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231680	CABLE	MOSCOW 15852	1	11/16/1981	B1
231682	CABLE	MOSCOW 16619	1	12/4/1981	B1
231684	CABLE	MOSCOW 16619	1	12/4/1981	B1
231686	CABLE	MOSCOW 16627	1	12/4/1981	B1
231689	CABLE	MOSCOW 01907	3	2/17/1982	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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MEMORANDUM

6459 Add-On

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

November 10, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: RICHARD PIPES

SUBJECT: Interim Response to Congressman Wirth

Per Janet's note to me of November 9 (Tab A), attached is a short interim reply to Congressman Timothy Wirth's letter concerning the emigration cases of two Soviets. The letter states that we have referred his correspondence to the State Department, and we will respond more fully when a response is received from State.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab I.

Approve_____ Disapprove_____

Tab I Letter to Cong. Wirth
A - Janet Colson's note to Pipes
Tab II Pipes memo of Nov. 6 stating referred to State
A - Letter from Cong. Wirth to Allen

N

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Congressman Wirth:

Thank you for your letter of October 21 calling my attention to the plight of Vladimir Gladshtein and Eugenia Imas, Soviet citizens who have been denied visas to rejoin their son in the United States. I am consulting the Department of State on the best ways to proceed in this matter. In the meantime, let me assure you that we are deeply concerned with such violations of human rights and the specific provisions of the Helsinki accords which you cite.

You will hear from me further before long.

Sincerely yours,

Richard V. Allen
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

The Honorable Timothy E. Wirth
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

#6459

RECEIVED

81 NOV 9 A9:20

JANET COLSON	✓		
BUD NANCE			
DICK ALLEN			
IRENE DERUS			
JANET COLSON			
BUD NANCE			
PETER			
CY TO VP		SHOW CC	
CY TO MEESE		SHOW CC	
CY TO BAKER		SHOW CC	
CY			
CY			
Cc			

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

#6459

Dick Allen

Because of the length of time involved in getting a reply from State, let's do an interim reply.

11/9/81

ASL A

MEMORANDUM 6459

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

INFORMATION

November 6, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: RICHARD PIPES RP

SUBJECT: Letter from Congressman Wirth concerning two Soviet Emigration Cases

The attached letter (Tab A) from Congressman Timothy Wirth concerning the emigration cases of Vladimir Gladshtein and Eugenia Imas has been referred to the State Department for a draft reply.

Tab A Letter from Congressman Wirth

6454

6

TIMOTHY E. WIRTH
2D DISTRICT, COLORADO

COMMITTEES:
BUDGET
ENERGY AND COMMERCE
CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS, CONSUMER PROTECTION AND FINANCE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON FOSSIL AND SYNTHETIC FUELS
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

WASHINGTON OFFICE:
2454 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515
(202) 225-2161

DISTRICT OFFICE:
8648 WEST COLFAX AVENUE
LAKEWOOD, COLORADO 80215
(303) 234-5200

October 21, 1981

Mr. Richard Allen
National Security Advisor
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. Allen:

I am writing to you to bring to your attention the plight of Vladimir Gladshtein and Eugenia Imas, 25 Mecio L.T.S.R., Apartment 46, Kaunas 233036 U.S.S.R.

Since December of 1978 to the present, Gladshtein and Imas have been denied permission to emigrate to the United States to be with their son five times. I wrote to Soviet officials in November of 1979 and have not received a response as to what the Soviet Union's posture is going to be regarding this situation.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 13/2 of the Helsinki Accords signed by our nation, the Soviet Union, and thirty-three others, explicitly states, "everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own."

I urge you to use your good offices to intercede on the behalf of these two people. How long must such persecution of law-abiding Soviet citizens continue? When will the Soviet Union begin to abide by the agreements reached in Helsinki and other international accords? Relations between our country and the Soviet Union are inevitably affected by such arbitrary actions by the Soviet government.

I would appreciate it if you would direct any correspondence concerning this matter to my Colorado office, located at 8648 West Colfax Avenue, Lakewood, Colorado 80215.

In advance, thank you for your assistance and cooperation.

With best wishes,

Sincerely yours,

Tim Wirth

Timothy E. Wirth

TEW:fm

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231680	CABLE MOSCOW 15852	1	11/16/1981	B1

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Soviet Trends' guest ~~analyst~~ commentator of the month: Eduard Kuznetsov (Soviet Jewish activist, now resident in Israel)

"Compared to the peak year 1979, Jewish emigration has dropped tenfold. The cause: Jews are a commodity which is no longer being bought. Earlier, Jews were exchanged for significant economic advantages which strengthened Soviet power; in addition, emigrating Jews performed the function of demonstrating the possibility of liberal trends within the Soviet system (customarily termed detente) and of creating an atmosphere of confidence during disarmament negotiations. The recent sale of 15 million tons of grain to the Soviet Union, and the continuation of talks of a military/political nature without linking them to the emigration index are the true causes of the catastrophic drop in Jewish emigration."

Novoye Russkoye Slovo (New York Russian-language daily) November 29, 1981

USSR 9

6664

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

December 3, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR RONALD K. PETERSON
Legislative Liaison Officer
Office of Management and Budget

SUBJECT: State Proposed Report on H.Con.Res. 187, Relating to Basic Rights of Soviet Citizens

The NSC Staff has reviewed and concurs in the proposed report prepared by the Department of State to the Chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on H. Con. Res. 187 which expresses the sense of the Congress that Secretary of State Haig should raise with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko the issue of basic rights of Soviet citizens, including freedom of religion and emigration. The Department of State views H. Con. Res. 187 as "totally consistent with the aims and practice of American foreign policy."

Allen J. Lenz
Staff Director

6664

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

November 13, 1981

LEGISLATIVE REFERRAL MEMORANDUM

TO: Legislative Liaison Officer-
National Security Council

SUBJECT: State proposed report on H.Con.Res. 187, relating to basic rights of Soviet citizens.

The Office of Management and Budget requests the views of your agency on the above subject before advising on its relationship to the program of the President, in accordance with OMB Circular A-19.

A response to this request for your views is needed no later than THURSDAY, DECEMBER 3, 1981.

Questions should be referred to Tracey Lawler (395-4710), the legislative analyst in this office.

Ronald K. Peterson
RONALD K. PETERSON FOR
Assistant Director for
Legislative Reference

Enclosures
cc: Ed Strait

11

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

NOV 9 1981

Dear Mr. Stockman:

In accordance with established procedure, there is transmitted herewith a proposed report on H.Con. Res. 187.

Please inform the Department whether there is any objection to the submission of this report.

Sincerely,

Richard Fairbanks
Assistant Secretary
for Congressional Relations

Enclosure:
Six copies of
Proposed Report.

The Honorable
David A. Stockman, Director,
Office of Management and Budget.

N

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I am responding to your request for Executive Branch comments on H. Con. Res. 187 which expresses the sense of the Congress that Secretary of State Haig should raise with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko the issue of basic rights of Soviet citizens, including freedom of religion and emigration.

As you know, the United States Government has consistently encouraged Soviet authorities to be less harsh and more responsive towards Soviet citizens attempting to exercise fundamental human rights, in particular freedom of religion and emigration. Both publicly and via diplomatic channels, the United States has deplored Soviet harassment and imprisonment of individuals who seek only to worship as they choose or to emigrate from the USSR.

I am pleased to inform you that in his recent talks with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko at the United Nations, Secretary Haig discussed the full range of humanitarian issues. It is our intention to continue to raise these issues in our future conversations with Soviet officials. Let me also assure you that whenever Secretary Haig plans to meet again with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko, we will keep fully in the mind the great concern of the American people and Congress for fundamental issues like freedom of religion and emigration.

Thus, it is our view that H. Con. Res. 187 is totally consistent with the aims and practice of American foreign policy.

The Office of Management and Budget advises that from the standpoint of the Administration's program there is no objection to the submission of this report.

Sincerely,

Richard Fairbanks
Assistant Secretary
for Congressional Relations

The Honorable
Clement J. Zablocki,
Chairman,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
House of Representatives.

97TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. CON. RES. 187

Expressing the sense of the Congress that Secretary of State Haig should, in his upcoming discussions with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko, raise the issue of the basic rights of Soviet citizens, particularly freedom of immigration and of religion.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

SEPTEMBER 22, 1981

Mr. GEJDENSON submitted the following concurrent resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs

---

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

Expressing the sense of the Congress that Secretary of State Haig should, in his upcoming discussions with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko, raise the issue of the basic rights of Soviet citizens, particularly freedom of immigration and of religion.

1 *Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate*
2 *concurring)*, That it is the sense of the Congress that Secre-
3 tary of State Haig should, in his upcoming discussions with
4 Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko at the United Nations
5 General Assembly, raise the issue of the basic rights of
6 Soviet citizens, particularly freedom of immigration and reli-

1 gious freedom, as set forth in international human rights ac-
2 cords, including the Helsinki Final Act.

O

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231682	CABLE MOSCOW 16619	1	12/4/1981	B1

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231684	CABLE MOSCOW 16619	1	12/4/1981	B1

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231686	CABLE MOSCOW 16627	1	12/4/1981	B1

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EMIGRATION 18

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AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY 41Ø1
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE PRIORITY 766Ø

CONFIDENTIAL

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 326258
E.O. 12Ø65:N/A

TAGS: SREF

SUBJECT: SOVIET JEWISH REFUGEES; CHANGE IN HIAS POLICY

1. ON DECEMBER 9, 1981 THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF HIAS MADE THE FOLLOWING ANNOUNCEMENT: IN RESPONSE TO A PERSONAL APPEAL FROM PRIME MINISTER BEGIN HIAS HAS AGREED TO COOPERATE ON A TRIAL BASIS WITH THE JEWISH AGENCY'S PLAN FOR HANDLING OF SOVIET JEWS ARRIVING IN VIENNA.

2. THE PLAN UNDER WHICH HIAS WILL ASSIST JEWISH EMIGRANTS ONLY IF THEY HAVE FIRST DEGREE RELATIVES IN THE U.S. OR OTHER WESTERN COUNTRIES WAS INTRODUCED BY THE JEWISH AGENCY LAST AUGUST. HIAS PARTICIPATION, SOME TERMS OF WHICH ARE STILL TO BE NEGOTIATED, WAS APPROVED BY THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS AND ANNOUNCED BY HIAS PRESIDENT EDWIN SHAPIRO. MR. SHAPIRO SAID HIAS WOULD TEST THE PLAN FOR A THREEMONTH PERIOD STARTING AROUND JANUARY 1, IN THE HOPE THAT IT WILL RESULT IN A HEAVIER FLOW OF JEWS FROM THE SOVIET UNION.

3. HE NOTED THAT ONLY 1,136 JEWS HAD LEFT THE USSR DURING THE PAST THREE MONTHS, THE LOWEST NUMBER IN THE PAST 1Ø YEARS. IN THE END OF THE 3 MONTHS THE RESULTS WILL BE EVALUATED AND A DETERMINATION MADE ABOUT CONTINUING THE

NEW POLICY.

4. MR. SHAPIRO DISCLOSED THAT HE AND HIAS EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT LEONARD SIEDENMANN HAD MET WITH PRIME MINISTER BEGIN ON NOVEMBER 22 IN JERUSALEM. AT THAT MEETING THE ISRAELI LEADER APPEALED TO THE ORGANIZATION TO TRY OUT THE PLAN.

5. UNDER LONG STANDING ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN HIAS AND THE JEWISH AGENCY, JEWISH REFUGEES ARRIVING IN VIENNA FROM THE SOVIET UNION HAVE BEEN MET BY JEWISH AGENCY WORKERS AND URGED TO CONTINUE ON TO ISRAEL. UNTIL LAST AUGUST, IF THEY DECLINED TO DO SO, THE JEWISH AGENCY REFERRED THEM TO HIAS WHICH PROVIDED ASSISTANCE IN IMMIGRATING TO LANDS OTHER THAN ISRAEL. IN AUGUST HOWEVER, THE JEWISH AGENCY UNILATERALLY ANNOUNCED IT WOULD NO LONGER REFER TO HIAS THOSE SOVIET JEWS WHO CHOSE NOT TO GO TO ISRAEL. THE ONLY EXCEPTIONS BEING THOSE WHO HAD SPOUSE, PARENTS OR CHILDREN IN THE U.S. HIAS RESPONDED AT THAT TIME THAT IT WAS NOT PREPARED TO REFUSE ITS SERVICES TO SOVIET JEWISH EMIGRANTS NOT SPECIFICALLY REFERRED BY THE JEWISH AGENCY. SINCE AUGUST, HIAS HAS BEEN ASSISTING SUCH EMIGRANTS WHO HAVE SOUGHT ITS HELP ON THEIR OWN INITIATIVE.

6. UNDER THE TRIAL PLAN IT IS EXPECTED THAT SOVIET JEWS WHO DO NOT WISH TO GO TO ISRAEL WILL SEEK THE HELP OF OTHER REFUGEE AND RESETTLEMENT ORGANIZATIONS BOTH JEWISH AND NON-JEWISH. FUNDS FOR SOVIET JEWISH RESETTLEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES ARE FURNISHED LARGELY BY THE U.S. GOVERNMENT.

