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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

*Dobunsky*  
1710 FILE  
*Stoessel / Kampelman  
Soviet Mission  
Human Rights*

March 18, 1985

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR NICHOLAS PLATT  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

SUBJECT: Ambassadors Kampelman/Stoessel Recommendations  
on U.S. Policy and Soviet Human Rights (C)

The President has reviewed and concurs with the recommendations for U.S. policy on Soviet human rights set forth by Ambassadors Max Kampelman and Walter Stoessel. Specifically, these include: the continuation and intensification of broadly-based foreign policy efforts to engage our friends and Allies in multilateral actions for improved Soviet human rights performance; the development of parliamentary networks; the encouragement of private sector efforts to enhance public/private awareness of Soviet human rights violations; the coordination of common efforts with our Allies; and the improvement of information-sharing among our Allies in Moscow embassies. (C)

We believe that these steps will broaden the scope of our previous consultations in Europe, will keep the matter of Soviet human rights violations in the forefront of European thinking and will provide us with timely opportunities to enlist further the help of the West Europeans in devising a common human rights policy. (C)

*Robert M. Kimmitt*  
Robert M. Kimmitt  
Executive Secretary

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority *NSC Waiver*  
BY *JN* NARA DATE *3/20/2019*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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MEMORANDUM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1710

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

FILE  
DOBRIANSKY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

March 18, 1985

ACTION

DECLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Authority NSC/DOS Waiver  
BY JN NARA DATE 3/20/19

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE *RM*

SUBJECT: Ambassadors Kampelman/Stoessel Recommendations on U.S. Policy and Soviet Human Rights

Issue

Results and recommendations of Presidential mission on Soviet human rights performance.

Facts

In 1983 and 1984, Ambassadors Walter Stoessel and Max Kampelman led delegations which you designated as Presidential missions to fifteen European countries to consult on the implications of continued deterioration in Soviet human rights performance.

Discussion

In general, they found that West European leaders agree with us that the systematic pattern of Soviet human rights violations is a long-term obstacle to improved East-West relations and that it is in the West's interest to foster change. However, U.S.-European differences exist on how to achieve improved Soviet human rights performance. Europeans prefer private diplomacy whereas we favor a mixture of private overtures and public pressure. European leaders are also more concerned about the potential for Western criticism of Soviet human rights abuses to disrupt East-West dialogue, and are reluctant to assign a significant coordinating role in human rights to NATO.

Based on their extensive consultations and awareness of U.S.-European differences, Ambassadors Kampelman and Stoessel have posed the following five recommendations for U.S. human rights policy:

- Continue efforts to engage our Allies and friends in common actions for improved Soviet human rights performance.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

cc Vice President



- Develop parliamentary networks to foster Soviet respect for human rights.
- Encourage private sector efforts to enhance public and private awareness of Soviet human rights violations.
- Continue to work with our Allies to coordinate common efforts on Soviet human rights issues.
- Enhance coordination and information sharing among our Allies in Moscow embassies.

The results and recommendations of the Presidential mission are consistent with our current policy. State intends to pursue this recommended course of action in NATO fora, in bilateral discussions with our friends and Allies in Europe and in connection with the CSCE Human Rights Experts Meeting in Ottawa, April 23 through June 17, 1985.

I concur with the recommendations set forth. They will facilitate concrete efforts which will broaden the scope of our previous consultations in Europe, will keep the matter of Soviet human rights violations in the forefront of European thinking and will provide us with more timely opportunities to enlist the help of the West Europeans in devising a common human rights policy.

RECOMMENDATION

OK      No  
*DR*      \_\_\_\_\_

That you approve implementation of the proposed recommendations.

