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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** EUROPEAN AND SOVIET AFFAIRS DIRECTORATE, NSC  
: RECORDS

**Withdrawer**  
MJD 4/27/2005

**File Folder** CHERNOBYL

**FOIA**  
F05-097

**Box Number** 90907 *RAC Box 8*

HARRIS, WILLIAM  
6

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
9126	REPORT	RE CHERNOBYL <i>D 8/31/2006 NLRRF05-097</i>	5	5/1/1986	B1 B3
9127	PAPER	RE CHERNOBYL DISASTER <i>PAR 8/31/2006 NLRRF05-097</i>	3	4/29/1986	B1 B3
9128	DRAFT CABLE	RE ACCIDENT <i>R 11/21/2007 NLRRF05-097</i>	2	ND	B1
9130	REPORT	RE CHERNOBYL ACCIDENT <i>PAR 8/31/2006 NLRRF05-097; UPHELD 6/16/2010 M08-125/1 #9130</i>	4	5/1/1986	B3
9131	CABLE	211527Z JUL 86 <i>R 11/21/2007 NLRRF05-097</i>	2	7/21/1986	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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NIO/USSR et al.  
29 April 1986

### IMPLICATIONS OF THE CHERNOBYL DISASTER

This is a very preliminary and tentative effort to scope out the implications of this disaster and related intelligence tasks.

Although it is by far the largest nuclear power plant accident in world history, the immediate effects are still far from clear.

If we accept Soviet official claims that two people died in the immediate event at the plant and the other three reactors were shut down, then the Soviets did use forewarning of a meltdown (possibly up to 24 hours) to evacuate the plant. But this is still very uncertain.

We have reports that evacuations in a 30 km radius are taking place. If these started well before the actual meltdown, immediate loss of life in the neighborhood may be quite small. But we also have rumors of hundreds, even thousands, of dead already, and of hospitals being heavily taxed. This suggests that only the plant took advantage of early warning. Again, very uncertain.

Long-term effects, resulting from radiation and associated ecological impact, are very difficult to predict on the basis our sparse current data, and will be influenced by variables such as weather and winds in the immediate future and Soviet protective measures.

Apparently the fire in the graphite of the reactor continues to inject new radioactive contaminants into the atmosphere.

#### Some Implications

The direct impact of the facility loss on the Soviet power economy is likely to be small. If the Soviets are obliged for safety reasons to shut down other reactors, it could have a noticeable impact.

Large economic impacts could well arise from:

The disruption of large areas downwind of the radiation source due to evacuations, shutdown of plants and facilities, and decontamination activities.

The impact of radiation on agriculture, especially the dairy industry.

Polution of water supplies, especially downstream on the Dniepr toward Kiev.

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BY CW NARA DATE 8/31/04

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The social impact of the accident will depend upon the number of casualties already suffered and expected over the longer term. Even if the number of people physically affected in the short run is small, the lingering public health effects of this kind of radiological event could magnify social impact.

A major concern of Soviet citizens will be how well their system looked out for their safety. And it will be of great importance to the regime to influence the way this is perceived, either by effective action or, as is the usual Soviet practice, by manipulating information.

The disaster could exacerbate ethnic and class resentments because, on present evidence, it seems likely that lower classes and Baltic and Ukrainian populations will suffer disproportionately.

If there is widespread death, illness, and dislocation, this event will be a severe psychological blow to the Gorbachev regime and its gospel of optimism, even if the economic effects are limited.

No matter what the regime does or says, many Soviets will blame their suffering on a negligent system which only looks out for the nomenklatura.

In a population where ancient superstitions still play a role, Chernobyl will be an evil omen.

In any case, the system under Gorbachev's new leadership will be put to a politically and psychologically important test:

Did it react with the honesty, efficiency, promptness, and public-mindedness he calls for?

Or did it manifest the usual sloth, carelessness, evasions, and outright lies?

Moscow will show a strong inclination to find prominent people to blame and punish. Shcherbitskiy, the Ukrainian party boss, is likely to come under renewed fire.

Although East European customers for Soviet electric power may face some disruptions and Soviet nuclear power plants are likely to lose their market for a while, the principal international effects of this event are likely to be political and psychological:

Governments and publics in both East and West Europe could be alienated in lasting ways by Soviet failure to provide any early warning, when something like three days were available. This will noticeably dull Soviet persuasiveness on all manner of negotiations, from arms control to trade, and their related propaganda efforts.

The accident will undoubtedly inspire the Green and other environmentally oriented political movements to new efforts directed against nuclear power.

If there are tangible environmental impacts in West Europe, such a rise in the rate of cancer deaths, these could linger as problems for Soviet diplomacy in the years ahead.

Some Intelligence Tasks

Our main tasks will be to assess the magnitude of this accident and to track the implications noted above and others that will surely develop, technical, economic, social, and political. In addition, we can already identify some other intelligence concerns.

