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SOVIET JEWRY AND SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY:
A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS

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INTRODUCTION:

Understanding the motivations of Soviet leaders in their dealings with the Soviet Jewish minority is a very difficult task. Some analysts assert that domestic political considerations are the dominant factors in determining the official attitude toward Soviet Jewry, and are the key to whether or not Soviet Jews are allowed to emigrate. Others argue that foreign policy factors are the dominant ones, while a third group of analysts point to a combination of internal and foreign policy considerations. Until the Soviet archives are opened -- a distant prospect at best -- it will be impossible to be certain which of these analytic approaches is the correct one. Nonetheless, in the opinion of the author, for the period 1970-1980, when more than 250,000 Soviet Jews were allowed to leave the USSR, foreign policy considerations -- and particularly a concern over Soviet-American relations -- were the central factors in the decision of the Soviet leadership to allow the emigration.

The issue of Soviet Jewish emigration from the USSR has been an important element in Soviet-American relations since the early 1970s when the Jackson-Vanik amendment sought to tie American trade concessions to the Soviet Union to the emigration of Soviet Jews. While the Soviet leadership has long asserted that there could be no "linkage" between Soviet-American relations on the one hand and what the Soviet leaders call "internal" matters of Soviet policy -- such as Jewish emigration -- on the other, it seems clear that such a linkage has been operative in Soviet-American relations for the last decade. Soviet desires for American grain and technology, Soviet hopes for conclusion of the SALT I and SALT II agreements, and Soviet fears of a Sino-American alliance directed against the USSR have combined to motivate the Soviet leadership to allow the emigration of more than 250,000 Jews from the Soviet Union since 1970 (see Annex I).

Yet the issue of Soviet Jewry as a factor in Soviet-American relations does not begin only in the 1970s. There is evidence to indicate that Soviet Jewry played a role, albeit not a major one, in Stalin's planning during World War II, and it does not seem accidental that the worst period for Soviet Jewry, 1949-1953, coincided with the worst years of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union. In addition, there is considerable evidence that Nikita Khrushchev, who ruled the USSR from 1955-1964 was also sensitive to American and other foreign nations' expressions of interest in the fate of Soviet Jews. Thus, while the bulk of this analysis will be devoted to a study of Soviet Jewry as a factor in Soviet-American relations in the last decade, particularly during the period of the Carter Administration, an examination will also be made of the impact of Soviet Jewry's role in Soviet-American relations in the Stalin and Khrushchev eras.

1. The Stalin Era

Given the limitations of space, it is not possible to present a detailed examination of Stalin's attitude to Soviet Jews. There is, however, one important element to note. A number of Stalin's top rivals in the Communist party were Jews (Trotsky, Kamenev and Zinoviev) and he was involved in a power struggle with them until the late 1920's when he was able to assert his full control over the Soviet state, and eliminate them (and other Jews) from positions of power. To what degree memories of this power struggle influenced him later in life is impossible to determine¹; however, he did dissolve the Evseksiia, the Jewish sections of the Communist party in 1930, two years after his consolidation of power, at least in part because of "Jewish nationalist tendencies".² As a result, there was no central Soviet Jewish organization until World War II when the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee was formed.

In the early stages of the German attack on the Soviet Union, Stalin was fairly desperate for Western assistance, and the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee, formally founded in April 1942, although in preparation as early as August 1941, was one outgrowth of his quest for Western aid.³ As Joshua Gilboa has stated in his study of Stalin's policy toward Soviet Jewry, "Soviet authorities attached great significance to the influence of world Jewry in shaping general public opinion in the West, whose support in the war against Germany was considered vital."⁴

By organizing the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee and sending its top leaders (Solomon Mikhoels, director of the Moscow Jewish State theater, and Itsik Feffer, a noted Soviet Jewish poet) on a tour of Jewish communities in England, Canada, Mexico, and the United States, Stalin hoped to gain increased Western (and Jewish) economic aid, increased military assistance, and also the early opening of a second front against the Germans on the continent of Europe, thereby relieving some of the German pressure on the Red Army.

Interestingly enough, however, while Stalin's aim in establishing the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee was to gain Western support, the Committee soon developed a life of its own and served, albeit informally, as an organization for Soviet Jews during World War II. Indeed, there were a number of Soviet Jews who wished to greatly expand the domestic role of the Anti-Facist Committee. As the poet David Hofstein stated: "The Jewish Anti-Facist Committee must become the center of Russian Jewry, and not merely an agency for raising funds in the United States."⁵

While Stalin permitted a rise in Soviet Jewish consciousness through the establishment of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee, as well as through the production of a large number of Jewish war-time literary works, many of which were infused by specifically Jewish, as well as anti-German themes, the end of World War II, and the onset of the Cold War, were to bring about a major change in his attitudes. While there is some evidence that one of Stalin's goals in giving diplomatic and military support to Israel in its war of independence against the Arabs was to influence the Jews of the United States and prevent the consolidation of the Anglo-American alliance,⁶ by early 1949 with NATO established and the Cold War in full swing, Stalin cracked down hard on Soviet Jewry. By this time Stalin appeared clearly paranoid, and he was not willing to tolerate any manifestations of Jewish nationalism. The ties Soviet Jews had with their coreligionists abroad, which had been an asset for Stalin's strategy during World War II, now became a major liability for the Soviet Jews themselves when the United States and Britain became Cold War enemies. Stalin's destruction of Jewish culture during the 1949-1953 period and his murder of top Jewish poets and writers are, unfortunately, too well known to have to be described in detail.⁷ Suffice it to say that the leader of the Jewish Anti-Facist Committee, Solomon Mikhoels was murdered, the Committee itself was dissolved, all Yiddish publishing houses were closed down, Jewish books were removed from

Soviet libraries and bookstores, Jews were accused of being "cosmopolitans" and eliminated from many areas of Soviet life including the foreign service and the foreign trade ministry, Jews were accused of "economic crimes" and made the scapegoats for Soviet economic difficulties in the early 1950's, and in 1952, 24 leading Jewish writers were murdered as Stalin evidently sought to destroy the Jewish cultural leadership in the Soviet Union. An even more serious action against Soviet Jewry seemed in preparation in early 1953 with the announcement of the "doctor's plot" where so-called "doctor murderers tied to the Joint Distribution Committee, that International Jewish Zionist Organization (working) ... for the bosses of the U.S.A.",⁸ were accused of trying to murder Soviet military and civilian officials. Fortunately for Soviet Jewry, however, Stalin suddenly died and the "doctor's plot" was shown to be a hoax. As a result, a possible Soviet pogrom was averted. Nonetheless, even after Stalin's death, the cultural liquidation which he instituted against Russian Jewry was not reversed, although, as the world situation changed, and the Cold War faded, his successors were to show themselves sensitive to Western concerns for Soviet Jewry.

II. The Khrushchev Era

When Nikita Khrushchev consolidated his power in the Soviet Union in 1955, he was not burdened with Stalin's general paranoia, or his paranoia about the Jews. Nonetheless, Khrushchev did suffer from what might be termed a "native" anti-semitism, as his occasional anti-semitic remarks indicated. In addition, unlike Stalin who had eased Soviet anti-religious efforts during World War II and its aftermath, Khrushchev revived the Soviet anti-religious campaign and closed a large number of Soviet churches and synagogues.

Nonetheless, it was not too far into Khrushchev's period of rule that international considerations began to affect the Soviet leader's treatment of

Soviet Jews. In the first place, China moved from an ally to an enemy, thereby precipitating a competition in the international Communist movement between China and the Soviet Union. Secondly, Khrushchev's grandiose economic plans ran into difficulty and the USSR began to seek American grain. These factors were to lead to a small amelioration of the condition of Soviet Jewry. Thus, in 1961, for the first time since Stalin had obliterated Jewish cultural institutions in the USSR in the late 1940's, a national Yiddish periodical, Sovietische Heimland, was introduced. As the Soviet Minister of Culture, Yekatarina Furtseva, reportedly stated several months earlier, to the Vice-chairman of the Franco-Soviet Cultural Society, "If the USSR did anything at all for Yiddish culture, it would not be for domestic reasons, but to please our friends abroad."⁹

A second example during the Khrushchev years indicating a certain amount of Soviet sensitivity to Western pressure can be seen in the episode when the Soviet government prohibited the baking of matzot in state bakeries in 1962 and 1963 but relaxed the ban in subsequent years after the protests from the West.¹⁰ Yet another case of Soviet sensitivity can be seen from the consequences of the publication of Trofim Kichko's virulently anti-semitic book, Judaism Without Embellishment in 1963. Coming at a time of serious economic difficulty in the Soviet Union which was beset by both a very poor harvest and a serious slow-down in economic growth, particularly in the consumer goods sector, the book slandered Judaism as a religion which fostered "speculation" and other illegal economic activities -- many of which allegedly took place in synagogues.¹¹ The publication of this book precipitated a wave of protest in the West, not only from Jewish groups, public officials, and clergy of all faiths, but also from the leaders of Western Communist parties whose allegiance the Soviet Union was then actively seeking, because of the Chinese Communist challenge to the USSR for leadership in the international communist movement.¹² The end result of the protests was a decision by the Soviet leadership, which had been forced to seek grain from the

United States because of its poor harvest in 1963, to mildly condemn Kichko's book because "it might be interpreted in the spirit of anti-semitism".¹³

III. The Brezhnev Era - Part I - The Nixon-Ford Years

If the Khrushchev regime had shown some sensitivity to Western concern over the plight of Soviet Jewry, the Brezhnev leadership was to display considerably more sensitivity, particularly over the emigration issue, although often in a rather disjointed manner. This may have been due to the fact that the Soviet leaders never quite made up their minds as to how to handle Jewish emigration, whether permissively, or by harsh crackdowns. Part of the problem may have stemmed from the fact that the drive of the Brezhnev regime for improved relations with the West, in which the emigration of Soviet Jews was to play a role (Prime Minister Kosygin's December 3, 1966 statement on the reunification of families, which was reprinted in Izvestia, appears to have been a gesture in this direction) was upset by two important international events in the 1967-1968 period: the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War and the liberalization movement in Communist Czechoslovakia which was aborted by the Soviet invasion of August 1968. Paradoxically, while the Soviet propaganda media were to blame a so-called "alliance of Zionism and imperialism" for both the 1967 war and the liberalization movement in Czechoslovakia, the two developments were to activate a hitherto dormant Soviet Jewry which had earlier been characterized as "The Jews of Silence".¹⁴ Heartened by Israel's victory in the June 1967 war, an event which both restored their national pride and proved that Israel was a viable state, and convinced that liberalization in the USSR was no longer possible after the invasion of Czechoslovakia, activists among the Soviet Jews began to apply to emigrate to Israel. Perhaps spurred by its two bloody border skirmishes with China in March 1969 (and possibly hoping that once its leaders left, the Jewish emigration movement would die down), the Brezhnev regime permitted more than 2,000 Soviet

Jews to leave in 1969, in what may have been a calculated effort to gain Western support, or at least neutrality, in case the Sino-Soviet border battles were to escalate into a more serious confrontation.

As more Soviet Jews applied to emigrate in 1970, however, the Soviet leadership changed its policy and decided on a series of "show trials" which appeared aimed both at stemming the flow of valuable scientists and engineers which the regime could ill-afford to lose, and also at deterring other Soviet Jews from emigrating. By the spring of 1970, the Sino-Soviet border confrontation had diminished, and Soviet fears of a Sino-American alliance directed against the USSR had been reduced by the American invasion of Cambodia. These developments may have encouraged the Russians both to stage the "show trials" and cut Soviet Jewish emigration in half during 1970. Nevertheless, the "show-trials" were ultimately to prove counterproductive to the Soviet leaders, and emigration was soon to rise again.

The first "show-trial" opened in Leningrad in December 1970. The defendants were a group of Soviet Jews who, having been refused exit visas to Israel, had allegedly conspired to hijack a plane (the hijacking never took place). The Jews were quickly found guilty and the two alleged ringleaders were given the death penalty.¹⁵ The international outcry which greeted the death sentences, and the trial itself, not only forced the Soviet leaders to commute the death sentences to long prison terms, but also had the effect of bringing the Soviet Jewish emigration question to the forefront of public attention in the United States and Western Europe, and this resulted in an international conference on Soviet Jewry taking place in Brussels, in February 1971.