Prepared by:  
 Paula Dobriansky

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1710

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 18, 1985

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR NICHOLAS PLATT  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

SUBJECT: Ambassadors Kampelman/Stoessel Recommendations  
on U.S. Policy and Soviet Human Rights (C)

The President has reviewed and concurs with the recommendations for U.S. policy on Soviet human rights set forth by Ambassadors Max Kampelman and Walter Stoessel. Specifically, these include: the continuation and intensification of broadly-based foreign policy efforts to engage our friends and Allies in multilateral actions for improved Soviet human rights performance; the development of parliamentary networks; the encouragement of private sector efforts to enhance public/private awareness of Soviet human rights violations; the coordination of common efforts with our Allies; and the improvement of information-sharing among our Allies in Moscow embassies. (C)

We believe that these steps will broaden the scope of our previous consultations in Europe, will keep the matter of Soviet human rights violations in the forefront of European thinking and will provide us with timely opportunities to enlist further the help of the West Europeans in devising a common human rights policy. (C)

*Robert M. Kimmitt*  
Robert M. Kimmitt  
Executive Secretary

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Authority *NSC* *waiver*  
BY *JN* NARA DATE *3/20/2019*

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1710

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

March 8, 1985

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SIGNED

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: PAULA J. DOBRIANSKY <sup>PD</sup>

SUBJECT: Ambassadors Kampelman/Stoessel Recommendations on U.S. Policy and Soviet Human Rights

State has forwarded a memorandum to the President from Ambassadors Max Kampelman and Walter Stoessel concerning their participation in 1983-84 Presidential missions to Europe to discuss Soviet human rights performance (Tab ~~IV~~). Based on their extensive consultations in Europe, the memorandum provides an overview of European perceptions on human rights issues and sets forth five recommendations for U.S. policy.

The Kampelman and Stoessel missions have bolstered multilateral efforts to press for improved Soviet human rights performance. In fact, some recent positive multilateral developments include: Allied coordination in preparing for the Ottawa meeting has been excellent; the Council of Europe will be holding its first ministerial level meeting on human rights in Vienna on March 19-20, and the North Atlantic Assembly passed a resolution urging greater attention to human rights compliance and increased parliamentary involvement in the CSCE process.

At Tab I is a memorandum from you to the President summarizing and forwarding the Kampelman/Stoessel memorandum; at Tab ~~III~~ is a memorandum from Kimmitt to State indicating our concurrence with the proposed recommendations.

<sup>for</sup> Matlock, <sup>AS</sup> Sommer, <sup>we</sup> Raymond and <sup>Steve</sup> Steiner concur.

RECOMMENDATION

- 1. That you sign and forward the memorandum at Tab I.

Approve  Disapprove

- 2. That you authorize Bob Kimmitt to sign and dispatch the memorandum at Tab ~~III~~

Approve  Disapprove

Attachments

- Tab I - McFarlane Memo to the President
- Tab ~~II~~ - Platt Memo to McFarlane of March 2, 1985
- Tab ~~III~~ - Kimmitt Memo to Platt

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BY JN NARA DATE 3/20/19

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3/20/19

Log Number 1710

Date 18 MAR 1985

Subject: US POLICY & USSR HUMAN RIGHTS

DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION:  TOP SECRET  SECRET  CONFIDENTIAL  UNCLASSIFIED

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_____ Mr. Kimmitt	_____ [REDACTED]	_____ Mr. Mahley	_____ Col. Rye	_____ Cmdr. Thompson
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_____ Mr. Covey	_____ Mr. C. Lehman	_____ Mr. Raymond	_____ Cmdr. Stark	_____ NSC Admin.
_____ Mr. Cox	_____ Mr. R. Lehman	_____ Ms. Reger	_____ Mr. Steiner	_____
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DIRECTOR, AID Room 5942, Dept. of State				
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL Dept. of Justice, Room 5119				
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DIRECTOR, USIA 400 C Street, S.W.				
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Washington, D.C. 20520


March 2, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE  
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Ambassadors Kampelman and Stoessel's Recommendations

Attached is a memorandum to the President from Ambassadors Max M. Kampelman and Walter J. Stoessel about their participation in 1983-84 Presidential missions on Soviet human rights. It contains an overview of the views they encountered, the conclusions they reached, and five recommendations for U.S. policy based on their extensive consultations in Europe.