The causes and phenomenology of this accident are of great interest simply because of the insight they will provide into nuclear safety and protective measures, a world-wide concern.

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Unless the Soviet government is uncharacteristically prompt and candid in disclosing information about this accident, US intelligence will be a principal source of data and analysis on it, to inform everything from US policy to world opinion. This is likely to impose some new kinds of pressure for declassifying otherwise sensitive information or for sharing it with foreign governments. This is something the world believes it has a need to know about in detail. The protection of sources and methods will not be recognized as a comparably important concern.



TC

MEMORANDUM

April 30, 1986

TO: OES/N - Mr. Devine  
FROM: L/N - Jonathan B. Schwartz *JBS*  
SUBJECT: Soviet Duty to Warn Neighbors

L has advised the Press Office this morning that customary international law requires the Soviet Union to notify other states of the possibility of transboundary effects of the incident and to furnish them with the information necessary to address these effects. (We have not identified any specific treaty binding upon the Soviet Union which imposes this requirement. However, we believe that state practice and environmental declarations evidence this as a principle of customary international law. This issue of "notice" should be kept distinct from the issue of "state responsibility" for environmental damage. At present, we are giving no guidance on the latter, very sensitive subject.)

cc: OES/NTC - Mr. Prochnik/Mr. Congdon  
L - Mr. Matheson  
L/OES - Mr. Colson/Ms. Kennedy  
L/EUR - Ms. West  
EUR/SOV - Mr. Bean ✓

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NLR # 85-091 #9128  
BY AL NARA DATE 11/21/07

3. BEGIN TEXT OF PRESIDENT'S ORAL MESSAGE:

-- WE WISH TO EXPRESS OUR DEEP REGRET OVER THE ACCIDENT AT THE CHERNOBYL ATOMIC ENERGY STATION. WE HOPE CASUALTIES AND MATERIAL DAMAGE ARE MINIMAL.

-- THE PRESIDENT HAS DIRECTED ME TO ASSURE YOU THAT THE UNITED STATES IS PREPARED TO MAKE AVAILABLE TO THE SOVIET UNION HUMANITARIAN AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE IN DEALING WITH THIS TRAGEDY.

-- WE COULD SEND IMMEDIATELY A PARTY OF SCIENTISTS FROM OUR NUCLEAR EMERGENCY SEARCH TEAM (NEST) WHO CAN ASSIST IN DETERMINING AND SUBSEQUENTLY COORDINATING THE BEST USE OF THE RESOURCES FROM THE UNITED STATES NUCLEAR SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION PROGRAMS.

-- THESE RESOURCES CAN ALSO BE MADE AVAILABLE AND INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING CAPABILITIES:

1. ATMOSPHERIC RELEASE ADVISORY CAPABILITY (ARAC) WHICH CAN PREDICT RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL DISPERSION BASED ON GEOGRAPHY, WEATHER, AND THE RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS RELEASED.

2. AERIAL MEASURING SYSTEM (AMS), A HELICOPTER-BORNE RADIOLOGICAL MEASUREMENT SYSTEM WHICH CAN MAP THE ACTUAL SPREAD OF RADIOACTIVE CONTAMINATION.

3. RADIOLOGICAL ASSISTANCE TEAMS INCLUDING HEALTH PHYSICISTS AND EQUIPMENT TO MEASURE RADIOACTIVE CONTAMINATION IN WATER, AIR, AND SOIL. ALSO, TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE IN ASSESSING THE ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS OF THE RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS RELEASED.

4. MEDICAL PERSONNEL EXPERIENCED IN THE DIAGNOSIS AND TREATMENT OF RADIATION EXPOSURE IN PEOPLE.

5. TECHNICAL EXPERTISE AND ASSISTANCE IN RADIOLOGICAL DECONTAMINATION, RECOVERY FROM A NUCLEAR REACTOR ACCIDENT, AND MINIMIZING ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS.

END TEXT.

4. BEGIN TEXT OF ADDITIONAL POINTS.

-- WE ARE OF COURSE CONCERNED ABOUT THE LEVELS OF RADIATION RELEASED AS A RESULT OF THE ACCIDENT. PRESS REPORTS INDICATE HIGHER THAN NORMAL RADIATION LEVELS AS FAR NORTH AS FINLAND.

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~~SECRET~~

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-- SINCE RADIOLOGICAL DAMAGE OR ACCIDENT ASSESSMENT  
ISSUES WITH INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS MAY RESULT, WE

WOULD APPRECIATE ANY ADDITIONAL DETAILS YOU CAN PROVIDE  
ON THE CHERNOBYL ACCIDENT. WHITEHEAD

\*\* END OF CABLE \*\*

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~~Matlock~~  
DRC 43-86  
May 1986



## Defense Research Comment

NOFORN/WNINTEL

~~File &  
Chernobyl~~

### The Chernobyl Accident: Implications for Soviet Domestic and Foreign Policies (U)

~~(C)~~ The Soviet leadership's effort to suppress information about the Chernobyl Nuclear Powerplant accident has had serious repercussions both at home and abroad. The Kremlin's shift from minimal media coverage to an aggressive propaganda campaign likely will minimize domestic political damage. In Eastern Europe, the accident probably will intensify popular anti-Soviet sentiment, but it is unlikely to have long-term political impact on Soviet relations with its Warsaw Pact allies. Nevertheless, the Chernobyl disaster does represent a temporary setback for Gorbachev's East-West strategy because it tarnishes the image he has attempted to project as a representative of a new generation of responsible Soviet leaders.