The Brussels Conference, which, from the Soviet viewpoint, could only further tarnish the Soviet image in the West (the USSR had not yet gotten over the stigma of invading Czechoslovakia), was not the only problem facing the Soviet leadership in early 1971. Riots had broken out in Communist Poland in

December 1970 as Polish workers had demonstrated in the streets over the Gomulka regime's decision to raise the prices of consumer goods just before Christmas. The disorders led to the fall of Gomulka and his replacement by Edward Gierek, and the Soviet Union was compelled to give Poland a large loan to help it overcome the economic difficulties which had caused the Gomulka regime to raise prices.¹⁶ It seems clear that the Soviet leaders, observing the riots in Poland, were concerned that a similar development could happen in the USSR -- particularly since consumer goods were also of poor quality and in limited supply in the Soviet Union. To prevent this, it was necessary to improve the consumer goods sector of the Soviet economy and this could be done (or so the Soviet leaders seem to have thought) by importing Western goods and technology; preferably on a long-term, low-interest, credit basis. Secondly, it would be necessary to set some limits to the strategic arms race between the U.S.A. and the USSR since, by setting parameters on the weapons to be developed, it would be possible to conserve scarce Soviet resources. Given the fact that the Soviet economy is only one-half the size of that of the United States, and that, unlike the U.S., all of the Soviet Union's resources are committed every year, it would appear that a strategic arms agreement would be considerably more valuable to the USSR than to the United States. Reportedly, Nixon tried to exploit what he and Kissinger perceived as a Soviet vulnerability following the Polish riots by indicating, in a series of messages to Brezhnev beginning in early 1971, that the United States might be willing to help assist the Soviet economy if the USSR were ready to make concessions in a number of political areas, ^{such as} Vietnam and the strategic arms negotiations.¹⁷ It was, therefore, perhaps not just coincidental that Brezhnev, in a major speech to the 24th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in April 1971, pledged a significant increase in consumer goods production;¹⁸ and one month later the USSR made a major concession to stimulate the strategic arms negotiations.¹⁹

In the interim, however, the Soviet Jewish activists had not been idle. Undeterred by the Leningrad hijack trial, a number of Soviet Jews, adopting the tactics of the American Civil Rights movement, staged a sit-in at the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet (the Soviet Parliament) in March 1971 -- just before the opening of the 24th Party Congress, when a large number of foreign newsmen were in Moscow. As a result of their activism, they obtained a conference with a general from the Soviet Ministry of the Interior (which handles emigration visas) and many were later permitted to leave the Soviet Union.²⁰ Interestingly enough, however, while many of the sit-in activists were allowed to leave, the Brezhnev leadership, perhaps still unsure as to the proper policy in dealing with the emigration problem, staged another set of "show-trials" in May and June. Nonetheless, this form of intimidation came to an end in July, and a major reappraisal of Soviet foreign policy was made necessary, when Henry Kissinger made a surprise visit to Peking -- the first official visit of a representative of an American administration since the communist take-over of China in 1949. Kissinger's visit may well have aroused the concern of the Soviet leadership that the long-feared Sino-American alliance was now a real possibility. This concern, coupled with the large demonstrations on behalf of Soviet Jewry which greeted Kosygin in his trip to the West in the early fall of 1971,²¹ may have prompted the Soviet leaders to open the gates for the emigration of Soviet Jews in the last three months of 1971, as emigration shot up from about two hundred per month in the first three-quarters of 1971 to 3,000 per month by December.

The Soviet Jewish exodus continued strong through the first seven months of 1972 as Nixon visited both Peking and Moscow. During his visit to the Soviet capital, Nixon signed a strategic arms limitation agreement (SALT I) along with a commitment to increase Soviet-American trade. Meanwhile, the Soviet leaders had encountered a number of severe problems. In addition to trying to prevent

a Sino-American alliance, they were confronted with a very poor harvest -- the worst since 1963 -- and they were forced to begin negotiations for a major grain purchase from the United States.²² Secondly, in July 1972, the Russians were ejected from their air and naval bases in Egypt by Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, an action which weakened their strategic position in the Eastern Mediterranean. While the flow of Soviet Jews to Israel was certainly not the cause of Sadat's decision to expel the Russians (Sadat had been unhappy with the lack of Soviet military support for his confrontation with Israel, and by expelling the Russians he was signalling the U.S. for aid in getting Israel out of Sinai),²³ it is clear that the increasing exodus of Soviet Jews to Israel, many of whom were of military age and possessing technical skills useful to the Israeli economy, was very unpopular with the Arabs.²⁴ In any case, soon after the Soviet exodus from Egypt, the Brezhnev regime imposed a prohibitively expensive "head tax" on educated Soviet Jews seeking to emigrate to Israel.²⁵ This move may have been aimed at soothing Arab feelings at a time when the Soviet position in the Middle East was deteriorating, as well as at gaining funds from the West to pay for the expensive Western technology the USSR needed. It may also have been another attempt to deter Soviet Jewish scientists and technicians from emigrating or, as Brezhnev himself reportedly stated, it may have been a "bureaucratic bungle".²⁶ Whatever the cause, the "head-tax" precipitated a very strong American reaction, spearheaded by Senator Henry Jackson, who sought to tie the exodus of Soviet Jews to the trade benefits ("most favored nation" treatment on Soviet exports, and U.S. credits) that the Soviet leadership was seeking in an agreement which was to be signed by the Nixon Administration in October 1972 but which needed Congressional ratification to become law. The Soviet Union's reversal of position on the "head-tax" was to be the most important example yet of Soviet sensitivity to Western concern on the emigration issue.²⁷

Before proceeding with a discussion of Senator Jackson's efforts to tie

American trade benefits to Soviet Jewish emigration, it is important to note a parallel development occurring in West German relations with the Soviet Union. There are approximately 1.9 million Soviet Germans, primarily descendants of colonists who were invited to Russia by Catherine the Great and Alexander I. Like the Jews, they have suffered a considerable amount of discrimination in the Soviet Union, particularly since World War II. Beginning in 1971, Moscow began to allow sharply increased numbers of Soviet Germans to leave the USSR. The exodus appears to have been caused by two primary factors. In the first place, there was a concerted drive by a number of Soviet Germans, beginning in 1970, to emigrate from the USSR. Secondly, there was a Kremlin effort to exploit West German Chancellor Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik, which included trade benefits for the USSR, and also gain passage for the Soviet-FRG treaty in the German Bundestag in the face of opposition from a number of Germans who opposed improved relations with the USSR. The end result of the process was that while only 341 Soviet Germans were allowed to emigrate in 1970, in 1971 the number increased to 1,140 and shot up to 3,418 in 1972, 4,487 in 1973, and 6,517 in 1974. While the number of emigrants dropped somewhat in 1975 to 5,827 it rose sharply again in 1976 to 9,791 and remained above 7,000 through 1979. It is no coincidence that Soviet-West German trade also rose rapidly during this period, from 544 million rubles in 1970 to 4.246 billion rubles in 1979.²⁸ While it is not possible to go into a full discussion of Soviet German emigration in this paper, the interested reader is directed to Sidney Heitman's very thorough study, The Soviet Germans in the USSR Today (Koln, FRG: Bundesinstitut Fur Ostwissen - schaftliche und Internationale Studien, 1980) for further information. As can be seen by even this very brief discussion, however, there are a number of parallels between Soviet Jewish emigration and Soviet German emigration, and a research project comparing the two movements (and Soviet Armenian emigration) is now in the planning stage.²⁹

While Moscow was to show itself sensitive to pressure from West German legislators on the emigration issue, a similar phenomenon was to take place in the United States. As Congressional support for what became known as the "Jackson Amendment" to the Trade Bill began to rise, the Soviet leaders began to make a series of concessions. In the first place, they exempted emigres over the age of 55 from paying the "head-tax" and they also reduced the required payment for others by the number of years the prospective emigrant had worked for the state. In addition, a number of Jews were allowed to leave without paying the tax.³⁰ As the chief of the Soviet Ministry of the Interior's Visa Department reportedly told a group of Soviet Jewish activists, "The waiver of the exit tax in certain cases was not a change in the authorities' approach to the emigration problem, but a gesture toward a certain foreign power with which the USSR is seeking to develop commercial and economic relations."³¹

Gestures alone, however, did not suffice to quell the rising tide of Congressional support for the Jackson Amendment, particularly since the "head-tax" had been formally published as a Soviet law in December 1972. During a February 1973 trip to the United States, both the top Soviet expert on the United States, Georgi Arbatov, and the Soviet Deputy Foreign Trade Minister, V. S. Akhimov, were told in no uncertain terms of Congressional support for the Jackson Amendment. One month later, the American Treasury Secretary, George Shultz, met with Soviet leaders in Moscow and apparently conveyed the same message. Presumably, by this time Brezhnev understood the situation, because four days after the Schultz visit, the Soviet leadership permitted 44 Soviet Jews with higher education to depart the Soviet Union without paying the exit tax. The Soviet reasoning in permitting the 44 to depart was explained several days later by Viktor Louis, a Soviet "agent-journalist", who explained in an article in the Israeli newspaper Yediot Ahronot, that due to Congressional pressure the "head-tax" would "no longer be operative, although it would not be cancelled or changed."³²

This concession, which could be revoked at any time, did not stop the momentum of the Jackson Amendment; nor did efforts by the Nixon Administration which, on a number of occasions, demonstrated a greater interest in "detente" than in human rights. Meanwhile, Brezhnev had made a number of highly optimistic statements about the development of Soviet-American trade at the April 1973 meeting of the Communist Party's Central Committee, so it appeared that the Soviet leadership was willing to make concessions on the emigration of Soviet Jewry to obtain the benefits of American trade and technology.³³

Unfortunately for the Russians, however, the growing movement for Soviet-American detente, in which trade was to play such an important role, was to receive a number of blows in the latter part of 1973. In September 1973, the noted Soviet dissident physicist, Andrei Sakharov, spoke out against detente unless it was accompanied by democratization in the Soviet Union. One month later came the Yom Kippur War in which the Soviet leadership acted to enhance its own position in the Middle East, and undermine the U.S. position, by organizing an air and sea lift of weaponry to Syria and Egypt, by urging all the other Arab states to aid the Syrians and Egyptians in their conflict with Israel, and by opposing American initiatives for a cease-fire until the Arabs began to lose.³⁴ These Soviet actions, which served to exacerbate the war, caused many Americans to begin to doubt the wisdom of "detente" and to question a number of the Nixon Administration's policies toward the USSR, including its offers of massive credits. This concern was transformed in 1974 into what became known as the Stevenson Amendment to the Trade Bill. The Stevenson Amendment limited American credits to the USSR to a total of \$300 million, and also prohibited credits for the production of Soviet gas and oil.³⁵ This was a major blow to the Soviet leadership which had hoped for multi-billion dollar credits from the United States, including up to \$40 billion in credits to develop Soviet oil and natural gas reserves in Siberia.³⁶ While the Stevenson Amendment stipulated

that the credit ceiling could be lifted by the President if he determined it to be in the "national interest", this could be done only with Congressional approval, and Stevenson himself stated that this approval would be dependent on Soviet concessions, not only in the area of Soviet Jewish emigration, but also in the Middle East, arms control, and other areas of Soviet-American relations.³⁷ Having been shown by Soviet behavior in the Yom Kippur War that the Soviet leaders would not hesitate to violate either the spirit or the substance of detente, if such action would benefit the Soviet Union's world position, Stevenson and the majority of other Senators were determined to oppose the subsidization of the Soviet Union's economy, without clear political concessions in return. It is important to note that while the Soviet leaders appeared willing to live with the Jackson Amendment, and even apparently worked out a formula for Jewish emigration, via Kissinger's mediation, which both they and Jackson seemed to agree to, all this was predicated on the USSR's receipt of sizeable American economic credits. Consequently, when faced by the rigid credit limitations of the Stevenson Amendment, the Soviet leaders, in January 1975, repudiated the trade agreement which they had reached with the Nixon Administration in 1972.³⁸

Interestingly enough, however, the Soviet leadership did not terminate Jewish emigration after repudiating the trade agreement, although the 1975 emigration total of 13,000 was only about one-third the record level of 1973. The Soviet leadership's willingness to continue emigration, albeit at a reduced rate (the 1973 war and its aftermath may also have made Israel appear less desirable in the eyes of Soviet Jews), may have been due to three factors. In the first place, there was a new American President, Gerald Ford, who had committed himself personally on the issue of Soviet Jewry. Indeed, according to Senator Jacob Javits (who together with Senator Jackson and Senator Abraham Ribicoff had visited Ford soon after Nixon's resignation), the new President

had given his assurances that he would personally hold the Soviet Union to account for more humane emigration policies.³⁹ Secondly, another strategic arms limitation agreement was being negotiated (a preliminary arrangement had been worked out by Ford and Brezhnev at their November 1974 summit at Vladivostok) and the Soviet leadership continued to put high priority on getting the agreement formally accepted. Finally, the Soviet leaders wanted to hold a European Security Conference to ratify the post-war division of Europe, and they were compelled to give at least lip-service to the principle of emigration for the purpose of family reunification in order to get the Western powers to sign what has become known as the Helsinki Agreement.⁴⁰ The Soviet leaders also apparently had not given up hope of getting credits from the United States which in 1975 was beset by a severe recession, and the Russians may have felt that domestic economic pressure in the United States might compel the Ford Administration to grant credits to the Soviet Union in order to put unemployed American workers back to work. Indeed, despite the Soviet repudiation of the trade agreement, Soviet-American trade increased sharply in 1975 and 1976 (see Annex I). Given this overall situation, the inevitable outcry in the U.S. which would greet any termination of Jewish emigration would have been counterproductive to the larger Soviet interests.

Thus, Soviet Jewish emigration continued at a reduced rate throughout the Ford Administration, although it was to rise somewhat at the end of 1976 in an apparent signal to Jimmy Carter, who had been elected President in November 1976.