The conclusions and recommendations proposed by Ambassadors Kampelman and Stoessel are consistent with our current policy and approach. The Department will be pursuing these courses of action in NATO, in bilateral discussions with our friends and Allies in Europe, and in connection with the CSCE Human Rights Experts Meeting in Ottawa, April 23 - June 17, 1985. Several recent developments are encouraging: Allied coordination in preparing for the Ottawa meeting has been excellent; the Council of Europe will be holding its first-ever Ministerial level meeting on human rights in Vienna on March 19-20; and the North Atlantic Assembly passed a resolution urging greater attention to human rights compliance and increased parliamentary involvement in the CSCE process.

  
Nicholas Platt  
Executive Secretary





PRESIDENTIAL MISSION ON SOVIET HUMAN RIGHTS

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Ambassadors Walter J. Stoessel and Max M. Kampelman visited 15 European capitals as your representative to discuss with political leaders the implications of the continuing pattern of violations by the Soviet Union of human rights and freedoms.

The European leadership generally agrees with us that the systematic pattern of human rights abuses is a long-term barrier to improvement in East-West relations, and that it is in Western interest to bring about evolutionary change.

There are differences in tactics to reach this goal:

- o The Europeans often prefer private diplomacy, while we have advocated a mixture of diplomacy and public pressures;
- o The European leaders, responding to their public opinion, are generally more concerned than we are about the possibility that Western criticism of Soviet human rights abuses will disrupt the broader East-West dialogue;
- o Some Allies are reluctant for NATO to maintain a significant coordinating and declaratory role in human rights;
- o Some European leaders felt the Western position would be strengthened if we were perceived as being as vigorous on other regional human rights issues as on the Soviet problem.

Following are recommendations for your consideration:

- 1). The USG should continue and intensify its effort to engage the Europeans in a common effort to press for improved Soviet respect for human rights.
- 2). The Administration should encourage the development of relationships between our Congress and European parliaments to broaden political attention to the Soviet human rights issue.
- 3). The USG should support private-sector efforts to increase public and governmental attention to Soviet human rights.
- 4). The State Department should continue to work on improved coordination within the NATO alliance; common Western values as well as defense must remain a prominent part of the agenda.
- 5). Coordination among Allies should also be increased at the level of Moscow Embassies.



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

February 22, 1985

~~CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE~~  
MEMORANDUM

TO: The President

FROM: Ambassadors Max M. Kampelman *in NYK* and Walter J. Stoessel *WJS*

SUBJECT: U.S. Policy and Soviet Human Rights

Beginning in July of 1983, we have held a series of separate consultations with leaders of 15 European countries on the implications of the continued deterioration in Soviet human rights performance. This paper forwards our conclusions from these meetings, and a set of recommendations for your consideration.

There is little disagreement within the West that the record of the Soviet Union's compliance with its human rights commitments under the United Nations Charter and the Helsinki Final Act is poor and getting worse. A number of European leaders, however, were not fully aware of the details of the lack of Soviet compliance, including increased Soviet repression of all forms of dissent, new laws restricting contacts with foreigners, the abysmal level of emigration, and an alarming increase in official anti-semitic activities. European leaders generally share your commitment to seeking meaningful improvements in this record of repression, censorship, and denial of fundamental freedoms. We believe there is a consensus among our Allies and key neutral and non-aligned nations that the pattern of Soviet human rights abuses is a long-term barrier to significant improvement in East-West relations. It is clearly in Western interests to bring about evolutionary change.