#### The Political Price of Censorship

~~(C)~~ The 26 April accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Powerplant represents an important test of the Gorbachev leadership. The accident (which took place near the Ukrainian capital of Kiev) occurred at a time when party chief Gorbachev was propounding a more "open" information policy. The Soviet media always have been used as a political instrument to advance party goals. The Kremlin routinely has suppressed news thought to be embarrassing to the regime. While the party leadership has gained from this policy in terms of political control, it also has paid a price in loss of credibility. To enhance the effectiveness of the media as an instrument of Soviet policy, the Gorbachev leadership has fostered an image of "openness" through more detailed, but still carefully controlled, reporting of news at home and more sophisticated propaganda campaigns abroad. However, there have been clear and continuing signals that this policy has been controversial. Gorbachev, personally identified with the policy of "openness," has acknowledged publicly that not all members of the leadership approve of the new approach.

#### Initial News Blackout

~~(C)~~ Moscow's immediate reaction to the Chernobyl accident was to impose a news blackout, the traditional Soviet way of handling potentially embarrassing news. An official Soviet statement — a terse five-line acknowledgment of the accident — did not appear until 28 April, 2 days after the reactor explosion. Over the next several days, Soviet authorities continued to downplay the harmful effects of the accident. Brief government bulletins on the disaster, released every day or so, claimed that the situation had been brought under control — an assertion later contradicted by Soviet authorities themselves, who acknowledged that the crisis was not surmounted until nearly 2 weeks after the explosion. During this period, Soviet media concentrated on attacking Western press and government statements, charging the West with exaggerating the seriousness of the accident and attempting to exploit it for anti-Soviet purposes.

~~(C)~~ Moscow's suppression of information about the accident provoked a storm of international criticism, particularly from those

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European countries most seriously affected by radiation. The misleading media coverage also reinforced growing public anxiety at home, especially in the Ukraine, where Soviets with access to Western news were aware that their leaders deliberately were downplaying the scope of the accident.

### Moscow Counterattacks

(C) In order to counter Western accusations that the Soviets were suppressing information on Chernobyl, the Kremlin belatedly shifted to a more aggressive public relations campaign. Moscow invited Hans Blix, Director of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), to observe Soviet countermeasures first hand. On 2 May, in a move clearly intended to convince the Soviet populace of high-level party concern for those affected by the accident, Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers Nikolay Ryzhkov and Party Secretary Yegor Ligachev toured the Chernobyl area and visited the evacuees. At the same time, Moscow expanded its attack on Western media treatment of the event.

(C) On 6 May, Kremlin efforts to overcome the negative impact of the accident went into high gear. The chairman of the government commission investigating the accident and several other high-level officials held a press conference and denied Western charges that the Soviets had something to hide at Chernobyl. On 8 and 9 May, Soviet authorities organized a tour of the Kiev area for foreign journalists, who were briefed on the Chernobyl situation by Ukrainian officials. On 13 May, Soviet authorities, headed by investigation commission chairman Boris Shcherbina, provided a briefing to Western ambassadors on the situation.

(S/NF/WN) At the same time, the Soviet domestic media expanded coverage of the Chernobyl events. At the 8 May Politburo meeting, the leadership announced a series of measures to provide emergency assistance to evacuees. These moves also were designed to counter Western media charges of leadership callousness toward the victims of the accident. Kremlin spokesmen continued to make misleading

claims about the progress of recovery activities. On 8 May, the Soviets announced that the fire was out. In reality, the reactor continued to burn through the 11th, 2 weeks after the explosion.

(C) On 14 May, over 2 weeks after the reactor explosion, Gorbachev went on television to discuss the accident. His speech had at least four objectives:

- To repair damage to Soviet prestige caused by early stonewalling on the accident.
- To bolster his own domestic image by presenting himself as a strong and effective leader during a crisis.
- To convey to both the Soviet populace and the West the party leadership's concern for public safety.
- To reassure both audiences that the situation was under control and steps would be taken to preclude a repetition of the disaster.

The timing of the speech may have reflected both the Kremlin's assessment that the worst of the crisis had passed and Gorbachev's determination that he would not suffer politically from being publicly associated with the crisis.

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(U) On 14 May, Soviet Communist Party Chief Gorbachev delivered his first public statement on Chernobyl, 18 days after the accident.