IV. The Brezhnev Era II: The Carter Years

Although the United States was weakened both internally and in its world position in the 1970's by Vietnam and Watergate, developments that led to a sapping of the power of the American Presidency, a greater assertiveness on the part of Congress, and a public feeling against committing U.S. troops to

battle overseas, Moscow still had its three central concerns in dealing with the U.S. at the time Carter assumed the Presidency. In the first place, despite the sizeable Soviet strategic build-up which placed its primary emphasis on "heavy" MIRVed ICBM's, the Soviet military remained worried about a possible American technological advance that would enable the United States to leap ahead of the Soviet Union strategically, much as it had done in the early 1960's.⁴¹ In addition, while the percentage of the American Gross National Product devoted to defense had been dropping since Vietnam, Moscow had to be concerned about a possible reversal of this trend since the American economy, despite its problems, remained about twice the size of that of the USSR, and the gap in such fields as computer technology and automation appeared to be widening.⁴² For this reason, it remained more in the interest of the USSR than of the United States to achieve a SALT II agreement as speedily as possible. A second Soviet concern about the United States at the time Carter became President related to China. While Moscow could only have been encouraged by the fact that a rapid rapprochement between Peking (Beijing) and the United States did not occur in the aftermath of Nixon's 1972 visit to China (in part this was due to continued difficulties over the future of Taiwan; in part it was due to the influence of a group of Chinese leaders, later branded as "The Gang of Four"), there remained the possibility of a Sino-American entente directed against the USSR. While Moscow had sought to prevent this -- inter alia -- by a series of summit talks with American leaders (there were four summit meetings between Brezhnev and an American President between 1972 and 1976 to only one between and American President and the top Chinese leadership), and by maintaining the exclusive SALT talks, the Soviet political elite could not be sure that this pattern would continue, particularly in the post-Mao era which, coincidentally, began in September 1976, two months before Carter's election. Finally, despite its military advances, the Soviet Union remained in need of American technology, and the USSR was approaching a partial dependency relationship on American grain sales.

While SALT, China, and trade were important Soviet concerns at the time of Carter's inauguration, the Soviet leadership was also cognizant of the fact that the bilateral Soviet-American relationship had deteriorated sharply since the Nixon years. Despite the Brezhnev-Ford meeting at Helsinki in 1975 where the Helsinki Final Act was signed (ironically, this was to lead to increased dissent in Eastern Europe and the USSR rather than to an increased acceptance of Soviet domination over East Europe) and the symbolic Apollo-Soyuz joint space mission, the subsequent Soviet intervention in Angola in 1976 had chilled relations to the point where President Ford had stated in March 1976 that the word "detente" was no longer in his political vocabulary. In addition, the SALT talks had stagnated, in part because of Angola and in part because of disagreements over the American cruise missile and the Soviet backfire bomber, with the result that Brezhnev had to postpone a visit to the United States.⁴³ At the same time, the United States had called off three Soviet-American cabinet level meetings, and U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger had announced that he would no longer either urge Congress to lift the trade restrictions it had voted against the USSR or support multi-billion dollar investments in the USSR to develop Soviet oil and natural gas deposits.⁴⁴

Another area of Soviet-American conflict lay in the Middle East. While the U.S. had suffered losses in Africa and Asia in the mid-1970s, it had met with considerably more success in the Middle East where not only had the United States replaced the Soviet Union as the dominant foreign influence in Egypt, the Arab world's most populous state, it had also dominated the Middle East peacekeeping process which had been initiated by Kissinger in the aftermath of the Yom Kippur War. Indeed, Soviet influence in the region, which had reached a high point during the war dropped sharply and Moscow was reduced to the point where it could only call from the diplomatic sidelines for a resumption of the Geneva Peace Conference, where, as co-chairman, it could hope to rebuild its waning influence in the Middle East.⁴⁵

In sum, therefore, as the Carter Administration prepared to take office, Moscow was anxious to improve relations for a number of reasons including the reinvigoration of the SALT process, the lifting of U.S. trade restrictions, the continued prevention of a Sino-American entente and the reconvening of the Geneva Peace Conference.

Consequently, once the election campaign was over (the USSR attributed a large part of the cooling off of Soviet-American relations to campaign pressures), the Soviet leadership set about sending signals to the incoming Carter Administration that it was interested in improved relations and would look forward to Soviet-American cooperation in many areas. A major signal to the Carter Administration came during the meeting of the American-Soviet Trade and economic Council at the end of November 1976, when Brezhnev appealed for an end to the "freeze" on the strategic arms discussions and for a new agreement based on the Vladivostok accord. He also used the opportunity to call for an end to U.S. trade discrimination against the USSR, stating that U.S. firms lost between \$1.5 and \$2 billion because of it.⁴⁶ Two weeks later Pravda published a major article by Georgi Arbatov evaluating the state of U.S.-Soviet relations. After criticizing the "enemies of detente" (Soviet specialists like Arbatov tended to speak of "two tendencies" in the U.S., one of "realists" who seek cooperation with the USSR, and the other of cold-war "confrontationists"), Arbatov praised President-elect Carter's "positive" statements about improving Soviet-American relations and seeking ways to limit arms. Arbatov then went on to call for the resumption of the Geneva Middle East Peace Conference as quickly as possible.⁴⁷ A more concrete signal came in the last two months of 1976 when there was a sharp increase in the number of Soviet Jews allowed to leave the Soviet Union.⁴⁸ The most important Soviet signal, however, came the day before Carter's inauguration when Brezhnev, in a speech in Tula, noted that the SALT I agreement would expire in

October 1977 and appealed for the "consolidation" of the Vladivostock accord and for a resumption of the Geneva Middle East Peace Conference.⁴⁹

Nonetheless, in evaluating Jimmy Carter's performance in the election campaign and in the post-election period before he took office, Moscow may have had some mixed feelings. On the one hand Carter had called for a more aggressive effort to achieve a SALT agreement and for a \$5-7 billion cut in defense spending, and these sentiments must have been welcome in Moscow. In addition, he called for the gradual withdrawal of all U.S. ground forces from Korea, and this too must have been greeted warmly by Moscow as yet another example of "the retreat of American power". On the other hand, however, Carter had strongly emphasized human rights during the campaign and had followed up his words with a telegram of support to Soviet dissident Vladimir Slepak after the election.⁵⁰ In addition, during the latter stages of the Presidential campaign, on September 29, 1976, Carter had publicly praised the Jackson Amendment, stating that he shared Jackson's "deep concern over the protection of human rights and freedom of emigration in the USSR and throughout the world". Carter went on to tell Jackson, "the legislation which you coauthored, which is now the law of the land and which is aimed at securing these rights, will be effectively implemented by a Carter-Mondale Administration".⁵¹

Carter's emphasis on human rights, perhaps to the surprise of the Soviet leaders, was to accelerate after he became President and was to lead to a major clash with Moscow within a month of his taking office. In seeking to understand the violent Soviet reaction to Carter's championing of human rights,⁵² there are two major factors to take into account. On the one hand, as Adam Ulam has noted, the Soviet political elite tends to be "power hypochondriacs", seeing in the demands of the Soviet dissidents a threat to their power position, however remote.⁵³ Secondly, one might view the Soviet reaction to the human rights campaign as a test of wills with Carter. After all, the Soviets had not only signed the

Helsinki Final Act, but had also disseminated it publicly. By harassing and arresting those Soviet citizens seeking to monitor compliance with the "basket three" (human rights) provisions of Helsinki, the Soviets were, in effect, challenging the Western nations who had signed the agreement to see whether, or not, they gave anything more than mere lip-service to the ideals contained in the document.

The attack on Carter for his human rights stand came soon after Carter's inauguration speech which was positively received in Moscow as "restrained and modest".⁵⁴ It was precipitated by a formal declaration by the U.S. State Department which stated that by trying to intimidate Andrei Sakharov, the most prominent of the Soviet dissidents, the USSR was violating the principles of human rights.⁵⁵ While, initially, Moscow sought to separate its criticism of the State Department from a continuing positive treatment of Jimmy Carter, this ploy ceased after Carter endorsed the State Department action.⁵⁶ Perhaps as a response, the Soviet Union then arrested another key Soviet dissident, Aleksandr Ginsburg and expelled an AP journalist, George Krimsky.⁵⁷ These Soviet actions brought several questions to Carter at a news conference on February 8th as to whether he thought that the USSR was testing him by making the two moves, and whether he was concerned that his speaking out on human rights might jeopardize the American relationship with the USSR on other matters. Carter replied that he did not interpret the Soviet actions as a form of testing, and that he rejected the concept of linkage between human rights and other issues. Carter's reply on this topic is worth quoting in full:

This brings up the question that is referred to as linkage. I think we come out better in dealing with the USSR if I am consistently and completely dedicated to the enhancement of human rights, not only as it deals with the Soviet Union but all other countries. I think this can legitimately be severed from our inclinations to work with the Soviet Union, for instance in reducing dependence on atomic weapons and also seeking mutually balanced force reduction in Europe.⁵⁸

(emphasis mine)

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If Carter felt that he could sever the human rights issue from the SALT talks, Moscow was to take a different position. Indeed, only two days later, Yuri Orlov, head of the unofficial Soviet Helsinki Monitoring Committee was arrested and two days after that, on February 12, a Pravda editorial blasted the human rights campaign, citing Brezhnev to reinforce its view that such U.S. actions impeded detente, and amounted to attempts to interfere in the internal affairs of the socialist countries. At this point, however, Carter did not appear deterred by the Pravda statement, for two weeks later he personally met with Vladimir Bukovsky, a leading Soviet dissident who had been allowed to emigrate from the USSR as part of a trade for Chilean Communist leader Luis Corvalan. This Presidential action (which contrasted with President Ford's refusal to meet Aleksander Solzhenitsyn in 1975 "lest it harm detente")⁵⁹ was bitterly criticized in the Soviet press and precipitated a series of personal attacks on President Carter. These included an article in Pravda on March 13th which deprecated the American President's assertion that it would be possible to separate detente and talks on reducing strategic arms from "attempts to interfere in our internal affairs under the false flag of 'defending human rights'." Brezhnev himself leveled the strongest attack in his Trade Union speech of March 22nd in which he attributed the continued stagnation in Soviet-American relations to the Carter Administration and blasted its human rights campaign, stating "We shall not tolerate interference in our internal affairs by anyone, under any pretext. The normal development of relations on such a basis is, of course, unthinkable". While attacking the U.S. on human rights, Brezhnev did state that the USSR was still interested in pursuing cooperation with the United States in the areas of limiting strategic arms and chemical and bacteriological warfare, developing trade (if the U.S. removed its discriminatory trade barriers), and a peace settlement in the Middle East. On the latter issue, Brezhnev presented

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the most detailed and moderate Soviet peace plan to date, although one that was still unacceptable to both Israel and the United States because it did not include an insistence on the establishment of diplomatic, economic and cultural relations between Israel and its Arab neighbors once a peace treaty was signed.⁶⁰

Interestingly enough when asked in a news conference about Brezhnev's remarks, Carter replied that he considered the speech to be "very constructive".⁶¹ This statement by Mr. Carter illustrated what might be termed either as an overly optimistic view of the world or a case of naiveté. Whatever it might be called, this attitude was increasingly evident in the Administration's view of the USSR until, as Mr. Carter himself admitted, the invasion of Afghanistan served to shock the Administration, or at least the President, into a new outlook.

In light of the Soviet threats about linking U.S. human rights policy to the SALT talks, the Carter Administration might have waited a bit before pursuing the strategic arms talks with the USSR. Nonetheless, less than a week after Brezhnev's speech, Secretary of State Vance went to Moscow with the Carter Administration's multiple SALT plans. In taking this action, which actually was a protocol mistake since it was Gromyko's duty to come to Washington to meet the new American leadership, President Carter may well have signalled to the Russians an overeagerness to achieve a SALT agreement, yet another problem that was to weaken the U.S. bargaining position vis-a-vis the USSR over the next three years. In any case, by publicly announcing his SALT proposals before Vance left, one of which called for a major cut in strategic weapons on both sides, he had doomed the plans. In the first place the Soviet leaders were used to the quiet "back channel" methods of Kissinger, and were undoubtedly surprised by Carter's public methods. Secondly, given the influence of the Soviet "military-industrial complex" on Soviet policy, it was highly unlikely that

Brezhnev would immediately agree to the major cuts that Carter had proposed -- particularly when he had done so publicly.⁶² Interestingly enough, however, not only did the Soviet leaders reject the Carter SALT program, they did so in a way that appeared aimed at publicly insulting -- if not intimidating -- Carter. Thus not only were there extensive articles in Pravda and Izvestia denouncing the U.S. SALT position,⁶³ but Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko called a rare press conference in which he attacked both the SALT proposals and the human rights policy of the Administration, stating that the latter poisoned the atmosphere and was an impediment to the resolution of other issues between the USSR and the U.S., including strategic arms.⁶⁴ As far as the U.S. SALT program was concerned, he attacked the effort of the United States to include the backfire bomber in the agreement, and also the sharp cuts the U.S. was seeking in "heavy" MIRVed missiles as an attempt at seeking "unilateral advantage". He also called for a ban on the U.S. B-1 bomber and the Trident submarine (two forthcoming weapons in the U.S. arsenal) and threatened to "toughen" the Soviet position by once again bringing up the matter of forward based U.S. nuclear delivery systems in future SALT discussions. He did, however, hold out hope for improved Soviet-U.S. relations, but only if the U.S. changed its policies:

We would like to express the hope that the leadership of the United States will adopt a more realistic position, that it will give greater consideration to the security interests of the Soviet Union and its allies and will not seek to obtain unilateral advantages.