There are, however, some differences with our Allies and friends on tactics for achieving this goal:

-- A number of European governments continue to believe that private diplomacy is more effective than "public diplomacy" in achieving concrete results in Soviet human rights behavior. The Europeans are generally more willing than we to gloss over specific human rights problems in multilateral meetings such as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), and in bilateral dialogue with the Soviets. The United States,

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BY JW NARA DATE 3/20/19



on the other hand, has advocated a combination of public and private activities which draw attention to Soviet abuses and seek specific remedies. We believe this element of accountability is essential to maintain the credibility of negotiating processes such as the CSCE. Even the exchange of confrontational statements has a use in reminding the Soviets that their human rights abuses are unprofitable to them.

-- Likewise, the Europeans are in general more anxious than we to be seen in dialogue with the Soviets, and to conclude agreements. As a result, European leaders are generally concerned that the fact of Soviet human rights abuses not interfere with broader aspects of the East-West dialogue. This political situation results from the traditions of diplomacy and from the perception that European public opinion is reassured by East-West dialogue and the signing of agreements. The United States has been less taken with these appearances, and is in general more concerned about verification of and compliance with agreements.

-- The United States has advocated a significant role for NATO in expressing common Western humanitarian values, as well as a role in coordinating an Allied approach to East-West human rights issues and CSCE. Some Europeans, including the French, Spanish and Norwegians, believe that NATO should remain largely a behind-the-scenes coordinator, with European institutions such as the Council of Europe and the European Community playing a larger role.

-- The United States is ahead of the Europeans in developing political and institutional readiness to work with public interest groups and integrate human rights as a normal element of our overall foreign policy approach.

-- We have urged coordinated and unified Western pressure on the Soviets to respect the human rights of their citizens. Some Europeans advocate a "differentiated" approach whereby each country pursues issues of particular concern to it (e.g., the Norwegians concentrate on the Sakharov case, the Germans on emigration of ethnic Germans from the Soviet Union).

-- A number of European leaders remarked that U.S. criticism of Soviet human rights abuses would be more effective and credible if we were perceived to be pressing just as vigorously for human rights in Central America, Chile, South Africa, the Philippines and elsewhere around the globe.

We have taken these points into consideration in drawing up the recommendations which follow.



RECOMMENDATIONS

1). The U.S. government should continue and intensify its broadly-based foreign policy effort to engage our Allies and friends in common efforts -- including both public and private diplomacy -- to press for improved Soviet respect for human rights and CSCE commitments. Such initiatives are an important element of our overall effort to improve East-West relations, since to ignore patterns of Soviet abuses will over time erode the political and security relationship. We recommend that you regularly raise this issue in appropriate meetings with European and other Heads of State, such as meetings of the Seven. In doing so, you should assume common values and a common desire to advance them. A "let us think this through" approach could be helpful. Senior U.S. officials should seek high level dialogue on how to coordinate our independent efforts to achieve concrete improvements in human rights. The White House, National Security Council, Department of State, US Information Agency, and our missions overseas all have important roles to play.

2). Administration officials, and members of the U.S. Congress who participate in organizations such as the Interparliamentary Union and the North Atlantic Assembly, should encourage their colleagues to increase their activities on Soviet human rights. The United States should encourage the development of parliamentary networks which work privately and publicly to promote Soviet respect for their human rights commitments. (In a recent example of the positive effect this can have, Irish parliamentarians affiliated with a U.S.-based non governmental organization sponsored an all parties debate and resolution on treatment of Soviet Jewry.) The joint Executive-Congressional CSCE Commission is well-positioned to help stimulate increased activity by European parliamentarians, e.g., joint missions to Eastern countries and parliamentary reviews of Eastern compliance with human rights commitments. As suggested by several European leaders, the U.S. should encourage an active and expanding role for the Council of Europe (COE) in Soviet human rights. This subject should be raised when COE parliamentarians visit Washington, and when Congressional and Administration officials visit the COE in Strasbourg. The Department of State should make these points to Foreign Minister Genscher during his tenure (through April 1985) as chairman of the COE Committee of Ministers. The message should also be passed via the semi-annual Congressional exchange visits with the European Parliament.