### Domestic Implications

~~(C)~~ The initial Soviet handling of the accident has been at most only temporarily damaging to Gorbachev's domestic policies. There are indications, both from the IAEA chief who toured the reactor site and from Soviet engineers familiar with the accident, that the control, rescue, and evacuation efforts were badly mismanaged, particularly immediately after the accident occurred. Many of the rescue crews, fire fighters, and engineers were exposed needlessly to high levels of radiation, and evacuation of surrounding areas was delayed. It is doubtful, however, that these mistakes will reflect directly on Gorbachev; rather, scapegoats will be selected from among lower-level officials. In this connection, three local party officials were disciplined for their inept handling of the initial evacuation.

~~(C)~~ Gorbachev has identified himself personally with the policy of "openness" in news reporting. Consequently, the Kremlin's failure to apply the policy to the events in Chernobyl may reflect negatively on his leadership abilities. Similarly, some members of the Soviet political elite may blame Gorbachev for the negative international reaction to the accident. Both of these developments could undermine his authority and hinder his consolidation of political power.

~~(C)~~ On the other hand, the shift to a more aggressive propaganda campaign has proven to be fairly effective in containing domestic criticism and reassuring the Soviet people. In addition, the Soviet media have capitalized on the disaster by dramatizing Soviet solidarity and patriotism in the face of adversity, with bedside interviews of injured firemen and TV clips of grateful evacuees. The incident also provides Gorbachev with some political opportunities. He may be able to exploit the situation to purge or isolate those within the political elite that have opposed his "openness" policy. He also may use it to justify removal of two Brezhnev-era holdovers: Ukrainian party chief Vladimir Shcherbitskiy and Vladimir Dolgikh, the CC Secretary in charge of energy issues.

### Impact on the Warsaw Pact

~~(C)~~ Although the Chernobyl accident will feed historical anti-Soviet sentiment within certain East European countries, it is unlikely to have any long-term political impact on the Soviet Union's relations with Eastern Europe. Party-to-party and state-to-state relations in the Warsaw Pact are based on a calculus of power which is largely unaffected by events of this sort. Any resentment that East European officials may feel about the Soviets' failure to provide timely and accurate information about the accident will be tempered by the knowledge that protest will only further heighten Soviet sensitivities already aggravated by Western criticism of Moscow's secretiveness. In general, all the East European regimes have reassured their populations that they are not in danger from the reactor accident and that levels of radiation are being monitored to detect any possible health hazards. Warsaw has taken the most direct action so far to limit contamination and to keep the public informed. The other regimes have taken a more low-key approach and uniformly have downplayed the threat to public health.

### Foreign Policy Setback

~~(C)~~ While Gorbachev has proven more adept than his immediate predecessors at projecting to the West an image of reasonableness, the Chernobyl disaster represents at least a temporary foreign policy setback. The goal of this policy is to split the US from its NATO allies, and thereby pressure the US to be more receptive to Soviet arms proposals. The Soviets' initial silence on Chernobyl, as well as their subsequent lack of candor, undercut this strategy and dealt a blow to Gorbachev's efforts to present himself as representative of a new generation of responsible Soviet leaders.

~~(C)~~ The Soviet leadership has adopted several public relations measures to reestablish the image of openness and thereby neutralize the negative international reaction. These have included a Kremlin-sponsored tour of Kiev by foreign newsmen, an unusual appearance

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before the US Congress by a second secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Washington, a briefing of Western diplomats in Moscow by top-level Soviet officials overseeing the Chernobyl cleanup, and a Moscow press conference by a US physician assisting in treatment of the radiation victims.

~~(C)~~ Gorbachev's 14 May address on Chernobyl was a key part of this strategy. He continued the Soviet attack on the "unrestrained anti-Soviet campaign" by the West as a means of deflecting world attention away from the Kremlin's unwillingness to provide timely and detailed information on the domestic and foreign effects of the accident. He stated that the Soviets were willing to share information on the accident, stressed Soviet cooperation with the IAEA, and proposed an expanded role for the IAEA and other United Nations organizations in ensuring the safe development of peaceful nuclear power.

~~(C)~~ In addition, Gorbachev has attempted to use the accident to give new impetus to his arms control campaign. During his national address, he pointed to the greater threat posed by nuclear armaments. He announced an extension of the unilateral Soviet moratorium on nuclear tests until 6 August, the anniversary of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima. He also restated his proposal to President Reagan to




meet "without delay" in any European capital, or (in a gratuitous twist) in Hiroshima, to agree on a ban on all nuclear testing.

~~(C)~~ Concurrently, the Soviet START delegation in Geneva requested a special meeting with the US delegation on 15 May during which a new draft Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty was presented. This proposal, however, reflects only a formal repackaging of the INF portions of Gorbachev's January arms control proposal. Despite Kremlin efforts to divert world opinion, these efforts probably will fail to dissipate the adverse international reaction to Chernobyl.