Gromyko's use of the term "realistic" is a particularly interesting one, since that is the term used by the Soviet media to refer to Western statesmen who recognize that the "correlation of forces" is shifting against the West and "adjust" their policies accordingly. This theme of the Carter Administration's "lack of realism" was to be continued in the Soviet media, despite the Vance-Gromyko meeting in Geneva in May which President Carter was to characterize in his normally optimistic way as "upbeat",⁶⁵ and Pravda on June 19th even went so

far as to claim that "even the bourgeois press" of the United States had "noted with increasing frequency the lack of requisite realism" in the American Administration's approach to international affairs. At this point, however, Carter began to "adjust" American policies to better meet Soviet sensibilities. Thus, for example, unlike his well-publicized meeting with Vladimir Bukovsky,⁶⁶ he publicly stated that he would not meet the wife of recently imprisoned Soviet Jewish dissident Anatoly Sharansky who was then touring the United States, although he took pains to point out in his news conference of June 13th that Sharansky never had any sort of relationship with the CIA as the USSR had charged.⁶⁷ Even more to the USSR's liking, however, must have been Carter's decision on June 30th to discontinue plans for production of the B-1 bomber. This was, to put it mildly, a unilateral gift to Moscow since Brezhnev in his speech to the 25th Party Congress had spoken of mutual concessions on such weapons systems as the B-1.⁶⁸ It may well be that Moscow, having demanded that the U.S. show "more realism" in its policies, seemed satisfied at the result of its policy of intimidation -- particularly since Gromyko in his April 1st press conference, had called for a ban on the B-1 bomber.⁶⁹ Nonetheless, as if to press the Soviet advantage, the B-1 decision was dismissed as essentially a propaganda trick (the Soviet media noted that research on the weapon would continue), and the Administration was now intensely attacked for its plan to develop the neutron bomb and MX missile, thereby "moving toward a new upward spiral in the arms race".⁷⁰

It was perhaps to correct what he saw as a continued Soviet misperception of American policy (at a news conference on July 12th, Carter stated that he did not know how to explain the unfriendly rhetoric coming out of the USSR against him) that President Carter gave a major address at Charleston, South Carolina on July 21, 1977 in which he dealt extensively with Soviet-American relations. Carter made three central points in this speech.⁷¹ In the first place, he called

for enlarging the areas of cooperation between the USSR and the U.S. "on a basis of equality and mutual respect". The areas he mentioned included SALT, arms limitation in the Indian Ocean, and peace in the Middle East. In discussing the latter area, Carter remarked "we have begun regular consultations with the Soviet leaders, as co-chairmen of the prospective Geneva Conference, to promote peace in the Middle East". Carter also called for increased trade and referred warmly to Brezhnev (this was in sharp contrast to the continuing Soviet attacks on himself), even quoting from one of the Soviet leader's speeches which Carter called "sincere". Carter also stated, as he had done many times before, that the U.S. advocacy of human rights was not an attack on Soviet vital interests. Finally, he outlined the overall strategy of the Carter Administration toward the USSR by stating that he wanted to see the USSR "further engaged in the growing pattern of international activities designed to deal with human problems -- not only because they can be of real help, but because we both should be seeking a greater stake in the creation of a constructive and peaceful world order".

This speech may have been seen in Moscow as yet another example of the eagerness of the Carter Administration to have good relations with the USSR. Not only had Carter emphasized such terms as the USSR's "vital interests" and "mutual respect" (areas which Moscow had claimed Carter had violated with his human rights and SALT policies), he also offered cooperation in the areas most important to the USSR and appeared to grant the USSR equality in dealing with key world problems including the Middle East. In making this speech, Carter seemed to place himself in the school of those analysts who see Soviet policy as essentially defensive in nature and he therefore sought to meet Soviet sensibilities. Unfortunately, while his policies might have borne fruit if in fact the USSR was to be defensively inclined, a more offensively inclined Soviet Union was to take advantage of them as was to prove to be the case over the next two years.

The initial Soviet response to the Charleston speech was mixed,⁷² and Georgi Arbatov writing in Pravda a week later appeared to give the official Soviet response to it.⁷³ Although he attacked the Administration for worsening the political atmosphere and for not lifting the "artificial barriers it created in the way of developing mutually advantageous cooperation", Arbatov stated that "some of what Carter said in his Charleston speech can be seen as positive". He quickly qualified even this gesture, however, by then attacking the Carter Administration for its decision to deploy cruise missiles and create a neutron bomb. Interestingly enough, Arbatov also deemed it necessary to reject the "fabrication" that the USSR is more interested in detente and in economic ties with the West than the West with it (the frequent repetition of this theme in the Soviet press would appear to indicate Soviet sensitivity on this issue). Arbatov ended on a positive note, however, stating that it was still possible to develop improved relations, but warned that "unlike disputes, peace and good relations require willingness and realistic efforts on both sides".

The first area, it would appear, in which the Carter Administration was to demonstrate its "realism" -- by making concessions to the USSR -- was the Middle East. As mentioned above, the U.S. had dominated Middle East diplomacy since 1973, but the Carter Administration was now moving away from Kissinger's step-by-step diplomacy toward the convening of the Geneva Conference, thereby moving to meet one of the central Soviet demands. In an effort to prepare the diplomatic path toward the reconvening of Geneva, Secretary of State Vance set out for a trip around the Middle East in early August. Prior to departing, he stated that he had been in contact with the Soviet leaders about his trip and they had indicated a willingness to "use their influence" with some of the parties to "encourage flexibility".⁷⁴ This, unfortunately, was to be yet another overoptimistic evaluation of Soviet policies. The Soviet media openly deprecated Vance's efforts during his trip⁷⁵ and Palestinian leader Zuheir Mohsen later

stated that he had been told by the Russians at the time "not to have any trust in American promises".⁷⁶ In any case, Vance's trip proved to be a failure and the Carter Administration evidently decided that, by itself, it could not arrange the Geneva Conference because of Syrian and PLO opposition. Consequently, it was decided that Soviet assistance was required and at the end of September, it negotiated a joint statement with the USSR on the Middle East which was released on October 1st and which called, inter alia, for the convening of the Geneva Conference by December 1977.⁷⁷ In making this move, which brought the USSR back into the heart of the Middle East peacemaking process for the first time since 1973,⁷⁸ the Carter Administration clearly sought to create a climate of cooperation with the USSR and in this atmosphere both superpowers agreed to continue abiding by the SALT I agreement even though it formally expired on October 3rd,⁷⁹ moved ahead on their SALT II negotiations, and also moved ahead in the negotiations on limiting naval forces in the Indian Ocean.⁸⁰

It was in this general thrust of policy, that the Carter Administration requested that Congress consider changing the Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the trade bill so as to reverse the need for Soviet emigration assurances. Instead, the President was to be allowed to grant tariff benefits on an annual basis if he determined emigration levels were "adequate".⁸¹

Perhaps as a result of this shift in Administration policy, or because of the Helsinki follow-up meeting in the fall in Belgrade, Jewish emigration rose by almost 2,500 in 1977 to a total of 16,736, upon from 14,261 in 1976, with a noticeable increase taking place in the latter half of the year when Soviet-American relations began to improve.⁸²

The improvement in Soviet-American relations, however, was soon to be disrupted by events in the Middle East and by a further Soviet crackdown on dissidents, including Jewish dissidents. Thus Anwar Sadat changed the face of Middle East diplomacy by his historic trip to Jerusalem, an event which once again was to

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relegate Moscow to the sidelines in Middle East diplomacy -- a development strongly protested by Moscow. Interestingly enough, however, Moscow was to profit, albeit only temporarily, from the anti-Sadat alignment of Arab states which was to form in response to the Egyptian leader's trip to Jerusalem and the subsequent Camp David agreements.⁸³ The issue, however, that was to sharply worsen Soviet-American relations was the massive Soviet intervention into the Horn of Africa. Beginning one week after Sadat's visit to Jerusalem, Moscow airlifted some 20,000 Cuban soldiers to Ethiopia, together with 3,000 Soviet military technicians and large amounts of military equipment. The USSR also provided three Soviet generals to direct the Ethiopian army as it moved from the defensive onto the offensive against Somalia with whom it had been fighting a border war, and with Soviet and Cuban aid, by March, Somalia had been driven out of Ethiopia.⁸⁴

The sharp influx of Soviet and Cuban forces into Ethiopia, the second such Soviet move in Africa since 1975, precipitated a major outcry in Washington, although the American reaction was to be a very confused one, and it was to be the very confusion of American policy on the Horn of Africa which helped ensure the success of the Soviet venture. In the first place, the Administration seemed confused over whether or not to arm Somalia, first promising the Somalis arms and then retracting the promise.⁸⁵ Secondly, the Administration seemed divided over how to respond to the Soviet intervention. Thus, on January 12th, President Carter, again in a highly optimistic statement asserted "I hope we can induce the Soviets and Cubans not to send either soldiers or weapons into that area".⁸⁶ When Moscow ignored Carter's statement, a dispute broke out in the Administration as how best to respond to the Soviet move with Zbigniew Brzezinski publicly calling for a linkage to the SALT talks and Andrew Young and Cyrus Vance opposing such a policy. Carter himself seemed to come down on the side of the doves by stating at a press conference on March 2nd that there was no Administra-

tion policy of linkage between the Soviet involvement in the Horn and SALT.⁸⁷ One week later, however, at another news conference in which he announced that Somalia was withdrawing from Ethiopia, he stated his hope that once Ethiopian forces had re-established control over their own country, "withdrawal of the Soviet and Cuban combat presence should begin".⁸⁸ This was to turn out to be yet another case of unwarranted optimism. Indeed, the only concrete step the U.S. was finally to take in response to the Cuban/Soviet move into Ethiopia was to temporarily discontinue talks on arms limitation in the Indian Ocean.

Moscow, by contrast, was pursuing a consistent policy. By February 1978, it seemed to be utilizing Carter's hopes for a quick SALT accord as a cover for its activities in Africa and it sought to put the Carter Administration on the defensive for not doing enough to achieve SALT. Thus Pravda in a major editorial on February 11th at the height of the Soviet build-up in Ethiopia blamed the U.S. for the talks' standstill. It also noted that while Carter had publicly stressed the importance of achieving a new SALT agreement "from the standpoint of ensuring security for the U.S. itself and from the standpoint of the positive development of Soviet-American relations", "practical deeds" had to follow up such statements. Three weeks after denouncing Brzezinski's attempts at linking SALT to Soviet policy in the Horn of Africa, Pravda sought to demonstrate that many Americans, including President Carter, opposed such linkage as well, thus underlining the confusion in the American Administration over the issue.⁸⁹

In a response to the Soviet activities in Africa and propaganda on SALT, Carter gave a major speech on national defense at Wake Forest University on March 17, 1978.⁹⁰ After discussing the rise in Soviet military power, he warned the USSR that while the U.S. was prepared "to cooperate with the Soviet Union toward common social, scientific and economic goals", if Moscow "failed to

demonstrate restraint in missile programs and other force levels and in the projection of Soviet or proxy forces into other lands and continents, then popular support for such cooperation with the Soviets will certainly erode." Carter went on to say that even while the U.S. was searching for arms control agreements, it would continue to modernize its strategic system and revitalize its conventional forces.

Moscow reacted forcefully to Carter's speech, with Pravda claiming on March 19th that he was shifting emphasis from efforts to achieve arms control to "a course of threats and the aggravation of tension". In a more extensive critique, Arbatov, writing in Pravda on March 28th, attacked the U.S. for creating "dangerous new types of weapons, such as the neutron bomb", and for the efforts of some "leading" Administration figures to link SALT with the "course of events in the Horn of Africa". Finally, Arbatov issued a thinly veiled warning that the time had come for:

a choice of a path for the years to come: either an agreement on the basis of which one can make progress in the area of arms limitation and reduction and the development of peaceful and mutually advantageous cooperation, or the rejection of an accord, which would mean the torpedoing of the Soviet-American dialogue on fundamental questions of the two powers security and international security, and a significant worsening of the overall atmosphere in relations between the USSR and the U.S. 91

From Moscow's viewpoint, these repeated warnings may well have had some effect because on April 7th Carter announced he was deferring production of the neutron bomb -- a weapon long feared by the USSR. Just as in the case of the B-1 bomber decision, Moscow may have seen the Carter action as a response to Soviet pressure, since it appeared to reverse the Wake Forest assertion that the U.S. was continuing to modernize its strategic forces, and because the USSR had mounted such a major propaganda campaign in the West against the weapon. Interestingly enough, however, just as Moscow had publicly deprecated Carter's B-1 bomber decision, ~~so too~~ did it minimize the importance of the neutron bomb

deferment, with Pravda on April 9th complaining that the decision did not affect work on the development of neutron warhead carriers. Brezhnev, in a speech to the Young Communist League Congress in late April, however, did make a gesture in response to Carter's action by stating that the USSR would not produce the neutron bomb if the U.S. did not.⁹² The U.S., however, was well ahead of the USSR in neutron bomb research and development at the time of Brezhnev's "concession", and the value of the Soviet move was, therefore, doubtful. The Soviet leader also reported some progress in the SALT talks as a result of the Vance visit to Moscow in April.

Once again, however, a Third World dispute was to lead to a further deterioration of Soviet-American relations. Thus when Zaire rebels, operating out of Angola, attacked the mineral-rich province of Katanga in Zaire, the U.S. blamed the USSR, since Angola was allied to the Soviet bloc and the rebels had been trained by Cuba which had a large military force in Angola.⁹³ The U.S., in an effort to stop the invasion, organized a force of African soldiers who, together with Belgian and French troops, succeeded in repulsing the invaders. This American move to reverse the unfavorable flow of events in Africa was severely denounced by Moscow which claimed the USSR had nothing to do with the invasion and Moscow also criticized the NATO decision to increase defense expenditures by 3% annually, a development which, if not precipitated by the Soviet moves in Africa (the budget rise had been under discussion for some time), certainly was enhanced by it.