3). The United States government should continue to give appropriate encouragement to non-governmental human rights organizations concerned with Soviet human rights. These groups should be urged to further develop relationships with European and other counterpart organizations. (Some European peace groups have begun to realize that improvements in Soviet human rights are directly related to the prospects for European peace and security.) USIA and the National Endowment for Democracy should support scholarship and travel for this purpose. U.S. officials should encourage counterparts in other governments to develop institutionalized arrangements for integrating human rights with other foreign policy concerns, e.g. by creating human rights offices in foreign ministries, and by giving appropriate support and access to European non-governmental human rights organizations. USIA should have the fullest mandate from the White House to support activities which increase international public and political awareness of the Soviet human rights problem.

4). The Department of State should continue to work with our Allies to coordinate common efforts on Soviet human rights issues. Elements of this approach include continuing joint efforts in NATO, the United Nations, the Helsinki process, and forceful private diplomacy. The European Community pools information on their diplomatic initiatives on Soviet human rights. The State Department should work in NATO councils for similar coordination in that forum. The Secretary of State may well consider proposing to NATO Foreign Ministers that human rights issues be on the agenda for one of the semiannual meetings of the North Atlantic Council. The United States should continue to insist that human rights and humanitarian issues remain a prominent element of the CSCE process.

5). We should continue to work with our European friends and Allies to improve coordination and information-sharing in Moscow on Soviet human rights issues. Ambassador Hartman has suggested the desirability of increased sharing of information on discussions with Soviet officials, coordination of demarches on humanitarian subjects, and increased Allied visibility at the Moscow synagogue.

We will of course be at your disposal for further discussion and exploration of any of the ideas contained in this paper.

Attachment: Summary of itineraries for Presidential missions  
Executive summary

13

PRESIDENTIAL MISSION ON SOVIET HUMAN RIGHTS

I. July 4-14, 1983

France - July 5

Key Interlocutors:

Secretary General Gutmann  
Deputy Director for Europe Timsit  
CSCE Coordinator Beaux  
Cheysson staff member Delbourg

Italy - July 6

Key interlocutors:

Prime Minister Fanfani  
Foreign Minister Colombo  
Foreign Minister Secretary Malfutti  
Ambassador Remo Paolini

Vatican - July 6

Key Interlocutors:

Secretary of State Cardinal Casaroli  
U.S. Council for Public Affairs Archbishop Silvestrini

Austria - July 7

Key Interlocutors:

Bruno Kreisky  
Foreign Minister Lanc  
Ministry for Foreign Affairs Secretary General  
Hinteregger  
Ministry for Foreign Affairs Political Director  
Bauer  
Cardinal Koenig  
Newspaper editors

Netherlands - July 8

Key Interlocutors:

Prime Minister Lubbers  
Secretary General Verkade  
Ministry for Foreign Affairs Human Rights Coordinator  
Van Buuren  
Ministry for Foreign Affairs CSCE Off. De Vissen  
European Affairs Director Polak

Spain - July 9

Key Interlocutors:

NATO CSCE Caucus  
Ministry for Foreign Affairs Special Ambassador  
Jesus Esquerra  
North American Affairs Director General Jose Manuel  
Allendzsalazar



1X

FRG - July 11

Key Interlocutors:

Foreign Office State Secretary Berndt Von Staden  
Soviet Affairs Director Arnot  
Dr. Guenter Joetze  
Foreign Office Human Rights Director Schilling  
Ministerial Director General Dr. Hans Schauer

Great Britain - July 12

Key Interlocutors:

Foreign Secretary Sir Geoffrey Howe  
Under Secretary of State Raymond Whitney and staff  
European Parliament Human Rights Working  
Group Chairman, Lord Nicolas Bethell  
Peter Reddaway, LSOE

USNATO/Belgium - July 13

Key Interlocutors:

MFR Political Director Alfred Cahen  
Foreign Minister Leo Tindemans  
Secretary General Luns  
NAC, Luns also  
Secretary, North Atlantic Assembly POhillipe  
Deshornes  
Director, North Atlantic Assembly Committee for  
Education, Cultural Affairs and Information  
Guillaume Parmentien