#### Outlook

~~(C)~~ In the coming weeks, Gorbachev is likely to escalate his efforts to counteract the negative reaction to Chernobyl. He will continue to bank on the West's historic short-term memory of Soviet behavior. Additional media events designed to focus on arms control issues also will be staged to deflect international attention from the accident. At home, Soviet media will continue to focus on the human-interest aspects of the cleanup effort.

*Defense Intelligence Agency  
Soviet/Warsaw Pact Division  
Directorate for Research*

Questions and comments may be addressed to  
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*File: Chernobyl*

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
SECRETARIAT

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M/MED FOR DR. BRODINE  
PASS ELECTRICALLY AGRICULTURE FOR FAS/OICD

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: KSCA, TRGY, AMED, CASC, UR  
SUBJECT: POLITBURO STATEMENT ON CHERNOBYL: THE AX  
- FALLS AT LAST

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THE POLITBURO STATEMENT ON CHERNOBYL, PUBLISHED JULY 20, RAISES SEVERAL IMPORTANT QUESTIONS, AND LEAVES MOST OF THEM UNANSWERED:

3. CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT: ACCORDING TO THE STATEMENT, THE ACCIDENT OCCURRED DURING A TURBOGENERATOR EXPERIMENT WHICH TOOK PLACE DURING A PLANNED SHUTDOWN FOR SCHEDULED REPAIRS. IF THIS EXPERIMENT REALLY WAS THE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT, IT WILL BE IMPORTANT TO KNOW JUST WHAT THE EXPERIMENT INVOLVED AND HOW IT WENT WRONG TO UNDERSTAND HOW TO PREVENT A RECURRENCE, AND TO KNOW WHETHER RBMK REACTORS ALONE ARE SUSCEPTIBLE TO SUCH ACCIDENTS. THE STATEMENT CONTAINS NO SUCH DETAILS.

4. DAMAGES: THE REPORT CLAIMS THAT 28 PERSONS HAVE NOW DIED AS A RESULT OF THE ACCIDENT, THAT "SEVERAL HUNDRED THOUSAND" PEOPLE WERE GIVEN MEDICAL EXAMS, THAT 203 SUFFERED RADIATION SICKNESS, AND THAT 30 ARE STILL INSTITUTIONALIZED. "DIRECT LOSSES" FROM THE ACCIDENT ARE PUT AT 2 BILLION RUBLES; 400 MILLION RUBLES HAVE BEEN "DONATED" BY SOVIET CITIZENS TO THE RELIEF FUND. THE STATEMENT ALSO NOTES THAT OVER 700,000 SQUARE METERS OF HOUSING MUST BE BUILT "JUST FOR RURAL RESIDENTS." IT SAYS ABOUT ONE THOUSAND SQUARE KILOMETERS OF LAND AROUND THE REACTOR SITE ARE CONTAMINATED. WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THE CASUALTY FIGURES ARE HIGHER THAN THE SOVIETS ARE LETTING ON. WE ALSO NOTE THAT SINCE MOST

5. FIRINGS: YEVGENIY V. KULOV, CHAIRMAN OF THE STATE COMMITTEE FOR SAFETY IN THE ATOMIC POWER INDUSTRY, AND (FNU) MESHKOV OF THE MINISTRY OF MEDIUM MACHINE BUILDING, WERE DISMISSED. ALTHOUGH THE MINISTER OF POWER AND ELECTRIFICATION (MINENERGO), ANATOLIY I. MAYORETS, WAS SPARED -- HE DREW A CENSURE, GIVEN HIS SHORT TERM IN THIS OFFICE -- HIS DEPUTY, GENNADIY A. SHASHARIN, WAS ALSO FIRED. THIS IS THE FIRST PUBLIC MENTION WE HAVE SEEN OF EITHER THE MINISTRY OF MEDIUM MACHINE BUILDING OR MINENERGO, WHICH SUPPOSEDLY RUNS THE CHERNOBYL AES, DURING THE CRISIS. WE ALSO FIND SIGNIFICANT THE FIRING OF IVAN Y. YEMEL'YANOV, WHO WAS THE DESIGNER OF THE RBMK REACTOR. SOME WESTERN NEWS REPORTS HAVE INTERPRETED THE FIRINGS AS A SOVIET ATTEMPT TO BLAME PEOPLE, RATHER THAN TECHNOLOGY; BUT TO FIRE THE DESIGNER OF THE RBMK (WHICH IS WIDELY USED IN THE USSR), ESPECIALLY WHEN YEMEL'YANOV WAS SO INVOLVED IN THE PUBLIC RELATIONS CAMPAIGN WHICH FOLLOWED THE ACCIDENT, MAY INDICATE SERIOUS TECHNOLOGY PROBLEMS.

6. WE ALSO NOTE THAT WHEN THE AX FINALLY FELL, IT FELL AT THE CENTER AND NOT AT THE REPUBLICAN LEVEL. IF NOTHING ELSE, THIS WOULD SEEM TO INDICATE THAT UKRAINIAN FIRST SECRETARY AND POLITBURO MEMBER SHCHERBITSKIY'S POSITION IS STILL VERY STRONG.