7.
EMBASSY VIENNA IS REQUESTED TO PRESENT THE TEXT OF HIAS STATEMENT TO APPROPRIATE AUSTRIAN AUTHORITIES.

8. IN RESPONSE TO PRESS QUERY, WE HAVE RESPONDED ALONG

LINES OF GUIDANCE LAST AUGUST THAT U.S. POLICY HAS ALWAYS BEEN AND WILL CONTINUE TO BE THAT SOVIET JEWISH REFUGEES ARRIVING IN VIENNA SHOULD HAVE FREEDOM OF CHOICE WITH REGARD TO WHERE THEY WISH TO RESETTLE. ONCE THE SOVIET REFUGEES HAVE ARRIVED IN VIENNA, WE SEE NO REASON WHY THEY SHOULD BE OBLIGED TO GO TO ISRAEL IF THERE ARE OTHER COUNTRIES WILLING TO OFFER THEM REFUGE.
CLARK
BT

CONFIDENTIAL

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R I7872)1z@TWYDIYC

Emigr,

±+AM-EMIGRATION (3 TAKES)±

+BY ARTHUR SPIEGELMAN±

NEW YORK, DEC 30, REUTER -- THE NUMBER OF JEWS ALLOWED TO EMIGRATE FROM THE SOVIET UNION FELL TO UNDER 10,000 IN 1981, ITS LOWEST LEVEL IN A DECADE, THE NATIONAL AND GREATER NEW YORK CONFERENCES FOR SOVIET JEWRY SAID HERE TODAY.

OFFICIALS OF THE TWO GROUPS ALSO CLAIMED THERE WAS EVIDENCE OF INCREASED HARASSMENT OF JEWS IN THE SOVIET UNION AND, ACCORDING TO SEYMOUR LACHMAN, THE HEAD OF THE GREATER NEW YORK CONFERENCE, ''A CONCENTRATED EFFORT TO ELIMINATE JEWS AS A CULTURAL GROUP IN THE U.S.S.R.''

AT A PRESS CONFERENCE CALLED BY THE TWO GROUPS, NEW YORK REPUBLICAN SENATOR ALPHONSE D'AMATO CALLED ON PRESIDENT REAGAN TO ACKNOWLEDGE THE ISSUE BY EXTENDING THE ECONOMIC SANCTIONS HE IMPOSED YESTERDAY ON THE SOVIET UNION OVER U.S. DISSATISFACTION WITH THE POLISH SITUATION.

HE ALSO SAID THAT CONGRESS SHOULD REASSESS ITS RELATIONS WITH AMERICA'S EUROPEAN ALLIES IF THEY FAILED TO BACK THE UNITED STATES ON THE QUESTION OF SANCTIONS AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION.

MR LACHMAN SAID THAT ONLY 9,500 JEWS WERE ALLOWED TO LEAVE THE SOVIET UNION FOR ISRAEL IN 1981, WITH LESS THAN 400 DEPARTING IN EACH OF THE LAST THREE MONTHS OF THE YEAR.±

MORE 1443 AS

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R I7900)2z@TCYNCZC

±+AM-EMIGRATION 2 NEW YORK±

HE SAID, ''SOVIET JEWISH EMIGRATION IS DRYING UP TO ALMOST A TRICKLE. THIS YEAR'S FIGURE REPRESENTS AN 81 PER CENT DROP OVER 1979 WHEN 51,000 JEWS WERE ALLOWED TO LEAVE'' -- AN ALL-TIME HIGH. IN 1980, 21,000 JEWS WERE ALLOWED TO LEAVE.

HE ESTIMATED THAT BETWEEN 400,000 AND 500,000 SOVIET JEWS HAD INDICATED A DESIRE TO LEAVE THE SOVIET UNION OUT OF THE THREE MILLION JEWS LIVING THERE. JEWS, HE SAID, CONSTITUTED THE SOVIET UNION'S 12TH LARGEST ETHNIC GROUP.

MR LACHMAN ALSO CHARGED THAT SOVIET OFFICIALS HAD ARRESTED MORE JEWISH ACTIVISTS IN THE LAST SIX MONTHS THAN FOR ALL OF THE PAST SIX YEARS AND HAD SYSTEMATICALLY CRACKED DOWN ON JEWISH SCIENTIFIC, BIBLE AND CULTURAL CLASSES.

HE ALSO SAID THAT THE ONLY JEWISH KINDERGARTEN IN MOSCOW

AFTER THE PRESS CONFERENCE, HE OFFERED A VARIETY OF REASONS FOR THE DECLINE IN EMIGRATION, INCLUDING SOVIET FEARS OF A BRAIN DRAIN, SOVIET DISSATIFICATION WITH ITS RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES, AND THE FACT THAT JUST OVER HALF OF THOSE JEWS THAT EMIGRATE GO TO ISRAEL.+

MORE 1446 AS

+++R161

R I7910)LZ@TCYNZ@T

+FAM-EMIGRATION 3 NEW YORK+

OF THE 258,822 JEWS WHO LEFT THE SOVIET UNION BETWEEN OCTOBER 1968 AND OCTOBER 1981, ONLY 161,560 WENT TO ISRAEL.

ANOTHER MAJOR FACTOR IN THE DECLINE OF EMIGRATION WAS NEW RULES REGARDING THE ACCEPTANCE OF INVITATIONS FROM RELATIVES TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY.

IN PRIOR YEARS, SOVIET JEWS COULD ACCEPT INVITATIONS FROM COUSINS, UNCLES AND AUNTS LIVING IN ISRAEL TO GO THERE. BUT RECENTLY SOVIET OFFICIALS INTRODUCED A FIRST-DEGREE RELATIONS RULE MEANING THAT INVITATIONS HAD TO COME FROM HUSBANDS, WIVES, FATHERS, MOTHERS, SISTERS AND BROTHERS LIVING IN ISRAEL.

MR LACHMAN DECLINED TO SAY WHICH REASON HE THOUGHT WAS MOST PROMINENT IN SOVIET THINKING.+

REUTER 1447 AS

THE ALERT MAGAZINE

A BI-MONTHLY PUBLICATION OF THE UNION OF COUNCILS FOR SOVIET JEWS

Vol. 1, No. 4

Passover, 1982

SPECIAL ISSUE

1. Anti-Semit.
2. Birobidzhan

STEIN '78
ROCKY MTN. NEWS

ANTISEMITICA SOVIETICA

by Betsy Gidwitz

Antisemitica Sovietica:

New Intensity in an Old Campaign

by Betsy Gidwitz

Among the paintings in an official Minsk art exhibit in 1979 was a canvas that portrays alleged Nazi-Jewish collaboration during World War II. A pile of naked corpses is flanked by a Nazi officer and a Jewish prison camp trusty (the latter with prominent nose and wearing an inmate's uniform with a six-pointed star), the two men grinning at each other as if pleased with a task well executed.

Paintings are only one vehicle for Soviet claims of Nazi-Jewish collaboration; similar charges have been made in feature articles in *Pravda* and other newspapers, in mass-circulation periodicals and specialized journals, in books, and before the United Nations Security Council. To charge that an identifiable group of Soviet citizens collaborated with the hated invaders in the perpetration of Nazi crimes during the Great Patriotic War (Soviet title for World War II) is to invite, even demand, hatred and abuse of that group.

The latest Soviet anti-Jewish campaign dates from the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. Before the end of that summer, the first evidence of a coordinated attack had appeared. An article entitled "What is Zionism?" was published during the first week in August in major provincial newspapers throughout the Soviet Union. Zionism was compared with the Mafia and depicted as a global conspiracy that aimed to control the entire world. The article abounded with anti-Semitic stereotypes of greedy Jews.

Subsequent propaganda expanded on the same theme " attacking it with the same cliches leveled at Judaism in czarist years. Traditional charges expressed in the forgery *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion*, such as those of an international Jewish financial network and a Jewish master plan for world domination, were now ascribed to Zionism.

As the propaganda campaign intensified, it soon became obvious that Soviet anger embraced more than "international Zionism" and Israel. The term "Zionist" was being employed as a euphemism for "Jew" in much the same way that "rootless cosmopolitan" was used during the last years of Stalin. Although the anti-Zionist euphemism persists to this day, it has been joined since the mid-1970s by blatant racist attacks on Jews and Judaism without anti-Zionist camouflage.

Reviving Old Stereotypes

Judaism is assailed as a religion in much more vicious terms than other faiths. The Torah, wrote one Soviet propagandist in a book titled *Invasion Without Arms*, is an "unsurpassed textbook of bloodthirstiness, hypocrisy, treachery, perfidy, and moral degeneracy—all the basest human qualities." Echoing medieval anti-Semitic charges, contemporary Soviet propaganda also ascribes to Judaism a cult of money and economic exploitation.

The history of Jews has been rewritten to depict Jews as an extraordinarily wealthy and internationally powerful class during the nineteenth century. According to these interpretations, their vast resources and global connections enabled the "international Jewish bourgeoisie" to command significant influence over entire empires. The Jews of Russia are portrayed as rich, supportive of the imperial family, and exploitive of Russian peasants. The massacres of more than 100,000 Jews by the Cossack forces of Bogdan Khmelnitsky in the seventeenth century are justified as an expression of class struggle against Jewish economic exploiters.

Mixed Mass Media

The Soviet Union has mobilized mixed mass media and personnel to disseminate its anti-Semitic disinformation and propaganda to the far reaches of the USSR and even beyond its borders. Articles appear frequently in newspapers, including such national stalwarts as *Pravda* and *Izvestia;* republic and local newspapers; and special interest newspapers, ranging from the intellectual *Literaturnaya Gazeta* to the narrowly-focused *Gudok (Whistle)* newspaper for railroad workers. Journals and magazines publishing anti-Semitic articles include popular weeklies (particularly the mass-circulation pictorial *Ogonyok*), literary magazines, and scholarly and legal journals. Of special note are the youth and military publications that carry either especially strong or exceptionally large numbers of anti-Semitic articles. The publishing house of the prestigious Academy of Sciences, Nauka (Science), has issued a half dozen or so anti-Semitic books, each in the style of a scientific treatise. Translations of numerous anti-Semitic works, including Arabic versions, have been exported, and a variety of anti-Semitic foreign-language booklets and bulletins have been distributed abroad at no charge by Soviet embassies and other official missions.

In addition to conventional printed media attacks on Jews and Judaism, Soviet authorities also exploit television and film for propagation of anti-Semitism. A notorious television special called "Traders of Souls" was shown twice during prime time in 1977. In this special, a number of Soviet Jewish activists, identified by name and address, were portrayed as currency speculators, hooligans, drunks, and CIA agents. Another anti-Semitic television special, "Lies and Hatred," was aired in 1980. A limited circulation film, "Secret and Open Things," has been shown in some public theaters, but its main audience are closely-controlled

The Jewish Peril

groups, such as army units. Reportedly, the message of the film is so stridently anti-Semitic that authorities fear that unrestrained common citizens might be propelled into pogroms after watching it.

A peculiarly Soviet vehicle of this anti-Semitic campaign is the national Znaniye (Knowledge) Society. Among the tasks of this group is the transmission of approved knowledge in the form of political lectures in workplaces, community halls, and almost any available venue. (Similar programs are operated by the Party itself and by other groups). Attendance at such lectures is technically voluntary, but Soviet citizens wishing to get ahead or simply avoid harassment know that it is wise to be seen at a fair number of these functions. Because the lectures are not publicized among foreigners and, in theory, nothing of their content reaches the West, they are frequently used to convey to the Soviet people information that, for one reason or another, is not suitable for publication in the open press. More than print or other visual media, such lectures are crucial to the formation of Soviet public opinion.

Judaism and Zionism are frequently addressed at Znaniye lectures. According to recent emigres and a few foreign correspondents familiar with Znaniye meetings in the Moscow area, topics of lectures during the 1970s included blood libel charges, assertions that Israel plans to expand its "empire" to an area just south of Kiev, and claims that Jews control eighty percent of the international economy and plan total world domination by the year 2000. A Western listener at a 1978 Moscow University Znaniye lecture recorded the following statements by the speaker: Zionists manipulated Richard M. Nixon (then still a favorite of the Soviets for his detente policy) and were responsible for his misfortunes; the Zionist-controlled press hounded Nixon out of office; Zionists have fostered a myth that six million Jews were slaughtered during World War II; World War II was the outcome of a Zionist-Hitler conspiracy; and a Zionist-Maoist conspiracy was behind the United States human rights campaign.

Institutionalized Anti-Semitism

Disinformation and propaganda form only one component of the Soviet anti-Semitic assault. Intensified application of anti-Semitic quotas in educational institutions and in career selection is widespread. False charges, rigged judicial proceedings, and subsequent harsh prison sentences have claimed a number of Jewish victims, of whom Anatoly Scharansky is the best known. Punitive military conscription has been applied much more frequently to would-be Jewish emigrants than to others desiring to leave, such as Volga Germans. Jews are subject to frequent anti-Semitic verbal attacks by passersby on the street and fellow employees at places of work. Physical assaults, especially on children, are not uncommon.

Although permission to travel abroad is tightly controlled for all citizens, opportunities to travel outside the Soviet Union are even more circumscribed for Soviet Jews. Jewish specialists invited to present papers or receive awards at various conferences abroad are frequently denied the right to attend these events.