15  
II. July 18-25, 1984

Switzerland - July 19

Key Interlocutors:

Ministry for Foreign Affairs State Secretary  
Eduard Brunner  
Ministry for Foreign Affairs Director, Political  
Division Franz Muheim

FRG - July 20

Bonn

State Secretary Andraeas Meyer-Landrut  
American Affairs Director Von Studnitz  
Soviet Affairs Director Arnot

Denmark - July 23

Key Interlocutors:

Chief, Ministry for Foreign Affairs Legal Division  
Niels Boel  
Chief, Ministry for Foreign Affairs Political Division  
Thomas Rechnägel  
Acting Chief, East/West Affairs Office Harris Nielsen

France - July 24-25

Key Interlocutors:

Secretary General Francis Gutmann  
Political Director Jacques Andreani  
Opposition Deputies:  
Secretary General Parti Republicain  
Francis Leotard  
Deputy Parti Republicain Michel Noir

16  
III. September 4-22

Italy - September 7

Key Interlocutors:

Foreign Minister Andreotti  
Foreign Ministry Deputy Political Director Franceschi  
CSCE Office Deputy Director Costa

Vatican - September 7

Key Interlocutors:

Vatican officials Cardinal Casaroli and Monsignor  
Sylvestrini

USNATO/Belgium - September 9-11

Key Interlocutors:

Foreign Minister Tindemans  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Chief of Cabinet  
Georges van der Espt  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Director General of  
Political Affairs Cahen  
Austrian Ambassador to Belgium Ceska  
Head of Brussels Solidarity of Office Milewski  
NATO Assistant Secretary General Da Rin

Norway - September 11-12

Key Interlocutors:

Foreign Minister Stray  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs State Secretary Froysnes  
Labor Party Leader Brundtland

Finland - September 12-13

Key Interlocutors:

Prime Minister Sorela  
Foreign Minister Vayrynen  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Under Secretary Tornudd  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Director for Political  
Affairs Pietinen



11

Sweden - September 13-15

Key Interlocutors:

Prime Minister Bodstrom  
Deputy Foreign Minister Schori  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Director of Political  
Affairs Bekeris  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Director of western  
European and American Division Berquist

USSR - September 15-19

Key Interlocutors:

Former Member of Moscow Helsinki Monitoring Group  
Melman and wife  
Jewish Refusenik Lerner

Great Britain - September 19-21

Key Interlocutors:

Foreign Secretary Howe  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office Political Director  
Thomas  
Parliamentary Under Secretary Renton  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office Soviet Department Chief  
Broomfield

Ireland - November 2

Key Interlocutors:

Foreign Minister Barry  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Director of Political  
Affairs Mackernan  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Counsellor on Human Rights  
Barrington  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Counsellor on CSCE McCabe

(0763B)

File USSR  
Human Rights

John L. 18

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

May 15, 1985

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

Two years ago I signed the proclamation designating May 21 as National Andrei Sakharov Day. Recalling that Dr. Sakharov's Nobel Peace Prize cited him as a "spokesman for the conscience of mankind," I said that we who value freedom and human dignity must do all in our power to prevent him from being silenced.

As we honor Dr. Sakharov today and rededicate ourselves to the values of peace, freedom and justice that he represents, we do so with solemn awareness that for more than one year, he and his brave wife, Yelenna Bonner, have been cut off from all direct contact with family or friends in the West. A year ago this month Dr. Sakharov embarked on a hunger strike to protest the refusal of Soviet authorities to permit his wife to travel abroad for urgently needed medical treatment. Soviet authorities have turned a deaf ear to the outpouring of international outrage over the treatment of one of the Soviet Union's most distinguished citizens and of his courageous wife, who is a decorated veteran of World War II.