7. NEW MINISTRY: THE STATEMENT ANNOUNCES THE CREATION OF A MINISTRY OF ATOMIC ENERGY. WHAT DOES THIS MEAN FOR THE STATE COMMITTEE ON UTILIZATION OF ATOMIC ENERGY, THE STATE COMMITTEE FOR SAFETY IN THE ATOMIC POWER INDUSTRY, MINENERGO, THE MINISTRY OF MEDIUM MACHINE BUILDING, AND OTHERS?

8. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION: THE STATEMENT CALLS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF "A NEW GENERATION" OF NUCLEAR FISSION REACTOR, AND FOR STEPPED-UP INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN DEVELOPING THERMONUCLEAR FUSION. WE MAY SEE THE EFFECTS OF THIS NOT ONLY AT THE IAEA IN AUGUST AND SEPTEMBER, BUT AT THE US-USSR ATOMIC ENERGY AGREEMENT JOINT COMMISSION MEETING IN AUGUST, AND IN INCREASED SOVIET PRESSURE TO INCREASE COOPERATION IN THE FUSION AREA, BUILDING, IN PARTICULAR, ON THE REAGAN-BT

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F05-097 #9131

BY CN NARA DATE 11/21/07

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
SECRETARIAT

PAGE 01  
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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 MOSCOW 12423

PASS EPA  
S/NP FOR AMBASSADOR KENNEDY  
M/MED FOR DR. BRODINE  
PASS ELECTRICALLY AGRICULTURE FOR FAS/OICD

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: KSCA, TRGY, AMED, CASC, UR  
SUBJECT: POLITBURO STATEMENT ON CHERNOBYL: THE AX  
GORBACHEV FUSION STATEMENT IN GENEVA.

9. THE STATEMENT ALSO CALLS FOR INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION TO PREVENT NUCLEAR TERRORISM, BUT ADDS A LINE ABOUT PREVENTING THE TARGETING OF NUCLEAR REACTORS FOR DESTRUCTION AS A RESULT OF MILITARY ACTION. THIS MAY REFER TO ISRAEL'S ATTACK ON THE IRAQI REACTOR IN 1981, OR IT MAY BE SOMETHING NEW. WE SHALL BE WATCHING FOR FURTHER INDICATIONS OR STATEMENTS ALONG THIS LINE.

10. WE RECALL THAT IN 1983, AFTER THE KAL SHOOTDOWN, THE SOVIETS ATTEMPTED TO PAWN OFF AT THE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION IN MONTREAL A COLLECTION OF THEIR VARIOUS PRESS STATEMENTS AND PROPAGANDA ASSERTIONS AS "EVIDENCE" OR AS THE RESULTS OF THEIR OWN INVESTIGATION OF THE INCIDENT. IF THE SOVIETS TAKE THE SAME TACK THIS TIME AND PRESENT TO THE IAEA IN VIENNA NOTHING MORE THAN A JAZZED-UP VERSION OF THE JULY 20 POLITBURO STATEMENT, OUR GUESS IS THAT SUCH AN APPROACH WILL DO LITTLE TO SATISFY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY'S DESIRE FOR A FULL ACCOUNTING OF THE ACCIDENT, AND THAT CHERNOBYL' WILL BECOME AN EVEN BIGGER BLOT IN THE SOVIET COPYBOOK. HARTMAN  
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

August 8, 1986

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RODNEY B. McDANIEL

FROM: PAULA DOBRIANSKY <sup>TD</sup>SUBJECT: Response to Ukrainian American Bar Association  
re Chernobyl

Attached at Tab I for your signature is a memorandum for Sally Kelley noting NSC concurrence with the State Department's suggested response to Bohdan A. Futey, President of the Ukrainian American Bar Association, re Chernobyl.

<sup>N/A</sup>  
Gerald May concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

## Attachments

Tab I	McDaniel/Kelley Memo
Tab A	Suggested Response
Tab B	Incoming



MEMORANDUM FOR SALLY KELLEY

FROM: RODNEY B. McDANIEL

SUBJECT: Response to Ukrainian American Bar Association  
re Chernobyl

NSC concurs with the State Department's suggested response to Bohdan A. Futey, President, Ukrainian American Bar Association, re Chernobyl.

Attachment

Tab A Suggested Response  
Tab B Incoming

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
Suggested Reply

Dear Mr. Futey:

President Reagan has asked me to thank you and the Ukrainian American Bar Association for the concern expressed in your recently passed resolution regarding the tragedy at Chernobyl.

We share your concern for the victims of the disaster and have reiterated to the Soviet authorities on several occasions that the President's offer of technical and humanitarian assistance remains open.

We also are aware of the difficulties U.S. relatives of the victims have experienced in trying to communicate with their families. We have urged the Soviets to make every effort, in accordance with their obligations under the Helsinki Final Act, to facilitate communications between those in the affected areas and their relatives outside the Soviet Union.