Considered by official Soviet ideology to constitute both a religious group and a nationality group, Jews are accorded the rights of neither. Unlike other religious groups in the Soviet Union, Jews have no national organization, no institution for the training of clergy, no relevant publications, and no contacts with co-religionists abroad. Unlike other groups regarded as nationalities in the Soviet Union, Jews alone lack an infrastructure that would facilitate and encourage the development of their national heritage.

Why Now?

Official documentation of party leadership deliberation about the intensification of anti-Semitism is not available. But a number of explanations for the current rash of official and popular manifestations can be inferred from the *antisemitica* itself. Perhaps the most obvious reason for Soviet anti-Semitism is the history and tradition of Russian anti-Semitism. Its roots in czarist days have left a strong legacy of official and folkloric prejudice. Russian expansionism in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries brought Russian rulers their first contact with large Jewish communities. Acquisition of Jewish subjects was not greeted with particular favor. Immediately after Russian troops conquered Polotsk in 1563, Ivan the Terrible ordered

that all Jews who refused baptism should be drowned in the Dvina River. There followed, to cite only some of the more dramatic occurrences: the Cossack massacres of 1648-1651; the expulsion of 35,000 Jews from Livonia by Empress Elizabeth in 1744; proclamation of the "Pale" of Jewish settlement by Catherine II in 1772; anti-Jewish pogroms from 1881 until World War I; publication of the forgery *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion* in 1895 and its subsequent reprinting by the government press; the Beilis trial in 1911; large-scale cooperation by Russians, Latvians, and others with Nazi death squads during World War II; and anti-Semitic measures implemented by Iosif Stalin, particularly those undertaken between 1948 and his death in 1953. Anti-Semitism has been a constant reality through much of Russian history, passed on from one generation to another.

Russophilism

Related to the historical expression of anti-Semitism is a deep-rooted popular sense of Russian cultural identity—a perception of homogeneity so strong that non-Russians are viewed not only as *others*, but also as *aliens*.

In the czarist period, Russian identity was nurtured by the separateness of Russian Orthodox Christianity, surrounded in the West by Catholicism and Protestantism and in the south and east by Islam and other unfamiliar rites. The nature of the Russian economy, productive rather than commercial in emphasis, limited its trading capacity, thereby further isolation itself in the world arena.

In the Soviet period, a sense of separate identity has been nurtured by a distinct ideology, rejected in most of the industrialized world, and by a centrally-directed siege mentality suggesting that any diminution in "vigilance" against the "enemies of socialism" might lead to war. The role of the Soviet economy is little changed from that of its Russian predecessor.

Although Russian youth may clamor for the accoutrements of the international youth culture, blue jeans and Western music have not reduced the pull of Russian nationalism. Widely noted in the Western press, ethnic Russian chauvinism has increased markedly in recent years and is a second important contributing factor in the intensification of Soviet anti-Semitism.

Contemporary Soviet Russophilism contains several elements: a veneration of traditional—and greatly romanticized—Russian values; an abandonment of Marxism, however defined; a firm belief in the innate moral superiority of the Russian people and its messianic role in history; an almost mystical awe of the hardships Russians have endured—from cold winters to the Great Patriotic War; a corresponding denigration of other Soviet ethnic groups and foreigners generally; and anxiety, supported by census data, that the Russians may soon become a minority in the Soviet Union as a result of declining birthrate in European sections of the country and high reproduction in Soviet Central Asia.

Many Russian nationalists, inside Russia and in exile, accuse Jews of forcing communism on Russia, an ideology now perceived as alien to the Russian people. In fact, Jews were not attracted to the Bolshevik party in large numbers, but the small elite group that controlled the Party did include a larger proportion of Jews (perhaps twenty-five percent) that might have been expected according to the Jewish share of the pre-1917 Russian population (three to four percent). Until the mid-1930s, Jews constituted about thirty percent of the key figures in the secret police apparatus. Persons from other minority ethnic groups, particularly Poles and Latvians, exceeded their relative populations in secret police and other suppressive activity by even greater proportions, but this seems little remembered. Jews are widely perceived as the major perpetrators of the 1917 Revolution and of the excesses of the Soviet regime.

Another perception that has gained broad currency among Russians is that Jews are cowardly and sat out the Great Patriotic War. That this perception is officially promoted or at least tolerated is evident from the omission and/or falsification of information about Jews in the tide of Soviet literature extolling the "fighting brotherhood" of Soviet citizens during the Great Patriotic War. Although statistics on Jewish participation in the war effort were included in several postwar publications, the Soviets apparently are reluctant to acknowledge now that the more than 500,000 Jews who served in the Soviet armed forces during the Great Patriotic War won a disproportionately high number of combat awards, ranking them fourth highest among all Soviet ethnic groups in this category. (They were seventh highest in actual population.) To recognize the Jewish contribution to the war effort might cast doubts on Soviet assertions that Jews and Nazis collaborated during the war. Moreover, it may denigrate the Russian role in victory, and give credence to reports that Israelis are good fighters.

Finally, the Soviet Russian fear of demographic disaster is spurred by Sino-Soviet border tensions, Sino-



The Israeli Arms-Bearer

Soviet ideological differences, and the Russian historical memory of Ghenghis Khan and the Mongol hordes sweeping through Russia in the thirteenth century. Soviet Russians view Soviet Asians in ill-disguised racist terms and speak of the Chinese with contempt, nervously joking about the hundreds of millions just perched on the Soviet border waiting to invade. Recent Soviet propaganda has included accounts of alleged Israeli-Chinese military collusion and has compared Jewish and Chinese diasporas, accusing each of fifth-column activity in their countries of residence. Citing reported ties between Israel and China (or Zionists and Maoists), Soviet authorities further separate Jews from mainstream Soviet society and ascribe to them commonality and collaboration with the hated Chinese.

Protecting the Empire

Soviet Russian attitudes toward Soviet Central Asians, Jews, and other Soviet ethnic groups, individually and as they relate to each other, reflect problems of the Soviet domestic or internal empire. The unsolved—indeed, insoluable—issues of domestic empire constitute a third reason for intensified anti-Semitism.

Of all the subject peoples, the Jews are the most heavily urban-settled, most concentrated in the Soviet capital, best educated, and best served by support groups abroad. Exploiting these advantages, Soviet Jews have managed to publicize their grievances and to generate foreign pressure on the Soviet government. In so doing, they call attention to the fact of Soviet empire and, whether deliberately or not, encourage other ethnic groups to increase their own domestic resistance and seek international backing. (The efforts of Lithuanians, Ukrainians, and Crimean Tatars are especially noteworthy.)

The retention of strong ethnic identities and separatist objectives by minority peoples more than sixty years after the 1917 Revolution exposes the absurdity of the Soviet claim that communism solves nationality conflicts. That the limited success of Soviet Jews has drawn attention to other Soviet ethnic groups seeking independence or other opportunities for expression of national identity increases Soviet anger. The Soviet Union considers itself challenged on a major point of fundamental policy. It is reacting with an intensification of its longstanding "divide and rule" practice, an element of which requires the discrediting of Jews and Jewish causes.

Poland and Czechoslovakia

Judaism and Zionism are perceived as useful in explaining difficulties with the East European empire. Unrest in Poland and Czechoslovakia has been blamed on Jews and then cited as "proof" of the worldwide conspiratorial character of Zionism. Both the Slansky trials in 1952 and Soviet recriminations after the 1968 invasions of Czechoslovakia contained many blatantly anti-Semitic charges. In the East European empire as in the domestic empire, anti-Semitism is instigated to deflect anti-Soviet feelings on to another target, the Jews.

Letter to Ida Nudel

Former Prisoner of Conscience Ida Nudel was sentenced to four years of internal exile for "malicious hooliganism" in 1978. Ida was released on March 25, 1982 and is still awaiting a visa for Israel. The following message to Ida Nudel was signed by the entire Beth El Hebrew Congregation.

Dear Ida: This message comes to you from the entire congregation of Temple Beth El in Alexandria, Virginia, U.S.A., with our love and our prayers for your good health and spirits and to let you know that we are thinking of you. We would also like to send to you, as our way of sharing our Judaism, greetings for all our special holidays for you to hold in your heart and to think of whenever you need to.

On Rosh Hashana, we shall pray that you and others everywhere who are persecuted for their religious beliefs, be inscribed in the Book of Life to continue to be a beacon for all of us. On Yom Kippur, we shall look into our own hearts and see reflected there your vision of a world free of suffering and injustice. We know that your struggle is our struggle as well. Your sacrifices are not in vain. We hear your call and we sound the shofar on behalf of freedom.

On Chanukah we shall light the candles hoping to shed the light of liberty through the dark skies, knowing full well that though you may not be able to kindle the Chanukah lights, you are the flame whose bright spark is seen round the world; whose glow is not forgotten.

On Purim we shall celebrate our people's victory over tyranny long ago as we dream of the day when your release will be yet another victory over tyranny for all humankind.

On Passover we shall remember our people's exodus from bondage. We shall taste the bitter herb and drink the salt tears in the knowledge that as long as one Jew remains in bondage, we are all enslaved.

On Shevouoth we shall recall the covenant made at Sinai that links the Jewish people for all time; thus we renew our commitment to you and with you to end forever injustice and oppression, for we are children of the covenant together.

So until the time of rejoicing in freedom, of celebrating in the promised land is reached, we shall give you our holidays of the heart to celebrate and we shall hope that they may lift your spirits and renew you in times of despair. For we too, believe, as you have said, that someday your heart will be full of triumph. We here are working toward that end, and we pray with you that the day be soon.

Jews as Specialists

Anti-Semitism may be a response to perceptions of a disproportionately large number of Jews occupying important and prestigious positions in the national economy. Indeed, Jews do hold more scientific degrees and occupy more "specialist" posts than their numbers in the entire Soviet population would suggest. Although long displaced in a number of employment sectors—most notably the Party and government apparatus, diplomacy, foreign trade, and military and security services—Jews have achieved remarkable success in cultural, scientific, and technological fields. Intensified application of anti-Semitic quotas in university admissions in recent years reflect a basic mistrust of Jews in response to both Jewish emigration and the Soviet Union's own anti-Semitic propaganda. Moreover, the desire to "Russify" higher-level positions for domestic political reasons and to increase the educational level of local nationality in non-Russian territories as a means of satisfying local nationalist demands vis-a-vis Russian domination, has contributed to the increase in Jewish quotas.

A conspicuous reduction of Jewish personnel in specific fields, accomplished through limiting their access to appropriate education and otherwise restricting their employment opportunities, may itself increase anti-Semitism. By excluding Jews from academic institutions and prestigious professions, Jews are made to appear to be unacceptable. Observing the absence of Jews in significant sectors of society, others can only conclude that Jews are undesirable and that it is unwise to associate with them.

Totalitarianism

The totalitarian nature of the Soviet state is a key element in the current Soviet anti-Semitic campaign. No totalitarian regime claiming a monopoly on truth and justice can tolerate internal competition that claims an independent source of truth and justice. It is this need for monopoly, a sort of ideological insecurity, that motivates the crude attacks on Torah and Talmud.

Hannah Arendt has noted that totalitarianism requires an "objective enemy" who, like the carrier of a disease, is a "carrier" of dangerous alien "tendencies" that alone are capable of obstructing the "scientifically" planned programs of the totalitarian regime. Jews constitute a suitable "outside" force to be labeled scapegoats for problems in achieving the domestic and foreign policies of the regime.

Arab Apologists

Anti-Semitism, anti-Zionism, and general excoriation of Israel are all perceived as useful tools of foreign policy. Through propagation of such concepts, the Soviets hope to gain favor in the Middle East and in the Islamic world generally. Several Arab states have printed and distributed anti-Jewish material and routinely discriminate against Jewish citizens and would-be Jewish visitors. Doubtless they welcome Soviet efforts in support of anti-Semitism. It is no accident, as the Soviets themselves would say, that

Poisonous Mushrooms

Arabic is a frequent language of translation for Soviet anti-Semitic books sold abroad.

Beyond providing an exportable ideology, anti-Semitism is useful in supporting the Arabs in the Arab-Israeli conflict. By ascribing to Jews in general, and Israelis in particular, various forms of barbaric behavior—racism, collaboration with Nazis, routine brutality by Israeli soldiers, etc.—the Soviets try to explain away Arab military failures and to isolate Israel in world public opinion. In addition to assuaging Arab sensitivities, such propaganda is also intended to diminish Israel's stature. In weakening the esteem of Israel, the Western world to which Israel belongs is itself weakened, not least the United States, Israel's patron and the Soviet Union's chief adversary.

As compatible as Soviet anti-Semitism is with contemporary Soviet foreign policy, caution should be exercised in attributing to the relationship a sense of permanence or consistency. The longest lasting and most severe previous period of intense official Soviet anti-Semitism, from the late 1930s to Stalin's death in 1953, endured major realignments in USSR international policy—pro-West collective security, pro-Nazi Ribbentrop-Molotov non-aggression pact, pro-West wartime alliance, and anti-West postwar isolationism. It began before the establishment of the state of Israel, flourished during a period of strong Soviet support for

Reflection in the Mirror

Israel in 1948 and 1949, and started to wane in the mid-1950s although Soviet Middle East policy became strongly pro-Arab during the same period.