In recognizing the courage and ideals that Dr. Sakharov embodies, let us also remember the many thousands of his countrymen who likewise suffer the denial of basic human rights. Today the human rights situation in the Soviet Union remains bleak. Soviet authorities have succeeded in eliminating the main vehicle for human rights activism -- the Helsinki Monitors movement. Anatoliy Shcharanskiy, Yuriy Orlov and other monitors are now serving long terms of imprisonment or exile. Religious groups have become a major target of persecution, and Baptists, Catholics, Ukrainian Uniates, Pentecostalists and other groups have been subjected to arrest and harassment. The crackdown on Hebrew teachers and Jewish cultural activists which began in July 1984 continues. Jewish emigration last year reached a ten-year low.

In exiling Dr. Sakharov to Gor'kiy, the Soviet Government has attempted to silence and remove him from international attention, but their efforts will ultimately fail. Americans and others around the world who have drawn inspiration from his courage understand their obligation to carry his message to all and to redouble their efforts in pursuit of world peace and respect for

-more-

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BY JN NARA DATE 3/10/19

human rights. I am appreciative for the efforts undertaken by the Andrei Sakharov Institute, and I recognize the many concerned citizens around the world who have been inspired by Dr. Sakharov and who support his goals and ideals. We must act on his behalf, ensuring that his message of hope and freedom will never be silenced.

Today we renew our call to the new Soviet leadership to end the isolation of Dr. Sakharov and his wife and to permit Yelenna Bonner to travel abroad for needed medical care. Let all who cherish Dr. Sakharov's noble values, both governments and individuals, continue to press the Soviets for information about the Sakharovs and for an end to Soviet persecution of two of its most distinguished citizens.

# # #



October 2, 1985

SOV. HUMAN RIGHTS  
DISSIDENTS  
JM  
EP  
KS

FREE ANATOLY SHCHARANSKY

**Annrc:**

Next a VOA Editorial, reflecting the views of the U.S. Government.

**Voice:**

Anatoly Shcharansky is now in his seventh year of imprisonment in a Soviet labor camp. The thirty-seven year old computer scientist is reported to be dangerously ill as a result of prolonged confinement in the camp's internal prison.

Shcharansky's long ordeal began with the refusal of permission to emigrate in 1973. He was subjected to the usual persecution reserved for Jews who express a desire to leave the Soviet Union. But his hopes were raised in August, 1975 when the Soviet Government pledged its word at Helsinki, Finland, to respect the "freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief" of its people.

Nine months after the Helsinki accords were signed, Shcharansky joined with thirty-eight other courageous men and women of many faiths, nationalities and creeds, to found the Moscow Helsinki Watch Group. The participants sought to exercise the freedom their government promised at Helsinki and to monitor progress in Moscow toward genuine civil liberties. That progress can be measured by the fate of the monitors — by January, 1983 only three of the original thirty-nine had escaped imprisonment or exile.

Shcharansky was arrested on March 15, 1977, charged with so-called "anti-Soviet propaganda" and "espionage." Sixteen months later, on July

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14, 1978 he was sentenced to three years in prison and an additional ten years in a "strict-regimen" labor camp.

According to information obtained by Shcharansky's wife, Avital, Shcharansky continued to practice his religious faith, even after his transfer to the labor camp, despite threats from and severe reprisals by camp authorities. He protested against ill-treatment in prison and camp and fought back with hunger strikes aimed at bringing his plight to world attention. He is reported to have been placed in solitary confinement for a full three months -- on a diet of bread and water -- merely for lighting Hanukkah candles and reciting Bible verses.

Today the Soviet government refuses to permit either Mrs. Shcharansky or any friends or relatives or any independent human rights organization to speak with Shcharansky or ascertain the nature of his reported illness. Shcharansky's courage and fortitude are poignant reminders of the determination of some Soviet citizens to exercise rights which they do not now enjoy -- rights that are embodied in the Helsinki Accords and other international agreements.

Anncr:

That was a VOA Editorial, reflecting the views of the U.S. Government.