We have appealed to the Soviet Union, on the basis of international humanitarian values, to facilitate the provision of food and medical relief from abroad, including supplies from

Mr. Bohdan A. Futey,  
President,

Ukrainian American Bar Association,  
Post Office Box 11332,  
Cleveland Park Station,  
Washington, D.C.

private American groups and individuals. The Soviets have expressed appreciation for our offers but have indicated that they consider their resources sufficient to handle the problem. Given the apparent Soviet desire to restrict Western--and particularly U.S. Government--involvement in Chernobyl recovery efforts, offers of medical assistance tendered by private sources seem to be the most effective means of aiding the most seriously affected victims.

In closing, may I assure you that President Reagan is determined to pursue every opportunity to cooperate in bilateral and multilateral relief efforts aimed at helping the victims of the Chernobyl accident.

Sincerely,

581

**UNCLASSIFIED**  
(Classification)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT  
TRANSMITTAL FORM

S/S # 8623060

Date: August 7, 1986

FOR: VADM JOHN M. POINDEXTER  
National Security Council  
The White House

Reference:

To: The President From: Mr. Bohdan A. Futey  
Date: June 3, 1986 Subject: Resolution of concern  
regarding the tragedy at Chernobyl, Ukraine.  
WH Referral Dated: July 25, 1986 NSC ID# 432453  
(if any)

\_\_\_\_\_ The attached item was sent directly to the  
Department of State

Action Taken:

XX A draft reply is attached.  
\_\_\_\_\_ A draft reply will be forwarded.  
\_\_\_\_\_ A translation is attached.  
\_\_\_\_\_ An information copy of a direct reply is attached.  
\_\_\_\_\_ We believe no response is necessary for the reason  
cited below.  
\_\_\_\_\_ The Department of State has no objection to the  
proposed travel.  
\_\_\_\_\_ Other.

Remarks:

*mscohey, for*  
Nicholas Platt  
Executive Secretary

**UNCLASSIFIED**  
(Classification)

## T H E   W H I T E   H O U S E   O F F I C E

## REFERRAL

JULY 25, 1986

TO: DEPARTMENT OF STATE

## ACTION REQUESTED:

DRAFT REPLY FOR SIGNATURE OF:  
WHITE HOUSE STAFF MEMBER

## DESCRIPTION OF INCOMING:

ID: 432453

MEDIA: LETTER, DATED JUNE 3, 1986

TO: PRESIDENT REAGAN

FROM: MR. BOHDAN A. FUTEY  
PRESIDENT  
UKRAINIAN AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION  
POST OFFICE BOX 11332  
CLEVELAND PARK STATION  
WASHINGTON DC 20008SUBJECT: UKRAINIAN AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION WRITES  
ABOUT RESOLUTION ON CHERNOBYL AND REQUESTS  
MEETING WITH PRESIDENTPROMPT ACTION IS ESSENTIAL -- IF REQUIRED ACTION HAS NOT BEEN  
TAKEN WITHIN 9 WORKING DAYS OF RECEIPT, PLEASE TELEPHONE THE  
UNDERSIGNED AT 456-7486.RETURN CORRESPONDENCE, WORKSHEET AND COPY OF RESPONSE  
(OR DRAFT) TO:  
AGENCY LIAISON, ROOM 91, THE WHITE HOUSE, 20500SALLY KELLEY  
DIRECTOR OF AGENCY LIAISON  
PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE

AF

WHITE HOUSE  
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

8623060

- O - OUTGOING
- H - INTERNAL
- I - INCOMING

Date Correspondence Received (YY/MM/DD) 1/1

Name of Correspondent: Bohdan A. Futey

MI Mail Report User Codes: (A) \_\_\_\_\_ (B) \_\_\_\_\_ (C) \_\_\_\_\_

Subject: UKRAINIAN AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION WRITES ABOUT RESOLUTION ON CHERNOBYL & REQUESTS MEETING W/ PRESIDENT

ROUTE TO:

ACTION

DISPOSITION

Office/Agency (Staff Name)	Action Code	Tracking Date YY/MM/DD	Type of Response	Code	Completion Date YY/MM/DD
<u>OPC L-KOJELIS</u>	<u>ORIGINATOR</u>	<u>86107102</u>		<u>C</u>	<u>86107102</u>
<u>STATE</u>	<u>D</u>	<u>86107125</u>			<u>1/1</u>
		<u>1/1</u>			<u>1/1</u>
		<u>1/1</u>			<u>1/1</u>
		<u>1/1</u>			<u>1/1</u>

ACTION CODES:

- A - Appropriate Action
- C - Comment/Recommendation
- D - Draft Response
- F - Furnish Fact Sheet to be used as Enclosure

- I - Info Copy Only/No Action Necessary
- R - Direct Reply w/Copy
- S - For Signature
- X - Interim Reply

DISPOSITION CODES:

- A - Answered
- B - Non-Special Referral
- C - Completed
- S - Suspended

FOR OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE:

- Type of Response = Initials of Signer
- Code = "A"
- Completion Date = Date of Outgoing

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

Keep this worksheet attached to the original incoming letter.  
Send all routing updates to Central Reference (Room 75, OEOB).  
Always return completed correspondence record to Central Files.  
Refer questions about the correspondence tracking system to Central Reference, ext. 2590.