It is not impossible that the Soviets might seek to re-establish diplomatic relations with Israel while maintaining strident anti-Semitism at home. They can explain to the Arabs that Soviet-Israeli ties would allow the USSR stronger (pro-Arab) influence in peace negotiations. They can entice the Israelis to ignore Soviet domestic anti-Semitism in exchange for promises of increased emigration of Soviet Jews to Israel.

Ideology

Finally, an explanation for the intensification of Soviet anti-Semitism may be sought in ideology. Soviet sociopolitical theory on Judaism derives from Marxist concepts on religion and nationality. Religion is viewed as a set of irrational beliefs sustained by man's need to escape the exploitation and alienation inherent in capitalist society. Religious observance lacks its own internal dynamic and will disintegrate under communism. Therefore, the persistence in the Soviet Union of Jewish belief is an anachronism, practiced only by the elderly whose roots are in another era. Nationhood, according to Marxists, is accorded to those groups of people who share three characteristics—a common language, a common territory, and ties to the soil through a productive agricultural tradition. Lacking these attributes, the Jewish people are not considered a nation at all. In any case, nationalism, like religion, is obsolete.

In reality, Marx and his followers judged some nationalisms less disagreeable than others. If a nationalist movement weakened czarism or served other revolutionary interests, it was tolerated or even favored according to its perceived utility. Polish nationalism, which was viewed as contributing to the destruction of czarism, was approved. Similarly pragmatic, Lenin recognized that the Russian Jewish masses retained a strong sense of ethnic identity that would not easily be discarded. Although continuing to favor total assimilation as an ultimate goal, he advocated an interim phase of national and ethnic group development that itself would facilitate eventual assimilation. Once attaining power, the Bolsheviks granted full civic and national rights to the Jews. The new regime proceeded to create its own centrally-controlled "national" Jewish organizations while simultaneously destroying independent Jewish institutions that survived the 1917 Revolution or were created shortly thereafter. Chief among the new associations were the Yevsektsia (Jewish sections of the Party, 1918-1930) whose principal task was to force the secularization of Soviet Jewry and its adaptation to Soviet conditions.

The proclamation of Birobidzhan as an area of Jewish settlement in the Soviet Far East (1928) and the establishment of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee (1942-1948) followed in the same path of centrally-operated (and manipulated) national Jewish associations. The latter organization was clearly designed to encourage domestic and foreign Jewish support for the Soviet armed forces during World War II. Both the organization and the Jewish intellectuals around it were liquidated when their services were no longer required. Birobidzhan still exists in 1982 as the Jewish Autonomous Oblast, something of a farce as Jews constitute only 5.4 percent of its total population. Jewish ethnicity remains an official Soviet nationality and one's nationality is stil inscribed in the fifth paragraph of the internal passports (identity cards) carried by Soviet citizens. Jews, however, are permitted none of the infrastructure promoting national identity (publications in a widely understood language, national organizations, etc.) which is provided other Soviet nationalities.

If communist ideology appears irrelevant, and Soviet Middle East policy more concerned with strategic questions than with bigotry, explanations for Soviet anti-Semitism can be found in Russian nationalism, centrifugal forces of domestic and foreign empire, a need to deflect antigovernment antagonisms, and general internal repression.

Until the Soviet Union solves these problems, each of which is inherent in the nature of the regime, anti-Semitism is likely to remain a prominent characteristic of Soviet life. Circumstances may demand periodic intensification or reduction in the virulence of its official expression, but its presence will be constant. Meanwhile, if Soviet foreign affairs specialists had cautioned against an anti-Semitic campaign ten years

ago, they have much less reason to be concerned about international reaction now. The growing isolation of Israel (sanctified by the Soviet-encouraged 1975 United Nations resolution equating Zionism with racism and enforced by Arab oil power) and the not unrelated new chicness of the PLO in widely separated areas of the world, coupled with the rise of neo-Nazism in Europe, and an upsurge of anti-Semitism in many western countries all indicate that anti-Semitism is no longer the object of scorn that it once was. ■

Betsy Gidwitz is a Soviet area specialist at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and a lecturer of Aeronautics and Astronautics. This article is excerpted from a longer monograph by Professor Gidwitz. Copies of the original manuscript, which includes extensive footnotes and additional historical information, are available from the Union of Councils for Soviet Jews for $15 each.

Departure from Moscow*

It was a night of watching unto the Lord for bringing them out of the land of Egypt; this same night is a night of watching unto the Lord for all the children of Israel throughout their generations.

Exodus 12:42

Our ancestors of beloved memory,
shoulders burdened by the
unleavened dough wrapped in homespun cotton,
nostrils filled with the dust raised
by herds of weary cattle,
fled, terrified, the familiar bitterness
of Egypt, into freedom.

No more would they stumble barefoot
on the red boulders
of Pharoah's quarries,
prying precious stones for his fabulous tomb.

No more would they abandon
at the overseer's whim,
their tiny farms at harvest
to haul brick,
each yellowed rectangle stamped with
Pharoah's cartouche.

But they must force themselves
up out of slavery and into freedom.
With Moses' help,
they must bleach humiliation and fear
from their minds
throughout the years in the desert;
they must learn freedom.

In haste, Elena Tsypkin, you
carried the remnants of your life
unbelievingly up the staircase
at Sheremetevo International Airport.
Behind your eyes.
the woods and balconies of Moscow,
a bottle of champagne on the windowsill.

The leather suitcase bit your fingers.
Your body throbbed,
trembling at the last sight
of two people who
knew you before your birth.

The Kaddish for your past
was spoken in the embraces and tears
of those who love you.
The scenes that nourished your childhood
will remain behind
with your days of suffering in this place,
the chaotic farewell.

You have chosen to be free!
Courageously you thrust yourself
into the future;
there is no Moses to lead you
but your heart.

We will not forget your pain.

May the journey bring you peace,
and to all who are enslaved,
hope for the end of their oppression.

This poem was inspired by a young Russian refusenik's account of how she left the U.S.S.R. when her visa finally came through.

SPEECH ON ANTI-SEMITISM

This speech was made on December 1, 1981, in Madrid, by the U.S. Ambassador to the Madrid Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Max M. Kampelman.

Mr. Chairman:

Today is the ninth day since Dr. Andrei Sakharov and his wife, Elena Bonner, began a hunger strike in the city of Gorky, where he has been exiled by the authorities of the Soviet Union. A week ago today, the United States Senate unanimously—Republicans and Democrats, liberals and conservatives, representing all of our fifty states—adopted a resolution associating itself "fully and completely" with that protest. They joined in his condemnation of the Soviet Union for its "flagrant violation of the Helsinki Accords." I have no doubt that the Senate, in doing so, spoke for an outraged American people indignant at the harassment inflicted on Dr. Sakharov and his family.

We have noted on several occasions during the past year that harassment and mistreatment and repression have intensified in the Soviet Union. There is persecution of individuals and persecution of groups. Many ethnic and religious minorities have been particular victims.

The pattern of ethnic and religious oppression, officially sanctioned, takes many forms: the repressive legal restrictions on Crimean Tatars which prohibit them from returning to their historic homeland; forced Russification of the Baltic States; biased employment practices against Evangelical Christians; prohibition against manifestations of Ukrainian culture. We have talked of these and of others.

Last fall, the delegate of Belgium eloquently addressed a particularly pernicious aspect of Soviet repression: anti-Semitism. The Delegate of the United Kingdom has forcefully, on a number of occasions, brought this problem to our attention as well. Last Friday he did so again. This distasteful phenomenon has grown in intensity and in ugliness.

Speaking personally for a moment, I am Jewish by ancestry and commitment. My personal stake in this subject is, therefore, clear. Wherever anti-Semitism exists, Jews elsewhere react with concern and with the thought, "There but for the grace of God go I."

My intervention today, affected as all our statements may be by our personal values and beliefs, is nevertheless an expression of *my government's* deep concern.

The roots of anti-Semitism run deep in the human experience. It has commanded the attention and the profound intellectual energies of experts in psychology, sociology, religion and politics. The phenomenon is not yet fully understood, but we do know that the human being requires an avenue of release for his personal frustrations; and that, through a cofluence of accidental and historical forces, the Jew often has become the focus of the anger associated with that frustration and disappointment.

The task of civilized society has been to harnass and redirect the energy of that anger into more constructive channels, so that the basis of frustration may be understood and thus overcome. Regrettably, all too often totalitarian societies—unable to resolve the internal problems which beset them—have diverted the attention of their citizens away from the actual source of their frustration by finding targets on which to place the blame. Time and again, that scapegoat has been the Jew.

History has taught us that anti-Semitism is a contagious disease, a virus that endangers not only Jews but also the societies in which they live. It becomes our concern here in Madrid when and where anti-Semitism has government sanction. In that form, it is destructive to the Helsinki Final Act.

It is with regret that our delegation has concluded that the Soviet Union is clearly identified with a pattern of anti-Semitic behavior that could not function without government support and acquiescence.

Despite Soviet protestations to the contrary; despite the Soviet Constitution's prohibition of any "advocacy of racial or national . . . hostility"; despite Chairman Brezhnev's call at the 26th Party Congress in February

(continued on page 10)

Passover, 1982
SPECIAL ISSUE

The *Alert Magazine* is published bi-monthly by the Union of Councils for Soviet Jews, an organization dedicated to helping the Jews of the Soviet Union, especially those desiring to leave. Editor: Jeri Cohen; President: Lynn Singer; Vice Presidents: Ruth Newman, Joel Sandberg, Morey Schapira and Pam Cohen. The views expressed here are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the opinion of the Union of Councils for Soviet Jews.

SPEECH ON ANTI-SEMITISM, *continued from page 2*

to "fight resolutely against . . . anti-Semitism"; despite these words, government-condoned and government-propagated anti-Semitism florishes in the Soviet Union today.

The anti-Semitic campaign has intensified since the first CSCE review meeting. It has become more fearsome during our meeting here in Madrid. This latest surge, I assert without hesitation, is an officially sanctioned campaign, stimulated by state-controlled publication and exhibition of overtly anti-Semitic books, articles, cartoons and exhibitions.

The issue, Mr. Chairman, is too serious to exaggerate, and I will do my utmost not to do so. The label of anti-Semitism is too terrible to apply loosely, and I will guard against doing so. I proceed, therefore, with care to address this problem as a problem that dares not be ignored. The evidence is overwhelming. I will refer to only a few out of the hundreds of examples:

Fact: A book published in 150,000 copies in Moscow in 1977 and republished in 1979, written by Vladimir Begun and entitled *Invasion Without Arms*, characterizes the Torah, the Old Testament of the Bible, as, among other things, "an unsurpassed textbook (of) . . . hypocrisy, treachery, perfidy and moral degeneracy—all the basest human qualities." He writes: "Jewish and Christian hypocrites alike keep silent over this."

Fact: There are frequent cartoons—we have them here—representations in the official Soviet press portraying Jews with large hooked noses and evil-looking unshaven jowls. Indeed, in September 1975, after the Helsinki Final Act was signed, the *Kazakhstanskaya Pravda* reproduced a cover cartoon of the 1934 edition of the notoriously poisonous "Protocols of the Elders of Zion," depicting an evil-looking Jewish figure under the caption, "The Jewish Peril," digging his fingers into a globe of the world and making it bleed.

Fact: A 1979 exhibition of paintings in Minsk by the official Soviet artist Mikhail A. Savitsky included a canvas depicting the brutalities of the Nazi occupation of Byelorussia. The painting, entitled "Summer Theater," showed a pile of naked corpses in a concentration camp. Standing over them and grinning sadistically at each other are a helmeted Nazi officer and a Jew with the stereotype hooked nose and wearing a Star of David, presumably a camp trusty. Despite protestations against the work's blatant anti-Semitic character, a reprint of the painting also appeared in the Byelorussian Ministry of Culture's official journal.

Fact: Jews are repeatedly characterized in Soviet articles as criminals and gangsters. One illustration, an article by A. Filipenko, "Zionism and Crime," states that although "myth has become established that gangster bands consist exclusively of Italians, the facts prove that an active role is also played in the United States criminal syndicates by persons of Jewish origin." There are references in other Soviet publications to "the Jewish-Sicilian Mafia" (L. Korneyev, "The Most Zionist Business," in *Ogonyok*, November 28, 1978; and, same author, "Leaders—Gangsters" in *Medelya*, pp. 21-27, November 1977).

Fact: Reference to Jewish ownership of "death concerns," to "growing financial might," to the "Zionist Mafia of death," to Jewish control of media and banks and crime and multinational corporations, government, and the theater—all these abound. (L. Korneyev, "The Secret Wars of Zionism," *Neva*, No. 4, 1978; L. Korneyev, "The Most Zionist Business" (part one), *Ogonyok*, No. 28, 1978; V. Meshcheryakov, "With Someone Else's Voice," *Zhurnalist*, No. 4, 1976: and B. Antonov, "America in the Web of the Zionists," *Moskovskaya Pravda, March 1, 1978.)*

Fact: Soviet authorities in 1979 issued the *White Book*, which purported to reveal, as the subtitle states, "Espionage and Deception in the Name of Defense for Human Rights." Instead, the publication is replete with preposterious accusations and anti-Semitic attacks on Soviet Jewish activists and Western correspondents of Jewish origin. The *White Book* was first published by the Juridical Literature Printing House and edited by the director of the prestigious Association of Soviet Jurists. Even after this dispicable work received world-wide condemnation, a second edition was released in December, 1979.

