjected to repeated beatings at the labor camp in Siberia where he is serving a three year sentence. The only positive news recently was the dropping of charges of malicious violation of camp rules against Simon Shnirman.

In addition to the arrests and beatings, many Jews have been fired from their jobs, have had their apartments searched, their phones disconnected and their mail seized. Articles have appeared in Soviet newspapers and programs on Soviet television branding Hebrew teachers and other Jewish cultural activists (often by name) as "Zionist" subversives. Zionism has been equated with Nazism and World War II Jewish leaders accused of helping the Nazis round up Jews for the death camps. Although Soviet authorities claim that their campaign is directed solely against those they label as Zionists, there is no doubt that repeated irresponsible charges like these can fan the ugly flames of anti-Semitism.

The Soviet Jews who are being singled out for persecution have in common a desire to be free to leave the Soviet Union for the country of their choice, to preserve their ethnic heritage, and to teach and learn their historic language. On June 14, the Department of State issued a press statement stressing that "the continuation of this campaign constitutes a real obstacle to the constructive relations with the Soviet Union that the United States seeks."