# RECORDS MANAGEMENT ONLY

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 \_\_\_\_\_

## PRESIDENTIAL REPLY

Code	Date	Comment	Form
C	_____	Time: _____	P- _____
DSP	_____	Time: _____	Media: _____

**SIGNATURE CODES:**

**CPn - Presidential Correspondence**  
 n - 0 - Unknown  
 n - 1 - Ronald Wilson Reagan  
 n - 2 - Ronald Reagan  
 n - 3 - Ron  
 n - 4 - Dutch  
 n - 5 - Ron Reagan  
 n - 6 - Ronald  
 n - 7 - Ronnie

**CLn - First Lady's Correspondence**  
 n - 0 - Unknown  
 n - 1 - Nancy Reagan  
 n - 2 - Nancy  
 n - 3 - Mrs. Ronald Reagan

**CBn - Presidential & First Lady's Correspondence**  
 n - 1 - Ronald Reagan - Nancy Reagan  
 n - 2 - Ron - Nancy

**MEDIA CODES:**

B - Box/package  
 C - Copy  
 D - Official document  
 G - Message  
 H - Handcarried  
 L - Letter  
 M - Mailgram  
 O - Memo  
 P - Photo  
 R - Report  
 S - Sealed  
 T - Telegram  
 V - Telephone  
 X - Miscellaneous  
 Y - Study

# Ukrainian American Bar Association

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P.O. Box 11332, Cleveland Park Station, Washington, D.C. 20008

3 June 1986

The Honorable  
Ronald Reagan  
President of the United States  
The White House  
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President,

The Ukrainian American Bar Association, at its mid-year meeting May 23 - 25, 1986 in Philadelphia, passed a resolution of concern regarding the recent tragedy in Chernobyl, Ukraine. We are enclosing a copy of this resolution for the information of your office and staff.

In view of the everpresent uncertainty of the situation in Ukraine and the eagerness of the Ukrainian American community to assist, we respectfully await a response to meet with you, Mr. President, as soon as possible.

Sincerely,



Bohdan A. Futey  
President, UABA

Enclosure

BCC: Linas Kojelis



# Ukrainian American Bar Association

STATEMENT OF THE UKRAINIAN AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION

ON THE CHERNOBYL DISASTER

May 24, 1986

On or about April 26, 1986, the largest civilian nuclear disaster in history occurred in Chernobyl, Ukraine. The government of the Soviet Union remained silent and did not admit the occurrence of this human tragedy nor meet the immediate needs of the Ukrainian people until western governments who became concerned by the dramatic increase of radioactivity within their borders forced Soviet disclosure. Even to this day, the amount of information given by Moscow has been woefully inadequate.

In view of the unprecedented magnitude of this disaster for the international community and the Ukrainian community in particular, the Ukrainian American Bar Association demands of the Soviet Union the following:

1. That the U.S.S.R. comply with the provisions of Basket III of the Helsinki Final Acts and permit Ukrainian-Americans to communicate directly with their families and friends in Ukraine in order to locate and determine the status of their health and well-being;

2. That the Soviet Union suspend its ban on postal transfer from the west of medicines and dry goods. Moreover, in order to facilitate divided families in the west in their attempts to aid their relatives within Ukraine, we demand that the Soviet Union repeal its tariff impositions upon Ukrainians within the Ukrainian S.S.R. which make the sending of parcels literally impossible;

3. The U.A.B.A. endorses and supports in its totality the resolution of the Ukrainian Medical Association of North America in reference to the Chernobyl disaster and in particular its call for the establishment of an international Red Cross station in Kiev and full scientific disclosure of the effects of the disaster and genetic counseling for survivors and their offspring.

4. The failure of the Soviet government to meet the self-evident humanitarian needs and its international commitments further underscores the historic disregard by that government of its fundamental responsibilities to the Ukrainian people and the world community at large.

We note with regret that Chernobyl is merely the most recent of disasters that have befallen the Ukrainian people. In this century the Soviet made famine of the 1930's and the devastation of World War II are still fresh within our memories. The Soviet government's silence on these disasters (man-made and otherwise) is evidence of the international media isolation in which the Ukrainian people find themselves.

We applaud western media coverage and interest in the Chernobyl disaster and urge its continuation to prevent the silencing of another Ukrainian holocaust.

Unanimously approved, Mid-year Meeting, May 24, 1986.

*Chairman*  
*John H. Paton*  
*Walter C. [unclear]*

*Robert A. Fitey, Pres.*  
*Daria M. Stec, Secretary*