Fact: Last year, it was announced that the book *Judaism and Zionism* by Trofim K. Kichko was to be published. Designed for a "mass audience," the book pretends to "unmask the criminal activities of various Zionist organizations and Zionist-oriented Judaism." The author's previous work of seventeen years ago, *Judaism Without Embellishment*, was so virulent in its anti-Semitism that after international protests were made—including some from the major Western Communist parties—Soviet authorities were forced to withdraw the book for "erroneous statements."

Fact: Articles accusing Jews of collaborating with Hitler to destroy the European Jewish community, to destroy the Soviet Union, and to strengthen a Jewish state are disseminated widely. Jews have furthermore been accused in the Soviet press of stimulating anti-Semitism and setting fire to synagogues in order to settle in Israel. (L. Korneyev, "The Sinister Secrets of Zionism" (part two), *Ogonyok*, No. 35, 1975; (Colonel) I. Tsvetkov, "The Tool of Imperialist Aggression," *Krasnaya Zvezda*, October 27, 1976; *Kino*, August 1975, a review of the anti-Semitic film "The Secret and the Overt"; L. Korneyev, "Zionism's Octopus of Espionage," *Ogonyok*, No. 5, 1977. V. Chernyavski, "Conversations with a Reader," *New Times*, No. 37, 1977; T. Kichko and D. Koretsky, "Trap for the Youth," *Dnipro*, No. 7, 1975.)

Fact: Anti-Jewish material has been distributed to Red Army recruits and is published in official journals of the Soviet armed forces. (Captain Y. Makulin, "Rabbis and Soldiers" in *Sovietskyroin*, November 10, 1976.)

Fact: Jewish history is deleted from Soviet elementary and secondary school textbooks. Indeed, the Russian pogroms of the late 19th Century against the Jews are justified in a Soviet publication as part of the class struggle. (V. Ya Begun, Ibid. pp. 55-56.)

Fact: The Soviet Union—with the third largest Jewish community in the world—is the only country with a Jewish population in which there is not a single approved Jewish school and no means for teaching Jewish history and tradition. The private teaching of Hebrew is outlawed, while the official study of the language is restricted to a very few non-Jews. In recent weeks, over eighty Jewish teachers of Hebrew, in Moscow alone, received threats of prosecution and banishment should they continue their instructions.

Mr. Chairman, all of the evidence for the above facts reflects events taking place after the signing of the Helsinki Final Act. During the past fifteen years, a total of at least 112 Soviet books and brochures with anti-Semitic overtones of various degrees have been identified, some of them printed and reprinted in editions of 150,000-200,000 copies. Anti-Semitic propaganda is also carried out through lectures, stimulated by the Communist Party and the state.

Soviet anti-Semitism is not limited to domestic consumption. It is also widely exported to Arab, African and other Third World countries. The writings of outspoken Soviet anti-Semites—Kichko, Begun, Korneyev and others—have been featured prominently in publications of the PLO, for instance. In addition, their writings are often published in English and distributed throughout the English-speaking world.

A publication of the Novosti Press Agency, the 77-page *Sword of David* by Leo Korn, has been widely distributed at Soviet Embassies and international fairs. Clearly aimed at Western readers, the pamphlet purports to reveal the "monstrous lie of Zionism" which is called "the most reactionary force of Jewish bourgeois nationalism." The booklet alleges that anti-Semitism is, after all, the fault of the Jews themselves, an understandable "result of the non-Jewish workers' hatred of their exploiters who belonged to the rich Jewish bourgeois caste." Canadian authorities demanded the publication's removal from the Ontario Science Center in 1978, where it was being given away by Soviet representatives.

In March of 1979, this same author raised the spectre of an international Jewish conspiracy, a familiar anti-Semitic theme, in the journal *Communist of the Armed Forces*. In an article entitled "Zionism—The Tool of Imperialistic Expansion and Neo-Colonialism," he wrote: "The Jewish financiers and industrialists strive to direct the domestic and foreign policies of the U.S.A., England, France, the FRG, Belgium and of other capitalist states . . ."

Now, it may be said that these books, articles and films are mere reflections of their authors, who have the right to their own opinions, no matter how repulsive. But we all know that nothing can be published openly or distributed in the Soviet Union without the official imprimatur of the government censoring agency, Glavlit. Indeed, the chairman of the Soviet State Committee for Printing, in justifying the Soviet banning of Western publications at the September 1979 International Book Fair in Moscow, cited legislation prohibiting books on racism and those that "stir up hatred and hostility between people." It is significant that anti-Semitic books, pamphlets, films and articles published in the Soviet Union are not required to meet that noble standard.

This is not a pretty picture that we have painted, Mr. Chairman. We have done so with profound regret and sadness. We have cited but a few deplorable examples. At our last session, the delegate from the United Kingdom cited others. There are many other instances of blatant government-condoned anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union. These are accompanied by harassment and imprisonment of Jewish leaders, discrimination against Jews in education and employment, active and frequently violent interference with the study of Hebrew and the possession of articles of prayer, and by a drastic reduction in the number of Jews being allowed to escape this pervasive anti-Semitism through emigration.

I respectfully suggest that there should be no room for anti-Semitism in a society that professes its commitment to the teachings of Marx, a Jew. The early roots of socialism were idealistic. They had their philosophic justification in a commitment to human brotherhood and to the dignity of the individual. Where there is anti-Semitism, Mr. Chairman, there is a corruption of those ideals.

I make this plea once again. The Soviet Union is a society that is large and powerful and has existed for more than sixty years. There is no need for that society to crush human beings, small and insignificant as they may appear in the broader perspective of history. There should be no need to stimulate hatred among peoples.

It is time for that society to develop a stronger faith in itself and in the inner strength of its people. The world, and certainly my Government, would welcome a Soviet decision to mobilize its resources and its people constructively to help meet its internal problems without the use of diversionary hate tactics. This is the only way we can ever hope to achieve the spirit of understanding mandated by the Helsinki Final Act that we all seek and that eludes us.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

8 USSR - Emigration

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NYT 1/29/82

Bush Pledges Forceful Policy on Soviet Jews

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 28 — Six leaders of major Jewish organizations met with Vice President Bush today to seek assurances that the Reagan Administration would strengthen its efforts in negotiations with the Soviet Union to allow the free emigration of Soviet Jews.

Mr. Bush assured the delegation "that the President considers this matter to be the highest priority," adding, "I personally feel, and I know I am the heartbeat of the President on this, that the matter of Soviet Jewry is one matter we are not holding back on."

Representatives from North America, Western Europe, Israel and Australia attending the meeting of the Presidium of the World Conference on Soviet Jewry expressed alarm at the sharp decline in the number of Jews being allowed to emigrate. The drop from a high of 51,000 in 1979 to 9,447 in 1981 prompted Leon Dulzin, chairman of the presidium, to speak of "beginning the struggle all over again."

A longtime Congressional supporter of Soviet Jews, Senator Henry M. Jackson, Democrat of Washington, told the audience that "steady, determined effort" was needed "to prevent the trend to put emigration on the back burner" after the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and the crisis in Poland.

'Statement of Principle'

Mr. Bush suggested that perhaps the Administration could issue a "statement of principle."

"We are not in such a delicate situation with the Soviets that we couldn't do something like that," he added.

Theodore M. Mann of the National Conference on Soviet Jewry expressed the hope that the issue of Soviet Jews would "not become a matter of private diplomacy but of public action." Emigration figures show only about 300 Jews a month leaving the Soviet Union, while "harasssment of Jewish dissidents" is growing and Western interest lagging, the presidium reported. Meeting for the first time in the United States, it called for a world conference on Soviet Jews to be held in Western Europe this fall. Next May has been designated "solidarity month" and a series of demonstrations and other events will be organized to demonstrate support for Soviets Jews wishing to emigrate.

In an attempt to broaden Congressional support, individual members of the American branch of the World Conference sponsored a fact-finding trip by three Congressmen to the Soviet Union in the Congressional recess. Christopher H. Smith, Republican of New Jersey, James M. Shannon, Democrat of Massachusetts, and Sam Gejdenson, Democrat of Connecticut, made the trip to meet with Jewish dissidents.

Representative Shannon said that the Soviet Union was misreading the mood in America. The fact that longtime Congressional supporters of Soviet Jewry, like Charles A. Vanik, have retired and that others, like Senator Jackson, are now in the minority party of the Senate merely underscored "the need for new members of Congress to go the Soviet Union and tell the Soviets that human rights is not an issue that will die," he said.

(Policy): (1) In January 1982, VPres. Bush met w/ leaders of major Jewish organizations to assure the Reagan Administr. would (6) Bush pledges forceful policy strengthen its efforts in negotiations w/ the S.U. to allow the free emigration of Soviet Jews. Bush assured the delegation that "the Pres. considers this matter to be the highest priority."

(2) as Sen. Jackson has stated "steady, determined effort" is needed to prevent the trend to put emigration on the back burner.

(Bush – issuance of statement of principle)

(3) p. 4 – Kirkpatrick

(4) Reagan's statement in May – * support of Sov. Jewry

Record:

(1) sharp decline in the number of Jews being allowed to emigrate – 51,000 in 1979 / 9,497 in 1981

(2) concern re: drop in nos. leaving the S.U. at the harassment of Jewish dissidents

(3) of ↓ is not only drop in emigration but human rights suppression of Jews in the S.U. – linguistically, culturally. (Jeane Kirkp.'s speech)

(4) quote Kampelman – re: teaching of Hebrew delivered his stat. – Dec. 1

(5) analysis – downward trend years ago → int'l / domestic reasons
poor US/USSR relat. drain on economy

Department of State

OUTGOING TELEGRAM

ORIGIN EUR-12

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 INR-10 CIAE-00 DODE-00 IO-15 NEA-06
NSAE-00 SSO-00 PA-01 INRE-00 RP-10 ICAE-00 SP-02
SPRS-02 /058 R

DRAFTED BY EUR/SOV: ALAGOODMAN
APPROVED BY EUR: JDSCANLAN
EUR/SOV: AEDARBYSHIRE
EUR/SOV: TWSIMONS
EUR/CE: WTHOMPSON
NEA/IAI: ECUBBISON
RP/IP: JHOGANSON

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O P 072206Z JAN 82
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY VIENNA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
INFO AMCONSUL LENINGRAD PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY
USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 004219~~

E.O. 12065: N/A

TAGS: SREF, PEPR, AU, UR, US, IS

SUBJECT: PRESS GUIDANCE ON JAI CURTAILMENT OF ACTIVITIES IN RESPONSE TO AUSTRIAN REFUGEE PROCESSING PLAN

1. IN RESPONSE TO ARTICLES APPEARING IN THE NEW YORK TIMES AND WASHINGTON POST, DEPT. HAS PREPARED PRESS GUIDANCE WHICH ADDRESSEES SHOULD USE IF INQUIRIES ARE RECEIVED REGARDING JAI DECISION TO CURTAIL ACTIVITIES IN VIENNA IN PROTEST OVER NEW AUSTRIAN PLAN TO TRY TO ENSURE FREEDOM OF CHOICE FOR SOVIET JEWS ARRIVING IN VIENNA. IN THIS GUIDANCE, DEPT. HAS REPEATED GUIDANCE PREVIOUSLY ISSUED TO COVER OTHER CONTINGENCY QUESTIONS.

2. BEGIN TEXT:

Q: DOES THE DEPARTMENT HAVE ANY COMMENT ON THE REPORT THAT THE ISRAELI AGENCY THAT HANDLES IMMIGRATION OF SOVIET JEWS, JAI, HAS DECIDED TO CURTAIL ITS ACTIVITIES?

A: THE DEPARTMENT HAS SEEN NEWSPAPER REPORTS THAT THE ISRAELI JEWISH AGENCY, JAI, HAS DECIDED TO WITHDRAW FROM THE FACILITY PROVIDED BY THE AUSTRIAN GOVERNMENT FOR MEETING WITH SOVIET JEWISH REFUGEES BECAUSE OF

AUSTRIA'S DECISION TO GRANT SOVIET JEWS ACCESS TO OTHER VOLUNTARY AGENCIES WHICH MIGHT HELP THEM RESETTLE IN COUNTRIES OTHER THAN ISRAEL. THE DEPARTMENT CANNOT CONFIRM THESE REPORTS AND HAS NO COMMENT ON THEM.

Q: WHAT IS UNITED STATES POLICY WITH REGARD TO WHERE SOVIET JEWS WHO LEAVE THE USSR WITH VISAS FOR ISRAEL SHOULD RESETTLE?