Nonetheless, despite the Soviet activity in Africa, Carter clung to his "no linkage" position and stated, in a press conference on May 25th, that the "SALT agreement is so important for our country, for the safety of the entire world, that we ought not to let any impediment come between us and the reaching of a successful agreement".⁹⁴

The American President, however, then appeared to sharply qualify this position by asserting:

But there is no doubt that if the Soviets continue to abuse human rights, to punish people who are monitoring the Soviets compliance with the Helsinki Agreement (Yuri Orlov had just been sentenced to 7 years in jail), which they signed of their own free will, and unless they show some constraints on their own involvement in Africa and on their sending Cuban troops to be involved in Africa, it will make it much more difficult to conclude a SALT agreement and to have it ratified once it is written.

In viewing the contradictory nature of the Carter speech, the Soviet leaders may well have been a bit puzzled. Nonetheless, on the basis of Carter's previous concessions on human rights, the B-1, and the neutron bomb, they may well have assumed that Carter would once again back down if the USSR pressed hard enough -- particularly in threatening a collapse of the SALT talks, which Carter had publicly stated he wanted so much. Consequently, beginning in the late spring of 1978 Moscow stepped up its persecution of the Soviet dissidents, including Jewish dissidents. Nonetheless, as it mounted its campaign against the dissidents, Moscow had to be aware of a new development that was likely to affect Soviet-American relations, the move toward a closer relationship between the United States and China, and Moscow was to couple its crackdown on the Soviet dissidents with warnings to the U.S. not to get too closely involved with China lest SALT be harmed.

By February 1978, the post-Mao succession struggle in China had finally ended with the team of Hua Kuofeng and Teng Hsiao Ping now clearly in charge. At the 5th National Peoples Congress which met in February, Hua set forth a program calling for the rapid modernization of agriculture, industry, national defense and science and technology, and the Chinese government announced a heightened interest in Western credits and technology.⁹⁵ At the same time, China rejected a Soviet request for improved relations, setting forth the condition that no improvement would be possible unless the Soviets made a major withdrawal from Chinese borders. The pro-Soviet coup d'etat in Afghanistan in April 1978 heightened Chinese suspicions of Moscow as did a Soviet raid across the Ussuri

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River in early May (despite a Soviet apology). Therefore, when Carter's National Security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, by now a bete noire of the Russians (Moscow's clear favorite in the Administration was Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, a "realist") made a visit to China in late May, the stage was set for a rapid improvement of Sino-American relations. The first fruits of this development were to come on June 8th when the United States approved a sale to China of infrared scanning equipment which it had denied to the USSR. Meanwhile, Carter had issued yet another speech in an effort to clarify American policy toward the Soviet Union, this time at the U.S. Naval Academy at Annapolis on June 7th.⁹⁶ Once again, as in the case of the Wake Forest speech, he seemed to give the USSR a choice between increased cooperation and confrontation, although there were some additional nuances. Thus he indicated that while the U.S. wanted to increase collaboration with the USSR, it also wanted to do so with China. In addition, while citing the huge losses suffered by the USSR in World War II and his conviction that the people of the Soviet Union wanted peace, he also strongly criticized the USSR for exploiting areas of instability in the world, and for the first time in his Presidency, he came close to joining the school of thought which saw Soviet policy as essentially offensive when he stated "to the Soviet Union, detente seems to mean a continuing aggressive struggle for political advantage and increased influence". He also again denounced the "abuse of basic human rights" in the USSR and the Soviet attempts "to export a totalitarian and repressive form of government". Nonetheless, he reiterated his call for improved relations with Moscow and once again stated that the U.S. had "no desire to link the negotiations for a SALT agreement with other competitive relationships".

The first official answer to Carter came in a Pravda editorial on June 17th which asserted some linkage requirements of its own as far as SALT was concerned by warning the U.S. against playing the "China card":

Washington's latest intrigues, or to be more exact, "petty intrigues" with China do not in the least serve to strengthen confidence. In and of itself, the desire to play the "China card" in the global game is nothing new for American politicians. But until now, it seemed that U.S. leaders were aware that they could not play that card without endangering the cause of peace and indeed, without danger to themselves and to the United States' own national interest.

To all appearances, however, certain officials who occupy important positions in Washington are now so overwhelmed with anti-Soviet emotions that these dangers are being ignored. These officials are closing their eyes to the fact that alignment with China on an anti-Soviet basis would close off the possibility of cooperation with the Soviet Union in reducing the threat of nuclear war and, of course, limiting arms.⁹⁷

Brezhnev himself, in a major speech in Minsk a week later, reiterated the Soviet warning against playing the "China card".⁹⁸ Interestingly enough, however, he also drew attention to a major Soviet initiative at the MBFR talks in Vienna where Moscow offered to withdraw three divisions and 1,000 tanks from Eastern Europe. While this may have been a ploy to divide the U.S. from its European allies which had more to lose if detente weakened, it might also have been a recognition of the fact that the possible entente between the U.S. and China required a further reinforcement of the Chinese front, particularly at a time when Soviet manpower resources were becoming strained. Nonetheless, the "China card" issue in Soviet-American relations was temporarily to pale as the dispute over human rights increased in intensity during the summer.

The Soviet harassment of dissidents in the late spring and summer of 1978 differed from the anti-dissident campaign in the early months of the Carter Administration. This time, not only were Soviet dissidents persecuted (by June, Orlov had been sentenced to prison, and Vladimir Slepak and Ida Nudel, leading Jewish "refusniks", had been arrested), but so too were Americans who resided in the USSR. Thus, on June 12th, less than a week after the Annapolis speech, Francis Crawford, Deputy head of the International Harvester Company office in Moscow, was arrested for currency speculation. Two weeks later, two U.S. news-

paper correspondents, Hal Piper and Craig Whitney were accused by a Moscow court of libeling Soviet T.V., a Soviet action highly inconsistent with the Helsinki Agreement. While the Soviet actions may have been a response to the American arrest of two low-level Soviet U.N. aides for espionage, it may also have been intended as a test of the American willingness to continue its defense of human rights by signalling to Carter that Americans who lived in Moscow might become fair game in such a situation. Nonetheless, despite these events, during the early stages of the revived anti-dissident drive Carter continued to sound optimistic about relations with the USSR, stating on June 26th, "I have a deep belief that the underlying relationship between ourselves and the Soviets is stable and that Mr. Brezhnev, along with myself, wants peace and wants to have better friendship".⁹⁹ He added once again that the U.S. opposed linkage and that it "never tried to threaten the Soviet Union" and "never held out the prospect of increased or decreased trade if they did or did not do a certain thing that we thought was best". Carter added at the news conference that he hoped that he and Brezhnev might meet personally to ratify the SALT agreement. In addition to such verbal gestures with which President Carter sought to once again assure the USSR of America's good intentions, U.S. Ambassador to Moscow Malcolm Toon refrained from emphasizing the human rights issue in a T.V. address on Moscow T.V. on American Independence Day, July 4th.

Perhaps encouraged by this apparent softness of the American position on human rights, Moscow then announced the treason trial of Anatoly Sharansky, the Jewish dissident, a man whom President Carter had publicly stated was not involved with the CIA. (In addition, two Jews were sentenced to death for so-called "economic crimes" in a trial where 44 of the 52 defendants were Jews.)¹⁰⁰ In trying Sharansky for treason, thereby in effect calling Carter a liar, however, Moscow went too far, even for Carter who can be said to have leaned over backwards in search of good relations with the USSR up to this point. Despite the

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fact that American U.N. Ambassador Andrew Young's statement that there were "hundreds and perhaps thousands of people" in American prisons whom he would call political prisoners, weakened the American protest against Sharansky's jailing (the Soviet media gave extensive coverage to Young's comments),¹⁰¹ Carter nonetheless decided to do more than merely verbally protest. Thus he cancelled a sale of a sophisticated computer system to Moscow and announced he was reviewing the sale of highly sophisticated oil drilling equipment, thus depriving the USSR of the American equipment which Moscow needed the most (the USSR was far behind the U.S. in both computer technology and in sophisticated oil drilling equipment). Carter further hit the USSR in areas of Soviet-American relations in which Moscow stood to gain the most by cancelling a Moscow visit by his science advisor, Frank Press (who had just visited Peking), as well as American participation in the scheduled sixth session of the joint Soviet-American commission on scientific and technological cooperation.¹⁰² Even these gestures, however, were weakened when Carter sent Secretary of State Vance to Geneva for another SALT meeting at the very height of the furor over the harassment of the Soviet dissidents and American reporters. Moscow took note of this, and reiterated Vance's statement that the SALT talks, because of their enormous importance for the maintenance of peace, should not be "linked to other questions".¹⁰³ Another weakness of Carter's policy, however, at least as probably seen from Moscow, came in his decision to once again allow the sale of oil field equipment to Moscow after Crawford was given a suspended sentence and the two American reporters were given small fines. While the Americans had gotten out of trouble, the Soviet dissident Ginsburg, and the "refusniks" Sharansky, Slepak, Nudel and others remained in jail, and American willingness to once again send the oil equipment despite their continued imprisonment may well have signalled to the Russians that Carter would not use American trade pressure on behalf of Soviet

dissidents, and that his human rights policies would again be limited to verbiage. Indeed, in a press conference on August 17th, Carter had said:

We obviously don't have any inclination to declare a trade embargo against the USSR to stop all trade. It is to the advantage of our own country to trade with the Soviet Union. I think embargoes that have been enforced in the past by previous administrations, for instance, unannounced and unilateral (embargoes) of shipments of feed grains and food grains and soybeans overseas has been very detrimental to our country. I do not intend to do that.¹⁰⁴

In sum, therefore, the USSR had mounted a major anti-dissident campaign in the face of American protests. While Moscow may have felt that once again it had successfully pressured the American President into retreating in his human rights efforts, as Carter reversed his position taken in the May 25th news conference that Soviet human rights violations would "make it much more difficult to conclude a SALT agreement", the Soviet leaders were to prove less successful in preventing Washington from playing the "China card", a development that threatened Soviet security in Asia.

Indeed, from the Soviet perspective, the situation in Asia seemed to be rapidly deteriorating. Not only had the United States and China entered into a more friendly relationship, but Japan and China were also moving closer together. On August 12th, Japan and China signed a Friendship and Cooperation Treaty in Peking, which Pravda was to label as anti-Soviet because it contained an "anti-hegemony" article which was seen as directed against the USSR.¹⁰⁵ Soon afterwards Chinese Premier Hua visited Rumania, Yugoslavia and Iran, an action which further aroused Soviet ire. Meanwhile, the USSR sought to counter the Chinese rapprochement with Japan by trying to improve its own relations with the economically potent island nation, but these efforts proved unsuccessful when Japan refused to sign a cooperation treaty with Moscow unless the USSR agreed to return the four small islands just north of Japan which the USSR had seized at the end of World War II, something the USSR was unwilling to do. Adding further to the pressure on Moscow at this time was Carter's unexpected decision on October 18th

to go ahead with production of the neutron bomb, although he somewhat qualified this move by stipulating that the components would be stockpiled instead of inserted into warheads. ¹⁰⁶

Interestingly enough, however, possibly because Washington had played its "China card", or because of concern over the neutron bomb, Moscow became more forthcoming in the SALT talks and only a week after the neutron bomb decision Pravda reported that progress had been made in the talks. ¹⁰⁷ At the same time there was another sharp increase in the number of Jews being allowed to leave the Soviet Union (the emigres included Benyamin Levich, a prominent Jewish "refusnik" scientist who had been denied permission to leave for seven years, and Boris and Natalia Katz). ¹⁰⁸ Thus while only 1,899 Jews had been allowed to leave in July 1978, that figure rose to 3,286 in October and 4,197 in December -- more than double the July exodus which had been the monthly average from January to July.