A: AS WE HAVE PREVIOUSLY STATED, U.S. POLICY HAS ALWAYS BEEN AND WILL CONTINUE TO BE THAT SOVIET JEWISH REFUGEES ARRIVING IN VIENNA SHOULD HAVE THE FREEDOM TO CHOOSE WHERE THEY WISH TO RESETTLE IF THERE ARE SEVERAL COUNTRIES WILLING TO OFFER THEM REFUGE. WE SEE NO REASON WHY SOVIET JEWISH REFUGEES FROM THE USSR SHOULD BE FORCED TO SETTLE IN ANY SPECIFIC COUNTRY IF THERE ARE SEVERAL COUNTRIES WILLING TO OFFER THEM REFUGE. WITH REGARD TO REFUGEES RESETTLING IN THE UNITED STATES, WE HAVE ALWAYS BEEN AND WILL REMAIN COMMITTED TO THE PRINCIPLE OF FAMILY REUNIFICATION. IN PARTICULAR, WE FEEL THAT OUR ROLE MUST BE TO ASSIST JEWISH REFUGEES FROM THE SOVIET UNION WHO WISH TO JOIN THEIR RELATIVES LIVING IN THE UNITED STATES.

Q: WILL AMERICAN VOLUNTARY AGENCIES CONTINUE TO ASSIST SOVIET JEWS WHO WISH TO RESETTLE IN THE UNITED STATES CONTRARY TO THE WISHES OF THE ISRAELIS?

A: ALTHOUGH SOME AMERICAN JEWISH AGENCIES MAY DECIDE TO COOPERATE WITH THE WISHES OF THE ISRAELIS, TO THE BEST OF OUR KNOWLEDGE, MOST AMERICAN VOLUNTARY AGENCIES WILL CONTINUE TO OFFER ASSISTANCE TO SOVIET JEWS WHO ARRIVE IN VIENNA AND WISH TO RESETTLE IN THE UNITED STATES.

Q: DOES THE DEPARTMENT HAVE ANY COMMENT ON THE ISRAELI ACCUSATION THAT THE UNITED STATES HAS PROVOKED THE SOVIET UNION INTO A NEW HARD LINE POLICY THAT LIMITS JEWISH EMIGRATION FROM THE USSR?

A: WE ARE UNAWARE THAT THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT HAS PLACED BLAME ON THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DECLINE IN JEWISH EMIGRATION FROM THE SOVIET UNION. ANY CHARGES TO THIS EFFECT WOULD BE MISDIRECTED AND ILL-FOUNDED. SINCE 1972 WHEN LARGE NUMBERS OF SOVIET JEWS WERE FIRST PERMITTED TO EMIGRATE FROM THE SOVIET UNION, UNITED STATES POLICY HAS BEEN DIRECTED TOWARDS INCREASING THE NUMBER OF JEWS PERMITTED TO EMIGRATE BY SOVIET AUTHORITIES.

Q: DOES THE DEPARTMENT HAVE ANY COMMENT ON THE CONTENTION THAT THE DECISION BY MANY SOVIET JEWS NOT TO RESETTLE IN ISRAEL JEOPARDIZES THE FLOW OF JEWISH EMIGRATION FROM THE SOVIET UNION?

A: WE ARE VERY CONCERNED ABOUT THE DECLINE IN JEWISH EMIGRATION FROM THE SOVIET UNION AND HAVE STUDIED THE QUESTION CLOSELY. TO DATE WE HAVE SEEN NO EVIDENCE WHICH SUGGESTS TO US THAT THE RECENT DECLINE IN JEWISH EMIGRATION IS DUE TO THE DECISION BY MANY SOVIET JEWS NOT TO RESETTLE IN ISRAEL.

3. ADDRESSEES SHOULD NOTE THAT UNTIL SITUATION IN VIENNA IS CLARIFIED, DEPT. WOULD PREFER TO AVOID COMMENTING ON SPECIFICS OF JAI MOVE AS MATTER IS PROPERLY ONE BETWEEN JAI AND GOVERNMENT OF AUSTRIA. HOWEVER, ADDRESSEES MAY RESPOND TO ANY INQUIRY REGARDING USG POLICY ON SOVIET JEWISH REFUGEES WITH SUGGESTED ANSWER GIVEN ABOVE. SHOULD ADDRESSEES RECEIVE AN INQUIRY ASKING FOR A USG ASSESSMENT OF SPECIFICS OF AUSTRIAN PLAN OR POLICY, PLEASE ADVISE IMMEDIATELY.

4. FOR VIENNA: EMBASSY MAY WISH TO ADVISE GOA OF CONTENT OF DEPT. PRESS GUIDANCE, ESPECIALLY WITH REGARD TO REAFFIRMATION OF USG SUPPORT FOR POLICY OF FREEDOM OF CHOICE. AT SAME TIME, EMBASSY SHOULD INFORM GOA THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO ISSUE FURTHER STATEMENTS AS EVENTS WARRANT.
HAIG

JN 3/14/19

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JEWISH EMIGRATION FROM THE USSR IN 1981

by Z. Alexander

In 1981 the number of Jews permitted to leave the USSR - with Israeli visas - reached the lowest point we have witnessed since 1971, thus bringing the "aliya" (or rather - the exit) from the USSR to its minimum.

The drastic cut in the number of exits was accompanied by a wave of harassments and imprisonments of those seeking to leave - especially the refuseniks (whose number has rose to measures we haven't known in the past). The process which started in 1980 became much more serious, when in 1981 the number of exits dropped each month. The total of exit permits approved by the Soviet authorities for 1981 comes to about 9000 individual visas, compared with 20.319 in 1980 and 50.343 in 1979.

In the first half of 1981, 6622 individual visas were granted in the Dutch embassy in Moscow (representing Israel in the USSR), compared with 2500 granted in the second half.

Similar process (though not so grave) of monthly reduction in the granting of exit visas occurred last year, when compared with 14.295 individual visas granted in the first half of 1980, only 6024 were granted in the second half.

The annual reduction in the number of exit visas granted in 1980 was 59.7% compared with 1979, while in 1981 the annual reduction was 55.7% compared with 1980.

The continuous reduction in the exit quota of Jews from the USSR beginning with 1980, indicates a strict and planned Soviet policy. The meaning of such a policy is that Soviet Jews are denied their basic rights of emigrating to Israel. The introduction of this policy - which differed from the past Soviet policy - caused great anxiety among Soviet Jews - as well as among other Jewish communities over the world.

a. THE HISTORY OF THE JEWISH EXODUS FROM THE USSR

We are not quite certain about the method of the Soviet decision-making regarding the right of Jews to leave the USSR for Israel - neither are we aware of their decisive considerations on the subject.

Nevertheless, a combined analysis of declarations, publications and casual talks with official representatives and spokesmen of the Soviet Union, as well as the examination of data on exit permits granted to Jews during the last years, enable us to draw several conclusions or assumptions on the Soviet policy regarding the right of its Soviet Jewish citizens to immigrate to Israel.

We might assume that the Soviet policy towards Jewish emigration derives from several elements - some fixed and some changing - which are influenced by considerations connected with external policy, internal policy, economic interests and others.

One of the main fixed elements of the Soviet policy on the subject of emigration is the basic negation of the possibility of any sort of emigration from the USSR - including emigration to any other Communist country. This basic negation both of emigration and of repatriation from the USSR is ideological in essence. It has nothing to do usually with the personal data of the potential emigrants. Occasional positive response of the Soviet authorities comes either as a result of political and public pressures exerted by foreign elements, or otherwise out of internal and external policy considerations. These instances, however, prove no change in the basic ideological attitude.

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REPATRIATIONS FROM THE USSR

In spite of this basic policy, we have data on several emigrations, or rather repatriations - of large numbers of people from the USSR since World War II.

1. Repatriation to Poland (first)

The repatriation of Poles to Poland was based on an agreement signed by the Soviet and Polish governments on July 6 1945, right after World War II, and was carried out in 1945-1949. A few hundreds of thousands of Poles* (140.000 Jews included) - refugees and/or WW II prisoners, made their way back from Russia to Poland.

2. Repatriation to Poland (second)

The second repatriation to Poland occurred in 1957-1960, again on the basis of an agreement signed on March 25 1957, by the Soviet and Polish governments**, and stated that all ex-citizens of Poland of Polish and Jewish nationality, who had a documentary evidence proving they were in fact Polish citizens up to 1939, and who still had relatives in Poland - were permitted to return to Poland. This agreement referred to citizens belonging to the Polish nationality only, but as stated, the exception was that 10% of the total were Polish citizens of the Jewish nationality (and their families), who were allowed to return to Poland according to a specific paragraph in the agreement. 25.000 Jews left Russia to Poland in that period - according to data gathered at the Israeli embassy in Warsaw those days.

3. Repatriation to West Germany

The repatriation of Germans from the USSR to West Germany, within the framework of a formal agreement signed between the two countries concerned, started in 1956, as we know. This repatriation - continuing up to our days - concerns over 85.000 persons*** who could prove their belonging to the German nationality, and who received affidavits ('vyzovs') from relatives in Germany. This came in addition to 9.626 war prisoners who returned in 1955, following an agreement with Adenauer.

4. Repatriation to Spain

There was also the repatriation of a few thousands Spanish citizens, who escaped the Franco regime, and were allowed to return to Spain following its downfall.

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* According to Krystyna Kerstein's research - "On the Repatriation of the Polish Population after WW II", published in 1974 by PAN - the Polish Academy for Sciences and the Historical Institute, 266.000 Polish citizens immigrated back to Poland during this period.

** The agreement was published in the Pravda issue of March 26 1957, No. 85(14114). According to this agreement, requests for exit could have been submitted starting with Dec. 31 1956.
In accordance with the Wielka Encyklopedia Powszechna of 1967 (p.787), the total number of Polish repatriants from the USSR reached about 1.5 million.

*** According to the registrations at the border station in Friedland, as well as those at the Ministry of Interior of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Red Cross data.

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5. Repatriation to Greece

Further, there is the repatriation of Greeks who were inhabitants of Tzarist Russia for generations, others who fled from Turkey to the USSR, and Greek refugees, members of the Communist party - who left after the attempted coûp-d'état of 1948-9 in Greece. The repatriation agreement started in 1965 and continued till 1967. Within this framework, 4-6 thousands Greeks emigrated (according to a report by the representative of the agency in Athens. The details were confirmed by the councellor of the Greek embassy in Moscow, as well as by the BBC.)

All these repatriations were carried out on the basis of agreements reached at between the USSR and the concerned countries. They all deal with the return of persons of certain nationalities to their national homeland, in most cases these individuals being requested to prove that their repatriation was based on family reunification as well.

People of Ukrainian, Bielorussian or Lithuanian nationalities, as well as Germans, all who had Polish citizenship prior to 1939, when World War II broke out, were not allowed to return back to Poland from Russia, as they were not included in the repatriation agreement, since they were not recognized as a part of the Polish nationality. As mentioned before, the Jews formed an exception in this respect.

6. The Repatriation to Israel

The first signs of the possibility of granting exit permits for Israel to Jews, within the framework of family reunification, were expressed in Khrushchev's words as early as 1957 and 1960. During the eleven years of Khrushchev's rule in the USSR, 2418 exit visas for Israel were granted to Jews, compared with only 18 granted during the first six years since the establishment of Israel (1948-53), in Stalin's days.

A certain change was introduced in the Soviet policy towards the exit of Jews from the USSR to Israel, when Leonid Brejhnev came to power. This change was expressed in formal declarations of Soviet officials (Kosigin in Paris, Dec. 1968; Gomulka's speech in Warsaw - March 1968 - copied in "Izvestia" on March 23 1968). Thus, in 1965-67 (till July 1967, following the Six Day War), 4498 Jews in the USSR received exit visas for Israel.

The Six Day War marked a turning point in the Jewish immigration to Israel : the Aliya of Soviet Jews was completely stopped for 14 months, and those seeking exit were told by the Soviet authorities there was no chance of renewing the Aliya as long as diplomatic relations with Israel don't exit. No requests for departure were accepted during the period of these 14 months. Those Jews who wished to leave for Israel found themselves paying for Israel's victory in the Six Day War.

September 1968 marked another change, when, though only five Jews were granted exit permits in the USSR, it was a start sign, which encouraged Jews in the USSR to intensify their pressure in order to exercise their right to immigrate to Israel. Simultaneously, world Jewry, Israel and Western public opinion intensified their pressure too. The combination of all these factors imprinted its seal on the Aliya from the USSR in the last decade.

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The last months of 1968 witnessed a tendency of growth in the number of exit visas Jews were granted to leave for Israel : In September - 5; in October - 73; in November - 110 and in December - 191.

The tidings of the renewal of Aliya travelled fast among Soviet Jews, who anticipated it impatiently. Many Jews - who neither dared nor could - submit their requests for emigration during the 14 months since the Six Day War, did not hesitate to take advantage of the development and submitted their papers. For 16 months - beginning in September 1968 - the number of those asking for affidavits from relatives in Israel, reached 34.000.

The USSR authorities were probably taken by surprise to realize the large number of people requesting emigration to Israel. Nevertheless, till June 1970 they were careful not to imprison Jews for their wish to leave for Israel, though some such instances occurred (Boris Kochubievsky, Lila Untman, Shimon Grillus and others).

On June 15 1970, the Soviet Security Services changed their attitude towards those seeking emigration : they took advantage of the unsuccessful attempt to take over a plane in Leningrad and fly it to Israel, and opened a wide campaign against Aliya activists in Leningrad, Kishinev, Riga and Vilnius. Imprisonments and searches were carried out and documents and material of Jewish content were confiscated from dozens of Jews who wanted to emigrate to Israel. This took place in Leningrad, Moscow, Riga, Vilnius, Kharkov, Kiev, Tbilisi, Sukhomel and other cities. K.G.B. agents set to preparing the trials ; quite a few witnesses were interrogated and a large quantity of 'incriminating' evidences was collectd.