In any case, while seeking to push ahead on SALT, Moscow was also moving to enhance its position in Asia. Thus soon after Japan refused the offer of a treaty with the USSR, Moscow moved to sign one with Vietnam whose relations with China had become increasingly strained. The apparent goal of the treaty, when coupled with the large shipments of Soviet weapons to Hanoi in the fall of 1978, was to confront China with a powerful enemy on another border, thereby compelling China to deploy its military forces accordingly. ¹⁰⁹ Soon after the signing of the treaty, Vietnam invaded China's ally, Cambodia, apparently on the assumption that its treaty with Moscow would deter the Chinese from any counterinvasion. China, however, then played its "Washington card" by indicating its willingness to normalize relations with the United States by making concessions on the Taiwan issue. The United States responded affirmatively and on December 15th came the joint announcement that formal Sino-American diplomatic relations would be established on January 1, 1979, while U.S.-Taiwanese relations would

be terminated the same day, although the U.S. would continue to maintain "commercial, cultural, trade and other (military) relations with Taiwan".¹¹⁰

As might be expected, Moscow did not look very favorably on the acceleration of the Sino-American rapprochement, although Carter, in his typically optimistic fashion, reported that he had received a "very positive" message from Brezhnev on the development. Moscow Radio, however, and Pravda were quick to present a different interpretation of Brezhnev's message, noting that Brezhnev had stated that the Soviet Union would very closely follow how Sino-American relations would develop and would "draw the appropriate conclusions for Soviet policy".¹¹¹ A central Soviet concern about the rapprochement was expressed in a Moscow Radio broadcast by Valentin Zorin which indicated that Moscow was quite worried that the Chinese would now find it easier to acquire Western arms and modern military technology.¹¹² Other Soviet media expressed the concern that a military bloc of China, Japan and the U.S. might be forming.¹¹³ These fears were undoubtedly exacerbated during Teng Tsaio Ping's late January visit to the United States in which the Chinese leader used the opportunity to appeal to the U.S. to join a common anti-Soviet front. While the U.S. officially disassociated itself from Teng's anti-Soviet remarks, the fact that the joint communique issued at the close of his trip called for joint opposition to efforts to establish "hegemony", indicated to Moscow that the U.S. seemed to be supporting China's anti-Soviet stand.¹¹⁴

Fortunately for Moscow, however, subsequent events were to lessen its concern both about the Asian strategic situation and the Sino-American alignment, albeit only temporarily. Thus less than two weeks after the end of Teng's visit to Washington, China invaded Vietnam with the apparent goal of getting the Vietnamese to pull out of Cambodia thereby allowing China's ally, the Pol Pot regime, which was fighting a guerrilla war against the Vietnamese, to regain power. If this was indeed the Chinese goal, it failed and after several weeks of fighting,

China was compelled to withdraw its forces from North Vietnam although it stated that it was successful in "punishing Vietnam". Nonetheless, Vietnamese forces remained in Cambodia and the Vietnamese army had proven itself at least the equal of the Chinese. At the same time, there was clear embarrassment in Washington over the Chinese move and Moscow may well have thought that the Chinese invasion would slow the Sino-American rapprochement.¹¹⁵ As far as Sino-Soviet relations were concerned, while Moscow issued several warnings to China during the invasion, the period of fighting was so short the USSR did not have to follow through on its warnings. In addition, while China moved after the war to denounce its 1950 treaty with the USSR, it also called for new talks with Moscow, this time without the preconditions demanded in 1978. Moscow could only be heartened by this Chinese retreat, and by the subsequent Chinese government announcement that its 1978 modernization goals had been too ambitious and that they would have to be revised downward.¹¹⁶

In sum, while China remained a major threat to the Kremlin, and U.S. Vice-President Walter Mondale's visit to China in the summer of 1979 signalled the continuation of cordial relations, the immediacy of the danger precipitated by the Sino-Japanese treaty and the Sino-American rapprochement seemed to have been, at least temporarily, averted.

Nonetheless, for the first time since the 1971-72 period the three main factors which had caused the Soviet leadership to permit large numbers of Soviet Jews to emigrate in the early 1970's were again present; Soviet fear of a Sino-American alliance, the Soviet desire for a SALT treaty, and an American Administration willing to grant the USSR trade benefits, were again operative factors in the Soviet-American relationship. By the early spring of 1979, the SALT talks were in their final stage, the U.S. Commerce Department permitted the computer sale which had been cancelled in 1978, and there was a growing (albeit not yet majority) sentiment in Congress to raise the \$300 million limit

on grants to the USSR as well as lift the Jackson-Vanik Amendment.¹¹⁷ In such a situation, Jewish emigration from the USSR again increased (it was to reach a record 51,320 in 1979) and Brezhnev made a number of other gestures to the U.S. on the Soviet Jewry issue by pardoning five Soviet Jews involved in the alleged hijacking of the Soviet airliner in 1970 (Boris Penson, Anatoly Altman, Arieh Knokh, Wolf Zalmanson and Hillel Butman), who were then allowed to go to Israel. He also traded Soviet Jewish activists Eduard Kuznetsov and Mark Dymshitz, both of whom had originally been sentenced to death in 1970 for their roles in the alleged hijack attempt, along with Russian dissident Aleksander Ginzburg, Ukrainian Nationalist Valentin Moroz, and Ukrainian Baptist Georgi Vins (all of whom were well-known Soviet dissidents) for the two Soviet spies caught in the United States. It does not seem accidental that these actions of Brezhnev coincided with the Moscow visit of a U.S. Congressional delegation which included Charles Vanik, co-author of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment.¹¹⁸ It should be noted, however, that while the emigration of Soviet Jews reached record heights, and a few well-known dissidents were released, there was no let-up on the crackdown on Soviet Jewish and non-Jewish dissidents, including long-term "refusniks" as the Soviet leadership clearly separated the emigration issue from that of the dissidents. In addition, there was a rising tide of anti-semitic propaganda published in the USSR and a new Soviet citizenship law was put into effect that held the possibility of hampering future Jewish emigration.¹¹⁹

Nonetheless, despite the harassment of Soviet dissidents, the overall atmosphere for Soviet-American relations had been greatly improved from its low point in April 1977 and it was not long before the negotiations on SALT II were completed and a date was set for a summit between Carter and Brezhnev to sign the agreement.

The SALT agreement has been discussed in great depth elsewhere and need not be gone into in any detail here. Suffice it to say that the agreement

appeared to be a compromise between the two sides, establishing equal ceilings on MIRVed missile totals and delivery systems. Nonetheless the United States conceded to Moscow a larger number of "heavy" missiles (which could threaten U.S. land-based ICBMs), although there was a limit on how many warheads could be carried per missile. In addition the backfire bomber was not included as a delivery vehicle while the American cruise missile was. However, Moscow agreed not to step up its production of the medium-range (though refuelable) bomber, and the American forward based systems were also not included in the agreement.

The summit took place in Vienna (reportedly out of deference to Brezhnev's health) although this was yet another protocol concession on the part of the United States since it was Brezhnev's turn to go to the United States. Of particular interest was Carter's speech during the summit's first day where, again expressing an optimistic view, he stated the hope that "our new SALT treaty could provide the basic framework we seek to reduce tension and conflict throughout the world".¹²⁰

Indeed, in an apparent effort to entice the USSR to take a more cooperative position in the Third World, the U.S. made several concessions to Moscow during the summit. Thus Carter agreed to the resumption of the naval limitation talks in the Indian Ocean which had been interrupted after the Soviet and Cuban intervention in Ethiopia, despite the fact that the Cubans remained in Ethiopia in large numbers. In addition, the U.S. publicly committed itself to strengthen trade ties with Moscow, and "recognized the necessity" of working for the "elimination of obstacles to mutually beneficial trade and financial relations".¹²¹

Thus Vienna ended with a few more American concessions than Soviet ones, but with the expressed hope by President Carter that not only would Soviet-American relations improve, but that the USSR would show restraint in the Third World. Such, however, was not to be the case.

One of the areas of increasing contention between the USSR and the United States was Afghanistan. Noor Mohammed Taraki who had seized power in a military

coup in April 1978 and who had signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the USSR in December 1978, was in deep trouble. Although Soviet military aid and advisors had poured into the country after the coup, and Taraki had begun to institute major land reform and social reform programs in the rural areas of Afghanistan, he had incurred the wrath of the Islamic religious leaders as well as tribal leaders who resisted Kabul's efforts to extend its control to their areas. It was not long before virtually the entire country was in a state of rebellion. Moscow blamed the turmoil on outside forces, including Egypt, the United States and Pakistan and as the summer of 1979 progressed, Moscow followed up warnings against "outside intervention" in Afghanistan by increasing still further its military involvement in that country,¹²² thereby disregarding a series of American statements opposing the heightened Soviet military commitment. Thus in a speech on August 2nd, Brzezinski, citing "prudent" American restraint during the Iranian crisis, said "We expect others similarly to abstain from intervention and from efforts to impose alien doctrines on deeply religious and nationally conscious peoples".¹²³ Brzezinski's warning, however, was taken no more seriously by the Russians than Carter's plaintive hope of January 1978 that the Russians and Cubans would not get more heavily involved in Ethiopia. Indeed, several days after Brzezinski's statement, Soviet forces helped put down an attempted coup in Kabul,¹²⁴ and the build-up of Soviet military advisors and military equipment increased, although the rebels continued to score victories against the highly unpopular Taraki regime, and against Taraki's successor, Hafiz Amin, who overthrew Taraki in mid-September.

If Moscow disregarded American warnings about Afghanistan, it acted similarly during the imbroglio over the "Soviet Brigade" in Cuba. When Carter proclaimed that the U.S. found the "status quo of the Soviet brigade in Cuba unacceptable" -- despite the fact that the brigade did not violate the Khrushchev-Kennedy understanding of 1962 -- the American President soon had to back down when the USSR stood firm, thus, in effect, accepting the status quo that he previously said he

found "unacceptable". The end result was that the Soviet brigade in Cuba stayed in place (although Carter promised it would be watched closely and a new U.S. Caribbean Joint Task Force would be created) and Carter pressed ahead to get the SALT agreement ratified -- despite a series of personal attacks on Carter in the Soviet press over the brigade issue.¹²⁵ Indeed, Moscow may have seen this as yet another example of Carter's weakness and vacillation, and Pravda on October 3rd noted that Carter in his speech announcing the end of the crisis "was forced to admit in his speech that the presence of Soviet military personnel at military training centers in Cuba, is certainly no reason to return to the cold war". The Pravda article also cited Carter's pleas to the Senate to ratify SALT II.

Almost as damaging to the credibility of the Administration during the summer of 1979 was the "Andrew Young affair", where the American U.N. Ambassador first said he had met accidentally with the PLO representative to the U.N., then admitted it had been a planned meeting, then resigned, and then stated that the State Department knew all along about the planned nature of the meeting, even though it violated both U.S. policy and a clear commitment to Israel. In watching the handling of the affair by the Carter Administration, Moscow may well have concluded that Carter's Administration was not only a vacillating one, but that the President could not control his chief assistants.¹²⁶

If the Soviet "Cuban Brigade" and Andrew Young affairs might have raised questions of Carter's competence in Moscow, there was no such questioning of the competence of the American farmer as Soviet orders for American grain spiralled because of another poor harvest in the USSR to 25 million tons by early October. The USSR also continued to hope for the lifting of trade restrictions, and Carter's decision to appoint former IBM Chairman Thomas Watson, an advocate of increased trade with the USSR, instead of a professional diplomat as Ambassador to Moscow, may have signalled to the Russians that the U.S. President was also

genuinely interested in an increase in trade. Nonetheless, Congress now seemed unwilling to grant Moscow "Most Favored Nation" status, a development that must have seemed galling to the USSR since China seemed well on its way to achieving just such a status.

If Moscow was unhappy over the lack of Congressional action on trade, it was even more unhappy with Congressional opposition to the SALT II treaty.¹²⁷ Indeed, after the treaty was signed, Soviet leaders warned the Senate against any changes, and visits by Senate Majority leader Robert Byrd and Senators Joseph Biden and Richard Luger did little to change the official Soviet attitude. Meanwhile, Moscow could not have been too pleased with President Carter either for the actions he was taking in the area of strategic weaponry. Gone were the days of unilateral concessions such as over the B-1 bomber and neutron bomb. Indeed, Carter decided, in an action that was clearly within the letter of the SALT II agreement -- although Russia said it was against the spirit of the agreement -- to push ahead with the mobile MX ICBM which was seen as a hedge against any Soviet first strike against the increasingly vulnerable U.S. land based ICBM force. In addition, Carter announced his agreement to a 5% increase in overall defense spending (hitherto he had wanted only a 3% increase). The USSR attacked both actions as a pay-off to the hawks to get SALT II approved by the Senate.¹²⁸ The development that seemed to anger Moscow the most, however, was Carter's efforts to get NATO to agree to deploy in Western Europe U.S. medium range ballistic missiles (Pershing II's) and ground-launched cruise missiles that had the capability of hitting the USSR.

While Moscow was later to claim that the NATO decision to accept the deployment of the nuclear tipped Pershing and cruise missiles and the Senate's stalling on SALT and trade were the reasons for the sharp deterioration of Soviet-American relations in 1980, the real reason was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan which took place at the end of 1979. In response to the Soviet action, President

Carter announced the withdrawal of the SALT II treaty from Senate consideration, imposed a partial grain embargo and a high technology export ban, and cancelled U.S. participation in the Moscow Olympics. At the same time, the U.S. Academy of Sciences announced a suspension of scientific exchanges with the USSR. In addition, the U.S. stepped up its search for Middle East bases for its newly-created rapid deployment force and sought to arrange an anti-Soviet alliance of Muslim states in the Middle East. For its part, the Soviet leaders called the U.S. an "unreliable partner" and took the opportunity to exile the Soviet Union's leading dissident Andrei Sakharov from Moscow to the city of Gorky. As Soviet-American relations deteriorated, so too did conditions for Soviet Jews. Not only did emigration drop sharply (to a total of 21,471 in 1980 with only 789 leaving in November and 889 in December), there was an increase in the harassment of "refusniks" such as Viktor Brailovsky.¹²⁹ While Moscow may have felt that the vacillating Carter Administration would again move to seek improved relations with the USSR, in this case they were mistaken and relations plummeted almost to the level of the Cold War. Then, in November, came the election of Ronald Reagan, a confirmed anti-Soviet political figure far to the right of Carter. While Moscow may have entertained the hope that Reagan would be another Nixon, the initial acts and statements by the President-elect and his hard-line Secretary of State Alexander Haig, were very strongly anti-Soviet, and reminded many observers of John Foster Dulles's comments and actions in the early 1950's, a time when the Cold War was in full swing. Indeed, it was not long before Soviet-American relations deteriorated further, a development that led to a further diminution in the Soviet Jewish exodus.