On December 15 1970, the Leningrad Trial opened, and a week later the severe verdicts - including two death penalties - were publicized.

The Leningrad Trials caused much commotion in Israel - as well as in other parts of the world, and stimulated a vigorous campaign against the severe verdicts. Protests, rallies and demonstrations spread all over the Western countries. International media covered the events extensively, though it was Christmas time. In Italy the whole subject of harassment of Soviet Jews became an issue at the election campaign : Italian stevedores - including members of the Communist party and of the trade-union (affiliated to the Communist party) - banned both Soviet and Spanish vessels : the first in protest against the Leningrad Trials, and the last in protest against the attitude towards the Basks in Spain.

The world-wide storm reached its peak in the first World Conference for Soviet Jewry, which opened in Brussels on February 23 1971 : this was the corner-stone of the International Jewish movement for Soviet Jewry.

Those very days, wide-scale preparations for the 24th Congress of the Communist party took place in the USSR. It was scheduled for March 1971, and as usual, members of Communist parties in the West were invited. The Soviet authorities, naturally, were interested to minimize to its utmost the conflicts existing between the USSR and Western Communist parties, some of which even went so far as to criticize the Soviet policy towards Jews.

This actually brought about the decision on the renewal of the Jewish emigration from the USSR. Soviet media in the USSR started emphasizing more and more the fact that the Soviet government acts in accordance with humanitarian standards, permitting repatriation to Israel, within the framework of Jewish families reunification with their relatives in Israel. Thus, the decision taken by the Soviet authorities to increase the number of exit permits to Israel came into effect as early as March 1971; that month - 1020 exit permits were granted, being followed by 1569 in April. During ten months in 1971 (March through December) 14.011 Jews were granted emigration

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visas to Israel, compared with only 1046 granted in the whole of 1970. The relatively liberal policy of granting Jews emigration visas to Israel, continued - with fluctuations - till the end of 1979.

The meaningful reduction in granting emigration visas to Israel in the years 1975-1977, could have been the result of the suspension of the extensive trade agreement between the USA and the USSR, at the end of 1974. Since the beginning of 1975 and up to the end of 1977, the average monthly quota of exit visas to Jews came to 1100-1400, compared with the monthly average of 2186 for the years 1971 - 1974.

In 1979 a new stage was marked in the emigration policy of the Soviets towards Jews : the number of exit visas meaningfully rose - 30.594 in 1978 and 50.343 in 1979.

It is obviously difficult to be sure of the reasons that drove the Soviet authorities to have such a meaningful increase in the number of exit visas to Israel. Nevertheless, it is logic to assume that this policy was meant to appease world public opinion - especially the USA government - towards the renewal of the SALT talks. It is not far fetched to assume that this gesture was also meant to improve the USSR's image, just prior to the negotiations concerning the expansion of the trade contracts between the USSR and the USA. It could have also been regarded as a response to public and political activities of the Jewish people in Israel and elsewhere on the one hand, and to the struggle of Soviet Jews to materialize their right to emigrate to Israel on the other hand. We kept hoping that the Soviet authorities will adhere to this policy and even stop the wave of harassments that became part of the daily life of Jews seeking to leave. Unfortunately, as early as the summer of 1979 the situation has started deteriorating, reaching its worst nowadays.

The emigration quotas - fixed and occasionally changing - can confirm the assumption that the Soviet policy toward Jewish emigration is probably influenced by the politico-economic relations of the super-powers (USA-USSR), in addition to general internal policy considerations, which occasionally even concern various Republics or cities, but are detached from the actual wish or desire of the Jews to emigrate.

As already stated, as early as the summer of 1979, a new phenomenon was introduced in the Soviet policy toward Jews seeking to leave : we mean the 'first-degree family kinship restriction' we have never known before. The OVIR started to maliciously enquire into the degree of family kinship existing between the senders from Israel and the Soviet receivers of the vyzovs. This restriction, first introduced in Odessa, spread to most Ukrainian cities and later on to most other cities in other Republics as well. The Soviet authorities do not even consider thousands of appeals by Jews for emigration, on the grounds that the 'family kinship is insufficient', i.e. the relatives in Israel who sent the vyzovs are not 'first-degree' relatives.

No doubt, these restrictions caused alarm among Soviet Jews, who saw in it a new rigorous Soviet policy designed to reduce drastically the number of exit visas. It has given rise to a new class of Jews in the USSR, who are neither given exit visas nor are 'refuseniks': having been deprived of the opportunity of submitting an application they never received a refusal.

At the end of 1980, in summarizing the data for that year, some analysts related the drastic reduction in the number of exit visas given in some Republics to the high percentage of drop-outs from those Republics. It appeared possible to draw the conclusion that some kind of correlation existed between the number of drop-outs and the scale of reduction in exit visas issued in certain Republics. Nevertheless, the reduction in the number of exit permits during 1981 spread to new regions, thus becoming a factor closing the gates of emigration.

6/..

The policy of drastically cutting the number of exit permits in 1980 was also influenced by the deterioration of bi-lateral relations between the USA and the USSR. Thus Soviet Jews are caught in a tragic state, being held - so to say - hostages, depending on relationship they have no control over.

Up to the present (starting with 1968 and till the end of 1981), 259.635 Jews left the USSR with Israeli visas, but the number of those who are still in the USSR, after having received vyzovs from relatives in Israel (following their request), comes to additional 381.700 individuals. This means that thousands of divided families fight their bitter destiny in anticipation of the day when they can be united with their loved ones.

In addition, all those who were lucky to leave the USSR during the last 14 years - numbering about 260.000 persons - actually undermined the position and state of their relatives who remained behind. We might assume that there are at least half a million relatives - in various degrees of relationship - who look forward to being reunited with their families in Israel or elsewhere.

b) HOLDERS OF 'VYZOVS' (AFFIDAVITS)

A singular problem, no doubt, is formed by all those 380.000 Jews, who during recent years have received (following their request) - affidavits (vyzovs) from relatives in Israel (this being a precondition to submitting the official request to leave), but are still in the USSR. These Jews have undermined their personal state and security by the very fact they requested from relatives in Israel to send them the vyzovs, and furthermore - by receiving the vyzovs - which must be sent from Israel by mail. (Jews who submit their papers for emigration must present - jointly with the vyzov they received from Israel - the envelope it was sent in, stamped by both the Israeli and the Soviet post offices. Only those vyzovs sent by mail, checked and registered by the Soviet Censor - are valid... The recipients of such vyzovs are usually classified by the Soviet Security Services as "unfaithful element", with all the connotations it carries...)

In light of the above details, there is no wonder that the number of those asking to get vyzovs from relatives in Israel is in direct correlation with their chances of receiving the exit visas. When, on the one hand, the exit quota is reduced and on the other hand the harassment of Jews seeking emigration is intensified - the number of Jews asking to get vyzovs is reduced. Quite a few Jews do not see any reason to jeoperdize themselves and get involved with the Soviet authorities as long as there is hardly any chance for leaving. On the other hand, every sign of growth in the number of exit visas issued, is immediately expressed in a meaningful growth in the number of Jews asking to get vyzovs.

Therefore, the drastic cut in the number of exits in 1981 caused a serious drop in the number of those receiving vyzovs from relatives in Israel. As long as there are no conceivable chances of receiving exit visas, Jews are deterred from submitting their emigration applications, fearing to lose their jobs and suffer all its implications.

7/..

c) REFUSENIKS

Last year there was a substantial rise in the number fo Jews whose applications for emigration to Israel were refused, while a diminishing number of veteran refuseniks received exit visas after years of waiting.

Unfortunately, we lack information on the precise number of refuseniks. Many are even afraid to tell their relatives in Israel of the refusal they got to their applications. Anyway, the number of refuseniks we knew of during recent years 'stabilized', more or less, around 3000 persons. We got used to the 'fact' that each year about 25-30% of those refuseniks we knew of, succeeded to receive exit visas to Israel, following years of waiting. Their 'place' (in the refuseniks' list) was usually taken by new refuseniks.

Starting with 1980, there occurred quite a substantial rise in the number of refuseniks (about whom we have data), and it reached 4741 individuals (a growth of 58.8% in one year!) To this figure we must add the thousands of families whose requests for emigration were rejected by OVIR (supposedly owing to 'insufficient family kinship'), thus being unable even to submit their formal applications.

The number of refuseniks at the end of 1981 reached 7040 (a growth of 48.5% in 1981). The number of Jews from among them who have been refuseniks for over ten years is 70 - with all the implications involved. Those who have been refuseniks for 'only' five years and over number 221.

The fate of the refuseniks is extremely tragic. Most of them - having lost their jobs - wander about with no chance of regaining another one, in their field of profession. In most cases, their children were driven out of universities, sometimes even from high-schools. When students are dismissed from universities - they are usually automatically drafted to the army. This means a long delay in the chances of getting exit visas, as a result of the claim of 'possession of military secrets'.

Thus, refuseniks have to live on their dull savings, and on parcels dispatched from relatives in Israel and other countries.

d) EXIT FROM THE VARIOUS REPUBLICS

In 1980 and 1981 the number of Jews (mostly Bukharans), who left Uzbekistan, was significantly reduced. (This could have been in connection with the Afghanistan war at the other side of the border). While in 1979 they formed 9% of the total of those who received exit visas, in 1980 they formed only 2.8% and in 1981 just 0.9% of the total exits (which was reduced anyway).

On the other hand, we mark a significant growth in the percentage of Jews from the R.S.F.S.R. (Great Russia), who received exit visas : while in 1979 they formed 15.7% of the total of those who received exit visas, in 1980 their percentage rose to 21% and in 1981 to 51%, i.e. the Jews of R.S.F.S.R. were relatively* less inflicted by the policy of drastically cutting the scale of exits of Jews from the USSR in the last two years.

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* next page

At the same time, there was a drastic and most significant reduction in the number of exits from the Ukraine. The percentage of Ukrainian Jews from within the total exits came down from 48.2% in 1978 to 44.7% in 1979, 22.7% in 1980 and 23.2% in 1981. The reduction in actual numbers is much more significant : 22 523 Jews from the Ukraine left in 1979; 4611 in 1980 and 2030 in 1 81.

In addition, meaningful changes were introduced regarding the number of exit visas granted to Jews in various big cities in the USSR : in 1981, the percentage of Jews from Moscow who were permitted to emigrate, came to 37.4% of the total exits, compared with about 6% of the total exits which was the common figure in preceding years*.

A relative growth - though unmeaningful - occurred also in the number of Jews permitted to emigrate from Leningrad - in comparison with other cities in the USSR : in 1980 - 10.7% of the total departures came from Leningrad; in 1981 - 9.2%, and this compared with an average of 7.5% of the total exits in the years 1978-1979.

e) "NESHIRA" - THE DROP-OUT PHENOMENON

In 1981 Neshira reached a peak we have never known before.

In 1976 the percentage of drop-outs out of the total exits from the USSR came to		49.1%
In 1978	it was	58.4%
In 1980	it came to	65.6.%
and in 1981	it reached	81.4.%

The highest percentage of Neshira came from the Ukrainian cities : Kiev - 96.4% and Kharkov - 98.8%. Not far beyond are - Odessa - with 93.9%; Leningrad with 92.9% and Moscow with 91.3%. In Riga the percentage of drop-outs reached 65.7%; Vilnius - 59.7% and in Chernovitz - 56.3%. Even Jews from Tbilisi, the Capitol of Georgia, dropped out in large numbers, bringing the percentage of drop-outs from this city to 49.2%.

The first signs of Neshira were noticed as early as 1971, then forming only 0.4% of the total departures. To our deepest regret, no serious nor decisive treatment was given to this phenomenon in those days.
The Neshira kept growing by the year - sometimes even by the month - like a contagious desease.

Even in those early stages of Neshira, we were afraid of the USSR's reaction to this phenomenon. A close study of the hisotry of repatriations from the USSR in the last three decades taught us that every single emigration from that country is founded on two basic principles - complimentary to each other : repatriation (the return to one's historical homeland) and reunification of families. On the basis of these combined two principles, over a quarter of a million Poles returned to Poland during 1945-1949, and an additional such number returned in 1957-1960. This was also the basis for the return of about 85.000 ex-German citizens to Western Germany. And these very principles served as the basis for the return from the USSR of Spanish refugees to Spain and Greeks to Greece.

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* We might assume that the reason for this policy had some connection with the Congress of the Communist party that took place in Moscow in March 1981.

Similarly, the exit of Jews from the USSR to Israel was founded on these two principles (the difference being that all repatriations were anchored in signed agreements between the USSR and the concerned country - Poland, West Germany, etc., whereas the repatriation of Jews was the result of an untiring struggle of the State of Israel and the Jewish People all over the world, and first of all owing to the struggle of Jews inside the USSR for their right to immigrate to Israel).

At the very first stages of Neshira, in 1973-1974, we feared that the Soviet authorities might react to this phenomenon by cutting Jewish emigration, as the Neshira means - people n o t returning to their homeland, thus standing in total contradiction to the accepted Soviet principles regarding exit of its inhabitants to other countries.