V. The Reagan Administration

When the Reagan Administration took office, the Soviet government, evidently feared that the President, elected with a large popular mandate and pledged to increase defense spending and to a harder line toward the USSR, would escalate the arms race at a time of serious economic difficulty in the USSR. Therefore Moscow sent a series of signals to the U.S. in quest of an improved relationship. Speaking at the 26th CPSU Party Congress, Brezhnev devoted a great deal of space to the need for a new strategic arms agreement with the United States and he also appealed for improvement in Soviet-American relations as a whole. The Soviet leader followed up this appeal by offering to meet Reagan in a Summit Conference -- a marked Soviet departure from the Carter period when the former American President had appealed -- in vain -- to Moscow for a summit during his first two years in office. In another move to improve Soviet-American relations, the USSR sent a series of signals to the American Jewish community in an effort to influence the Reagan Administration to take a softer line. Thus the Soviet representative at the Helsinki follow-up meeting in Madrid, S. A. Kondrachev, in November 1980, stated, "the more detente prospers, the more Basket Three (which deals with emigration among other human rights issues) prospers. Thus those circles who do not want detente also limit the implementation of Basket Three."¹³⁰ A second signal to the American Jewish community came in the unusual (for the CPSU) denunciation of anti-Semitism, in Brezhnev's 26th Party Congress address. The fact that a high ranking member of the Soviet Embassy, Sergei Rogov, made a special point of informing major American Jewish organizations such as B'nai B'rith of Brezhnev's public denunciation of anti-Semitism, clearly indicates that Moscow wished to highlight this point.¹³¹ Yet another Soviet signal was the release of Yosif Mendelevich, the last of the Jewish participants in the alleged 1970 airplane highjacking, from jail and granting of permission for him to emigrate to Israel.

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It seems clear why Moscow was sending these signals. With the Soviet economy, and particularly its agricultural sector, weak; with a popular U.S. President pledging sharply increased defense spending now in office, and with the USSR continuing to fear a closer Sino-U.S. tie, the Soviet leaders wanted to improve Soviet-American relations. Yet, while at the beginning of his administration Reagan appeared thereby to have a certain amount of leverage in dealing with the USSR -- at least in the area of obtaining an increase in the Soviet Jewish exodus -- such was not to be the case. While it is still too early to make a definitive evaluation of the Reagan Administration's policy toward the USSR, and, in any case, consideration of space precludes such an analysis in this paper; nonetheless, certain things do appear clear. In the first place Reagan succeeded in dissipating much of the leverage which he could have used. As far as the Sino-Soviet-U.S. triangle was concerned, despite U.S. offers to sell Peking arms, Sino-American relations were clearly troubled during the first two years of the Reagan Presidency over the Administration's handling of the Taiwan issue. As might be expected, Moscow repeatedly sought to exploit this situation to improve relations with China. While Peking has not yet taken up Moscow's offers, it has distanced itself somewhat from Washington, thus reducing the leverage Reagan might have had by a prospective Sino-American alignment.

In the area of nuclear armaments, Reagan's generally bellicose statements (and those of his advisers) helped lead to the growth of the nuclear freeze movement in the U.S., as well as to opposition in Western Europe to the planned deployment of U.S. Pershing II and Cruise missiles. As this political opposition grew, Reagan found himself pressured into a more rapid agreement to resuming the strategic arms limitation talks (he called them START talks) than he might have wished to be. As far as the Carter-imposed partial grain embargo was concerned, Reagan unilaterally lifted it (primarily under pressure

from U.S. farmers) without apparently seeking any quid pro quo in return.¹³² Indeed, U.S. actions toward Moscow in both the strategic arms and trade areas seemed to belie Reagan's statement at a Holocaust ceremony early in his Presidency:

"Never shall it be forgotten for a moment that wherever it is taking place in the world, the persecution of people for whatever reason -- persecution of people for their religious belief -- that is a matter to be on (the) negotiating table or the United States does not belong at that negotiating table".¹³³

If the issue of Soviet Jewry received little, if any, emphasis during discussions of either strategic arms or the sale of grain, where the U.S. had leverage (indeed, more than a few observers openly questioned the Reagan Administration's commitment to human rights issues), the continuing deterioration of Soviet-American relations in other spheres was not conducive to improving the chances for Soviet Jews to leave the country. Whether on petty issues, such as the denial of Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin the right to park in the State Department garage, or on more serious ones such as the refusal to renew the U.S.-USSR agreements on science and technology, energy, and the use of outer space for peaceful purposes, as well as the Reagan campaign against the gas pipeline which the West Europeans are building for the USSR, the United States gave Moscow little hope that Soviet-American relations would improve. To be sure, by remaining in Afghanistan, by engineering the martial law crackdown in Poland, and by sending increased amounts of sophisticated military equipment to Cuba, Moscow was doing more than its share to maintain the cold war atmosphere between the two countries. Nonetheless, in such an atmosphere the chances of a significant number of Soviet Jews being allowed to leave the USSR were not great and as the statistics in Annex I indicate, the Soviet Jewish exodus declined precipitously during the first year of the Reagan Administration, a development that has continued to this time (September 1, 1982), although because of the lifting of the partial grain embargo, Soviet-American trade actually rose.

This brief analysis of the Reagan Administration's policy affords a useful point of departure for drawing some conclusions about the role of Soviet Jewry in the Soviet-American relationship.

VI. Conclusions:

What then can be concluded about the significance of Soviet Jewry as a factor in Soviet-American relations. In the first place, despite their protestations to the contrary, it is clear that the Soviet leaders have been sensitive to Western interest and pressure on the issue of Soviet Jewry. In the case of Stalin, the Soviet leader sought to use Soviet Jews as a means of gaining Western support during World War II and established the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee for this purpose, but turned on the Jews sharply during the Cold War. Khrushchev, in the face of Western pressure, made some minor concessions to Soviet Jewry including the publication of a national Yiddish magazine, and the withdrawal from publication of a virulently anti-Semitic book. It was not until the time of Brezhnev, however, that the Soviet leadership was to show its greatest sensitivity on the issue of Soviet Jewry. Not only were large numbers of Soviet Jews allowed to emigrate, but the Soviet leaders also backed down from enforcing a "head tax" on prospective emigrants -- despite the fact that the tax had been published as a Soviet law.

To be sure, these concessions were not made out of humanitarianism. There were two concrete objectives which the Soviet leadership wanted: trade benefits from the U.S. and the conclusion of a SALT agreement, and the Soviet leaders were also very concerned about the possibility of a Sino-American alliance. When it looked as if Moscow might achieve its goals, and when Sino-American relations were becoming very close, as in the 1971-1973 and 1978-1979 periods, Soviet Jewish emigration skyrocketed. When one or more of these goals seemed out of reach, as in the 1975-1977 and 1980-1981 periods, Jewish emigration dropped sharply. In many ways, therefore, the emigration level serves as a

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barometer of Soviet-American relations, at least from the Soviet point of view.

If Western pressure -- or the Soviet desire for Western benefits -- have been instrumental in achieving the emigration of more than 250,000 Soviet Jews, these factors have been far less potent in improving the status of Judaism in the USSR. In part, this may be due to Soviet sensitivity on matters deemed "internal", as a threat to their control over Soviet society. It should be pointed out however that Moscow considered the emigration issue "internal", and yet proved willing to allow sizeable Jewish - and German - emigration. Another factor that might be operative is a lack of concerted human rights interest on the part of the United States on behalf of Soviet dissidents and Soviet Jews seeking to practice their Judaism in the USSR. During the Kissinger era, the U.S. tended to downplay human rights, and it was primarily Congressional pressure which forced the lifting of the "head tax". In the case of Jimmy Carter, while the former President started out strong on human rights, his efforts soon lagged as he appeared not only to vacillate on the issue (as he was to do on so many others), but also to allow himself to be browbeaten by the Soviet Union as he appeared to be on the B-1 bomber and, initially, on the neutron bomb. It remains to be seen, therefore, what would be the effect of a firm President who remained consistent in support of human rights in the Soviet Union, and linked U.S. trade and SALT benefits to such a policy and to Soviet adventures in the Third World (as Sakharov had called for back in 1973). Unfortunately, at least in his first two years, Ronald Reagan has not showed himself to be such a President. In any case, one thing is clear. For there to be continued Jewish emigration from the USSR, a modicum of civility in Soviet-American relations is necessary. For should Soviet-American relations deteriorate further into a new cold war, not only would an even more severe anti-Semitic campaign in the Soviet Union be expected, but a virtual end to Jewish emigration could also be a consequence.

ANNEX I

SOVIET-AMERICAN TRADE AND SOVIET JEWISH EMIGRATION
1969 - 1981 (trade in millions of rubles)

<u>Year</u>	<u>Soviet Exports to the U.S.</u>	<u>Soviet Imports from the U.S.</u>	<u>Total Trade</u>	<u>Soviet Jewish Emigrants</u>
1969	54.5	105.1	159.6	2,902
1970	57.8	103.1	160.9	1,044
1971	54.4	76.4	183.6	13,022
1972	129.2	461.4	537.8	31,681
1973	137.8	1,023.2	1,161.0	34,733
1974	177.3	564.9	742.2	20,628
1975	137.4	1,462.1	1,599.5	13,221
1976	198.7	2,006.8	2,205.5	14,261
1977	271.6	1,256.3	1,527.9	16,736
1978	253.1	1,599.3	1,852.4	28,864
1979	350.2	2,486.9	2,837.1	51,320
1980	151.0	1,351.5	1,502.5	21,471
1981	183.4	1,662.0	1,845.4	9,447

1. Sources on Soviet trade:

Vneshniaia Torgovlia SSSR Za 1970, 1972, 1974, 1976, 1978 and supplement to Soviet Foreign Trade, 1981, 1982

2. Sources on Soviet Jewish Emigrants:

a. 1969 and 1970, Paula Stern, Water's Edge: Domestic Politics and the Making of American Foreign Policy (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1979), p. 217.

b. 1971-1981, Soviet Jewry Research Bureau of the National Conference on Soviet Jewry, New York City.

Annex I to "Soviet Jewry and Soviet Foreign Policy: A Preliminary Analysis", a paper presented by Dr. Robert O. Freedman.

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Footnotes

1. Stalin is known to have commented, in reference to the large percentage of Jews in the Menshevik Faction at the Russian Social Democratic Party Congress of 1907, as compared to the Bolshevik Faction which was primarily Russian: "It would not be a bad idea for us, the Bolsheviks, to organize a pogrom in the Party". (Cited in William W. Orbach, The American Movement to Aid Soviet Jews (Amherst, Massachusetts: University of Massachusetts Press, 1979, p. 14)
2. For an excellent discussion of the rise and fall of the Evsektsiia, see Zvi Y. Gitelman, Jewish Nationality and Soviet Politics: The Jewish Sections of the CPSU 1917-1930 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972). The dissolution of the Evsektsiia is discussed in Chapter 8.
3. The best discussion of the origin and development of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee is found in Yehoshua Gilboa, The Black Years of Soviet Jewry (Boston: Little Brown, 1971), Chapter 2.
4. Ibid, p. 42
5. Ibid, p. 51
6. Zionist Archives (Jerusalem) Documents No. S25/486/17/7/1941; S25/486/13/10/41; S25/6600/4/5/47 - Skira I; S25/6660/5/47 - Skira II; S25/6600/5-6/47 - Skira III; and especially S25/9299/7/31/47 (report of a conversation between a high ranking Yishuv official (Eliahu Epstein) and the First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Washington.
7. The story is told in Gilboa, op.cit., chapters 7-10.
8. Ibid, p. 295
9. Jerusalem Post, February 3, 1961. Cited in William Korey, The Soviet Cage (New York: Viking Press, 1973), p. 35.
10. For a description of the matzot ban, see Korey, ibid, pp. 46-47 and Joshua Rothenberg, The Jewish Religion in the Soviet Union (New York: Ktav, 1971), pp. 85-88. The Brezhnev regime lifted the ban in 1969, although Soviet Jews still have difficulty getting sufficient matzot.
11. It should be noted that the book was published at a time when many Jews were being given the death penalty for alleged "economic crimes". For a description of these "crimes" see Korey, ibid, pp. 80-81.
12. For a description of Sino-Soviet relations at this time, see William Griffith, Sino-Soviet Relations, 1964-1965 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1967), chapter 2.
13. Cited in Korey, op.cit., p. 81.
14. See the description by Elie Wiesel, The Jews of Silence, (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966).

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15. A description of the Leningrad trial is found in Korey, op.cit., chapter 11, and Leonard Schroeter, The Last Exodus (New York: Universe Books, 1974), chapters 10 and 11.
16. For a description of the events in Poland, see A. Ross Johnson, "Polish Perspectives, Past and Present", Problems of Communism, Vol. 20, No. 4 (July - August 1971), pp. 59-72. Ironically, Gomulka had blamed the student demonstrations of 1968 on "Zionists" and as a result had expelled the vast majority of Poland's Jews by 1970 so that they were no longer available to be blamed for the December 1970 riots. For an analysis of Gomulka's policies toward the Jews, see Paul Lendvai, Anti-Semitism Without Jews (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1971), Part Two.
17. Marvin and Bernard Kalb, Kissinger (New York: Dell, 1975), p. 245.
18. Leonid Brezhnev, "Report of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to the 24th Congress of the CPSU", The 24th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, March 30 - April 19, 1971 (Moscow: Moscow Press Agency Publishing House, 1971), p. 50.
19. For a detailed description of Soviet policy at this point, see John Newhouse, Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973), p. 215.
20. For a description of the sit-in, see Korey, op.cit., pp. 179-182.
21. Ibid, pp. 293-294.
22. Perhaps due to poor American intelligence, or possibly because of Kissinger's desire to encourage trade as a means of ensuring detente, the Russians were able to buy up a great deal of American grain at a very low price. For an excellent analysis of the grain deal, and other Soviet-American economic agreements, see Marshall Goldman, Detente and Dollars (New York: Basic Books, 1975), especially chapter 7.
23. For a description of the background of Sadat's expulsion decision, see Robert O. Freedman, Soviet Policy Toward the Middle East Since 1970 (New York: Praeger, 1978), chapter 3.
24. Ibid, p. 73.
25. For a description of the head-tax, see Korey, op.cit., pp. 315-320.
26. Cited in report by Marquis Childs, Washington Post, March 13, 1973 (cited in Paula Stern, Water's Edge: Domestic Politics and the Making of American Foreign Policy (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1979), p. 65.
27. For studies of the development of American opposition to the head-tax which was ultimately to develop into the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, see Stern, ibid, and Orbach, op.cit. Stern, a former legislative assistant to Senator Gaylord Nelson, is highly unsympathetic to the role played by Senator Jackson. Orbach takes a more balanced approach. For earlier studies, see Morris Brafman and David Schimel, Trade for Freedom: Detente, Trade and Soviet Jews (New York: Shengold, 1975) and William Korey, "The Story of the Jackson Amendment", Midstream Vol. 21, No. 3 (March 1975), pp. 7-36.

Footnotes - 3

28. Cf. Vneshniaia Torgovlia SSSR ZA 1970, p. 12 and Vneshniaia Torgovlia SSSR ZA 1979, p. 10.
29. Anyone interested in participating in this research project is invited to contact Dr. Heitman, c/o Department of History, Colorado State University, Fort Collins, Colorado 80523, or myself, c/o Office of the Dean, Peggy Meyerhoff Pearlstone School of Graduate Studies, Baltimore Hebrew College, 5800 Park Heights Avenue, Baltimore, Maryland 21215.
30. Korey, "The Story of the Jackson Amendment", loc. cit., pp. 9-10.
31. Cited in Korey, The Soviet Cage, op.cit., p. 320.
32. American Jewish Yearbook, 1974-1975, p. 211. Cited in Brafman and Schimel, op.cit., p. 41. For a description of Viktor Louis, see Freedman, op.cit., p. 57.
33. For an excellent analysis of the Soviet leadership's interest in Western trade at this time, see Foreign Broadcast Information Service Special Report: Pressures for Change in Soviet Foreign Economic Policy (Washington: FBIS, April 5, 1974) Report No. 306.
34. For a description of Soviet policy during the Yom Kippur War, see Freedman, op.cit., chapter 5.
35. Korey, loc.cit., p. 30.
36. For a description of some of the natural gas and oil projects for which the Soviet leadership was seeking American assistance, see John P. Hardt, "West Siberia: The Quest for Energy", Problems of Communism, Vol. 22, No. 3 (May-June 1973), pp. 25-36.
37. Korey, loc.cit., p. 30.
38. Stern argues, not entirely convincingly, that Jackson's quest for publicity, and Kissinger secretiveness, doomed the agreement (pp. 162-193).
39. Cited in report by Marjorie Hunter, New York Times, August 16, 1974. See also the report by Wolf Blitzer, Jerusalem Post, August 16, 1974.
40. For a description of Soviet policy on emigration since signing the Helsinki Agreement, see Elizabeth C. Sheetz, "Emigration from the USSR in the Post-Helsinki Period", Radio Liberty Research Bulletin, RL 2/77 (Washington: Radio Liberty, January 7, 1977), pp. 1-11.
41. Cf. Dmitry Proektor, "Problems of Military Detente in Europe", International Affairs (Moscow), December 1975, p. 33, cited in Graham D. Vernon, "Controlled Conflict: Soviet Perceptions of Peaceful Coexistence", Orbis Vol. 23, No. 2 (Summer 1979), p. 286, and Morton Schwartz, Soviet Perceptions of the United States (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978).
42. Cf. Seymour E. Goodman, "Soviet Computing and Technology Transfer", World Politics, Vol. 31, No. 4 (July 1979), pp. 539-570. See also Philip Hanson, "Western Technology in the Soviet Economy", Problems of Communism, Vol. 27, No. 6 (Nov.-Dec. 1978), pp. 20-30.

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43. For a study of the development of the SALT talks, see Thomas W. Wolfe, The SALT Experience (Cambridge: Ballinger, 1979).
44. Cited in report by Bernard Gwertzman, New York Times, January 31, 1976.
45. Cf. Freedman, op.cit., chapters 6 and 7.
46. Pravda, December 1, 1976
47. Pravda, December 11, 1976
48. Cf. National Conference on Soviet Jewry News Bulletin No. 131 (November 15, 1978), p. 2
49. Pravda, January 19, 1977
50. Carter's telegram to Soviet dissident Jew Valdimir Slepak (who had been refused an exit visa) reportedly expressed "great concern about the treatment" that Jewish dissidents had suffered at the hands of the Soviet secret police, and stated that Carter had a "deep personal interest" in their cases. See the report by Peter Osnos, Washington Post, October 26, 1976.
51. Cited in Orbach, op.cit., p. 153
52. For a good analysis of the human rights controversy, see Jeremy Azrael, "Soviet-American Relations: Notes on Detente", Current History, October 1978, pp. 117-120.
53. Adam Ulam, "U.S.-Soviet Relations: Unhappy Coexistence", Foreign Affairs - America and the World 1978 (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1979) p. 559.
54. Izvestia, January 22, 1977
55. New York Times, January 28, 1977
56. Cf. Radio Moscow, in English, January 29, 1977
57. Cited in report by Peter Osnos, Washington Post, February 5, 1977
58. The text of the press conference is printed in Presidency, 1977 (Washington: Congressional Quarterly, 1978) (hereafter Presidency, 1977), p. 124.
59. Ford later said he was sorry he did not meet with Solzhenitsyn (Christian Science Monitor, March 3, 1977)
60. Pravda, March 22, 1977. For a comparative analysis of the various Soviet peace plans, see Robert O. Freedman, "The Soviet Conception of a Middle East Peace Settlement", in The Limits to Power: Soviet Policy in the Middle East (ed. Yaacov Ro'i) (London: Croom Helm, 1979), pp. 282-327.
61. Presidency, 1977, p. 133-A

62. For a discussion of the "back channel", see Newhouse, op.cit., pp. 203-205.
63. Cf. Pravda and Izvestia, April 3, 1977
64. Pravda, April 1, 1977 (translated in Current Digest of the Soviet Press Vol. 29 No. 13, pp. 5-9)
65. Presidency, 1977, p. 146-A
66. Pravda on June 11th had called the meeting "The infamous White House reception of the criminal Bukovsky".
67. Presidency, 1977, p. 152-A. Sharansky had been arrested in March.
68. Documents and Resolutions, 25th Congress of the CPSU (Moscow: Novosti, 1976), pp. 16; 39.
69. For President Carter's justification in not using the B-1 as a "bargaining chip" see his news conference of June 30th, reprinted in Presidency, 1977, p. 153-A.
70. Pravda, July 17, 1977
71. The text of the speech is found in the Department of State Bulletin, August 15, 1977, pp. 193-198.
72. Cf. Pravda, July 24, 1977
73. Pravda, August 3, 1977
74. Cited in the report by Don Oberdorfer in the July 30, 1977 issue of the Washington Post.
75. For a description of Soviet policy during this period, see Freedman, Soviet Policy Toward the Middle East Since 1970, op.cit., pp. 295-298.
76. Cited in AP report from Beirut, Baltimore Evening Sun, September 14, 1977.
77. For the text of the joint statement and an analysis of its implications, see Freedman, Soviet Policy Toward the Middle East Since 1970, op.cit. pp. 303-306.
78. See ibid, chapters 6-8
79. Pravda, September 25, 1977
80. Pravda, October 4, 1977
81. Orbach, op.cit., pp. 153-154
82. For a monthly breakdown of Soviet Jewish emigration in 1977, see National Conference on Soviet Jewry News Bulletin No. 131 (November 15, 1978), p.2.
83. Soviet strategy in the Middle East during this period is discussed in Robert O. Freedman, "Soviet Policy Toward the Middle East From the Sinai II Accord to the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Agreement" in W. Raymond Duncan (ed.), Soviet Policy in the Third World (New York: Pergamon, 1980), pp. 155-195.

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84. For a detailed study of Soviet intervention in the Ethiopian-Somali war, see Richard Remnek, Soviet Policy in the Horn of Africa: The Decision to Intervene (Alexandria, Virginia: Center for Naval Analyses, 1980). See also David Albright, "The Horn of Africa and the Arab-Israeli Conflict", in World Politics and the Arab-Israeli Conflict (ed. Robert O. Freedman) (New York: Pergamon, 1979), pp. 147-191.
85. Cf. Robert O. Freedman, "The Soviet Union and the Arab-Israeli Conflict", in ibid, pp. 84-85, explanatory footnote no. 58.
86. Cited in President Carter: 1978 (Washington: Congressional Quarterly, 1979), p. 85-A (hereafter President Carter: 1978)
87. Cited in ibid, p. 84-A
88. Cited in ibid, p. 85-A
89. Pravda, March 5, 1978
90. The text of the speech is in President Carter: 1978, pp. 139-A to 141-A.
91. Translated in Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. 30, No. 12, p. 4.
92. Pravda, April 26, 1980
93. Cf. Carter's press conference on May 25, 1978 in President Carter: 1978, p. 101-A
94. Cited in President Carter: 1978, p. 101-A
95. For a study of the evolution of PRC economic policy to this point, see Robert F. Dernberger, "Prospects for the Chinese Economy", Problems of Communism Vol. 28 No. 5-6 (Sept.-Dec. 1979), pp. 1-15.
96. The text of the speech is in President Carter: 1978, pp. 148-A to 151-A.
97. Translated in Current Digest of the Soviet Press Vol. 30 No. 24, p. 1. Interestingly enough, a former speech writer of Carter's, James Fallows, claimed that the speech was essentially a "stapling" of a Vance memorandum to a Brzezinski memorandum. See James Fallows, "The Passionless Presidency", Atlantic Monthly, May 1979, p. 43.
98. Pravda, June 26, 1978
99. President Carter: 1978, p. 109-A
100. Cited in National Conference on Soviet Jewry Press Service Release, May 30, 1980.
101. Cf. Izvestia, July 14, 1978
102. For Moscow's reaction, see Izvestia, July 28, 1978.
103. Pravda, July 15, 1978
104. President Carter: 1978, p. 116-A

105. Pravda, August 13, 1978
106. President Carter: 1978, p. 45
107. Pravda, October 29, 1978
108. By the end of 1978 no less than 28, 864 Jews had been permitted to emigrate, the highest number since the record 33,500 in 1973.
109. For an excellent study of these events and the subsequent Sino-Vietnamese war, see Sheldon W. Simon, "The Soviet Union and Southeast Asia", a paper prepared for the Council on Foreign Relations Conference, "The Soviet Union in Asia", New York City, December 1979.
110. For the text of the joint announcement and Carter's comments on it, see President Carter: 1978, p. 161-A.
111. Cf. Radio Moscow in English to North America, December 22, 1978 and Pravda, December 22, 1978.
112. Radio Moscow, in English to North America, December 21, 1978
113. Cf. Izvestia, January 14, 1979
114. Cf. Pravda, February 4, 1979
115. Cf. Izvestia, March 21, 1979
116. Dernberger, loc. cit., pp. 10-11
117. An editorial in the New York Times on April 6, 1979 reflected this viewpoint. It was rebutted in a letter-to-the-Editor by Eugene Gold, Chairman of the National Conference on Soviet Jewry, which was published on April 26, 1979.
118. Cf. report by Kevin Klose, Washington Post, April 21, 1979.
119. For analyses of the increasing tide of anti-semitism in the Soviet Union at this time, see The Position of Soviet Jewry 1977-1980: Report on the Implementation of the Helsinki Final Act Since the Belgrade Follow-up Conference (Surrey, England: World Conference on Soviet Jewry, 1980); William Korey, "The Future of Soviet Jewry: Emigration and Assimilation", Foreign Affairs Vol. 58 No. 1 (Fall 1979), pp. 67-81; and Zvi Gitelman, "Moscow and the Soviet Jews: A Parting of the Ways", Problems of Communism Vol. 29 No. 1 (January-February 1980), pp. 18-34.
120. Pravda, June 17, 1979 (translated in Current Digest of the Soviet Press Vol. 31, No. 24, p. 2).
121. The text of the communique was printed in Pravda, June 19, 1979.
122. For an analysis of the dilemmas facing Moscow in Afghanistan prior to the invasion, see Freedman, "Soviet Policy Toward the Middle East from the Sinai II Accord to the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Agreement", loc.cit., pp. 181-182.

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123. Cited in report by Hedrick Smith, New York Times, August 3, 1979. State Department spokesman Hodding Carter was subsequently to relate the warning specifically to Afghanistan.
124. See the report in the Washington Post, August 7, 1979.
125. Cf. Pravda, September 28, 1979
126. Cf. Izvestia, August 17, 1979
127. Cf. Pravda, June 20, 1979 and July 1, 1979
128. Pravda, September 16, 1979
129. This is documented in The Position of Soviet Jews, 1977-1980, op.cit.
130. New York Times, November 25, 1980 (cited in Elizabeth Scheetz, "Recent Trends in the Emigration of Jews from the Soviet Union", Radio Liberty Report No. 468/80 (December 9, 1980)
131. Cited in William Korey, "Brezhnev and Soviet Anti-Semitism", in The Decisive Decade: Soviet Jewry 1971-1980, (ed. Robert O. Freedman) (Duke University Press, forthcoming)
132. Cf report by Bernard Gwertzman, New York Times, April 25, 1981
133. Cited in New York Times, May 1, 1981