We were proven wrong in those first years, when Neshira just started : The USSR authorities paid no attention to the Neshira of Jews to countries over the ocian. We tried to explain to ourselves the Soviet authorities' acceptance of Neshira as a kind of a policy aimed at causing the Israeli government (and World Jewry) abhore its intervention as the leader of the struggle for Soviet Jewry to immigrate to Israel. The Soviet authorities even left the impression they did not really care where Jews ended, once they left the USSR with vyzovs from relatives in Israel and with Israeli visas.

In 1980, the first hints appeared, proving that the Soviets, out of their own internal considerations, do not approve - or rather could accept no longer - the phenomenon of Jewish drop-outs. These signs were manifested in the drastic reduction of the number of exits, first of all from cities and areas with the highest percentage of Neshira*. At the second stage there came unequivocal messages, insinuations and even Soviet officials' remarks, proving that the Neshira disturbs them (probably both because it stands in contradiction with the Soviet emigration principles, as well as because it causes uproars among other national minorities in the USSR). This sort of Soviets' remarks and messages against Neshira became more and more frequent in 1981 - leaving no room for further speculation or interpretation. (Enclosed are some such remarks which we gathered).

One might state that we still have no formal statements that the reduction of the numbers of exit permits is a direct result of Neshira. However, we can no longer doubt that Neshira was and is a major factor in the present Soviet emigration policy as it applies to Jews.

If we wish to have a conceivable rate of Jewish emigration from the USSR, we - most probably - have to find a proper solution to the Neshira. And - the sooner - the better.

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* See Z. Alexander's article, Soviet Jewish Affairs, 1981, p. 19.

January 1982

SOME REMARKS BY SOVIET OFFICIALS ON THE 'DROP-OUT' PHENOMENON

In recent months we have witnessed quite a few remarks by Soviet officials on the drop-out phenomenon. The notion expressed in an article, published in Soviet Jewish Affairs (Vol. 11 No. 2 1981, p. 18), that the Soviets are no longer going to put up with Neshira, is strongly validated by the following remarks, given on various occasions to various people.

1. Comments by Mr. Sergey Kondrachov, the No. 3 member on the Soviet Delegation to the Madrid Conference of the CSCE :

   a. From a report by (then) Rep. Robert Drinan
   Drinan : "More specifically, I would like to know how many Jews will be permitted to leave the USSR in the next year?"

   Kondrachov : "This is a question of bilateral relations, which should be worked out between the countries involved. You know well that many who leave the Soviet Union never go to Israel..."

   The meeting took place on November 26, 1980.

   b. From a report by Professor I. Fisher-Hjalmars on a conversation between a Swedish Member of Parliament and Kondrachov :

   "...Regarding Russian Jews the Russian delegate said :
   1. Again and again falsified invitations arrive from Israel
   2. Thousands of Jews are not using the issued emigration permits
   3. Many Jews do not go to Israel but to other countries, i.e. they get visas under false pretenses".

   The meeting took place on December 12, 1980.

   c. From a report by the Chief Rabbi of Britain, Immanuel Jakobovits :

   "..Kondrachov told me about the many who did not go to Israel at all as stipulated in their applications, plus the families in Vienna and elsewhere who had applied to return to the Soviet Union".

   The meeting took place on December 20, 1980.

2. Declaration of the Chief Rabbi of Moscow :

   The secretary of Israel's Ashkenazic Chief Rabbi, Rabbi Shlomo Goren, confirmed that the details of a conversation between Rabbi Goren and Moscow's Rabbi Yakov Fishman, as they appeared in "Ma'ariv", April 26, 1981, were correct.

   The gist of Rabbi Fishman's message was that the Russians understand requests submitted by Jews who wish to be reunited with relatives in Israel, but when Jews use such means to emigrate to the West they (the Russians) see it as an act causing great harm to the Soviet Union itself.

   The impression conveyed by Rabbi Fishman's statement was that the drastic reduction in emigration from the USSR was connected to "neshira".

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3. Extracts from a report of the Canadian Committee on Soviet Jewry concerning a meeting of Members of the Parliamentary Committee on Soviet Jewry, with Ambassador A.N. Yakovlev in Ottawa, June 25, 1981 :

a. "On the issue of declining Jewish emigration, Mr. Yakovlev quoted from the policy report of the World Jewish Congress saying that 80-90% of those leaving the USSR do not stay in Israel, and that the decline in exit visas reflects a decline in demand..."

b. "He (Yakovlev) also said that the Government of the USSR did not want to supply the West with people who became involved in anti-Soviet activity. He stated clearly, 'the Soviet government has not made any commitment to any country regarding emigration anywhere, other than Israel'...

c. "Rev. Roland de Corneille, M.P. asked the Ambassador if there is a different policy for emigration to the West, other than to Israel. The Ambassador responded that there is no emigration in the Soviet law, other than the occasional family rejoining, which might be permitted under special circumstances, but that Israel is a special case, as it is the homeland of the Jewish people..."

d. "In the final discussion on the general emigration situation, Ambassador Yakovlev again reiterated, there has never been a commitment on emigration to any country except Israel. It is unfortunate that 80-90% do not stay..."

4. From comments by Sonia Lerner, daughter of refusenik-activist Professor Aleksandr Lerner, following her visit to Moscow in July 1981. She was allowed to go from Israel to Moscow, to attend her mother's funeral :

Sonia met Konstantin I. Zotov, (Head of the National OVIR) and had several phone conversations with him. He took care to extend her visa from July 15 to July 19, in accordance with her wishes.

On July 15, Zotov told Sonia that "we discovered a long time ago that the question is (no longer) reunion with close relations but reunion with (distant) cousins. We accepted even that. But then we face a situation that they now don't want to go to Israel at all; they all want to go to America and other places..." He reportedly concluded, "This will have to stop. If this goes on, there will be no further emigration."

In a telephone conversation, he further asked her that in contacts with others in the USSR she should describe Israel in such a way that will not cause her listeners to want to leave. She promised to "tell the truth".

5. Foreign Minister of Israel, Mr. Yitzhak Shamir, following his meeting with the Soviet Foreign Minister Mr. A. Gromyko in New York, September 24, 1981, reported that Moscow is worried by the fact many of the Soviet Jews who get permission to emigrate to Israel go - instead - to the USA. To Shamir's question why the Soviets have tremendously cut down the number of exits, Mr. Gromyko replied that "the situation nowadays is completely changed, as Jews no longer go to Israel but to the USA".

6. Another declaration of the Chief Rabbi of Moscow in a phone conversation with Rabbi Shlomo Goren, held after Yom Kippur (quotation from the Jerusalem Post of Oct. 12, 1981) :

"The Chief Rabbi of the Soviet Union said recently that 'if Soviet Jews choose to emigrate to countries around the world besides Israel, then the Soviet authorities won't let any Jew leave'."

"Fishman also said that 'when Soviet Jews leave for Western countries, they disgrace the Soviet Union".

7. Mr. Isi J. Leibler met the First Secretary and the Press Attaché at the Soviet Embassy in Canberra, Australia, on November 3, 1981. Following is an extract from his report :

"After a standard ritualistic presentation by the First Secretary denying there was a Jewish problem in the Soviet Union, the Press Attaché said emigration had declined for two reasons : first, he claimed most of the nationalists had already left; secondly, that Moscow was reacting against the exploitation of the scheme by most Jews who contrary to their applications were not interested in going to Israel. He described Jews who did not go to Israel as "utterly dishonest" people who "shamelessly exploited our laws" to travel to the United States, Canada and Australia. The measures the Soviet Union had taken as a result meant that Jews were now being treated in the same way as Soviet Germans, Ukrainians or citizens of other nationalities. The Press Attaché said the Soviets would no longer tolerate the hoax of Jewish emigration."

8. The Israeli Peace Delegation met with Dr. Kislov, Head of the Middle-East Department at the America-Canada Institute in Kiev.

Following is a paragraph that appeared in "Al-Ha-Mishmar" December 27, 1981.

"To the claim made by the members of the delegation on the right of Soviet Jews to emigrate to Israel, Dr. Kislov stated that 70% of the total emigrants drop-out anyway and never get to Israel. According to his claim, from amongst the 200.000 Jews who left the USSR, about 100.000 are to be found in New York."

FILE - Jewish EMIG. (USSR 41

Weinstein: (212) 757-1500

(United Jewish Appeal)

a. outstanding Jewish leaders (US/USSR) to travel next fall to USSR

How many can go? Restrictions?

visa trouble?

places can visit? how arrange?

should notify Emb. Moscow, Leningrad?

themes - emigration

↓
Official delegation

how go about setting up meetings & itinerary? -
govt., academicians, institutes? - questionable

can meet w/ dissidents, refuseniks? -
(State Dept. - can set it up)

Large group? - questionable / small group - yes
some visa prob.
press coverage - prob.

CALL ↓
Andrew Goodman
> Dick Combs
632-8671

> Mama Juchopobur > Theodore Mann (Sept.)
[> CALL Goodman - / weinstein / lunch]

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Emigration

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

February 19, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR RONALD K. PETERSON
Legislative Liaison Office
Office of Management and Budget

FROM: MICHAEL O. WHEELER
Staff Secretary

SUBJECT: State's Proposed Report on S.Con.Res. 53 re Soviet anti-Semitism and restrictions on Jewish emigration

We have reviewed and amended the first page (Tab I) of State's proposed report (Tab II) on S.Con.Res. 53, a resolution which expresses the sense of the Congress that the President should express to the Soviet Government at every appropriate opportunity the opposition of the United States to Soviet anti-Semitism and restrictions on Jewish emigration.

Attachments:

Tab I Amended first page of State's proposed report
Tab II Incoming memorandum

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I am responding to your request for Executive Branch comments on S.Con.Res. 53 which expresses the sense of the Congress that the President should inform the Soviet Government at every appropriate opportunity of the opposition of the United States to Soviet anti-Semitism and restrictions on Jewish emigration.

As you know, the United States Government has consistently encouraged Soviet authorities to be more responsive toward Soviet citizens seeking to exercise fundamental human rights, in particular the freedom of religion and emigration. Both publicly and via diplomatic channels, the United States has deplored Soviet harassment and imprisonment of individuals who seek to practice their religion or to emigrate from the USSR.

Regrettably, the Soviet Government persists in claiming that the treatment of Jewish cultural and religious activists as well as Jewish emigration are internal policy matters. Our ability to influence them in this area is therefore limited. The Soviets further contest our right to present views in matters of emigration to third countries such as Israel. These factors, coupled with the current state of heightened bilateral tensions, work to reduce the effectiveness of our efforts in support of those who seek to worship as they choose in the Soviet Union or to emigrate from the USSR.

Nonetheless, we intend to continue to make every effort on behalf of those who are persecuted for their religious beliefs or who wish to emigrate from the Soviet Union.

Thus, it is our view that S.Con.Res. 53 is totally consistent with the aims and practice of American foreign policy.

The Honorable
Charles H. Percy,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
United States Senate.

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

NSC/S
0530

January 26, 1982

LEGISLATIVE REFERRAL MEMORANDUM

TO: Legislative Liaison Officer
National Security Council

SUBJECT: State's proposed report on S.Con.Res. 53, a resolution which expresses the sense of the Congress that the President should express to the Soviet Government at every appropriate opportunity the opposition of the United States to Soviet anti-Semitism and restrictions on Jewish emigration.

The Office of Management and Budget requests the views of your agency on the above subject before advising on its relationship to the program of the President, in accordance with OMB Circular A-19.

A response to this request for your views is needed no later than WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 24, 1982.

Questions should be referred to Jim Barie (395-4580) or to me (395-4700).

Ronald K. Peterson
for Assistant Director for Legislative Reference

Enclosures

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I am responding to your request for Executive Branch comments on S. Con. Res. 53 which expresses the sense of the Congress that the President should ~~express to~~ the Soviet Government at every appropriate opportunity inform/ the opposition of/ of the United States to Soviet anti-Semitism and restrictions on Jewish emigration.

As you know, the United States Government has consistently encouraged Soviet authorities to be ~~less harsh and~~ more responsive toward~~s~~ Soviet citizens ~~attempting~~ seeking/ to exercise fundamental human rights, in particular the/ freedom of religion and emigration. Both publicly and via diplomatic channels, the United States has deplored Soviet harassment and imprisonment of individuals who seek ~~only~~ to practice their religion or to emigrate from the USSR.

Regrettably, the Soviet~~s~~ government persists in claiming that view the treatment of Jewish cultural and religious activists as well as Jewish emigration ~~as~~ are/ internal policy matters. Our ability to influence them in this area is therefore limited. The Soviets further contest our right to present views in matters of emigration to third countries such as Israel. These factors, coupled with the current state of heightened bilateral tensions, work to reduce the effectiveness of our efforts in support of those who seek to worship as they choose in the Soviet Union or to emigrate from the USSR.

Nonetheless, we intend to continue to make every effort on behalf of those who ~~have been~~ are/ persecuted for their religious beliefs or who ~~have been denied permission~~ wish/ to emigrate from the Soviet Union.

Thus, it is our view that S. Con. Res. 53 is totally consistent with the aims and practice of American foreign policy.

The Honorable
Charles H. Percy,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
United States Senate.

The Office of Management and Budget advises that from the standpoint of the Administration's program there is no objection to the submission of this report.

Sincerely,

Richard Fairbanks
Assistant Secretary
for Congressional Relations